Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ges in light of the requirements in Koenig v. State, 597 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1992); Olvey, 609 So.2d 640, and Sutton, 635 So.2d 1032. The complexity will probably increase with the new statutory emphasis on civil restitution and incarceration costs. See § 960.29-.297, Fla....

...[7] Obviously, the legislature has some ability to shift a cost from one category to the other. Thus, this list may not be accurate in the future. We expressly note that this opinion does not address civil restitution and incarceration costs as enacted in 1994. See § 960.29-.297 Fla....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Ilkanic was convicted of trespass after warning, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to forty-five days in jail. The City of Fort Lauderdale moved to impose a lien on Ilkanic for $50 per day for each day of his incarceration, pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which is part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act ("the Act")....

...(b) If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...The legislative intent for this statute is expressly set forth in the Act itself in the following statement: "The Legislature also finds that there is an urgent need to alleviate the increasing financial burden on the state and its local subdivisions caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders." § 960.29, Fla....

...ration against equal protection arguments). Ilkanic further argues that the statute violates procedural due process because the Act imposes a lien on the real or personal property of the convicted offender for payment of the incarceration charges. §§ 960.292, 960.294, Fla....

...Vamper, 579 So.2d 730 (Fla.1991). However, he contends that there must be a determination of a prisoner's ability to pay before a lien can be imposed. We believe Ilkanic misreads the statute. There is no provision for holding the prisoner in contempt upon the failure to pay. Section 960.294(2) provides that the order imposing the incarceration charges shall be enforced in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action....

...State, 669 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Alberts v. State, 711 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the First District's decision and hold that sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), do not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, nor do sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the right to substantive due process....

...Mr. Goad initiated a civil action against the *882 Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr. Goad's incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration. By the terms of section 960.297, the state may recover these costs for the portion of the offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994, the effective date of the law. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the cause of action asserted in the complaint, and Mr. Goad then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the counterclaim. He argued that the application of section 960.297 would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions, because the statute was not in effect at the time he committed the criminal offenses resulting in his incarceration. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. 754 So.2d at 96-97. The First District reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that sections 960.293 and 960.297 "afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment," and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 100. Goad now raises two issues for review: first, whether sections 960.293 and 960.297 of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act (the Act) [1] violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; and second, whether these same sections violate the right to substantive due process....

...When attempting to discern *883 legislative intent, courts must first look at the actual language used in the statute. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000). Here, the Florida Legislature specifically set out its intent in section 960.29: The Legislature finds that former approaches to the problem of compensating crime victims through restitution have proven inadequate or have been inconsistently applied in many cases....

...It is the legislative intent that the liquidated damages authorized in this act bear a rational relation to the damages and losses a crime victim incurs as a result of a convicted offender's conduct, and the state *884 and its local subdivisions incur as a result of implementation of a convicted offender's sentence. § 960.29, Fla....

...civil action" and the "lien created upon the imposition of a per diem charge has the same effect as the lien created by the entry of a civil judgment." Id. at 1373. Therefore, we hold that imposing a civil *885 restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment....

...Goad has failed to present clear proof that the Act actually operates as a criminal sanction that is capable of violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws. DUE PROCESS CLAIM Goad claims that the Act violates his substantive due process rights because sections 960.293 and 960.297 attach new legal consequences to events completed prior to the enactment of the law....

...tate and the goal it intended to achieve, and whether individuals are ultimately being treated in a fundamentally unfair manner in derogation of their substantive rights. See id. In Ilkanic, this Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to section 960.293(2)(b): We conclude that imposing a per diem charge on convicted offenders clearly relates to a permissive legislative objective of reimbursing public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons. Furthermore, we believe that the flat charge of $50 per day is reasonably related to the costs of incarceration. 705 So.2d at 1372-73. We find that this reasoning applies equally to section 960.297, the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement. For offenders convicted before July 1, 1994, section 960.297(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), [4] provides that the State may recover incarceration costs, up to $50 per day, for the portion of the offender's sentence remaining after July 1, 1994. Goad contends that the statute violates his right to substantive due process because section 960.297 attaches a new penalty to conduct completed before the statute's enactment....

...ctive of reimbursing *886 public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons"). CONCLUSION Accordingly, we approve the First District's decision below and disapprove Gary and Alberts to the extent that those cases find that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. It is so ordered. ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., and SHAW and HARDING, Senior Justices, concur. NOTES [1] See §§ 960.29-.297, Fla....

...[2] The Act was implemented to address two concerns: the problem of compensating crime victims through restitution and the urgent need to alleviate the increasing financial burdens on the State and its local subdivisions caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders. See § 960.29, Fla....

...Goad challenges only those portions of the Act that relate to the recovery of incarceration costs by the State. [3] Hudson describes the seven factors as "guideposts" for determining whether a civil statute actually imposes a remedy that is in the nature of criminal punishment. 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. [4] Section 960.297 provides in full: (1) The state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293. (2) For those convicted offenders convicted prior to July 1, 1994, the state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as a counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293, for the convicted offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994.

...n 775.089(1). In authorizing the imposition of civil restitution liens, the Florida Legislature expressed its intention to "enable crime victims, the state, and other aggrieved parties to recover damages and losses arising out of criminal acts ...." § 960.29(1)(a), Fla....

...Most significantly, the legislature further provided, that "[n]otwithstanding this civil restitution lien act, the crime victim, the state and its local subdivisions, or other aggrieved parties are not precluded from collecting . . . moneys awarded by a restitution order under s. 775.089. ..." § 960.295(2), Fla....

...avorably to the accused"). Under accepted principles, Escambia County cannot be a "victim" within the meaning of section 775.089(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). The majority opinion fails to acknowledge that the language it (selectively) quotes from section 960.295(2) can be fully explained by antecedent provisions that, while they render convicts financially liable to the state, do not authorize restitution awards under section 775.089(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002). See § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) ("Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs."). The majority opinion mistakenly relies on section 960.295, Florida Statutes (2002) ("Civil restitution lien supplemental to other forms of restitution available to lienholder."), misapplies civil precedent in a penal context, and dishonors the rule of lenity....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. March 13, 2000. Rehearing Denied April 12, 2000. *96 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Appellee, pro se. PADOVANO, J. Section 960.297, Florida Statutes authorizes the state to initiate a civil action against a prison inmate to recover the costs of the inmate's incarceration....

...91. Mr. Goad initiated a civil action against the Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr. Goad's incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration. By the terms of section *97 960.297, the state may recover these costs for the portion of the offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994, the effective date of the law. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the cause of action asserted in the complaint, and Mr. Goad then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the counterclaim. He argued that the application of section 960.297 would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions, because the statute was not in effect at the time he committed the criminal offenses resulting in his incarceration. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. Following the rendition of a final judgment, the Department appealed to this court to challenge the trial court's disposition of the counterclaim. Sections 960.293 and 960.297 are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act. See §§ 960.29-297, Fla....

...t decided in the Ilkanic case. Here we must decide whether the Act is invalid as an ex post facto law. [1] Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const. Art 1, § 9; Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. Section 960.297 applies retroactively to the existing population of prison inmates, but that alone does not make it an ex post facto law....

...ted a civil remedy into a criminal penalty"); see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). When the Legislature enacted the statute at issue here, it clearly expressed its intent to afford only civil remedies. Section 960.29, Florida Statutes contains a finding that "there is an urgent need to alleviate the increasing financial burden on the state and its local subdivisions caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders." Subsection (1)(a) the...

...and other aggrieved parties to recover damages and losses arising out of criminal acts." It is clear from these declarations that the Legislature intended to provide a purely civil remedy. This point is underscored by the Legislature's statement in section 960.29(3)(b) that the statute "rests upon the principle of remediation and not punishment." We recognize that a statute may purport to afford a civil remedy and yet actually impose a remedy that is in the nature of a criminal punishment....

...e cost of supervision. Here again, the court relied on the distinction between civil and criminal laws in the case law pertaining to double jeopardy claims. Our application of the Hudson factors in the present case leads us to conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 contain no provision that could be properly characterized as punishment for a crime....

...Finally, although the potential imposition of a lien may have some slight deterrent effect, the mere presence of a deterrent purpose does not render the sanction criminal. Several Florida decisions also provide indirect support for our conclusion that sections 960.293 and 960.297 are not ex post facto laws....

...n Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), when it rejected the double jeopardy argument asserted there. These cases involve different constitutional issues, but the characteristics of the challenged statutes remain the same. If sections 960.293 and 960.297 are civil in nature for due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy purposes, then they are likely civil in nature for ex post facto purposes....

...In Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So.2d 542 (Fla.1980), the court held that the statute did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because it did not increase punishment for prisoners whose crimes were committed before its effective date. Sections 960.293 and *100 960.297 operate in the same way to expose previously convicted inmates to future liability for subsistence costs....

...The court explained, however, that if it were not for the revocation of gain time, it would have concluded that the statute was purely civil. By implication then, the statutes in the present case do not violate the ex post facto clauses. For these reasons, we conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 Florida Statutes afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment....

...State, 949 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Here, 319.25 months did not exceed the 30-year maximum sentence for a first degree felony. Wilson was not entitled to Apprendi relief. Wilson also argues that the court lacked authority to impose the costs of incarceration because section 960.297, Florida Statutes (2003), provided that the State may pursue a separate civil action, but did not permit the costs to be imposed by the trial court here. He also contends that, even if the court could impose the costs of incarceration, the imposition of $50 daily and $250,000 was duplicative. Wilson is partially correct. We disagree with Wilson's interpretation of the statute. Section 960.292 details the procedure for imposing a civil restitution lien order, stating in pertinent part: (1) Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293....

...The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders. Though the lien is a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment, Goad v. Department of Corrections, 845 So.2d 880, 884-85 (Fla.2003), section 960.292(2) explicitly provides that the trial court may enter the civil restitution lien order. See McMurry v. State, 890 So.2d 494, 494-95 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Accordingly, Wilson's procedural argument lacks merit. We agree that Wilson is entitled to partial relief with respect to the costs of incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that: (2) Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs....

...nst the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. Here, Wilson argues the court erred by imposing both $50 daily and $250,000 for costs. We agree. The Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act, which contains section 960.293, does not violate substantive due process because it bears a reasonable relationship to the legislative objective of alleviating the financial burden on the State resulting *686 from the costs of incarceration. Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Fla.1998); see also § 960.29(3) & (4) (noting the Act rests on the principle of remediation, not punishment, and that the civil restitution liens are intended to assist the State and its subdivisions to recover the costs resulting from a convicted offender's sentence). Because Wilson's civil liability boils down to his responsibility to pay for his room, board, and other incarceration costs, see Goad, 845 So.2d at 885, Wilson is liable under section 960.293(2) for either $50 daily or $250,000, but not both....

...Fried, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Under the authority of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), we affirm the amended order granting Appellant's victim a civil restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.29 et seq., Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...First, the Court made clear that governments may legislate imprecise formulas, such as liquidated damages clauses, in order to compensate victims for losses, so long as the damage amount legislated is rationally related to the damage incurred. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. It is our conclusion that the amounts listed in section 960.293 represent reasonable estimates of the losses incurred by crime victims within the bounds defined by Halper and therefore imposition of a lien for the listed amount was not error....

...[1] Second, in Halper, the Court recognized that the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause are not triggered when private parties file civil suits for damages caused by conduct that was also the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. Id. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903. Although under section 960.292(2), the criminal trial court retains jurisdiction over the matter, the legislative intent of the statute, as expressed in section 960.29(1)(c), was to create an accelerated method of providing civil restitution to crime victims. Accordingly, as the imposition of a civil restitution lien under section 960.29 et seq....

...pellant. We have considered Appellant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. STONE, FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We note that in the instant case, the victim asked for and was awarded less than she was entitled to under section 960.293(1)(a).

...Restitution was never discussed nor made a part of the written plea agreement or sentence. Three days after sentencing, the state sought to amend the judgment to include a provision for restitution on behalf of one of the victims, Brian Furches. Furches also petitioned the court to enter a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Florida's restitution statute [1] as it relates to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 [2] and held that restitution may either be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter. State v. Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471 (Fla.1993); see also § 960.292(2) ("The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders."); L.O....

...That purpose is to make victims of crime whole by restoring to them the value of that which they have lost as a result of the crime, rather than to punish the wrongdoer. J.O.S. v. State, 668 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), approved, 689 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1997). See also *402 § 960.29(2)(b), Fla....

...State, 718 So.2d 155 (Fla.1998)(the prime concerns underlying restitution is to give the perpetrator of a crime an opportunity to make amends, and to make the victim of a crime whole again); Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (civil restitution lien granted to crime victim pursuant to section 960.29, et....

...2d DCA 1991)(sentence which did not include restitution or statement of reasons for the absence of restitution was incomplete and court could amend it to remedy that incompleteness). We find the court's imposition of the civil restitution lien was consistent with Florida's civil restitution lien statute. §§ 960.29, et....

...Stat. (1997). This statute, similar to Florida's criminal statute, requires that "[u]pon motion by the... crime victim ... the court in which the convicted offender is convicted shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of crime victims. ..." § 960.292(2), Fla....

...Appellant did not appeal or otherwise challenge this sentence or restitution order. Appellant violated that probation, and was sentenced to four and one-half years in prison for that violation in December of 1994. The sentence also provided that a civil judgment for restitution, presumably under section 960.29 et seq....

...As to Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of his defense counsel for failing to object to the imposition of restitution without an evidentiary hearing, in Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we held that imposition of a civil restitution lien under section 960.29 et seq....

...For the reasons explained below, we need not address the constitutional issues raised in the instant case, and we affirm the trial court's order. Appellant Rolling is a death-sentenced multiple murderer. Pursuant to section 944.512, Florida Statutes, in Count I of the complaint and sections 960.29 through 960.297 in Count II, the state sought imposition of a lien in the action below against Rolling's property, especially the proceeds from sale of a book containing accounts of the crimes for which Rolling was convicted....

...ied to each of them. Appellants have not otherwise raised any issue with regard to the trial court's findings and conclusions. In addition, although at oral argument counsel for both appellants admitted that the lien imposed also rests upon sections 960.29-.297, in their briefs neither appellant has attacked the validity of the lien insofar as it relies on this alternative statutory basis. Sections 960.29-.297 provide that upon petition by the state, its local subdivisions, crime victims, or other aggrieved parties, the court may enter a civil restitution lien against the "real or personal property" of a convicted offender. See § 960.291(7),.292(2), Fla....

...that a person possesses on the convicted offender's behalf, including, but not limited to, any royalties, commissions, proceeds of sale, or any other thing of value accruing to the convicted offender, or a person on the convicted offender's behalf." § 960.291(7), Fla....

...ial relationship, and her sale of items of Rolling's personal property support the court's finding that London is receiving benefits on Rolling's behalf and thus the lien attaches to the proceeds she has garnered from sale of Rolling's property. See § 960.291(7), Fla. Stat. In addition, Rolling could not transfer his property to London to avoid the lien. See § 960.29, .295, Fla....

...ty of care owed to Appellant by destroying the photographs while he was away from Walton CI. Appellant subsequently filed an amended complaint, and on March 8, 2006, DOC filed an answer denying liability *126 and asserting a counterclaim pursuant to section 960.297(1), Florida Statutes (2005), for the costs of Appellant's incarceration....

...Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. No factual disputes exist with respect to the statute of limitations issue, and as discussed below, Appellant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on that issue. In section 960.29, the legislature made the finding that "there is an urgent need to alleviate the increasing financial burdens on the state ......

...caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders." In an effort to remedy that problem, the legislature expressed its intent to "impose a long-term civil liability for the costs of incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien, against a convicted offender...." § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat.; see also § 960.29(4), Fla....

...(stating that the civil restitution lien is intended to assist the state in collecting the costs "incur[red] as a result of the implementation of a convicted offender's sentence"). An offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction. §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...(a) If the conviction is for a capital or life felony, the convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000. "The civil restitution lien shall be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order." § 960.292, Fla. Stat. The sentencing court has the authority to enter such orders on its own motion or upon motion by the state. § 960.292(1), Fla....

...5th DCA 2007); Cruz v. State, 742 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Ilkanic, 683 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), approved, 705 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1998). Alternatively, the state *127 may seek recovery of the amounts provided for in section 960.293 "in a separate civil action or as a counterclaim in any civil action." See § 960.297(1), Fla. Stat. This case involves a civil restitution lien order entered based upon a counterclaim filed pursuant to section 960.297(1), not a civil restitution lien order entered by the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...cribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere." (emphasis added). Section 95.11(3)(f) provides that a four-year statute of limitation applies to "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability." An action brought pursuant to 960.297(1) is founded on the statutory liability incurred by the convicted offender upon his conviction. See §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. Therefore, because section 960.297(1) does not prescribe a time period within which the state must bring an action under the statute, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f) applies....

...rceration did not begin to run until Appellant filed his action for damages against DOC. This was error. The statute of limitations begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs. See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. The plain language of section 960.293(2) provides that a life-sentenced offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs in a liquidated amount "upon conviction." See also § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat. (" Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to... the state ... as set forth in s. 960.293." (emphasis added)). By the terms of the statute, the offender's conviction is the last element of the action to occur. Thus, we conclude that the state's cause of action under section 960.297(1) to recover "the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293" accrues upon the offender's conviction. The filing of the action as a counterclaim does not impact the statute of limitations. The counterclaim authorized by section 960.297(1) is, in this case, a permissive counterclaim because it does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to Appellant's complaint....

...be barred if it is filed beyond the statute of limitations. See DuBreuil v. James, 365 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In an effort to avoid the application of the statute of limitations to bar its counterclaim, DOC argued that a cause of action under section 960.297(1) does not accrue until the offender is released from prison, and because Appellant is still incarcerated, the statute of limitations has not yet started to run. This argument is contrary to the plain language of sections 960.292(1) and 960.293(2), which state that a convicted offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs "upon conviction." Nothing in these statutes suggest that liability for incarceration costs is not *128 triggered until the offender is released, particu...

...See also Miami-Dade County v. Moss, 842 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that the county was entitled to recover compensation for the number of days in the convicted offender's sentence, rather than only the number of days actually served). The legislature amended section 960.297 in 2009 to prescribe a specific statute of limitations for actions to recover incarceration costs....

...The statute, as amended effective July 1, 2009, provides that "[c]ivil actions authorized by this section may be commenced at any time during the offender's incarceration and up to 5 years after the date of the offender's release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." See § 960.297(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). However, this new statute of limitations does not apply in this case because the state's cause of action against Appellant under section 960.297(1) was extinguished by the existing statute of limitations on January 29, 2002, well before the new statute became effective....

...See Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla.1994); Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We recognize that our holding has the potential to limit the state's ability to recover incarceration costs from convicted offenders under section 960.297, but it does not affect the state's ability to pursue a restitution lien through the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...Mar. 28, 2000); Green v. State, 998 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (Altenbernd, J., concurring); see also Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., Staff Analysis for SB 2298 [*] , at 8, 10, 20 (Mar. 20, 2009) (on file with comm.) (reporting that DOC uses section 960.297 to seek reimbursement for incarceration costs "to offset claims paid to offenders" and stating that the new statute of limitations has the potential to "deter frivolous filings by inmates" and "result in increased collection of [incarceration] costs")....

...The court sentenced him to time served on the battery and trespass counts and to concurrent Prison Releasee Reoffender (fifteen years with credit for time served) and Habitual Felony Offender (fifteen years six months with credit for time served) sentences on the robbery count. Pursuant to section 960.293 of the Florida Statutes, the court also imposed a civil lien against Appellant for incarceration costs. We affirm in all respects and write to address the propriety of the amount of the lien.1 Section 960.293(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that “[u]pon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local 1 Appellant also takes issue with the trial court’s limitation of his counsel’s questions during voir dire, the constitutionality of section 960.293, and the constitutionality of his Prison Releasee Reoffender and Habitual Felony Offender sentences. We affirm on these issues without further comment. subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs.” § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). Section 960.293(2)(b) specifies that: If the conviction is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions. Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing. § 960.293(2)(b), Fla....

...Appellant challenges the amount of the lien, arguing that he cannot be charged for days he was incarcerated but not yet sentenced. We disagree. Although no Florida court has considered whether a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs associated with time-served under section 960.293(2)(b), the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[s]ection 960.293(2) does not limit costs to those incurred after conviction.” Riggins v....

...In arriving at its conclusion, the court reasoned that a contrary “interpretation would undermine the stated ‘intent of the statute . . . [to] fully compensat[e] . . . the state[] and its local subdivisions for damages and losses incurred as a result of criminal conduct.’” Id. (quoting § 960.29(3)(a), Fla....

...Eric Ilkanic (“Ilkanic”) was convicted of trespass after warning, a second degree misdemeanor, and sentenced to 45 days in the Fort Lauderdale jail. The City of Fort Lauderdale (“the City”) then moved the court to impose a lien on Ilkanic in the amount of $50.00 per day for each day of incarceration, pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b)....

...ave been inconsistently applied in many cases. The Legislature also finds that there is an urgent need to alleviate the increasing financial burdens on the state and its local subdivisions caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders. § 960.29, Fla. Stat. (1995). The Legislature states that “[t]his civil restitution lien act rests upon the principle of remediation and not punishment, which is meted out by criminal sanctions afforded by law.” § 960.29(3)(b), Fla....

...on is for an offense other than a capital or life felony, a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted of *565 fender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions.” § 960.293(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). In Rosero v. State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we held that section 960.293 creates a civil lien remedy and the amounts listed in subsection one are reasonable estimates of losses incurred by crime victims....

...Similarly, we now hold that a liquidated damage of $50 per day, pursuant to subsection two, is reasonable compensation to the state for costs incurred in incarcerating convicted offenders and bears a reasonable relationship to the valid legislative purpose of alleviating the burden of incarcerating criminal offenders. See § 960.293(2)(b)j Fla....

...Freddy Palomares appeals the trial court's civil restitution lien order entered against him and in favor of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) for $198,000 for the costs of his incarceration pursuant to the Florida Civil Restitution Lien Act, §§ 960.29–.297, Fla. Stat....

...2d DCA 2024) ("[T]his case turns on an interpretation of a statute, a legal determination that is reviewed de novo."). The legislature enacted the Act to provide "a restitution remedy that is alternative and supplemental to existing statutory and common-law remedies that are available for restitution." § 960.295(1)....

...1 We reject Mr. Palomares' remaining arguments without further discussion. 2 state, its local subdivisions, or aggrieved party and which attaches against the real or personal property owned by a convicted offender." § 960.291(1)....

...ed"), statutory context indicates that the debt is one for "damages and losses arising out of criminal acts, imposed against the real and personal property owned by the convicted offender who committed an offense that caused the damages and losses," § 960.29(1)(a); see also § 960.29(4) ("It is the legislative intent that the civil restitution liens authorized in this act assist crime victims to collect the amounts awarded and authorized as actual and liquidated damages and losses a crime victim incurs as a result of a...

...which is caused by imposition of a convicted offender's sentence," which includes "the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs in connection with the implementation of a state court's sentence" and which "shall be determined by the court, as provided for in s. 960.293." § 960.291(5)(b)1. For the conviction of an offense that is not a capital or life felony, as in Mr. Palomares' case, section 960.293 provides that the costs of incarceration are "a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence," which is "based upon the length of the 3 sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing." § 960.293(2)(b). A convicted offender incurs civil liability for the costs of his or her incarceration upon conviction. See § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to . . . the state . . . as set forth in s. 960.293."); § 960.293(2) ("Upon conviction, a convicted offender is liable to the state and its local subdivisions for damages and losses for incarceration costs and other correctional costs."). I. Mr. Palomares first argues that the State employed the wrong statutory procedure to recover the costs of his incarceration. The Act provides for two procedures. Section 960.292 provides that the "civil restitution lien shall be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order" and that [u]pon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party,...

...The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later. § 960.292(2). The State may enforce a civil restitution lien order "in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, including levy against personal property by the sheriffs of this state and foreclosure against nonexempt real property." § 960.294(2). Alternatively, section 960.297 provides that the "state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293." § 960.297(1). Mr. 4 Palomares argues that FDOC was required to file a separate civil action pursuant to section 960.297. FDOC argues—and the trial court agreed— that FDOC could file a motion for a civil restitution lien order in Mr. Palomares' criminal case pursuant to section 960.292(2), by which it sought to make its civil restitution lien for the costs of his incarceration enforceable. Section 960.297(1) provides that the State "may" file a separate civil action to seek recovery of incarceration costs from a convicted offender, but nothing in the text of that provision indicates that is the sole means by which the State must do so in order to recover incarceration costs. Cf., e.g., Agile Assurance Grp., Ltd....

...2d DCA 2014) (providing that "use of the word may deems relevant language permissive" but construing a forum selection clause as mandatory because the surrounding text—"may be instituted exclusively in the courts of Makati City"—indicated a mandatory requirement for where a legal action must be filed). While section 960.297 makes a separate civil action available to the State by use of the precatory term "may," a fair reading of the surrounding text of the Act as a whole indicates that the State may alternatively use the civil restitution lien— and thus the civil restitution lien order—as a means to recover its damages and that the civil restitution lien is a separate remedy from any judgment obtained in a civil action under section 960.297....

...reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued." (second alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 5 33 (2012))). Section 960.29 provides that the "Legislature intends" for "a civil restitution lien" to be "a legal mechanism" enabling "the state . . . to recover damages and losses arising out of criminal acts" and that the "Legislature intends" to "impose a long-term civil liability for the costs of incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien." § 960.29(1)(a), (1)(d); see also § 960.295(2) ("A civil restitution lien order entered under this civil restitution lien act does not bar any subsequent civil remedy or recovery ....

...Rather than specifying with particularity when or how the civil restitution lien arises, the statutory definition in the Act merely provides that the lien "exists" and "attaches against the real or personal property owned by a convicted offender." § 960.291(1). Mr. Palomares argues that because FDOC did not file a separate civil action under section 960.297(1)—which he characterizes as "the only mechanism available for the state to seek the imposition of the civil restitution lien"—"no 'civil restitution lien' existed for the entry of any 'civil restitution lien order.' " In other words, Mr. Palomares argues that the civil restitution lien cannot exist until the State first obtains a judgment in a separate civil action pursuant to section 960.297(1)....

...n begins to exist or the means by which the lien comes to exist, Mr. Palomares' argument must still be rejected. 6  Nothing in the Act requires the State to file a separate civil action, and nothing in section 960.297(1)'s text indicates that a separate civil action is a necessary predicate for a civil restitution lien to exist....

...by operation of law it "exists" and "attaches" to the property owned by a "convicted offender," and that definition does not set forth any qualifications or conditions to the existence of the lien other than the fact that the defendant must have been convicted of a crime. See § 960.291(2) (" 'Convicted offender' means a defendant who has a conviction as defined herein entered against the defendant in the courts of this state."); § 960.291(3) (" 'Conviction' means a guilty verdict by a jury or judge, or a guilty or nolo contendere plea by a defendant, regardless of adjudication of guilt."). Mr. Palomares misplaces reliance on an overreading of a single sentence in Goad v. Florida Department of Corrections, 845 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2003), in which the supreme court described section 960.297 as "the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement," seizing on the phrase "the mechanism" and arguing that that language indicates that the State must follow section 960.297 to recover incarceration costs. See id. at 885 (emphasis added). However, in Goad the FDOC recovered the defendant's costs of incarceration pursuant to section 960.297 by filing a counterclaim in a separate civil action that the defendant initiated. Id. at 881–82. In relevant part, the supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violated his substantive due process rights. Id. at 885. It relied on its prior decision finding that section 960.293 does not violate substantive due process rights and provided that "this reasoning applies equally to section 960.297, the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement." 7 See id. at 885 (citing Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1372–73 (Fla. 1998)). In the context of that case, section 960.297 was "the mechanism" for recovering incarceration costs, but the opinion cannot be read to infer that the supreme court determined section 960.297 to be the only procedural mechanism, and the court did not discuss section 960.292 at all. The Act presumes the existence of a lien against convicted offenders....

...137, 141 (Fla. 1934) ("A lien is merely a remedy for the debt."). From that, it can only reasonably be inferred that the text of the Act also presumes that the convicted offender has caused "damages or losses" to the lienor within the meaning of the Act, § 960.291(5), thereby justifying imposition of a lien against the convicted offender's property to secure the lienor's recovery of the damages or losses....

...Palomares incurred liability to the State for damages in the form of incarceration costs by operation of law from the moment he was convicted. See Smith, 27 So. 3d at 126 ("An offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction." (citing §§ 960.292(1), .293(2), Fla. Stat. (2005))). And given that the legislature liquidated those damages to a specific daily amount based upon the length of the sentence imposed at the time of sentencing, the amount of his liability only required a mathematical calculation. See § 960.293(2)(b)....

...at 141 ("[A] lien cannot exist until the amount for which it is security is ascertained or capable of ascertainment."), which therefore justified the "exist[ence]" of a civil restitution lien in its favor against Mr. Palomares' property as security for 8 his payment of that debt, see § 960.291(1). That civil restitution lien could, in turn, "be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order" upon "motion by the state." § 960.292(2). For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by following the motion procedure in section 960.292(2) instead of requiring FDOC to commence a separate civil action under section 960.297(1). II. Mr. Palomares also argues that section 960.292 does not allow nonparties like FDOC to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order. He argues that the language in section 960.292(2) allowing "the state" to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order is limited to the "prosecuting authority representing the State of Florida," whereas FDOC argues that it qualifies as "the state" because it is the state agency responsible for incarcerating convicted offenders. The Act does not define the word "state," but if FDOC is to be considered eligible to take advantage of the procedure set forth in section 960.292 to obtain a civil restitution lien order, it must necessarily qualify as the "state," as it cannot qualify as a "local subdivision," a "crime victim," or "aggrieved party." See § 960.292(2); see also § 960.291(4), (6) (defining "[c]rime victim" and "[l]ocal subdivisions")....

...Though "aggrieved party" is an undefined term—and FDOC might ostensibly constitute an "aggrieved party" in the sense that it has incurred costs to incarcerate Mr. Palomares—the Act indicates that the "aggrieved party" is part of the broader definition of the "crime victim." See § 960.291(4). Read in isolation, the first part of the first sentence in section 960.292(2) could be perceived as supportive of Mr....

...The sentence prescribes different methods for obtaining a civil 9 restitution lien order, authorizing the State to file a "motion" while requiring local subdivisions, crime victims, and aggrieved parties to file a "petition." § 960.292(2)....

...prosecuting authority is a party to the criminal proceeding, whereas state agencies, local subdivisions, crime victims, and aggrieved parties are not. And because it is generally the parties to a lawsuit who request relief by filing a motion, the first portion of that sentence in section 960.292(2) could be perceived in isolation as referring to the State as a party and, consequently, as referring to the prosecuting authority and not nonparty state entities or agencies like FDOC. However, courts cannot read portions of...

...2d DCA 2012) ("It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole." (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))). Even though a portion of the first sentence in section 960.292(2) could arguably refer to the State as a party, the latter half of that same sentence more naturally refers to the State as a government entity because it refers to the trial court entering civil restitution lien orders in favor of "the state" and "its local subdivisions," § 960.292(2) 10 (emphasis added); prosecuting authorities do not have local subdivisions as defined in the Act. Moreover, there are some circumstances under which nonparties have the right to file motions in pending cases, so the mere fact that section 960.292(2) authorizes "the state" to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order is not determinative of whether FDOC qualifies as the state....

...meaning "local subdivisions of the State of Florida which maintain correctional facilities, such as counties that maintain county correctional facilities or counties that provide funds directly or indirectly for the maintenance of correctional facilities within the county," § 960.291(6)— indicates that the Act is referring to the "state" and its "local subdivisions" as government entities that incarcerate people as opposed to prosecuting authorities....

...See Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. O'Neal, 398 So. 3d 1100, 11 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) ("Pursuant to its motion, the state, through the FDOC, was entitled to a civil restitution lien order in the amount provided by section 960.293."); Acosta v....

...4, 288 So. 3d at 1078–79. The legislature created the Act with the express purpose of "assist[ing]" with the recovery of "damages and losses" that "the state and its local subdivisions incur as a result of implementation of a convicted offender's sentence." § 960.29(4)....

...of FDOC's damages has merit. The trial court sentenced Mr. Palomares to 132 months in the "Florida State Prison." Noting that the Act requires the liquidated damages to be calculated "based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing," § 960.293(2)(b), FDOC and the trial court multiplied the $50 daily liquidated damages amount by the number of days within 132 months (approximately 3,960 days) for a total of $198,000. 12  But Mr....

...The trial court erred because it awarded FDOC—which only administers state prisons— damages for all 132 months, even though it was Hillsborough County—a "local subdivision" of the "state" that "maintain[s] [a] county correctional facilit[y]," § 960.291(6)—that incurred the costs for incarcerating Mr. Palomares for 1,635 of the days within those 132 months. While section 960.293(2)(b) does not expressly contemplate a scenario where, as here, a convicted offender's sentence causes both the "state" and a "local subdivision" to incur incarceration costs for the same sentence, the Act supports the conclusion that FDOC cannot recover damages incurred by a local subdivision. First, the legislature's express purpose of the Act is to enable the state and its local subdivisions to recover damages they "incur as a result of implementation of a convicted offender's sentence," § 960.29(4) (emphasis added), and, logically, they can only incur such damages if a convicted offender is in fact incarcerated in their facility....

...by the State is the result of time Mr. Green spent in county jail"). Additionally, the Act authorizes the trial court "to enter separate civil restitution lien orders as appropriate in favor of the crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, or aggrieved parties," § 960.292(3) (emphasis added), which indicates that there are circumstances when a civil restitution lien order is appropriate and circumstances when it is not....

...In determining the appropriateness of the entry of the civil restitution lien order in this case, it is reasonable to look to the relevant circumstance of the location of a convicted offender's sentence of incarceration in either a state prison or county correctional facility. See § 960.293(2)(b) (providing that the liquidated damage amount "shall be assessed ....

...Palomares for the costs it incurred by incarcerating him while he awaited his sentence, see Freeman v. State, 165 So. 3d 695, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding that "a convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs associated with time-served under section 960.293(2)(b)" (citing Riggins v. Beseler, 568 F. App'x 850, 854 (11th Cir. 2014))), the trial court would be correct to deny the county's requested relief because it already awarded those damages to FDOC, see § 960.295(2) (providing that "no duplicate recovery may be made in favor of crime victims, the state and its local subdivisions, and other aggrieved parties"). 14  We reverse the trial court's civil res...

...I disagree that resolution of this appeal requires such laborious reasoning. The plain language of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien Act allows the state to pursue a civil restitution lien order by motion in the underlying criminal proceeding. See § 960.292(2) ("[u]pon motion"). It also provides that the state "may seek recovery" by "separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action." See § 960.297(1) (emphasis added)....

...he state" is limited merely to the prosecuting state attorney's office, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with provisions in the Act indicating that "the state" also includes the FDOC, which is undisputedly a state agency. Most obviously, section 960.292 expressly permits other nonparties that have 15 been injured by the offender's conduct to seek such an order in that proceeding. See § 960.292(2) (authorizing "the court in which the convicted offender is convicted" to enter such orders "[u]pon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion" (emphasis added)). And the damages and loss for which the "the state" is permitted to recover under the Act include its "costs of incarceration and other correctional costs," see §§ 960.291(5)(b)1, .293(2)—expenses that would, as the majority notes, typically be borne by the FDOC. In short, I do not believe that the issues on appeal present close questions that require us to dig so deeply into our statutory construction toolbox....

...of marijuana, respectively. Considered together, this evidence was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti and, thus, to withstand the motion to dismiss. As to Issue II, the trial court entered a $5,000.00 civil restitution lien order pursuant to section 960.29, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), et seq....

.... caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders," the legislature sought to "impose a long-term civil liability for the costs of incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien, against a convicted offender." Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005)). Under the resulting remedy crafted by the legislature, "[a]n offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction." Id. (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2)). To that end, section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2019), grants the court in which a person is convicted "continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up t...

...Acosta was still serving his sentence of incarceration, the State, through its Department of Corrections, moved under several provisions of chapter 960 for the imposition of a civil restitution lien order. The resulting order expressly acknowledges the court's continuing jurisdiction under section 960.292(2) and awards the Department the amount provided under section 960.293(2)(b). On appeal, Mr....

...e by restoring to them the value of that which they have lost as a result of the crime," Florida law is settled that the "civil restitution lien act rests upon the principle of remediation and not punishment." Id. at 401-02 (second quotation quoting § 960.29(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)). Consistent with that framing, our supreme court has expressly held "that imposing a civil restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment." Goad v....

...."), and § 775.089(7) ("The burden of demonstrating the present financial resources and the absence of potential future financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant."), with § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to . . . the state . . . as set forth in s. 960.293."), and § 960.293(2)(b) (setting the amount of restitution "for an offense other than a capital or life felony" at "$50 per day of the convicted offender's sentence")....

...PALMER, LAWSON and BERGER, JJ., concur. . On remand, the trial court has the authority to enter a civil restitution lien order with respect to the cost of incarceration. See Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corrections, 27 So.3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); § 960.29(l)(a), Fla. Stat.; 960.292(2), Fla....

....089(1). In authorizing the imposition of civil restitution liens, the Florida Legislature expressed its intention to “enable crime victims, the state, and other aggrieved parties to recover damages and losses arising out of criminal acts .... ” § 960.29(l)(a), Fla....

...Most significantly, the legislature further provided, that “[njotwith-standing this civil restitution lien act, the crime victim, the state and its local subdivisions, or other aggrieved parties are not precluded from collecting ... moneys awarded by a restitution order under s. 775.089. ...” § 960.295(2), Fla....

...The order further provided “[t]he [c]ourt retains jurisdiction to modify restitution in this case.” The trial court did not enter an order specifically addressing restitution for costs of incarceration.  Over six and a half years later, DOC moved for imposition of a civil restitution lien judgment pursuant to sections 960.291(5)(b)(1), 960.292, 960.293(2)(b), 960.297(1), and 960.297(3), Florida Statutes (2024), which are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims’ Remedy Act....

...urdens on the state . . . caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders,” the legislature imposed “a long-term civil liability for the costs of incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien, against a convicted offender.” § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2024). Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes (2024), provides that “[u]pon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties . . . .” (emphasis added). The convicted offender is liable for damages and losses for incarceration and other correctional costs. See § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Accordingly, “[a]n offender’s liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender’s conviction.” Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla. Stat.) Section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2024), states: Upon motion by the state, ....

...1988) (holding a civil 2 restitution judgment imposed after sentencing does not violate equal protection or substantive due process rights); Goad v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 845 So. 2d 880, 884-85 (Fla. 2003) (holding that imposing a civil restitution judgment under section 960.293 and 960.297 is a civil remedy that does not constitute criminal punishment)....

...For convictions for an offense other than a capital or life felony, “a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day of the convicted offender’s sentence shall be assessed against the convicted offender and in favor of the state or its local subdivisions.” § 960.293(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added). Damages are based on “the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.” Id. Here, Defendant became liable for the costs of his incarceration at the time of his conviction. See § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat.; Smith, 27 So. 3d at 126. DOC—as an agent of the State—timely moved for liquidated damages in the trial court in which Defendant was convicted. See § 960.292(2), Fla. Stat....

...The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the civil restitution lien order because DOC filed its motion just over six and a half years into Defendant’s eight-year sentence, which is within the prescribed time set forth in the statute. Id. Because Defendant incurred liability at the time of his conviction and DOC satisfied section 960.292(2)’s requirements, we find the trial court erred in denying DOC’s motion. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand with directions to grant DOC’s motion and impose a civil restitution lien order based on the length of Defendant’s sentence in accordance with section 960.293(2)(b). Proceedings to impose civil restitution liens pursuant to section 960.293 are civil in nature and do not implicate liberty interests, even when rendered in the criminal court....

...Dep’t of Corr. v. Holt, 373 So. 3d 969, 971 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023). On remand, Defendant need not be present for imposition of the civil restitution lien judgment because liability was incurred upon conviction and liquidated damages are to be assessed pursuant to section 960.293(2)(b). Reversed and remanded. CONNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 3