Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...s in the sentencing guidelines. See Ch. 95-184, §§ 26-27, at 1716-18. Sections 28-35. These sections amend various statutes relating to monetary compensation for crime victims. See Ch. 95-184, §§ 28-35, at 1718-22. For example, section 28 amends section 960.293, Florida Statutes, to reflect that a crime victim should be compensated in a civil suit for damages for actual losses suffered as a result of the crime....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Ilkanic was convicted of trespass after warning, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to forty-five days in jail. The City of Fort Lauderdale moved to impose a lien on Ilkanic for $50 per day for each day of his incarceration, pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which is part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act ("the Act")....

...(b) If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...State, 669 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Alberts v. State, 711 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the First District's decision and hold that sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), do not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, nor do sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the right to substantive due process....

...Mr. Goad initiated a civil action against the *882 Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr. Goad's incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration....

...itted the criminal offenses resulting in his incarceration. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. 754 So.2d at 96-97. The First District reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that sections 960.293 and 960.297 "afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment," and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 100. Goad now raises two issues for review: first, whether sections 960.293 and 960.297 of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act (the Act) [1] violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; and second, whether these same sections violate the right to substantive due process....

...civil action" and the "lien created upon the imposition of a per diem charge has the same effect as the lien created by the entry of a civil judgment." Id. at 1373. Therefore, we hold that imposing a civil *885 restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment....

...Goad has failed to present clear proof that the Act actually operates as a criminal sanction that is capable of violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws. DUE PROCESS CLAIM Goad claims that the Act violates his substantive due process rights because sections 960.293 and 960.297 attach new legal consequences to events completed prior to the enactment of the law....

...tate and the goal it intended to achieve, and whether individuals are ultimately being treated in a fundamentally unfair manner in derogation of their substantive rights. See id. In Ilkanic, this Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to section 960.293(2)(b): We conclude that imposing a per diem charge on convicted offenders clearly relates to a permissive legislative objective of reimbursing public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons....

...ctive of reimbursing *886 public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons"). CONCLUSION Accordingly, we approve the First District's decision below and disapprove Gary and Alberts to the extent that those cases find that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws....

...al punishment. 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. [4] Section 960.297 provides in full: (1) The state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293. (2) For those convicted offenders convicted prior to July 1, 1994, the state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as a counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293, for the convicted offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994.

...The majority opinion fails to acknowledge that the language it (selectively) quotes from section 960.295(2) can be fully explained by antecedent provisions that, while they render convicts financially liable to the state, do not authorize restitution awards under section 775.089(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). See § 960.293(2), Fla....

...91. Mr. Goad initiated a civil action against the Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr. Goad's incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration....

...ion. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. Following the rendition of a final judgment, the Department appealed to this court to challenge the trial court's disposition of the counterclaim. Sections 960.293 and 960.297 are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act....

...e cost of supervision. Here again, the court relied on the distinction between civil and criminal laws in the case law pertaining to double jeopardy claims. Our application of the Hudson factors in the present case leads us to conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 contain no provision that could be properly characterized as punishment for a crime....

...Finally, although the potential imposition of a lien may have some slight deterrent effect, the mere presence of a deterrent purpose does not render the sanction criminal. Several Florida decisions also provide indirect support for our conclusion that sections 960.293 and 960.297 are not ex post facto laws....

...n Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), when it rejected the double jeopardy argument asserted there. These cases involve different constitutional issues, but the characteristics of the challenged statutes remain the same. If sections 960.293 and 960.297 are civil in nature for due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy purposes, then they are likely civil in nature for ex post facto purposes....

...In Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So.2d 542 (Fla.1980), the court held that the statute did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because it did not increase punishment for prisoners whose crimes were committed before its effective date. Sections 960.293 and *100 960.297 operate in the same way to expose previously convicted inmates to future liability for subsistence costs....

...The court explained, however, that if it were not for the revocation of gain time, it would have concluded that the statute was purely civil. By implication then, the statutes in the present case do not violate the ex post facto clauses. For these reasons, we conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 Florida Statutes afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment....

...Section 960.292 details the procedure for imposing a civil restitution lien order, stating in pertinent part: (1) Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293....

...the civil restitution lien order. See McMurry v. State, 890 So.2d 494, 494-95 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Accordingly, Wilson's procedural argument lacks merit. We agree that Wilson is entitled to partial relief with respect to the costs of incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that: (2) Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs....

...nst the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. Here, Wilson argues the court erred by imposing both $50 daily and $250,000 for costs. We agree. The Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act, which contains section 960.293, does not violate substantive due process because it bears a reasonable relationship to the legislative objective of alleviating the financial burden on the State resulting *686 from the costs of incarceration....

...ons to recover the costs resulting from a convicted offender's sentence). Because Wilson's civil liability boils down to his responsibility to pay for his room, board, and other incarceration costs, see Goad, 845 So.2d at 885, Wilson is liable under section 960.293(2) for either $50 daily or $250,000, but not both....

...First, the Court made clear that governments may legislate imprecise formulas, such as liquidated damages clauses, in order to compensate victims for losses, so long as the damage amount legislated is rationally related to the damage incurred. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. It is our conclusion that the amounts listed in section 960.293 represent reasonable estimates of the losses incurred by crime victims within the bounds defined by Halper and therefore imposition of a lien for the listed amount was not error....

...pellant. We have considered Appellant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. STONE, FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We note that in the instant case, the victim asked for and was awarded less than she was entitled to under section 960.293(1)(a).

...with impunity so long as the judgment entered against the prison guards does not exceed the $50 per day "civil restitution lien" for "damages or losses" the State can obtain for the costs of incarceration pursuant to sections 960.291(1), (5)(b) and 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...w representing "the State of Florida," filed a "motion for imposition of civil restitution lien judgment" against Mr. Green in his criminal case in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. This motion sought a civil restitution lien under sections 960.292(2) and 960.293(2)(b) for "liquidated damages" for the costs of incarceration for fifteen years in prison at the statutory rate of $50 per day....

...isoner's offense or the date the State seeks the costs of incarceration. [2] Ironically, if Mr. Green had committed first-degree murder, a capital offense, rather than manslaughter, his maximum restitution amount would have been set at $250,000. See § 960.293(2)(a)....

...No. 4D09-4771. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. October 6, 2010. Rehearing Denied December 6, 2010. Samuel Welsh, Crawfordville, pro se. No appearance required for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. The imposition of a lien under section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes, is a civil matter, not a matter of criminal sentencing....

...The trial judge accepted appellant's plea, ordered him to serve two three-and-one-half-year concurrent prison terms on the violation of probation and the charge of dealing in stolen property. In addition, the trial judge assessed appellant $10,000 as a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Appellant challenges only the constitutionality of section 960.293....

...(stating that the civil restitution lien is intended to assist the state in collecting the costs "incur[red] as a result of the implementation of a convicted offender's sentence"). An offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction. §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...5th DCA 2007); Cruz v. State, 742 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Ilkanic, 683 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), approved, 705 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1998). Alternatively, the state *127 may seek recovery of the amounts provided for in section 960.293 "in a separate civil action or as a counterclaim in any civil action." See § 960.297(1), Fla....

...Section 95.11(3)(f) provides that a four-year statute of limitation applies to "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability." An action brought pursuant to 960.297(1) is founded on the statutory liability incurred by the convicted offender upon his conviction. See §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...rceration did not begin to run until Appellant filed his action for damages against DOC. This was error. The statute of limitations begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs. See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. The plain language of section 960.293(2) provides that a life-sentenced offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs in a liquidated amount "upon conviction." See also § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat. (" Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to... the state ... as set forth in s. 960.293." (emphasis added)). By the terms of the statute, the offender's conviction is the last element of the action to occur. Thus, we conclude that the state's cause of action under section 960.297(1) to recover "the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293" accrues upon the offender's conviction....

...ion 960.297(1) does not accrue until the offender is released from prison, and because Appellant is still incarcerated, the statute of limitations has not yet started to run. This argument is contrary to the plain language of sections 960.292(1) and 960.293(2), which state that a convicted offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs "upon conviction." Nothing in these statutes suggest that liability for incarceration costs is not *128 triggered until the offender is released, particu...

...We reject this argument because the statute does not authorize the fee as a punishment, but rather as a consequence of being a county prisoner. See Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Fla. 1998) (upholding $50 per diem charge on convicted prisoners under section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), because charge "clearly relates to a permissive legislative objective of reimbursing public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons"); see also Solomos v....

...Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. William John McMurray appeals the trial court's assessment of the cost of his incarceration. He contends that the trial court was without authority to assess such a cost. We disagree and affirm. Section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: (2) Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs....

...The court sentenced him to time served on the battery and trespass counts and to concurrent Prison Releasee Reoffender (fifteen years with credit for time served) and Habitual Felony Offender (fifteen years six months with credit for time served) sentences on the robbery count. Pursuant to section 960.293 of the Florida Statutes, the court also imposed a civil lien against Appellant for incarceration costs. We affirm in all respects and write to address the propriety of the amount of the lien.1 Section 960.293(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that “[u]pon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local 1 Appellant also takes issue with the trial court’s limitation of his counsel’s questions during voir dire, the constitutionality of section 960.293, and the constitutionality of his Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences. We affirm on these issues without further comment. subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs.” § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). Section 960.293(2)(b) specifies that: If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing. § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...Appellant challenges the amount of the lien, arguing that he cannot be charged for days he was incarcerated but not yet sentenced. We disagree. Although no Florida court has considered whether a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs associated with time-served under section 960.293(2)(b), the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[s]ection 960.293(2) does not limit costs to those incurred after conviction.” Riggins v....

...RAMIREZ, J. Miami-Dade County appeals from a summary final judgment which awards the County compensation for the actual number of days served by appellee Mel Tyrone Moss rather than for the number of days to which he was sentenced. We reverse because section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000) provides that the County is entitled to compensation for the days of Moss' sentence....

...Moss entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to 364 days incarceration. He actually served only 271 days, presumably as a result of "gain time" earned for good behavior. After his release, the County filed suit against Moss to recover the costs of incarceration pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2000). Section 960.293(2) provides that a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs....

...The trial court held that the statute was intended to compensate the state and its subdivisions for the part of the sentence that was actually served and entered final judgment for the County in the amount of $13,550. We reverse because the plain language of section 960.293(2)(b) states that damages are liquidated for the number of days of the convicted offender's sentence, not the number of days actually served....

...Eric Ilkanic (“Ilkanic”) was convicted of trespass after warning, a second degree misdemeanor, and sentenced to 45 days in the Fort Lauderdale jail. The City of Fort Lauderdale (“the City”) then moved the court to impose a lien on Ilkanic in the amount of $50.00 per day for each day of incarceration, pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b)....

...on is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted of *565 fender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions.” § 960.293(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). In Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we held that section 960.293 creates a civil lien remedy and the amounts listed in subsection one are reasonable estimates of losses incurred by crime victims....

...Similarly, we now hold that a liquidated damage of $50 per day, pursuant to subsection two, is reasonable compensation to the state for costs incurred in incarcerating convicted offenders and bears a reasonable relationship to the valid legislative purpose of alleviating the burden of incarcerating criminal offenders. See § 960.293(2)(b)j Fla....

...murder. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence. O'Neal v. State, 244 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table decision). In September 2022, the department filed in the circuit court a motion to impose a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2022)....

...(2022) ("Funds, resources, or employees of this state or its political subdivisions may not be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings unless the use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated."). Pertinent here, section 960.293(2) provides that "[u]pon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs."1 The State may seek these damages in a civil action or as a 1 Such damages are liquidated. For a life or capital felony, the offender is liable for $250,000. § 960.293(2)(a)....

...the "duration of the sentence or up to [five] years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." § 960.292(2); Wilson v. State, 957 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Proceedings to impose civil restitution liens pursuant to section 960.293 are civil in nature....

...2d at 1115. The public defender is not authorized to represent O'Neal in this civil restitution lien proceeding because it is civil in nature and does not implicate O'Neal's liberty interests. Further, defending against the department's efforts to obtain a civil restitution lien under section 960.293(2) does not invoke the due process concerns that justify the appointment of counsel in postconviction relief proceedings. The authorities relied on by the circuit court do not authorize appointment of public defenders in civil restitution lien proceedings. Graham addressed the right to counsel in state and federal collateral relief proceedings for death row inmates. 372 So. 2d at 1365. The test is liable for $50 per day based on the length of the sentence imposed. § 960.293(2)(b). 5 announced in Graham has been applied to determine when a defendant is entitled to counsel in postconviction relief proceedings generally....

...murder. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence. O'Neal v. State, 244 So. 3d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (table decision). In September 2022, the department filed in the circuit court a motion to impose a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2022)....

...(2022) ("Funds, resources, or employees of this state or its political subdivisions may not be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings unless the use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated."). Pertinent here, section 960.293(2) provides that "[u]pon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs."1 The State may seek these damages in a civil action or as a 1 Such damages are liquidated. For a life or capital felony, the offender is liable for $250,000. § 960.293(2)(a)....

...the "duration of the sentence or up to [five] years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." § 960.292(2); Wilson v. State, 957 So. 2d 683, 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Proceedings to impose civil restitution liens pursuant to section 960.293 are civil in nature....

...2d at 1115. The public defender is not authorized to represent O'Neal in this civil restitution lien proceeding because it is civil in nature and does not implicate O'Neal's liberty interests. Further, defending against the department's efforts to obtain a civil restitution lien under section 960.293(2) does not invoke the due process concerns that justify the appointment of counsel in postconviction relief proceedings. The authorities relied on by the circuit court do not authorize appointment of public defenders in civil restitution lien proceedings. Graham addressed the right to counsel in state and federal collateral relief proceedings for death row inmates. 372 So. 2d at 1365. The test is liable for $50 per day based on the length of the sentence imposed. § 960.293(2)(b). 5 announced in Graham has been applied to determine when a defendant is entitled to counsel in postconviction relief proceedings generally....

...Within eight months after entry of the restitution order, DOC filed its motion for imposition of a civil restitution lien judgment pursuant to the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims’ Remedy Act (the “Act”), specifically sections 960.291(5)(b)(1) and 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...ntencing. Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes (2022), provides: “Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293.” Section 960.292(2), in turn, provides: Upon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion, the court in which the convicted offender is c...

...the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later. 1 Section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), provides: If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be a...

...The trial judge accepted appellant’s plea and sentenced him to forty-eight months incarceration. In addition, restitution in the amount of $17.59 to the Spur Station was ordered, and a $10,000.00 civil restitution lien was orally assessed pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...The trial court sentenced the defendant to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ probation. At the sentencing hearing, the State did not raise the restitution issue; the trial court simply ordered $2,500 in restitution. The court then pronounced that pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2014), the court was required to enter a civil lien in the amount of $27,000 for the costs of incarceration....

...He also argues the court erred in imposing a civil lien in the amount of $27,000. The State agrees that the restitution must be reversed. As to the civil lien, however, the State argues the trial court correctly imposed the civil lien, pursuant to section 960.293, Florida Statutes. “We review a trial court’s restitution order for an abuse of discretion.” Prinz v....

...it. Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part that upon conviction, “the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293.” § 960.292(1), Fla....

...Subsection (2) provides that “the court in which the convicted offender is convicted shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and other aggrieved parties.” Id. § 960.292(2) (emphasis added). Section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides for the imposition of a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day. § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...“Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.” Id. Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eighteen months’ imprisonment, which is 547.5 days. It then imposed costs of incarceration in accordance with sections 960.292 and 960.293....

...n costs in favor of both the Sheriffs office and the State. We write solely to address that issue. Here, the trial court imposed a $25,500 civil restitution lien in favor of the Sheriffs office and a $250,000 lien in favor of the State, relying upon section 960.293, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...(b) If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. § 960.293(2)(a)-(b), Fla....

...Whatever factual distinctions exist between Wilson and the instant case, and regardless of the wisdom of compensating local law enforcement for pre-trial incarceration, the plain language of the statute simply does not permit the imposition of a lien under both subsections. As written, section 960.293 sets forth two scenarios: one where the defendant is convicted of a capital or life felony, triggering a liquidated damages lien of $250,000; and one where the defendant is convicted of any offense other than a capital or life felony,...

...WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. . In 2009, subsection (2)(b) was amended and a final sentence added. The final sentence of the subsection now reads "Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.” § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...which is caused by imposition of a convicted offender's sentence," which includes "the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs in connection with the implementation of a state court's sentence" and which "shall be determined by the court, as provided for in s. 960.293." § 960.291(5)(b)1. For the conviction of an offense that is not a capital or life felony, as in Mr. Palomares' case, section 960.293 provides that the costs of incarceration are "a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence," which is "based upon the length of the 3 sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing." § 960.293(2)(b)....

...A convicted offender incurs civil liability for the costs of his or her incarceration upon conviction. See § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to . . . the state . . . as set forth in s. 960.293."); § 960.293(2) ("Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs."). I. Mr....

...nonexempt real property." § 960.294(2). Alternatively, section 960.297 provides that the "state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293." § 960.297(1)....

...However, in Goad the FDOC recovered the defendant's costs of incarceration pursuant to section 960.297 by filing a counterclaim in a separate civil action that the defendant initiated. Id. at 881–82. In relevant part, the supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violated his substantive due process rights. Id. at 885. It relied on its prior decision finding that section 960.293 does not violate substantive due process rights and provided that "this reasoning applies equally to section 960.297, the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement." 7 See id....

...§§ 960.292(1), .293(2), Fla. Stat. (2005))). And given that the legislature liquidated those damages to a specific daily amount based upon the length of the sentence imposed at the time of sentencing, the amount of his liability only required a mathematical calculation. See § 960.293(2)(b)....

...See Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. O'Neal, 398 So. 3d 1100, 11 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) ("Pursuant to its motion, the state, through the FDOC, was entitled to a civil restitution lien order in the amount provided by section 960.293."); Acosta v....

...of FDOC's damages has merit. The trial court sentenced Mr. Palomares to 132 months in the "Florida State Prison." Noting that the Act requires the liquidated damages to be calculated "based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing," § 960.293(2)(b), FDOC and the trial court multiplied the $50 daily liquidated damages amount by the number of days within 132 months (approximately 3,960 days) for a total of $198,000. 12  But Mr....

...t was Hillsborough County—a "local subdivision" of the "state" that "maintain[s] [a] county correctional facilit[y]," § 960.291(6)—that incurred the costs for incarcerating Mr. Palomares for 1,635 of the days within those 132 months. While section 960.293(2)(b) does not expressly contemplate a scenario where, as here, a convicted offender's sentence causes both the "state" and a "local subdivision" to incur incarceration costs for the same sentence, the Act supports the conclusion that FDOC cannot recover damages incurred by a local subdivision....

...In determining the appropriateness of the entry of the civil restitution lien order in this case, it is reasonable to look to the relevant circumstance of the location of a convicted offender's sentence of incarceration in either a state prison or county correctional facility. See § 960.293(2)(b) (providing that the liquidated damage amount "shall be assessed ....

...Palomares for the costs it incurred by incarcerating him while he awaited his sentence, see Freeman v. State, 165 So. 3d 695, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding that "a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs associated with time-served under section 960.293(2)(b)" (citing Riggins v....

...In this motion, Rinaldo asked the district court to forbid Broward County from attaching or taking any of his ten-dollar award to satisfy the $250,000.00 civil restitution lien entered against Rinaldo and in favor of Broward County as reimbursement for incarceration costs for capital offenders pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 960.293(2)(a).6 The district court denied Rinaldo's motion. On appeal, Rinaldo argues that the district court erred in declining to enforce the jury's ten dollar compensatory damage award under Hankins v....

...ies it has paid to satisfy a section 1983 judgment against one of its employees, the Act is invalidated under the Supremacy Clause." Id. at 861. Hankins reasons that "[t]o allow the State to largely recoup this award would 6 Fla. Stat. § 960.293(2)(a) (1996), provides that a defendant convicted of a "capital or life felony," is "liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000." Under Fla....

...shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of the ... local subdivisions ..." On July 30, 1998, then-Sheriff of Broward County, Ken Jenne, obtained a $250,000.00 civil restitution lien against Rinaldo, and in favor of Broward County, under Fla. Stat. § 960.293, in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida....

...award preempted the state law lien "as it applied in th[at] case." Id. We need not address Rinaldo's argument under Hankins that a money judgment for a § 1983 plaintiff cannot be used to satisfy a civil restitution lien for incarceration costs under Fla. Stat. § 960.293....

...ward to satisfy the $250,000.00 civil restitution lien entered against Rinaldo and in favor of Broward County as reimbursement for incarceration costs for capital offenders pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 9 960.293(2)(a).6 The district court denied Rinaldo's motion. On appeal, Rinaldo argues that the district court erred in declining to enforce the jury's ten dollar compensatory damage award under Hankins v....

...judgment against one of its employees, the Act is invalidated under the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 861. Hankins reasons that “[t]o allow the State to largely recoup this award would be inimical to the goals of the federal statute” which are to 6 Fla. Stat. § 960.293(2)(a) (1996), provides that a defendant convicted of a "capital or life felony," is "liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000." Under Fla....

...shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of the . . . local subdivisions . . . " On July 30, 1998, then-Sheriff of Broward County, Ken Jenne, obtained a $250,000.00 civil restitution lien against Rinaldo, and in favor of Broward County, under Fla. Stat. § 960.293, in the Circuit Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida....

...preempted the state law lien “as it applied in th[at] case.” Id. We need not address Rinaldo's argument under Hankins that a money judgment for a § 1983 plaintiff cannot be used to satisfy a civil restitution lien for incarceration costs under Fla. Stat. § 960.293....

...After appellant was convicted and sentenced for one count of sexual battery on a child under 12, the trial court entered a final judgment imposing civil lien, which stated: THIS MATTER having come before the Court on September 30, 2016 pursuant to Florida Statute Section 960.293(2)(b) and finding that the Defendant has been convicted of an offense other than a capital or life felony and that damages are assessed at $50 per day of incarceration, it is hereby  ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that I...

...cost of incarceration. The trial court granted appellant’s rule 3.800(b) motion and amended the first paragraph of the final judgment to state: THIS MATTER having come before the Court on September 30, 2016 pursuant to Florida Statute Section 960.293(2)(b) and finding that the Defendant has been convicted of a capital or felony offense, and that damages are assessed as follows. Although appellant acknowledges on appeal that the trial court granted the rule 3.800(b)...

...1st DCA 2010) (quoting § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005)). Under the resulting remedy crafted by the legislature, "[a]n offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction." Id. (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2)). To that end, section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2019), grants the court in which a person is convicted "continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the d...

...under several provisions of chapter 960 for the imposition of a civil restitution lien order. The resulting order expressly acknowledges the court's continuing jurisdiction under section 960.292(2) and awards the Department the amount provided under section 960.293(2)(b). On appeal, Mr....

...the principle of remediation and not punishment." Id. at 401-02 (second quotation quoting § 960.29(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)). Consistent with that framing, our supreme court has expressly held "that imposing a civil restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment." Goad v....

...ndant and the financial needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant."), with § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to . . . the state . . . as set forth in s. 960.293."), and § 960.293(2)(b) (setting the amount of restitution "for an offense other than a capital or life felony" at "$50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence")....

section 775.089(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). See § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Upon conviction, a convicted

dismissing the City’s claim the court ruled that section 960.293(2)(b) does not apply to juvenile detention

...Weekly D1991 , 2013 WL 5224933 (Fla. 2d DCA Sept.18, 2013) (reversing in part for reinstatement of order of probation in one of appellant’s cases on appeal because of the possibility appellant would be liable for incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.293, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that upon conviction, defendants are liable to the state and its local subdivisions for the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.297 (authorizing a civil action to recover the costs set forth in section 960.293); see also Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Moss, 842 So.2d 284, 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (“[T]he plain language of section 960.293(2)(b) states that damages are liquidated for the number of days of the convicted offender’s sentence, not the number of days actually served.”)....

...The trial court did not enter an order specifically addressing restitution for costs of incarceration.  Over six and a half years later, DOC moved for imposition of a civil restitution lien judgment pursuant to sections 960.291(5)(b)(1), 960.292, 960.293(2)(b), 960.297(1), and 960.297(3), Florida Statutes (2024), which are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims’ Remedy Act....

...ivil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties . . . .” (emphasis added). The convicted offender is liable for damages and losses for incarceration and other correctional costs. See § 960.293(2), Fla....

...Stat. (2024). Accordingly, “[a]n offender’s liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender’s conviction.” Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...1988) (holding a civil 2 restitution judgment imposed after sentencing does not violate equal protection or substantive due process rights); Goad v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 845 So. 2d 880, 884-85 (Fla. 2003) (holding that imposing a civil restitution judgment under section 960.293 and 960.297 is a civil remedy that does not constitute criminal punishment)....

...For convictions for an offense other than a capital or life felony, “a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions.” § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...d the trial court erred in denying DOC’s motion. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand with directions to grant DOC’s motion and impose a civil restitution lien order based on the length of Defendant’s sentence in accordance with section 960.293(2)(b). Proceedings to impose civil restitution liens pursuant to section 960.293 are civil in nature and do not implicate liberty interests, even when rendered in the criminal court....

...Dep’t of Corr. v. Holt, 373 So. 3d 969, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). On remand, Defendant need not be present for imposition of the civil restitution lien judgment because liability was incurred upon conviction and liquidated damages are to be assessed pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b). Reversed and remanded. CONNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 3 

...Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YouTube (Nov. 25, 2015) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. Accordingly, we begin our discussion with sections 960.292 and 960.293, Florida Statutes (2022). In operation, as well as in public policy, sections 960.292 and 960.293 establish a procedure to obtain a restitution lien as well as the quantification of damages; that is, the amount of recovery a statutorily identified complainant may recover. To start, once convicted, "the convicted offender . . . incur[s] civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in [section] 960.293." § 960.292(1)....

...See § 960.297(1). On this record, it is clearly established that Mr. O'Neal incurred a civil liability for damages and losses after he was convicted of first-degree murder, a life felony. Pursuant to its motion, the state, through the FDOC, was entitled to a civil restitution lien order in the amount provided by section 960.293. Section 960.293(2)(a) provides that "[i]f the conviction is for a capital or life felony, the convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000." Although the FDOC appeared e...

...improperly found a willful and substantial violation because he was not legally prohibited from wearing a Halloween costume as a condition of his probation. Wells’s second argument on appeal relates to his ordered costs of incarceration. Section 960.293, Florida Statutes, provides: (2) Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional...

...shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing. § 960.293, Fla. Stat. (2022). Wells argues that section 960.293 violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment both on its face and as applied to Wells. 5  We will briefly address Wells’s constitutional argument first....

...both the Unites States and Florida constitutions is whether the “fine” is punitive. E.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Wright v. Uniforms for Indus., 772 So. 2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The Florida Supreme Court has expressly held that the costs imposed by section 960.293 are civil rather than punitive in nature. Goad v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 845 So. 2d 880, 884–85 (Fla. 2003) (“Therefore, we hold that imposing a civil restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment.”)....