Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...State, 669 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Alberts v. State, 711 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the First District's decision and hold that sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), do not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, nor do sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the right to substantive due process....

...Goad initiated a civil action against the *882 Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr....

...Goad's incarceration. Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration. By the terms of section 960.297, the state may recover these costs for the portion of the offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994, the effective date of the law. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the cause of action asserted in the complaint, and Mr. Goad then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the counterclaim. He argued that the application of section 960.297 would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions, because the statute was not in effect at the time he committed the criminal offenses resulting in his incarceration. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. 754 So.2d at 96-97. The First District reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that sections 960.293 and 960.297 "afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment," and therefore do not violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 100. Goad now raises two issues for review: first, whether sections 960.293 and 960.297 of the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act (the Act) [1] violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; and second, whether these same sections violate the right to substantive due process....

...n" and the "lien created upon the imposition of a per diem charge has the same effect as the lien created by the entry of a civil judgment." Id. at 1373. Therefore, we hold that imposing a civil *885 restitution lien pursuant to sections 960.293 and 960.297 to recover the incarceration costs of convicted offenders is a civil remedy that is not so punitive in nature as to constitute criminal punishment....

...Goad has failed to present clear proof that the Act actually operates as a criminal sanction that is capable of violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws. DUE PROCESS CLAIM Goad claims that the Act violates his substantive due process rights because sections 960.293 and 960.297 attach new legal consequences to events completed prior to the enactment of the law....

...ublic bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons. Furthermore, we believe that the flat charge of $50 per day is reasonably related to the costs of incarceration. 705 So.2d at 1372-73. We find that this reasoning applies equally to section 960.297, the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement. For offenders convicted before July 1, 1994, section 960.297(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), [4] provides that the State may recover incarceration costs, up to $50 per day, for the portion of the offender's sentence remaining after July 1, 1994. Goad contends that the statute violates his right to substantive due process because section 960.297 attaches a new penalty to conduct completed before the statute's enactment....

...mbursing *886 public bodies for the costs expended in incarcerating these persons"). CONCLUSION Accordingly, we approve the First District's decision below and disapprove Gary and Alberts to the extent that those cases find that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws....

...Goad challenges only those portions of the Act that relate to the recovery of incarceration costs by the State. [3] Hudson describes the seven factors as "guideposts" for determining whether a civil statute actually imposes a remedy that is in the nature of criminal punishment. 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488. [4] Section 960.297 provides in full: (1) The state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. March 13, 2000. Rehearing Denied April 12, 2000. *96 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Charlie McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Appellee, pro se. PADOVANO, J. Section 960.297, Florida Statutes authorizes the state to initiate a civil action against a prison inmate to recover the costs of the inmate's incarceration....

...Goad initiated a civil action against the Department in 1995, for injuries he sustained when he was attacked by another inmate. In response to this claim, the Department filed a motion for a summary judgment and a counterclaim under sections 960.293 and 960.297, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) to recover the costs of Mr....

...Section 960.293 provides that a defendant who is incarcerated for an offense that is neither a capital offense nor a life felony offense is liable to the state in the amount of $50 per day for the costs of incarceration. By the terms of section *97 960.297, the state may recover these costs for the portion of the offender's remaining sentence after July 1, 1994, the effective date of the law. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on the cause of action asserted in the complaint, and Mr. Goad then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the counterclaim. He argued that the application of section 960.297 would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions, because the statute was not in effect at the time he committed the criminal offenses resulting in his incarceration. The trial court agreed and held that section 960.297 could not be applied retroactively. Following the rendition of a final judgment, the Department appealed to this court to challenge the trial court's disposition of the counterclaim. Sections 960.293 and 960.297 are part of the Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act....

...t decided in the Ilkanic case. Here we must decide whether the Act is invalid as an ex post facto law. [1] Both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const. Art 1, § 9; Art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. Section 960.297 applies retroactively to the existing population of prison inmates, but that alone does not make it an ex post facto law....

...pervision. Here again, the court relied on the distinction between civil and criminal laws in the case law pertaining to double jeopardy claims. Our application of the Hudson factors in the present case leads us to conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 contain no provision that could be properly characterized as punishment for a crime....

...Finally, although the potential imposition of a lien may have some slight deterrent effect, the mere presence of a deterrent purpose does not render the sanction criminal. Several Florida decisions also provide indirect support for our conclusion that sections 960.293 and 960.297 are not ex post facto laws....

...State, 668 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), when it rejected the double jeopardy argument asserted there. These cases involve different constitutional issues, but the characteristics of the challenged statutes remain the same. If sections 960.293 and 960.297 are civil in nature for due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy purposes, then they are likely civil in nature for ex post facto purposes....

...Wainwright, 393 So.2d 542 (Fla.1980), the court held that the statute did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws, because it did not increase punishment for prisoners whose crimes were committed before its effective date. Sections 960.293 and *100 960.297 operate in the same way to expose previously convicted inmates to future liability for subsistence costs....

...The court explained, however, that if it were not for the revocation of gain time, it would have concluded that the statute was purely civil. By implication then, the statutes in the present case do not violate the ex post facto clauses. For these reasons, we conclude that sections 960.293 and 960.297 Florida Statutes afford civil remedies that are not the equivalent of criminal punishment....

...State, 949 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Here, 319.25 months did not exceed the 30-year maximum sentence for a first degree felony. Wilson was not entitled to Apprendi relief. Wilson also argues that the court lacked authority to impose the costs of incarceration because section 960.297, Florida Statutes (2003), provided that the State may pursue a separate civil action, but did not permit the costs to be imposed by the trial court here....

...ty of care owed to Appellant by destroying the photographs while he was away from Walton CI. Appellant subsequently filed an amended complaint, and on March 8, 2006, DOC filed an answer denying liability *126 and asserting a counterclaim pursuant to section 960.297(1), Florida Statutes (2005), for the costs of Appellant's incarceration....

...Ilkanic, 683 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), approved, 705 So.2d 1371 (Fla.1998). Alternatively, the state *127 may seek recovery of the amounts provided for in section 960.293 "in a separate civil action or as a counterclaim in any civil action." See § 960.297(1), Fla. Stat. This case involves a civil restitution lien order entered based upon a counterclaim filed pursuant to section 960.297(1), not a civil restitution lien order entered by the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...cribed elsewhere in these statutes, within the time prescribed elsewhere." (emphasis added). Section 95.11(3)(f) provides that a four-year statute of limitation applies to "[a]n action founded on a statutory liability." An action brought pursuant to 960.297(1) is founded on the statutory liability incurred by the convicted offender upon his conviction. See §§ 960.292(1), 960.293(2), Fla. Stat. Therefore, because section 960.297(1) does not prescribe a time period within which the state must bring an action under the statute, the four-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(3)(f) applies....

...(" Upon conviction, the convicted offender shall incur civil liability for damages and losses to... the state ... as set forth in s. 960.293." (emphasis added)). By the terms of the statute, the offender's conviction is the last element of the action to occur. Thus, we conclude that the state's cause of action under section 960.297(1) to recover "the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293" accrues upon the offender's conviction. The filing of the action as a counterclaim does not impact the statute of limitations. The counterclaim authorized by section 960.297(1) is, in this case, a permissive counterclaim because it does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to Appellant's complaint....

...be barred if it is filed beyond the statute of limitations. See DuBreuil v. James, 365 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In an effort to avoid the application of the statute of limitations to bar its counterclaim, DOC argued that a cause of action under section 960.297(1) does not accrue until the offender is released from prison, and because Appellant is still incarcerated, the statute of limitations has not yet started to run....

...See also Miami-Dade County v. Moss, 842 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that the county was entitled to recover compensation for the number of days in the convicted offender's sentence, rather than only the number of days actually served). The legislature amended section 960.297 in 2009 to prescribe a specific statute of limitations for actions to recover incarceration costs....

...The statute, as amended effective July 1, 2009, provides that "[c]ivil actions authorized by this section may be commenced at any time during the offender's incarceration and up to 5 years after the date of the offender's release from incarceration or supervision, whichever occurs later." See § 960.297(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). However, this new statute of limitations does not apply in this case because the state's cause of action against Appellant under section 960.297(1) was extinguished by the existing statute of limitations on January 29, 2002, well before the new statute became effective....

...See Wiley v. Roof, 641 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla.1994); Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So.2d 720, 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We recognize that our holding has the potential to limit the state's ability to recover incarceration costs from convicted offenders under section 960.297, but it does not affect the state's ability to pursue a restitution lien through the sentencing court under section 960.292(2)....

...Mar. 28, 2000); Green v. State, 998 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (Altenbernd, J., concurring); see also Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., Staff Analysis for SB 2298 [*] , at 8, 10, 20 (Mar. 20, 2009) (on file with comm.) (reporting that DOC uses section 960.297 to seek reimbursement for incarceration costs "to offset claims paid to offenders" and stating that the new statute of limitations has the potential to "deter frivolous filings by inmates" and "result in increased collection of [incarceration] costs")....

...n a civil action or as a 1 Such damages are liquidated. For a life or capital felony, the offender is liable for $250,000. § 960.293(2)(a). Otherwise, an offender 4 counterclaim in any civil action. § 960.297(1)....

...n a civil action or as a 1 Such damages are liquidated. For a life or capital felony, the offender is liable for $250,000. § 960.293(2)(a). Otherwise, an offender 4 counterclaim in any civil action. § 960.297(1)....

...im that there were no liens, costs, or restitution associated with his plea. Over a decade later, the Legislature enacted the Florida Civil Restitution Lien and Crime Victims' Remedy Act of 1994. See ch. 94-342, Laws of Fla. (codified as §§ 960.29-960.297, Fla....

...(Supp.1994)) ("Civil Restitution Act"). For offenders who were already incarcerated, the Act allows governmental entities to seek reimbursement of costs of incarceration for that part of the offender's sentence remaining *1095 after July 1, 1994. See § 960.297, Fla....

...The State may enforce a civil restitution lien order "in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, including levy against personal property by the sheriffs of this state and foreclosure against nonexempt real property." § 960.294(2). Alternatively, section 960.297 provides that the "state and its local subdivisions, in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action, may seek recovery of the damages and losses set forth in s. 960.293." § 960.297(1). Mr. 4 Palomares argues that FDOC was required to file a separate civil action pursuant to section 960.297....

...FDOC argues—and the trial court agreed— that FDOC could file a motion for a civil restitution lien order in Mr. Palomares' criminal case pursuant to section 960.292(2), by which it sought to make its civil restitution lien for the costs of his incarceration enforceable. Section 960.297(1) provides that the State "may" file a separate civil action to seek recovery of incarceration costs from a convicted offender, but nothing in the text of that provision indicates that is the sole means by which the State must do so in order to recover incarceration costs. Cf., e.g., Agile Assurance Grp., Ltd....

...2d DCA 2014) (providing that "use of the word may deems relevant language permissive" but construing a forum selection clause as mandatory because the surrounding text—"may be instituted exclusively in the courts of Makati City"—indicated a mandatory requirement for where a legal action must be filed). While section 960.297 makes a separate civil action available to the State by use of the precatory term "may," a fair reading of the surrounding text of the Act as a whole indicates that the State may alternatively use the civil restitution lien— and thus the civil restitution lien order—as a means to recover its damages and that the civil restitution lien is a separate remedy from any judgment obtained in a civil action under section 960.297....

...restitution lien arises, the statutory definition in the Act merely provides that the lien "exists" and "attaches against the real or personal property owned by a convicted offender." § 960.291(1). Mr. Palomares argues that because FDOC did not file a separate civil action under section 960.297(1)—which he characterizes as "the only mechanism available for the state to seek the imposition of the civil restitution lien"—"no 'civil restitution lien' existed for the entry of any 'civil restitution lien order.' " In other words, Mr. Palomares argues that the civil restitution lien cannot exist until the State first obtains a judgment in a separate civil action pursuant to section 960.297(1)....

...n begins to exist or the means by which the lien comes to exist, Mr. Palomares' argument must still be rejected. 6  Nothing in the Act requires the State to file a separate civil action, and nothing in section 960.297(1)'s text indicates that a separate civil action is a necessary predicate for a civil restitution lien to exist....

...plea by a defendant, regardless of adjudication of guilt."). Mr. Palomares misplaces reliance on an overreading of a single sentence in Goad v. Florida Department of Corrections, 845 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 2003), in which the supreme court described section 960.297 as "the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement," seizing on the phrase "the mechanism" and arguing that that language indicates that the State must follow section 960.297 to recover incarceration costs. See id. at 885 (emphasis added). However, in Goad the FDOC recovered the defendant's costs of incarceration pursuant to section 960.297 by filing a counterclaim in a separate civil action that the defendant initiated. Id. at 881–82. In relevant part, the supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that sections 960.293 and 960.297 violated his substantive due process rights. Id. at 885. It relied on its prior decision finding that section 960.293 does not violate substantive due process rights and provided that "this reasoning applies equally to section 960.297, the mechanism for imposing the $50 per day reimbursement." 7 See id. at 885 (citing Ilkanic v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 705 So. 2d 1371, 1372–73 (Fla. 1998)). In the context of that case, section 960.297 was "the mechanism" for recovering incarceration costs, but the opinion cannot be read to infer that the supreme court determined section 960.297 to be the only procedural mechanism, and the court did not discuss section 960.292 at all. The Act presumes the existence of a lien against convicted offenders....

...vil restitution lien order" upon "motion by the state." § 960.292(2). For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err by following the motion procedure in section 960.292(2) instead of requiring FDOC to commence a separate civil action under section 960.297(1). II. Mr....

...to pursue a civil restitution lien order by motion in the underlying criminal proceeding. See § 960.292(2) ("[u]pon motion"). It also provides that the state "may seek recovery" by "separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action." See § 960.297(1) (emphasis added)....

...urrent motive of spite or ulterior purpose, there is no abuse of process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no abuse of process here. Florida law allows the Sheriff to sue for White’s costs of confinement. See Fla. Stat. § 960.297(1)....

...urrent motive of spite or ulterior purpose, there is no abuse of process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no abuse of process here. Florida law allows the Sheriff to sue for White’s costs of confinement. See Fla. Stat. § 960.297(1)....

...uld be liable for incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.293, Fla. Stat. (2012) (providing that upon conviction, defendants are liable to the state and its local subdivisions for the costs of incarceration and other correctional costs); § 960.297 (authorizing a civil action to recover the costs set forth in section 960.293); see also Miami-Dade Cnty....

...riminatory manner by seeking the imposition of the civil restitution lien judgment based upon an improper, 1 Mr. O'Neal sought $85,000 in compensatory damages and $80,000 in punitive damages. 2 The Act includes sections 960.29 through 960.297, Florida Statutes (2022). 2 unjustifiable or arbitrary classification, that is, an inmate who has filed a civil rights complaint against FDOC and in order to offset any potential financial compensation...

...orders for the duration of the sentence and up to 5 years from release from incarceration or supervision." § 960.292(2). We note that a motion for civil restitution lien order may also be filed in a separate civil action or as counterclaim in any civil action. See § 960.297(1). On this record, it is clearly established that Mr....