Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...For guidance on instructions for burglary offenses committed between February 2000 and before July 1, 2001, see State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205 (Fla.2003) and Burnes v. State, 861 So.2d 78 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). 13.5 (a) TRESPASS ON SCHOOL GROUNDS OR FACILITIES § 810.097, Fla....

...public or non-public. Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. Comment This instruction was adopted in 2007. 13.5 (b) TRESPASS ON SCHOOL GROUNDS OR FACILITIES AFTER WARNING BY PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE § 810.097(2), Fla....

...State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). "To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have put forth evidence of each element in each crime." See K.S. v. State, 840 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The statute applicable, section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: 810.097 Trespass upon grounds or facilities of a school; penalties; arrest.— (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property; or (b) I...

...learly had legitimate business on school property, and therefore could not be found guilty of trespass. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, see Jones, 790 So.2d at 1197, we consider the state failed to prove a violation of section 810.097, because the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that appellant remained unlawfully on school property....

...appellee. *177 Before COPE and CORTIÑAS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. COPE, J. This is an appeal of an adjudication of delinquency in which D.J. was found to have trespassed on school property after being directed not to enter the property. See § 810.097(2), Fla....

...The homecoming dance was held the next evening, on Saturday, October 10. When J.A.M. and his date arrived at school for the dance, he was asked to leave. J.A.M. was later charged in a delinquency petition with trespass on school property in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2009). Under this statute, trespass is committed by any person who “[i]s a student currently under suspension or expulsion[] and who enters or remains upon the campus.” § 810.097(l)(b)....

COPE, J. This is an appeal of an adjudication of delinquency in which D.J. was found to have trespassed on school property after being directed not to enter the property. See § 810.097(2), Fla....

...contends the trial court erred in denying his judgment for dismissal at the close of the evidence because the State failed to prove he had no legitimate business for being at the school. We affirm. J.H. was charged for trespassing on the grounds of Ernest R. Graham K-8 Academy, in violation of Florida Statute section 810.097. § 810.097(1), Fla....

...Section 810,097(1) does not require that school personnel ask the trespasser his reasons for being on campus to determine whether he had legitimate business, and we decline the invitation to add such a requirement to the statute. The Florida courts, moreover, have found sufficient evidence to support a violation, of section 810.097(1) based on the personal observation of school officials, without having tp ask what legitimate reason or authorization the juvenile may have had for being on campus....

...BACKGROUND This action arises from Defendants' prohibition of Plaintiff Thomas Gray's ("Gray") distribution of Bibles on a public sidewalk within 500 feet of Key Largo School, a school safety zone pursuant to the Florida School Safety Zone Statute. § 810.0975, Fla....

...all be construed to abridge or infringe upon the right of any person to peaceably assemble and protest. (d) This section does not apply to residents or persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business within the school safety zone. § 810.0975(2), Fla. Stat. Section 810.0975(1) defines a "school safety zone" as being "within 500 feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or private elementary, middle, or high school or school board and used for elementary, middle, or high school education." The following facts are set forth in the Complaint....

...will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). III. ANALYSIS A. Vagueness Gray facially challenges § 810.0975 (the "School Safety Zone Statute") on grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

..."Legitimate business" is not defined in the statute and there is no scienter requirement. The statute exempts residents, persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business, or persons having another authorization, license or invitation to enter or remain in the school safety zone. § 810.0975(2)(b), (3), Fla....

...ly informs individuals of ordinary intelligence of the acts that will render them in violation of the statute. Florida's appellate courts have never had occasion to define, clarify or narrow the meaning of "legitimate business" within the context of § 810.0975....

....L.J. v. State of Florida, 581 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Additionally, Florida's statute prohibiting trespass upon school grounds prohibits any person not having "legitimate business on the campus" from entering or remaining on the campus. § 810.097(1), Fla....

...[2] Accordingly, the court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it sufficiently described the type of activity that would expose a person to criminal liability. Id.; see also J.H. v. State of Florida, 625 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Here, § 810.0975(2)(b) has no language, such as "on campus," that limits the scope of "legitimate business." Therefore, no inference limiting the scope of "legitimate business" to any purpose connected to the purpose of the school is warranted....

...n refuses an order by a principal or designee to leave the school safety zone. No order to vacate may issue unless the principal or designee has "a reasonable belief that [the person] will commit a crime or is engaged in harassment or intimidation." § 810.0975(2)(c), Fla....

...The findings above dispose of all dispositive substantive issues. Therefore, this Court need make no additional findings. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. # 85) is GRANTED IN PART. Subsections 2(a) and 2(b) of § 810.0975, Florida Statutes, are declared unconstitutionally vague....

...sed because they were redundant to the claims against Sheriff Roth in his official capacity. [2] The court in A.C. v. The State of Florida was interpreting § 228.091(2), Fla. Stat., the precursor to the current trespass upon school grounds statute, § 810.097, Fla....

...Rand did not violate any law or school policy by using the school track at night. State trespassing laws gives substantial leeway to schools to invite people onto their campuses. And Mr. Rand did not act unlawfully by accepting the school’s invitation to use its track. See § 810.097(l)(a), Fla....

...The homecoming dance was held the next evening, on Saturday, October 10. When J.A.M. and his date arrived at school for the dance, he was asked to leave. J.A.M. was later charged in a delinquency petition with trespass on school property in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2009). Under this statute, trespass is committed by any person who "[i]s a student currently under suspension or expulsion[] and who enters or remains upon the campus." § 810.097(1)(b)....

adjudication for trespass on school grounds ( section 810.097, Florida Statutes (2014) ) and the denial by

ALTENBERND, Chief Judge. G.A. was adjudicated delinquent for trespass on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Finding no merit to either assertion, we affirm. X.B. was charged by petition for delinquency with trespassing on the grounds of Horace Mann Middle School “when said [respondent] was a student currently under suspension or expulsion, in violation of s. 810.097(1).” The matter proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing where the trial court heard from the former dean of students at the school, Darren Jones (“Jones”), and Alicia Griffin (“X.B.’s mother”), among others....

...to sustain a conviction.” Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). “To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have put forth evidence of each element in each crime.” K.S. v. State, 840 So. 2d 1116, 1116 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2020), provides as follows: (1) Any person who: 4  (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invita...

...Thus, the elements of the crime “are that the person charged is [(1)] ‘a student currently under suspension or expulsion,’ [(2)] who enters or remains upon the campus or any other facility of a school.” L.M., 256 So. 3d at 228 (quoting § 810.097(1)(b), Fla....

...because the State did not introduce into evidence the exclusionary letter the school gave him to bring home. This argument is meritless. There is no requirement that the State must introduce the written notice of suspension or exclusionary letter to prove the suspension element of section 810.097(1)(b). Moreover, any argument that in order for a suspension to be effective under section 810.097(1)(b) it must be reported in writing, is 5 foreclosed by this Court’s holding in L.M....

...supervision to deter” his participation in a juvenile act, as described in section 985.02, Florida Statutes (2020), his return to school was not willful on his 6 part. This argument fails for two reasons. First, section 810.097(1) does not cross-reference section 985.02, which sets forth the legislative intent for chapter 985 concerning Florida’s juvenile justice system....

...has given us no reason to import the legislative intent for that chapter into a criminal trespass statute. Second, and more fundamentally, under the plain language of the statute, there is no requirement that the State prove that the student’s trespass was intentional. Section 810.097(1) does not state that a person must willfully enter or remain to be guilty of trespass....

...See Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539, 542-43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (explaining that “willfully” as used in section 810.08(1), Florida Statutes (1979) “refers to a general intent . . . intentionally, knowingly, and purposely done”); compare § 810.097(1) (“Any person ....

...ters 7 upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance . . . commits the offense of trespass . . . .”). X.B. has not asserted any argument to construe an element of willfulness into section 810.097(1) contrary to the plain language of the statute. Cf. J.H. v. State, 220 So. 3d 508, 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (affirming conviction under section 810.097(1) for trespassing without legitimate business for being on campus and rejecting contention that school principal should have inquired with juvenile why he was on campus because “[s]ection 810.097(1) does not require that school personnel ask the trespasser his reasons for being on campus to determine whether he had legitimate business, and we decline the invitation to add such a requirement to the statute”). Finally, X.B.’s reliance on M.C....

...his court as ‘any purpose for 8 being there which is connected with the operation of the school,’” and therefore did not violate section 228.091(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the predecessor to section 810.097(1)(a)....

...authority to do so as a teacher, he did have that authority in his capacity as a sheriff’s reserve deputy. 1 After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for JOA on the charge of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility after warning, brought under section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2021)....

...Whether Deputy Rimes had received consent to trespass someone from the school grounds was not hearsay. Instead, the giving of consent is a verbal act. See A.J.M. v. State, 182 So. 3d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Palmer v. State, 448 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). 2 Section 810.097(2) provides: (2) Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility....

...incipal to restrict access to the property. In J.R., the evidence failed to demonstrate that the school resource officer was designated by the principal to direct a person to leave, subject to a trespass charge. Id. at 430. J.R.’s conviction under section 810.097(2) was therefore reversed. Id. Here, the State responded that Deputy Rimes’ testimony that he was authorized “to trespass people” in his capacity as a reserve deputy was enough to survive the motion for JOA....

...State, 67 So. 3d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 2011). Our supreme court has held that “the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential element of the offense” of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility under section 810.097(2). D.J., 67 So. 3d at 1033. The statute requires the warning person to be “the principal of such school, or his or her designee.” § 810.097(2), Fla. Stat. As stated in D.J., “section 810.097 grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either leave the premises or face criminal sanction.” D.J., at 1033....

...The absence of evidence that the warning person “has received express or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise 4 control over the property of the school” requires reversal of a conviction for trespass on school grounds after warning under section 810.097(2). J.R., 99 So. 3d at 429. While a law enforcement officer’s position alone does not constitute express or implied authorization from the school’s principal for purposes of the trespass offense under section 810.097(2), here, viewing the inferences most favorably to the State, there was sufficient evidence that Deputy Rimes had consent to trespass people from school grounds to raise a jury question....

...ool principal to trespass people from school grounds. Whether he actually had such authority was therefore properly a question for the jury, so the trial court was correct to deny the motion for JOA. Appellant’s conviction for a violation of section 810.097(2), and his other convictions, are therefore AFFIRMED. LEWIS, BILBREY, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla....

Academy, in violation of Florida Statute section 810.097. § 810.097(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“Any person who

...State, 790 So.2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “To overcome a motion for judgment of acquittal, the state must have put forth evidence of each element in each crime.” See K.S. v. State, 840 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The statute applicable, section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: 810.097 Trespass upon grounds or facilities of a school; penalties; arrest.— (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property; or (b)...

...early had legitimate business on school property, and therefore could not be found guilty of trespass. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, see Jones, 790 So.2d at 1197 , we consider the state failed to prove a violation of section 810.097, because the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that appellant remained unlawfully on school property....

EVANDER, J.' M.M., a juvenile, appeals an order finding him guilty of trespass on school grounds in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2014), arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of dismissal. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to’ establish that he unlawfully entered, or remained upon, his middle school campus immediately following his suspension.' We disagree and, accordingly, áffirm. Section 810.097 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or ány other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property; or (b) Is a student currently under susp...

...ed, licensed, or invited to be anywhere else on school grounds. Accordingly, his willful action of *304 disobeying the instruction of both the dean and the school resource officer by entering into other areas of the campus constituted a violation of section 810.097(1)....

...those areas. Under M.M.’s theory, no trespass would have occurred until and unless the individual refused to comply with an instruction from an authorized school official to leave the campus. We conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of section 810.097(1) is that “school property” means any part of the school’s property. Accordingly, a person who does not have authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon a restricted area of the school property may be found guilty of violating section 810.097(1)....

...We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in D.J. v. State, 43 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In its opinion, the Third District affirmed a juvenile’s conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a school facility in violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...nd that the petitioner’s conviction must be vacated. BACKGROUND The petitioner in this case is D.J., a juvenile. On January 14, 2009, a petition for delinquency was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charging the petitioner with a violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...uch person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility, commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 810.097(2), Fla....

...She notified the school’s police officer, who arrested the petitioner for trespassing. Following the presentation of the State’s evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of dismissal. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k). Specifically, the defense argued that section 810.097(2) requires the State to prove, as an essential element of the trespass offense, that the defendant was warned to leave the school either by the school’s principal or by a person to whom the principal had granted authority to restrict access to the property....

...v. Dye, 346 So.2d 538 (Fla.1977). We granted review, dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320. See D.J. v. State, 47 So.3d 1287 (Fla.2010). Based on our consideration of Dye as well as the clear language of section 810.097(2), we find that the Third District’s conclusion was error....

...712 , 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001)). The question presented in this case is whether the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility as set out by section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...The statute provides that a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree by entering or remaining on the grounds of a school “after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility.” § 810.097(2)....

...�� Id. at 542 (emphasis added). Although the two cases concerned prosecutions under different trespass statutes, the parallels between Dye and the instant case cannot be avoided. When viewed in pari materia with section 810.09, it becomes clear that section 810.097 grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either leave the premises or face criminal sanction....

...Moreover, just as we concluded that the phrase “other authorized person” in section 810.09(2) referred to one who had received either express or implied authorization from the property’s owner to exercise control over the property, we find that the phrase “his or her designee” in section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise control over the property of the school. Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property....

...That the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential element of the offense is supported by the plain language of the statute, which clearly states that the offender must have been warned to leave the property “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.” § 810.097(2)....

...or refrain from entering the premises by either the principal or a designee of the principal. Furthermore, the primary decision relied on by the district court, Downer v. State, 375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), is not applicable to the current language of section 810.097(2)....

...ed by the owner. 4 The conclusion reached by this Court in Downer therefore does not apply in the instant case. Instead, the trial court and the district court should have relied on this Court’s decision in Dye when determining the requirements of section 810.097....

...system and one that guides the review of any criminal conviction in this state.” Barnum, 921 So.2d at 519 . Here, the statute provides that the offender must have been warned to leave “by the principal of such school, or his or her designee.” § 810.097(2), Fla....

...We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. . At the time Dye was decided, trespassing on the grounds of a school was criminalized by section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1975). That statute was later amended and renumbered, and is now codified under section 810.097, the statute at issue in the instant case....

...We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in D.J. v. State, 43 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In its opinion, the Third District affirmed a juvenile's conviction for trespassing upon the grounds of a school facility in violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...find that the petitioner's conviction must be vacated. BACKGROUND The petitioner in this case is D.J., a juvenile. On January 14, 2009, a petition for delinquency was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit charging the petitioner with a violation of section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...uch person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility, commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 810.097(2), Fla....

...She notified the school's police officer, who arrested the petitioner for trespassing. Following the presentation of the State's evidence, the defense moved for a judgment of dismissal. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.110(k). Specifically, the defense argued that section 810.097(2) requires the State to prove, as an essential element of the trespass offense, that the defendant was warned to leave the school either by the school's principal or by a person to whom the principal had granted authority to restrict access to the property....

...Dye, 346 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1977). We granted review, dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320. See D.J. v. State, 47 So.3d 1287 (Fla.2010). Based on our consideration of Dye as well as the clear language of section 810.097(2), we find that the Third District's conclusion was error....

...712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001)). The question presented in this case is whether the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility as set out by section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...The statute provides that a person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree by entering or remaining on the grounds of a school "after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or facility or not to enter upon the campus or facility." § 810.097(2)....

...." Id. at 542 (emphasis added). Although the two cases concerned prosecutions under different trespass statutes, the parallels between Dye and the instant case cannot be avoided. When viewed in pari materia with section 810.09, it becomes clear that section 810.097 grants to the principal of a school the same authority that is granted to the owner of private property by section 810.09, namely, the authority to order persons to either leave the premises or face criminal sanction....

...Moreover, just as we concluded that the phrase "other authorized person" in section 810.09(2) referred to one who had received either express or implied authorization from the property's owner to exercise control over the property, we find that the phrase "his or her designee" in section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied authorization from the school's principal to exercise control over the property of the school. Accordingly, to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property....

...That the identity and authority of the person who has warned a defendant to leave is an essential element of the offense is supported by the plain language of the statute, which clearly states that the offender must have been warned to leave the property "by the principal of such school, or his or her designee." § 810.097(2)....

...or refrain from entering the premises by either the principal or a designee of the principal. Furthermore, the primary decision relied on by the district court, Downer v. State, 375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), is not applicable to the current language of section 810.097(2)....

...ed by the owner. [4] The conclusion reached by this Court in Downer therefore does not apply in the instant case. Instead, the trial court and the district court should have relied on this Court's decision in Dye when determining the requirements of section 810.097....

...justice system and one that guides the review of any criminal conviction in this state." Barnum, 921 So.2d at 519. Here, the statute provides that the offender must have been warned to leave "by the principal of such school, or his or her designee." § 810.097(2), Fla....

...NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] At the time Dye was decided, trespassing on the grounds of a school was criminalized by section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1975). That statute was later amended and renumbered, and is now codified under section 810.097, the statute at issue in the instant case....

HAWKES, J. This is an appeal from a conviction for trespass on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Although the motion is not included in the record, one of the arguments defendant raises on appeal reveals fundamental error, namely that there was no evidence showing the principal or his designee ordered him to leave school grounds. Because this was a necessary element of section 810.097(2), we reverse....

...State, 852 So.2d 226, *669 230-31 (Fla.2003); see also A.P.R., 894 So.2d at 286 . After examining each of defendant’s arguments on appeal, we conclude that he has raised a claim which constitutes fundamental error. In particular, defendant argues the State offered insufficient evidence to establish section 810.097(2) as it did not show LaForte was a designee of the principal. As will be explained below, this was a necessary element of the offense, and the total absence of evidence supporting it warrants reversal. The need to prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee under Section 810.097(2) Section 810.097(2) defines the offense of trespass on school grounds in the following way: Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such pe...

...Because no evidence was introduced linking LaForte to the principal’s office in any way, and because the evidence which was introduced demonstrated LaForte had no such connection, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish this needed element of section 810.097(2)....

...eversal of defendant’s conviction. The Third District’s opinion in D.J. v. State By reversing defendant’s conviction, we are recognizing that the State must prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section 810.097(2)....

...In D.J., the evidence showed a school security guard had directed the defendant not to enter school property. Id. at 177 . On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court should have dismissed the case because the State failed to introduce any evidence that the security guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2). Id. The Third District rejected this argument. It found that proving the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee does not become a necessary element of section 810.097(2) unless, at trial, the defendant challenges the authority of the individual giving the order. Id. Because the defendant in D.J. did not contest the security guard’s authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the conviction. Id. This was incorrect for two reasons. *670 First, the language of section 810.097(2) clearly indicates that it is necessary to demonstrate the order to leave came from the principal or his/her desig-nee. It is also required by the jury instructions for section 810.097(2), which indicate the State must show: (1) Defendant entered or remained on the campus of (school name) [and] (2) The principal or [his] [her] designee [told or directed the defendant to leave the campus or facility] Fla....

...(Criminal) 13.5(b) (2010). Indeed, the jury instructions identify the charge as “Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities after Warning by Principal or Designee.” (emphasis added). The fact that the order came from the principal or his/her designee sets section 810.097(2) apart from other trespass charges....

...The State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was instructed to leave by the principal or his/her designee to establish the offense. Second, the authority cited by the Third District in D.J. does not support its interpretation of section 810.097(2). The Third District cited Downer v. State, 375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), and R.C.W. v. State, 507 So.2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), as support. However, neither case deals with section 810.097(2)....

...tion 810.08(1). As the Supreme Court stated, section 810.08(1) is satisfied so long as the defendant receives notice that he or she is trespassing; it does not require that such notice come from an authorized individual. This is in stark contrast to section 810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the principal or his/her designee ordering the defendant to leave. Unlike section 810.08(1), the language of section 810.097(2) requires that a particular authorized individual be involved for a violation to be found....

...broke section 810.09 into its elements, and found the provision did not require the State “to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or [another] author *671 ized person[.]” Id. at 702. Again, the situation changes when comparing section 810.09 with section 810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave....

...Conclusion We conclude that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to establish that defendant was ordered to leave school grounds by the school principal or his/her designee. Because this was an essential element of the charge under section 810.097(2), defendant’s conviction constitutes fundamental error....

...To the extent that this decision does not comport with the Third District’s opinion in D.J., we certify conflict. REVERSED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. . We address only the officer's authority to exclude individuals from school grounds under section 810.097(2). He may very well have authority elsewhere but the charge here was a violation of section 810.097(2).

...Gordon, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant. *668 Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Dixie Daimwood, Donna A. Gerace, and Trisha Meggs Pate, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. This is an appeal from a conviction for trespass on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Although the motion is not included in the record, one of the arguments defendant raises on appeal reveals fundamental error, namely that there was no evidence showing the principal or his designee ordered him to leave school grounds. Because this was a necessary element of section 810.097(2), we reverse....

...State, 852 So.2d 226, *669 230-31 (Fla.2003); see also A.P.R., 894 So.2d at 286. After examining each of defendant's arguments on appeal, we conclude that he has raised a claim which constitutes fundamental error. In particular, defendant argues the State offered insufficient evidence to establish section 810.097(2) as it did not show LaForte was a designee of the principal. As will be explained below, this was a necessary element of the offense, and the total absence of evidence supporting it warrants reversal. The need to prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee under Section 810.097(2) Section 810.097(2) defines the offense of trespass on school grounds in the following way: Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such pe...

...Because no evidence was introduced linking LaForte to the principal's office in any way, and because the evidence which was introduced demonstrated LaForte had no such connection, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish this needed element of section 810.097(2)....

...ts a reversal of defendant's conviction. The Third District's opinion in D.J. v. State By reversing defendant's conviction, we are recognizing that the State must prove the involvement of the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section 810.097(2)....

...In D.J., the evidence showed a school security guard had directed the defendant not to enter school property. Id. at 177. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court should have dismissed the case because the State failed to introduce any evidence that the security guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2). Id. The Third District rejected this argument. It found that proving the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee does not become a necessary element of section 810.097(2) unless, at trial, the defendant challenges the authority of the individual giving the order. Id. Because the defendant in D.J. did not contest the security guard's authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the conviction. Id. This was incorrect for two reasons. *670 First, the language of section 810.097(2) clearly indicates that it is necessary to demonstrate the order to leave came from the principal or his/her designee. It is also required by the jury instructions for section 810.097(2), which indicate the State must show: (1) Defendant entered or remained on the campus of (school name) [and] (2) The principal or [his][her] designee [told or directed the defendant to leave the campus or facility] Fla....

...(Criminal) 13.5(b) (2010). Indeed, the jury instructions identify the charge as "Trespass on School Grounds or Facilities after Warning by Principal or Designee. " (emphasis added). The fact that the order came from the principal or his/her designee sets section 810.097(2) apart from other trespass charges....

...The State must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was instructed to leave by the principal or his/her designee to establish the offense. Second, the authority cited by the Third District in D.J. does not support its interpretation of section 810.097(2). The Third District cited Downer v. State, 375 So.2d 840 (Fla.1979), and R.C.W. v. State, 507 So.2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), as support. However, neither case deals with section 810.097(2)....

...tion 810.08(1). As the Supreme Court stated, section 810.08(1) is satisfied so long as the defendant receives notice that he or she is trespassing; it does not require that such notice come from an authorized individual. This is in stark contrast to section 810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the principal or his/her designee ordering the defendant to leave. Unlike section 810.08(1), the language of section 810.097(2) requires that a particular authorized individual be involved for a violation to be found....

...broke section 810.09 into its elements, and found the provision did not require the State "to prove that appellant defied an order to leave communicated by the owner or [another] authorized *671 person[.]" Id. at 702. Again, the situation changes when comparing section 810.09 with section 810.097(2), which hinges entirely upon the identity of the individual ordering the defendant to leave....

...Conclusion We conclude that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to establish that defendant was ordered to leave school grounds by the school principal or his/her designee. Because this was an essential element of the charge under section 810.097(2), defendant's conviction constitutes fundamental error....

...To the extent that this decision does not comport with the Third District's opinion in D.J., we certify conflict. REVERSED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED. VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We address only the officer's authority to exclude individuals from school grounds under section 810.097(2). He may very well have authority elsewhere but the charge here was a violation of section 810.097(2).

...Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nora Hutchinson Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. EVANDER, J. M.M., a juvenile, appeals an order finding him guilty of trespass on school grounds in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2014), arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of dismissal. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he unlawfully entered, or remained upon, his middle school campus immediately following his suspension. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm. Section 810.097 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or rem...

...not authorized, licensed, or invited to be anywhere else on school grounds. Accordingly, his willful action of disobeying the instruction of both the dean and the school resource officer by entering into other areas of the campus constituted a violation of section 810.097(1). A sterile literal interpretation of a statute should not be adhered to when it would lead to absurd results....

...Under M.M.’s theory, no trespass would have occurred until and unless the individual refused to comply with an instruction from an authorized school official to leave the campus. 6  We conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of section 810.097(1) is that “school property” means any part of the school’s property. Accordingly, a person who does not have authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon a restricted area of the school property may be found guilty of violating section 810.097(1)....

...Case No. 5D15-1869 Because the plain language of controlling statutes dictates a reversal, I respectfully dissent. M.M. was adjudicated delinquent for trespass on school grounds in violation of section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...erson approaching the property and no more than 500 feet apart on agricultural land. § 810.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). 9  Turning to the statute in question here, section 810.097 provides that: (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property; o...

...With respect to the majority’s discussion of non-student visitors, it is worth noting that Florida’s trespass statutes can be used to control someone who strays into an 11 unauthorized area. Under section 810.097 (the school campus statute at issue here), if the visitor goes somewhere other than where he or she is authorized to be, their invitation to be on campus can be revoked and they can be told to leave the campus immediately. If the p...

..._____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Robert E. Long, Judge. February 11, 2019 PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges his adjudication of delinquency for trespassing on school grounds pursuant to section 810.097(1), Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in J.R. v. State, 50 So.3d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), affirming the trial court’s adjudication of J.R.’s delinquency under section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2008), for trespass on school grounds after having been warned by the principal or his desig-nee....

...ecision in D.J. v. State (D.J. I), 43 So.3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), quashed by D.J. v. State (D.J. II), 67 So.3d 1029 (Fla.2011). See J.R., 50 So.3d at 113 . In D.J. I, the Third District held that a defendant could be found guilty of trespass under section 810.097(2) absent evidence that the individual who had previously warned the defendant was a designee of the school’s principal....

...At the time of the Third District’s decision in J.R., we had accepted jurisdiction in D.J. I to resolve conflict on the question of whether the identity and authority of the warning individual were essential elements of the trespass offense set forth in section 810.097(2)....

...I and stayed proceedings in J.R. pending our resolution of D.J. I. Thereafter, we quashed the Third District’s decision in D.J. I and held that the warning individual’s identity and authority as a designee of the school’s principal are essential elements of trespass under section 810.097(2)....

...V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. *428 We conclude that the State failed to present evidence at trial that the individuals who warned J.R. were designees of the school’s principal and that the trial court therefore erred in adjudicating J.R. delinquent under section 810.097(2). Accordingly, we quash the Third District’s decision affirming the trial court’s ruling. I. BACKGROUND The State filed a petition for delinquency against J.R. on November 21, 2008, alleging that J.R. had violated section 810.097(2) by trespassing on the grounds of Ruben Dario Middle School in Miami-Dade County after having been warned “by the principal, or designee, to wit: GREGORY WILLIAMS and/or ORLANDO GUTIERREZ.” In the Interest of: [J.R.], No....

...The trial court responded to the defense’s argument by stating that the officers were “definitely” the principal’s designees because “the school board hired them to protect the schools and I take judicial notice of that.” The trial court denied J.R.’s motion, adjudged J.R. delinquent in violation of section 810.097(2), and issued a judicial warning to J.R....

...appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Third District, arguing that the State had failed to prove that either of the warning officers was a designee of the school’s principal. J.R. contended that because the designee status of the warning individual is an element of the trespass offense under the plain language of section 810.097(2), the State had failed to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt....

...further argued that the trial court’s attempt to take judicial notice of the officers’ designee status was inappropriate and therefore ineffective. The Third District did not address any of J.R.’s arguments in its per curiam affirmance of *429 the trial court’s ruling. See J.R., 50 So.3d at 113 . II. ANALYSIS Section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2008), provides: (2) Any person who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of a school after the principal of such school, or his or her designee, has directed such person to leave such campus or fac...

...775.083. In D.J. II, we considered the question of “whether the identity and authority of a person who has warned a defendant to leave a school are essential elements of the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility as set out by section 810.097(2), Florida Statutes (2009).” 1 D.J. II, 67 So.3d at 1032 . We concluded “that the phrase ‘his or her designee’ in section 810.097(2) necessarily refers to one who has received express or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise control over the property of the school.” Id. at 1033 . We held, therefore, that to prove that a defendant has committed the first-degree misdemeanor set out in section 810.097(2), the State must present evidence that the defendant was (1) warned to leave the premises by a specific person, and (2) that that person was either the principal of the school or one who had received authorization from the principal to restrict access to the property....

...l, we vacated D.J.’s conviction. Id. at 1035 . Our holding in D.J. II dictates the outcome of this case. The designee status of the officers who warned J.R. against trespassing on school grounds is an essential element of J.R.’s conviction under section 810.097(2)....

...sion. The trial court’s ruling therefore did not satisfy the conditions for taking proper judicial notice pursuant to section 90.201(1). Moreover, none of the district court decisions cited by the State in its brief as “decisional law” concern section 810.097(2) or otherwise establish that school police officers are desig-nees of the principal of the school to which they are assigned. J.R.’s conviction must be vacated because the State did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding of the officers’ designee status, which is an essential element of the trespass offense set forth in section 810.097(2)....

...At trial, the State argued — and the trial court agreed — that it was not required to present such evidence unless the defense first challenged the officers’ authority to restrict J.R.’s access to school grounds. We have since recognized, however, that this argument is inapplicable to cases prosecuted under section 810.097(2)....

...d by the owner”) (footnote omitted). We reject the State’s contention that the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2)....

...See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that security guard’s testimony “that her job was to monitor students’ behavior” did not amount to competent, substantial evidence to support a finding that the guard was a designee of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2))....

...CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, we quash the decision of the Third District in J.R. and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. . The 2008 version of section 810.097(2) at issue in this case is identical to the 2009 version that we considered in D.J....

...The trial court stated that it was a close call but denied the motion to suppress “because of what had been happening in the school; the testimony that there had been problems, gangs, fights, et cetera. He said he’s not a student; therefore, they need to check him out because of the safety.” Section 810.097(1) provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) Any person who: (a) Does not have legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property ... *213 and who enters or remains upon the campus or any other facility owned by any such school commits a trespass upon the grounds of a school facility and is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree ... Section 810.097(4) provides that a law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, “any person the officer has probable cause for believing has committed the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility.” Here, while Johnsen may have suspected that A.S.P. might be trespassing, the evidence did not establish probable cause to believe that A.S.P. had committed the crime of trespass upon school grounds as defined in section 810.097(1)....

...entrust with the execution thereof” (emphasis supplied)). 26 § 810.09(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (authorizing a property owner or his designee to detain a person he believes is engaged in felonious armed trespass until a law enforcement officer arrives); § 810.097, Fla....

...so typically gives immunity from criminal and civil liability for “false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention,” provided the citizen complies with the statutory requirements for detention. See, e.g., §§ 493.631(9), 810.08, 810.09, 810.097(3), 812.015(3)(c), Fla....

...remand for further proceedings. Florida’s School Safety Laws. Florida protects its school grounds by creating school safety zones “in, on, or within 500 feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or private [school].” § 810.0975(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Criminal trespass occurs when someone is on school grounds without “legitimate business on the campus or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain upon school property.” § 810.097(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2014). Any law enforcement officer may “arrest either on or off the premises and without warrant any person the officer has probable cause for believing has committed the offense of trespass upon the grounds of a school facility.” § 810.097(4), Fla. Stat. (2014). Every school principal is required to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency to prohibit people from loitering in the school safety zone, except for those with legitimate business, authorization, or license. See § 810.0975(2)(a), Fla....

...trespassing on school grounds is authorized to take into custody and detain such person “in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of time” while awaiting 2 arrival of a law enforcement officer. § 810.097(3), Fla....