Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...n 812.014) to differentiate between levels of the offense; section 10 amends subsection (2) of 538.23 (dealing with secondary metals recyclers) to correspond with the changes to the theft statute; section 11 amends the retail and farm theft statute (section 812.015) to reflect the changes in the theft statute; section 12 amends the criminal justice information statutes (section 943.051) to reflect the changes in the theft statute; and section 13 amends the accessory after the fact statute (section 773.03) by establishing new penalty degrees of the offense....

...after a probation violation. On May 29, 2001 Jaggernauth pleaded nolo contendere and was again convicted of grand theft under Florida Statutes § 812.014(1) as well as the misdemeanor offense of resisting a merchant under Florida Statutes § 812.015(6). The 2001 Information charging Jaggernauth with grand theft tracked the general language of § 812.014(1)....

...I also agree that if the conduct of the store manager supported the claim for punitive damages under the facts of this case, Winn Dixie would be subject to them. However, I agree with the trial judge that the facts of this case do not support an award of punitive damages. In the enactment of section 812.015, Florida Statutes, Florida has recognized that shoplifting is a serious problem in supermarkets....

...[2] The issue before us is whether the court properly granted appellees summary judgment in light of the facts disclosed. We first analyze the false arrest claim. Under Florida law, merchants, their employees, and peace officers who comply with the requirements of Section 812.015(3), Florida Statutes (1979), are not civilly liable for false imprisonment or arrest in detaining a person suspected of retail theft....

...elieve merchandise has been taken; (b) detain the suspect in a reasonable manner for a reasonable time; and (c) call a peace officer to the scene immediately after the suspect is taken into custody. Probable cause is also required to make an arrest. Section 812.015(4), (5)....

...The trial court was thus competent to determine this issue as a matter of law. We are satisfied, moreover, that the issue was correctly decided. The information furnished to officer Barnett by Mr. Alvarez was sufficient to provide him with probable cause to believe that Mr. Weissman had shoplifted. See § 812.015(4), Fla....

...With this in mind, and finding the existence of material issues of fact, the summary judgment granted to appellees Alvarez and K-Mart on the false arrest claim is reversed. Now directing our attention to appellants' other cause of action, we note that the limited protection afforded by Section 812.015 does not extend to claims of malicious prosecution....

...This construction of Section 812.13 ... we think, is precisely what the legislature intended. Id. at 246. We disagree with the district court's finding that the taking was ongoing at the time petitioners employed force. A theft can occur under sections 812.014(1) and 812.015(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), regardless of whether the goods are successfully removed from the store premises....

...[2] Under section 812.014(1), which defines theft, "[a] person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent to ... [d]eprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom." (Emphasis added.) Section 812.015, which defines retail theft as "the taking possession of......

...Attorney's Office to be technically defective. The defects were duly noted on a penal screening form. The first defect was that the complaint charged Gatto with "retail theft in viol[ation] of F.S. 812.021" when the statute cited should have been F.S. 812.015....

...premises, from the right to detain someone suspected of an offense such as shoplifting. The existence of probable cause is not an issue in this case because, admittedly, no one suspected the women of any illegal activity on the day in question. Thus section 812.015, Florida Statutes, did not provide a basis to detain them....

...To better aid the Court, Anthony should have included those portions of depositions that specifically state, on the record, who the deponent is and how he is connected to the parties. [2] Anthony's third amended complaint (Docket No. 205, ¶ 75) alleges that Miller violated Fla. Stat. § 812.015(1) instead of Section 812.014(1). This must be a scrivener's error, because Section 812.015(1) merely defines words used in the retail and farm theft statute and provides no civil remedy....

...t order is on defendant. Rivers v. Dillard's Dept. Store, Inc., 698 So.2d 1328, 1331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Rotte v. City of Jacksonville, 509 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Various statutes justify restraint under stated circumstances, e.g., F.S. 812.015, 901.15, 901.151 (2006)....

...1st DCA 1987); Stuckey, 907 So.2d at 1212. An element of the resisting a merchant offense is that the proscribed resistance to reasonable efforts of the merchant to recover the merchandise occurs "while" or "after" the defendant commits a theft of the merchant's property. See § 812.015(6), Fla....

...1st DCA 2004). Both the statute governing the resisting a merchant offense and the case law make clear that a defendant can be prosecuted and convicted of both resisting a merchant and the associated petit theft offense without offending double jeopardy. See § 812.015(6), Fla....

...775.083, unless the individual did not know, or did not have reason to know, that the person seeking to recover the property was a . . . merchant, merchant's employee. . . . For purposes of this section the charge of theft and the charge of resisting may be tried concurrently. § 812.015(6), Fla....

...[4] In a similar manner, section 810.09(1)(a)(1) prohibits trespassing on property other than a structure or conveyance after notice has been given. [5] For example, an officer can detain a shoplifter who is suspected only of petit theft based on probable cause. See § 812.015(3)(a), Fla....

...Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BENTON, J. Frederick Lane appeals his conviction for resisting a merchant's employee's efforts to recover stolen property in violation of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2002), arguing that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on two of the elements of the crime constituted fundamental error....

...775.083, unless the individual did not know, or did not have reason to know, that the person seeking to recover the property was a ... merchant's employee.... For purposes of this section the charge of theft and the charge of resisting may be tried concurrently. Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...We affirm and write concerning Johnson's third point. Appellant was charged with strong arm robbery, a second degree felony. See § 812.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). He complains that his lawyer did not request a charge on the lesser included offense of resisting a merchant, section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1997), a first degree misdemeanor....

stolen cable box. Bernard was not charged under section 812.15, Florida Statutes (2002), which makes the unauthorized

...e body of the information charges that appellant did "unlawfully take possession of, or carry away, merchandise of a value of $100 or more," with the intent to deprive the owner of the "full retail value of said property; contrary to chapter 812.014/812.015, Florida Statutes." It is apparent that throughout the proceedings below, appellant, *458 appellee, State of Florida, and the court considered that appellant was charged with and tried for grand theft of the second degree....

...state persuaded the court to give the definition of retail theft contained in the Standard Jury Instructions in Misdemeanor Cases: the sale price at the time the merchandise was stolen. This definition is also contained in the retail theft statute. § 812.015(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1981). The jury found petitioner guilty of grand theft. The judgment entered on the day of the verdict, February 22, 1983, adjudicated petitioner guilty of "retail theft," with "grand theft" written parenthetically and "812.014/812.015" cited as the offense statute numbers....

...a separate crime from other theft and that a conviction under the retail theft statute is necessarily a second-degree misdemeanor. It arrived at this result by analyzing the legislative history of sections 812.014, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), and 812.015, and concluding that section 812.015 created no new crime of retail theft, but "simply provided a set standard by which the market value of property stolen from a retail establishment is determined." Emshwiller, 443 So.2d at 346. We approve the decision of the district court. Under section 812.015, retail theft is a species of the theft defined in section 812.014, not a separate crime for purposes of penalty determination. Section 812.015 does not contain a penalty provision for first offenses, but merely enhances penalties for a second or subsequent conviction for petit theft involving merchandise or farm produce taken from a merchant or farmer....

"developmental" for "fundamental." Finally, section 812.15, Florida Statutes (2006), pertaining to the

§§ 553 and 605 of the Communications Act, and § 812.15(4)(b)(1) of the Florida Statutes. Upon information

...nd V. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Ivey on counts I and III. As to appellants' first argument, regarding the defective jury verdict, Ivey had raised the defense at trial that it was immune from liability for false imprisonment pursuant to Section 812.015, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...en asked whether Ivey's employees restrained the children "without probable cause or in an unreasonable manner or for an unreasonable length of time." We disagree that the verdict form's failure to include this language constitutes reversible error. Section 812.015(5) provides: A merchant, merchant's employee, or farmer who takes a person into custody, as provided in subsection (3) ......

...is subsequent self-identification and arrest of Hughes constituted a dutiful exercise of police authority in the presence of criminal activity. [1] The court has requested and received memoranda as to potential applicability of the lesser penalty of § 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...*1102 Contrarily, the majority opinion holds that the taking in the instant case was ongoing even after the appellants had left the store and were in the parking lot, reasoning that the possession of the property was in "continuing dispute." Compare the statutory definition of "retail theft" in section 812.015(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), which certainly does not require that merchandise, the possession of which has been acquired (taken) with the wrongful intent to deprive, be removed from the store....

...fenses of theft and robbery. I would certify the following to be questions of great public importance: (1) Are the words "obtaining" in the omnibus theft statute (§ 812.014(1), Fla. Stat.) and "the taking possession of" in the retail theft statute (§ 812.015(1)(d), Fla....

...the information did not allege that Tomko was, in fact, a merchant. We disagree with the State's argument. The definition of "merchant" includes an agent or employee "of any premises or apparatus used for retail purchase or sale of any merchandise." § 812.015(1)(b), Fla....

...State, 614 So.2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (relying on Baker to reverse robbery conviction under similar circumstances where use of force followed abandonment of property). Under Peterson's theory, he was guilty only of the misdemeanor offense of resisting a merchant. See § 812.015(6)....

...The defendant then escaped, but was apprehended shortly afterwards by a St. Petersburg police officer in the parking lot. At the close of all the evidence, defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed on the charge of resisting a merchant, pursuant to section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1993), as a lesser included offense of robbery....

...The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery, as charged in the information. On appeal, the defendant seeks a new trial on the robbery conviction based on the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of resisting a merchant. Pursuant to the 1992 amendment of section 812.015(6), the charge of resisting a merchant is a permissive lesser included offense of robbery....

...We affirm. This appeal presents to us a rather confused record in regard to the exact crime with which appellant was charged and convicted. In sorting through the confusion, we must decide whether or not "retail theft" of merchandise, as defined in section 812.015, Florida Statutes (1981), where value is alleged and proved, is a separate criminal offense from "theft" as contemplated by section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...e body of the information charges that appellant did "unlawfully take possession of, or carry away, merchandise of a value of $100 or more," with the intent to deprive the owner of the "full retail value of said property; contrary to chapter 812.014/812.015, Florida Statutes." It is apparent that throughout the proceedings below, appellant, appellee, State of Florida, and the court considered that appellant was charged with and tried for grand theft of the second degree....

...The trial judge agreed, specifically stating that he did not "think we are dealing with market value." On the same day as the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge entered a judgment adjudicating appellant guilty of "Retail Theft" with the words "Grand Theft" entered parenthetically thereunder, and citing "812.014/812.015" as the "Offense Statute Number(s)." Sentencing was continued pending completion of a pre-sentence investigation....

..." as the crime for which appellant was convicted. While it makes no reference to "Grand Theft," it cites as the "Offense Statute Number(s)" only section "812.014(2)(b)(1)." Our colleagues at the Third District Court of Appeal held in Tobe that under section 812.015, "retail theft" of merchandise where its sale value is alleged and proved, is a second degree misdemeanor, separate and apart from a "theft" under section 812.014. The Standard Jury Instructions In Misdemeanor Cases include an instruction on such an offense. However, we cannot conclude that such a separate *345 offense exists where the sale value of the merchandise is alleged and proved. While section 812.015(1)(d) defines "retail theft," nowhere in section 812.015 is any specific punishment prescribed for "retail theft," nor is it designated either a felony or a misdemeanor. Only in section 812.015(2) is punishment referred to in regard to "theft," and that subsection is an enhancement provision that refers to "a second or subsequent conviction for petit theft involving merchandise." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 812.014(2)(c) do...

...gree. However, we conclude that theft of merchandise offered for sale in a retail establishment is included in section 812.014(2)(a) or (b), if the sale price is $100 or more. Further, we cannot perceive when the "value of merchandise" as defined in section 812.015(1)(c) would ever be less than the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, as "value" is defined in section 812.012(9)(a)....

...is petit theft under section 812.014(2)(c). We arrive at our conclusion that there is no separate crime of "retail theft" of merchandise where value is alleged and proved by an analysis of the legislative history of what are now sections 812.014 and 812.015, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...In 1978, by chapter 78-348, the legislature again amended section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1977) to add "knowingly" to the definition of theft. At the same time, the retail theft arrest statute, section 901.34 was repealed [3] and re-enacted, with amendments, as section 812.015....

...nd theft and petit theft. He then instructed that "value of merchandise means the sale price of the merchandise at the time it was stolen." We believe that is correct. Instead of creating a separate crime of "retail theft" of merchandise by enacting section 812.015, we believe the legislature simply provided a set standard by which the market value of property stolen from a retail establishment is determined. In all such cases, a jury's search for "market value" need proceed no further than determining the sale price of the items stolen at the time of the theft. The issue is not before us here, but we conclude that a charge could be made under section 812.015 in regard to the taking or carrying away of merchandise, altering or removing a label or price tag, transferring merchandise from one container to another, removal of a shopping cart, or theft of farm produce where the element of value is not alleged, or if alleged, not proved....

...The district court agreed with respondent and reversed, relying primarily on the authority and reasoning in Judge Rawls' dissent in Williams. It was Judge Rawls' position that when a merchant detains a suspected shoplifter under section 901.34, Florida Statutes (1975) [here section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)], a policelike atmosphere has been created, pursuant to the sovereign's grant of power, and the suspect is "in custody." Section 812.015(3)(a) provides: [a] law enforcement officer, a merchant, a merchant's employee, ......

...tion, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time... . [A] law enforcement officer shall be called to the scene immediately after the person has been taken into custody. [Emphasis supplied.] Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: [a]n individual who resists the reasonable effort of a law-enforcement officer, merchant [or] merchant's employee ......

...had probable cause to believe the individual had concealed or removed from its place of display or elsewhere and who is subsequently found to be guilty of theft of the ... merchandise ... is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree... . We do not agree with the Third District or Judge Rawls that section 812.015, Florida Statutes raises the action of a store employee charged with the duty of protecting his employer's property interests to the level of state action for purposes of invoking the protection of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution....

...If, as the court below held, the detention by the store employer be state action, then it would follow that the state would be liable in damages for any detention found to be unreasonable, a result surely not contemplated by the legislature in the passage of section 812.015(3)....

...The majority opinion points out that the common law recognized the right of an owner of property to forcibly restrain and confine a person suspected of theft. Because this common law right antedated the statutory right of reasonable detention under section 812.015, Florida Statutes (1981), the majority concludes that a merchant who detains a suspected thief is not acting in pursuant of authority that comes from the state....

...r this issue raised for the first time on appeal. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 *1007 (Fla. 1978). Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.014(2)(c)(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 812.015(6), Fla....

...e prompt call to law enforcement together with the turning over of the investigation, without recommendation or rancor, to Officer Green, someone trained and authorized to conduct it, was an honest albeit mistaken effort to comply with the spirit of section 812.015(3), Florida Statutes (1985), which gives a merchant immunity from prosecution for false imprisonment if he acts with probable cause and calls law enforcement immediately after taking a shoplifting suspect into custody....

...ERVIN and BOOTH, CONCUR; BENTON, J., CONCURS IN RESULT WITH OPINION. BENTON, J., concurring in result. Edward C. Stewart argues for reversal of his conviction for armed robbery on grounds the trial court did not instruct on the lesser included offense of resisting a merchant. See § 812.015(6), Fla....

...Similarly, “[questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review.” Allen v. State, 82 So.3d 118, 120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Possession or use of an antishoplifting device countermeasure is prohibited by section 812.015(7), Florida Statutes (2010): It is unlawful to possess, or use or attempt to use, any antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any premises used for the retail purchase or sale of any merchandise....

...other record made of the register receipt. (i) “Antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure” means any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device. § 812.015(l)(h), (i), Fla....

...3d DCA 1999). In Blunt , two women “covered the store security sensors with tinfoil to evade detection when they attempted to walk past the sensors with the stolen merchandise hidden in a bag.” Id. at 1258 . The state charged Blunt with violating section 812.015(7). Id. Blunt moved to dismiss the charge, and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss because: Tinfoil, by itself, does not fall under the definition of an ‘antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure’ found in s. 812.015(l)(i) because tinfoil is *44 not an item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered....

...�when the language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most favorably to the accused.’ ” Id. (quoting § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1997)). In the instant case, the booster bag used by Cenatis fits the plain language of section 812.015(l)(i)....

...After the police and Morris’ husband arrived and discussed the incident, Morris departed the store. Morris brought this action against Albertson’s claiming damages for false arrest. Albertson’s denied liability on the grounds that it was immune from suit under Florida statute § 812.015....

...for theft of merchandise shall not be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment when the merchant [or] merchant’s employee ... has probable cause to believe that the person committed theft of merchandise ... Fla.Stat.Ann. § 812.015 (West Supp.1983)....

...There appears to be no case law to instruct us on the extent of the immunity furnished insurers and their employees by section 626.989(6). We think comparison of that section with the protection afforded merchants or their employees and law enforcement authorities by section 812.015(3), Florida Statutes, may help us determine the scope of the immunity under section 626.989(6). Section 812.015(3)(c) states that the taking into custody and detention by a law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant's employee or farmer, if done in compliance with all the requirements of subsection (3) shall not render such person criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention....

...lawfully taken merchandise from the merchant or farm produce from the farm and that taking the person into custody can effect recovery of that property; and with the manner and duration of the detention. It has been determined that the protection of section 812.015 does not extend to claims of malicious prosecution. Weissman, 396 So.2d at 1167. A comparison of the operative language of section 812.015 and that of section 626.989 reveals much. Section 812.015 speaks specifically to civil or criminal liability for "false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention." § 812.015(3)(c). Section 626.989(6), on the other hand, speaks to "civil liability for libel or otherwise." Section 812.015 creates an immunity for the persons specified, if they have conformed with the stated requirements, from both civil and criminal prosecution for three stated torts and crimes....

CIKLIN, J. Michelle Rimondi appeals her convictions and sentences for third-degree grand theft in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2009), and felony retail theft in concert with others in violation of section 812.015(8)(a)....

...*1062 Thus, we look to section 775.021(4) to discern the legislature’s intent. As a result, the resolution of this case turns on a comparison of the statutory elements of third-degree grand theft as defined in section 812.014 and felony retail theft as defined in section 812.015(8)(a)....

...it, or to appropriate the property to one’s own use or the use of any other person not entitled to it; and (4) the value of the property taken is valued at $300 or more. See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2009). The elements of felony retail theft under section 812.015(8)(a) are: (1) Knowingly (2) taking possession of or carrying away of merchandise, property, money, or negotiable documents; (3) with intent to deprive the merchant of possession, use, benefit, or full retail value; (4) the value of the property taken is valued at $300 or more; and (5) the person, individually or in concert with one or more other persons, coordinates the activities of one or more individuals in committing the offense. See § 812.015(l)(d), (8)(a), Fla....

...etail theft in concert with others offense. 4 Although both offenses are third-degree felonies, the third-degree grand theft is a “lesser offense” because its required statutory elements are always subsumed by the retail theft offense defined in section 812.015(8)(a) “without regard to the charging document or evidence at trial.” See Pizzo v....

...fense conviction and affirm the greater.”). Affirmed in part and reversed in part. TAYLOR and GERBER, JJ., concur. . Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). . In 1985, the Florida Supreme Court held, "Under section 812.015, retail theft is a species of the theft defined in section 812.014, not a separate crime for purposes of penalty determination.” Emshwitler v....

...e a double jeopardy violation because the two offenses are not "separate” offenses as defined in section 775.02l(4)(a) because each offense does not require “proof of an element that the other does not.” While felony retail theft as defined in section 812.015(8)(a) contains an element that is not an element of third-degree grand theft, the converse is not true — third-degree grand theft does not require "proof of an element that the other does not.”

...At the conclusion of the case Mr. Stuckey requested that the jury be given instructions on the lesser included offenses of petty theft, battery and resisting a merchant. The crime of resisting a merchant, as it is applicable to the present case, is described in section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2004), as follows: (6) An individual who, while committing or after committing theft of property......

...ot allege that the security guard was a merchant. The Second District disagreed, noting that the statutory definition of "merchant" includes an agent or employee "of any premises or apparatus used for retail purchase or sale of any merchandise." See § 812.015(1)(b), Fla....

...* * * The state does concede that the petition does not allege that appellant knew the victim was a school board employee, an element of the new statute. We therefore remand for the offense to be reclassified as simple assault. (Emphasis added). See also § 316.1935, Fla. Stat. (2005)(fleeing or eluding officer); [9] § 812.015(6), Fla....

...ses or fails to stop in compliance with such an order, or having stopped in knowing compliance with such order, willfully flees in an attempt to elude such officer . . . . (Emphasis added). See Creed v. State, 886 So.2d 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). [10] Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2005), in pertinent part, provides: An individual who, while committing or after committing theft of property, transit fare evasion, or trespass, resists the reasonable effort of a law enforcement officer ....

...e imprisonment, based on the detention of Hood's daughter, Sharon Davis, on shoplifting charges. According to the complaint, the agents or employees of the store acted without probable cause in detaining Davis against her will. Zayre's answer raised section 812.015, Florida Statutes (1985) (immunity for merchants) as an affirmative defense....

...The trial court entered summary final judgment for Zayre, and the plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether there was sufficient probable cause to detain Sharon Davis. If probable cause is found to exist, then Zayre would not be liable based on section 812.015, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...of an alleged shoplifter. On appeal, Rothstein contended that the question of probable cause could not be resolved by summary judgment since it was a fact question for the jury. The Third District disagreed. After noting the statutory predecessor of section 812.015, the court held that the facts in Rothstein were not in dispute and were sufficient to arouse the employee's suspicion and prompt an inquiry into whether or not the merchandise was being stolen....

S.C. §§ 553(a)(1) and 605(e)(4), and FlaStat. § 812.15. CSC also seeks to impose a constructive trust

PER CURIAM. We reverse Appellant’s robbery conviction and remand for a new trial on grounds that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offense of resisting a merchant. Pursuant to the 1992 amendment of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes, the charge of resisting a merchant is a lesser-included offense of robbery....

...missible hearsay. 1 While a charge of theft of retail merchandise is prosecuted pursuant to the general theft statute (sections 812.012 and 812.014, Florida Statutes (2013)), it is also subject to separate and more specific statutory treatment under section 812.015....

...However, where the offense charged is retail theft, a different definition of “value” applies: “Value of merchandise” means the sale price of the merchandise at the time it was stolen or otherwise removed, depriving the owner of her or his lawful right to ownership and sale of said item. § 812.015(l)(d), Fla....

...Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. LEVINE, J. May an officer, based on information provided by store employees, handcuff an appellant on suspicion of shoplifting although the shoplifting did not occur in the officer’s presence? Because the legislature enacted section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that law enforcement may detain based on probable cause developed from a store employee’s report of suspected shoplifting, we answer in the affirmative. Accordingly, we affirm....

...determinations, we review de novo whether the application of the law to the facts establishes a basis for the trial court’s findings regarding reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Lee v. State, 868 So. 2d 577, 579 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The issue on appeal is governed by section 812.015, Florida Statutes (2016)....

...be recovered by taking the offender into custody may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for prosecution, take the offender into custody and detain the offender in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time. § 812.015(3)(a), Fla....

...on a description by the employee. Id. The officers followed the vehicle, eventually stopping it, handcuffing the occupants, and searching for the allegedly stolen spark plugs. Id. The First District held that the officers’ stop of the vehicle was authorized by section 812.015, Florida Statutes, because the officers had received information on the suspected shoplifting from the Wal-Mart employee....

...After detaining the appellant in the store’s security office, the store employee called police to report the suspected shoplifting. Id. An officer arrived, questioned the appellant and charged him with shoplifting. Id. The Third District concluded that the officer had acted appropriately, noting that for the purposes of a section 812.015 detention or arrest, “[f]irst hand knowledge by an officer is not required; the receipt of information from someone who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth is adequate.” Id....

...loss prevention, believed she might be shoplifting. Based on the dispatch call and information provided to the officer by the store employees when he arrived on the scene, the officer developed probable cause. See id. (observing that “first hand knowledge” is not necessary to meet section 812.015’s probable cause requirement)....

...The officer could have reasonably concluded that the loss prevention employee was reliable in his conclusion that appellant had attempted to steal merchandise from the store. Therefore, the officer could handcuff appellant for the purpose of attempting to effect a recovery of the merchandise. See § 812.015(3)(a), Fla....

...The officers moved the truck to a back corner of the parking lot away from the general public, and an investigator from the sheriff’s department trained in dismantling meth labs arrived and took over. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, because under sections 901.15 and 812.015, Florida Statutes (2013), the officers did not have the authority to make the initial stop based only upon information provided by Walmart employees who had witnessed a theft....

...here was nothing suggesting that defendants had put anything in the cooler in the truck bed before they left the Walmart parking lot. The trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the officers did not have the authority under section 812.015 to arrest defendants....

...See State v. Taylor, 79 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (the court conducts de novo review of the application of Gant to the facts of the case). The circuit court erred by concluding that section 901.15 applied in this case by either supplanting or modifying section 812.015(4)....

...satisfy paragraph (1). See State v. Boatman, 901 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). It is undisputed that the Walmart loss-prevention employees in the case at bar cannot be characterized as fellow officers. This case was instead controlled by section 812.015(4), which specifically addresses warrantless arrests for retail theft and provides, in part, that a law enforcement officer “may arrest, either on or off the premises and without warrant, any person the officer has probable cause to believe ....

...(1955). Accordingly, the officers in this case were authorized to stop and arrest defendants based upon information provided by the Walmart employees. See Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (affirming summary judgment for K-Mart under sections 812.015(3) and (5) in a suit for false arrest for shoplifting, because the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under section 812.015(4) based on information provided by K-Mart’s security officer)....

...However, those cases, dealing with whether Miranda [1] rights must be given by private security officers, are inapplicable to the factual situation presented by Snell. Snell asserts that the security officers involved in his case used excessive force in coercing him to empty his pockets, in violation of section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). Section 812.015(3)(a) provides, in pertinent part: A law enforcement officer, a merchant, ......

COPE, J. The question presented by this State appeal is whether tinfoil can be an “antish-oplifting or inventory control device coun- . termeasure” for purposes of a prosecution under subsection 812.015(7), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...thing from a store. They covered the store security sensors with tinfoil to evade detection when they attempted to walk past the sensors with the stolen merchandise hidden in a bag. Defendants were charged with, among other things, a violation of subsection 812.015(7), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides, “It is unlawful to possess, or use or attempt to use, any antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any premises used for the retail purchase or sale of any merchandise.” Use of such a device is a third-degree felony....

...See id. The retail theft statute defines “antisho-plifting or inventory control device countermeasure” as “any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device.” § 812.015(1)©, Fla....

...ants wrapped tinfoil around the store security sensors to evade detection of the stolen merchandise in their bag. Tinfoil, by itself, does not fall under the definition of an “antishoplift-ing or inventory control device countermeasure” found in s. 812.015(l)(i) because tinfoil is not an item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered....

...An "antishoplifting or inventory control device” is defined as "a mechanism or other *1259 device designed and operated for the purpose of detecting the removal from a mercantile establishment or similar enclosure, or from a protected area within such an enclosure, of specially marked or tagged merchandise." Id. § 812.015(l)(h)....

...for purposes of lawful self-defense that is compact in size, designed to be carried on or about the person, and contains not more than two ounces of chemical." On this occasion the pepper spray was obviously not used for a self-defense purpose. [4] Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it a first degree misdemeanor for a shoplifter to resist the reasonable efforts of a store security officer in recovering the stolen property....

...for the wrong reason. See Lowery v. State, 766 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). It contends that the evidence did not support an element of the offense, i.e., that Burton resisted the employee’s “reasonable effort .. n to recover the property.” § 812.015(6)....

...e trial court should have given the requested instruction on this permissive, lesser-included offense. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the robbery charge. See Epps, 728 So.2d at 762 . DAVIS, J., and GREEN, OLIVER L., Senior Judge, concur. . § 812.015(6), Fla....

...He also maintains that the court compounded that error by preventing defense counsel from informing the jury of that offense, thus precluding appellant from presenting his defense to the jury. We agree. Although K.C. v. State, 524 So.2d 658 (Fla.1988) and the version of the statute interpreted therein, section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1991), previously required that the defendant be convicted of theft before he or she could be charged with resisting a merchant, the statute, apparently in response to K.C., was amended in 1992 to eliminate that requirement....

...The following emphasized language was added: “An individual who, while committing or after committing theft of property, resists” and the language “and who is subsequently found to be guilty of theft of the subject property is guilty of’ was eliminated. See § 812.015(6), Fla.Stat....

...der a new case number following the Court’s disposition in Hopkins. Lastly, the Court rejects the Committee’s proposed new standard jury instruction 15.4, Resisting Recovery of Merchandise. The Committee sought to track the statutory language of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides as follows: (6) An individual who, while committing or after committing theft of property, transit fare evasion, or trespass, resists the reasonable effort of a law enforcement officer, merc...

...ssion of increasingly violent crimes. The defendant's criminal history in this case does not meet the criteria in Keys v. State or the statute [2] and therefore, the departure sentence should be reversed. NOTES [1] § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1987). [2] § 812.015, Fla....

...mpting to leave the store. The defendant was arrested and charged with strong-arm robbery. Prior to trial, defense counsel informed the court that the defense would request a jury instruction on the lesser offense of resisting a merchant pursuant to section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1995), as a lesser-included offense of robbery....

...The court deferred ruling, and subsequently denied the request to instruct the jury on resisting a merchant. The trial judge instructed the jury on battery and petit theft as lesser-included offenses of robbery. The jury then convicted the defendant of strong-arm robbery. Pursuant to the 1992 amendment of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes, the charge of resisting a merchant is a lesser-included offense of robbery....

...hearsay.1 While a charge of theft of retail merchandise is prosecuted pursuant to the general theft statute (sections 812.012 and 812.014, Florida Statutes (2013)), it is also subject to separate and more specific statutory treatment under section 812.015. Under the general theft provisions, “value” is defined in relevant part as follows: 1 The Appellant thus contended, both at the adjudicatory hearing and on appeal, that the admissible evidence was insufficient to est...

...inition of “value” applies: “Value of merchandise” means the sale price of the merchandise at the time it was stolen or otherwise removed, depriving the owner of her or his lawful right to ownership and sale of said item. § 812.015(1)(d), Fla....

...e in this case. [COURT] Mr. Peterson? [STATE COUNSEL] I think if they have a question about what the law is, the court can instruct them on what the law is. And there is law that directly answers their question. [[Image here]] [COURT] I’ll look at 812.015. * * * [COURT] I’m going to suggest that we redact some of this, so that it makes some sense. And, basically, that I instruct the jury that Florida Statute 812.015 provides: ......

...He is charged with aggravated battery, which *1143 is separate and apart from the charge of retail theft. There is not only a time differential, there is also a distance differential, sir. [COURT] Objection noted, and overruled. Please bring in the jury. The court then read the jury instruction crafted from section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997): The pertinent portion of this rather long and detailed statute reads as follows, and it’s found in subsection [812.015](3)(a): “A merchant, who has probable cause to believe that a retail theft has been committed by a person, and in the case of retail or farm theft, that the property can be recovered by taking the offender into custody may, for the purpose...

...Nevertheless, neither party requested a jury instruction concerning the right of a merchant, who has probable cause to believe that a retail theft has been committed, to “take the offender into custody and detain the offender in a reasonable manner for a length of time.” § 812.015(3)(a), Fla....

...Instead, under the terms of the statute, the merchant with probable cause may, “for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery or for prosecution, take the offender into custody and detain the offender in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time.” § 812.015(3)(a), Fla....

properly instructs upon the offense defined under section 812.015, Florida Statutes (2017) (Retail and farm

PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges his conviction of resisting a retail merchant in violation of section 812.015(6)....

...State, 684 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd 698 So.2d 825 (Fla.1997). Appellant correctly argues that the jury should have been instructed that in order to convict appellant of resisting a retail merchant it had to find that appellant was committing or had committed theft. Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in relevant part: (6) An individual who, while committing or after committing theft of property ......

motion for summary judgment on the basis of section 812.015(3-5), Florida Statutes (1981), which permits

PER CURIAM. We reverse the juvenile disposition order adjudicating the appellant guilty of evasion of transit fare under section 812.015(l)(j), Florida Statutes, because the state failed to present any evidence of the essential element of intent....

...The state charged the child with evasion of transit fare after she boarded and rode a Tallahassee city bus, using a nontransferable Florida A & M University bus pass that a coworker had given her. The statute provides that evasion of transit fare is a form of petit theft, requiring refusal to pay transit fare. See § 812.015(1)0), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...notice of nontransferability. Despite the lack of evidence of intent, the trial court adjudicated C.G. guilty and imposed a sentence of six months’ probation. Evasion of transit fare is a form of petit theft, which is a specific intent crime. See § 812.015(1)¾), Fla....

...cle, or to evade the payment of such fare, or to enter any mass transit vehicle or facility by any door, passageway, or gate, except as provided for the entry of fare-paying passengers, and shall constitute petit theft as proscribed by this chapter. § 812.015(l)(j), Fla....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. We reverse the juvenile disposition order adjudicating the appellant guilty of evasion of transit fare under section 812.015(1)(j), Florida Statutes, because the state failed to present any evidence of the essential element of intent....

...The state charged the child with evasion of transit fare after she boarded and rode a Tallahassee city bus, using a nontransferable Florida A & M University bus pass that a coworker had given her. The statute provides that evasion of transit fare is a form of petit theft, requiring refusal to pay transit fare. See § 812.015(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...a notice of nontransferability. Despite the lack of evidence of intent, the trial court adjudicated C.G. guilty and imposed a sentence of six months' probation. Evasion of transit fare is a form of petit theft, which is a specific intent crime. See § 812.015(1)(j), Fla....

...cle, or to evade the payment of such fare, or to enter any mass transit vehicle or facility by any door, passageway, or gate, except as provided for the entry of fare-paying passengers, and shall constitute petit theft as proscribed by this chapter. § 812.015(1)(j), Fla....

...The state charged K.C., a juvenile, with one count of petit theft for taking candy from a grocery store, in violation of section 812.014(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), and *659 two counts of resisting a store employee’s efforts to recover the merchandise, in violation of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides [a]n individual who resists the reasonable effort of a law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, or farmer to recover merchandise or farm produce which the law enforcement of...

...unless the individual did not know, or did not have reason to know, that the person seeking to recover the merchandise or farm produce was a law enforcement officer, merchant, merchant’s employee, or farmer. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on all counts, and argued on appeal that section 812.015(6) precludes the state from charging the offense of resisting a merchant prior to the conviction for the underlying theft....

...n 812.-015(6) that in order to be convicted for resisting a merchant, one must be found guilty of the underlying theft.” K.C., 507 So.2d at 770 . The court recognized conflict with the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal which have held that section 812.015(6) requires a finding of guilt on the underlying theft before the state can bring the charge of resisting a merchant. See In the Interest of J.L.P., 490 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); K.M.S. v. State, 402 So.2d 593 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Accord In the Interest of W.L.B., 502 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). We find these holdings consistent with the plain language of section 812.015(6)....

...has been convicted of the theft. The state argues that this interpretation results in separate trials, unnecessarily and unduly burdening the judicial system. Regardless of our views on this argument’s merit, the clear and unequivocal language of section 812.015(6) leaves no room for interpretation....

employees to recover the candy, in violation of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1983).1 He was adjudicated

WARNER, J. Convicted of felony retail theft in violation of section 812.015(8)(a), Florida Statutes, Toccara McClover appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to give her requested jury instruction on abandonment....

...Similarly, in this case, the defendant was entitled to the abandonment instruction where both she and her companion left the store without taking any merchandise. This is particularly true where the defendant was charged, not with grand theft, but with retail theft. Section 812.015(l)(d) defines retail theft as: taking possession of or carrying away of merchandise, property, money, or negotiable documents; altering or removing a label, universal product code, or price tag; transferring merchandise from one conta...

...me of resisting a merchant, the supreme court’s decision in K.C. v. State, 524 So.2d 658 (Fla.1988) (also rendered after the appellant was sentenced in this case), requires us to reverse on this charge as well. In K.C., the supreme court held that section 812.015(6) requires a finding of guilt on the underlying theft before the state can bring the charge of resisting a merchant....

...signation on the misdemeanor conviction. Reversed and remanded with directions to correct the scrivener’s error by deleting the habitual offender designation on the defendant’s sentence for the misdemeanor of resisting a merchant in violation of section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1991)....

store detective for shoplifting pursuant to Section 812.015(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) and accused

...However, the statutory language does not authorize an across-the-board $60 charge in all cases. In this case, McRae was sentenced to five years probation, and the $60.00 charge is proper. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Section 784.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1993). . Section 812.015, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Luis Santino Milian appeals his convictions and sentences for third-degree grand theft in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2009), and felony retail theft in concert with others in violation of section 812.015(8)(a)....

...3d DCA 1983); Weissman v. K-Mart Corp., 396 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Sanders v. City of Belle Glade, 510 So.2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Butler v. City of Vero Beach, 495 So.2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Martinez v. WestKilO So.2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); § 812.015(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985); § 812.015(3)(b), Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 812.015(l)(c), Fla....

meaning of “all terms of sentence.” See, e.g., § 812.15(7), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“The court shall, in addition

...quittal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. We find no merit to appellant's attack on the conviction for theft of the bicycle pump and affirm the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal. We are compelled to agree with appellant that section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1983), as written requires, as an essential element of the offense of resisting a merchant, that the defendant be "subsequently found to be guilty of theft of the subject merchandise." Although it is doubtful tha...

MILLS, Judge. W.L.B. entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of resisting a merchant, Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1985), reserving the right to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss that charge....

...ab, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before MILLER, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ. MILLER, J.  Appellant, Alexander Martinez-Rivero, challenges his conviction for possession of an antishoplifting device countermeasure in violation of section 812.015(7), Florida Statutes....

...“If the State has presented competent evidence to establish every element of the crime, then a judgment of acquittal is improper.” State v. Williams, 742 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citation omitted). ANALYSIS Section 812.015(7), Florida Statutes, provides, “[i]t is unlawful to possess, or use or attempt to use, any antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any premises used for the retail purchase or sale of any merchandise.” Possession of such a device is a third-degree felony. § 812.015(7), Fla....

...device” is described as “a mechanism or other device designed and operated for the purpose of detecting the removal from a mercantile establishment or similar enclosure, or from a protected area within such an enclosure, of specially marked or tagged merchandise.” § 812.015(1)(h), Fla....

...1st DCA 1996) (citation omitted). Under Florida law, an “[a]ntishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure” is defined as “any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device.” § 812.015(1)(i), Fla....

...his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) motion to dismiss one count of unlawful use or attempted use of an antishoplifting or inventory control device countermeasure within any premises used for a retail establishment, in violation of section 812.015(7), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...y definition of “any item or device which is designed, manufactured, modified, or altered to defeat any antishoplifting or inventory control device,” we are constrained to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss the challenged charge. § 812.015(1)(i), Fla....

...He claims that the trial court erred in denying his judgment of acquittal because the State failed to show that the officers were in the performance of a legal duty when they attempted to detain and handcuff appellant for suspected shoplifting at a convenience store. We affirm, concluding that section 812.015(4), Florida Statutes (2022), gave the officers the authority to arrest and handcuff appellant based upon information supplied by the convenience store’s employee....

Stat.); ch. 92-155, § 3, Laws of Fla. (creating § 812.15, Fla.Stat., regarding unauthorized reception of

605(a) and 605(e)(4) in Count II] and state [Section 812.15 of the Florida Statutes in Count III] law.

merchant) of the juvenile petition was in error. Section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (1979), under which appellant

(1997) and resisting merchandise recovery, section 812.015(g), Florida Statutes (1997). Because the latter

...Compton, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from a juvenile delinquency case. Appellant was convicted of delinquency by robbery, section 812.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997) and resisting merchandise recovery, section 812.015(g), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The trial court instructed the jury on value by reading the standard grand theft jury instruction, founded upon section 812.012(9), Florida Statutes (1981). The court erred by adding to this instruction the definition of value contained in the retail theft statute, section 812.015(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1981)....

included offense of resisting a merchant under section 812.015(6), Florida Statutes (2024). For the reasons

....097, Fla. Stat. (authorizing the chief administrative officer of a school, or his designee, to temporarily detain a person until a law enforcement officer arrives, if there is probable cause to believe the person is trespassing on school property); § 812.015(3)(a), Fla. Stat....

...gives immunity from criminal and civil liability for “false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention,” provided the citizen complies with the statutory requirements for detention. See, e.g., §§ 493.631(9), 810.08, 810.09, 810.097(3), 812.015(3)(c), Fla....

...No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. Comment This instruction was adopted in 2015. 15.5 RESISTING RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY § 812.015(6), Fla....

...property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it. § 812.012(4), Fla. Stat. “Property” means anything of value, and includes tangible personal property. - 36 -  § 812.015(1), Fla. Stat. “Merchant” means an owner or operator, or the agent, consignee, employee, lessee, or officer of an owner or operator, of any premises or apparatus used for retail purchase or sale of any merchandise. § 812.015(1), Fla....

...Instead, “probable cause” is a practical, common sense determination, given the totality of circumstances, including a person’s knowledge, training and experience, as to whether there was a fair probability for a person to believe a certain fact is true. Affirmative Defense. § 812.015(6), Fla....

...burden of persuasion) that the defendant knew or had reason to know that (victim) was a [merchant] [merchant’s employee] [law enforcement officer], you should find [him] [her] not guilty. Lesser Included Offenses RESISTING RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY - 812.015(6) CATEGORY CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...812.014(2)(e) 14.1 degree* Battery 784.03 8.3 Assault 784.011 8.1 Comments *§ 812.015(6), Fla....

...If, however, the jurors are being instructed on Resisting a Merchant as a lesser- included offense of Robbery, then Theft should be given as a lesser- included offense. “Law enforcement officer” is not defined in chapter 812, Florida Statutes, or in case law interpreting § 812.015(6), Fla....

...er, 125 So.3d at 927 . We reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to an abandonment defense instruction. Id. at 928 . In doing so, we confirmed that under the retail theft statute, an attempt to commit retail theft is retail theft. Id. (citing § 812.015(l)(d), Fla....