Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448
Florida Statute 1003.1 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
Florida Statute 1003.01 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
Link to State of Florida Official Statute
F.S. 1003.01 Case Law from Google Scholar Google Search for Amendments to 1003.01

The 2024 Florida Statutes (including 2025 Special Session C)

Title XLVIII
EARLY LEARNING-20 EDUCATION CODE
Chapter 1003
PUBLIC K-12 EDUCATION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 1003.01
1003.01 Definitions.As used in this chapter, the term:
(1) “Alternative measures for students with special needs” or “special programs” means measures designed to meet the special needs of a student that cannot be met by regular school curricula.
(2) “Career education” means education that provides instruction for the following purposes:
(a) At the elementary, middle, and high school levels, exploratory courses designed to give students initial exposure to a broad range of occupations to assist them in preparing their academic and occupational plans, and practical arts courses that provide generic skills that may apply to many occupations but are not designed to prepare students for entry into a specific occupation. Career education provided before high school completion must be designed to strengthen both occupational awareness and academic skills integrated throughout all academic instruction.
(b) At the secondary school level, job-preparatory instruction in the competencies that prepare students for effective entry into an occupation, including diversified cooperative education, work experience, and job-entry programs that coordinate directed study and on-the-job training.
(c) At the postsecondary education level, courses of study that provide competencies needed for entry into specific occupations or for advancement within an occupation.
(3) “Certified unaccompanied homeless youth” means a youth certified as an unaccompanied homeless youth pursuant to s. 743.067.
(4) “Children and youths who are experiencing homelessness,” for programs authorized under subtitle B, Education for Homeless Children and Youths, of Title VII of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. ss. 11431 et seq., means children and youths who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence, and includes:
(a) Children and youths sharing the housing of other persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason; living in motels, hotels, travel trailer parks, or camping grounds due to the lack of alternative adequate accommodations; living in emergency or transitional shelters; or abandoned in hospitals.
(b) Children and youths having a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.
(c) Children and youths living in cars, parks, public spaces, abandoned buildings, bus or train stations, or similar settings.
(d) Migratory children living in circumstances described in paragraphs (a)-(c).
(5) “Core-curricula courses” means:
(a) Courses in language arts/reading, mathematics, social studies, and science in prekindergarten through grade 3, excluding extracurricular courses pursuant to subsection (11);
(b) Courses in grades 4 through 8 in subjects that are measured by state assessment at any grade level and courses required for middle school promotion, excluding extracurricular courses pursuant to subsection (11);
(c) Courses in grades 9 through 12 in subjects that are measured by state assessment at any grade level and courses that are specifically identified by name in statute as required for high school graduation and that are not measured by state assessment, excluding extracurricular courses pursuant to subsection (11);
(d) Exceptional student education courses; and
(e) English for Speakers of Other Languages courses.

The term is limited in meaning and used for the sole purpose of designating classes that are subject to the maximum class size requirements established in s. 1, Art. IX of the State Constitution. This term does not include courses offered under ss. 1002.321(4)(e), 1002.33(7)(a)2.c., 1002.37, 1002.45, and 1003.499.

(6) “Corporal punishment” means the moderate use of physical force or physical contact by a teacher or principal as may be necessary to maintain discipline or to enforce school rule. However, the term “corporal punishment” does not include the use of such reasonable force by a teacher or principal as may be necessary for self-protection or to protect other students from disruptive students.
(7) “District school board” means the members who are elected by the voters of a school district created and existing pursuant to s. 4, Art. IX of the State Constitution to operate and control public K-12 education within the school district.
(8) “Dropout” means a student who meets any one or more of the following criteria:
(a) The student has voluntarily removed himself or herself from the school system before graduation for reasons that include, but are not limited to, marriage, or the student has withdrawn from school because he or she has failed the statewide student assessment test and thereby does not receive any of the certificates of completion;
(b) The student has not met the relevant attendance requirements of the school district pursuant to State Board of Education rules, or the student was expected to attend a school but did not enter as expected for unknown reasons, or the student’s whereabouts are unknown;
(c) The student has withdrawn from school, but has not transferred to another public or private school or enrolled in any career, adult, home education, or alternative educational program;
(d) The student has withdrawn from school due to hardship, unless such withdrawal has been granted under the provisions of s. 322.091, court action, expulsion, medical reasons, or pregnancy; or
(e) The student is not eligible to attend school because of reaching the maximum age for an exceptional student program in accordance with the district’s policy.

The State Board of Education may adopt rules to implement the provisions of this subsection.

(9)(a) “Exceptional student” means any student who has been determined eligible for a special program in accordance with rules of the State Board of Education. The term includes students who are gifted and students with disabilities who have an intellectual disability; autism spectrum disorder; a speech impairment; a language impairment; an orthopedic impairment; an other health impairment; traumatic brain injury; a visual impairment; an emotional or behavioral disability; or a specific learning disability, including, but not limited to, dyslexia, dyscalculia, or developmental aphasia; students who are deaf or hard of hearing or dual sensory impaired; students who are hospitalized or homebound; children with developmental delays ages birth through 9 years or through the student’s completion of grade 2, whichever occurs first, or children, ages birth through 2 years, with established conditions that are identified in State Board of Education rules pursuant to s. 1003.21(1)(e).
(b) “Special education services” means specially designed instruction and such related services as are necessary for an exceptional student to benefit from education. Such services may include transportation; diagnostic and evaluation services; social services; physical and occupational therapy; speech and language pathology services; job placement; orientation and mobility training; braillists, typists, and readers for the blind; interpreters and auditory amplification; services provided by a certified listening and spoken language specialist; rehabilitation counseling; transition services; mental health services; guidance and career counseling; specified materials, assistive technology devices, and other specialized equipment; and other such services as approved by rules of the state board.
(10) “Expulsion” means the removal of the right and obligation of a student to attend a public school under conditions set by the district school board, and for a period of time not to exceed the remainder of the term or school year and 1 additional year of attendance. Expulsions may be imposed with or without continuing educational services and shall be reported accordingly.
(11) “Extracurricular courses” means all courses that are not defined as “core-curricula courses,” which may include, but are not limited to, physical education, fine arts, performing fine arts, career education, and courses that may result in college credit. The term is limited in meaning and used for the sole purpose of designating classes that are not subject to the maximum class size requirements established in s. 1, Art. IX of the State Constitution.
(12) “Habitual truant” means a student who has 15 unexcused absences within 90 calendar days with or without the knowledge or consent of the student’s parent, is subject to compulsory school attendance under s. 1003.21(1) and (2)(a), and is not exempt under s. 1003.21(3) or s. 1003.24, or by meeting the criteria for any other exemption specified by law or rules of the State Board of Education. Such a student must have been the subject of the activities specified in ss. 1003.26 and 1003.27(3), without resultant successful remediation of the truancy problem before being dealt with as a child in need of services according to the provisions of chapter 984.
(13)(a) “In-school suspension” means the temporary removal of a student from the student’s regular school program and placement in an alternative program, such as that provided in s. 1003.53, under the supervision of district school board personnel, for a period not to exceed 10 school days.
(b) “Suspension,” also referred to as out-of-school suspension, means the temporary removal of a student from all classes of instruction on public school grounds and all other school-sponsored activities, except as authorized by the principal or the principal’s designee, for a period not to exceed 10 school days and remanding of the student to the custody of the student’s parent with specific homework assignments for the student to complete.
(14)(a) “Juvenile justice education programs or schools” means programs or schools operating for the purpose of providing educational services to youth in Department of Juvenile Justice programs, for a school year composed of 250 days of instruction, or the equivalent expressed in hours as specified in State Board of Education rule, distributed over 12 months. If the period of operation is expressed in hours, the State Board of Education must review the calculation annually. A district school board, including an educational entity under s. 985.619, may decrease the minimum number of days of instruction by up to 20 days or equivalent hours as specified in the State Board of Education rule for teacher planning, subject to the approval of the Department of Juvenile Justice and the Department of Education.
(b) “Juvenile justice provider” means the Department of Juvenile Justice, the sheriff, or a private, public, or other governmental organization under contract with the Department of Juvenile Justice or the sheriff that provides treatment, care and custody, or educational programs for youth in juvenile justice intervention, detention, or commitment programs.
(15) “Physical education” means the development or maintenance of skills related to strength, agility, flexibility, movement, and stamina, including dance; the development of knowledge and skills regarding teamwork and fair play; the development of knowledge and skills regarding nutrition and physical fitness as part of a healthy lifestyle; and the development of positive attitudes regarding sound nutrition and physical activity as a component of personal well-being.
(16) “Regular school attendance” means the actual attendance of a student during the school day as defined by law and rules of the State Board of Education. Regular attendance within the intent of s. 1003.21 may be achieved by attendance in:
(a) A public school supported by public funds;
(b) A parochial, religious, or denominational school;
(c) A private school supported in whole or in part by tuition charges or by endowments or gifts;
(d) A home education program that meets the requirements of chapter 1002;
(e) A private tutoring program that meets the requirements of chapter 1002; or
(f) A personalized education program that meets the requirements of s. 1002.395.
(17) “School” means an organization of students for instructional purposes on an elementary, middle or junior high school, secondary or high school, or other public school level authorized under rules of the State Board of Education.
History.s. 111, ch. 2002-387; s. 1, ch. 2003-391; s. 81, ch. 2004-357; s. 15, ch. 2006-74; s. 2, ch. 2007-28; s. 5, ch. 2008-147; s. 3, ch. 2008-204; s. 6, ch. 2009-164; s. 14, ch. 2011-55; s. 15, ch. 2011-175; s. 10, ch. 2012-133; s. 3, ch. 2013-225; s. 33, ch. 2014-39; s. 1, ch. 2021-70; s. 1, ch. 2022-24; s. 6, ch. 2022-65; s. 148, ch. 2023-8; s. 10, ch. 2023-16; s. 25, ch. 2023-108; s. 25, ch. 2024-133; s. 3, ch. 2024-162.

F.S. 1003.01 on Google Scholar

F.S. 1003.01 on CourtListener

Amendments to 1003.01


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 1003.01

Total Results: 48

Luz Marina Silva v. U.S. Attorney General

448 F.3d 1229, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11475

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: May 5, 2006 | Docket: 3174

Cited 347 times | Published

F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir.2003); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (i). Silva complains that the Board of Immigration

Feng Chai Yang v. United States Attorney General

418 F.3d 1198, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15596

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jul 29, 2005 | Docket: 204569

Cited 329 times | Published

opinion the IJ’s decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), the IJ’s decision is the final agency determination

Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S. Attorney General

492 F.3d 1223, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16950

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jul 17, 2007 | Docket: 2028711

Cited 257 times | Published

affirms the IJ's decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), "we review the IJ's decision as if it were

United States v. Velasquez Velasquez

524 F.3d 1248, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 8640

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Apr 21, 2008 | Docket: 1508

Cited 177 times | Published

determining the cases coming before [it]." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). Moreover, even if the BIA did affirm

Michaelle Lapaix v. U.S. Attorney General

605 F.3d 1138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 9678

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: May 12, 2010 | Docket: 522601

Cited 161 times | Published

may grant summary dismissal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i). Specifically, the code vests discretion

Maria Belen Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Attorney General

913 F.3d 1301

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jan 25, 2019 | Docket: 14516830

Cited 93 times | Published

Id. at 1012-13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 ; BIA Prac. Man., Ch. 1.3(a)(i) (rev. 6/15/2014)

Gbaya v. United States Attorney General

342 F.3d 1219, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16898, 2003 WL 21961804

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 19, 2003 | Docket: 397726

Cited 88 times | Published

redesignated and can now be found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E). 2 . Lozada's third

Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Attorney General

703 F.3d 1303, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 295

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jan 4, 2013 | Docket: 890034

Cited 71 times | Published

evidence. Under the relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(8), the BIA is empowered to review an IJ’s

Jacqueline Stevens v. U.S. Attorney General

877 F.3d 1293

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Dec 15, 2017 | Docket: 6242636

Cited 66 times | Published

also bound both by agency precedent, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g), and by precedent established by the federal

Sammir A. Poveda v. U.S. Attorney General

692 F.3d 1168, 2012 WL 3655293, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18159

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 27, 2012 | Docket: 593315

Cited 41 times | Published

unless it is modified or overruled. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g). And the majority points to no authority to

Darvin Daniel Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney General

935 F.3d 1148

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 21, 2019 | Docket: 16092142

Cited 26 times | Published

cases coming before the Board." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (d)(1)(ii). That duty exists independent

Ilian Esponda v. U.S. Attorney General

453 F.3d 1319, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 16182

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jun 28, 2006 | Docket: 398618

Cited 26 times | Published

summarily dismissing an appeal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) solely because a petitioner indicated

Nelson Javier Sosa-Martinez v. U.S. Atty. Gen.

420 F.3d 1338, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17990

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 22, 2005 | Docket: 398395

Cited 24 times | Published

the BIA entered an order, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), summarily affirming the IJ’s decision.

Kazanjian v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County

967 So. 2d 259, 2007 WL 2710760

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 19, 2007 | Docket: 1454213

Cited 18 times | Published

unexcused absences within 90 calendar days." § 1003.01(8), Fla. Stat (2005). Though the statute does

Allison Realty Co. v. Graves Investment Co.

155 So. 745, 115 Fla. 48, 1934 Fla. LEXIS 1464

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: May 25, 1934 | Docket: 3272447

Cited 18 times | Published

as amended by Chapter 15053, Acts of 1931, Section 1003 (1), et seq., Cum. Supp., C. G. L., 1934, to foreclose

Andre Martello Barton v. U.S. Attorney General

904 F.3d 1294

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Sep 25, 2018 | Docket: 7930086

Cited 13 times | Published

that it is permissible under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (e)(4)(i)(A) for the Board to summarily

Town of Ponce Inlet v. Rancourt

627 So. 2d 586, 1993 WL 495972

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 3, 1993 | Docket: 1254841

Cited 6 times | Published

[1] pictures of the Rancourts' property, and section 1003.01 of the zoning ordinance. The record indicates

In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2012-09

122 So. 3d 263, 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 617, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 1893, 2013 WL 4734579

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Sep 4, 2013 | Docket: 60234660

Cited 5 times | Published

instructional services that meet the intent of Fla. Stat. 1003.01(13) or that gives preemployment or supplementary

Finest Meridor v. U.S. Attorney General

891 F.3d 1302

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jun 7, 2018 | Docket: 7079931

Cited 4 times | Published

determination for anything but clear error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (d)(3)(i). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182

Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County, Florida

842 F.3d 1324, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21702, 2016 WL 7099781

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Dec 6, 2016 | Docket: 4548857

Cited 4 times | Published

equate secondary and high schools, id. § 1003.01, and another provision suggests that only high

Brinklys v. Johnson

175 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42211, 2016 WL 1244539

District Court, M.D. Florida | Filed: Mar 30, 2016 | Docket: 64308001

Cited 4 times | Published

submitted for the first time on appeal. Part 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) provides: Except for taking administrative

Van Den Borre v. State

596 So. 2d 687, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 548, 1992 WL 12174

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 29, 1992 | Docket: 1358972

Cited 2 times | Published

Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 1003[01] (1983). The trial court should require persuasive

Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board

2 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28907, 2014 WL 897072

District Court, M.D. Florida | Filed: Mar 6, 2014 | Docket: 64293503

Cited 1 times | Published

debate on this issue, and that statute, Fla. Stat. § 1003.01, favors the position of the School Board: 1003

Elias Jimenez-Galicia v. U.S. Attorney General

690 F.3d 1207, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16907

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 13, 2012 | Docket: 1074217

Cited 1 times | Published

to carry out in individual cases, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1). . See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) ("The

In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2011-03

95 So. 3d 868, 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 352, 2012 WL 2848895, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 961

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: May 17, 2012 | Docket: 60311327

Cited 1 times | Published

children and has one or more play structures. § 1003.01 Fla. Stat. “School” means an organization of

First Nat. Bank of Bradenton v. Albee

169 So. 613, 125 Fla. 171

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Aug 6, 1936 | Docket: 3266049

Cited 1 times | Published

1935, under Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, Section 1003 (1), et seq., 1934 and 1936 Supp. to C.G.L., it

Sheldon Turner v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jan 30, 2025 | Docket: 67645147

Published

Argued: Jul 28, 2023

its implementing regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (“The Attorney

Karastan Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Mar 6, 2024 | Docket: 66680340

Published

as he did here. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h); Yu, 568 F.3d at 1333 (“The fact that

Karastan Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Mar 6, 2024 | Docket: 66680340

Published

as he did here. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h); Yu, 568 F.3d at 1333 (“The fact that

Karastan L. Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Dec 23, 2022 | Docket: 66680340

Published

as he did here. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h); Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1328, 1333

Karastan L. Edwards v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Dec 23, 2022 | Docket: 66680340

Published

as he did here. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h); Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1328, 1333

Rainey Muoka Mutua v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jan 5, 2022 | Docket: 61690838

Published

ultimately found one side more credible. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (“Facts determined by the [IJ], includ-

Pathmanathan Jathursan v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Nov 17, 2021 | Docket: 61494522

Published

the immigration judge did not decide. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3); see also Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Att’y Gen

Visavakumar Thamotar v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Jun 17, 2021 | Docket: 59993054

Published

discretionary grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) and acknowledged that although § 1208

Maxime P. Blanc v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: May 11, 2021 | Docket: 59897515

Published

decisions of immigration judges de novo.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii). And when the Board considers a petitioner’s

ACADEMY FOR POSITIVE LEARNING, INC. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 24, 2021 | Docket: 59678211

Published

education, science, and social studies.” Section 1003.01(10), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “Special

Pankajkumar Patel v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 19, 2020 | Docket: 17460638

Published

Act and its implementing regulations,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), the scope of an individual immigration

Pankajkumar Patel v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 19, 2020 | Docket: 17465973

Published

Act and its implementing regulations,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), the scope of an individual immigration

ACADEMY FOR POSITIVE LEARNING, INC. v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 22, 2020 | Docket: 17089296

Published

education, science, and social studies.” Section 1003.01(10), Florida Statutes (2018), defines “Special

L.M. v. State

256 So. 3d 226

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 20, 2018 | Docket: 64690132

Published

applicable to the criminal trespass provision. Section 1003.01(5)(a) of the Florida Education Code does include

S. J. v. Malcolm Thomas

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 18, 2017 | Docket: 6244016

Published

removal is clearly defined in the Education Code. § 1003.01, Fla. Stat.; § 1003.53, Fla. Stat. Further, the

Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board

124 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109489, 2015 WL 4999162

District Court, M.D. Florida | Filed: Aug 19, 2015 | Docket: 64303700

Published

debate on this issue, and that statute, Fla. Stat. § 1003.01, favors the position of the School Board: 1003

Aracelys C. Toro v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

707 F.3d 1224, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 731, 2013 WL 409135, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2447

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Feb 4, 2013 | Docket: 1079837

Published

implementing regulations.” 2 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Thus, the BIA “should be accorded

Odulene Dormescar v. U.S. Attorney General

690 F.3d 1258, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17158

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 15, 2012 | Docket: 462137

Published

second notice to appear. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7) (“The Board may return a case to the Service

Odulene Dormescar v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: Aug 15, 2012 | Docket: 2904197

Published

amend the second notice to appear. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(7) (“The Board may return a case to the Service

Michaelle Lapaix v. U.S. Attorney General

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Filed: May 12, 2010 | Docket: 531835

Published

grant summary dismissal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i). Specifically, the code vests discretion

In Re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure

22 So. 3d 9, 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 555, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 1663, 2009 WL 3132829

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Oct 1, 2009 | Docket: 1639562

Published

with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA") and F.S. 1003.01(3). 2. A surrogate parent is needed to act in

Ago

Florida Attorney General Reports | Filed: Nov 23, 2004 | Docket: 3255994

Published

Sincerely, Charlie Crist Attorney General CC/tls 1 Section 1003.01(5)(a), Fla. Stat., defines "suspension", a