CopyCited 73 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida
...Section
38.22 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., authorizes courts to impose imprisonment and fines for contempt, but states no maximum time for such imprisonment. [13] Section
775.01 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that the common law crimes of England are crimes in Florida. [14] Section
775.02 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that when no maximum punishment is prescribed for criminal contempt, the maximum shall not exceed one year imprisonment and a fine of $500.00....
...38, § 1-7(j)), but contempt has been held not to come under the section because a separate section limits applicability to offenses included within the Code of Illinois. People v. Stollar, 31 Ill.2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97 (1964), and Ill. Rev. Stat., 1961, Ch. 38, § 1-3. The comparable Florida statute, Fla. Stat. § 775.02, F.S.A., provides a similar limitation of one year and a fine of $500, but limits its applications, solely to common law crimes....
...this Court has not had to face, and which I feel is not required in the determination of the case sub judice. If the language noted above from Bloom, supra , were the only test provided by the Supreme Court, the question of whether or not Fla. Stat. § 775.02, F.S.A., applies to indirect criminal contempt might be essential, but such is not the case....
...In fact, the Supreme Court, in Bloom, stated: "We accept the judgment of Barnett and Cheff that criminal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious one; ... ."
391 U.S. 194, p. 198,
88 S.Ct. 1477, p. 1480. The view that Fla. Stat. §
775.02, F.S.A., applies and that therefore Rule 3.840(a) (4), CrPR, is unconstitutional unless saved by the imposition of six months or less is one which I cannot espouse....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1293
...England, as enunciated in LaTour v. Stone,
139 Fla. 681,
190 So. 704 (1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in section
775.02, Florida Statutes." Section
775.01, Florida Statutes (1985), provides: Common law of England....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...s enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. *821 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...s enunciated in Latour v. Stone, *824 [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...aw of England, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan , (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...s enunciated in Latour v. *826 Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...s enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by *828 Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
...nd, as enunciated in Latour v. Stone, [
139 Fla. 681]
190 So. 704 (Fla. 1939), Sullivan v. Leatherman,
48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950), and State v. Egan,
287 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973), as adopted by Section
775.01, Florida Statutes, and punishable as provided in Section
775.02, Florida Statutes....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 2116570, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 7966
...v. State,
682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996)). Absent clear legislative intent to authorize separate punishments, courts employ the Blockburger 2 “same elements” test, ie., “whether each offense has an element that the other does not,” codified at section
775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2009). 3 If, as here, each of the offenses has an element that the other does not, the court must then determine if one of the exceptions set forth in section
775.021(4)(b) applies to preclude separate convictions and sentences....
...es which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. Ramirez argues that, for each criminal episode, he was unlawfully convicted of two degree variants of the same basic offense. As such, he contends that section 775.021(4)(b)2. prevents two of his convictions. The supreme court has interpreted section 775.021(4)(b)2....
...3d at 1076 . The term “degree” is “a level based on the seriousness of an offense”; however, a degree-relationship can be found, “for example, when a crime may have aggravated forms of the basic offense.” Id. While Valdes informs us that section 775.021(4)(b)2....
...This analysis applies equally to Ramirez’s convictions for striking Bouzigard. Double jeopardy similarly precludes convictions for both felony battery (one prior) and domestic battery by strangulation arising out of the same event because they are both aggravated forms of simple battery. 6 § 775.021(4)(b)2., Fla....
...AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED. SAWAYA and COHEN, JJ., concur. . Neither party contests that these two pairs of convictions stem from two separate criminal episodes. . Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 ,
52 S.Ct. 180 ,
76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). . Section
775.02 l(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), states: Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall b...
...For the purposes of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial. . Though not argued by the parties, we also find that felony battery (one prior) subsumes simple battery. See § 775.021(b)3., Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 2010866, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9074
...there are any “specific, clear and precise statements of legislative intent.” Valdes,
3 So.3d at 1071 . Absent a clear statement of legislative intent in the criminal offense statutes themselves, courts employ the Blockburger 1 test, codified in section
775.021(4), Florida Statutes, to determine whether separate offenses exist. Id. at 1070-72 . Section
775.021(4)(a) provides that offenses committed in “the course of one criminal transaction or episode” are separate offenses only “if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.” In section
775.021(4)(b), the legislature has stated that its intent “is to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction.” There are three enumerated exceptions to this rule of construction: 1. Offenses which require identical elements of proof. 2. Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute. 3. Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. §
775.021(4)(b), Fla....
...Neither statute contains any “specific, clear, and precise” statement of the legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for the two offenses when they arise out of the same criminal transaction. 2 See Valdes,
3 So.3d at 1071 . *1062 Thus, we look to section
775.021(4) to discern the legislature’s intent....
...The felony retail theft offense, however, contains an element that is not an element of the third-degree grand theft, namely that the defendant “coordinates the activities of one or more individuals in committing the offense.” 3 Thus, the exception enumerated in section 775.021(4)(b)3 is applicable as the statutory elements of third-degree grand theft are subsumed by the felony retail theft in concert with others offense....
...preme Court’s ruling in Valdes,
3 So.3d at 1067 , because the two offenses are found in separate statutory provisions. The state’s reliance on Valdes is misplaced, however, because the supreme court in Valdes only addressed the interpretation of section
775.021(4)(b)2, which applies to *1063 “[ojffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.” Our decision here is based on section
775.021(4)(b)3 as well as the definition of “separate offenses” as defined in section
775.021(4)(a)....
...of that the other does not. Robbery requires that the State show that “force, violence, assault, or putting in fear was used in the course of the taking,” and grand theft requires that the State show the value of the property taken. Accordingly, section 775.021(4)(b)l is inapplicable. Additionally, because neither offense is wholly subsumed by the other, neither is a necessarily included offense of the other. Therefore section 775.021(4)(b)3 is also inapplicable....
...usly placed on the statute is presumed to have been adopted in the reenactment.”). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the supreme court’s interpretation of the retail theft statute is still authoritative after Valdes given that paragraph (b) of section 775.021(4) was added in 1988, several years after the Emshwiller opinion....
...dditional element does not change the analysis, however, as expanding the number of elements for the retail theft offense does not change the fact that all of the elements of third-degree grand theft are subsumed by it. . Even if the exception under section
775.02 l(4)(b)3 were inapplicable, convictions under both statutes in this case would constitute a double jeopardy violation because the two offenses are not "separate” offenses as defined in section
775.02l(4)(a) because each offense does not require “proof of an element that the other does not.” While felony retail theft as defined in section
812.015(8)(a) contains an element that is not an element of third-degree grand theft, the c...
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 18739, 2006 WL 3228578
...Double Jeopardy Analysis Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec *928 tion 9 of the Florida Constitution protect persons from being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Our supreme court recently reiterated that it looks to the Blockburger 2 test, as codified in section
775.021(4), Florida Statutes, to determine whether double jeopardy has been violated. State v. Paul,
984 So.2d 1167 (Fla.2006). Section
775.021(4), Florida Statutes (2005), states: (a) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall b...
...Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. (Emphasis added). The analysis involves two steps. Gordon v. State,
780 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla.2001). First, the court must determine whether the offenses each contain an element of proof that the other does not, as stated in section
775.021(4)(a). If they do not, double jeopardy bars multiple prosecutions or convictions. If they each contain separate elements, then the court must determine if one of the three exceptions in section
775.021(4)(b) applies....
...The first exception is merely a restatement of the same elements test in subsection (4)(a). The second exception is referred to as the “degree variants” test. The third exception deals with necessary lesser included offenses. a. The Blockburger or “Same Elements” Test Blockburger and section 775.021(4)(a) require courts to first examine whether “each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not....” This step is referred to as the “same elements” test....
...g that for both crimes, the State would adduce proof of the same facts, ie. that on August 9, 2005, Duff was driving with a suspended or revoked license. This argument runs afoul of the “same elements” test, as expressed in the plain language of section 775.021(4)(a)....
...In other words, this test focuses on comparing the statutory elements, not the underlying pleadings or proof. Duff also argues that Cooke does not control this case because the court in Cooke did not consider the “degree variants” exception in section 775.021(4)(b)(2). b. The “Degree Variants” Exception Section 775.02(4)(b)(2) provides an exception to the Legislature’s intent to “convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or transaction” for offenses which are “degrees of the same offense a...
...ense distinguished only by degree factors.” Id. at 154 . However, in Gordon v. State,
780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001), the supreme court noted that Extended to its logical extreme, a broad reading of Sirmons and the second statutory exception would render section
775.021 a nullity....
...Indeed, the plethora of criminal offenses is undoubtedly derived from a limited number of “core” crimes. In no uncertain terms, the Legislature specifically expressed its intent that criminal defendants should be convicted and sentenced for every crime committed during the course of one criminal episode. See § 775.021(4)(b)....
...iolation, are consistent with the limited statutory exception. However, extension of this exception to multiple convictions for attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and felony causing bodily injury would contravene the plain meaning of section 775.021....
...Consequently, the court looked to whether the crimes were intended to punish the same “primary evil”. Id. Both the supreme court and this Court have continued to follow the “primary evil” analysis in applying the “degree variants” exception in section 775.021(4)(b)(2)....
...In effect, we held that dual convictions for driving without a valid driver’s license and driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender, arising out of the same incident, violate double jeopardy because they are degree variants (same primary evil), contrary to section 775.021(4)(b)(2), and because one is a necessary lesser included offense of the other, contrary to section 775.021(4)(b)(2)....
...gree variants of the same core offense. Lopez-Vazquez,
931 So.2d at 235 . Based on the above analysis, we conclude that Duffs conviction for driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender violates the “degree variants” exception in section
775.021(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes....
...n that “if two charged crimes share a lesser included offense, or if one offense is a lesser included offense of the other, dual convictions necessarily violate double jeopardy.” Adopting such a rule would be an unwarranted judicial extension of section 775.021(4)(b)(3), in which the Legislature proscribed dual convictions for “[o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” This exception applies only to necessary lesser included offenses....
...Florida no longer follows the “same conduct” test. We reverse Duffs subsequent conviction for driving while license revoked as a habitual traffic offender because it violates the “degree variants” principle of double jeopardy, as codified in section 775.021(4)(b)(2), Florida Statutes (2005)....