Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Lauderdale, for appellee. GROSS, J. Gregory Jackson appeals his convictions after a jury trial of grand theft of a motor vehicle and possession of a motor vehicle with an altered vehicle identification number, contrary to sections 812.014(1)(c)6 and 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ly deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of another person not entitled to its use. See §§ 812.014(1)(a) & (b), 812.014(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997), makes it unlawful to "possess......

...ho purchased moped from a boy named Rodney Middleton for $35); R.M., 412 So.2d at 45 (involving defendant who borrowed bicycle from a friend). As to the conviction of possessing a motor vehicle with an altered identification number, we also reverse. Section 319.33(1)(d) requires that a defendant's possession be "with knowledge" of the destruction, alteration or removal of the VIN number....

...cerning the tinkering with a VIN number. There was no showing that Jackson's fingerprints appeared in those out-of-the-way places where VIN numbers on the vehicle had been altered. No other fact in evidence suggests the requisite state of mind for a section 319.33(1)(d) violation, so under Law, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury verdict....

...ss additional record attachments to a subsequent denial refute this facially sufficient claim. *1169 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. BLUE, A.C.J., and GREEN and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] § 812.13(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] § 319.33(d), Fla....

...State, 605 So.2d 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bayer v. State, 597 So.2d 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Moore's other claims are without merit. SENTENCE AFFIRMED; RESTITUTION REVERSED. HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 812.014(1), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] § 319.33(1)(d), Fla....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. OWEN, Judge. Virginia Stark was without doubt involved in an automobile theft ring. However, the evidence adduced at her jury trial for the alleged violation of Fla. Stat. § 319.33(1)(d) (1971) [1] was insufficient to show that at the time she sold the stolen automobile she had knowledge of the alteration of the vehicle identification number. She is therefore entitled to be discharged. Fla. Stat. § 319.33(1)(d) is a specific intent crime and as such the State has the burden of affirmatively proving by direct or circumstantial evidence that the act was done with the requisite specific intent....

...The State's evidence in this case failed to meet this requirement. The judgment appealed is reversed and upon remand the trial court is respectfully directed to enter an order discharging appellant. CROSS and DOWNEY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. § 319.33(1)(d) (1971) provides: "(1) It is unlawful: * * * * * * "(d) To sell or offer for sale in this state a motor vehicle on which the motor number or manufacturer's serial number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced with kn...

...See In re Forfeiture of 40' Fiberglass Boat, 453 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(in the absence of standing, all other issues become moot). Appellant argues that despite appellees' unintentional purchase of a stolen automobile which because of the VIN alterations was rendered "contraband" pursuant to § 319.33(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1993) [2] , appellees lack standing to contest the forfeiture action....

...ad "standing" to make the claim. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The forfeiture of the Cadillac was subsequently dismissed upon the identification of the vehicle by its owner. [2] The pertinent part of section 319.33(7)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1993) dealing with motor vehicles and title certificates provides as follows: (a) If all identifying numbers of a motor vehicle or mobile home do not exist or have been destroyed, removed, covered, alte...

...Lee Troyer was arrested on June 14, 1990, for attempting to procure a vehicle license tag by false means. The amended information, detailing the offense, was appropriately captioned "Obtaining A License Tag By Fraud." The body of the information, however, charged a violation of section 319.33, Florida Statutes, a statute pertaining to certificates of title, and alleges that Troyer "did make application for title and/or registration and in the course of said application [knowingly] used a false or fictitious name ......

...he one with which the defendant is charged. Keesee v. State, 204 So.2d 925 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967); see also, Janes v. State, 585 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Troyer's conduct, although perhaps prohibited by some other statute, is neither condemned by section 319.33, nor described in the main portion of the information....

...We conclude that it has not been shown that such a felony was committed. No such felony appears to have been committed incident to the fraudulent title certificate. The title certificate was kept in the Camaro, but mere possession of an unlawfully issued automobile title certificate is not a crime. Sections 319.33(1)(e), 319.33(4), Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 319.33(4) provides that "[i]t is unlawful for any person knowingly and with intent to defraud to have in his possession ......

...meanor and therefore could not cause the Camaro to be contraband under section 932.701(2)(e). Indeed, the point that conduct of the type involved here concerning the title certificate would appear to be more closely related to section 843.02 than to section 319.33(4) may further indicate that that conduct was not meant by the legislature to be encompassed within section 319.33(4). Also, we do not conclude that the Camaro was an instrumentality in the commission of the crime of fraudulently obtaining either an automobile title certificate under section 319.33(1)(e), or a driver's license under section 322.212(5), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 895.03(3), Fla.Stat. [2] § 895.03(4), Fla.Stat. [3] § 817.036, Fla.Stat. [4] § 812.014(2), Fla.Stat. [5] § 319.35(1)(a), Fla.Stat. [6] § 831.01, Fla.Stat. [7] § 319.33(1)(e), Fla.Stat....

...2d DCA 1992), this court reviewed a case in which the defendant was arrested for attempting to procure a vehicle license tag by false means. The information filed against the defendant was captioned "Obtaining A License Tag By Fraud," but the body of the information charged a violation of section 319.33, Florida Statutes, which proscribed obtaining certificates of title by fraud....

...ed in the body of the instrument, the offense described in the body is the one with which the defendant is charged." Id. This court then concluded: [The defendant's] conduct, although perhaps prohibited by some other statute, is neither condemned by section 319.33, nor *1162 described in the main portion of the information....

...he Proceedings in the Trial Court Marrero was charged with trafficking in cocaine, a violation of section 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1997); selling or possessing a motor vehicle with altered vehicle identification numbers, a violation of section 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1997); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of section 893.147(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...NOTES [1] Orders granting motions to dismiss in criminal cases are appealable. State v. Smith, 578 So.2d 826 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); State v. Saufley, 574 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). [2] § 319.35(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). [3] § 831.01, Fla. Stat. (1989). [4] § 319.33, Fla....

...Thus, respondent concluded that its complaint was filed within the 60-day period allowed in section 932.703(3). [1] The trial court found that respondent had probable cause to seize the vehicle; apparently, the court determined that it was contraband under section 319.33(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). That statute provides in part the following: 319.33 Offenses involving vehicle identification numbers, ......

...nald, Richard, and Robert Copher. We affirm in part and reverse in part. The first point raised by the state is that the trial court erred in dismissing the charge of sale of a motor vehicle with an altered or destroyed motor number, in violation of section 319.33(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1977). Section 319.33(1)(d) provides: (1) It is unlawful: ......

...urer's serial number ... . Appellees moved to dismiss this charge on the ground that the informations failed to allege the essential element of intent to defraud, which, appellees urged, was implicitly required in order to distinguish a violation of section 319.33(1)(d), a felony, [1] from the misdemeanor of a violation of section 320.33, [2] which provides: It is unlawful for any person to knowingly buy, sell, receive, dispose of, conceal or have in his possession any motor vehicle from which t...

...ntification mark has been removed, defaced, covered, altered, or destroyed for the purpose of concealment or misrepresenting the identity of the said motor vehicle. (Emphasis added.) The trial court rejected this contention, and we agree. As we read section 319.33(1)(d), this statute requires only knowledge of the alteration or destruction of the motor number....

...tatute. One such reason is illustrated by section 320.33, which requires the specific intent to conceal or misrepresent the identity of the motor vehicle. It is ironic that section 320.33, which proscribes, inter alia, the same conduct proscribed in section 319.33(1)(d), requires a specific intent not required under section 319.33(1)(d), yet imposes a less harsh penalty than section 319.33(1)(d); however, it is not our function to question the wisdom of our legislature....

...State, 302 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1975), both of which involved the felony automobile theft statute versus the misdemeanor temporary unauthorized use statute, and upon which appellees rely, are not on point. Having concluded that section 319.33(1)(d) does not require a specific intent to defraud, the trial court nevertheless granted appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that where a defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of two separate statutes which proscribe the...

...If the facts show a violation of two or more statutes, he may elect under which he will prosecute, in the absence of a prohibitory statute. * * *" There being no prohibitory statute here, the prosecutor acted within his discretion in charging appellees under section 319.33(1). The second issue before us is whether the trial court erred in dismissing a second count that charged appellee Robert Copher with making a false statement in a bill of sale on a motor vehicle, in violation of section 319.33(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), in that he "did make a false statement in a bill of sale for a motor vehicle, to-wit: [sic] did state a 1974 Pontiac Grand Prix motor vehicle, Identification number 2K57T4A149810, was a 1977 Pontiac motor vehicle, Identification number ID2J57Y7AB5140." Section 319.33 provides: (1) It is unlawful: (a) To alter or forge any certificate of title to a motor vehicle or any assignment thereof or any cancellation of any liens on a motor vehicle; (b) To hold or use such certificate, assignment, or cancella...

...We agree with the trial court's reasoning and with its conclusion on this issue. As the trial court noted, an unintentional typographical error in a motor vehicle identification number or the street number of the seller's address would result in a factually false statement, and under the state's interpretation of section 319.33(1)(e), subject the seller to criminal felony liability....

...The single exception is subsection (1)(a), which prohibits alteration or forgery of a certificate of title or a lien cancellation. Inclusion of a knowledge requirement in this subsection would have been superfluous, since forgery and alteration cannot be done unintentionally. We therefore construe section 319.33(1)(e) to include intent to defraud as an element of the offense proscribed....

...r are reversed; the order granting appellee Robert Copher's motion to dismiss is affirmed in part and reversed in part; and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. HOBSON, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 319.33(5) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s....

...engine compartment. The City impounded the vehicle and, even though a teletype check showed the owner of the repair shop to be the owner, and the VINs to be consistent with the title, the City filed a complaint for forfeiture based on a violation of section 319.33, Florida Statutes (2000). The statute provides that it is unlawful for anyone to *1081 possess a motor vehicle "on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced, with knowledge of such destruction ..." § 319.33(1)(d)....

...State, 585 So.2d 489 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). In Cooper the vehicle did not have a visible VIN on the dash board, on the driver's door jam, or anywhere else that manufacturers place the visible numbers. The defendant in Cooper was convicted of violating section 319.33(1)(d) and appealed, arguing that the court erred in instructing the jury that it is illegal to remove "a" vehicle identification number....

...He contended that even though all of the visible VINs had been removed, he had not committed a crime because a concealed VIN still remained on the vehicle. The majority rejected that contention, explaining: It is clear that the legislative intent for section 319.33(1)(d) was to provide for ready ascertainment of a vehicle identification number in order to deter thefts and that removal of the visible identification number is a violation of this section even if the concealed identification number is not removed....

...If the statute criminalized the removal of "a" VIN, it would be clear; however, the use of the word "the" makes it unclear as to whether the statute applies in this case. If a statute is "susceptible of differing constructions," it is construed most favorably to the defendant. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). Construing section 319.33(1)(d) most favorably to the appellant, we find no violation....

...Copher, 395 So.2d 635 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981); Cf: State v. Young, 371 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1979). We have examined the remaining points urged by appellant as to the grand theft count and find them to be without merit. The second count charged the defendant with a violation of Section 319.33(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in pertinent part: (1) It is unlawful: * * * * * * (e) To use a false or fictitious name, give a false or fictitious address, or make any false statement in any application or affidavit re...

...However, the form was not sworn to before a notary public or anyone else authorized to administer oaths, and the jurat was therefore never completed. This was, in itself, fatal to the state's charge because the signed form had not yet become an application within the meaning of Chapter 319. Section 319.33(1)(e), as noted above, requires that the false statement allegedly made by the defendant must have been made in an "application or affidavit required under the provisions of" Chapter 319....

...sworn to before a notary public or other officer empowered to administer oaths, shall be filed with said department, and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed in this law... . Assuming, without deciding, that one could violate the provisions of Section 319.33(1)(e) without submission of the offensive application to the Department, [3] the fact is that the document signed by the defendant had not yet become a matured application of the kind contemplated by Sections 319.33(1)(e) and 319.23(1)....

DIAMANTIS, Judge. Appellant Dennis Cooper appeals his conviction on two counts of possession of a motor vehicle with a removed vehicle identification number in violation of section 319.33(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1989). We affirm. Section 319.33(1)(d) provides that it is an offense to possess a motor vehicle “on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been ......

...ble vehicle identification number has been removed from a vehicle, it is legal to possess a vehicle as long as the concealed vehicle identification number remains on the vehicle. We reject this contention. It is clear that the legislative intent for section 319.33(1)(d) was to provide for ready ascertainment of a vehicle identification number in order to deter thefts and that removal of the visible identification number is a violation of this section even if the concealed identification number is not removed....

...State, 367 So.2d 1119, 1120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A statute should be construed so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent. Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297, 299 (Fla.1978). AFFIRMED. GOSHORN, C.J., concurs. DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion. . Section 319.33(l)(d) makes it an offense to possess a motor vehicle on which the motor number or vehicle identification number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced with knowledge of such removal except as provided in section 319....

state charged Mike Kennedy with violation of section 319.33(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), alleging that

defraud as an element of the offense described in section 319.33(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1997). See State v

...Thus, respondent concluded that its complaint was filed within the 60-day period allowed in section 932.703(3). 1 The trial court found that respondent had probable cause to seize the vehicle; apparently, the court determined that it was contraband under section 319.33(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). That statute provides in part the following: 319.33 Offenses involving vehicle identification numbers, ......

cause seeking title to the Porsche pursuant to section 319.33(6), Florida Statutes (1987). The City’s initial

Odometer Fraud, F.S. 319.35(l)(a), Title Fraud, F.S. 319.33(l)(e), is contained therein. The appellees challenged

...Appellant appeals his convictions, after jury trial, of trafficking in stolen property (Counts III and VIII), in violation of section 812.019(1), Florida Statutes, and making a false statement in an application for a vehicle title (Count IX), in violation of section 319.33(l)(e), Florida Statutes....

...or permanently deprive the other person of a right to the motor vehicle, or to appropriate the motor vehicle to his own use or to the use of another. 4 If these same elements must be proven with regard to a violation of the prior charge pursuant to section 319.33(l)(d), double jeopardy could bar this later prosecution. However, we do not agree that section 319.33(l)(d) has any of the same elements....

...eft offense. See Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994). But it does not appear to us that the alteration charge is an aggravation or enhancement of the theft in any regard, any more than the theft plays any part in the alteration of VIN charge. Section 319.33(6) provides that any person who violates section 319.33 is guilty of a felony of the third degree, the same degree as the auto theft crime....

...n addition to punishment for any theft accomplished or facilitated by altering the VIN of a motor vehicle. One is not a degree offense of the other. AFFIRMED. HARRIS, C.J., and PETERSON, J., concur. . U.S. Const.Amend. V; Art. 1, § 9, Fla. Const. . § 319.33(l)(d), Fla.Stat....

...(b) Appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto. ⅜ ⅜5 ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜! (2)(c) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if the property stolen is: * * * * * * 4. A motor vehicle. . Section 319.33 provides as follows: 319.33 Offenses involving vehicle identification numbers, applications, certificates, papers; penalty.— (1) It is unlawful: # * # * •}: ¡ft (d) To possess, sell or offer for sale, conceal, or dispose of in this state a motor vehicle or mobile ho...

Ronald Elliott was also charged with violating section 319.33(1), which prohibits making false statements

...for the purpose of rebuilding and resale, does s. 319.30 apply? 2. When a motor vehicle becomes a total loss according to the terms of s. 319.30 (5), F. S., in a foreign state with a foreign title and is thereafter rebuilt and sold in Florida, does s. 319.33 , F....

...Florida, provided that your department, upon due investigation of any given case, does not find and determine that requisite facts do or did exist establishing criminal violations under s. 319.14 , s. 319.30 , or s. 319.34 , F. S. AS TO QUESTION 2: Section 319.33 (5), F. S., makes a violation of any provision of that section a felony. Examination of the provisions of s. 319.33 (1)-(4) discloses that no provision therein defines any offense concerning the rebuilding of motor vehicles or the selling of such rebuilt vehicles or concerning vehicles built from salvage or total loss vehicles (discussed supra under question 1). Furthermore, no evidence has been brought to my attention that would tend to establish a violation of any of the offenses described in s. 319.33 (1)-(4). Therefore, unless and until judicially construed otherwise, and based upon the foregoing circumstances, I am of the view that the provisions of s. 319.33 do not apply to the rebuilding or resale of flood-damaged motor vehicles as set forth in your inquiry....

...HWARTZ, Judge. At a non-jury trial, the defendant was convicted of uttering a forged instrument in violation of § 831.02, Fla.Stat. (1977), and knowingly obtaining money by means of a forged motor vehicle certificate of title, which is forbidden by § 319.33(2), Fla.Stat....

...He contends first that he could not properly have been convicted of uttering a forgery (a) because a motor vehicle certificate of title is not an instrument covered by §§ 831.01 and 831.02, Fla.Stat. (1977) and (b) because the legislature’s specific treatment of such certificates in § 319.33, Fla.Stat....

...Brooks, 27 Ohio St.2d 144 , 271 N.E.2d 869 (1971); and is therefore subject to both the forgery and uttering statutes, §§ 831.01-.02, Fla.Stat. (1977). See State v. La Pointe, 345 So.2d 362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Moreover, since the specific certificate of title criminal provisions contained in § 319.33, Fla.Stat....

...same criminal conduct. See Fayerweather v. State, 332 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla.1976). Jalbert also argues that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal as to both charges because he did not possess the “specific intent” to defraud required under both § 319.33(2) and § 831.02, Fla.Stat....

...Since the other points raised by the defendant likewise lack merit, the judgment below is therefore Affirmed. . Unlike State v. Young, 357 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), in which the “specific” statute provided for a lesser penalty than the general one, violations of both § 319.33 and § 831.02, Fla....

WENTWORTH, Judge. In Case No. BA-16 appellant seeks review of judgments of conviction and sentences for offenses involving vehicle identification numbers, applications, and certificates as proscribed by § 319.33, Florida Statutes....

...d. See § 790.27(2); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 10.18. The more apt analogy is to the crime of possessing a vehicle “with knowledge” that the motor vehicle identification number “has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered, or defaced,” § 319.33(l)(d), Fla....

...1968, in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and knowingly sell a motor vehicle, to-wit: a 1966 Ford Mustang on which the manufacturer’s serial number has been destroyed, removed, covered, altered or defaced, contrary to F.S. 319.33.” To this information petitioners plead not guilty....

...oward County, upon the concept that the informations were void, and hence the petitioners were entitled to be discharged. The circuit judge agreed, discharged petitioners and the state has appealed. We quoted the information above. The statute, F.S. Section 319.33, F.S.A. reads: “319.33 Alteration or forgery; procuring or passing certificate covering *16 stolen vehicle; serial numbers; false or fictitious name or address....

...may only be decided by a jury; (3) the Escalade was not contraband; and (4) forfeiture of the Escalade was an excessive punishment under the Florida Constitution. The Town responded that summary judgment was properly entered because it established the elements of section 319.33, Florida Statutes (2016); there were no material issues of fact; summary judgments are appropriate in forfeiture actions; and the Escalade’s forfeiture was not excessive punishment under Article I, § 17 of the Florida Constitution. We have de novo review. Dennis v. Kline, 120 So. 3d 11, 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). The Third District has held that a pleader must allege facts showing the motor vehicle was used in violation of section 319.33 to be subject to forfeiture....

...those who depend on them.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, no allegation or proof of intent to defraud is necessary . . . in a civil action seeking forfeiture of the vehicle.” Id. The Third District allowed the forfeiture of a vehicle under section 319.33 because the City alleged ultimate facts showing the defendant used a false name when he applied for title to the car. Id. at 662. Here, the defendant violated section 319.33(1)(e), which provides it is unlawful “[t]o use a false or fictitious name, give a false or fictitious address, or make any false statement in any application or affidavit required under the provisions of this chapter or in a bill of sale or sworn statement of ownership or otherwise commit a fraud in any application.” § 319.33(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2016). “Any motor vehicle used in violation of this section shall constitute contraband which may be seized by a law enforcement agency and shall be subject to forfeiture proceedings.” § 319.33(6), Fla....

...license.” This is a felony under section 322.212, Fla. Stat. (2016). While the State amended the information to allege a misdemeanor charge, that does not eliminate the statute’s application for the forfeiture proceeding. The Escalade was also contraband under section 319.33(1)(e)....

...That section provides it is unlawful “[t]o use a false or fictitious name, give a false or fictitious address, or make any false statement in any application or affidavit required under the provisions of this chapter or in a bill of sale or sworn statement of ownership or otherwise commit a fraud in any application.” § 319.33(1)(e), Fla....

...motor vehicle used in violation of this section shall constitute contraband which may be seized by a law 5 enforcement agency and shall be subject to forfeiture proceedings pursuant to ss. 932.701-932.704.” § 319.33(6), Fla. Stat. Even if it could be said that the vehicle did not automatically fall under section 932.701’s definition of contraband, it fits within the definition under section 319.33. And last, the defendant argues the seizure of the Escalade constitutes excessive punishment, prohibited by Article I, § 17 of the Florida Constitution....

...He later admitted to the police officer that his name is Nathaniel James. The State’s amended information charged appellee with the use of a false name with intent to commit fraud in an application for a motor vehicle registration and/or title in violation of § 319.33(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), a third degree felony....

...Petersburg Beach v. Jewell, 489 So.2d 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The present case, unlike Jewell , involves a criminal charge only. No question of forfeiture of the vehicle is before us. . Although not raised by the sworn motion to dismiss, it appears that § 319.33(1)(e) applies only to motor vehicle ownership documents: bills of sale, motor vehicle titles, and similar matters regulated by chapter 319, Florida Statutes....

...Motor vehicle registrations, by contrast, are regulated by chapter 320, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides separate penalties for violations of its provisions. See §§ 320.02(6), 320.57, Fla.Stat. (1987). To the extent the State has utilized § 319.33(1)(e) to charge false statement in an application for a motor vehicle registration, the information appears to be defective....