Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...y the trial court here. He also contends that, even if the court could impose the costs of incarceration, the imposition of $50 daily and $250,000 was duplicative. Wilson is partially correct. We disagree with Wilson's interpretation of the statute. Section 960.292 details the procedure for imposing a civil restitution lien order, stating in pertinent part: (1) Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s....

...The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders. Though the lien is a civil remedy rather than criminal punishment, Goad v. Department of Corrections, 845 So.2d 880, 884-85 (Fla.2003), section 960.292(2) explicitly provides that the trial court may enter the civil restitution lien order....

...[1] Second, in Halper, the Court recognized that the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause are not triggered when private parties file civil suits for damages caused by conduct that was also the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. Id. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903. Although under section 960.292(2), the criminal trial court retains jurisdiction over the matter, the legislative intent of the statute, as expressed in section 960.29(1)(c), was to create an accelerated method of providing civil restitution to crime victims....

...Restitution was never discussed nor made a part of the written plea agreement or sentence. Three days after sentencing, the state sought to amend the judgment to include a provision for restitution on behalf of one of the victims, Brian Furches. Furches also petitioned the court to enter a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The Florida Supreme Court interpreted Florida's restitution statute [1] as it relates to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 [2] and held that restitution may either be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter. State v. Sanderson, 625 So.2d 471 (Fla.1993); see also § 960.292(2) ("The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders."); L.O....

...Stat. (1997). This statute, similar to Florida's criminal statute, requires that "[u]pon motion by the... crime victim ... the court in which the convicted offender is convicted shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of crime victims. ..." § 960.292(2), Fla....

...e present in this case. For example, Chapter 947, Florida Statutes (2004) allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of a maximum prison sentence imposed—for the purpose of monitoring any Parole Commission release order. Section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2004) provides that the court "shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders." Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) allows...

...(stating that the civil restitution lien is intended to assist the state in collecting the costs "incur[red] as a result of the implementation of a convicted offender's sentence"). An offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction. §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...(a) If the conviction is for a capital or life felony, the convicted offender is liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000. "The civil restitution lien shall be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order." § 960.292, Fla. Stat. The sentencing court has the authority to enter such orders on its own motion or upon motion by the state. § 960.292(1), Fla....

...im in any civil action." See § 960.297(1), Fla. Stat. This case involves a civil restitution lien order entered based upon a counterclaim filed pursuant to section 960.297(1), not a civil restitution lien order entered by the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...Section 95.11(3)(f) provides that a four-year statute of limitation applies to "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability." An action brought pursuant to 960.297(1) is founded on the statutory liability incurred by the convicted offender upon his conviction. See §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla....

...The statute of limitations begins to run when the last element of the cause of action occurs. See § 95.031(1), Fla. Stat. The plain language of section 960.293(2) provides that a life-sentenced offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs in a liquidated amount "upon conviction." See also § 960.292(1), Fla....

...tion under section 960.297(1) does not accrue until the offender is released from prison, and because Appellant is still incarcerated, the statute of limitations has not yet started to run. This argument is contrary to the plain language of sections 960.292(1) and 960.293(2), which state that a convicted offender is liable to the state for incarceration costs "upon conviction." Nothing in these statutes suggest that liability for incarceration costs is not *128 triggered until the offender is re...

...We recognize that our holding has the potential to limit the state's ability to recover incarceration costs from convicted offenders under section 960.297, but it does not affect the state's ability to pursue a restitution lien through the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...*1263 PALMER, J., concurs. PETERSON, J., concurs specially, with opinion. PETERSON, J., concurring specially. I concur with the majority opinion and write only to express my belief that neither the victim nor the State is precluded from pursuing restitution pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that "[t]he court shall have continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution orders." This statute was not specifically cited in the mo...

...n. We affirm without comment, except as to two matters. As a condition of pro-, bation following Kleintank’s release from prison, the trial court required Kleintank to pay the cost of his incarceration. The State properly concedes that pursuant to section 960.292, Florida Statutes (2014), the proper remedy is a civil restitution lien....

...urt’s order granting the State’s Motion Requesting the Court to Retain Jurisdiction (“Motion to Retain Jurisdiction”) over the defendant for a period of five years for the sole purpose of imposing civil restitution lien orders pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2014). Because the trial court had jurisdiction to rule on the State’s Motion to Retain Jurisdiction and because section 960.292(2) authorizes the trial court to retain such jurisdiction over a convicted felon for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for up to five years from release from supervision, we affirm the order under review....

...The State then orally moved for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the defendant for five years for the sole purpose of entering 2 civil restitution lien orders in favor of the victim as set forth in section 960.292(2). At defense counsel’s request, the trial court ordered the State to file a written motion, but announced that it was “reserv[ing] jurisdiction for purposes of restitution and for determining this motion.” There was no objection from defense counsel. As requested by defense counsel, the State filed its written Motion to Retain Jurisdiction1 pursuant to section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2014), which provides: Upon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion, the court in which the convicted offender is co...

Gross, J. The state appeals the trial court’s denial of (1) its motion to order restitution as part of defendant’s sentence, filed five *111 days after sentencing, and (2) its motion for entry of a civil restitution lien pursuant to section 960.292, Florida Statutes (2015)....

...Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that an order of restitution must be imposed at the time of sentencing. The trial court agreed with defendant and denied the motion. The state’s subsequent motion for entry of a civil restitution lien on behalf of the victims pursuant to section 960.292 was also denied after defendant argued that the statute did not allow the state to file a civil suit for damages....

...The trial court thus erred in denying the state’s motion for an order of restitution filed 5 days after imposition of defendant’s sentence. The trial court also erred in denying the state’s motion for entry of a civil restitution lien on behalf of the victims. Section 960.292(2) provides that, “[u]pon motion by the state ......

...ring civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later.” Id.; see also Nickerson v. State, 178 So.3d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (explaining that section 960.292(2) “permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for a period of five years from release from supervision”)....

PER CURIAM. Pursuant to section 960.292, Florida Statutes (2005), the trial court was authorized to impose a civil restitution lien order for incarceration costs....

...counterclaim in any civil action. § 960.297(1). However, the court of conviction also retains jurisdiction to impose a civil restitution lien for the "duration of the sentence or up to [five] years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." § 960.292(2); Wilson v....

...counterclaim in any civil action. § 960.297(1). However, the court of conviction also retains jurisdiction to impose a civil restitution lien for the "duration of the sentence or up to [five] years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." § 960.292(2); Wilson v....

...Department of Corrections’ lien cannot be imposed because it was not part of the initial sentence.” This appeal follows. The primary issue on appeal, and the basis for the trial court’s ruling, is whether the restitution lien must be imposed at the time of sentencing. Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes (2022), provides: “Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293.” Section 960.292(2), in turn, provides: Upon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion, the court in which the convicted offender is convicted...

...��s 5-year sentence (1,825 days) at $50 per day, for a total amount of $91,250. 2 Defendant was incarcerated at the Broward County Jail for a total of 924 days prior to his transfer to a DOC facility. 2 § 960.292(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 960.292(2)’s plain language tells us that a civil restitution lien is not required to be imposed at the time of sentencing. See Nickerson v. State, 178 So. 3d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (explaining that section 960.292(2) “permits the trial court to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for a period of five years from release from supervision”). Defendant concedes that DOC’s motion was filed within the period set forth in section 960.292(2)....

...ien had to be ordered at the time of sentencing was error. See State v. Sandomeno, 217 So. 3d 110, 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (holding the trial court erred in denying the motion for entry of a civil restitution lien on behalf of the victims, citing to section 960.292(2) and noting that “[t]he statute gives the trial court continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, we reject Defendant’s constitutional challenges to section 960.292, Florida Statutes (2022), as such challenges have been twice rejected by the Florida Supreme Court....

...Although an affidavit of probation violation had been filed in Case No. 89-02482, there was no reference to Case No. 87-09025 in that affidavit. Thus, the hen question was excluded from the revocation proceeding initiated by the affidavit in Case No. 89-02482. Further, section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (1995), upon which the State rehes for its contention that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to enter a restitution hen order, cannot be apphed retroactively to Al-berts because her offense in Case No....

...We also note that the record in this case does not contain an order imposing the restitution lien. The $10,000.00 referred to in the plea agreement does not constitute a restitution lien unless a separate order is entered imposing the lien pursuant to section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...2d 554, 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citations omitted). We therefore reverse the restitution part of the sentence and remand the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing. As to the $27,000 civil lien, the trial court properly entered it. Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes, provides in part that upon conviction, “the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s. 960.293.” § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Subsection (2) provides that “the court in which the convicted offender is convicted shall enter civil restitution lien orders in favor of crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and other aggrieved parties.” Id. § 960.292(2) (emphasis added). Section 960.293(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides for the imposition of a liquidated damage amount of $50 per day....

...“Damages shall be based upon the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.” Id. Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eighteen months’ imprisonment, which is 547.5 days. It then imposed costs of incarceration in accordance with sections 960.292 and 960.293....

while an appeal of the judgment is pending. Section 960.292, Florida Statutes (1999), seems to contemplate

...upon the length of the 3 sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing." § 960.293(2)(b). A convicted offender incurs civil liability for the costs of his or her incarceration upon conviction. See § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to ....

...n costs and other correctional costs."). I. Mr. Palomares first argues that the State employed the wrong statutory procedure to recover the costs of his incarceration. The Act provides for two procedures. Section 960.292 provides that the "civil restitution lien shall be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order" and that [u]pon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party,...

...The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later. § 960.292(2)....

...Mr. 4 Palomares argues that FDOC was required to file a separate civil action pursuant to section 960.297. FDOC argues—and the trial court agreed— that FDOC could file a motion for a civil restitution lien order in Mr. Palomares' criminal case pursuant to section 960.292(2), by which it sought to make its civil restitution lien for the costs of his incarceration enforceable. Section 960.297(1) provides that the State "may" file a separate civil action to seek recovery of incarceration costs from...

...In the context of that case, section 960.297 was "the mechanism" for recovering incarceration costs, but the opinion cannot be read to infer that the supreme court determined section 960.297 to be the only procedural mechanism, and the court did not discuss section 960.292 at all. The Act presumes the existence of a lien against convicted offenders....

...Palomares incurred liability to the State for damages in the form of incarceration costs by operation of law from the moment he was convicted. See Smith, 27 So. 3d at 126 ("An offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction." (citing §§ 960.292(1), .293(2), Fla....

...Palomares' property as security for 8 his payment of that debt, see § 960.291(1). That civil restitution lien could, in turn, "be made enforceable by means of a civil restitution lien order" upon "motion by the state." § 960.292(2). For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by following the motion procedure in section 960.292(2) instead of requiring FDOC to commence a separate civil action under section 960.297(1). II. Mr. Palomares also argues that section 960.292 does not allow nonparties like FDOC to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order. He argues that the language in section 960.292(2) allowing "the state" to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order is limited to the "prosecuting authority representing the State of Florida," whereas FDOC argues that it qualifies as "the state" because it is the state agency responsible for incarcerating convicted offenders. The Act does not define the word "state," but if FDOC is to be considered eligible to take advantage of the procedure set forth in section 960.292 to obtain a civil restitution lien order, it must necessarily qualify as the "state," as it cannot qualify as a "local subdivision," a "crime victim," or "aggrieved party." See § 960.292(2); see also § 960.291(4), (6) (defining "[c]rime victim" and "[l]ocal subdivisions")....

..."aggrieved party" in the sense that it has incurred costs to incarcerate Mr. Palomares—the Act indicates that the "aggrieved party" is part of the broader definition of the "crime victim." See § 960.291(4). Read in isolation, the first part of the first sentence in section 960.292(2) could be perceived as supportive of Mr....

...The sentence prescribes different methods for obtaining a civil 9 restitution lien order, authorizing the State to file a "motion" while requiring local subdivisions, crime victims, and aggrieved parties to file a "petition." § 960.292(2)....

...prosecuting authority is a party to the criminal proceeding, whereas state agencies, local subdivisions, crime victims, and aggrieved parties are not. And because it is generally the parties to a lawsuit who request relief by filing a motion, the first portion of that sentence in section 960.292(2) could be perceived in isolation as referring to the State as a party and, consequently, as referring to the prosecuting authority and not nonparty state entities or agencies like FDOC. However, courts cannot read portions of...

...2d DCA 2012) ("It is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole." (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992))). Even though a portion of the first sentence in section 960.292(2) could arguably refer to the State as a party, the latter half of that same sentence more naturally refers to the State as a government entity because it refers to the trial court entering civil restitution lien orders in favor of "the state" and "its local subdivisions," § 960.292(2) 10 (emphasis added); prosecuting authorities do not have local subdivisions as defined in the Act. Moreover, there are some circumstances under which nonparties have the right to file motions in pending cases, so the mere fact that section 960.292(2) authorizes "the state" to file a motion for a civil restitution lien order is not determinative of whether FDOC qualifies as the state....

...by the State is the result of time Mr. Green spent in county jail"). Additionally, the Act authorizes the trial court "to enter separate civil restitution lien orders as appropriate in favor of the crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, or aggrieved parties," § 960.292(3) (emphasis added), which indicates that there are circumstances when a civil restitution lien order is appropriate and circumstances when it is not....

...I disagree that resolution of this appeal requires such laborious reasoning. The plain language of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien Act allows the state to pursue a civil restitution lien order by motion in the underlying criminal proceeding. See § 960.292(2) ("[u]pon motion")....

...he state" is limited merely to the prosecuting state attorney's office, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with provisions in the Act indicating that "the state" also includes the FDOC, which is undisputedly a state agency. Most obviously, section 960.292 expressly permits other nonparties that have 15 been injured by the offender's conduct to seek such an order in that proceeding. See § 960.292(2) (authorizing "the court in which the convicted offender is convicted" to enter such orders "[u]pon motion by the state, upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party, or on its own motion" (emphasis added))....

...Hankins reasons that "[t]o allow the State to largely recoup this award would 6 Fla. Stat. § 960.293(2)(a) (1996), provides that a defendant convicted of a "capital or life felony," is "liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000." Under Fla. Stat. § 960.292(2), " ......

...6 Fla. Stat. § 960.293(2)(a) (1996), provides that a defendant convicted of a "capital or life felony," is "liable for incarceration costs and other correctional costs in the liquidated damage amount of $250,000." Under Fla. Stat. § 960.292(2), " ....

...3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005)). Under the resulting remedy crafted by the legislature, "[a]n offender's liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender's conviction." Id. (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2)). To that end, section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2019), grants the court in which a person is convicted "continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up t...

...Acosta was still serving his sentence of incarceration, the State, through its Department of Corrections, moved under several provisions of chapter 960 for the imposition of a civil restitution lien order. The resulting order expressly acknowledges the court's continuing jurisdiction under section 960.292(2) and awards the Department the amount provided under section 960.293(2)(b). On appeal, Mr....

...."), and § 775.089(7) ("The burden of demonstrating the present financial resources and the absence of potential future financial resources of the defendant and the financial needs of the defendant and his or her dependents is on the defendant."), with § 960.292(1) ("Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to ....

...PALMER, LAWSON and BERGER, JJ., concur. . On remand, the trial court has the authority to enter a civil restitution lien order with respect to the cost of incarceration. See Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corrections, 27 So.3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); § 960.29(l)(a), Fla. Stat.; 960.292(2), Fla....

its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). As was the

its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). As was the

its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). As was the

PER CURIAM. In accordance with Lund v. State, 658 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we strike the civil restitution hen order entered in this ease, based on its noncomphance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

PER CURIAM. In accordance with Lund v. State, 658 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we strike the civil restitution lien order entered in this case, based on its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

PER CURIAM. In accordance with Lund v. State, 658 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we strike the civil restitution lien order entered in this case, based on its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...Discussion As Justice Kagan stated in 2015, "we're all textualists now." Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YouTube (Nov. 25, 2015) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg. Accordingly, we begin our discussion with sections 960.292 and 960.293, Florida Statutes (2022). In operation, as well as in public policy, sections 960.292 and 960.293 establish a procedure to obtain a restitution lien as well as the quantification of damages; that is, the amount of recovery a statutorily identified complainant may recover. To start, once convicted, "the convicted offender . . . incur[s] civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in [section] 960.293." § 960.292(1). In order to recover those damages and losses, section 960.292(2) provides that "[u]pon motion by the state ....

...2003)), the legislature explicitly limits the court of conviction's continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender to "entering civil restitution lien orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision." § 960.292(2)....

...case.” The trial court did not enter an order specifically addressing restitution for costs of incarceration.  Over six and a half years later, DOC moved for imposition of a civil restitution lien judgment pursuant to sections 960.291(5)(b)(1), 960.292, 960.293(2)(b), 960.297(1), and 960.297(3), Florida Statutes (2024), which are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims’ Remedy Act....

...caused by the expenses of incarcerating convicted offenders,” the legislature imposed “a long-term civil liability for the costs of incarceration, by means of the civil restitution lien, against a convicted offender.” § 960.29(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2024). Section 960.292(1), Florida Statutes (2024), provides that “[u]pon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties ....

...See § 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. (2024). Accordingly, “[a]n offender’s liability for the costs of incarceration exists as a matter of law upon the offender’s conviction.” Smith v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla. Stat.) Section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2024), states: Upon motion by the state, ....

...§ 960.293(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024) (emphasis added). Damages are based on “the length of the sentence imposed by the court at the time of sentencing.” Id. Here, Defendant became liable for the costs of his incarceration at the time of his conviction. See § 960.292(1), Fla. Stat.; Smith, 27 So. 3d at 126. DOC—as an agent of the State—timely moved for liquidated damages in the trial court in which Defendant was convicted. See § 960.292(2), Fla. Stat....

...The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the civil restitution lien order because DOC filed its motion just over six and a half years into Defendant’s eight-year sentence, which is within the prescribed time set forth in the statute. Id. Because Defendant incurred liability at the time of his conviction and DOC satisfied section 960.292(2)’s requirements, we find the trial court erred in denying DOC’s motion. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand with directions to grant DOC’s motion and impose a civil restitution lien order based on the length of...

its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(B), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). As was the

PER CURIAM. In accordance with Lund v. State, 658 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we strike the civil restitution lien order entered in this case, based on its noncompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

PER CURIAM. In accordance with Lund v. State, 658 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), we strike the civil restitution hen order entered in this ease, based on its noneompliance with the requirements of section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...He challenges the constitutionality *1074 of Florida's Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victim's Remedy Act of 1994, sections 960.29 through 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). We decline to reach this issue since the record is devoid of a separate order requiring restitution under the Act, as is required by section 960.292(3)....

...State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). However, we affirm the imposition of $300 for attorney's fees since the appellant agreed to pay that cost as part of his plea bargain. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 960.292(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...5th DCA 2005) (holding trial court lacked jurisdiction to order restitution more than sixty days after sentencing). Reversed with instructions to strike the restitution order. The reversal is without prejudice to the State or the victim to pursue a civil restitution lien under section 960.292(2), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...The trial court found that DOC was entitled to a civil restitution lien but ultimately ruled that DOC could only seek restitution by (1) filing a separate civil action or (2) having the state attorney file a motion for such relief on DOC’s behalf in the criminal case.1 Because this ruling was based on a misreading of section 960.292, Florida Statutes (2022), we reverse. Section 960.292 provides in relevant part: (1) Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions, and aggrieved parties as set forth in s....

...reference to “the state.” The statute provides that a civil restitution lien order may be obtained (1) “[u]pon motion by the state”; (2) “upon petition of the local subdivision, crime victim, or aggrieved party”; and (3) “on [the court’s] own motion.” § 960.292(2)....

...5th DCA 2008) (finding that language in one statute “reveal[ing] that the Legislature knows how to make provision” for an award of both actual and treble damages implied that another statute lacking such language did not permit both)). Instead, the legislature in section 960.292(2) specifically authorized “the state” to file a motion for a civil restitution lien in a criminal case. DOC is an executive agency of the state, and when it takes any action, it does so on behalf of the state. As a result, section 960.292(2) authorizes DOC to move for a civil restitution lien order in a criminal case....

...Michael Grimace, in proper person. Charles T. Martin, Jr., Assistant General Counsel (Tallahassee), for appellee Florida Department of Corrections. Before LOGUE, C.J., and SCALES and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 960.292(2), Fla....

...Dep’t of Corr., 27 So. 3d 124, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (recognizing that the statute of limitations for civil actions brought by the state “does not affect the state’s ability to pursue a restitution lien through the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)”); Rodriguez v....