Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Gieseler on behalf of Pacific Legal Foundation, Stuart, FL, as Amicus Curiae. PARIENTE, J. This case involves charter schools; specifically the procedures a charter school sponsor must follow when it decides to "immediately" terminate a charter pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), because "good cause has been shown" or the "health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened." § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla....

...The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Survivors Charter Schools, Inc. v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 968 So.2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007), concluded that the APA must be followed when a school board immediately terminates a charter school charter under section 1002.33(8)(d) and concluded that "immediately" essentially meant anything less than ninety days....

...he APA, and our application of principles of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the procedures of the APA to apply to the immediate termination of charter school charters under section 1002.33(8)(d)....

...At the conclusion of the meeting, the School Board voted to terminate the charters and a notice of immediate termination was then hand-delivered to each school. The notice indicated the termination was "for `good cause' because of the severity of the Audit Findings," based on section 1002.33(8)(d) as well as the charter provisions, and would become effective in twenty-four hours....

...rd." 968 So.2d at 42. After reviewing both the APA and the Charter School statute, the Fourth District concluded that "the process leading to the School Board's termination decision was subject to the APA." Id. at 43. Noting that under section *1226 1002.33(8)(c), [6] a charter school sponsor may terminate a charter on nonimmediate grounds after giving ninety days notice in writing, the district court concluded, by reading the two provisions together, that for "immediate" terminations: Under [section 1002.33(8)(d) ], immediate means only something less than ninety days, which clearly encompasses the fourteen-day notice requirement of section 120.569(2)(b) as applied to the School Board's determination of good cause for termination (plus t...

...rocess and evidentiary issues raised by Survivors. Id. at 46. OVERVIEW The question before this Court is whether the School Board must adhere to the Administrative Procedure Act when it decides to immediately terminate a charter school charter under section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), or whether it is required to follow only the specific procedures set forth in various provisions contained in section 1002.33....

...State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Fla.2006) ("[I]t is not this Court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom or policy of a particular statute." (quoting State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001))). Because the provisions of section 1002.33, the charter schools statute, are central to our analysis, we first discuss the general provisions of that statute....

...We then provide an overview of the APA and the principles that govern its applicability. Finally, using principles of statutory construction, we focus on whether the Legislature intended that the procedures set forth in the APA should be followed in "immediately" terminating charter school charters under section 1002.33(8)(d). THE CHARTER SCHOOLS STATUTE Charter schools are nonsectarian public schools that operate under a performance contract (charter) with a public sponsor — either a district school board or a university. See § 1002.33(1), (7), (9)(a), Fla....

...ice, including charter schools. One of the legislatively stated guiding principles for charter schools is that they "provide[ ] parents with the flexibility to choose among diverse educational opportunities within the state's public schools system." § 1002.33(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Private schools, parochial schools, and home education programs are not eligible for charter school status. § 1002.33(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under the charter school statute, funding for students attending charter schools is provided on the same basis as for students in basic or special public programs, § 1002.33(17), Fla. Stat., and charter schools are eligible for capital outlay funding under chapter 1013. See § 1002.33(19), Fla. Stat. (2005). The duties of the district school board include *1229 monitoring the revenues and expenditures of the charter schools. See § 1002.33(5)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 1002.33 also sets forth the requirements for eligible students and for employees of charter schools, bases for funding, requirements for charter school facilities, and procedures for charter school performance review. See § 1002.33(10), (18), (23), Fla. Stat. (2005). Finally, section 1002.33 sets forth detailed procedures for the creation and operation of a charter school, as well as termination procedures that apply when a sponsor determines that a charter must be terminated. § 1002.33(6)-(8), Fla....

...nder nonemergency circumstances, as well as procedures for immediate termination of charters for good cause or where the health, safety or welfare of the students is threatened. These two types of terminations are treated in different subsections of 1002.33(8). Section 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), pertains to all terminations other than those requiring immediate action and provides: (c) At least 90 days prior to renewing or terminating a charter, the sponsor shall notify the governing body of the school of the proposed action in writing....

...ving a written request. The charter school's governing body may, within 14 calendar days after receiving the sponsor's decision to terminate or refuse to renew the charter, appeal the decision pursuant to the procedure established in subsection (6). Section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), governing immediate terminations of charters, which was in effect when the School Board terminated Survivors' charters, provides: (d) A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor determines th...

...The school district in which the charter school is located shall assume operation of the school under these circumstances. The charter schools governing board may, within 14 days after receiving the sponsors decision to terminate the charter, appeal the decision pursuant to the procedure established in subsection (6). § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005). [10] Both termination provisions make reference to an appeal pursuant to subsection (6) of section 1002.33. Section 1002.33(6)(c) provides *1230 that an appeal of the determination of a charter school sponsor, such as the School Board, may be taken to the State Board of Education. See § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...Under the statute, when an appeal is filed, the State Board of Education must convene a meeting of the Charter School Appeal Commission (CSAC), which will study and make a recommendation to the State Board of Education regarding its decision about the pending appeal. § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...The stated purpose of the CSAC is to "assist the commissioner and the State Board of Education with a fair and impartial review of appeals by applicants whose charter applications have been denied, [or] whose charter contracts have not been renewed or have been terminated by their sponsors." § 1002.33(6)(e)(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The CSAC members "shall thoroughly review the materials presented to them from the appellant and the sponsor" and may "request information to clarify the documentation presented to it." § 1002.33(6)(e)5, Fla....

...The CSAC must provide its recommendation to the State Board of Education and must include a "fact-based justification for the recommendation." Id. The statute expressly provides that "[t]he decision of the Charter School Appeal Commission is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act." § 1002.33(6)(e)2, Fla....

...Once the recommendation of the CSAC is provided to the State Board of Education, the Board must either accept or reject the decision of the district school board no later than ninety days after the appeal is filed. The district school board is mandated to implement the decision of the State Board of Education. § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). While "[t]he decision of the State Board of Education is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act," § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005), it is "final action subject to judicial review." § 1002.33(6)(d), Fla....

...§ 120.68, Florida Statutes (2005). It is this general APA procedure for notice and hearing set forth in sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, that the Fourth District concluded must be followed by the School Board in immediately terminating a charter under section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...*1232 However, the Fourth District acknowledged that the "relationship between chapters 120 and 1002 is ... complex." Survivors, 968 So.2d at 45. Recognizing that an agency must follow the APA unless exempted by the Legislature, the Fourth District attempted to harmonize the provisions of the APA and section 1002.33 by determining that the School Board could only terminate a charter under section 1002.33(8)(d) after compliance with section 120.569, and that an "immediate" termination in the charter schools statute "means only something less than ninety days." Id....

...plies to agency action, that principle applies where there are no other countervailing indications of legislative intent. [11] We must now determine if the Fourth District's attempt to harmonize the APA with the "immediate" termination provisions of section 1002.33(8)(d) is consistent with legislative intent relating to charter schools....

...rt. Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003). While that principle is undisputed, the actual application of that principle is at times difficult. In this case, if the Legislature had expressly stated that the APA governs terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d), this case would not be before us....

...Commission and the State Board of Education, there would also be no need for statutory construction to determine legislative intent. [12] The answer would be clear. However, in this case, despite the comprehensive statutory *1233 scheme set forth in section 1002.33 for the creation, operation, and termination of charter schools, the Legislature neither expressly subjected the school boards and other charter school sponsors to the APA in matters involving immediate terminations, nor expressly exempted school boards from the APA requirements. We determine that within the express text of section 1002.33, the Legislature has given clear indication of legislative intent as to procedures to be followed relative to charter schools by providing a comprehensive, detailed statutory scheme that does not intend that the provisions of the APA be incorporated into the charter school termination process....

...ed as mere surplusage." Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599, 606 (Fla.2006) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003)). In this regard, we focus first on the word "immediately" in section 1002.33(8)(d). That section expressly states that a sponsor, here the School Board, may "immediately" terminate a charter school charter upon good cause shown or where the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened. § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla....

..."Where, as here, the legislature has not defined the words used in a [statute], the language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So.2d 1349, 1354 (Fla.1997). The word "immediately" in section 1002.33(8)(d) is not defined, and it is therefore "appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing statutes" in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of words used there....

...ary.'" (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992))). The word "immediately" means "without interval of time." See Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 621 (11th ed.2003). Accordingly, the Legislature's use of the word "immediately" in section 1002.33(8)(d) indicates that the charter may be terminated "without interval of time." Therefore, termination of a charter "immediately" means something different than termination accomplished over a period of weeks or months or, even as inte...

...," which is the time frame established for non-emergency terminations of charter school charters. See Survivors, 968 So.2d at 45. Our conclusion that "immediate" contemplates prompt action is strengthened *1234 by the fact that the reasons for which section 1002.33(8)(d) may be invoked are limited to situations where "the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened" and where "good cause" for immediate termination is shown....

...es that govern nonemergency terminations, and that the circumstances must be exigent so as to necessitate immediate action. [13] If grounds necessitating immediate action are not present, then the district school board must utilize the provisions of section 1002.33(8)(c). On the other hand, when emergency-type situations are present, then the chance of harm to the students increases and the concomitant need for immediate action is obvious, thereby justifying immediate termination under section 1002.33(8)(d). Thus, in determining the legislative intent behind section 1002.33(8)(d), we look not just at the use of the word "immediately" but at the fact that this subsection addresses the type of circumstances requiring an immediate response, such as a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the students....

...harmony with one another." Heart of Adoptions, 963 So.2d at 199 (quoting Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 898 (Fla.2002)). It is thus significant to our analysis that the Legislature set forth detailed procedures in section 1002.33(8)(c) for the school boards to follow for nonemergency termination and nonrenewal of a charter. Survivors concedes, and we agree, that because the Legislature set forth those detailed procedures in section 1002.33(8)(c), the APA would not apply to nonemergency terminations under that subsection. At the same time, Survivors urges us to find, as did the Fourth District, that when it comes to emergency terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d), the procedures of the *1235 APA would apply....

...We consider Survivors' view to be contrary to common sense in that a school board would be subjected to more extensive procedures under the APA when emergency circumstances are present than it would be subjected to for all other terminations under the procedures set forth in section 1002.33(8)(c)....

...cess are not evaluated by fixed rules of law, but rather by the requirements of the particular proceeding." Id. In finding that the APA does not apply to immediate charter school terminations, we reiterate the Legislature's clearly stated purpose of section 1002.33(8)(d) — to provide school boards and other charter school sponsors with the ability to "immediately" terminate charters where there are emergency-type circumstances, such as those that threaten the health, safety or welfare of students, or where other good cause necessitating immediate action exists. The principles we discuss have led us to an interpretation that gives the greatest effect to the actual legislative language set forth in section 1002.33, more fully accomplishes the legislative purpose apparent in that provision, and honors the detailed termination and appeal statutory scheme....

...e intent that a school board act "immediately" when emergency-type circumstances arise such as those that threaten the health, safety or welfare of the students. Therefore, we reject the district court's conclusion that "immediate" termination under section 1002.33(8)(d) "means only something less than ninety days." Survivors, 968 So.2d at 45....

...s opinion. We further reverse the order of the district court that awarded prevailing party attorney's fees to Survivors. It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., did not participate. NOTES [1] Section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provided in pertinent part as follows: A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened....

...The guidelines were adopted by the State Board of Education on September 16, 2003. See State Board of Education, Minutes, Florida International University, Miami, Florida (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://www.fldoe.org/board/meetings/Sep_ 16_03/Minutes_2003-08-19.pdf. [6] Section 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provided in pertinent part: (c) At least 90 days prior to renewing or terminating a charter, the sponsor shall notify the governing body of the school of the proposed action in writing....

...eiving the notice, request an informal hearing before the sponsor. [7] The district court did not address or attempt to harmonize the immediate order provisions of section 120.569(2)(n), Florida Statutes, with the immediate termination provisions of section 1002.33(8)(d)....

...We note that section 120.569(2)(n) does provide that an agency may enter an immediate final order, such as a cease and desist order, if it finds an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare. However, this APA provision does not specify a "good cause" basis for immediate action, as is provided in section 1002.33(8). Further, the provision for appeal of the immediate order under chapter 120 and the appeal provisions set forth in section 1002.33(6) for immediate terminations are not similar. [8] Provisions applicable to charter terminations are found in section 1002.33(8)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes (2005). The provisions applicable to appeals of charter terminations are found in section 1002.33(6)(c)-(e), Florida Statutes (2005). [9] In 2006, the Legislature enacted section 1002.335, Florida Statutes (2006), which established an independent state-level entity called the "Florida Schools of Excellence Commission" and provided it with the power to authorize charter schools throughout the state....

...2006-302, § 1, Laws of Fla. Under that statute, a school board is required to obtain approval of the State Board of Education in order to retain exclusive authority to authorize charter schools in its district. The First District Court of Appeal held section 1002.335 unconstitutional in Duval County School Board v....

...rovides in pertinent part that "[t]he school board shall operate, control and supervise all free public schools within the school district." See art. IX, § 4(b), Fla. Const. We expressly do not address the merits of that issue in this opinion. [10] Section 1002.33(8)(d) was amended in 2006 to provide in pertinent part as follows: (d) A charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened....

...The First District rejected the DOE's argument that an appeal procedure set forth in section 1009.42(1), Florida Statutes (2003), created an implied exemption from the APA. However, the statutory procedure at issue in Gopman is distinguishable from that set forth in section 1002.33....

...do not have express statutory sanction." Gopman, 908 So.2d at 1121. In section 1009.42(1), the statute leaves it to the State Board of Education to adopt a rule of procedure establishing "a committee to consider appeals that are not resolved by other administrative action. " (Emphasis added.) In contrast, in section 1002.33, the Legislature expressly set forth the detailed procedure for deciding questions of immediate termination and for appealing those decisions. Additionally, section 1002.33(6)(c) provides that in charter school terminations, the decision of the State Board of Education, while final agency action, is not subject to the provisions of the APA. [12] Legislation proposed for the 2009 legislative session, if enacted, would amend section 1002.33(8)(d) to do just that by stating that "[t]he sponsor's determination is not subject to an informal hearing under paragraph (b) or pursuant to chapter 120." Fla. S. Comm. on Educ., CS for SB 278 (2009). [13] Section 1002.33(8)(a) provides that for nonrenewal or termination of charters, cause includes failure to participate in the State's education accountability system, failure to meet student performance requirements, failure to meet generally accepted standards of fiscal management, violation of law or other good cause shown....

...The Charter School Appeal Commission Guidelines adopted by the Commission on August 8, 2003 and by the State Board of Education on August 19, 2003 state that the component parts of "good cause" for immediate termination are "one or more of the other legally sufficient causes" listed for regular termination in section 1002.33(8)(a)....

...hool could or would have remedied the concerns with proper notice. See Charter School Appeal Commission Guidelines 17, available at http://www.fldoe. org/board/meetings/Aug_19_03/CharterSchool AppealGuidelines.pdf. [14] Survivors states that because section 1002.33(8)(c) provides specific procedural guidance for ninety-day terminations, but did not delineate similar procedures for immediate terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d), the Legislature therefore intended that immediate terminations under section 1002.33(8)(d) fall within the realm of the APA. This contention ignores the fact that section 1002.33(8)(c) does not expressly require APA-type notice and hearing for nonemergency terminations and, further, that emergency terminations are an integral part of the overall detailed legislative scheme in place for charter school creation,...

...This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A). We find no error and affirm. OCSB filed suit against the State Board in the circuit court of Osceola County, Florida, seeking a judgment declaring Florida's charter school statute, section 1002.33, Florida Statutes (2003), facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied....

...sue involved. Carlile, 354 So.2d at 365. That is the case here. Here, although OCSB's complaint alleges that the State Board's action infringed on its constitutional rights, the primary purpose of the lawsuit is to challenge the constitutionality of section 1002.33....

...non-exemplary nature of Joseph Littles. Joseph Littles appealed the School Board's decisions to the State Board of Education, which submitted the matter to the Florida Charter School Appeal Commission for review and a non-binding recommendation. See § 1002.33(6)(c), (f), Fla....

...mmendation as to both of the proposed schools and upheld the School Board's denial of those applications. The Palm Beach County School Board is the sponsor of Joseph Littles and would be the sponsor of the two new schools had they been approved. See § 1002.33(5), Fla. Stat. (2005). The *1282 schools place primary reliance on Florida Statutes section 1002.33(5)(b)4., which states that the "sponsor's policies shall not apply to a charter school." This reliance is misplaced....

...We leave to future case law the development of this distinction, but the charter school creation policy at issue here does not appear to be a prohibited attempt to apply School Board policies to either Joseph Littles or the new schools. An application for a charter school can be denied for "good cause." § 1002.33(6)(b)3., Fla....

...plexities of our modern society.'" Avatar Dev., Corp., 697 So.2d at 565 (quoting Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913, 924 (Fla.1978)). Here, the schools have argued that the only legislative guidance as to what "good cause" means is found in section 1002.33(6)....

...Provide rigorous competition within the public school district to stimulate continual improvement in all public schools. 3. Expand the capacity of the public school system. 4. Mitigate the educational impact created by the development of new residential dwelling units. § 1002.33(2), Fla....

...B. During the course of the investigations, Fernandez and Cristobol initiated an administrative proceeding against the School Board with the Florida Department of Administrative Hearings under Florida Statutes Section 1002.33(4)(a)(1). They claimed that the reassignments and “gag orders” -- the prohibitions on interacting with potential witnesses during the investigations -- amounted to unlawful reprisal. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(4)(a) (prohibiting “unlawful reprisal,” defined as “an action taken by a district school board or a school system employee against an 6  Case: 17-14319 Date Filed: 08/10...

...First, we looked to the Florida Statutes’ description of charter conversion and observed that “[a]n application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(3)(b)) (emphasis added)....

...their official duties. Florida law establishes the process for effecting the conversion of a public school to a charter school. Among other things, it enumerates who may apply for charter conversion, expressly including the principal. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33....

...on Plaintiff's status as a public employee. See e.g., P.J. v. Gordon, 359 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1349-50 (S.D.Fla.2005) (for the purposes of tort liability, school board had no duty to monitor or supervise charter school's employees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 1002.33)....

...de also suggest that the term “secondary education” means courses through which students can obtain high school credit. One provision grants certain state colleges authority to “develop charter schools that offer secondary education.” Id. § 1002.33(5) (emphasis added)....

...After he learned that the school would not receive additional staff or funding, D’Angelo explored converting the school to charter status. Florida law provides that “[c]harter schools shall be part of the state’s program of public education.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(1). “An application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council . . . .” Id. § 1002.33(3)(b)....

...employee who has control over personnel actions, shall take unlawful reprisal against another district school board employee because that employee is either directly or indirectly involved with an application to establish a charter school,” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(4), and an employee may file a complaint with the Department of Education within 60 days, id. § 1002.33(4)(a)(1)....

...The Flordia statute that governs the establishment of charter schools provides, “An application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(3)(b)....

...able cause to pursue any disciplinary action against any of the Plaintiffs’ Florida Educator’s Certificates. Id. *1362 Also during the investigation, on July 13, 2012, each Plaintiff filed a complaint for unlawful reprisal pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (4) with the Florida Department of Education (the “Department”)....

...The DOAH’s final administrative hearing took place in January and February 2014. At its conclusion, the administrative law judge entered a recommended order finding that the District committed an unlawful reprisal against each Plaintiff in violation of Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (4). Id. ¶ 45 . The Department of Education adopted the recommended order entirely, finding that the “Miami-Dade County School Board violated section 1002.33(4)(a)” with respect to each Plaintiff....

...“Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and have only such powers as statutes confer.” State ex rel. Greenberg v. Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry, 297 So.2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The statute governing unlawful reprisal, Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 , provides, first, that “[n]o district school board... shall take ■ unlawful reprisal against another district school board employee because that employee is either directly or indirectly involved with an application to establish a charter school.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (4)(a)....

...erning charter conversion provides that “[a]n application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (3)(b))....

...The Court notes that (but takes no position on whether) there may be an argument to be made that the unlawful reprisal statute itself signifies the Florida Legislature's intent that speech regarding charter school conversions should be protected. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (4)(a) ("No district school board, or district school board employee who has control over personnel actions, shall take unlawful reprisal against another district school board employee because that employee is either directly or indirectly...

...The School Board of Osceola County, ("School Board"), appeals the Florida State Board of Education's, ("State Board"), reversal of the School Board's denial of United Cerebral Palsy of Central Florida's, ("UCP"), application for the establishment of a charter school. Following the procedures established in section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes (2003), UCP submitted its application for the establishment of a charter school to the School Board....

...of new and existing charter schools in the county, resulting in each student receiving less of an education. UCP timely appealed the decision to the State Board and the Charter School Appeals Commission, ("Commission"), acting under the authority of section 1002.33(6), unanimously recommended approval of the charter school application. The State Board accepted the Commission's recommendation that the denial of the application based upon perceived inadequate charter school capital outlay funding did not constitute statutory good cause pursuant to section 1002.33. The School Board then initiated this appeal but requested transfer to the circuit court because the School Board believed that court had jurisdiction rather than a district court of appeal. JURISDICTION Section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that the State Board of Education's final order following a review of a District School Board's decision is a final action subject to judicial review, but does not specify the court having jurisdiction of the review....

...These provisions leave to the Florida Legislature the manner in which appeals may be taken from administrative agencies. The Legislature has taken this cue from the constitution and enacted a general law in charter school applications by providing in section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes (2002), that the State Board's review of a District School Board's decision is a final action subject to judicial review....

...rt in determining which court, circuit or district, is to review the State Board's decision. *911 Initially, we observe that the appeal provisions of Chapter 120 of the Florida Statutes, the "Administrative Procedure Act," are not applicable because section 1002.33(6)(c) specifically exempts decisions rendered by the State Board from that act....

...istrict rather than a state-wide agency; to-wit: the Florida State Board of Education. The preceding analysis leads us to the conclusion that the district courts and not the circuit courts have jurisdiction to review the final decisions described in section 1002.33(6)(d), Florida Statutes (2003). REQUIREMENT OF GOOD CAUSE UCP's application for a charter school may be denied by the School Board for "good cause." § 1002.33(6)(b)3, Fla....

...of the charter school application. [4] *913 The State Board determined that the School Board did not have good cause to reject the charter school application because the applicant met all the statutory requirements for an approval as established by section 1002.33(6)....

...strict. [10] This is not entirely correct. [11] Although the district would likely experience some financial impact associated with a charter school's failure, the amount is unclear and does not appear to warrant denial on that basis alone. Sections 1002.33(14) and 1013.62(7) provide for indemnification of school boards from the private debts of a charter school....

...absence of the charter school. Despite the legislative freeze on capital funding, and a significant increase in the number of charter school applications, the Florida Charter School Review Panel recommended to the Florida Legislature that it repeal section 1002.33(13), which placed a cap on the number of charter schools that could operate within a district....

...[12] The Panel recommended that the number of charter schools should be based on the: (1) parental demand for educational opportunities, and (2) corresponding supply of meritorious charter schools, rather than on the amount of available funding. The Legislature agreed and repealed section 1002.33(13) in 2003....

...NOTES [1] Section 228.056(4), Florida Statutes (2001) (repealed 2002), permitted a school board to override the recommendation of the state board upon a showing of good cause. That section was subsequently repealed and incorporated as amended into section 1002.33, Florida Statutes....

...Chapter 228 of the State Education Code formerly empowered a school board to override the State Board's decision for good cause. § 228.056, Fla. Stat. (2001) (repealed 2002). This power has been abrogated through enactment of the Florida K-20 Education Code, Chapters 1000-1002, Florida Statutes (2003). Section 1002.33(6) now provides in relevant part: (b) The State Board of Education shall by majority vote accept or reject the decision of the district school board no later than 90 calendar days after appeal is filed....

...provide adequate educational facilities); § 1001.42(7) (requiring the school board to provide adequate instructional materials); § 1001.42(10) (requiring the school board to determine the amount of funds necessary to operate all schools). [6] See § 1002.33(5)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (requiring the school board, as sponsor, to monitor the revenues and expenditures of each charter school); § 1002.33(6)(a)5(b) (requiring the school board to review the financial plan contained in each charter school application)....

...[8] The State discontinued capital funding, with limited exceptions, after the 2003-2004 school year. See generally § 1013.62(7), Fla. Stat. (2003). [9] The School Board attached a table to its appeal showing the operational budgets, and deficits, of each charter school in Osceola County between 2002 and 2003. [10] See § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla....

...appeal statute. As set forth below, we affirm the constitutionality of the charter school statute’s administrative appeal process, but reverse the State Board’s order and remand to the State Board for further proceedings necessary to comply with section 1002.33(6)(e)5., Florida Statutes (2016)....

...charter school in the county. The School Board noted that, under the “Guiding principles; purpose” section of the charter school statute, one of the core missions of charter schools is to “[e]ncourage the use of innovative learning methods.” § 1002.33(2)(b)3., Fla. Stat. Another is to provide “diverse educational opportunities.” § 1002.33(2)(a)l., Fla....

...The School Board’s letter concluded that Applicants’ proposal failed to satisfy either purpose, noting that “the learning methods were not using new ideas or methods or new ideas about how learning can be done in this District.” Applicants appealed the School Board’s denial to the State Board, pursuant to section 1002.33(6)(c), Florida Statutes....

...ed for more than a decade in the schools of this District.” Initially, the appeal was presented to the Charter School Appeal Commission (“CSAC”), an advisory body that makes recommendations to the State Board concerning charter school actions. § 1002.33(6)(e)l., Fla....

...Following a cursory hearing, CSAC unanimously determined “that the School Board did not have competent substantial evidence to support its denial of the Charter School Application based on the Applicant’s failure to meet the standards for the Education Plan pursuant to Section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-6.0786, Florida Administrative Code.” Accordingly, CSAC recommended that the State Board reverse the School Board’s denial of the charter school application....

...CSAC did not make any factual determinations in its recommendation. Following issuance of CSAC’s recommendation, a hearing was held before the State Board as to “[w]hether the School Board had good cause to deny the application based on Applicant’s failure to comply with Section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes.” Without any questions or discussion, the State Board voted unanimously to reverse the School Board’s denial of the charter school application, holding that the School Board lacked good cause in denying the application. The State Board’s order stated that “[u]pon review of the evidence presented to the School Board, the [CSAC] recommendation and hearing transcripts [and] pursuant to Section 1002.33(6), Florida Statutes, it is hereby ordered that the School Board’s denial of the Charter School’s application is reversed.” As noted above, the School Board now appeals the State Board’s order on two grounds....

...According to the School Board, by allowing the State Board to reverse actions of a local school board on appeal, the charter school statute effectively empowers the State Board to be the ultimate creator of charter schools. Specifically, the School Board takes issue with section 1002.33(6)(c), Florida Statutes, which allows for such an appeal....

...of supervision—by the Florida Constitution. It is “a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children within its borders.” Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const, (emphasis added). The legislature’s adoption of section 1002.33(6)(c) is therefore constitutional....

...IX, § 2, Fla. Const. Our holding is consistent with an earlier opinion by one of our sister courts. In School Board of Volusia County v. Academies of Excellence, Inc., 974 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), the Fifth District Court of Appeal explained: Section 1002.33(6)(c) does not permit the State Board to open a charter school....

...The approval of an application is just the beginning of the process to open a charter school. Once the charter application has been granted, the school board still has control over the process because the applicant and the school board must agree on the provisions of the charter. See § 1002.33(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005). A school board can also cause a charter to be revoked or not renewed. See § 1002.33(8), Fla....

...se” charter schools. See § 1000.03, Fla. Stat. (2016). For instance, a local school board must still negotiate with the proposed charter school to create a charter contract, and can always terminate the contract should the school later breach it. § 1002.33(7)-(8), Fla. Stat. A local school board can always initially deny an application—like in the present case—or an application renewal, should that application be deficient for failing to comply with the requirements of the charter school statute. § 1002.33(6)0»), (8), Fla....

...The charter school statute even provides a local school board, not the State Board, with the ability to instantly terminate a charter if there are “facts and circumstances .indicating that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school’s students exists.” § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat. The School Board’s reliance on Duval County School Board v. State, Board of Education, 998 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), is misplaced. There, the First Distinct held that section 1002.335, Florida Statutes, was facially unconstitutional because the establishment of the “Florida Schools of Excellence Commission,” an independent state-level entity that could directly authorize the creation of charter schools, “pos...

...The statute states: “If an application is denied [by a school board], the sponsor [school board] shall, within 10 calendar days after such denial, articulate in writing the specific reasons, based upon good cause, supporting its denial of the application .... ” § 1002.33(6)(b)3.a., Fla....

...Imhotep-Nguzo Saba Charter Sch., 947 So.2d at 1285 . The charter school statute establishes CSAC in order to “assist the commissioner and the State Board of Education with a fair and impartial review of appeals by applicants whose charter applications have been denied.” § 1002.33(6)(e)l., Fla. Stat. In doing so, CSAC makes a written recommendation to the State Board regarding “whether the appeal should be upheld or denied and include[s] the reasons for the recommendation being offered.” § 1002.33(6)(e)2., Fla. Stat. Importantly, “[a] fact-based justification for the recommendation must be included.” § 1002.33(6)(e)5., Fla. Stat. (emphases added). The State Board “must consider the commission’s recommendation in making its decision, but is not bound by the recommendation.” § 1002.33(6)(e)2., Fla....

...All the recommendation stated was “that School Board did not have competent substantial evidence to support its denial of the Charter School Application based on the Applicant’s failure to meet the standards for the Educational Plan pursuant to 1002.33 .......

...record. Due to the omission, we cannot meaningfully determine if the State Board’s decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case so that CSAC can make factual determinations consistent with section 1002.33(6)(e)5., Florida Statutes. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2009) (“The CSAC must ... include a ‘fact-based justification for the recommendation.’” (quoting § 1002.33(6)(e)5., Fla....

...Although a “fact-based justification” on the part of the State Board itself is not required by the statute, a failure to do more than summari *363 ly reject the CSAC recommendation may render appellate review of the State Board’s decision impossible. See § 1002.33(6)(d), Fla....

...charter school statute also violates due process by failing to dictate whether the State Board must provide written reasons for overturning a school board’s decision. We note in passing that the statute requires only CSAC to explain such reasons. § 1002.33(6)(e)2., Fla....

...hat is consistently used in Florida Statutes, when addressing public schools. Compare § 1002.32, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“establish[ing] a category of public schools to be known as developmental research (laboratory) schools (lab schools)”), with § 1002.33, Fla....

...§ 1002.32, Fla. Stat. (2018). “There is established a category of public schools to be known as developmental research (laboratory) schools (lab schools).” § 1002.32(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). 2. Charter schools. § 1002.33, Fla....

...“All charter schools in Florida are public schools and shall be part of the state’s program of public education. A charter school may be formed by creating a new school or converting an existing public school to charter status.” § 1002.33(1), Fla. Stat....

...s. Accordingly, the voters cannot be said to have fair and sufficient notice to intelligently cast his or her vote. In Duval County School Board v. State Board of Education, 998 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the First District found that section 1002.335, Florida Statutes (2006), was facially unconstitutional. The Legislature, in 2006, enacted section 1002.335 to create the “Florida Schools of Excellence Commission” as an independent body with the power to authorize charter schools throughout the State of Florida....

...Relying on this Court’s reasoning in its decision in Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006), the First District found that the statute removed constitutional authority from the school boards and relegated them to essentially ministerial functions. Accordingly, the First District found that section 1002.335 “pose[d] a present total and fatal conflict with article IX, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.” Duval Cty., 998 So....

...Section 1003.02, Florida Statutes (2018), builds on this constitutional authority, stating that “district school boards must establish, organize, and operate their public K-12 schools.” § 1003.02, Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). Public K-12 schools in Florida include, for example, charter schools. Id. § 1002.33(1)....

...at 14 (emphasis added). In support of this conclusion, the majority cites Duval - 32 - County School Board v. State Board of Education, 998 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), a decision that invalidated “section 1002.335, Florida Statutes, which established the ‘Florida Schools of Excellence Commission’ as an independent, state-level entity with the power to authorize charter schools throughout the State of Florida.” To begin with, the term...

...Nowhere does this decision establish the unfettered right of school boards to authorize or not authorize charter - 33 - schools that is suggested by the majority opinion. Indeed, no such right currently exists under Florida law. See § 1002.33(6)(c)3.a., Fla....

...The dilemma School faces here is that although charter schools are, by legislative decree, "public schools," the only statutory *17 exemption from special assessments that arguably applies — section 1013.51, Florida Statutes (2005) — clearly does not apply to charter schools. In section 1002.33(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), the legislature exempted charter schools from "all statutes" contained in Chapter 1013, which includes section 1013.51. The clarity of these provisions notwithstanding, School argues that, because section 1002.33(1), Florida Statutes (2005), declares that charter schools are "public schools," we should conclude that the legislature intended that the exemption apply....

...4th DCA 1986), School argues alternatively that it is exempt from the assessments here at issue because the assessments "were actually in the nature of ad valorem taxes, impact fees and service availability fees" for which School does enjoy a statutory exemption pursuant to sections 1002.33(18)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...The Survivors BB charter does not contain the final clause of General Provision K regarding non-applicability of General Provision K if termination is pursuant to General Provision J, and the Survivors BB charter updates the statutory reference from section 228.056(10)(c) to section 1002.33(8)....

...ors BB charters. Following the special meeting, the School Board hand-delivered "Notification[s] of Immediate Termination [of] Charter Agreement" to both Survivors WPB and Survivors BB. The notifications indicated that the terminations were based on section 1002.33(8)(d) and General Provision J of the charters and would become effective in twenty-four hours....

...The second is, if the APA did apply, what due process protections were required and whether they were provided by the School Board. The first question to be answered in this appeal is whether the provisions of the APA apply to the charter school termination process set forth in Florida Statutes section 1002.33....

...Board was so exempt (and the charters did not include an express APA exemption). Additionally, Florida Statutes section 120.81(1) provides APA exceptions for educational units, but none of these address the charter school termination process. Under section 1002.33, a district school board may terminate a school charter for *43 reasons specified in the statute under section 1002.33(8), and the charter school may appeal to the Charter School Appeal Commission (CSAC) and then the State Board of Education based on the procedures set forth in section 1002.33(6). As part of the procedures set forth in section 1002.33(6), the statute expressly exempts the State Board of Education from the provisions of the APA in section 1002.33(6)(c) and the statute expressly exempts the CSAC from the provisions of the APA in section 1002.33(6)(f)2. Conspicuously absent in section 1002.33 is any provision exempting the School Board's termination decision from the provisions of the APA. Based on our reading of chapter 120 and section 1002.33, we conclude that the process leading to the School Board's termination decision was subject to the APA....

...This is because the charter school termination proceedings determine a substantial interest of Survivors, as it would suffer injury-in-fact on an immediate basis by the immediate termination of the charters and the injury resulting from the termination of the charters is of a type intended to be protected by section 1002.33 where it specifically addresses the charter termination process. Furthermore, the School Board charter termination process is not expressly exempted from the APA under section 120.63, subject to an APA exception under section 120.81, or otherwise exempted by the charters in question. Additionally, section 1002.33 does not indicate that the School Board's termination decision is exempt from the provisions of the APA, despite expressly exempting the CSAC and Board of Education termination appeal decisions....

...A, in section 120.81(1)(j) provides an APA exception for the agendas of school board meetings, which "shall be prepared upon the calling of the meeting, but not less than 48 hours prior to the meeting." The rest of the relevant statutes are found in section 1002.33. Section 1002.33(8)(a) addresses termination of school charters and allows for termination on the same bases included in the Survivors charters, including "other good cause shown." Section 1002.33(8)(d), like the Survivors charters, allows for immediate termination based on good cause shown or a threat to the health, safety, or welfare of students....

...termination. However, the charters themselves require twenty-four hours' notice prior to immediate termination. Additionally, the charters expressly exclude immediate terminations from the procedures governing terminations in general as set forth in section 1002.33(8)(b) and the charters....

...latter is found in section 120.569 while the former is found in section 120.81. The relationship between chapters 120 and 1002 is much more complex. Much of the complexity stems from the seeming clash between the immediate termination provisions of section 1002.33(8)(d) and the notice and hearing requirements of section 120.569(2)(b)....

...hown is subject to APA requirements. If these requirements are met, a charter can be terminated with just twenty-four hours notice, rather than subject to the full ninety-day procedure for termination. We reach this conclusion based on the fact that section 1002.33(8)(d) does not provide a timeline for notice and hearing, other than by excluding itself from the general procedure for terminating charters which requires ninety days' notice....

...dequate procedures which would have protected J.J. from his misconduct. Defendant Gordon has been convicted of and sentenced for sexually abusing J.J. while employed by the Smart School as a counselor in its after school program. Plaintiff points to Section 1002.33, the Florida statute authorizing the formation of charter schools and describing the relationship between charter schools and their county school boards, the Smart School's Charter Agreement ("charter") with the School Board, and the common law as the sources of the School Board's legal duty to protect J.J....

...n to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.") Turning next to the merits of the pending motion, the undersigned also has carefully considered whether Fla. Stat. § 1002.33, the charter, or the common law *1350 required the School Board to monitor or supervise the hiring, training or supervision of the Smart School's employees or to "to ensure that the Smart School maintained adequate procedures for ensuring...

...eged in Paragraph 58 of the Complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the School Board had no such duty under the facts alleged in the Complaint and that, therefore the School Board should be dismissed from this action. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 In Paragraph 57 of her Complaint P.J. alleges that Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 is one of the sources of the alleged duties owed to J.J....

...The sponsor shall ensure that the charter school participates in the state's education accountability system. If a charter school falls short of performance measures included in the approved charter, the sponsor shall report such shortcomings to the Department of Education. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(5)(b)....

...of its students. Importantly, the statute contains language which strongly suggests that the sponsoring school board has no such duties. Specifically, subsection (5)(b)(4) provides that "[t]he sponsor's policies shall not apply to a charter school." § 1002.33(5)(b)(4) Furthermore, other portions of the statute suggest that the School Board owed no such duties to J.J. Subsection (9)(k) provides that "[t]he governing body of the charter school shall exercise continuing oversight over charter school operations. § 1002.33(9)(k) (emphasis added) The statute in subsection (12)(a) mandates that "[a] charter school shall select its own employees." § 1002.33(12)(a)....

...Thus, the statute places squarely on the Smart School's governing entity the duty to oversee school operations and to hire its own staff. Moreover, under the statute, charter schools have wide latitude to manage their affairs and are only required to provide an annual progress report to their sponsors. Pursuant to § 1002.33(9)(k), the reporting is limited to two areas: the charter *1351 schools' academic performance and their financial records. See § 1002.33(9)(k). The Court further notes that she has reviewed the available legislative history of Fla. Stat. § 1002.33....

...vision of staff and the safety of its student body. However, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that those duties lie with any entity other than the Smart School's governing body. Therefore, to the extent that Count IV is based on Fla. Stat. § 1002.33, it must be dismissed. The Charter Agreement A charter is defined as "an instrument by which a governmental entity grants rights, liberties or powers to its citizens". Black's Law Dictionary.228 (7th ed.1999). In the context of this case, Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 delegated to the School Board the responsibility for approving the Smart School's charter and then monitoring its progress in meeting its educational goals, its revenues and expenditures, and ensuring its participation in the state's accountability system....

...latory requirements imposed on traditional public schools." Julie F. Mead, Devitish Details: Exploring Features Of Charter School Statures That Blur The Public/Private Distinction, 40 Harv. J. on Legis, 349 (2003). In the case of Florida, Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 provides the legal parameters of school charters....

...istrict School Board (“Sumter County”), which acts as the sponsoring school district of the Villages Charter Schools. See id. ¶2 ; Independent Audit Records 2012-2014 at 63 (Doc. 142-16; Independent Audit Records 2012-2014); see also Fla. Stat. section 1002.33(5)(a)l. The Charter School Corporation operates the Villages Charter Schools as “charter schools-in-the-workplace” pursuant to Florida Statutes section 1002.33(15)....

...es Charter Schools. Id. ¶ 6 . Under Florida law, the charter must include “[t]he governance structure of the school, including the status of the charter school as a public or private employer as required in paragraph 12(I).” 41 *1190 Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (7)(a)15. As such, the Villages Charter Schools are organized as “private employers” as defined in Florida Statutes section 1002.33, and, accordingly, “employees of the [Charter School Corporation] do not participate in the Florida Retirement System.” McDaniel Aff....

...lorida. McDaniel Dep. at 54. Because the Villages Charter Schools are a “component unit” of Sumter County, the Villages Charter Schools’ financial reports are required to be included in Sumter County’s Annual Financial Report. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (9)(g)2....

...Under Florida law, “[e]harter schools are nonsectarian public schools that operate under a performance contract (charter) with a public sponsor-either a district school board or university.” Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1228 (Fla. 2009) (citing Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (1), (7), (9)(a)). “An application for a new charter school may be made by an individual, teachers, parents, a group of individuals, a municipality, or a legal entity organized under the laws of Florida.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (3)(a)....

...501(c)(3) status corporation are eligible for up to a 15-year charter, subject to approval by the district school board. Such long-term charters remain subject to annual review and may be terminated during the term of the charter, but only during the term of the charter pursuant to subsection (8). 52 Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (7)(a)12....

...chool board property and improvements, furnishings, and equipment purchased with public funds shall automatically revert to full ownership by the district school board, subject to complete satisfaction of any lawful liens or encumbrances. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (8)(e)....

...hools, such as that they be “nonsectarian”, that they admit eligible students as identified in the statute, that they not charge tuition or registration fees, and that they not violate anti-discrimination provisions under Florida law. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (9)....

...ained the services of a certified public accountant or auditor for the annual financial audit, pursuant to s. 1002.345(2), who shall submit the report to the governing body[,]” reviewing audit reports, and participating in governance training. Id. § 1002.33(9)®....

...Indeed, several other provisions of the charter school statute establish that under Florida law, the public charter school is one legal entity, and the entity which creates and operates the charter school is a separate legal entity. See, e.g., id. §§ 1002.33(9)(k), (12), (16)....

...An excerpt from a Sumter County audit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2013, provides: Discretely Presented Component Unit. The Villages Charter School, Inc. (Charter School) is a not-for-profit corporation organized pursuant to Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, the Florida Not For Profit Corporation Act, and Section 1002.33, Florida Statutes....

...Under Florida’s charter school statute, a charter school’s sponsor, here Sumter County, has many duties, which include monitoring and reviewing the charter school in its progress towards the goals established in the charter and monitoring the revenues and expenditures of the charter school. Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (5)(b)....

...ns in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public and common use areas. 24 C.F.R. § 100.204 (a). . Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (12)(i) provides: A charter school shall organize as, or be operated by, a nonprofit organization....

...As either a private or a public employer, a charter school may contract for services with an individual or group of individuals who are organized as a partnership or a cooperative. Individuals or groups of individuals who contract their services to the charter school are not public employees. *1190 Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (12)(i)....

...For example, Florida Statutes § 218.39 requires charter schools to complete an annual financial audit of its accounts and records. Additionally, the provisions relating to funding, facilities, and exemption from ad valorem taxes all relate to charter schools— not the entities which operate them. See Fla. Stat. §§ 1002.33 (17), 1002.33(18)(c), 196.1983....

...hool Corporation. . Subsection (8) of the charter school statute provides the grounds on which a sponsor may choose to not renew or terminate a charter and provides the procedure which a sponsor must follow in terminating the charter. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33 (8)....

...ing the flow of federal funds to these entities. See Ritch Dep. at 26; McDaniel Dep. at 29-31, 34-35. Additionally, Florida’s charter school statute seems to indicate that charter schools-not their operators-receive federal funds. See Fla. Stat. §§ 1002.33 (17)(c)-(d), 1002.33(20)(a)l (providing that "all charter schools shall receive all federal funding for which the school is otherwise eligible, including Title I funding, not later than 5 months after the charter school first opens and within 5 months after any s...

the Trust is a “church plan” within 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(33). Church plans are not subject to Parts 1 and

...After he learned that the school would not receive additional staff or funding, D’Angelo explored converting the school to charter status. Florida law provides that “[c]harter schools shall be part of the state’s program of public education.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(1). “An application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council . . . .” Id. § 1002.33(3)(b)....

...take unlawful reprisal against another district school board employee because that employee is either 5 directly or indirectly involved with an application to establish a charter school,” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(4), and an employee may file a complaint with the Department of Education within 60 days, id. § 1002.33(4)(a)(1)....

...The Flordia statute that governs the establishment of charter schools provides, “An application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.” Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(3)(b)....

...des K through 6 in its first year, grades K through 7 in its second year, and grades K through 8 thereafter. Renaissance hoped to open the school with 862 students and to grow to 1,415 students by its fifth year. The application was made pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2011), which allowed Renaissance to replicate a “high-performing” charter school already in operation....

...as entered on May 21, 2012. The reason given for reversing the School Board’s decision was that it had “failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Charter Applicant’s application did not materially comply with the requirements of Section 1002.33(6)(c)3.b., Florida Statutes.” The School Board appealed the State Board’s order, requiring it to permit Renaissance to open and operate a charter school in Seminole County....

...be reversed. The “substantially replicates” requirement is contained in those provisions of the charter school statute which refer to “high-performing” charter schools. Schools identified as “high-performing” charter schools pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes, are given preferential treatment in the application process....

...They are entitled to submit an application to a sponsor 1 to establish and operate a new charter school that will “substantially replicate” its educational program in an existing school. The statute states: (a) A high-performing charter school may submit an application pursuant to s. 1002.33(6) in any school district in the state to establish and operate a new charter school that will substantially replicate its educational program....

...graph and must include the verification letter provided by the Commissioner of Education pursuant to subsection (5). If the sponsor fails to act on the application within 60 days after receipt, the application is deemed approved and the procedure in s. 1002.33(6)(h) applies. If the sponsor denies the application, the high-performing charter school may appeal pursuant to s. 1002.33(6)....

...hin the state under paragraph (a) in any year. A subsequent application to establish a charter school under paragraph (a) may not be submitted un *75 less each charter school established in this manner achieves high-performing charter school status. § 1002.331(3)(a)-(b), Fla....

...One of the permitted reasons to deny an application is if the sponsor demonstrates by “clear and convincing evidence” that “[t]he proposed charter school’s educational program does not substantially replicate that of the applicant or one of the applicant’s high-performing charter schools ....” § 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(III), Fla....

...ly similar to at least one of the applicant’s high-performing charter schools and the organization or individuals involved in the establishment and operation of the proposed school are significantly involved in the operation of replicated schools. § 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Fla....

...instruction model and the very same organizations, ie., the very same governing board and ESP. The Legislature has delegated to the State Board the statutory power to hear an appeal from the denial of a high-performing charter school application. §§ 1002.33(6)(b)3.c. and 1002.33(6)(c)3.b., Fla....

...and by allowing it to use the elementary portion of the school being replicated (North Broward *76 Elementary) to establish yet another school (this one in Lake County), the State Board is allowing Renaissance to sidestep the limitations imposed by section 1002.331(3)(b), Florida Statutes, which states that “[a] high-performing charter school may not establish more than one charter school within the state under paragraph (a) in any year.” The State Board’s interpretation of the statute es...

...tutory factors by “clear and convincing” evidence, but the statute does not make clear in what forum a sponsor is to present “clear and convincing evidence” sufficient to deny the application and contains no express provisions for a hearing. § 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Fla....

...The State Board is then required to review the School Board’s decision to determine whether the sponsor has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, one of the five reasons listed for denying the application, but there is no real record for the State Board to review with respect to high-performing charter schools. See § 1002.33(6)(e)3.a., Fla....

...o proceedings before individual school boards. See Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220 (Fla.2009) (holding that charters schools were not entitled to hearing under APA when school board terminated charter under section 1002.33(8)(d), Florida Statutes; review of the charter school statute which provides for immediate termination of charter under emergency conditions did not require APA hearing that would prolong termination; interpretation was consistent wit...

...sance’s application. REVERSED. LAWSON and BERGER, JJ., concur. . An application to open a charter school may be made by an individual, teachers, parents, a group of individuals, a municipality, or a legal entity organized under the laws of Florida § 1002.33(3)(a), Fla. Stat. Charter schools must have a public sponsor — either a district school board or a state university. § 1002.33(5)(a), Fla. Stat. The sponsor must perform a number of duties, including monitoring and reviewing the school and monitoring the revenues of the school. § 1002.33(5)(b), Fla....

...Universal unsuccessfully sought approval of its charter school application from *1211 the Osceola County School Board. After the School Board denied Universal's application at a public meeting Universal's principals attended, it mailed a written statement articulating the denial to the applicant. Section 1002.33(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2006), specifies that a charter applicant may appeal any denial or failure to act on an application no later than 30 calendar days after receipt of the School Board's decision....

...We agree and reverse. 1 1 We have consolidated both appeals for purposes of this opinion.  In August 2015, Somerset filed two applications with the Indian River School Board to replicate high-performing charter schools it was operating in Miami, pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2015)....

...cations. It issued two separate letters, accompanied by supporting documentation, detailing specific reasons for the School Board’s decisions. In sum, the School Board concluded that the applications did not meet the standard for replication under section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), in several ways, including: (1) Each application failed to demonstrate that it substantially replicated the educational program of Somerset’s high- performing charter school that it was intended to replicate, thus failing to meet the requirements of section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(III), Florida Statutes. (2) Each application failed to demonstrate that it complied with all civil rights requirements (including a federal desegregation order under which the School Board must operate its schools), 2  thus failing to meet the requirement of section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(II), Florida Statutes, that a proposed high- performing charter school application materially comply with all applicable state and local health, safety, and civil rights requirements as described in section 1002.33(9)(a)-(f), Florida Statutes. (3) Each application failed to contain a balanced financial plan and sufficient safeguards regarding internal controls as described in section 1002.33(6)(a)5., Florida Statutes, and therefore, failed to meet the statutory requirements set forth in section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(I), Florida Statutes; and (4) Each application’s education plan failed in the following respects: (A) Failed to “meet the statutory requirement for demonstrating how the school will use the guiding principles and meet the statutorily defined purpose of a charter school as required by section 1002.33(6)(a)1., Florida Statutes.” (B) Failed to “meet the statutory requirement for describing the educational foundation of the school and the teaching and learning strategies that will be employed as required by section 1002.33(7)(a)2., Florida Statutes.” (C) Failed to “meet the statutory requirement for explaining not only what the school will teach but also how and why, as well as proving a detailed curriculum plan that illustrates how students will be provided services to attain the Florida Standards as required by section 1002.33(6)(a)2., Florida Statutes.” (D) Failed to “meet the statutory requirement for describing how the school will address transportation services for its student body as required by section 1002.33(20)(c), Florida Statutes.” In November 2015, Somerset appealed the School Board’s decisions to the State Board of Education....

...eard, and the State Board’s final orders, which were issued by Commissioner Pam Stewart “on behalf of the State Board of Education Chair,” reflect the legal arguments advanced by Somerset in in its briefs. See § 286.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2015); § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...ter application has been the subject of two recent Florida district court opinions. In School Board of Seminole County v. Renaissance Charter School, Inc., 113 So. 3d 72, 76 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District noted that in similar appeals under section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, courts usually review the State Board of Education’s decisions to determine “whether its factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence and whether it erroneously interpreted the law.” The c...

...It is the School Board’s burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the high-performing charter school application does not comply with the statutory requirements, including substantial replication. Section 1002.33(6)(b)(3)(b)(III) provides that the School Board may deny the charter application if “[t]he proposed charter school’s educational program does not substantially replicate that of the applicant or one of the applicant’s high-performing charter schools.” Id....

...2d 1077, 1079 (Fla. 1998). Here, the School Board articulated specific objections to the applications submitted by Somerset and provided documents to support their determination that the applications did not materially comply with statutory requirements. Under section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., a School Board may deny an application for replication of a high-performing charter school if there is clear and convincing evidence of any of the following deficiencies: (I) The application does not materially compl...

...during the application process; or 6  (V) The proposed charter school's educational program and financial management practices do not materially comply with the requirements of this section. Section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(II), Florida Statutes (2015), requires a replication charter application to materially comply with all applicable civil rights requirements, pursuant to sections 1002.33(9)(e), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...The record also contains clear and convincing evidence that the proposed Somerset schools are not substantially similar to the high- performing charter schools that they would purportedly replicate. To be considered “substantially similar” within the meaning of section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), a charter application “must have the same characteristics and be alike in substance or essentials to the school it is replicating.” Sch....

...Although Somerset argues that it provided examples of the planned similarities between its proposed schools and the Miami schools, those similarities are not enough to overcome the School Board’s reasons for denying the replication applications under section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015)....

...We next address the School Board’s argument that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the proposed charter schools’ educational plans do not comport with the statutory requirements for high-performing charter school replications, as set forth in section 1002.33(7)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2015)....

...d high-performing replication educational plans. Finally, we address the School Board’s argument that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Somerset’s applications failed to comply with the financial requirements in sections 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(I) and (6)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2015). Section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(I) requires a replication charter school application to include a balanced plan and a description of controls that will safeguard finances as described in section 10202.33(6)(a)5....

...balances based on revenue projections, a spending plan based on projected 9  revenues and expenses, and a description of controls that will safeguard finances and projected enrollment trends. § 1002.33(6)(a)5., Fla....

...Johnson, 708 So.2d 594, *456 596-97 (Fla.1998) (same); Dep't of Ins. v. S.E. Volusia Hosp. Dist., 438 So.2d 815, 820 (Fla.1983) (same). Accordingly, we affirm the final order. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The appeal to this Court is authorized by statute, sec. 1002.33(6)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), but "[T]he decision of the State Board of Education is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120." § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...oard hearing. Again, this argument was not properly preserved for our review. The School Board further argues that the State Board's order must be reversed because it fails to include a fact-based justification for the Board's decision. We disagree. Section 1002.33(6)(e) 1. & 5. of the Florida Statutes (2005) provides: *284 1002.33....

...The chair must ensure that the written recommendation is submitted to the State Board of Education members no later than 7 calendar days prior to the date on which the appeal is to be heard. Both parties in the case shall also be provided a copy of the recommendation. § 1002.33(6)(e)1....

...ence from its application that should have said the school's goal was to be an "A" school, a representative from the School Board also admitted that the application template did not include a requirement that one of the goals include a school grade. Section 1002.33(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes also contains no such requirement, and the *285 Florida charter schools standard application includes no such requirement....

...Also, a School Board representative admitted that Academies' budget was correct if it could achieve its estimated enrollment number. Finally, the School Board challenges the State Board's final order, claiming that the order which was entered pursuant to section 1002.33 of the Florida Statutes conflicts with, and thereby violates, the School Board's constitutional authority under Article IX, section 4(b), of the Florida Constitution, to operate, control and supervise public schools, and its authority...

...provision for a uniform and high quality system of free public schools. Specifically, the School Board argues that, because the act of operating and controlling all free public schools in Volusia County is conferred exclusively on the School Board, section 1002.33(6)(c) is unconstitutional because it permits the State Board to open a charter school. Section 1002.33(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides: 1002.33 Charter Schools * * * (6) Application process and review.-Beginning September 1, 2003, applications are subject to the following requirements: * * * (c) An applicant may appeal any denial of that applicant's application or failure to act on a...

...approve or deny the application. The district school board shall implement the decision of the State Board of Education. The decision of the State Board of Education is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120. § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...as is provided by law. The state board of education shall consist of seven members appointed by the governor to staggered 4-year terms, subject to confirmation by the senate. The state board of education shall appoint the commissioner of education. Section 1002.33(6)(c) does not permit the State Board to open a charter school....

...The approval of an application is just the beginning of the process to open a charter school. Once the charter application has been granted, the school board still has control over the process because the applicant and the school board must agree on the provisions of the charter. See § 1002.33(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005). A school board can also cause a charter to be revoked or not renewed. See § 1002.33(8), Fla....

...A fact-finder and decision-maker who knows its decisions will not be accorded respect is less inclined to worry over their accuracy. Nevertheless, for reasons best known to others, this is apparently the way this process has been designed to operate. Therefore, I concur in the result. NOTES [1] Section 1002.33(6)(b)3 of the Florida Statutes provides: 1002.33 Charter Schools * * * (6) Application process and review.—Beginning September 1, 2003, applications are subject to the following requirements: * * * [b] 3....

...oard of Education as provided in paragraph (c). If an application is denied, the district school board shall, within 10 calendar days, articulate in writing the specific reasons based upon good cause supporting its denial of the charter application. § 1002.33(6)(b)3, Fla. Stat. (2005)(emphasis added). Interestingly, the requirement for "good cause" has been dropped from the most recent version of the statute which provides: 1002.33 Charter Schools * * * [6][b]3....

...If an application is denied, the district school board shall, within 10 calendar days, articulate in writing the specific reasons for its denial of the charter application and shall provide the letter of denial and supporting documentation to the applicant and to the Department of Education supporting those reasons. § 1002.33(6)(b)3, Fla....

...In August 2015, Somerset filed an application with the St. Lucie County School Board to establish a middle school that would replicate a high- performing charter school that it was currently operating in Broward County. The application was made pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2015), which allows “[a] high-performing charter school [to] submit an application pursuant to s. 1002.33(6) in any school district in the state to establish and operate a new charter school that will substantially replicate its educational program.” § 1002.331(3)(a), Fla. Stat....

...The Evaluation Instrument, which was adopted by the Florida Department of Education under Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.0786, sets out twenty standards that a school board must use as part of its review of a charter school replication application. See § 1002.33(6)(b), Fla....

...Renaissance Charter Sch., Inc., 147 So. 3d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). On appeal, the School Board argues that it demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence a valid basis for denying Somerset’s application: the application did not materially comply with the requirements of section 1002.33(6(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015). As such, the School Board contends that its denial of the application should be upheld. Section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), provides that the School Board may deny the charter application if the application fails to meet any one of the five listed criteria. For example, the School Board may deny an application if “[t]he proposed charter school’s educational program does not substantially replicate that of the applicant or one of the applicant’s high-performing charter schools.” § 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(III), Fla. Stat....

...statements in an attempt to support those assertions. Furthermore, the application included some educational staff it deemed vital to its educational program, but failed to appropriately account for those staff in its budget, which would also violate sections 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(V) and 1002.33(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). 3  However, despite the School Board’s specific, detailed, and well- founded objections to the deficiencies in Somerset’s application and clear and convincing evidence that Somerset’s application did not materially comply with the requirements of section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), the State Board of Education issued an order overturning the School Board’s decision and granted Somerset’s application to open the charter school in St....

...In August 2015, Somerset filed an application with the St. Lucie County School Board to establish a middle school that would replicate a high- performing charter school that it was currently operating in Broward County. The application was made pursuant to section 1002.331, Florida Statutes (2015), which allows “[a] high-performing charter school [to] submit an application pursuant to s. 1002.33(6) in any school district in the state to establish and operate a new charter school that will substantially replicate its educational program.” § 1002.331(3)(a), Fla. Stat....

...The Evaluation Instrument, which was adopted by the Florida Department of Education under Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-6.0786, sets out twenty standards that a school board must use as part of its review of a charter school replication application. See § 1002.33(6)(b), Fla....

...Renaissance Charter Sch., Inc., 147 So. 3d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). On appeal, the School Board argues that it demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence a valid basis for denying Somerset’s application: the application did not materially comply with the requirements of section 1002.33(6(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015). As such, the School Board contends that its denial of the application should be upheld. Section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), provides that the School Board may deny the charter application if the application fails to meet any one of the five listed criteria. For example, the School Board may deny an application if “[t]he proposed charter school’s educational program does not substantially replicate that of the applicant or one of the applicant’s high-performing charter schools.” § 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(III), Fla. Stat....

...statements in an attempt to support those assertions. Furthermore, the application included some educational staff it deemed vital to its educational program, but failed to appropriately account for those staff in its budget, which would also violate sections 1002.33(6)(b)3.b.(V) and 1002.33(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2015). However, despite the School Board’s specific, detailed, and well- founded objections to the deficiencies in Somerset’s application and clear 3 and convincing evidence that Somerset’s application did not materially comply with the requirements of section 1002.33(6)(b)3.b., Florida Statutes (2015), the State Board of Education issued an order overturning the School Board’s decision and granted Somerset’s application to open the charter school in St....

...[Section 4(a)] … indicate[s] a school district is functionally synonymous with a county. Moreover, by statute, “All charter schools in Florida are public schools and shall be part of the state’s program of [public] education.” § 1002.33(1), Fla....

...On appeal, the Fifth District noted that section 1013.51, Florida Statutes (2005), permitted public schools to unilaterally invoke an exemption from special assessments. Id. at 16 n. 1. However, the court went on to hold that the statutory exemption did not apply to charter schools because pursuant to section 1002.33(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), charter schools were exempted from all statutes contained within chapter 1013....

...al services within the district by providing funding for the charter school? In order to supplement the educational opportunities of children, the Florida Legislature in 1996 authorized the creation of charter schools. 1 The statute, now codified at section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes, allows for both the creation of new charter schools and the conversion of existing public schools to charter status. 2 Section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes, provides for the creation of such charter schools as part of the state's program of public education....

...sa Island Authority, despite its good intentions, has no authority to commit funds to assist a charter school providing educational services within the district. Sincerely, Charlie Crist Attorney General CC/tgh 1 See s. 1, Ch. 96-186, Laws of Fla. 2 Section 1002.33 (3), Fla. Stat. 3 Section 1002.33 (1), Fla....

...ary at best. See Sch. Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 3d at 967 ("Here, although OCSB's complaint alleges that the State Board's action infringed on its constitutional rights, the primary purpose of the lawsuit is to challenge the constitutionality of section 1002.33."). Thus, we do not believe that the County met its burden to plead and prove the applicability of the sword-wielder doctrine....

...of that contract. Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to “emphasize that our holding here is applicable only to suits on express, written contracts into which the state agency has statutory authority to enter.” Id. at 6. Notably, section 1002.33(7), Florida Statutes (2019), provides that “[t]he terms and conditions for the operation of a charter school . . . shall be set forth by the sponsor and the applicant in a written contractual agreement, called a charter.” § 1002.33(7), Fla....

...3d DCA 1972) (“Our review of the record and briefs satisfies us that the issue was sufficiently raised.”). The charter schools also argue that we should address the issue of whether they are entitled to interest on the retroactive funds under section 1002.33(17)(e), Florida Statutes (2019)....

...On remand, the trial court shall conduct any necessary hearings to make findings of facts and conclusions of law as to the amount of referendum funds payable to the charter schools retroactively and whether the charter schools are entitled to interest on late payments of funds pursuant to section 1002.33(17)(e). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. LEVINE, J., concurs specially with opinion. MAY, J., dissents with opinion. LEVINE, J., concurring specially. I fully agree with the majority opinion that the trial cou...

...It is clear that the school board’s original decision to levy a voted millage was discretionary. Further, this court’s en banc decision also recognized that the method by which those funds are distributed is operational or ministerial. The Academy en banc opinion recognizes that section 1002.33(17)(b) states that the funding of charter schools is “the sum of” three sources, divided by the number of students in the school district, multiplied by the number of charter school students....

...The method, as directed by statutes and outlined in the Academy en banc opinion, is a formulaic act without any statutory discretion. See also Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty. v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 279 So. 3d 281, 291-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (recognizing that distribution of funding to charter schools is formulaic). 2 Section 1002.33(17) states that students in charter schools “shall be funded” the same as students in other public schools....

...basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the” school board. 371 So. 2d at 1019. Nor did the school board “possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to” retain all of the 2018 referendum funds in light of section 1002.33(17)....

...It began when the plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment for the School Board. The plaintiffs argued the School Board’s decision to place a referendum on the ballot asking for voter approval of an ad valorem levy for the operational needs of only non- charter district schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...3d 508, 513 (Fla. 2020) (citing Spangler v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 106 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958)). In the trial court, the plaintiffs suggested three ways in which the School Board waived sovereign immunity. First, it was statutorily waived by sections 1002.33(17) and 1002.33(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2018). Second, it was waived under an extension of Pan-Am Tobacco Corp....

...Dep’t of Corrections, 471 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1985). And third, sovereign immunity does not apply to the ministerial act of paying the plaintiffs. For the reasons expressed below, none of these theories support a waiver of sovereign immunity. First, sections 1002.33(17) and (7), Florida Statutes (2018), address the method by which the School Board pays charter schools....

...3d DCA 1986)). Indeed, in the section of the plaintiffs’ initial brief entitled “Sovereign Immunity Has Been Waived in this Instance,” the word “contract” cannot be found. The only argument made is that sovereign immunity was waived by sections 1002.33(17) and (7), Florida Statutes (2018). As the majority well knows, we are limited to the arguments raised by the parties on appeal....

...18 referendum revenues. In the alternative, the complaint requested the circuit court to declare the 2018 referendum to be illegal and void. The charter school appellants asserted that the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...s added). 6 as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). The Fourth District concluded, In sum, our review is limited to the 2018 versions of sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9), and how those statutes may be read in harmony according to their plain meaning. The 2018 referendum, by excluding charter schools from that portion of the current discretionary operating millage levy provided in section 1011.71(9), violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added)....

...Miami-Dade referendum excluded charter schools by omission. The result is the same. The School Board’s refusal to share with Miami-Dade charter schools those Referendum funds generated from the ad valorem tax levy violates the clear mandate of section 1002.33(17)(b), which requires that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in...

...This is an appeal by the Miami-Dade County School Board from a final order of the State of Florida Board of Education, reversing a decision to immediately terminate the Charter School Contract between the County School Board and Rise Academy of South Dade, pursuant to section 1002.33(8) of the Florida Statutes (2009). There is considerable disagreement among the parties and scant guidance in the law concerning the rights and obligations of the parties in an immediate termination proceeding conducted pursuant to the 2009 version of Section 1002.33(8), which permits immediate termination of a charter school contract “if the sponsor [County School Board] determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened.” 1 However, c...

...Children (Trinity), to consolidate the charter contracts of its two schools. The School Board argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) lacked subject matter jurisdiction and erred in reversing the School Board’s denial. It also contends that section 1002.33(6)(h), Florida Statutes (2011), violates the Florida Constitution to the extent that it impinges on the School Board’s authority to run the public school system in Hillsbor-ough County....

...rd sent Trinity only one draft contract that covered both schools. Trinity and the School Board began to negotiate the terms of that single document. The School Board did not advise Trinity that it had to submit a new charter school application. See § 1002.33(3)(a)....

...Retreating from its earlier assurances, the School Board rejected consolidation, advising Trinity in writing that there is no educational benefit for students by combining the two schools. Thereafter, Trinity and the School Board attempted, unsuccessfully, to mediate this matter before DOE. See § 1002.33(6)(h)....

...The School Board moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ denied the motion. After an evidentiary hearing, he granted Trinity’s consolidation request. Analysis At the outset, we address DOAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over Trinity’s consolidation request. Section 1002.33(6)(h) provides, in part, as follows: The terms and conditions for the operation of a charter school shall be set forth *922 by the sponsor and the applicant in a written and contractual agreement, called a charter....

...Indeed, the School Board’s letter advising Trinity of its rejection hardly allows such a facile characterization. We agree with the ALJ that Trinity’s request was an effort to modify existing charter contracts. As such, the statutory bar to DOAH’s jurisdiction was inapplicable. As the ALJ reasoned: [Sjection 1002.33(7)'(c) shows a legislative intent that an existing charter school may modify its original charter without having to provide a new application. Section 1002.33(7)(c) provides that “[a] charter may be modified during its initial term or any renewal term upon the recommendation of the sponsor or the charter school’s governing board and the approval of both parties to the agreement.” The...

...Thus, the legislature has provided an existing charter school with the authority to seek a modification of its charter. Because of [sic] the issue brought forward by Trinity School occurs in the context of an existing charter and is a dispute concerning the charter school statute, subject matter jurisdiction is proper under section 1002.33(6)(h)....

...The procedural posture in which this matter came before the ALJ establishes that Trinity was not applying for a new charter. Moreover, the School Board’s decision does not qualify as a charter termination or nonrenewal. This dispute by the terms of section 1002.33(6) was not exempt from the ALJ’s consideration....

...25, 2011). The final order was supported by competent, substantial evidence. It belied the School Board’s conclusion that consolidation would be devoid of educational benefit to the students. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue. Finally, we conclude that section 1002.33(6)(h) is constitutional....

...Although the constitutional issue could have been better developed below, see Rice v. Dep’t of Health Rehabilitative Servs., 386 So.2d 844, 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we may pass on the constitutionality of a statute when it is necessary for reviewing administrative action. See id. We will not shun our duty. Section 1002.33(6)(h) does no violence to article IX, sections 2 and 4 4 of our *924 constitution. Cf. Sch. Bd. of Volusia Cnty. v. Acads. of Excellence, Inc., 974 So.2d 1186, 1191-93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding section 1002.33(6)(c) allowing DOE to approve or deny charter school application did not violate article IX, section 4(b) of constitution conferring public school control and operation on school board)....

...rminate a charter contract. See id. at 1193 . We see no constitutional impediment to the ALJ’s decision. Affirmed. ALTENBERND and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur. . In 2011, the legislature enacted legislation regarding high-performing charter schools. See § 1002.331, Fla....

...(2011); Ch.2011-232, § 1, at 3451, Laws of Fla. (effective July 1, 2011). The statute is not applicable to the dispute before us and we do not opine on whether Trinity's two schools would satisfy the definition of a high-performing charter school. See § 1002.331(1). We note that the statute allows the sponsor of such high-performing schools to consolidate the schools under a single charter; School Board approval does not appear to be necessary. See § 1002.331(2). . Section 1002.33(6)(h) provides, in part, as follows: The Department of Education shall provide mediation services for any dispute regarding this section subsequent to the approval of a charter application and for any dispute relating to the approved charter, except disputes regarding charter school application denials....

...law judge appointed by the Division of Administrative Hearings. . The School Board posits that Trinity’s dissatisfaction with the rejection of the proposal to consolidate should have been submitted to the DOE Charter School Appeal Commission. See § 1002.33(6)(c)....

...educational purposes would not be authorized under state law. To legally undertake this type of transaction, a change in state law would be required. Sincerely, Charlie Crist Attorney General CC/tls 1 The City of Sunny Isles joins in the request. 2 Section 1002.33 (3), Florida Statutes, recognizes the authority of a municipality to apply for a charter school....

...of Miami-Dade Cnty., Case No. 2019-030739-CA-01 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 2019). Other litigation is easy to foresee. This decision will also likely have a major impact on future charter school funding cases. The majority’s interpretation of the opening sentence of section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, erodes a guiding principle established by the Legislature that charter school students be funded the same as their counterparts attending district schools....

...d a substantial disparity in funding between public charter schools and district schools. These charters now face a substantial hurdle in hiring qualified teachers to enable them to successfully compete with the other public schools in the district. § 1002.33(2)(c), Fla....

...Court certify the following question as an issue of great public importance for review by the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.330(a)(2)(C): Are local school boards required under section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, to share with public charter schools revenues generated from a voted operating millage levied pursuant to section 1011.71(9), Florida Statutes, which was approved by voters pr...

...Palm Beach County, Florida placed a referendum on the ballot asking county voters to approve an ad valorem levy for the operational needs of only non-charter district schools. We conclude the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), providing “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the -3- sa...

...proportionate share of the 2018 referendum revenues. In the alternative, the complaint requested the circuit court to declare the 2018 referendum to be illegal and void. Appellants asserted the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), providing that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other pub...

...The circuit court found the 2018 referendum did not violate Florida law. The circuit court later entered a final judgment in the school board’s favor, prompting this appeal. We conclude the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated Florida law, as explained below. A. Interpreting sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) in harmony according to plain meaning favors the charter schools’ position. The method by which students enrolled in charter schools are funded, and the sources from which such funding is derived, are provided in Section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), titled “Charter schools.” That section provides, in pertinent part: (17) Funding....

...district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school. . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla....

...Because the increased operating millages permitted by sections 1011.71(1) and (9) are both discretionary, and because a school district’s “current operating discretionary millage levy” is to be included in the method of funding students enrolled in a charter school under section 1002.33(17)(b), the 2018 referendum’s exclusion of charter schools violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added)....

...3d 1220, 1234 (Fla. 2009) (“[W]e give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). B. The school board’s arguments lack merit. 1. The school board misinterprets sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) as providing two distinct funding mechanisms. The sections are related and must be read in harmony. -7-  The school board argues sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) provide two distinct funding mechanisms and, therefore, section 1002.33(17) has no application to the instant case. According to the school board, “[g]eneral funding for charter schools under [section 1002.33(17)(b)] includes a mandatory requirement that [Florida Education Finance Program] funds be distributed to charter schools,” but section 1011.71(9) explicitly states “additional millage for school operational purposes” generated after a local referendum or general election “do not become part of the calculation of the Florida Education Finance Program.” The flaw in the school board’s reasoning is that charter schools’ general funding under section 1002.33(17)(b) does not include only Florida Education Finance Program components. Rather, section 1002.33(17)(b)’s plain language provides charter schools’ funding is “the sum of” three sources: (1) “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s....

...by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school.” Id. The flaw in the school board’s reasoning arises from its misapplication of the word “including” within section 1002.33(17)(b)....

...1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act,” what else is the fund for students enrolled in a charter school to be “the sum of”? The question cannot be answered, because interpreting the word “including” as modifying each funding component stated within section 1002.33(17)(b) improperly renders the phrase “the sum of” as mere surplusage....

...-8- phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The only logical construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the word “including” modifies only its nearest reasonable referent, that is, “gross state and local funds.” See Scherer v....

...modifiers (adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, restrictive clauses) should be read as modifying the nearest noun, verb, or other sentence element to which they can reasonably be said to pertain.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the proper construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the basis for the agreement for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s....

...discretionary millage levy.” As explained in Section A above, “funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” include increased operating millages permitted by both sections 1011.71(1) and (9). 2. The school board overlooks section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning that charter school students shall be funded by the same method as other public school students. The school board correctly argues that section 1002.33(17) describes the method of funding charter school students. However, the school board then argues the method of funding charter school students is not the same as the method for funding public school students, despite the plain meaning of section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence – “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the s...

...Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012) ([T]he nearest-reasonable-reference canon “applies not just to words that precede the modifier, but also to words that follow it.”) (emphasis added). Applying the nearest-reasonable-referent canon to section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence, the modifier “the same as” may apply to the antecedent phrase “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program,” or it may apply to the subsequent phrase “students enrolled in o...

...- same as” draws a direct comparison to the earlier phrase “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school.” In reaching our opinion, we have not ignored the antecedent phrase “as if they are in a basic program or a special program” within section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence....

...established conditions that are identified in State Board of Education rules pursuant to s. 1003.21(1)(e). (emphasis added). - 11 -  Based on the foregoing, we agree with appellants’ argument that, under section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning, “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). 3....

...2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing that “legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative intent”). Conclusion In sum, our review is limited to the 2018 versions of sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9), and how those statutes may be read in harmony according to their plain meaning. The 2018 referendum, by excluding charter schools from that portion of the current discretionary operating millage levy provided in section 1011.71(9), violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic - 14 - program or a special program, the same as stude...

...of great public importance: Does a local referendum which levies additional millage for school operational purposes under section 1011.71, Florida Statutes (2018), but which includes only non-charter schools in the referendum, violate section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018) (“Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in ot...

...hts. However, they have argued that: It has always been the intention for Florida’s children to receive comparable levels of funding regardless of what public school they attend. Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. By opening section 1002.33(17) in the manner that it did, the Legislature created a baseline question to guide any interpretation of charter school funding provisions: Are public charter schools being funded at a comparable level to their dist...

...public school students in the District if they have been denied the benefit of the proceeds from the 2018 Referendum. To deny public charter school students an equal opportunity to a quality education is to deny the very intent of section 1002.33(17) and article IX, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. - 19 - (Emphasis added). The Florida Constitution provides that “[t]he education of children is a fundamental value of...

...of all children residing within its borders.” Art. IX, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). Moreover, “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school . . . shall be funded . . . the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” § 1002.33(17), Fla....

...Jan. 21, 2021). - 26 - dissent recognized as much, given his proposed disposition to remand for the circuit court to invalidate the referendum. Consequently, even if the new en banc majority’s interpretation of section 1002.33(17) were correct, the only legally-proper remedy would be to invalidate the 2018 referendum. Rather than taking that principled approach and acknowledging the only proper remedy is the referendum’s invalidation, the majority has...

...public’s perception of the judiciary’s ability to render meaningful justice. To resolve this political question here at issue, the majority has resorted to an opaque, result-oriented analysis to shoehorn statutory language into the result it desires. III. The majority rewrites section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018). 3 A circuit court in Miami recently decided Archimedian Academy, Inc....

...entire referendum. At the end of the day, no one, not even this court, is looking out for the voters. - 29 -  Apart from the majority’s improper decision to consider this case en banc, its interpretation of section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, is deeply flawed. By means of interpretive legerdemain, the majority has rewritten section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, while pretending not to do so. The majority’s analysis, dressed in textualist garb, is a naked departure from textualism. A. The majority rewrites the first sentence of section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes. The proper analysis must begin with the plain language of the statute. The first sentence of the statute provides: “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” § 1002.33(17), Fla....

...(2018). Although subsection (17) is labeled “funding,” it appears in the statute governing charter schools—it is not found in the part of the Florida Statutes governing funding for school districts. See §§ 1071.60–1071.78, Fla. Stat. (2018). The first sentence of section 1002.33(17) consists of two parts: an operative clause and a comparative clause. Id. The operative clause of section 1002.33(17) states that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school ....

...Thus, the statute sets forth a method for funding “students enrolled in a charter school,” which is “the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the district.” The following example illustrates why this is the natural interpretation of the first sentence of section 1002.33(17)....

...s statute as saying that “law clerks shall be paid the same as judges.” Such a statute is referring to a method of payment, not an amount or source of payment. Here, the key question is whether the referendum violates the operative clause of section 1002.33(17)—i.e., the requirement that students enrolled in a charter school “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program.” The referendum obviously does not violate this requirement....

...The canon “calls for a commonsense interpretation of the way in which words are put together to form phrases, clauses, or sentences.” Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). According to the majority, the most reasonable interpretation of section 1002.33(17) is that “the same as” modifies the subsequent phrase “students enrolled in other public schools in the district,” rather than the antecedent phrase “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program....

...f they are in a basic program or a special program” actually supports the plaintiffs’ argument. But this is a non sequitur designed to distract the reader from the fact that the majority has simply excised a key phrase from the first sentence of section 1002.33(17). B. The majority rewrites section 1002.33(17)(b), Florida Statutes. In addition to rewriting the first sentence of section 1002.33(17), the majority also rewrites section 1002.33(17)(b). Again, we must begin with the plain language of the statute. Section 1002.33(17)(b), Florida Statutes, states that the basis for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of the school district’s operating funds from the FEFP and the General Appropriations Act, and then provides examples...

...’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school. . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018) (emphasis added). The majority interprets section 1002.33(17)(b) as meaning that the funding for charter schools is “the sum of” (which, as explained below, the majority takes to mean “the addition of”) three different sources: (1) “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s....

...provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act,’ what else is the fund for students enrolled in a charter school to be ‘the sum of’?” However, this question is based upon a flawed premise—namely, that “the sum of” as used in section 1002.33(17)(b) means “the addition of” rather than “the total amount of.” To be sure, this is one definition of the word “sum.” See Sum, Merriam- Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/sum (last visited September 15, 2020). But the word “sum” can also mean a “specified amount of money” or “the whole amount.” Id. If the word “sum” is being used in section 1002.33(17)(b) to mean “a specified amount of money” or “the whole amount,” then the School Board’s interpretation of the statute does not render the phrase “the sum of” mere surplusage. - 33 -  The question therefore becomes the following: which definition of “sum” is being used in section 1002.33(17)(b)? “[G]ross state and local funds,” “discretionary lottery funds,” and “funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” are all types of funds included within the FEFP and the General Appropriations Act. Therefore, the word “sum” in section 1002.33(17)(b) is not used to mean “the result of adding numbers,” but rather is used to denote a “specified amount of money” or “the whole amount.” This interpretation is consistent with the natural reading of section 1002.33(17)(b), which is that each of the items listed after the word “including” are all illustrations of components of the FEFP. It is completely unnatural to read the word “including” as applying only to the first item of the list. Under the same natural reading of section 1002.33(17)(b), the referendum-based millage cannot be part of the “current operating discretionary millage levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b). “Current operating discretionary millage levy” refers to the single levy contemplated under section 1011.71(1). Notably, this phrase is used in section 1002.33(17)(b) and section 1011.71(1), but not in section 1011.71(9)....

...calculation of the Florida Education Finance Program total potential funds in 2001-2002 or any subsequent year.”). The fact that the Legislature did not use the term in section 1011.71(9) means that the “current operating discretionary millage levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b) does not include a separate “additional” millage levy authorized under a referendum, which is expressly excluded from FEFP funds....

...as provided in s. 1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act, including gross state and local funds[;] discretionary lottery funds[;] and funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; . . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla....

...“combined” refers to the combination of the various millages for the purpose of assessing whether the combined rate complies with the overall constitutional limit on total assessed millage. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the language of section 1002.33(17)(b) predates the additional voted-upon millage in section - 35 - 1011.71(9)....

...1997) (“[I]t is inappropriate to use an amendment enacted ten years after the original enactment to clarify original legislative intent.”). 6 The charter school statute was enacted in 1996 (previously section 228.056, Florida Statutes) and is now codified at section 1002.33, Florida Statutes....

...tive intent”). Second, the Legislature ultimately did not adopt language which would have made the amendment retroactive. An earlier version of the bill proposing the amendment stated: “The provisions of this act relating to ss. 1011.71 and 1002.33, Florida Statutes, amending and clarifying the use of certain voted discretionary operating millages levied by school districts, apply to revenues collected on or after July 1, 2019.” (Emphasis added)....

...eptional importance. Once having usurped the en banc rule, the majority says its decision derives from the “plain meaning” of the statute. Don’t be fooled. What the majority has done is rewrite the operative clause of the first sentence of section 1002.33(17) to say that students enrolled in a charter school “shall be funded the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” And to bolster this rewriting of the first sentence, the majority has also rewritten section 1002.33(17)(b) so that charter school students shall be funded in the same amount and from the same sources as students enrolled in other public schools....

...oard hearing. Again, this argument was not properly preserved for our review. The School Board further argues that the State Board's order must be reversed because it fails to include a fact-based justification for the Board's decision. We disagree. Section 1002.33(6)(e)1. & 5. of the Florida Statutes (2005) provides: 1002.33....

...The chair must ensure that the written recommendation is submitted to the State Board of Education members no later than 7 calendar days prior to the date on which the appeal is to be heard. Both parties in the case shall also be provided a copy of the recommendation. § 1002.33(6)(e)1....

...ence from its application that should have said the school's goal was to be an "A" school, a representative from the School Board also admitted that the application template did not include a requirement that one of the goals include a school grade. Section 1002.33(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes also contains no such requirement, and the Florida charter schools standard application includes no such requirement....

...Also, a School Board representative admitted that Academies' budget was correct if it could achieve its estimated enrollment number. Finally, the School Board challenges the State Board's final order, claiming that the order which was entered pursuant to section 1002.33 of the Florida Statutes conflicts with, and thereby violates, the School Board's constitutional authority under Article IX, section 4(b), of the Florida Constitution, to operate, control and supervise public schools, and its authority...

...provision for a uniform and high quality system of free public schools. Specifically, the School Board argues that, because the act of operating and controlling all free public schools in Volusia County is conferred exclusively on the School Board, section 1002.33(6)(c) is unconstitutional because it permits the State Board to open a charter school. Section 1002.33(6)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides: 1002.33 Charter Schools * * * (6) Application process and review....

...approve or deny the application. The district school board shall implement the decision of the State Board of Education. The decision of the State Board of Education is not subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120. § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla....

...provided by law. The state board of education shall consist of seven members appointed by the governor to staggered 4-year terms, subject to confirmation by the senate. The state board of education shall appoint the commissioner of education. *1193 Section 1002.33(6)(c) does not permit the State Board to open a charter school....

...The approval of an application is just the beginning of the process to open a charter school. Once the charter application has been granted, the school board still has control over the process because the applicant and the school board must agree on the provisions of the charter. See § 1002.33(6)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005). A school board can also cause a charter to be revoked or not renewed. See § 1002.33(8), Fla....

...er school applicant is filing an appeal, the Commissioner of Education shall convene a meeting of the Charter School Appeal Commission to study and make recommendations to the State Board of Education regarding its pending decision about the appeal. § 1002.33(6)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] Section 1002.33(6)(b)3 of the Florida Statutes provides: 1002.33 Charter Schools * * * (6) Application process and review....

...oard of Education as provided in paragraph (c). If an application is denied, the district school board shall, within 10 calendar days, articulate in writing the specific reasons based upon good cause supporting its denial of the charter application. § 1002.33(6)(b)3, Fla....

...of Education adopted the recommendation and reversed the School Board’s denial of the application. The School Board took this appeal, wherein it raises evidentiary issues and also challenges the constitutionality of the charter school appeal statute, section 1002.33(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2015). We affirm on the constitutional challenge, but we reverse and remand for CSAC to make factual findings necessary for review of the evidentiary issues raised on appeal.  The School Board’s challenge of section 1002.33(6)(c), Florida Statutes, was entertained by this court in another appeal and found to be without merit....

...3d at 359, CSAC’s written recommendation stated “that the School Board did not have competent substantial evidence to support its denial of the Charter School Application based on the Applicant’s failure to meet the standards for the Education Plan pursuant to 1002.33, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-6.0786, Florida Administrative Code.” This court recognized that section 1002.33(6)(e)5., Florida Statutes (2016), requires CSAC to include a fact- based justification in its written recommendation to the State Board of Education, and it found that CSAC’s finding was a “legal conclusion, not a fact-based justification,” and as such, meaningful review was not possible....

...conclusions: [T]he School Board did not have competent substantial evidence to support its denial of the Charter School Application based on the Applicant’s failure to meet the standards for the Educational Plan pursuant to Section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-6.0786, Administrative Code. . . . the Organizational Plan pursuant to Section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-6.0786, Florida Administrative Code. . . . [and] the Business Plan pursuant to Section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, and State Board of Education Rule 6A-6.0786, Florida Administrative Code. Although CSAC members posed questions to the parties during the CSAC meeting, their questions do not shed light on CSAC’s fact-based...

...This appeal involves the 2015 version of the statute, but the subsections at issue are the same in both versions of the statute. 2  Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand for CSAC to make factual findings consistent with section 1002.33(6)(e)5., Florida Statutes (2015). Reversed and remanded with instructions. WARNER, CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for...

impact fees, pursuant to the provisions in section 1002.33(18)(f), Florida Statutes, for the construction

Pozzuoli: You have asked whether the language of section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, requires that charter schools

...(Renaissance) to operate a charter school in Polk County over the objections of the School Board. The School Board argues that the proposed charter school's educational program did not "substantially replicate" that of the high-performing charter school being replicated. See § 1002.331(3)(a), Fla....

...We agree and reverse. The facts of this case are substantially similar to those articulated in School Board of Seminole County v. Renaissance Charter School, Inc., 113 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). Here, Renaissance filed a high-performing charter school application pursuant to section 1002.331, for Renaissance Charter School at Polk, a K through 8 charter school....

...rd, Renaissance argued that the material issue was not substantial replication, but instead whether the proposed charter school would be a high-performing school. The School Board countered that -3- section 1002.331 required substantial replication. The State Board's half-page order stated that "the School Board failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Charter Applicant's application did not materially comply with the requirements of section 1002.33(6)(c)3.b., Florida Statutes." The order did not include any findings of fact. It is the School Board's burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the high-performing charter school application does not comply with the statutory requirements, including substantial replication. Section 1002.33(6)(b)(3)(b)(III) provides that the School Board may deny the charter application if "[t]he proposed charter school's educational program does not substantially replicate that of the applicant or one of the applicant's high-performi...

...City of Fort Walton Beach, 534 So. 2d 754, 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ("That an appellate court may not consider matters outside the record is so elemental there is no excuse for an attorney to attempt to bring such matters before the court."). Moreover, section 1002.331(3)(b) limits a high-performing charter school to one application for a charter school per year....

...Board to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law. Despite the statutory deficiencies, the record is sufficient to demonstrate that the School Board's decision to deny Renaissance's charter application is supported by clear and convincing evidence. See § 1002.33(6)(b)(3)(b); see also Seminole, 113 So....

...All actions of district school officials shall be consistent and in harmony with state laws and with rules and minimum standards of the state board.” . . . Florida’s charter schools are likewise “part of the state’s program of public education,” and “[a]ll charter schools in Florida are public schools.” § 1002.33(1), Fla. Stat. The Local Boards do not challenge the overall structure of Florida’s system of public schools or its primary funding mechanism, the Florida Education Finance Program (“FEFP”), and Florida courts have repeatedly ac...

...IX, section 1(a) to ensure adequate provision be made for the “free public schools” in Florida. While charter schools are statutorily considered to be public schools, the reality is that they do compete with the traditional public schools in their districts. Indeed, section 1002.33(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2017), sets forth that one of the purposes of charter schools is to “[p]rovide rigorous competition within the public school district to stimulate continual improvement in all public schools.” Given such...

...Mary White (hereinafter "White") is an African-American and Wilbesan was an African-American-operated charter school. That being said, the following facts were gleaned from a liberal reading of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 12). [4] Plaintiff Wilbesan was a charter school located in Tampa, Florida, established under *1299 § 1002.33 of the Florida Statutes....

...[4] As noted above, subsequent to filing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs filed an Affidavit of Claims (Doc. 15) that sets forth in greater detail and somewhat more clarity the course of events. However, I have not considered this affidavit in connection with the motion to dismiss. [5] Section 1002.33 is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the creation, termination, and operation of charter schools....

...Arguably, Florida law suggests the contrary. Thus, Florida law specifically provides that a school's charter may be terminated immediately if the school's sponsor determines that good cause has been shown or if the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.33(8)(d)....

...The court later entered a final judgment in favor of the School Board, prompting this appeal. Discussion 1 Appellants argue that the Charter Schools are entitled to a proportionate share of the revenues generated by the 2018 Referendum because: (A) section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), requires that public charter school students be funded the same as other public school students; (B) the millage levy authorized under section 1011.71(9) is part of the “current operating discretionary...

...the charter schools; and (C) the passage of House Bill 7123 supports the conclusion that the School Board is required to share the 2018 Referendum revenues. 2 We consider each of these arguments in turn. The first sentence of the charter school funding provision in section 1002.33(17) describes the calculation method for funding students, not the source or amount of such funding Appellants first argue that the Charter Schools are entitled to a proportionate share of the revenues generated from the 2018 Referendum because section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes, requires that public charter school students be funded the same as other public school students. Section 1002.33(17) provides, in pertinent part: (17) Funding.--Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are 1 “The standard of review for an order granting summary judgment is de novo.” State Farm Fla....

...4th DCA 2016). 2 Appellants also rely on a circuit court order from a different circuit that is not binding on this court. -4-  in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district. § 1002.33(17), Fla....

...The weight increases the amount of funds a district is eligible to receive since the FTE is multiplied by the program cost factor to reach a weighted FTE. § 1011.62(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2018). With this context in mind, we conclude that the first sentence of section 1002.33(17) plainly requires charter school funding to take into account whether charter school students are enrolled in a “basic” or “special” education program, “the same as” is done with non-charter public school funding....

...funding source or amount. -5-  Appellants look to a 2004 Attorney General Opinion (“AGO”) to support their interpretation of the statute. That opinion addressed the question of “whether the language of section 1002.33, Florida Statutes, requires that charter schools be funded ‘the same as’ other schools in the public school system.” Op....

...ll of the same sources as district-operated schools and, instead, merely repeated the language of the charter school funding provision without analysis. For these reasons, we conclude that the language of the charter school funding provision in section 1002.33(17) simply makes the method of calculating funding for charter schools and non-charter schools the same; it does not mean that the funding amount or sources of funding are the same....

...were not entitled to receive a portion of the proceeds from the 2018 Referendum on this basis. The millage levy authorized under section 1011.71(9) is not part of the “current operating discretionary millage” that must be shared with the Charter Schools Section 1002.33(17)(b), Florida Statutes, sets forth the sources of funding for charter schools: (b) The basis for the agreement for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance program as provided in s....

...district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school[.] § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla....

...Appellants contend that the 2018 Referendum revenues are part of the “current operating discretionary millage levy,” and therefore must be shared with the charter schools. -6-  This argument fails for two reasons: (1) the phrase “current operating discretionary millage levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b) refers solely to the nonvoted discretionary millage levy authorized by section 1011.71(1); and (2) the phrase “current operating discretionary millage levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b) refers to a source of funds which are a component of the FEFP funds, and does not include the separate additional millage levy authorized under section 1011.71(9), which is expressly excluded from the FEFP funds. Each of these points is addressed in turn. 1. The phrase “Current Operating Discretionary Millage Levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b) refers to the nonvoted discretionary millage levy contemplated under section 1011.71(1) The Legislature’s use of the phrase “current operating discretionary millage” in section 1002.33(17)(b) refers to the single nonvoted discretionary millage levy contemplated under section 1011.71(1), which states: 1011.71 District School Tax (1) If the district school tax is not provided in the General Appropr...

...chool operational purposes.” Id. Further, as the trial court noted below, a millage levy under subsection (9) is not discretionary, as it requires voter approval, and therefore the use of the phrase “current operating discretionary millage” in section 1002.33(17)(b) cannot be reasonably 3 Section 200.001(3), Florida Statutes, which sets forth different categories of school millage rates, recognizes “nonvoted discretionary school operating millage” and “voted district school operating millage” as separate and distinct categories. § 200.001(3)(b),(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). -8- interpreted to refer to the additional voted-upon millage in section 1011.71(9). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the language of section 1002.33(17)(b) predates the additional voted-upon millage in section 1011.71(9)....

...“combined” refers to the combination of the various millages for the purpose of assessing whether the combined rate complies with the overall constitutional limit on total assessed millage. 2. The phrase “Current Operating Discretionary Millage Levy” in section 1002.33(17)(b) refers to a subset of the FEFP funds, not a separate source of funds The text of section 1002.33(17)(b) makes clear that the phrase “current operating discretionary millage levy” refers to a source of funds which are 4 The charter school statute was enacted in 1996 (previously section 228.056, Florida Statutes) and is now codified at section 1002.33, Florida Statutes....

...ida Statutes. -9- a component of the district’s FEFP funds and does not include the separate “additional” millage levy authorized under section 1011.71(9), which is expressly excluded from the FEFP funds. Section 1002.33(17)(b) provides that funding for students enrolled in charter schools is limited to the sum of the school district’s operating funds from the FEFP and the General Appropriations Act, and then provides examples of the subset of funds...

...district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school. . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla....

...(2018) (emphasis added). Although section 1011.71(9) expressly states that revenues generated pursuant to the voted-upon millage are excluded from the FEFP funds, appellants contend that this clear legislative mandate has no bearing on whether such revenues must be shared with public charter schools. They contend that section 1002.33(17)(b) guarantees charter schools sources of funding that exist outside of the FEFP, such as the “current operating discretionary millage levy.” However, the language of section 1002.33(17)(b) indicates that the “current operating discretionary millage levy” is not a separate source of funding apart from the FEFP....

...from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” are all examples of operating funds from the FEFP and the General Appropriations Act. Appellants contend that the sources of funding listed after the word “including” in section 1002.33(17)(b) are not illustrative of sources of FEFP funding; they say the use of the word “including” exists only to clarify that public charter schools are entitled to both state and local FEFP funds....

...The very manual upon which appellants rely even noted that discretionary lottery funds “are added to the FEFP allocation that is distributed to the districts” and are therefore a part of the FEFP funding. Regarding the “current operating discretionary millage levy” referred to in section 1002.33(17)(b), appellants assert that this is a source of funding existing outside of the FEFP....

...State to provide, as part of the FEFP, a supplement based on a district’s - 11 - current operating discretionary millage levy if that millage were not also a component of the district’s FEFP funds. A logical reading of section 1002.33(17)(b) compels the conclusion that each of the items listed after the word “including” are all components of the FEFP. Because a voted millage levied under section 1011.71(9) is excluded from the FEFP calculation and charter s...

...ative intent”). Second, the Legislature ultimately did not adopt language which would have made the amendment retroactive. An earlier version of the bill proposing the amendment stated: “The provisions of this act relating to ss. 1011.71 and 1002.33, Florida Statutes, amending and clarifying the use of certain voted discretionary operating millages levied by school districts, apply to revenues collected on or after July 1, 2019.” (Emphasis added)....

...By excluding charter schools from that portion of the current discretionary operating millage levy permitted by section 1011.71(9), as approved by voters in the 2018 Referendum, the school - 14 - district is violating section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added)....

...ion and internal quotation marks omitted). I would reverse the circuit court’s final judgment, and remand for the circuit court to enter a new final judgment finding the 2018 Referendum was illegal and therefore void. A. Interpreting sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) in harmony according to plain meaning favors the charter schools’ position. The method by which students enrolled in charter schools are funded, and the sources from which such funding is derived, are provided in Section 1002.33(17), Florida Statutes (2018), entitled “Charter schools.” That section provides, in pertinent part: (17) Funding....

...district’s current operating discretionary millage levy; divided by total funded weighted full-time equivalent students in the school district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school. . . . § 1002.33(17)(b), Fla....

... Because the increased operating millages permitted by sections 1011.71(1) and (9) are both discretionary, and because a school district’s “current operating discretionary millage levy” is to be included in the method of funding students enrolled in a charter school under section 1002.33(17)(b), the school district’s exclusion of charter schools from the 2018 Referendum violated section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” See Sch....

...2009) (“[W]e give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). B. The school district’s arguments lack merit. 1. The school district misinterprets sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) as providing two distinct funding mechanisms. The sections are related and must be read in harmony. The school district argues sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9) provide two distinct funding mechanisms and, therefore, section 1002.33(17) has no application to the instant case. According to the school district, “[g]eneral funding for charter schools under [section 1002.33(17)(b)] includes a mandatory requirement that [Florida Education Finance Program] funds be distributed to charter schools,” but section 1011.71(9) explicitly states “additional millage for school operational purposes” generated after a local referendum or general election “do not become part of the calculation of the Florida Education Finance Program.” The flaw in the school district’s reasoning is that charter schools’ general funding under section 1002.33(17)(b) does not include only Florida Education Finance Program components. Rather, section 1002.33(17)(b)’s plain language provides charter schools’ funding is “the sum of” three sources: (1) “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s....

...district; multiplied by the weighted full-time equivalent students for the charter school.” - 17 -  The flaw in the school district’s reasoning arises from its misapplication of the word “including” within section 1002.33(17)(b)....

...1011.62 and the General Appropriations Act,” what else is the fund for students enrolled in a charter school to be “the sum of”? The question cannot be answered, because interpreting the word “including” as modifying each funding component stated within section 1002.33(17)(b) improperly renders the phrase “the sum of” as mere surplusage....

...construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The only logical construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the word “including” modifies only its nearest reasonable referent, that is, “gross state and local funds.” See Scherer v....

...modifiers (adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, restrictive clauses) should be read as modifying the nearest noun, verb, or other sentence element to which they can reasonably be said to pertain.”) (emphasis added). Thus, the proper construction of section 1002.33(17)(b) is that the basis for the agreement for funding students enrolled in a charter school shall be the sum of “the school district’s operating funds from the Florida Education Finance Program as provided in s....

...“funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy” include increased operating millages permitted by both sections 1011.71(1) and (9). - 18 -  2. The school district overlooks section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning that charter school students shall be funded by the same method as other public school students. The school district correctly argues that section 1002.33(17) describes the method of funding charter school students. However, the school district then argues the method of funding charter school students is not the same as the method for funding public school students, despite the plain meaning of section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence – “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the s...

...al Texts 152 (1st ed. 2012) (the nearest-reasonable-reference canon “applies not just to words that precede the modifier, but also to words that follow it.”) (emphasis added). Applying the nearest-reasonable-referent canon to section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence, the modifier “the same as” may apply to the antecedent phrase “shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program,” or may apply to the subsequent phrase “students enrolled in othe...

...phrase “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school.” In reaching my opinion, I have not ignored (as the school district has faulted the charter schools for ignoring) the antecedent phrase “as if they are in a basic program or a special program” within section 1002.33(17)’s first sentence....

...en, ages birth through 2 years, with established conditions that are identified in State Board of Education rules pursuant to s. 1003.21(1)(e).” (emphasis added). Based on the foregoing, I agree with the charter schools’ argument that, under section 1002.33(17)’s plain meaning, “Students enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the school district.” (emphasis added). 3....

...in part and dissenting in part) (proposing that “legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative intent”). Conclusion In sum, our review should be limited to the 2018 versions of sections 1002.33(17) and 1011.71(9), and how those statutes may be read in harmony according to their plain meaning. In my opinion, by excluding charter schools from that portion of the current discretionary operating millage levy provided in section 1011.71(9), as approved by voters in the 2018 Referendum, the school district is violating section 1002.33(17)’s requirement that “[s]tudents enrolled in a charter school, regardless of the sponsorship, shall be funded as if they are in a basic program or a special program, the same as students enrolled in other public schools in the s...

...llowing questions: 1. Would the creation of a three-member team designated by the board of directors of a private charter school to make all employment, promotion, and disciplinary decisions within the school satisfy the antinepotism requirements of section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes? 2....

...In light of the absence of language such as that contained in section 112.3135 (2)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibiting action by a collegial body in the appointment or employment of relatives, it does not appear that the creation of such a team to make employment decisions for the Bay Haven Charter Academy would violate section 1002.33 (24), Florida Statutes....

...Question One According to information supplied with your request, Bay Haven Charter Academy, Inc., (hereinafter "Bay Haven" or "the academy") is a charter school located in Bay County, Florida. The academy was created as a not-for-profit corporation which operates a kindergarten through eighth grade school pursuant to section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes, with the oversight of its sponsor, the Bay County School Board....

...has been renewed annually each year for the past several years. Florida's antinepotism laws have been adopted to prohibit those public officials who have the power to appoint or promote or recommend their own relatives from exercising that power. 1 Section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes, making provision for charter schools in Florida, was amended in 2009 2 to include the following restriction on the employment of relatives: "(24) RESTRICTION ON EMPLOYMENT OF RELATIVES....

...wing a commission member to abstain. If each member of a commission were allowed to abstain, the board could conceivable employ a relative of each of its members." 7 You have suggested that it may be possible to avoid the antinepotism prohibition of section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes, by adoption of a policy by the board creating a three member team consisting of the principal, the chief financial officer, and a third party from Bay Haven Charter Academy to review all employment, promotion, and disciplinary decisions within the school....

...In light of the absence of language such as that contained in section 112.3135 (2)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibiting action by a collegial body in the appointment or employment of relatives, it would appear that the creation of such a team to make employment decisions would not violate section 1002.33 (24), Florida Statutes. However, if such a team is created, members thereof continue to be subject to the provisions of section 1002.33 (24), Florida Statutes....

...However, this office has serious concerns with regard to the possible disparate treatment in the employment of charter school personnel in public entity charter schools and in private entity charter schools with regard to the differing standards for antinepotism prohibitions contained in section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes....

...12.3135 (2)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibiting action by a collegial body in the appointment or employment of relatives, I cannot advise you that the creation of such a team to make employment decisions for the Bay Haven Charter Academy would violate section 1002.33 , Florida Statutes. However, if such a team is created, members thereof continue to be subject to the provisions of section 1002.33 (24), Florida Statutes....

...tant who is not a relative of any person being considered. A member of the team would be required to recuse himself or herself from any discussion of or vote on proposed personnel action on that team member's relative. Government in the Sunshine Law Section 1002.33 (1), Florida Statutes, provides that "[c]harter schools shall be part of the state's program of public education" and that "[a]ll charter schools in Florida are public schools." The statute also specifically requires compliance with s...

...collegial body, created by the Bay Haven Charter Academy board of directors to perform these duties would be subject to section 286.011 , Florida Statutes. 14 Public Records Charter schools are specifically made subject to the Public Records Law by section 1002.33 (16)(b), Florida Statutes....

...e Principal of the Bay Haven Academy, those records and meetings of that team would be subject to the Public Records Law and the Government in the Sunshine Law. Sincerely, Bill McCollum Attorney General BM/tgh 1 See , for example, ss. 112.3135 , and 1002.33 (24)(b), Fla....

...he Galbut decision in situations involving collegial bodies. 6 Section 112.3135 (2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1994 Supp.). 7 See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 73-335 (1973). 8 See Article IV, s. 4.1, Bylaws of Bay Haven Charter Academy, Incorporated, dated 4/7/2009). 9 Section 1002.33 (16)(b), Fla....

...2009) (citation omitted). Eagle formerly operated a charter school in Wellington, Florida, sponsored by the Palm Beach County School Board. The term of the charter school contract was five years, commencing July 1, 2014, and ending June 30, 2019. Section 1002.33(8), Florida Statutes, governs the termination of a charter, and provides for two types of terminations: (1) the nonrenewal or termination of a charter within 90 days, and (2) immediate termination of a charter where the health, safety, or welfare of the students is threatened. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d at 1229 (citing 2005 version of the statute). The two types of terminations are treated in different subsections of 1002.33(8)....

...chool of the proposed action in writing. The notice shall state in reasonable detail the grounds for the proposed action and stipulate that the school’s governing board may, within 14 calendar days after receiving the notice, request a hearing.” § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017). On March 16, 2018, the School Board gave Eagle written notice of termination of the charter contract within 90 days pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(b), Florida Statutes (2017). The School Board initiated the 90-day termination proceeding based on Eagle’s alleged “[f]ailure to meet generally accepted standards of fiscal management.” See § 1002.33(8)(a)2., Fla....

...Under the version of the statute in effect at the time, the School Board had the option of conducting the hearing itself or to refer the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) for an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) to conduct the hearing and enter a recommended order. § 1002.33(8)(b)1....

...After two continuances at Eagle’s request, the hearing was ultimately reset for August 9 and 10, 2018. Meanwhile, on July 1, 2018, the applicable termination provision of the charter school statute was amended in part. See Ch. 2018-6, § 9, Laws of Fla.; § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla....

...nd costs incurred during the administrative proceeding and any appeals.” Id. On August 1, 2018, while the 90-day termination proceeding was still pending, the School Board voted to immediately terminate Eagle’s charter contract pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...The ALJ reserved ruling on Eagle’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs and directed the parties to brief the issue. In its subsequent filings, the School Board argued, among other things, that no statutory basis for fees and costs existed because the 2018 version of section 1002.33(8)(b), effective July 1, 2018, could not be retroactively applied in this case, which “arose in April 2018 when the School Board gave notice to [Eagle] that it was pursuing 90-day termination under the 2017 statute.” On September 17, 2018, the ALJ entered his order on Eagle’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the 2018 version of section 1002.33(8)(b)....

...The ALJ then entered his final order awarding attorney’s fees and costs, “without prejudice to the [School Board’s] right to appeal the issue of Eagle’s entitlement . . . .” This appeal by the School Board followed. Analysis Prior to its 2018 amendment, section 1002.33(8)(b) did not contain a fee-shifting provision. See § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017). Effective July 1, 2018, the Legislature added the following fee-shifting provision: “The [ALJ] shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during the administrative proceeding and any appeals.” § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla....

...1st DCA 2006)); see also Bionetics Corp. v. Kenniasty, 69 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2011) (“Substantive statutes are presumed to apply prospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.”). Here, the Legislature did not express a clear intent that the amendment to section 1002.33(8)(b) apply retroactively. Thus, the ALJ correctly agreed with the School Board that the fee-shifting provision in section 1002.33(8)(b) was not intended to, and should not be, applied retroactively....

...identified a date upon which the controlling moment supposedly fell.” The School Board clearly identified the commencement of the case as the operative date. 6 because the [School Board] does not have a cause of action against Eagle under section 1002.33(8), the controlling moment here simply cannot have been, as in [Young], the accrual of the underlying cause of action, to which the right to recover fees might be subordinate.” Eagle argues the ALJ correctly determined that he...

...Here, in contrast, the statute authorizes fees incurred from the commencement of the litigation. Again, the statute provides: “The [ALJ] shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during the administrative proceeding and any appeals.” § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla....

...an action is filed.”). The sponsoring school board must make the initial choice to notice a charter school for termination, after which the charter school must evaluate the sponsor’s reasons for termination and decide whether to contest the termination. § 1002.33(8)(b), Fla....