Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ough 376.21, Florida Statutes. The allegations, therefore, do not state a cause of action under Section 376.205 ("Individual cause of action for damages under ss. 376.011-376.21."). However, another portion of Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, Sections 376.30 through 376.319, deals with environmental and health hazards, as well as with danger and damage to surface and ground waters posed by the storage, transportation, and disposal of pollutants. Section 376.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes, declares the legislative intent to deal with discharge of pollutants that pose a great danger to citizens of the state. Section 376.313, Florida Statutes ("Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss. 376.30-376.319."), provides, in part, as follows: (1) The remedies in ss. 376.30-376.319 shall be deemed to be cumulative and not exclusive. (2) Nothing in ss. 376.30-376.319 requires the pursuit of any claim against the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund or the Inland Protection Trust Fund as a condition precedent to any other remedy. (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss. 376.30-376.319....

...ad or prove negligence in any form or manner. *99 Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308.[ [2] ] We find no basis for holding the above-quoted provisions inapplicable under the allegations of the complaint's paragraph 33, quoted supra, which includes allegations that appellees violated Chapter 376 by permitting pollutants to d...

...land, where the plaintiffs were working. Appellees contend, however, that the statute does not apply because (1) the pollutants were gaseous, and (2) the alleged events occurred prior to the statute's effective date. [3] As to the pollutants' form, Section 376.301(12), Florida Statutes, defines "pollutants" as follows: "Pollutants" includes any "product" as defined in s. 377.19(11), pesticides, ammonia, chlorine, and derivatives thereof, excluding liquefied petroleum gas. [emphasis added] Thus, Section 376.301(12), Florida Statutes, specifically includes ammonia, chlorine, and derivatives thereof as "pollutants." Ammonia and chlorine are both, by definition, [4] gaseous materials....

...dings. ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See also Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1989) (holding sexual harassment falls outside of the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation statute). [2] Section 376.308, Florida Statutes, lists various defenses available including act of war, of government, or of God, but does not list immunity under the Workers' Compensation Act, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes....

...s sections. See E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614, 629 (Fla.2009); McDonald v. State, 957 So.2d 605, 610 (Fla.2007); Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222, 1229-30 (Fla.2005). Section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2004), provides as follows: Except as provided in s. 376.3078(3) and (11), nothing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss. 376.30-376.319....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

...*1221 This provision is currently codified in section 376.813(3). Curd, 993 So.2d at 1083 . The statute at issue is found within chapter 376, which is entitled “Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Removal.” Section 376.315 of this chapter provides that “[sjections 376.30-376.319, being necessary for the general welfare and the public health and safety of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss. 376.30-376.319 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.” Additionally, section 376.30, which gives legislative intent regarding pollution of surface and ground waters, provides in pertinent part that the preservation of surface and ground waters “can only be served éffec-tively by maintaining the quality of state waters in as close to a pristine condition as possible, taking into account multiple-use accommodations necessary to provide the broadest possible promotion of public and private interests.” § 376.30(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). Section 376.30 further provides that the Legislature found and declared that escapes of pollutants “pose threats of great danger and damage ... to citizens of the state, and to other interests deriving livelihood from the state.” § 376.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). We find that section 376.313(3) and the language used in section 376.30 are clear and unambiguous, and we rely solely on their plain language to discover the legislative intent....

...376.121, of any destruction of the environment and natural resources, including all living things except human beings, as the direct result of the discharge of a pollutant.” See § 376.031(5). Moreover, the Legislature intended that the statute be liberally construed. See § 376.315 (“Sections 376.30-376.319 ... shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss. 376.30-376.319 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.”). The title of section 376.313, “Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss. 376.30-376.319,” implies that a liberal construction should be applied under these circumstances....

...damages to real or personal property but one can also recover for damages to “natural resources, including all living things.” Furthermore, section 376.313(3) states that “[t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308.” Those defenses specified in section 376.308 include acts of war, acts by a governmental entity, acts of God, and acts or omissions by a third party....

...expense in rehabilitating the Property. It is without dispute that appellant grounds his complaint against appellees on the statutory language of section 376.313(3). That section, in its pertinent parts, provides as follows: [N]othing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss. 376.30-376.319......

.... There is no case law in Florida interpreting the propriety of caveat emptor as a defense to an action brought under Florida Statutes Chapter 376. However, Florida Statutes section 376.315, unequivocally states the legislative intent that Sections 376.30-376.319 "shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under Sections 376.30-376.319 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act" ("FWPCA") (emphasis added)....

...The FWPCA specifically allows private party actions against any person who violates the act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a). By drawing reference to a Federal statute as guidance for statutory interpretation, Florida Statutes section 376.315 mandates *1375 that Florida courts construe Florida Statutes, sections 376.30-376.319, in accordance with similarly patterned Federal law....

...Under common law doctrines, without resulting demonstrable damage, a wrong in itself is not compensable. There is no clear legislative mandate in section 376.313 to provide otherwise. Moreover, to interpret section 376.313 otherwise would lead to a subversion of the principal purpose of sections 376.30 to 376.319, Florida Statutes (1989). The chief thrust of those statutory enactments is to protect the lands and waters of Florida and to provide for the prompt containment and removal of damage to those lands and waters by pollutant discharge. See § 376.30....

...It also expressly prohibits discharge of pollutants into the soil or water, contrary to state standards, [7] which allegedly occurred in this case, and requires any person discharging pollutants to "immediately undertake to contain, remove, and abate the discharge to the department's satisfaction." § 376.305(1), Fla.Stat....

...discharge, all sums expended by the state for clean up. Persons who clean up a site are entitled to contribution for costs and expenses from the persons causing the discharge. [9] And current owners can be required to clean up a polluted site. [10] Section 376.308 limits the defenses of a person who is responsible for unlawful discharge of pollutants to: (1) an act of war; (2) an act of the government; and (3) an act of God; and (4) an act of a third party (other than an employee or agent), or one in a contract relationship for which that person is not responsible....

...The state could only have looked to the prior owner (the Phelps), assuming Kaplan had no knowledge of the tank as he alleged, and also assuming he did nothing to cause the pollution. [12] The Inland Protection Trust Fund (the "Fund") could also recover from the responsible party, sums expended by the state for clean up. § 376.3071(7), Fla.Stat....

...[17] It further provides that in such suit it is not necessary for such person to plead or prove negligence. "Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in section 376.308...." If chapter 376 was not intended to create private causes of action for prohibited discharges of pollutants against polluters, this new amendment is completely superfluous....

...4th DCA 1994); The Haskell Company v. Lane Company, Ltd., 612 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). [4] See The Haskell Co. v. Lane Company, Ltd., 612 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). [5] See English Case of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R., 3 H.L. 330 (1868). [6] § 376.30, Fla.Stat....

...In this opinion, we use references to the 1989 statute because that is the statute in effect when this suit was filed against Phelps, and it is the one referenced in the pleadings. Additionally, there has been no new amendment to the sections cited since that time. [7] § 376.302, Fla.Stat. (1989). [8] See §§ 376.307 and 376.3071, Fla.Stat. (1989). [9] See § 376.05(4) and (5), Fla.Stat. (1989). [10] Section 376.305(1), Florida Statutes (1989) states: Any person discharging a pollutant as prohibited by ss. 376.30-376.319 shall immediately undertake to contain, remove, and abate the discharge to the satisfaction of the department....

...sibility for the discharge by the person taking such action. Notwithstanding this requirement, the department may undertake the removal of the discharge and may contract and retain agents who shall operate under the direction of the department. [11] § 376.308(c), Fla.Stat. (1989) [12] See Sunshine Jr. Stores, Inc. v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 556 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 564 So.2d 1085 (Fla.1990). [13] 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281, et.seq. [14] §§ 376.30(5), 376.315, Fla.Stat....

...scharge of pollutants or hazardous substances or other pollution conditions..... [16] § 376.09(5) & (6), Fla.Stat. (1989). [17] Section 376.313, Florida Statutes (1989) provides: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing contained in ss. 376.30-376.319 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss. 376.30-376.319....

...plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308....

...Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So.3d 1216 (Fla. 2010)). . The Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 238, was filed in 2013 before any off-Site soil remediation had occurred. In the Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs raised a claim under Florida's Water Quality Assurance Act, Fla. Stat. § 376.30 , et seq„ as well as common law claims for strict liability, nuisance, negligence, trespass, and medical monitoring....

...was impairing the reasonable beneficial use of adjacent waters; and (4) that upon application of Chapters *1179 376 and 403, Fla. Stat. and Fla. Admin. Code Rules Chapters 17-3 and 17-4, to the facts of the case, the respondents were in violation of § 376.302, Fla....

...ot released into the environment during Sunshine's ownership of the property; (2) that § 403.141(2) (providing that if damage attributable to two or more polluters is divisible, each polluter should be held liable only for the damage he caused) and § 376.308(4) (providing a "third party polluter" defense in action to force cleanup of polluted properties) evince the legislative intent not to impose liability on parties in Sunshine's situation; and (3) that all of the pollution at issue was nece...

...Specifically, DER ruled (1) that the provisions of § 403.141(2) providing for divisibility of liability wherein environmental damage is divisible apply only to liability for damages, and not to liability for cleanup costs; (2) that the third party defense established by § 376.308(4) did not apply to relieve Sunshine of liability for cleanup since the gasoline contamination at issue was not solely the result of acts or omissions of K & F; (3) that as owner of a contaminated property which is continuing to maintain a...

...R should be upheld. However, in this case, DER's conclusions of law are based on completely erroneous facts that are contrary to the findings of fact of the hearing officer which DER accepted. DER contends that the third party defense established by § 376.308(4) did not apply to relieve Sunshine for liability for the cleanup since the gasoline contamination at issue was not solely the result of the acts or omissions of K & F, and that as owner of contaminated property which is continuing to con...

...d party is not available to K and F, and therefore it is not available to its successor in title, Sunshine. We disagree. As found by the hearing officer, the defense that the pollution was caused by an act or omission of a third party as provided in § 376.308(4) is applicable to Sunshine under the facts in this case and it is not guilty of any violation of Chapters 376 or 403....

...J., concur. ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., dissent. ERVIN, Judge, dissenting. I. Given the broad regulatory powers delegated to the Department of Environmental Regulation (Department) concerning the correction and prevention of polluting discharges under Section 376.303, Florida Statutes (1985), I think the issue before us could, in a rather simple and straightforward way, be resolved by deferring to the Department's interpretation of its delegated powers....

...y delegated to it, we should, in this case of first impression, turn to applicable case law from the federal sector. This, I think, is required by the express terms of Section 376.315, Florida Statutes (1985), stating that the provisions of sections 376.30 through 376.315 shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth both under those statutes and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (33 U.S.C.A....

...Employees Relations Comm'n, 353 So.2d 108, 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Kidd v. Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 297, 120 So. 556 (1929). Because Sunshine has defended on the basis that its predecessor in title was solely responsible for the discharge of the polluting gasoline — a defense authorized by section 376.308(4) — an examination of case law in which federal courts have interpreted the corresponding federal statute, section 311(f) of the FWPCA (33 U.S.C.A....

...Among other things, the notice stated that "K & F's activities... on property currently owned by respondent Sunshine have resulted in a discharge of refined petroleum products upon the lands and waters of the state." The effect of this allegation was to accuse Sunshine of a violation of Section 376.302, Florida Statutes (1985), prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into or upon any waters of the state or lands in violation of any departmental standard....

...paramount consideration of Congress in its enactment of the 1970 amendments to the FWPCA. Such interests were also the primary motivating goal behind the enactment of Florida's own Clean Water Act. Consider the following legislative declarations in Section 376.30, Florida Statutes (1985): [7] (1) The Legislature finds and declares that the preservation of surface and groundwaters is a matter of the highest urgency and priority, and that such use *1188 can only be served effectively by maintaini...

...(2) The Legislature further finds and declares that: * * * * * * (d) Such state interests outweigh any economic burdens imposed by the Legislature upon those engaged in storing pollutants and related activities. (3) The Legislature intends by the enactment of ss. 376.30-376.315 to exercise the police power of the state by conferring upon the Department of Environmental Regulation the power to: (a) Deal with the hazards and threats of danger and damage posed by such storage and related activities; * * * * *...

...that the interest of the state in such preservation outweighs any burdens of liability imposed by the Legislature upon those persons engaged in storing pollutants and related activities. (5) The Legislature further declares that it is the intent of ss. 376.30-376.315 to support and complement applicable provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, specifically those provisions relating to the national contingency plan for removal of pollutants....

...Considering the large numbers of discharges caused by underground gasoline storage tanks and the staggering costs necessary to pay for their cleanup, I propose that the following question be certified to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: May the third-party defense, as provided in Section 376.308, Florida Statutes *1189 (1985), be applied to absolve an owner or operator of a gasoline-distribution facility from liability, on evidence showing that before its ownership gasoline had previously leaked from an underground storage tank, and although it no longer continued to leak therefrom during the later owner's or operator's control of the facility, it nonetheless continued to discharge into the groundwaters of the state, as defined in Section 376.301, Florida Statutes (1985), by seeping into same while the facility was in the control of that owner or operator? WENTWORTH, Judge, dissenting....

...discharge" or "seepage," and "installation." The latter term is not limited to physical structures but expressly includes "any ... facility ... or operation," (e.s.), which emits groundwater contaminants. Section 403.031(4), Florida Statutes (1985). Section 376.308(4) limits the third party defense to occurrences which are "solely" the result of "[a]n act or omission of a third party, other than ......

...one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship existing, directly or indirectly, with the defendant... ." Our attention has not been directed to any provision, either in our law or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which defines the phrase "contractual relationship" as it is used in section 376.308(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Stores, Inc., acquired from K & F the title to the property here in question would appear to me to fall clearly within the generic definition of a relationship based on contract. Black's Law Dictionary (1979). Under such an analysis, the third party defense to liability embodied in section 376.308(4) would not be available to Sunshine under the circumstances of this case even with respect to the original discharge from the tank. NOTES [1] Section 376.301(3), Florida Statutes, (1985), defines the term "discharge" as including not only the leaking, but the seeping, of any pollutant which occurs and which affects the groundwaters of the state. "Seep" is defined as, among other things, "to enter or penetrate slowly ... [or] to become diffused or spread." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2056 (1971). [2] Section 376.308, Florida Statutes (1985), states: Liabilities and defenses of facilities. — In any suit instituted by the department under ss. 376.30-376.315, it is not necessary for the department to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner. The department need only plead and prove that the prohibited discharge or other polluting condition has occurred. The only defenses of a person alleged to be responsible for the discharge to any action under ss. 376.30-376.315 are to plead and prove that the occurrence was solely the result of any of the following or any combination of the following: * * * * * * (4) An act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the defendant or o...

..., very high." (Footnote omitted.) [5] For example, it has been estimated that 10,000 spills of oil and hazardous substances annually pollute the navigable streams of the United States. 11 Envt'l.L.Rep. (Envtl.L.Inst.) 10140 (July 1981). Furthermore, Section 376.30(2)(b)-(c) Florida Statutes (1985), declares, as a legislative fact, that discharges of stored pollutants, resulting from actions taken by both private and public entities, "have occurred in the past, are occurring now, and present futu...

...[8] The "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980" is a federal hazardous waste cleanup statute with a third-party defense to liability containing language which is precisely parallel to the language of the third party defense embodied in section 376.308(4), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...The Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") appeals an order awarding attorney's fees and costs to Frank Gibbins pursuant to chapter 73. The issue on appeal is whether DEP's actions in seeking access to Gibbins' property to investigate and remediate petroleum contamination, as mandated by section 376.30(4), constituted a taking....

...DEP notified Gibbins that it was seeking entry upon his land to drill, install and utilize a number of wells. On 21 June 1994, DEP served Gibbins with an administrative order for access to his property for contamination assessment or remedial action. See §§ 376.303(4), 403.061(8), and 403.121(2), Fla....

...hereby GRANTED. The court awarded Gibbins $29,306.25 in attorney's fees and costs at a subsequent hearing at which expert witnesses testified about the reasonableness of the fees. DISCUSSION DEP is charged by the legislature with enforcing sections 376.30-376.319 to ensure the quality of surface and ground waters in the state. See §§ 376.30-376.319, Fla. Stat. (1995), The Pollution Discharge Prevention and Removal Act. The legislature authorizes DEP to exercise the state's "police power" to gain access to property to conduct contamination assessments or remedial actions. Section 376.303(4), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: The Department [DEP] may require a property owner to provide site access for activities associated with contamination assessment or remedial action. Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit an action by the property owner to compel restoration of his property or to recover damages from the person responsible for the polluting rendition requiring assessment or remedial action activities. § 376.303(4), Fla....

...See § 403.7191(1)(d), Fla.Stat. (1997). Chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes titled "Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Removal" defines "petroleum products' chemicals of concern" as including constituents in petroleum products including lead. See § 376.301(28), Fla.Stat. (1997). In enacting sections 376.30 through 376.319, the legislature intended to "support and complement applicable provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, specifically those provisions relating to the national contingency plan for removal of pollutants." See § 376.30(5), Fla.Stat....

...value based on theories of: strict liability (Count I), reckless or negligent endangerment/failure to warn (Count II); trespass (Count III), private nuisance (Count IV), negligence (Count V), and violation of Florida’s Water Quality Assurance Act, § 376.30, Fla....

...Violation of Florida’s Water Quality Assurance Act (Count VI) The section of the Act Plaintiffs rely on prohibits the discharge of “pollutants or hazardous substances into or upon the surface or ground waters of state or lands.” See Fla. Stat. § 376.302 (l)(a) (2004)....

....An issue of fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). . Plaintiffs incorrectly reference this section of the statute in Count VI as § 376.30(3)(b).

pipe. The legislative intent, expressed in section 376.-30(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) is to preserve

...The two portions of chapter 376 at issue in this case are the Pollutant Discharge [Prevention] and Control Act, passed in 1970 and codified at sections 376.011–376.21, Florida Statutes (the “1970 [a]ct”), and the Water Quality Assurance Act, passed in 1983 and codified at sections 376.30–376.317, Florida Statutes, (the “1983 act”). The 1970 act is intended to protect coastal waters and adjoining lands, whereas the 1983 act is intended to combat pollution to surface and ground waters. §§ 376.021, 376.041, 376.30(1)(b), & (2)(b), Fla....

...defined in section 376.031. See ch. 96-263, § 13, at 1030, Laws of Fla. While the 1970 act involves pollution of coastal waters and adjoining lands, the 1983 act provides a cause of action for those harmed by pollution of ground and surface waters. See § 376.30, Fla. Stat. (2011) (entitled “Legislative intent with respect to pollution of surface and ground waters”); § 376.302(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (prohibiting the discharge of “pollutants or hazardous substances into or upon the surface or ground waters of the state or lands”). Section 376.315, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that “[s]ections 376.30–376.317, being necessary for the -5- general welfare and the public health and safety of the state and its inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss. 376.30– 376.317 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended.” Additionally, section 376.30(2)(b) provides that the Legislature found and declared that spills, discharges, and escapes of pollutants “as a result of procedures taken by private and governmental entities involving the storage, transportation, and disposal of...

...state, to citizens of the state, and to other interests deriving livelihood from the state.” (Emphasis added.) In contrast to the 1970 act, the 1983 act does not and never has included any definition of damages in its definition section. See § 376.301, Fla. Stat. (2011) (setting forth the definitions for sections 376.30-376.317, 376.70, and 376.75 (the 1983 act)). Instead, the 1983 act provides for the recovery of “all damages.” Specifically, section 376.313(3), Florida Statutes (2011), of the 1983 act states as follows: Except as provided in s. 376.3078(3) and (11), nothing contained in ss. 376.30–376.317 prohibits any person from bringing a cause of action in a court of competent jurisdiction for all damages resulting from a discharge or other condition of pollution covered by ss. 376.30–376.317....

...-6-  Such person need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited discharge or other pollutive condition and that it has occurred. The only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308. (Emphasis added.) In this case, because Lieupo filed his cause of action under section 376.313(3) of the 1983 act, the “all damages” language of the 1983 act applies, not the more restrictive definition of the 1970 act that expressly only applies to the 1970 act....

...2001) (“[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.”). Moreover, the Legislature has directed that section 376.313(3) be liberally construed. See § 376.315, Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Sections 376.30–376.317 . . . shall be liberally construed to effect the purposes set forth under ss. 376.30– 376.317 ....

...requesting an order authorizing access to and limited use of respondents’ property to perform a contamination assessment, alleging that respondents had failed and refused to remove the hazardous substances from the site. The motion notes that Florida Statute section 376.307, which creates the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, authorizes the state to clean up and restore sites whenever the person in charge fails to do so....

...hazardous substances found. After hearing extensive testimony on the motion and reviewing memoranda of law *773 submitted by the parties, the trial judge entered the order in question in which he “found” that applying the 1983 statute [sections 376.30-376.315, Florida Statutes (1985)] to conditions on the land which existed prior to the effective date of the statute would be an unconstitutional taking without compensation, or an inverse condemnation....

...ly entitled to use the funds for that purpose, it may not be able to perform the assessment at all, so a remedy by appeal after final judgment is inadequate, particularly in view of the remedial purpose of the statute in question. In the adoption of section 376.30, et seq., the Legislature has expressly declared, in pertinent part: (2) The Legislature further finds and declares that: (a) The storage of pollutants within the jurisdiction of the state and state inland waters is a hazardous underta...

...s presumed. Harvey v. Wittenberg, 384 So.2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Times Publishing Company v. Williams, 222 So.2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). The legislature has authorized D.E.R. to use the trust funds for making the pollution assessment, in adopting section 376.307 and stating therein that “The fund may be used to carry out the provisions of this act and for the cleanup and restoration of any site contaminated with [the defined deleterious substances] [Emphasis added].” § 376.307(2), Fla.Stat....

...The act also authorizes D.E.R. to establish a requirement that any facility covered by the act be subject to complete and thorough inspection, and to monitor a facility which has discharged pollutants to ensure that such discharge does not continue to occur. § 376.303(l)(c), Fla.Stat....

...The petition for certiorari is granted, and that portion of the trial court’s order of June 12,1985 which denies to petitioner the use of money from the Water Quality Assurance Fund for the purpose of conducting the pollution assessment, is quashed. WRIT GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED IN PART. COBB, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur. . § 376.307, Fla.Stat....

...The two portions of chapter 376 at issue in this case are the Pollutant Discharge and Control Act, passed in 1970 and codified at sections 376.011-376.21, Florida Statutes (the “1970 Act”), and the Water Quality Assurance Act, passed in 1983 and codified at sections 376.30-376.317, Florida Statutes, (the “1983 act”). The 1970 act is intended to protect coastal waters and adjoining lands, whereas the 1983 act is intended to combat pollution to surface and ground waters. §§ 376.021, 376.041, 376.30(1)(b), & (2)(b), Fla....

...& Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 28 (Fla. 2004) (finding the cause of action created by section 376.313(3) is one of strict liability). The 1983 act has its own definitional section, but it does not include a definition of the word “damages.” § 376.301, Fla....

...that chapter 376, Florida Statutes (2004), allows a cause of action by these plaintiffs, we have construed several provisions of the chapter in pari materia and given effect to the various sections.” Id. Specifically, the court construed sections 376.315 and 376.30 as expressing a legislative intent for the 1983 act to be “liberally construed” to promote public and private interests, including “public health and safety,” “the environment,” and “other interests deriving livelihood from the state.” Id. at 1221 (citing §§ 376.315 & 376.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat.). 4  The court then stated, “We find that section 376.313(3) and the language used in section 376.30 are clear and unambiguous, and we rely solely on their plain language to discover the legislative intent.” Id....

...guage of section 376.031, which states the “damages” definition only applies to the 1970 act. It would also contradict the court’s statement that it reached its decision based “solely” on the “plain language” of sections 376.313(3) and 376.30, and the court’s finding that the 1983 act should be liberally construed....