Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...us liability for the negligent driving of the purchaser after they have transferred possession of the motor vehicle to the purchaser. In order to receive this protection, the seller must follow the specific requirements set forth in the statute. See § 319.22(2) Fla....

...The damage suit has now been tried and the jury found for plaintiff against Hughes but not against R.S. Evans. It is contended here that the disposition of the issue of ownership below was error, mainly because of the trial court's refusal to charge that if the jury found F.S. § 319.22, F.S.A. (pertaining to endorsement and delivery of title certificate) had not been complied with by Evans it must find that the car was owned by Evans when the accident occurred. It is evident from a reading of Section 319.22 in its entirety that the primary emphasis intended by this section is upon the marketability of title to a vehicle....

...Appellant contends, however, that one who has not complied with the provisions of this section has not succeeded in divesting himself of ownership of the vehicle, with the result that tort liability growing out of such interest may successfully be asserted against him. The source of this contention is to be found in F.S.A. § 319.22(2) which provides that an owner who has sold and delivered a vehicle to a purchaser "shall not by reason of any of the provisions of this law, be deemed the owner of such vehicle so as to be subject to civil liability for the operation of s...

...In the Ragg and Platt cases, supra, this court was careful to point out that Chapter 319, Florida Statutes, did not provide an exclusive method of transferring title nor abrogate the common law of sales. By putting these decisions together, the true import of Section 319.22(2) as it affects the possible tort liability of the seller of an automobile is brought into focus....

...and Florida case precedent lead to the conclusion that ownership in fact passed to the Creditors upon repossession. The Florida statute generally provides that a certificate of title is required in order to obtain marketable title to sell a vehicle. See Fla. Stat. § 319.22.6 If the vehicle at issue has been repossessed or otherwise transferred by operation of law, 6 Fla. Stat. § 319.22 provides, in pertinent part: Except as provided in §§ 319.21 and 319.28, a person acquiring a motor vehicle ....

...necessary to sell a repossessed vehicle. Normally, one can own a vehicle in Florida without having a certificate of title to it, but an owner cannot transfer ownership of a vehicle to a third party until the certificate of title is in his name. See Fla. Stat § 319.22....

...Fourth, if the Florida legislature did not recognize repossession as one event 21 that effects an ownership change before the Florida DMV issues a title, the inclusion of repossession in the Fla. Stat. § 319.28 exception to § 319.22 would make no sense.9 This exception evinces an intention to carve repossession and other “transfers of ownership by operation of law” out of the certificate of title requirement, signifying that such transfers by themselves constit...

...MPETENCE, NEVERTHELESS INTENDS TO DRIVE THE VEHICLE? Id. at 261 n. 1. At the time of the incident in Horne, a Florida statute specifically precluded the imposition of civil liability on an automobile seller after a bona fide transfer of the vehicle. § 319.22(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). Thus, we concluded in Horne that we could not hold an automobile seller responsible given the legislature's clear intent to bar any liability in section 319.22(2)....

...We hold that under these circumstances, a joint titleholder who has not divested himself or herself of the ownership interest is an owner as a matter of law. A joint titleholder holds a joint tenancy interest in the vehicle and, accordingly, has the right to possess and use the vehicle. See § 319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla....

...- 17 - above, and the mere fact that he did not act on these legal rights does not alter or diminish their existence. Further, had Taylor-Christensen died, Christensen would have inherited the vehicle because of his joint ownership interest. See § 319.22(2)(a)(1)(a), Fla....

...recovery, for the misfortune of the injured person should not depend entirely on the repository of the legal title; nor is recovery dependent upon perfection of title in a given person, Rutherford v. Allen Parker Co., Fla., 67 So.2d 763, construing Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes 1951, and F.S.A....

...le for the buyer's subsequent negligent acts in the operation of the automobile. McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1957); Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955); Whalen v. Hill, 219 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); § 319.22(2), Fla....

...ther] a `sale' is an entrustment... .") (emphasis in original). Clearly, Potamkin, the seller, knew that Newry was an incompetent driver and accordingly, does not escape liability for its negligent conduct. [1] Contrary to the majority view, neither section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1981), nor the dangerous instrumentality doctrine insulates Potamkin from liability. Section 319.22(2) discontinues liability after transfer of title....

...Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1955); Whalen v. Hill, 219 So.2d 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Here, we are concerned with the seller's negligence prior to and concurrent with the sale. Because Potamkin's duty arose prior to the transfer of title, section 319.22(2), providing immunity for acts occurring after the transfer of title, offers Potamkin no support....

...Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 206 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (complaint which alleged that insurance company knew or should have known that its doctor was not licensed in Florida and was committing illegal act stated cause of action for negligence). [2] Section 319.22(2), Fla....

...The contention of the defendant-bank that the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to this transaction and that the transaction should be governed pursuant to F.S. Section 319, F.S.A., Title Certificates, [2] does not impress us. The main thrust of the bank's argument in support of this contention is that Section 319.22(1) should govern this situation. Section 319.22(1) reads as follows: "319.22 Transfer of title....

...sale does not prevent the passage of title from the seller to the buyer. Motor Credit Corporation v. Woolverton, Fla. 1957, 99 So.2d 286; Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., Fla. 1955, 81 So.2d 635; Ragg v. Hurd, Fla. 1952, 60 So.2d 673. F.S. Section 319.22(1), F.S.A., provides that a purchaser shall not acquire a "marketable" title until the certificate of title is issued to him....

...Supreme Court of Florida. December 20, 1957. *287 Joseph A. Hackney and Caldwell, Parker, Foster, Wigginton & Miller, Miami, for appellant. Victor H. Eskenas, Miami, for appellee ROBERTS, Justice. On this appeal we are concerned with the impact of Sec. 319.22 and Sec....

...*289 the purchaser from the conditional vendor secures good title." See also cases collected in 47 A.L.R. 105, s. 88 A.L.R. 119. On this appeal the finance company contends that, by the clear terms of the Certificate of Title Act, particularly Sec. 319.22 and Sec....

...ced in Glass v. Continental Guaranty Corp., supra, 88 So. 876, and followed in Commercial Credit Co., Inc., v. Parker, 101 Fla. 928, 132 So. 640, as against a conditional vendor, or his assignee, under a duly recorded conditional sale contract. Sec. 319.22 provides as follows: "(1) * * * no person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such owner be a dealer or otherwise, hereafter shall acquire a marketable title in or to said motor vehicle until he, she, or it shall have had...

...Langran replied, "That is true. I would say that is true." We hold, therefore, that in the circumstances shown by the record here, Mrs. Woolverton is not charged with constructive notice under Sec. 319.27(2) of the finance company's lien. As to the effect of Sec. 319.22(1) on Mrs....

...In these circumstances to allow the finance company to take advantage of the purchaser's not having a title certificate would be about as inconsistent as to allow the culprit who murdered his father and mother to beg for mercy on the ground that he was an orphan. We have also considered the following provision of Sec. 319.22(1), supra: "* * nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or an assignment of such certificate for said motor vehicle for a valuable consideration." Whether...

...55, need not be decided, since as has been noted above the dealer in the instant case had actual authority to resell the repossessed trailers, so that no question of estoppel based upon apparent authority is involved. See O'Loughlin v. Erwin M. Jennings Co., Inc., supra, 140 A. 758. The provision of Sec. 319.22(1) providing that "* * * no court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any such motor vehicle, hereafter sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or encumbered, unless evidenced by...

...Wolverton did, in fact, have record title to the trailer at the time she filed her suit — the finance company having transferred it to her at the time of the execution of the Sutton-Woolverton conditional sale contract. We conclude, therefore, that the provisions of § 319.22 and § 319.27(2), supra, do not change the rule of Glass v....

...Gallina, 753 So.2d 60 (Fla. 2000). They are subject to a number of exceptions, however. For example, the owner of a vehicle who has delivered possession of it to another under a conditional sales contract, and who has complied with all the requirements of F.S. 319.22, is not liable for its negligent operation....

...Finally, it is contended that the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act violates due process by allowing prejudgment seizure of property without notice or a hearing. We disagree. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974). A word of caution. Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1979), was amended effective 1 January 1980 to provide that the use of the disjunctive "or" in a motor vehicle certificate of title or registration shall create a joint tenancy with each named owner having the abs...

...intent. Since the appellee sheriff stipulated to the existence of the requisite intent in this case, it was patent error for the trial court not to honor that stipulation. The trial court explains in support of its order that the legislature amended section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes, in 1979 (Laws of Florida, Ch....

...Vivian Smith perfected a vested right when she acquired the pickup truck in 1977 as a tenancy by the entireties, and that right could not be sold, forfeited, or encumbered without her knowledge and consent. Murray v. Sullivan, supra . Giving retroactive effect to the 1979 amendment of section 319.22(2) so as to permit forfeiture of the truck based on her husband's activities without her knowledge and consent clearly deprives her of that vested property right....

...ssued in this state * * *." § 319.23(5) "* * * Licensed dealers need not apply for certificates of title for such motor vehicles in stock * * * but upon transfer of same shall * * * give transferee a reassignment of the certificate of title * * *." § 319.22(1) "Except as provided in §§ 319.21 [relating to new cars or purchase of used cars by dealers] and 319.28 [relating to transfer of ownership by operation of law], no person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such ow...

...tle. When a title certificate endorsed in blank is left in the hands of the dealer, it may well be that the marketable title is also in the hands of the dealer for although the purchaser acquires ownership, he does not acquire marketable title under § 319.22(1) until there is issued a certificate of title in the name of the purchaser....

...pulous dealer, and we find that Atlantic, the purchaser of an unrecorded lien, cannot assert its claim as superior to a subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration claiming under a recorded certificate of title. This is obviously the intent of §§ 319.22(1) and 319.27(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...Such were not the facts in the instant case and the rule has no application here, where the dealer Saye had been permitted to keep in his possession a valid blank assignment of title from the record title holders and he assigned same to Strickland to whom was thereafter issued a new certificate of title. By virtue of F.S. §§ 319.22 and 319.27(2), F.S.A., Atlantic is estopped to claim a lien superior to that of the record title holder....

...We narrow the certified question to the facts of the case and hold that there is no liability. [1] *262 It is uncontroverted that the sale of the automobile in question was completed and that respondent automobile dealer was not the owner of the car at the time of the accident. Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1981), provides in pertinent part that the seller of a motor vehicle who has made a bona fide sale or transfer ......

...relationships, not to create uncertainty by establishing ambivalent criteria for the construction of those relationships." Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266, 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Second, except for minor changes not pertinent here, section 319.22(2) has been the law since the enactment of chapter 23658, section 3, Laws of Florida (1947)....

...As we recognized in Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644, *263 646 (Fla. 1986), "of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal consensus." Moreover, by enacting section 319.22(2), the legislature has evidenced its intent to bar a cause of action against the seller once ownership and possession of a motor vehicle is transferred to the purchaser....

...It is fundamental to our judicial system that these questions be determined by the jury. The limitation of liability must be left to the jury when the evidence does not support the allegation that the seller has knowledge of the buyer's incompetence. Second, the majority has determined that section 319.22(2) Florida Statutes (1981), and the legislative intent behind it, controls this situation....

...As stated earlier, this case involves the seller's own negligent entrustment of an automobile to one the seller knows is incapable of operating it. The seller's liability for posttransfer negligence of the buyer is simply not relevant. The legislative intent behind section 319.22(2), which deals only with postsale liability, has no bearing on the policy reasons for rejecting section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which deals with negligent entrustment....

...Therefore, if the cars in question are owned by the debtor and his nonfiling spouse as joint tenants, the Chapter 7 trustee is authorized to sell the debtor's interest in the vehicles and divide the proceeds among the debtor's creditors. Relying upon Florida Statute Sections 319.22(2)(a)(1) and (2) and the decision of Florida's First District Court of Appeal in Amsouth Bank v....

...er vehicle as tenants by the entirety with his wife because of the way their names are listed on the car titles. Their names are not separated on the Corvette title or the Impala title using the conjunctive term "and" as specified by Florida Statute Section 319.22(2)(a)(2). Rather, the trustee argues, the vehicles are owned by the debtor and his wife only as joint tenants under the plain language of Florida Statute Sections 319.22(2)(a)(1)....

...Upon the death of a coowner, the interest of the decedent shall pass to the survivor as though title or interest in the vehicle or mobile home was held in joint tenancy. This provision shall apply even if the coowners are husband and wife. FLA. STAT. Ch. 319.22(2)(a)(1) (2003) (emphasis added)....

...When a vehicle or mobile home is registered in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the conjunctive by the use of the word "and," the signature of each coowner or his or her personal representative shall be required to transfer title to the vehicle or mobile home. FLA. STAT. Ch. 319.22(2)(a)(2) (2003) (emphasis added)....

..."or" separates the names on the Impala title. The issue is whether these titles create an ownership between the spouses as joint tenants or as tenants by the entireties. The trustee points to the Hepner decision and the discussion of Florida Statute Section 319.22(2) in which the Florida appellate court noted that the creation of an estate by the entirety in vehicles registered in Florida requires two separate elements of proof: (i) the intention to create an estate by the entireties; and, (ii) registration in the names of husband and wife....

...d words or word elements Id. at 544, 988 P.2d 955 (citing Webster's Third Neiu International Dictionary 1114 (1993)). A hyphen can mean either "or" or "and." Thus, the meaning of a hyphen joining two parties in some unspecified way is ambiguous. [2] Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes does not provide any help in resolving this ambiguity; the statute only addresses transfers of vehicles with titles separating co-owners with the words "and" or "or." The statute does not address any variation from these two options, such as the use of a hyphen standing alone....

...applying the tenancy by the entireties presumption broadly to all marital personal property, the presumption must yield to any statute specifically delineating how to create an ownership interest in any particular type of personal property, such as Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes....

...In other words, the court will extend Beal Bank's presumption only in the absence of any controlling statute, express agreement, account statement, or other governing indicia that explicitly establishes a form of ownership other than tenancy by the entireties. For example, if the Corvette were titled as "Husband or Wife", Section 319.22(2)(a)(1) would control and establish that, like the Impala above, the car is owned by the debtor and his wife as *60 joint tenants regardless of the parties' intentions or the Beal Bank presumption. Arguing that Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes should cede to the Beal Bank presumption, the debtor points to an inadvertent footnote in an unpublished decision rendered by this court in In re Weichertz, No....

...The issue in that decision was whether a non-filing spouse had any legal interest in two motorcycles owned by the debtor. The non-filing spouse was not included on the title of either motorcycle. Upon holding that the spouse had no interest, in dicta, the court commented that Section 319.22 "may no longer be binding in cases of a vehicle titled between a husband and a wife." Weichertz, supra, at 4, n. 1. Upon further reflection in this case, which squarely raises the issue of the applicability of Section 319.22 after the Beal Bank decision, the court concludes that Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes does remain enforceable, even as to vehicles owned jointly by a husband and a wife....

...o own the asset as tenants by the entireties. Rather, the statute mandates the way for spouses to establish each form of ownership. Therefore, if the names of multiple owners are separated on the vehicle title using the relevant terms "and" or "or", Section 319.22 controls....

..." are used. Then, as with the Corvette here, an ambiguity exists, and the presumption will arise that the vehicle is owned by the spouses as tenants by the entireties. The Chapter 7 trustee argues only that the explicit provisions of Florida Statute Section 319.22(2)(a)(1) operate to trump any presumption the debtor asserts under Beal Bank....

...any joint creditors exist, or assert any basis to otherwise challenge the finding that the Corvette is owned by the debtor and his non-filing spouse as tenants by the entireties. Having found that the Beal Bank presumption does apply irrespective of Section 319.22 when the underlying title is ambiguous, and further finding no basis to rebut the presumption here, the court holds that the Corvette is exempt from claims of the debtor's creditors and is not subject to administration in this case. The trustee's objection is overruled as to the Corvette. The opposite is true as to the 2000 Chevy Impala titled as "DANIELS SHLO (-) OR SHARON." Florida Statute Section 319.22(2)(a)(1) specifies that where the term "or" separates the names of multiple owners on a vehicle title, a joint tenancy results even where the co-owners are husband and wife....

...looking to the explicit and unequivocal use of the term "or" separating the names of the debtor and his wife on the title to the Impala. By including the "or" between their names, the debtor's title falls squarely within the ambit of Florida Statute Section 319.22(2)(a)(1)....

...recovery, for the misfortune of the injured person should not depend entirely on the repository of the legal title; nor is recovery dependent upon perfection of title in a given person, Rutherford v. Allen Parker Co., Fla., 67 So.2d 763, construing Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes 1951, and F.S.A....

...The trial court's decision in the present case reflects an analysis not unlike the Fischer court's. After Fischer was decided, however, the Legislature effected a statutory change which must be taken into account in determining the nature of the ownership of an automobile by more than one person. Since amendment of section 319.22, Florida Statutes, by chapter 79-333, section 1, at 1736, Laws of Florida, one spouse can transfer title *910 to an automobile without the other spouse's consent, if the title is in both names disjunctively....

...When a vehicle or mobile home is registered in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the conjunctive by the use of the word "and," the signature of each coowner or his personal representative shall be required to transfer title to the vehicle or mobile home. § 319.22(2)(a), Fla....

...le is held in the names of coowners using the disjunctive form "or." In re Brown, 162 B.R. 616 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1993) (allowing liquidation of the husband's interest in a motor vehicle titled in the spouses' names disjunctively on grounds that, under section 319.22(2)(a)1, Florida Statutes, the spouses were unequivocally joint tenants). In Smith v. Hindery, 454 So.2d 663 (Fla.1st DCA 1984), we reversed the forfeiture of a truck accomplished under the Contraband Forfeiture Act before the amendment to section 319.22(2) had taken effect. In Hindery we found an estate by the entirety even though title was held in the names of a cattle rustler or his wife, but we said: A word of caution. Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1979), was amended effective 1 January 1980 to provide that the use of the disjunctive "or" in a motor vehicle certificate of title or registration shall create a joint tenancy with each named owner having the abs...

...In re Gonzalez, 92 B.R. 960 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1988). All of the documents reflecting the alleged purchase of the vehicle by Hinchliff from the Debtor's father were executed prior to the transfer of title to the Debtor. Further, it should be noted that Fla.Stat. § 319.22 provides in pertinent part that no court shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter....

...f section 45.061. Therefore, we declare the entire law to be unconstitutional. [4] Milton also contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Leapai on the question of ownership of the vehicle involved in the collision. Section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that an owner who has made a bonafide sale or transfer of a motor vehicle and who has delivered possession of it to a purchaser shall not, by reason of any of the provisions of Chapter 319, be deem...

...Milton's counterevidence merely showed that the certificate of title had not been delivered to the Department of Motor Vehicles. This evidence, however, did not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning Leapai's endorsement and delivery of the certificate of title to Ekeroma, which, under section 319.22(2), would relieve her of liability....

...roceeds and, therefore, became proper plaintiffs to a conversion action. The defendants attempt to distinguish this case from other conversion actions because it involves the right to possess motor vehicles, which are governed by a specific statute. Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes governs the transfer of title to motor vehicles and provides that "a person acquiring a motor vehicle ......

...The plaintiff in Bunting brought a conversion claim against a towing company that would not release the plaintiffs truck to him because the certificate of title was in the name of a third party. See id. at 107. The court rejected the towing company's defense based on section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes because the statute addresses only transfers of title and the acquisition of marketable title, not the mere transfer or passage of title. See id. at 108; see also Florida Dept. of Corr. v. Blount Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 411 So.2d 930, 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (stating that Fla.Stat. § 319.22(1) does not prevent valid title from being passed, only marketable title)....

...1993) (holding that car dealership was liable to floor plan financier for conversion of vehicles by failing to remit proceeds to financier); Wilson v. Bankers Inv. Co., 47 So.2d 779 (Fla.1950) (holding defendants liable for conversion of automobile even though certificate of title was in defendant's name). Assuming that section 319.22 was not limited to marketability of title, the plaintiffs still have a valid claim for conversion of the motor vehicles they have submitted uncontroverted evidence form which the court or a jury could infer that they have a valid claim to the vehicles....

...An affidavit by one Waldorf stated he and Godby co-owned the corporation Wheels Unlimited, Inc. and that Godby brought the vehicle into the corporation as a capital contribution but that the title was never formally transferred to the corporation. 492 So.2d at 786. The district court of appeal reasoned that section 319.22, Florida Statutes (1985), dealing with the transfer of title to motor vehicles, was not calculated to prohibit courts from recognizing equitable interests which were not asserted in opposition to the rights of good faith purchasers who had relied upon a duly issued certificate of title....

...*137 Thus, except in the case of licensed dealers, the purchase of a motor vehicle is prohibited unless the purchaser obtains a properly executed certificate of title. For convenience, a licensed dealer may simply reassign the certificate, but, of course, any nondealer purchaser will have to obtain a title in his name. Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes (1985), states: (1) Except as provided in ss....

...ading. Section 319.23(1), Florida Statutes (1985), requires the application for a title certificate to be notarized. Nowhere in chapter 319 is there any mention of an equitable interest in ownership. We believe that the district court of appeal read section 319.22 too narrowly when it reasoned that its basic purpose was to protect bona fide owners of motor vehicles who have relied upon duly issued certificates of title....

...BARKETT, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Under section 932.704, Florida Statutes, which must be strictly construed, notice of forfeiture proceedings is to be given to "all others who claim an interest" in the subject property. I do not believe that section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, bars the assertion of an interest, irrespective of its equitable nature. I agree with the district court that: The salutary purpose of this statute [319.22(1)] is to stabilize the ownership, sale, and transfer of motor vehicles and to protect the rights of bona fide owners of motor vehicles by requiring one method of transferring record title and protecting those who rely upon a recorded certificate of title....

...urchases such new motor vehicle for purposes other than resale." (Emphasis supplied.) It is interesting to note that a special occupational license and other requisites are *839 provided for "secondhand dealers". See Section 320.27 F.S. 1959, F.S.A. Section 319.22(1) F.S....

...On the appeal McQueen also stressed the lateness of the recordation of the lien in this state. The Supreme Court, Thomas, J., held that F.S. Section 319.21, F.S.A. was enacted "to establish the necessity for certificates of title, generally," and that F.S. Section 319.22, F.S.A....

...uth Carolina certificate about any lien, were plead. The appellant also stressed the lateness of the recordation of the lien in this state. *50 The action culminated in a decision that appellant was not a bona fide buyer because of the provisions of Section 319.22, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A., and a judgment against appellant for the value of the security....

...an application for an initial certificate. The former statute was enacted to cover transfers by operation of law; the latter to establish the necessity for certificates of title, generally. We have digested these two sections of the statutes because Section 319.22, Florida Statutes 1949, and F.S.A., which the court held controlled the present cause, was intended to apply in cases not regulated by those sections....

...any such motor vehicle, * * * sold * * * or mortgaged * * * unless evidenced by and on a certificate of title duly issued * * *." The title to this section and its content indicate that it was designed to regulate transfers of title. In referring to Section 319.22 as authority for his decision the judge merely said that by virtue of that law the defendant, appellant, was not a bona fide purchaser....

...After he took possession of the vehicle and paid for the same, he relied on the dealer to secure the proper transfer of title, and this by law is the dealer's duty. F.S. Section 319.23(5), F.S.A. The trial court was concerned — as are we — with the language of F.S. Section 319.22(1), F.S.A., reading as follows: "Except as provided in §§ 319.21 and 319.28, no person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such owner be a dealer or otherwise, hereafter shall acquire a marketable title in or to...

...Hooker, Jr., d/b/a Prestige Cars, Fla.App. 1970, 235 So.2d 20; Motor Credit Corporation v. Woolverton, Fla. 1957, 99 So.2d 286. If we are correct in this, it would follow that the plaintiff acquired no security interest in the motor vehicle from Hooker and had no standing to rely on Section 319.22(1)....

...e UCC which may be inconsistent or in conflict with Chapter 319. § 680.104(2)(h), Fla. Stat. However, it has been consistently held that Section 672.403 is not in direct conflict with the provisions of Chapter 319, in particular Sections 319.21 and 319.22....

...ugh not marketable title, to a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though a title certificate is retained by the original owner and never delivered to the buyer. Murray, Commercial Law, 30 U.Miami L.Rev. 63, 100-101 (1975). In other words, Section 319.22(1) provides that a purchaser shall not acquire a "marketable" title until the certificate of title is issued to him; however, it does not prevent valid title from being passed....

...when the judgment of dissolution was made final on January 22, 1982. The Third District Court of Appeals reasoned: "At the time of the accident, title to the Toyota had not been transferred to Joyce in accordance with Florida Statutes. See Sections 319.22, .23, .28, Fla....

...ota." Johnson v. Aetna, id., at 861 [n. 3]. As referenced above, the Florida courts construed Florida Statutes Section 319.28 as causing ownership to pass, regardless of the fact that formal title had not yet transferred pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 319.22, .23, or .28....

...If so, the Father is a necessary party to this dispute, and the Trustee would need to proceed by adversary proceeding instead of by motion. The Trustee, in response, contends that the Father has no judicially recognizable interest because he is not listed as either a lien holder or an owner on the Title and, pursuant to §§ 319.22 and 319.27 of the Florida Statutes, no court can recognize his alleged equitable interest....

...ing the back of the car's certificate of title. The transferee, however, does not obtain marketable title until the transfer is registered with the State of Florida and the state issues a new certificate of title in the transferee's name. FLA. STAT. § 319.22....

...m, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle or mobile home sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." FLA. STAT. § 319.22 (Emphasis added)....

...ext's plain meaning." Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 238 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook Co., 493 U.S. 20, 28-30, 110 S.Ct. 304, 310, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989)). In this case, the language of Florida Statute section 319.22, "no court shall recognize," is not ambiguous and does not demand an absurd result....

...Conclusion. Based on this analysis, the Truck is property of the estate. The Trustee is entitled to use, sell, or lease the Truck pursuant to § 363. The Father has no judicially recognizable ownership or equitable interest in the Truck pursuant to §§ 319.22 and 319.27 of the Florida Statutes because, John H....

...party rests, we find no reversible error involved on that score. The main thrust of appellee's case seems to be that appellant could not maintain this complaint because he did not hold the title certificate in his name. Thus, relying on a portion of section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] appellee contends that appellant has neither standing nor a cause of action for conversion, civil theft or negligence. We reject that contention because the reference statute has to do with transfers of title and the acquisition of marketable title. The entire section provides: 319.22 Transfer of title....

...4th DCA 1970), this court held: It has been settled law in this jurisdiction for many years, as well as in other jurisdictions, that the failure of the purchaser to obtain the title certificate at the time of sale does not prevent the passage of title from the seller to the buyer... . Florida Statute Section 319.22(1), F.S.A., provides that a purchaser shall not acquire a "marketable" title until the certificate of title is issued to him....

...The Statute does not provide that no valid title shall be perfected until a purchaser obtains a title certificate [citations omitted]. This holding was followed more recently in Florida Department of Corrections v. Blount Pontiac-GMC, Inc., 411 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), wherein that court said: *108 In other words, Section 319.22(1) provides that a purchaser shall not acquire a "marketable" title until the certificate of title is issued to him; however, it does not prevent valid title from being passed....

...(1989). A person acquiring a motor vehicle or mobile home from the owner thereof, whether or not the owner is a licensed dealer, shall not acquire marketable title until he has had issued to him a certificate of title to the motor vehicle or mobile home. § 319.22(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). The purchaser's failure to obtain the title certificate at the time of sale does not, however, prevent the passage of title from the seller to the buyer. Motor Credit Corp. v. Woolverton, 99 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1957). Section 319.22(1) "does not provide that no valid title shall be perfected until the purchaser obtains a title certificate, but that no marketable title shall be perfected until that time." Woolverton, at 290....

...679.504 & 679.505. These statutes apply to secured collateral generally, not exclusively motor vehicles. When a car is at issue, Florida has enacted specific legislation addressing ownership, title, and transfer of repossessed motor vehicles. Florida Statute 319.22 provides in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in §§ 319.21 and 319.28, a person acquiring a motor vehicle......

...A certificate of title issued by the State of Florida is absolutely necessary. For a court to recognize the "right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle...sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered" such person must have valid certificate of title issued to them. Fla. Stat. 319.22(1)....

...As an extension of these corresponding rights and duties, the bankruptcy court found that the debtor retains legal title to the vehicle until at least the time for redemption expires. Id. Although this Court gives far more importance to Florida Statute 319.22, and finds that Chapter 319 is concerned with much more than just the mere marketability of title, the result is the same, just reached differently....

...ure, briefly note such fact of nonexistence and show the name and address of the party from whom the vehicle was obtained, on the face of the separate application for initial certificate of title which is made by the purchaser or transferee * * *." "Section 319.22(1)....

...In addition, the Debtor also asserts that both vehicles are owned by him and his wife as tenants by the entirety. In opposition, the Trustee contends that the vehicles are owned by the Debtor and his wife as joint tenants, based on Florida Statute § 319.22(2)(a)(1)....

...tor is superior to the non-perfected lien of the Debtor's wife. This leaves for consideration the back-up position urged by the Debtor which relates to the ownership interest of the Debtor and his wife in the motor vehicles involved. Florida Statute § 319.22 provides in pertinent part that: 319.22 Transfer of title — (2)(a)1....

...could prevail over a new owner who had not yet obtained a certificate of title in his name, despite possession of the old owner's assigned certificate of title. Pertinent Florida statutes relating to the purchase and sale of used motor vehicles are: § 319.22 Transfer of Title....

...The decision additionally stands for the proposition that where a party has the power to obtain a title certificate and does not do so, he is responsible for the consequences of his negligence. In light of the foregoing cases and in light of the express language of Florida Statute 319.22 which provides that a purchaser does not acquire marketable title to a motor vehicle until he has had issued to him a certificate of title and that "no court ....

...More importantly, my decision also does not conflict with Lewis because I am construing Florida law. C. Applicability of Certificate of Title Act TFCU alternatively asserts that Iferd does not have title to the repossessed vehicle by virtue of Florida Statutes § 319.22. Chapter 319 of Florida Statutes takes precedence over any inconsistent provisions of the UCC. See Correria v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 235 So.2d 20, 24 n. 2 (Fla.App.1970). Under § 319.22, Except as provided in ....

...until he has issued to him a certificate of title to the motor vehicle . . .: nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or an assignment of such certificate for such motor vehicle . . . for a valuable consideration. FLA. STAT. § 319.22....

...title is issued to him. The statute does not provide that no valid title shall be perfected until a purchaser obtains a title certificate." Correria, 235 So.2d at 24 (emphasis in original). Florida cases have consistently limited the application of § 319.22 to cover only the marketability of title and not the transfer or passage of title. See id;see also Cooney v. Jacksonville Trans. Auth., 530 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ("[S]ection 319.22(1) deals only with marketable title, and does not govern the seller's liability for the purchaser's negligent operation of the vehicle.") (citations omitted); Bunting v....

...4th DCA 1988) (finding a substantial issue of material fact as to whether a purported owner owned the truck, notwithstanding the fact that the title certificate was not in his name). There is no Florida case law on point with regard to § 319.28. However, since courts have held that § 319.22 deals only with marketability of title....

...one contain the peculiar selling arrangement which exists in the present case and which existed in Motor Credit Corporation v. Woolverton, [5] upon which the trial court relied. Petitioner's cited cases reassert the provisions of Sections 319.21 and 319.22, Florida Statutes, to the effect that a purchaser must obtain from an automobile dealer a certificate of title and also that notice of irregularities in the seller's title is imputed to the purchaser; the Woolverton holding is an equitable exception to these general rules of law....

...s a result, the purchaser was not charged with constructive notice of the finance company's lien under Section 319.27(2), Florida Statutes. *348 In Woolverton , we then made a most important distinction when we noted that merely because the statute, Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, prevented a "marketable" title from being passed, it did not mean that there were no circumstances under which title could actually pass....

...ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur. DEKLE, J., concurs with result. McCAIN, J., dissents with opinion. McCAIN, Justice (dissenting): I must respectfully dissent from the majority view in this cause where we are again concerned about the application of Section 319.22 and Section 319.21, Fla....

...Sub judice, the trial court, after making an initial determination that the "dealer" had actual or implied authority to sell, relied on the principle of law stated in Wooverton, wherein our Court held: "We have also considered the following provision of Sec. 319.22(1), supra: `* * * nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or an assignment of such certificate for said motor vehicle for a valuable consideration.' Wheth...

...1958). [2] 125 So.2d 134 (Fla.App. 1960). [3] 134 So.2d 829 (Fla.App. 1961). [4] 143 So.2d 210 (Fla.App. 1962). [5] 99 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1957). [6] Id. at 288. [7] Id. at 288-289. [8] Id. at 289. [9] Id. at 290. [10] Id. at 291. [1] Sections 319.21, 319.22, Fla....

...which was used to apply for title, may have been forged. And it was indicated that both signatures on the Power of Attorney were notarized by Prestige Pontiac's employee, although neither McDaniel nor his stepfather were present during notarization. Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, addresses the transfer of title for mobile homes and motor vehicles, and provides that "no court shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person ......

...rovides that no person shall acquire marketable title until issued a certificate of title. Appellants contend that in the circumstances of this case the certificate of title was not duly issued, and that title thus never passed to McDaniel. However, section 319.22(1) deals only with marketable title, and does not govern the seller's liability for the purchaser's negligent operation of the vehicle. See Platt v. Dreka, 79 So.2d 670 (Fla. 1955); see also, section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes....

...by the common law of conversion. See Id. The Iferd court found that the UCC, and thus Florida law, preserves legal title in a debtor's bankruptcy estate despite a prepetition repossession. See Id. Additionally, Florida's motor vehicle title statute, § 319.22, provides that title to a repossessed car remains in the debtor until the vehicle is sold and a new certificate of title is issued....

...The Trustee objected to the claimed exemption. The Florida Vehicle Registration Certificate reflects that the vehicle is owned by "Pujol Jean Michel or Cher Gillette." (Trustee's Exhibit 5). This Registration is the only documentation in evidence regarding ownership of the vehicle. Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes provides in part: Title XXIII. Motor Vehicles Chapter 319. Title Certificates 319.22....

...M.D.Fla.2000) (adopting the reasoning of the bankruptcy court in Chiodo ). If a new certificate of title to a repossessed vehicle is not issued by the petition date, then the surviving ownership interest is property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate. See id. "Florida's motor vehicle title statute, § 319.22 [ et seq ], provides that title to a repossessed car remains in the debtor until the vehicle is sold and a new certificate of title is issued ....

...198, n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 2309, 76 L.Ed.2d 515 (1983)). The court also took note of the fact that Florida has enacted special legislation addressing ownership, title, and transfer of repossessed motor vehicles, as provided in Florida Statutes Section *778 319.22....

...Except as otherwise provided herein, no court shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle . . . sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. FLA. STAT. 319.22, cited in Chiodo, 250 B.R....

...owner." See id. The court concluded that under Florida Statute § 319.28, the act of repossession causes ownership of a motor vehicle to pass, regardless of the fact that formal title to the vehicle is not transferred pursuant to Florida Statutes §§ 319.22, .23, or.28....

...rtificate of Title and the subsequent issuance of certificates of title to Garay and de la Nuez by the states of Nebraska and New Jersey. We agree. We reject Raynor's argument that the Florida title was not properly endorsed by Equilease pursuant to section 319.22, Florida Statutes (1983), thereby rendering summary judgment in favor of Equilease improper, since certificates of title were applied for and issued by Nebraska and New Jersey to Garay and de la Nuez. As this Court stated in Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 1955), with regard to section 319.22, *1095 [w]hile it is clear that under this section no civil liability can accrue to a seller who has complied with the title certificate requirements, it does not necessarily follow that a seller who does not comply with these requirements is ipso facto liable....

...Prior to the district court decision in Kalter, the bankruptcy court from which Kalter originated addressed the issue of whether a vehicle repossessed pre-petition was property of the estate. In re Chiodo, 250 B.R. 407 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000). The Court noted that § 319.22 of the Florida Statutes requires the issuance of a certificate of title to effectuate the transfer of a motor vehicle and to confer marketable title....

...only as a joint tenant. In determining the nature of the ownership of an automobile by more than one person, the specific statutory provisions of this State governs. Therefore, to determine the nature of a party's intent, one must look to Fla. Stat. § 319.22(2)(a)(1)....

...is registered in the names of two or more persons as co-owners in the conjunctive by the use of the word "and," the signature of each co-owner or his or her personal representative shall be required to transfer title to the vehicle or mobile home. Fla. Stat. § 319.22(2)(a). In addition, Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1) provides, "....

...Mastrofino, the non-debtor husband of Ann Mastrofino (Debtor), just like the title in the instant case. The Debtor's contention that the Geo Prism automobile was owned by her with her non-debtor husband as tenants by the entireties was rejected by this court based on Fla. Stat. § 319.22, the identical Statute involved here....

...Hindery, 454 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), disapproved on other grounds in In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1986) (finding entireties estate in truck even though title held in names of a cattle rustler or his wife because 1979 amendments to section 319.22(2) providing use of disjunctive in title creates joint tenancy not retroactive); In re Estate of Cardini, 305 So.2d 71, 73 (Fla....

...The next day after Freer had done some work on the car, he took it out for a test during which he negligently collided with Mrs. DeCarlo's car causing her serious personal injuries. At the time of the collision appellant had not taken the necessary steps to transfer the legal title to the automobile under section 319.22(2) Florida Statutes (1985), and did not do so until September 12, 1985....

...saction something other than that which both appellant and Freer described it to be, to wit: a bonafide sale of the Cadillac. The supreme court has made it clear in a number of cases, see, e.g., Palmer, that while compliance with the requirements of section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (1985), will protect the seller of the motor vehicle from tort liability for the negligent operation of the vehicle by one having the beneficial interest with control and authority over the use of the vehicle, the...

...ed on the handful of documents discovered in his residence. iii. Open Motor Vehicle Titles Defendants assert that Sosa's possession of open titles to three vehicles was in violation of Florida law, providing probable cause to arrest. Florida Statute Section 319.22(5) makes it "illegal to transfer title to a motor vehicle when the purchaser's name does not appear on the title....

...rovided any case law interpreting the statutes to include such a requirement. Defendants also argue that since Sosa claims the three vehicles were intended for personal use rather than business purposes, Sosa's possession of the open titles violated Section 319.22(5)....

...n the Community Bank are owned by the Debtor as a tenant by the entirety or as a joint tenant. Considering first the Trustee's objection to the claim of exemption of the Geo Prism, registration of car ownership in this State is governed by Fla.Stat. § 319.22, which in subclause (a)(1), provides: When a motor vehicle or mobile home is registered in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the alternative by the use of the word "or," such vehicle shall be held in joint tenancy....

...ng a first lien in favor of Herman Kaufman, dated November 10, 1983. On these facts, the automobile is not excluded from the debtors' estate on the basis that the transfer to Phyllis Kaufman was not completed prior to the filing of bankruptcy. Under § 319.22, Fla.Stats., the endorsement and delivery of the Certificate of Title by the bank was probably sufficient....

...Stichter, Michael Hooi, Stichter, Riedel, Blain & Prosser, P.A., Michael A. Linsky, Michael A. Linsky, PA, Tampa, FL, for Debtor. *544 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON CREDITOR MONTANARO'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY MICHAEL G. WILLIAMSON, Bankruptcy Judge. Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes has long mandated that title to a motor vehicle or mobile home cannot pass until a certificate of title is issued to the new owner....

...In this case, the Debtor, who purchased thirty-seven mobile home trailers from Angelo C. Montanaro ("Montanaro") in May 2009, simply failed to submit the bills of sale and transfers of title to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("DHSMV") in compliance with section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes. There is no equitable exception to compliance with this requirement that applies under these circumstances. Accordingly, because the Debtor, as a purchaser, failed to comply with the requirements of section 319.22, [1] this Court must strictly enforce its mandate and find that ownership remains with the seller, Montanaro....

...en forms for each of the Units. [17] Conclusions of Law The Court has jurisdiction to determine the Motion for Relief from Stay pursuant *546 to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and 11 U.S.C. § 362. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes governs transfers of title of mobile homes such as those involved in this case....

...Except as otherwise provided herein, no court shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any . . . mobile home sold . . . unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. [18] A. Cases Finding an Equitable Exception to Section 319.22(1) of the Florida Statutes While this statutory provision appears to be clear in its mandate that title cannot pass until a certificate of title is issued, there is a body of case law that has emerged under which an equitable exception to this requirement can be recognized....

...Unfortunately, the dealer did not remit the cash payment to the finance company, which accordingly refused to release its lien or transfer title, thus leaving Mrs. Woolverton without title to the trailer. In subsequent litigation between Mrs. Woolverton and the finance company, the finance company relied on section 319.22, which provides, as noted above, that no court may recognize the interest of any person in a trailer "unless evidenced by a certificate of title." In rejecting the finance company's reliance on this statutory requirement, the Florida S...

...ode, which provides that [a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives the merchant power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in [the] ordinary course of business. [21] As to the effect of section 319.22, the Florida Supreme Court in Woolverton noted that "the failure of the purchaser to obtain the title certificate at the time of *547 sale does not prevent the passage of title from the seller to the buyer." [22] While the statute prov...

...In the Greyhound case, Austin bought the car and paid the dealership, but unfortunately the dealership did not pay Greyhound. As a result, Austin never received title. As in Woolverton, in subsequent litigation between the car purchaser and the titleholder, Greyhound relied on Florida Statute 319.22(1) for the proposition that title cannot pass until an actual certificate of title was received from the DHSMV....

...ownership, or gives him authority to sell the property, or stands by in silence and watches the mortgagor deal with it as owner, he nullifies the effect of recording by his inconsistent representation. [26] B. Cases Requiring Strict Compliance with Section 319.22(1) of the Florida Statutes In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court considered a decision by the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal that reviewed a claim of equitable exception to section 319.22 in the context of a forfeiture proceeding....

...Because [the claimant] did not hold a certificate of title to the automobile, it did not have standing to contest the forfeiture. [28] In Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Zimerman, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal considered another case in which the buyer failed to comply with section 319.22....

...As stated by the court, the entrustment provision contained in section 672.403 does not apply "unless the lien holder entrusts possession of the motor vehicle to a merchant or acquiesces in such entrusting by the owner." [30] Because the equitable entrustment doctrine did not apply, the Green Tree court found that section 319.22 required the purchaser to obtain a title certificate at the time of sale in order to obtain title to the vehicle. [31] Another case in which a court enforced the provisions of section 319.22 and rejected an argument of equitable ownership was the bankruptcy case of In re Coburn....

...ded the transfer of the truck to him requesting a new certificate of title from the State of Florida. *549 Importantly, the Coburn case did not involve any issues of entrustment. It was simply a case of a party not complying with the requirements of section 319.22....

...[33] Because the father had held the endorsed title for three years without recording his interest, he lacked standing to assert any claim as to the vehicle after the son filed for bankruptcy. C. Application to this Case We conclude, therefore, that as a general proposition section 319.22 is to be strictly enforced....

...This is a straightforward sale in which the Debtor as purchaser simply failed to forward the certificates of title and related documents to the DHSMV so that a new certificate of title could be issued in the purchaser's name. Certainly the Debtor cannot be heard to complain about its own failure to comply with 319.22....

...:30 a.m. 3. The parties are ordered to meet and confer, or alternatively, schedule mediation before the next scheduled hearing. 4. In the interim, Montanaro may proceed to rent the Units to third-party tenants. DONE and ORDERED. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1) (2008)....

...[9] Joint Ex. 3 ¶ 2(a). [10] Id. [11] Id. at ¶ 2(b). [12] Id. at ¶ 2(c) (referencing Exhibit E—FDMV Lien Form). [13] Joint Ex. 12. [14] Id. [15] Joint Ex. 4. [16] Joint Ex. 10, Exhibit A—Final Default Judgment. [17] Id. ¶ 3(a). [18] Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1)....

...[27] 513 So.2d 135 (Fla.1987). [28] Id. at 138. [29] 611 So.2d 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). [30] Id. at 610. [31] Id. [32] 250 B.R. 401 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999). [33] Id. at 404. [34] The only case cited by the parties that did not strictly enforce the requirements of section 319.22 and did not involve entrustment or any other action that would equitably estop the titleholder from claiming ownership is the case of In re Forfeiture of $7464 and 2002 Cadillac Escalade, 872 So.2d 1017 (Fla....

...Calandrino, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee. MONACO, J. This appeal, brought on behalf of the appellants, Vongsack Xayavong and Daomonh Xayavong, causes us to examine the interplay between the case of Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand and Associates, 780 So.2d 45 (Fla.2001), and section 319.22, Florida Statutes (2003), in connection with a levy resulting from a judgment against Vongsack Xayavong, of an automobile titled in the names of "Daononh Xayavong or Vongsack Xayavong." Because the statute is unambiguous in its meaning, we agree with the trial court that the automobile was subject to levy....

...Xayavong that because their automobile is titled in the names of "Daononh Xayavong or Vongsack Xayavong," Beal Bank required the trial court to consider it to be presumptively held as a tenancy by the entireties, and thus exempt from levy for the debt of only one of the couple. This view ignores the impact of section 319.22. Section 319.22 was adopted by the legislature in response to Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fischer, 217 So.2d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). In Fischer the Fourth District held that an automobile titled in the name of "James L. or Susann G. Fisher" was owned as an estate by the entireties, given the intention of the parties in that case. Section 319.22(2), contains the following provisions concerning the proper endorsement for the transfer of automobile titles: (a) ......

...required to transfer title to the vehicle or mobile home. In Amsouth Bank of Florida v. Hepner, 647 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), a case involving the levy on an automobile that predated Beal Bank, the First District interpreted these provisions of section 319.22(2) to require that with respect to motor vehicles, there must be more than just an intention to create a tenancy by the entireties....

...Thus, extrinsic evidence could not be used to establish an estate by the entireties in a motor vehicle where the Florida title lists the coowners using the disjunctive "or." See Hepner; In re Brown, 162 B.R. 616 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1993). We agree with this plain reading of section 319.22(2)(a), and conclude as a result that the language of the statute is not affected by Beal Bank....

...operty. If individuals can eliminate the ambiguity, then the legislature can do likewise. We, thus, agree with the trial court that Beal Bank does not extend to the attachment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is titled in the manner described by section 319.22(2)(a)....

...Two of the so-called exceptions to title holder liability addressed by the courts have also been addressed by statute in the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law. See § 316.003(26), Fla. Stat. (2005) (conditional sales exception — “owner” defined as one who holds legal title or conditional sales vendee); § 319.22(2), Fla....

...(2005) (incomplete transfer — transferor not liable for incomplete transfer if certain formalities are honored). If the answer to this case involved the application of the statutory scheme, with *139 out more, it would be easy. Because Ap-pellee never transferred title of the vehicle in accordance with section 319.22(2), Florida Statutes (2005), and was not a conditional sale vendor as set forth in section 316.003(26), Florida Statutes (2005), 5 he remained a co-owner of the car by virtue of holding legal title at the time of the collision....

...to Mr. Hughes, even though it had not attended to statutory formalities for transfer and avoidance of transferor liability. 7 Id. at 636 . Our high court agreed. It concluded that, although a transfer of ownership using the formalities contained in section 319.22, would, as the statute states, terminate the transfer- or’s liability, the statutory method of transfer was not intended to be exclusive....

...By statute, Appellee was a co-owner because he held legal title to the car. §§ 316.008(26), 322.01(30), 324.021(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). Appellee retained the “absolute” legal right to encumber the car or sell it without the join-der of Ms. Taylor-Christensen. § 319.22(2)(a)l„ Fla. Stat. (2005). If Ms. Taylor-Christensen had predeceased him, he also retained the right of survivorship in the car. § 319.22(2)(a)l., Fla....

...y or by implication supersede common law). If the common law can be superseded by implication, it seems that we are at or near that point, at least to the extent that we are addressing the liability of a title holder who is a "natural person.” See § 319.22(1), Fla....

certificate of title for the vehicle and thus, under section 319.22, Florida Statutes, he has no standing to pursue

listed on a vehicle’s certificate of title, section 319.22, Florida Statutes (1985), did not preclude

...3 [A bailee of a vehicle is one to whom the vehicle has been furnished or delivered by [its owner] [a person with authority over its use] for a particular purpose, with the understanding that it will be returned.] Note on use of S.Sa requirements of § 319.22, Fla....

...Kalter dealt with the pre-petition repossession of a vehicle by a secured creditor. In that case the court noted that when property rights of a motor vehicle are at issue, Florida has codified in the Certificate of Title statute specific legislation regarding ownership, title, and transfer. Kalter pointed out that § 319.22 [1] of the Florida Statutes generally provides that a certificate of title is required in order to obtain marketable title to sell a vehicle....

...shall pay the sum of $3,555.00 to Debtor's attorney within forty five days of the date of this Order. 3. In the event the above sum is not paid within the time specified above, upon a motion by debtor the Court will enter a judgment upon which execution will issue. NOTES [1] Fla. Stat. 319.22(1) provides: Except as provided in ss 319.21 and 319.28, a person acquiring a motor vehicle or mobile home from the owner thereof, whether or not the owner is a licensed dealer, shall not acquire marketable title to the motor vehicle or mobile...

question presented in the negative. The purpose of Section 319.22(2), F.S.A., as follows: “(2) An owner who has

...ownership and right of possession. Therefore, once a vehicle is repossessed the ownership interest in the automobile of the Debtors is extinguished, notwithstanding the fact that there was no formal title certificate issued pursuant to Fla. Statutes Section 319.22, 23, or 28....

...ted. The debtor who has purchased the vehicle has neither the Manufacturer’s Statement of Origin nor a title certificate and does not have marketable title. In the Matter of Canup Mechanical, Inc., 1 B.R. 703 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1979). Florida Statutes § 319.22....

title holder can be the owner, citing Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1).4 They contend that if Debtor was not the registered

Warlock. *667The statute he relies on, Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1), applies only to the title registration of

...the worst cases in which he has been involved. 50 The Warlock Racing Boat Debtor takes the position that he had no obligation to disclose the Warlock racing boat because, in his view, it is not property of the estate. 51 Debtor relies on Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (1) to argue that ownership requires a registered certificate of title....

..., even though he does not hold registered title either. Even after Debtor had obtained the registered title to the Motorcycle, Debtor disclosed only that he was holding the Motorcycle for his father. (3) Debtor has taken the position that Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (1) shields him from having to disclose or turn over the Warlock, even though he has had possession and control of the boat since 2000 and the statute he cites does not apply to boats....

...amended motion in open court and the trial resumed; on the same day, the Debtor filed an “amended” version of the motion, raising the same arguments. 141 Debtor proclaims that the UST is implicitly challenging the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (1), which requires (with a certain relevant exception) a certificate registered with the Florida DMV in order to have marketable title of a motor vehicle. 142 Debtor contends that any ruling by this Court that he owned the Motorcycle or Warlock on the Petition Date is a “refutation” of Fla. Stat. § 319.22 , which he characterizes as a constitutional challenge....

...to the State’s Attorney General, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2403 . Therefore, Debtor maintains, this proceeding must be dismissed. Debtor’s claim of a constitutional challenge is unfounded. The UST has not asked the Court to overturn Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (1), or any other provision of state law. This adversary proceeding concerns only the issue of whether Debtor’s conduct, before and during this case, falls within the proscriptions of § 727(a)(2)-(5). As discussed above, Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (1) has no bearing on any of the issues in this proceeding....

...urts Doctrine Identifying the Challenge Under FRCP 5.1(a)(b), the Courts Evasive Concealment of Requirement FRCP 5.1(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (b), the Courts Failure to Recognize Lack of Jurisdiction Under FRCP 5.1(c) to Enter a Final Order Refuting, F.S. 319.22(1) or to Reject the Constitutional Challenge Without Notice to the State Attorney Generals Office, the Courts Intent to Enter a Final Judgment in an Adversary Proceeding Regarding F.S. 319.22(1) and the Constitutional Challenges by the Plaintiffs and Attorney’s, the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs Attorney’s Failure to Follow FRCP 4(m), Failure to Follow FRCP 19(a)(1)(A), FRCP (a)(l)(B)(i)." . Doc. No. 137. . According to Debtor: "The only way to attempt to make a claim when every court in the State of Florida is barred by F.S. 319.22(1), would be to challenge the constitutionality of the statute or the validness, which is the constitutionality challenge, if in the end result the plaintiff is claiming to refute F.S. 319.22(1) completely.” Doc....

...The vehicle then bore the name Food Haul on its doors; its tires were branded with Food Haul’s initials; and it was recovered as a result of a witness responding to a Food Haul advertisement offering a reward for its recovery. We cannot accept appellant’s argument that Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes (1973) 1 requires proof of ownership by a certificate of title....

...By misplacing her reliance upon the dealer, appellee ran squarely against the statutory scheme devised by the legislature to protect the relative interests of motor vehicle purchasers, dealers, and financial institutions whose funds underwrite much of the motor vehicle industry. Section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that: “ * * * no person acquiring a motor vehicle from the owner thereof, whether such owner be a dealer or otherwise, hereafter shall acquire a marketable title in or to said motor vehicle unti...

...r as to liens or otherwise; * * * Under the controlling statutes as applied to the circumstances of this case, the Wythes were not innocent purchasers for value without notice and they did not attain a title free of plaintiff’s claim. See Sections 319.22(1) and 319.27(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; May v....

...There the court held that a lien-holder on a motor vehicle who placed said vehicle on a dealer’s lot upon repossession from a prior purchaser and gave the dealer actual authority to sell the vehicle was estopped from asserting his lien as against a second purchaser for value. Although the court considered the provisions of Section 319.22(1) and held them inapplicable, it did so on the principle of agency arising out of the actual authority to sell conferred upon the dealer after the vehicle was repossessed from the first purchaser....

...By signing the title in blank and delivering both title and automobile to Fincher’s agent, Cowden, pursuant to the agreement we described above, the Hills transferred both legal and beneficial title to Fincher and so could not be liable to the appellant. See § 319.22(2) (a), Fla.Stat....

...Jenes’ name, without having Jenes see that Pay-saver was claiming a lien of $11,000. Plaintiff cites the court to the Florida statutes regarding motor vehicle title certificates and the recordation of liens on title certificates, Florida Statutes, § 319.22-33, as authority for its assertion of a lien....

...the instruction was proper to be correct. A present sale can be based on a deferred payment 1 and the jury was entitled to be instructed on that point. The court also granted a new trial because, at trial, it had refused to give an instruction under section 319.22, Florida Statutes (1989). We find again that the court’s earlier ruling on the proposed instruction was correct. The provisions of section 319.22 constitute a shield not a sword....

...As the court stated in Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635 (Fla.1955): “It is contended here that the disposition of the issue of ownership below was error, mainly because of the trial court’s refusal to charge that if the jury found F.S. § 319.22 F.S.A. (pertaining to endorsement and delivery of title certificate) had not been complied with by Evans it must find that the car was owned by Evans when the accident occurred. It is evident from a reading of Section 319.22 in its entirety that the primary emphasis intended by this section is upon the marketability of title to a vehicle....

...Careful examination of the evidence presented at the trial reveals that plaintiff Mercer produced no substantial evidence to the contrary. Appellee contends that the trial court should not recognize the claim of the intervenors to the subject vehicle by reason of the provisions of F.S. Section 319.22, F.S.A., to the effect that: “ * * * Except as otherwise provided herein, no court in any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to *247 any such motor vehicle, hereafter sold...

...had wired into the account and there were several cases like his. Eventually, Ladrie received a tag from the DMV’s fraud division. . Because this issue is likely to arise on remand, we note that, contrary to Maroone's second contention on appeal, section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, would not operate to prevent the trial court or a jury from making a determination that the MSO is the property of SunTrust....

...The fact that SunTrust, if awarded the MSO, will be able to obtain the title pursuant to receipt of the MSO, is distinct from the trial court actually recognizing any right, title, claim, or interest of SunTrust in the vehicle unless evidenced by a certificate of title, which would have been contrary to the provisions of section 319.22(1).

...Appellant was defendant in a replevin action and suffered a final judgment after a nonjury trial. The evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment reveals that by purchasing an automobile from one not the holder of the certificate of title in violation of § 319.22, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., defendant would not acquire the right of possession....

...nterest constitutes property of the estate. In re Daugherty, 261 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2000). Motorcycles are motor vehicles subject to the Florida statutory registration and titling laws. FLA. STAT. § 320.01; FLA. STAT. §§ 319.001-319.41. Section 319.22 of Chapter 319 the Florida Statutes governs the transfer of title of a motor vehicle. A person does not obtain "marketable title" to a motor vehicle "until he or she has had issued to him or her a certificate of title to the motor vehicle...." Fla. Stat. § 319.22(1)....

...im, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle or mobile home sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. FLA. STAT. § 319.22(1). The Florida Supreme Court rejected as too narrow the finding Section 319.22's purpose was to protect bona fide vehicle owners who have relied upon duly issued certificates of title. Lamar v. Wheels Unlimited, Inc., 513 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla.1987). It concluded the Florida Legislature's intent *867 in enacting Section 319.22 was broader....

...A lienholder must file a lien notice and have the lien notated on the certificate of title. FLA. STAT. § 319.27. No lien is notated upon the Motorcycle's Certificate of Title. The Motorcycle is unencumbered. FLA. STAT. § 319.27(1). The statutory language of Florida Statute Sections 319.22 and 319.27 is unambiguous and does not demand absurd results....

...the [vehicle]." Id. The Certificate of Title named the Debtor as the owner of the Motorcycle on the Petition Date. The Defendant had no recognizable right, title, claim, or interest in the Motorcycle on the Petition Date pursuant to Florida Statute Section 319.22(1)....

...Case No. 312023SC000753. Ryan Scott DiGiovanni of Ryan Scott DiGiovanni, PLLC, Vero Beach, for appellant. No brief filed for appellee. PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Bunting v. Daly’s, Inc., 528 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (rejecting the argument that under section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes (1985), a plaintiff did not have standing or a cause of action for conversion because he did not hold a title certificate in his name, because that statute only affects the marketability of title); Williams Mgmt....

...292 , 55 N.E.2d 35 (1944) (dealership that intentionally violates statutes regulating dealership plates is estopped to deny responsibility for vehicles illegally using those plates). A dealership issues a temporary tag under chapter 320. The language in section 319.22(2) does not seem to eliminate any duty that may be created by section 320.131 for a dealership that issues temporary tags....

...he never actually obtained a certificate of title for them. The United States government now claims a tax lien on the cars. This Court must decide whether a tax lien on the cars is superior to the ownership interest the ex-wife claims in them. Under section 319.22, Florida Statutes, the Court cannot recognize any interest in a car unless the person claiming the interest has a certificate of title....

...And Stanton claims — and the Court will assume for purposes of summary judgment — that the Debtor agreed to title the cars in her name when he gave them to her in 2008. The problem is that there is no dispute that the cars are not actually titled in Stanton’s name. And under section 319.22, Florida Statutes, a person cannot claim an ownership interest in a car unless they have title to it: No court shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle ... unless evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued to that person, in accordance with the provisions of [chapter 319]. 18 In order to overcome this obstacle, Stanton contends there is an equitable exception to section 319.22, Florida Statutes. 19 The cases relied on by Stanton to support an equitable exception to section 319.22, however, are distinguishable from this case. All of those cases are “entrustment” cases. 20 The “entrustment” doctrine — first recognized in Motor Credit Corp. v. Woolverton — creates an equitable exception to section 319.22 where the original titleholder entrusts a vehicle to a dealer who has express or implied authority to sell it, the dealer sells the car to a third party, but the innocent third party does not obtain title to the car at the time of purchase....

...Adv. Doc. No. 41. . Adv. Doc. No. 47 at 3. . Id. at 2-4; Adv. Doc. No. 63. . Adv. Doc. No. 68. . The Court has jurisdiction over this contested matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 . This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(K) & (O). .§ 319.22(1), Fla....

...The Florida Certificate of Title (Ex. 1) was not issued until more than five months later, on April 26, 1988, the day before this bankruptcy was filed. The defendant husband, who collects antique cars, knowingly occasioned the delay. A Florida statute, § 319.22(1) provides that, with two exceptions not pertinent here: “no court shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or to any motor vehicle or mobile home sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered, unless evidenced...

...The sale, therefore, did not fall within UCC § 9-307(1), upon which Correría rests, and which applies solely to sales in the ordinary course of business. If Correría is applicable to the transaction which concerns us, it would apply to every motor vehicle sale and Fla.Stat. § 319.22(1) would be completely vitiated....

...1st DCA 1993) (“The presumption of coownership of a motor vehicle can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof.”). The Debtor’s assertion she has merely a non-beneficial or custodial interest in the Vehicle is contradictory to the plain and unambiguous language of Fla. Stat. Section 319.22(2)(a)(l), which is determinative in establishing the nature of a party’s ownership intent. In re Daugherty at 740 . Section 319.22(2)(a)(l) provides: “When a motor vehicle or mobile home is registered in the names of two or more persons as coowners in the alternative by the word ‘or,’ such vehicle shall be hold in joint tenancy.” The Debtor and her daughter, by the ownership designation “Laura N Kirk or Bethany M Kirk,” own the Vehicle as joint tenants. Fla. Stat. § 319.22 (2)(a)(l); In re Daugherty at 740 ....

...pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 328.01(3)(d)(2)(a). The presumption that marital property is held as tenancy by entireties "must yield to any statute specifically delineating how to create an ownership interest in any particular type of property, such as Section 319.22 of the Florida Statutes." Daniels, 309 B.R....

...tions and limit them to applicable state law exemptions. [21] FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1998). [22] The Daniels decision addresses the creation of ownership interests in motor vehicles and the proper endorsements of the owners, as governed by Fla. Stat. § 319.22. The vessel counterpart, Fla. Stat. § 328.01, is virtually identical to § 319.22.

...Fla.Stat.), but rather on the basis that Wheels Unlimited, Inc. had no standing because its claimed interest in the motor vehicle was not evidenced by a certificate of title and hence its interest was not cognizable by the court under sec *787 tion 319.22(1), Florida Statutes. We do not agree and reverse. Section 319.22, Florida Statutes, provides that a person acquiring a motor vehicle will not acquire marketable title until he has had issued to him a certificate of title....

...ng a new certificate of title. This explains why in this case, as in many cases, the controversy is between persons neither of whom claims through a duly issued certificate of title. Legal and equitable principles must then be applied independent of section 319.22, Florida Statutes, otherwise bare possession or might would always prevail and the person not in possession would always be denied judicial relief solely because his claim was not evidenced by a certificate of title duly issued and not because his claim was inferior to that of his adversary in possession....

...d, in criminal activity of the type warranting forfeiture under *788 section 932.701, et seq., Florida Statutes. 2 We do not hold that the factual issues should be resolved in favor of Wheels Unlimited, Inc. but merely that in forfeiture proceedings section 319.22(1), Florida Statutes, does not bar the assertion of a title or lien interest not based on a recorded certificate of title duly issued and that the issues of fact in this case preclude summary judgment against the intervenor Wheels Unlimited, Inc....

...2, 2015, the vehicle was removed from the Father’s policy. That same month, the Son added the vehicle to his own insurance policy. At no time prior to the accident did the Father notify the DMV of the sale or transfer of the vehicle as required under section 319.22, Florida Statutes....

...f no vicarious liability by the Father. Plaintiffs reason that the Father remained the legal owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident because he failed to timely notify the DMV of the purported sale and transfer of the vehicle as required by section 319.22, Florida Statutes....

...According to Plaintiffs, compliance with the statute is the only way to avoid civil liability. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the trial court applied the wrong “subjective intent” standard in determining the issue of liability. The Father counters that Plaintiffs’ reliance on section 319.22 is misplaced because compliance with the statute is not the sole litmus test for determining ownership and, in turn, the existence of vicarious liability. Rather, vicarious liability may be avoided where, as in the instant case, there...

...held “naked legal title” under a faulty incomplete transfer. Under such a scenario, beneficial ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the buyer and the titleholder is relieved of liability. We agree with the Father. 1. Compliance with Section 319.22, Florida Statutes Section 319.22, Florida Statutes, provides that an owner who has made a bona fide sale or transfer of a motor vehicle and delivered possession thereof to a purchaser shall not be deemed the owner of the vehicle so as to be subject to civil liability if either of the following requirements are met: 1....

...When such owner or coowner has delivered to the department, or placed in the United States mail, addressed to the department, either the certificate of title properly endorsed or a notice in the form prescribed by the department. § 319.22(2)(a), Fla....

...days after the sale or transfer in the form prescribed by the department. Notice by such owner or coowner under this paragraph shall satisfy the notice requirement under subparagraph (a)2. for limitation of liability under paragraph (a). § 319.22(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Although section 319.22 makes clear that no civil liability can accrue to a seller of a motor vehicle who complies with the requirements of the statute, Florida courts analyzing the statute have consistently held that “it does not necessarily follow that a...

...the sale or transfer of a motor vehicle. Essentially, Plaintiffs are arguing that the 2009 amendment abrogated the common law and did away with the beneficial ownership exception to the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. We disagree for several reasons. First, section 319.22 “has been construed by this court as affecting the marketability of title, not the mere transfer or passage of title.” Bunting v. Daly’s, Inc., 528 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). This remains true with the version of the statute applicable in this case. See § 319.22(1), Fla....

...the vehicle and further claiming that he relinquished control of the vehicle to the other co-owner with whom he did not reside. 140 So. 3d at 500. It is undisputed that the co-owner took no steps to transfer his ownership in the vehicle pursuant to section 319.22 prior to the accident....

...evidenced by the confirmation letter from the Father’s insurance carrier. Pursuant to Christensen and the precedent cited therein, this objective evidence was more than sufficient to defeat vicarious liability despite the Father’s failure to comply with section 319.22, Florida Statutes. 7  Affirmed. FORST, J., and CROOM, JANET C., Associate Judge, concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion...

that he was entitled to protection under F.S. Section 319.-22(1), F.S.A., which provides that no court of

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Horne v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 533 So.2d 261 (Fla.1988); *1186 Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); § 319.22(2), Fla.Stat....

...The statutory exception for husband and wife conforms the statute to the definition of property held by the en-tireties which ownership is singular and indivisible. The statute is definitive in eliminating the proof requirements that the owners intended to create a tenancy by the entirety and overcomes the provisions of section 319.22(2)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...alers in the handling, disposition and sales of the vending machines here involved. The decree appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Reversed. ALLEN, Acting C. J., and ICANNER, J., concur. . Fla.Stat. § 319.22, F.S.A.

...utside of the reach of creditors of the decedent's probate estate. See § 655.79, Fla. Stat. (2007) (permitting bank accounts to be maintained and held in joint tenancy or by the entireties, which are not deemed to be assets of a decedent's estate); § 319.22(2)(a)1., Fla....