Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...It also argued that the Florida statute: (1) does not create a cause of action for personal injury, and (2) provides an affirmative defense – the Third Party Defense – that applied to bar Plaintiffs’ claims against both Rinehart and Crescent. According to Crescent, the Third Party Defense, found at § 376.308(2)(d), Fla....

...not prove two elements of the statutory defense, namely that they: (1) exercised due care with respect to the pollutant in question; and (2) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party responsible for the discharge. See § 376.308(2)(d), Fla....

...9  prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in [section] 376.308. The plain language of the statute does not indicate whether a plaintiff can maintain a personal injury cause of action against a defendant that acquires polluted property after the plaintiff’s exposure....

...ght of all relevant facts and circumstances,” and (3) the defendant “took precautions against any foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and against the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.” § 376.308(2)(d), Fla....

...(2002); and create funds and programs designed to facilitate the restoration of contaminated sites, see, e.g., § 376.3071(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). The statutory scheme provides for both civil and criminal penalties. See § 376.302(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 376.308 authorizes the DEP to sue polluters and force the cleanup of contaminated sites....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

...n the statute cannot be viewed as a legislative oversight. In other statutes within the same scheme (sections 376.30-376.319), where the Legislature wanted to hold a party responsible only if it actually caused the contamination, it so provided. See § 376.308(1)(a), Fla....

...ses provides further evidence that the Legislature intended to create a cause of action rather than to modify existing ones. The last sentence of section 376.313(3) states that "[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308." The phrase "such cause of action" obviously refers to the cause of action created in the preceding sentences. The statute then lists the only defenses allowed to the new cause of action — those specifically listed in section 376.308. The defenses available under the statute allow defendants in certain circumstances to avoid liability if they can prove they did not cause or know about the pollution. The "innocent purchaser defense," detailed in section 376.308(1)(c), protects a purchaser of contaminated petroleum and drycleaning sites if the purchaser can show: (1) that it acquired title to property contaminated by the activities of a previous owner, operator, or third party; (2) that it di...

...polluting condition at the time it acquired title. Because the innocent purchaser defense is limited to petroleum and drycleaning sites, purchasers of other contaminated sites remain liable unless they fall within one of the other defenses listed in section 376.308. Of these, the "third party defense" allows defendants to escape liability if they can show that a third party's act or omission caused the contamination. See § 376.308(2)(d), Fla....

...private individuals, but not the DEP, to sue owners of contaminated property. Aramark argues that the DEP may only enforce the statute if the owner either caused the discharge or owned or operated the facility at the time the discharge occurred. See § 376.308(1)(a), Fla....

...Therefore, Aramark argues, under the First District's interpretation of the statute, in this case a private individual could sue for damages but the DEP could not. We disagree both that the statute draws such a distinction and that, if it did, the result would be incongruous. Aramark relies on section 376.308(1)(a), which limits the entities DEP can sue. The very next subsection, however, section 376.308(1)(b), allows the DEP to sue "all persons specified in s....

...NOTES [1] Aramark argues that the third party defense was meant to apply to common law claims against a narrow group of defendants such as general partners of polluters and persons liable for the acts of polluting employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This argument ignores the language of section 376.308(2)(d), which explicitly provides who the third party must be....

...ad or prove negligence in any form or manner. *99 Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308.[ [2] ] We find no basis for holding the above-quoted provisions inapplicable under the allegations of the complaint's paragraph 33, quoted supra, which includes allegations that appellees violated Chapter 376 by permitting pollutants to d...

...dings. ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See also Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1989) (holding sexual harassment falls outside of the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute). [2] Section 376.308, Florida Statutes, lists various defenses available including act of war, of government, or of God, but does not list immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

...damages to real or personal property but one can also recover for damages to “natural resources, including all living things.” Furthermore, section 376.313(3) states that “[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308.” Those defenses specified in section 376.308 include acts of war, acts by a governmental entity, acts of God, and acts or omissions by a third party....

...The only issue before us was whether the district court erred in abstaining from hearing the Boyes' lawsuit brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992. We held that the district court did err. The reason abstention was inappropriate, we explained, is that Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) is preempted by the citizen suit provision of the RCRA to the extent that § 376.308(5) would operate to bar suit to enforce the RCRA. We have had no occasion in this appeal to express any view on any other aspect of the Florida statute or program involved in this case, and we do not do so. We expressed in our original opinion, and we express now, no view on whether any other aspect of the Florida program is preempted in any other circumstance or case. More specifically, we have expressed no view on the operation of § 376.308(5) as a bar to suit to enforce state law.  The petitions for panel rehearing are DENIED and no member of this panel nor other judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en...

...discharge, all sums expended by the state for clean up. Persons who clean up a site are entitled to contribution for costs and expenses from the persons causing the discharge. [9] And current owners can be required to clean up a polluted site. [10] Section 376.308 limits the defenses of a person who is responsible for unlawful discharge of pollutants to: (1) an act of war; (2) an act of the government; and (3) an act of God; and (4) an act of a third party (other than an employee or agent), or one in a contract relationship for which that person is not responsible....

...[17] It further provides that in such suit it is not necessary for such person to plead or prove negligence. "Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in section 376.308...." If chapter 376 was not intended to create private causes of action for prohibited discharges of pollutants against polluters, this new amendment is completely superfluous....

...sibility for the discharge by the person taking such action. Notwithstanding this requirement, the department may undertake the removal of the discharge and may contract and retain agents who shall operate under the direction of the department. [11] § 376.308(c), Fla.Stat....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

....2 They also asserted various state law claims. On the basis of Burford abstention and, alternatively, the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the district court dismissed the RCRA claims without prejudice. In its analysis, the court relied heavily on § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the Boyes’ suit for remediation. The district court then declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims....

...We then provide a general discussion of federal preemption and proceed to consider whether Florida law is preempted by the RCRA. As we explain in Part III, the RCRA neither expressly preempts all state law, nor occupies the entire field of underground storage tank regulation. However, § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 6972, the RCRA citizen suit provision, and is thus preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Because § 376.308(5) is preempted, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the Boyes’ suit against Shell and Tenneco. I....

...§ 376.3071(9)(b). 5 The FDEP was formerly known as the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation. For consistency, we will use the term FDEP throughout this opinion. 5 376.3071(5).6 Florida later enacted § 376.308(5), which prohibits any person from pursuing any “administrative or judicial action” to require remediation of a contaminated site that is eligible for the EDI program before the state has committed funding for the remediation. See § 376.308(5).7 6 Section 376.3071(5) reads as follows: (5) Site selection and cleanup criteria.– (a) The department shall adopt rules to establish priorities for state- c...

...The effect of the contamination on the environment. Moneys in the fund shall then be obligated for activities described in paragraphs (4)(a)-(e) at individual sites in accordance with such established criteria. ... Fla. Stat. § 376.3071(5). 7 Section 376.308(5) reads as follows: (5) Effective July 1, 1996, and operating retroactively to March 29, 1995, notwithstanding any other provision of law, judgment, consent order, order, or ordinance,...

...of restoration or the compelling of restoration in advance of the state’s commitment of restoration funding in accordance with a site’s priority ranking pursuant to s. 376.3071(5)(a). ... Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5). 8 Most, if not all, of the facts we refer to appear to be undisputed by the parties....

...full purposes and objectives’ of federal law.” Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1413 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984)). Here Florida law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the RCRA’s full purposes and objectives. Under § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, the Boyes cannot sue to obtain the relief that they are seeking – remediation of the petroleum contamination. Under 42 U.S.C. § 6972, the citizen suit provision of the RCRA, they can.19 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) with Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) (prohibiting Florida courts from ordering any person to remediate petroleum contamination Memorandum of Agreement appears to authorize the FDEP to jointly implement the RCRA’s underground storage tank program with the EPA....

...he regulations. 19 It is irrelevant that the statute of limitations for an action to compel cleanup is tolled until state funding is committed, and that the Boyes can still bring a civil action for damages or personal injury. See § 376.308(5). Because § 376.308(5) bars the Boyes’ suit for immediate remediation, it does not provide the full relief permitted by the RCRA. 19 from underground storage tank discharges on a site that is eligible for EDI cleanup prior to the date Florida commits funds)....

...To borrow the Third Circuit’s metaphor, the RCRA sets a floor for regulation of hazardous waste, see Old Bridge Chemicals, 965 F.2d at 1296, and to allow the Florida program to restrict or limit the federal remedy would lower that floor. Thus, Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) is preempted because it conflicts with federal law, and the provisions of the RCRA govern.20 The Boyes are entitled to bring their RCRA claims for remediation in federal court. The Burford and primary jurisdiction abstention doctrines are inapplicable. VI. CONCLUSION Because § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the Boyes’ suit for remediation, is preempted by 42 U.S.C....

...§ 6972, the citizen suit provision of the RCRA, the district court abused its discretion in abstaining from hearing the 20 The RCRA does contain a savings clause that allows a state to enact more stringent regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991g. Section 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, however, is not saved from federal preemption by the RCRA’s savings clause....

...ot released into the environment during Sunshine's ownership of the property; (2) that § 403.141(2) (providing that if damage attributable to two or more polluters is divisible, each polluter should be held liable only for the damage he caused) and § 376.308(4) (providing a "third party polluter" defense in action to force cleanup of polluted properties) evince the legislative intent not to impose liability on parties in Sunshine's situation; and (3) that all of the pollution at issue was nece...

...Specifically, DER ruled (1) that the provisions of § 403.141(2) providing for divisibility of liability wherein environmental damage is divisible apply only to liability for damages, and not to liability for cleanup costs; (2) that the third party defense established by § 376.308(4) did not apply to relieve Sunshine of liability for cleanup since the gasoline contamination at issue was not solely the result of acts or omissions of K & F; (3) that as owner of a contaminated property which is continuing to maintain a...

...R should be upheld. However, in this case, DER's conclusions of law are based on completely erroneous facts that are contrary to the findings of fact of the hearing officer which DER accepted. DER contends that the third party defense established by § 376.308(4) did not apply to relieve Sunshine for liability for the cleanup since the gasoline contamination at issue was not solely the result of the acts or omissions of K & F, and that as owner of contaminated property which is continuing to con...

...d party is not available to K and F, and therefore it is not available to its successor in title, Sunshine. We disagree. As found by the hearing officer, the defense that the pollution was caused by an act or omission of a third party as provided in § 376.308(4) is applicable to Sunshine under the facts in this case and it is not guilty of any violation of Chapters 376 or 403....

...Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 108, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Kidd v. Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 297, 120 So. 556 (1929). Because Sunshine has defended on the basis that its predecessor in title was solely responsible for the discharge of the polluting gasoline — a defense authorized by section 376.308(4) — an examination of case law in which federal courts have interpreted the corresponding federal statute, section 311(f) of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C.A....

...Considering the large numbers of discharges caused by underground gasoline storage tanks and the staggering costs necessary to pay for their cleanup, I propose that the following question be certified to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: May the third-party defense, as provided in Section 376.308, Florida Statutes *1189 (1985), be applied to absolve an owner or operator of a gasoline-distribution facility from liability, on evidence showing that before its ownership gasoline had previously leaked from an underground storage ta...

...discharge" or "seepage," and "installation." The latter term is not limited to physical structures but expressly includes "any ... facility ... or operation," (e.s.), which emits groundwater contaminants. Section 403.031(4), Florida Statutes (1985). Section 376.308(4) limits the third party defense to occurrences which are "solely" the result of "[a]n act or omission of a third party, other than ......

...one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship existing, directly or indirectly, with the defendant... ." Our attention has not been directed to any provision, either in our law or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which defines the phrase "contractual relationship" as it is used in section 376.308(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Stores, Inc., acquired from K & F the title to the property here in question would appear to me to fall clearly within the generic definition of a relationship based on contract. Black's Law Dictionary (1979). Under such an analysis, the third party defense to liability embodied in section 376.308(4) would not be available to Sunshine under the circumstances of this case even with respect to the original discharge from the tank....

...any pollutant which occurs and which affects the groundwaters of the state. "Seep" is defined as, among other things, "to enter or penetrate slowly ... [or] to become diffused or spread." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2056 (1971). [2] Section 376.308, Florida Statutes (1985), states: Liabilities and defenses of facilities....

...[8] The "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980" is a federal hazardous waste cleanup statute with a third-party defense to liability containing language which is precisely parallel to the language of the third party defense embodied in section 376.308(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The only issue before us was whether the district court erred in abstaining from hearing the Boyes’ lawsuit brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 . We held that the district court did err. The reason abstention was inappropriate, we explained, is that Fla. Stat. § 376.308 (5) is preempted by the citizen suit provision of the RCRA to the extent that § 376.308(5) would operate to bar suit to enforce the RCRA....

...nd we do not do so. We expressed in our original opinion, and we express now, no view on whether any other aspect of the Florida program is preempted in any other circumstance or case. More specifically, we have expressed no view on the operation of § 376.308(5) as a bar to suit to enforce state law....

...remediation of the contamination.2 They also asserted various state law claims. On the basis of Burford abstention and, alternatively, the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the district court dismissed the RCRA claims without prejudice. In its analysis, the court relied heavily on § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the Boyes' suit for remediation....

...We then provide a general discussion of federal preemption and proceed to consider whether Florida law is preempted by the RCRA. As we explain in Part III, the RCRA neither expressly preempts all state law, nor occupies the entire field of underground storage tank regulation. However, § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes is in direct conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 6972, the RCRA citizen suit provision, and is thus preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Because § 376.308(5) is preempted, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the Boyes' suit against Shell and Tenneco. I....

...following exceptions [not applicable in this case]: Fla. Stat. § 376.3071(9)(b). ("FDEP")5 assigns each contaminated site a priority ranking and undertakes remediations in accordance with those rankings. See § 376.3071(5).6 Florida later enacted § 376.308(5), which prohibits any person from pursuing any "administrative or judicial action" to require remediation of a contaminated site that is eligible for the EDI program before the state has committed funding for the remediation. See § 376.308(5).7 5 The FDEP was formerly known as the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation....

...The effect of the contamination on the environment. Moneys in the fund shall then be obligated for activities described in paragraphs (4)(a)-(e) at individual sites in accordance with such established criteria.... Fla. Stat. § 376.3071(5). 7 Section 376.308(5) reads as follows: (5) Effective July 1, 1996, and operating retroactively to March 29, 1995, notwithstanding any other provision of law, judgment, consent order, order, or ordinance,...

...e the cost of restoration or the compelling of restoration in advance of the state's commitment of restoration funding in accordance with a site's priority ranking pursuant to s. 376.3071(5)(a).... Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5). 8 Most, if not all, of the facts we refer to appear to be undisputed by the parties....

...f federal law." Feikema, 16 F.3d at 1413 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984)). Here Florida law is an obstacle to the accomplishment of the RCRA's full purposes and objectives. Under § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, the Boyes cannot sue to obtain the relief that they are seeking—remediation of the petroleum contamination. Under 42 U.S.C. § 6972, the citizen suit provision of the RCRA, they can.19 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) with Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) (prohibiting Florida courts from ordering any person to remediate petroleum contamination from underground storage tank discharges on a site that is eligible for EDI cleanup prior to the date Florida commits funds)....

...To borrow the Third Circuit's metaphor, the RCRA sets a floor for regulation of hazardous waste, see Old Bridge Chemicals, 965 F.2d at 1296, and to allow the Florida program to restrict or limit the federal remedy would lower that floor. Thus, Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) is preempted because it conflicts with federal law, and the provisions of the RCRA govern.20 The Boyes are entitled to bring their RCRA claims for remediation in federal court. The Burford and primary jurisdiction abstention doctrines are inapplicable. IV. CONCLUSION 19 It is irrelevant that the statute of limitations for an action to compel cleanup is tolled until state funding is committed, and that the Boyes can still bring a civil action for damages or personal injury. See § 376.308(5). Because § 376.308(5) bars the Boyes' suit for immediate remediation, it does not provide the full relief permitted by the RCRA. 20 The RCRA does contain a savings clause that allows a state to enact more stringent regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991g. Section 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, however, is not saved from federal preemption by the RCRA's savings clause. It cannot be said that a state provision barring suit to enforce federal law is in any way more stringent than a federal law allowing such suit.  Because § 376.308(5) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits the Boyes' suit for remediation, is preempted by 42 U.S.C....

...[but] need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred.” § 376.313(3), Fla. Stat. (2008). This subsection then provides that “[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those provided in s. 376.308.” Section 376.308 lists four basic defenses: “(a) An act of war; (b) An act of government ...; (c) An act of God ...; or (d) An act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the defendant....” § 376.308(2), Fla....

...ability” against his or her employer. Thus, section 440.11(1) would afford General Dynamics workers’ compensation immunity from Plaintiffs’ WQAA claims. However, section 376.313(3) limits defenses for a WQAA claim to “only” those listed in section 376.308....

...y, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.”). Our analysis focuses on what the WQAA means when it says that “the only defenses to such cause of action are those provided in s. 376.308.” In context, this language follows immediately after the strict liability language of the statute, which relieves a potential plaintiff of the burden to prove negligence “in any form or manner” by the defendant, and makes the defendant liable based solely upon proof that pollution occurred on its land....

...” and other similar defenses. Id. Although this language from the Sher-win-Williams case is clearly dicta, even Plaintiffs concede that it would not be reasonable to read section 376.313(3) as barring all legal and statutory defenses not listed in section 376.308, Florida Statutes, as a bar to WQAA claims....

...on confirms Plaintiffs’ contention that the Cunningham court appears to have authorized a separate WQAA claim based upon that court’s conclusion, without analysis, that the “only defenses to such cause of action ...” [are] those specified in s. 376.308, id....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308. § 373.313(3). The defenses specified in § 376.308 do not include the doctrine of caveot emptor , indicating that it was the legislature's intent to not allow the doctrine to bar a claim under § 376.313(3)....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

...Subsection (3) provides that it is not necessary to plead or prove negligence. [2] This discussion of requisite proof indicates that a separate cause of action is being created by the statute. Moreover, subsection (3) also states that the "only defenses to such cause of action *999 shall be those specified in section 376.308." This reference to the "only defenses to such cause of action" indicates that a cause of action was created by the statute....

...nation on their own property. Because the circuit court held that Appellant's damages were not recoverable unless Appellees caused the contamination on their own property, the exceptions in subsections (4) and (5) and potential defenses specified in section 376.308 were not addressed by the trial court....

...Appellant, FT Investments, Inc., seeks review of a final order of the Department of Environmental Protection finding appellant strictly liable for petroleum contamination on property purchased by appellant. Although conceding it did not qualify for the “innocent purchaser defense” under section 376.308(1)(c), Florida Statutes, because it knew of the petroleum contamination before it purchased the property, appellant argues it did qualify for the “third party defense” under section 376.308(2)(d), Florida Statutes, because the petroleum contamination was caused solely by the acts or omissions of a third party....

...After it was determined that there were no disputed issues of material fact, the Department assigned a presiding officer to conduct an informal proceeding. Appellant argued it was entitled to a third party defense to strict liability for the petroleum contamination under section 376.308(2)(d) because the petroleum contamination was caused solely by the acts or omissions of a third party. However, the presiding officer issued a final order concluding that appellant’s knowing purchase of contaminated property, which precluded the assertion of an innocent purchaser defense under section 376.308(1)(c), also precluded the assertion of a third party defense under section 376.308(2)(d). Alternatively, the final order concluded that even if appellant could assert a third party defense, appellant failed to exercise due care with respect to the contamination. This appeal followed. Created in 1992, the innocent purchaser defense of section 376.308(l)(c) protects the purchaser of contaminated petroleum and drycleaning sites from strict liability under the statute if the purchaser can show that it (1) acquired title to property contaminated by the activities of a previous owner,...

...v. Easton, 894 So.2d 20, 24 (Fla.2004). Because the innocent purchaser defense is limited to petroleum and drycleaning sites, purchasers of other contaminated sites remain strictly liable unless they fall within one of the other defenses listed in section 376.308. Aramark, 894 So.2d at 24 . Of these, the third party defense of section 376.308(2)(d) allows a defendant to escape *371 liability if it can show that (1) a third party’s act or omission was the sole cause of the contamination; (2) the defendant exercised due care with respect to the pollutant concerned, taking...

...d party and against the consequences that could fore-seeably result from such acts or omissions. Id. The third party defense preexisted the innocent purchaser defense and carried over, essentially unchanged, from earlier versions of the statute. See § 376.308(4), Fla. Stat. (1991). See also Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Regulation, 556 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (en banc) (applying the third party defense of section 376.308(4) to the purchase of petroleum contaminated property)....

...ocent purchaser defense and its knowledge of the contamination prior to purchase, while precluding it from asserting the innocent purchaser defense, did not prevent it from asserting the third party defense. However, we cannot agree. When it amended section 376.308 to explicitly provide an innocent purchaser defense, the legislature expressed the clear intent that a purchaser of property must establish he or she did not have knowledge of the petroleum contamination after making an appropriate in...

...The only issue before us was whether the district court erred in abstaining from hearing the Boyes’ lawsuit brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992. We held that the district court did err. The reason abstention was inappropriate, we explained, is that Fla. Stat. § 376.308(5) is preempted by the citizen suit provision of the RCRA to the extent that § 376.308(5) would operate to bar suit to enforce the RCRA. We have had no occasion in this appeal to express any view on any other aspect of the Florida statute or program involved in this case, and we do not do so. We expressed in our original opinion, and we express now, no view on whether any other aspect of the Florida program is preempted in any other circumstance or case. More specifically, we have expressed no view on the operation of § 376.308(5) as a bar to suit to enforce state law. The petitions for panel rehearing are DENIED and no member of this panel nor other judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be...

...Gunster, Yoakley, Valdes-Fauli & Stewart, P.A., 768 So.2d 468, 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(holding that where there is an ambiguity in the contract, the trial court’s interpretation of contract will be affirmed if supported by competent substantial evidence). We do not address the general applicability of section 376.308(5), Florida Statutes (1997), in that we conclude the statute has no effect on the pre-existing agreement between the two parties....