Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Fla. Stat. § 843.02. 6 violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130,2 Fla....

...The court rejected Pastor’s proffered bases for probable cause, determining that Fla. Stat. § 843.02, Fla. Stat. § 316.072, and § 54-2 of the Miami City Code were not applicable because Durruthy complied with the officer’s 2 Section 316.130 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]here sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless required by other circumstances, walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic.” Fla. Stat. § 316.130(3). 3 Under this statute: It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s....

...move on so as to cease blocking or obstructing free passage thereon.” Miami City Code § 54-2(b). 7 orders to get out of the street, even if he backpedaled and continued to film when ordered off the street, and that Fla. Stat. § 316.130 was inapplicable because it is directed at preventing pedestrians from walking among vehicular traffic....

...prosecutors.” Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001). 284 F.3d at 1195. After thorough review of the entire record, we are satisfied that Pastor had probable cause to arrest Durruthy for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130,6 and that, in any event, she had arguable probable cause to effect the Plaintiff’s arrest. Again, § 316.130 provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]here sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless required by other circumstances, walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic.” Fla. Stat. § 316.130(3)....

...street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage . . . after a request by a law enforcement officer to move on so as to cease blocking or obstructing free passage”). Because Pastor had probable cause to arrest Durruthy for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130, we need not consider whether these other statutes provided additional bases for probable cause. 14 a person without a warrant if “[a] violation of chapter 316 has been committed in the presence of the officer.” Fla....

...Moreover, plainly he was in the middle of the busy street at a chaotic time when the police were attempting to clear the streets, and by his own account, specifically knew that the officers were trying to clear that very intersection. The district court nevertheless held that no probable cause existed under § 316.130, reasoning: The statute is directed at preventing pedestrians from walking among vehicular traffic....

...In this case, however, there was no vehicular traffic in the roadway. Further, [Durruthy] was not a pedestrian in the normal sense of the word but an obvious member of the media acting within the scope of his journalistic duties. Under these circumstances, an arrest pursuant to § 316.130 could not be reasonable. Durruthy, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1298. We disagree. First, the statute does not require that there be vehicular traffic in the roadway at the time of the offense. See Fla. Stat. § 316.130(3); see also Fla....

...se is being committed. It is therefore difficult to understand the claim that no probable cause, let alone arguable probable cause, existed to arrest Durruthy when the undisputed facts show him to have been in unmistakable violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.130(3)....

...otherwise satisfied. A driver who runs a red light when no other cars or pedestrians are around is not exempt from a traffic law requiring him to stop, even though the obvious purpose of the law -- preventing accidents -- may be moot at the time. Section 316.130(3) unambiguously says that “[w]here sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless required by other circumstances, walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic.” No one has denied that Durruthy did just 16 that....

...1999) (same); Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1992) (same). Finally, even if we could somehow impute such knowledge to Pastor, we can discern no grounds for saying that she could not enforce Fla. Stat. § 316.130(3) simply because other officers in unspecified circumstances had not enforced it....

...By 8 Fifth Circuit decisions rendered prior to September 30, 1981 are binding precedent on this court. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). 19 its own terms, the guideline doesn’t alter the elements of § 316.130, provide an affirmative defense, create any enforceable rights in a defendant, or otherwise undermine probable cause....

...1995) (holding that the Department of Justice’s dual prosecution policy “is an internal policy [of self-restraint] which confers no enforceable rights on a criminal defendant”). Nor does it address precisely how an officer should react to the circumstances of directly seeing a violation of § 316.130 on a busy street at a chaotic time. We add that for qualified immunity purposes we are concerned only with the constitutional requirements of probable cause....

...20 alone arguable probable cause. Simply put, the internal guideline does not convert an illegal act suddenly into a legal one. Moreover, even though we believe Pastor had probable cause to arrest Durruthy for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130, she would also be “entitled to qualified immunity if there was [even] arguable probable cause for the arrest.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1283 (emphasis added)....

...(emphasis added). No caselaw gave Pastor fair warning that she would be charged with the knowledge that other officers previously allowed Durruthy to film in the street, or that she somehow lacked probable cause to arrest Durruthy for violating § 316.130 because of that “permission.” See Williams v....

...and their decisions have to be made “in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.” 523 U.S. 833, 853, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1720, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998) (citation omitted). Moreover, nothing found in the language of § 316.130 or in the command of the Fourth Amendment states with “obvious clarity” that Pastor’s conduct in arresting Durruthy was unlawful....

...guable probable cause to arrest Durruthy for obstructing or resisting the officers, there was probable cause or at least arguable probable cause to arrest him under Fla. Stat. § 316.30. The district court found this argument unconvincing because § 316.130 "is directed at preventing pedestrians from walking among vehicular traffic" and "there was no vehicular traffic in the roadway." Durruthy, 235 F....

...a cameraman at the time of the arrest goes to the core of the qualified immunity analysis. And that is where the district court is correct and the majority of this Court wrong with respect to Pastor's arguable probable cause to arrest under § 316.130. Again, the district court pointed out that "[t]he statute is directed at preventing 31 pedestrians from walking among vehicular traffic." 235 F. Supp.2d at 1298. Notwithstanding what the statute does and does not require, "an arrest pursuant to § 316.130 could not be reasonable" given that at the time of the arrest, Pastor knew that "there was no vehicular traffic in the roadway" and that Durruthy was "an obvious member of the media acting within the scope of his journalistic duties." Id. In my view, the district court correctly analyzed the applicability of § 316.130 in terms of whether Pastor, at the time of the arrest and given her knowledge of the circumstances, had arguable probable cause to arrest based on § 316.130. The inquiry is not whether Durruthy actually violated the statute or whether the elements of the statute were met, but whether it was objectively reasonable for Pastor to arrest Durruthy given the obvious circumstances. Pastor's invocation of § 316.130 fails to amount even to an after-the-fact excuse for her actions. Durruthy was charged only with obstruction of an officer under Fla. Stat. § 843.02, and that charge was dropped immediately by the State Attorney upon viewing the videotape of the arrest. Pastor never articulated § 316.130 as the purported basis for the arrest at the time of the arrest and raised it as a justification for the arrest only after the commencement of this litigation....

...Stat. (1993). [2] pedestrian shall walk upon a limited access facility or a ramp connecting a limited access facility to any other street or highway; however, this subsection does not apply to maintenance personnel or any governmental subdivision. § 316.130(18), Fla....

...The photograph depicted the vehicle with a dent on its right side. Plaintiff's counsel objected. After voir dire, the trial court sustained the objection, thereby precluding the introduction of the photograph. At the conclusion of the trial testimony, the defendants requested a jury instruction on section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes, which prohibits pedestrians from walking on a roadway paved for vehicular traffic when a sidewalk is available....

...That's it." After deliberations the jury returned a verdict finding the defendants 80% negligent *1086 and the plaintiff 20% negligent. The defendants moved for a new trial, arguing, in part, that (1) the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, (2) the jury should have been instructed on section 316.130(3), (3) the photograph of Barkett's vehicle should have been introduced into evidence, and (4) the plaintiff was incorrectly permitted to comment on the defendants' failure to call Dr....

...The standard of review over a trial court's decision regarding a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion. Franklin v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 759 So.2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The defendants argue that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...Hugo, 714 So.2d 467, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). One of the theories of defense in this case was that the plaintiff was illegally in the roadway when he was struck by Barkett. The defendants therefore requested an instruction which tracked the language of section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes....

...ts evidentiary value. To do so deprived the jury of their right to evaluate the evidence presented and to consider it in light of the applicable law. As there was evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that there was a sidewalk, and section 316.130(3), Florida Statutes, would prohibit the conduct of the plaintiff, the trial court erred by refusing to give the requested instruction....

...The undisputed evidence at trial was that Barkett was driving within the speed limit, not talking on a cell phone, paying attention to the road, in the correct lane of travel, and traveling with the green light when he hit the plaintiff who, pursuant to section 316.130(3), was illegally in the street handing out flyers....

...Although all of the factors testified to by the expert may normally occur while a motorist is driving at night, the effect of those factors may not have been commonly understood by the jurors. Thus the expert's testimony was properly admitted in evidence. Hill. AFFIRMED. PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.130(10), Florida Statutes, provides: Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway. Section 316.130(12), Florida Statutes, also provides: No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles to the curb or by the shortest route to the opposite curb.

...A bicycle is a "vehicle" under Chapter 316. § 316.003(2), (75), Fla. Stat. (1989). A bicyclist generally has all the same rights and duties under the chapter that are applicable to the driver of any other vehicle. § 316.2065(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). The instruction based on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes (1989), should not have been given *1224 because Jamie was not a "pedestrian," defined as "[a]ny person afoot," at the time of the accident....

...The parents of a deceased minor child appeal a jury verdict and resulting final judgment in favor of the operator of the motor vehicle involved in the auto accident which took the child's life. They claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: "No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a *559 vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield." Although this...

...At the court's direction, Mr. Seltzer drafted an instruction meant to balance the standard jury instruction and explain to the jury a parent's obligation to supervise his or her child. Mr. Seltzer also requested the instruction which gave rise to the present appeal, namely, section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes, which provides: "No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for the driver to yield." Over the Rosenfelds...

...egligence and damage instructions and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on the part of Mr. Seltzer. The Rosenfelds timely moved for a new trial, alleging as error the court's instruction to the jury on section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes. The court denied the motion, prompting this appeal. The Rosenfelds argue that section 316.130(8) was legally erroneous when applied to a two-year-old child, because a two-year-old cannot be found to be negligent....

...old the child responsible for his or her own acts. This applies to a claim of comparative negligence as well. *560 See Lindenfield v. Dorazio, 606 So.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Here, the trial court instructed the jury that a violation of section 316.130(8), which would place a duty of care on the child, was evidence of negligence even though the foregoing cases would not permit a child to be comparatively negligent....

...That being the case, the jury would not have considered the negligence of the child unless it first found negligence of Mr. Seltzer, which it failed to do. Because the jury did not reach the question of comparative negligence, any error in the giving of the instruction on section 316.130(8) was harmless....

...denial of a new trial on this ground as well. Affirmed. TAYLOR, J., concurs. POLEN, J., dissents with opinion. *561 POLEN, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction based upon section 316.130(8), Florida Statutes, which would suggest the jury could consider comparative negligence of the two-year-old child/victim....

...First, a review of the scoresheet indicates that two points were scored under the portion of the scoresheet entitled "prior record" for a prior jaywalking conviction in Hawaii. In Florida, the offense of jaywalking is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor but is a noncriminal "infraction." Section 316.130, Fla....

...Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Juan Sanchez responded to the scene shortly after the accident. Trooper Sanchez conducted a lengthy investigation and ultimately concluded that Deveau was at fault for failing to avoid the accident. Deveau was cited for violating section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a hu...

...cquired evidence pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure of his person. Specifically, the defendant contended that he was unlawfully detained and subsequently searched by an officer following his alleged violation of a pedestrian traffic statute, section 316.130(12) of the Florida Statutes (2009). 4 The defendant argued that he did not violate section 316.130(12) and, therefore, his seizure and subsequent search were unlawful....

...around and stop him, even if there’s a 10-foot discrepancy. He doesn’t know where he was going. He can’t say where the shortest route was. And by [the defendant’s] testimony and by the officer’s testimony, he was acting in compliance with [section 316.130(10) ], which says, the passenger shall yield the right of way to vehicles upon the roadway....

...ncorrect conclusions of law. We agree. First, the trial court erred in concluding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to stop the defendant for jaywalking. The officer witnessed the defendant crossing the street in a diagonal direction. Section 316.130(12) of the Florida Statutes states that, when there is no available cross-walk, an individual must cross the street by a route at right angles to the curb or the shortest distance possible....

...afety). REVERSED and REMANDED. TORPY and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . This court possesses jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.140(c)(1)(B) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. . See § 790.23 Fla. Stat. (2009). . See § 790.01(2) Fla. Stat. (2009). . Section 316.130(12) of the Florida Statutes (2009) states, in pertinent part: Pedestrians; traffic regulations [[Image here]] (12) No pedestrian shall, except in a marked crosswalk, cross a roadway at any other place than by a route at right angles t...

...ause to believe that a violation of law has occurred.”); see also Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757 (Fla.1997). We agree with the State that the officer had probable cause to stop Williams based *546 on the violation of a pedestrian traffic statute, section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...1 See State v. Nichols, 52 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“[T]he arresting officer had probable cause to stop the defendant to issue him a citation because the officer could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking” in violation of section 316.130(12))....

...e stop would have been proper was if the crack rendered the vehicle “unsafe.” See Hilton, 961 So.2d at 295 . There is no similar “safety hazard” language in the statute at issue here. REVERSED and REMANDED. MARSTILLER and RAY, JJ., concur. . Section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (2012) provides: Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the shoulder on the left side of the roadway in relation to the pedestrian�...

...here they gave statements to law enforcement. The investigating officer, Corporal Brian Davis of the Florida Highway Patrol (“FHP”), concluded in his report that the pedestrians were, responsible for the accident as they violated Florida Statute § 316.130 (which provides, inter alia, that a pedestrian walking along a road must walk on the shoulder on the left side of the road in relation to his direction of travel, facing traffic that may approach from the opposite direction)....

...Vendors sell the Herald between 5:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. on weekdays and until 5:00 p.m. *1327 on Sundays. The vendor program has been commercially successful for Plaintiffs. [3] This dispute arose when City police officers cited three Sentinel vendors under Section 316.130(5) of the Florida Statutes ("316.130(5)"). Florida Statute 316.130(5) reads: "[n]o person shall stand in the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic for the purpose of soliciting a ride, employment, or business from the occupant of any vehicle." Fla. Stat. Ann. 316.130(5) (West 2002)....

...City police officers cited the Sentinel vendors on the morning of March 25, 2003 near the intersections of Sheridan Road and Highway 441, Hollywood Boulevard and Highway 441 and Hollywood Boulevard and Interstate 9. On that same morning, a City police officer cited a Herald vendor under 316.130(5) also on Hollywood Boulevard....

...at ¶ 3, ¶ 6. The City has announced that it will cite any person who sells newspapers on the streets and will arrest repeat offenders. Compl. at 22. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin Defendant from interfering with the vendors' sales because they contend that 316.130(5) is facially unconstitutional, and the City's enforcement of it violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights as applied. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that 316.130(5) is: (1) an unconstitutional content-based restriction upon Plaintiffs' free speech and press rights; (2) is, alternatively, not a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech; (3) is unconstitutionally overbroad; and (4) violates Plaintiffs' 14th Amendment due process rights on vagueness grounds. Defendant responds that 316.130(5) is a content-neutral restriction on conduct, is narrowly tailored, leaves open ample avenues for communication, and promotes the City's interests in public safety and the orderly flow of traffic....

...CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)). A. Time, Place, and Manner Restriction of Speech in Public Forum The parties agree that Hollywood public streets are public fora. [5] Therefore, one of two constitutional standards apply. If 316.130(5) is a contentbased restriction, the state bears a high burden to show that "its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Education, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. On the other hand, if 316.130(5) is a content-neutral enactment, then the state may enact a less-scrutinized time, place, and manner regulation of expression....

...A content-neutral regulation must be: (1) content-neutral; (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest; and (3) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Id. (citations omitted). For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that 316.130(5) is content-neutral, and therefore, the time, place, and manner analysis applies....

...the occupant of any vehicle." Plaintiffs do not contend that the state disagrees with Plaintiffs' message or viewpoint nor do they provide any evidence that Florida's legislators attempted to suppress any speech with which they disagreed by passing 316.130(5)....

...Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (6th Cir.1992) ("[w]e cannot believe ... that Kentucky prohibited nearly all forms of pedestrian activity upon its roads, excepting only solicitation, because it wished to censor expression."). Instead, Plaintiffs argue that 316.130(5) is impermissibly content-based because it permits some conduct such as political campaigning but prohibits vendors and individuals soliciting business, a ride, or employment from standing in the roadway paved for traffic....

...sed one ... unless we were to interpret the ordinance as preferring food for the body over food for the soul, which we decline to do." Id. Other federal circuits and a state supreme court have followed similar reasoning and found statutes similar to 316.130(5) to be content-neutral and ultimately, constitutional....

...to suppress certain ideas, information, viewpoints ..."). These courts decided whether the statutes in question were applied evenhandedly to each person within each category of speech, not whether certain categories were allowed or prohibited. Thus, 316.130(5) is not content-based simply because it "does not burden all communication potentially disruptive to traffic." Denver Publ'g, 896 P.2d at 316. In sum, Plaintiffs do not contend that 316.130(5) targets the Plaintiffs' message or that the statute expresses disagreement with the message. Nor do Plaintiffs argue that Florida seeks to censor or inhibit their message. The fact that 316.130(5) prohibits certain solicitors seeking a ride, employment or business but allows other forms of solicitation does not convert the statute into a content-based one....

...s dangerous.'") (citation omitted); Denver Publ'g, 896 P.2d at 316 ("the City need not wait for misfortune to strike to demonstrate the Ordinance addresses legitimate governmental interests..."). Relying on Cox, Plaintiffs contend that even assuming 316.130(5) is content-neutral, it still violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored, 702 F.Supp....

...lar intersection, the time of day, and a host of other variable factors. Id Plaintiffs point out that vendors have attended safety training courses, wear bright-colored clothing during their sale shift, and work only during daylight hours, and thus, 316.130(5) does not take into consideration the vendors' special safety precautions....

...However, "it is the regulation's relationship `to the overall problem the government seeks to correct,' not its necessity in [the Plaintiffs'] particular case, that determines its validity." Ass'n of Cmty., 930 F.2d at 596 (citation omitted). The relationship between 316.130(5) and the state's interests in safety and smooth traffic flow is a sound one although the legislature could have taken other factors into consideration....

...Ater, 961 F.2d at 1229 (noting that because Kentucky's legitimate interest would support prohibiting all activity, including solicitation, Kentucky could decide not to prohibit solicitation). Moreover, the government need not devise the least restrictive regulation to curb the problem or not enforce 316.130(5) because of imaginable alternative solutions. Ward 491 U.S. at 800, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Thus, 316.130(5) does not substantially burden more speech than is necessary. In fact, 316.130(5) is an underinclusive measure. Therefore, the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. 3. Ample Alternative Opportunities for Communication It is undisputed that 316.130(5) leaves open ample alternative opportunities for communicating the Plaintiffs' message....

...Here, Plaintiffs have ample opportunities to communicate their message to newsreaders. For example, those same drivers and passengers who buy their newspapers from vendors can buy the same newspaper at a convenience store, a news rack, a vending machine, through home delivery or delivery to their work address. Importantly, 316.130(5) does not completely foreclose the vendors' business opportunities on Hollywood's streets. So long as the vendors stand on the median or sidewalk, and never enter the paved roadway, the vendors may still solicit stopped automobile drivers and passengers. Thus, if the vendors follow 316.130(5), their interests and those of the City can coexist....

...the converse of `narrowly tailored'"). "`The overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.'" Hill, 530 U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct. 2480. Plaintiffs "do not show that 316.130(5) will inhibit the First Amendment rights of other individuals or demonstrate that the conduct of other parties is more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their own..." Krishna, 876 F.2d at 499-500. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that 316.130(5) is overbroad because it bans "adults who receive safety-training, wear bright-colored clothing" and does not distinguish between adults and teenagers on the streets. Def.'s Mot. at 12. The plain language of 316.130(5) does not restrict protected activity, namely actors who stand on the sidewalk or on the median and who do not solicit a ride, employment, or business while standing on the roadway. See ACORN, 798 F.2d at 1273. Plaintiffs have not shown that a substantial amount of protected activity would be swept in the legitimate ambit of 316.130(5) or that "the impact of [316.130(5) ] on the conduct of other speakers will differ from its impact on [them]..." Hill, 530 U.S. at 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the statute is overbroad. C. Statute is not Void for Vagueness Sentinel and Herald also argue that 316.130(5) is void for vagueness because the terms "soliciting," "business," or "stand" are not defined and thus the statute does not give sufficient warning to the reader as to what conduct is prohibited....

...because we are `condemned to the use of words, [and] can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.'" Id. at 733,120 S.Ct. 2480. Plaintiffs point to the testimony of two City officers who were confused as to what activity is prohibited under 316.130(5)....

...[30:7-19; 32:7-11; 32:20-22; 34:5-14; 35:8-13; 36:17-37:4]; Courtney Dep. [31:18-22; 33:22-34:14]. Plaintiffs contend that if two City police officers cannot agree on the correct interpretation of the statute, then surely the average person cannot tell what conduct falls within 316.130(5)'s prohibitions. Thus, Sentinel and Herald argue that 316.130(5) gives inadequate guidance to police officers and is unconstitutionally vague. Id. However, the testimony of two police officers compared to the knowledge of scores of police officers does not demonstrate that police officers generally do not know what activity 316.130(5) prohibits....

...[8] "The fact that [a legislative act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid ..." Id. Here, an individual who stands on the portion of the roadway paved for traffic to solicit a ride would violate 316.130(5). Therefore, because a set of circumstances would exist where the statute would be valid, 316.130(5) is not void for vagueness on its face....

...To establish irreparable injury, Plaintiffs must prove that the injury they will suffer is "neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent." Northeastern Fla Chapter of Assoc. of Gen. Contractors of Amer. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). Because the Court finds 316.130(5) survives Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge it follows that Plaintiffs would not suffer an imminent unconstitutional restriction of their First Amendment rights....

...People in Hollywood buy between 1,500 and 2,000 Sentinel papers each weekday and between 2,000 to 3,000 Sentinel newspapers each Sunday through the program. Greenberg Aff. at ¶ 7. [4] Plaintiffs argue that anti-solicitation is the principal purpose behind 316.130(5). Defendant contends that promoting public safety and the free flow of traffic were the motives behind the statute. Neither side could point to any legislative history behind 316.130(5). The general heading of Florida Statute Annotated 316.130 is "Pedestrian obedience to traffic control devices and traffic regulations." Fla. Stat. Ann. 316.130 (West 2002)....

...See, e.g., ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1264-67 (9th Cir.1986) (analyzing character of streets open to motorized traffic to determine if it is a public forum). [6] The principal authority on which Plaintiffs rely for the the proposition that 316.130(5) is content-based because it allows certain categories of solicitation is Bischoff v....

...However, this Court views the proper test to determine content neutrality as whether the state disagrees with a speaker's message. Thus, discrimination within a certain category of solicitation may be content-based. No such discrimination within a category exists in 316.130(5). Moreover, 316.130(5), unlike 316.2045, does not facially prefer charitable activity or political campaigning. In addition, 316.2045 states: "it is unlawful, without proper authorization or a lawful permit, for any person or persons wilfully to obstruct the free, convenient and normal flow of traffic..." Fla. Stat. Ann. 316.2045. Unlike in Bischoff, 316.130(5) does not vest any official discretion in a state or local official for prior authorization. [7] Plaintiffs do not that contend 316.130(5) is vague because it authorizes or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement....

...The defendant officer moved for summary judgment, arguing that she had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff-either for the offense charged or for other offenses — such as unjustifiably walking in a roadway paved for vehicular traffic, Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3)....

...The district court denied summary judgment, id., but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, id. at 1084 . The Court explained: After thorough review of the entire record, we are satisfied that Pastor had probable cause to arrest Durruthy for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130 .... Again, § 316.130 provides, in pertinent part, that “[wjhere sidewalks are provided, no pedestrian shall, unless required by other circumstances, walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic.” Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3)....

...r reasonably believes that an offense is being committed. It is therefore difficult to understand the claim that no probable cause ... existed to arrest Durruthy when the undisputed facts show him to have been in unmistakable violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3).” Id....

...rest. Id. at *2 . The district entered summary judgment for the defense, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at *1 . As in Durrwthy, the Court concluded that probable cause existed to arrest the plaintiff for violating Fla. Stat. § 316.130 (3). Id. at *2 . The plaintiff nonetheless maintained that a violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.130 constituted only a noncriminal traffic infraction, so it could not furnish probable cause to support a full custodial arrest....

...thin the authority conferred by § 901.15(5) when making a warrantless arrest for violation of FI. Stat. § 316.089, a civil infraction involving failure to maintain a single lane). Therefore, Officer Pastor had probable cause to arrest Ybarra under § 316.130(3) because she unmistakably violated the statute and Florida law allows for an arrest to be based upon a violation of chapter 316....

...Bailey v. Board of County Comm'rs of Alachua County, 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n. 4 (11th Cir.1992). Accordingly, Pastor submits as alternative bases for probable cause various alleged violations of the traffic laws concerning pedestrians in the streets. Section 316.130, Fla Stat., for example, makes it unlawful for a pedestrian to "walk along and upon the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic." Similarly, § 54-2 of the Miami City Code makes it unlawful for any person to "walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city so as to obstruct free passage ......

...to comply with an order or direction of a law enforcement officer. Plaintiff in this case, however, did comply by walking backwards toward the sidewalk. He may not have moved fast enough for the officers' liking, but he complied nonetheless. As for § 316.130, Fla....

...In this case, however, there was no vehicular traffic in the roadway. Further, Plaintiff was not a pedestrian in the normal sense of the word but an obvious member of the media acting within the scope of his journalistic duties. Under these circumstances, an arrest pursuant to § 316.130 could not be reasonable....

...The record supports the trial court's ruling, and therefore, I conclude that no reversible error has been shown. I would affirm the denial of Isom's motion to suppress. NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] Hitchhiking is a noncriminal traffic infraction. § 316.130(5), (19), Fla....

violations of pedestrian regulations under section 316.130 *544and violations of Chapter 316 by a bicyclist

...have reasonably concluded that the defendant was jaywalking.”); State v. Williams, 119 So. 3d 544, 545-46 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“We agree with the State that the officer had probable cause to stop Williams based on the violation of a pedestrian traffic statute, section 316.130[.]”); Heien v....

violations of pedestrian regulations under section 316.130 and violations of Chapter 316 by a bicyclist

...hat they were to consider. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 4.11.(expressly provides for the paraphrasing of a statute where appropriate.) We do agree, however, with Beeman’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to either read or paraphrase section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2001), and we find that the failure to inform the jury as to this section deprived Beeman of a fair determination of his claim. Section 316.130(15), provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered vehicle and give warning when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused or incapacitated person. (Emphasis added.) Section 316.130(15) places a responsibility on every driver in relation to a person either walking or on a “human-powered vehicle,” to give warning when necessary....

...In the instant case, the evidence was ample, albeit in dispute, to submit the matter to the jury to determine: whether “No Jaywalking” signs were in the area; whether such signs were designed to implement “traffic control;” if the pedestrians violated section 316.130, Florida Statutes (1981), 1 by crossing the roadway where they did; and whether such “jaywalking” was a proximate cause of Gray’s injuries....

...Consequently, we affirm the judgment for the defendant Break and his carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED for new trial consistent with this opinion. COBB and COWART, JJ., and C. WEL-BORN DANIEL, Associate Judge, concur. . Section 316.130, Florida Statutes (1981), states in part as follows: (1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic control device specifically applicable to him unless otherwise directed by a police officer....

...t,--be-deducted from, or in the case of section 318,14(9) or (10) elections, to be added to, the penalty or cests-by — the-traffic violations bureau or clerk’s office: (l-)-Three-dollars for all violations of pedestrian regulations-under-section-316.130 and-violations of Chapter 316 by a bicyclist 14 years-of-age -or under; (2) Six- dollars for all non-moving traffic infractions;-.and *464 (3)- Ten dollars-for all moving infractions....

pedestrians to walk on the shoulder facing traffic. Section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (1977); Fla.Std. Jury

id. § 316.003(28) (defining pedestrian); id. § 316.130 (describing detailed regulations for pedestrians);

...on March 7, 1998, as McCellan was standing in the middle of S.E. 9th Street blocking the path of the officers’ patrol car and impeding any other vehicular traffic. During the ensuing stop, the officers issued him a traffic citation for violation of section 316.130(4), Florida Statutes (1997), which states: 316.130 Pedestrian obedience to traffic control devices and traffic regulations.— [[Image here]] (4) Where sidewalks are not provided, any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the shoulder on the left si...

...Defense counsel argued below that the patrolmen lacked any objective basis or standard to justify the stop where McCellan had adequately explained his presence along the narrow roadway and had asserted that he was not blocking vehicles. For the first time on appeal, McCellan contends that section 316.130(4) does not prohibit him from standing in the middle of the road....

...“los[t] their balance and f[e]ll 11 In addition to battery of a law enforcement officer in violation of Florida Statutes § 784.07(2)(b), Martin alleges that Prosper violated: § 316.061(1) (leaving the scene of an accident); § 316.130(18) (walking on a limited access facility or a ramp connecting a limited access facility to any other street or highway); § 316.072(3) (failure to obey commands of police officials); § 843.02 (resisting an officer without violence to his...

...Florida Highway Patrol Trooper Juan Sanchez responded to the scene shortly after the accident. Trooper Sanchez conducted a lengthy investigation and ultimately concluded that Deveau was at fault for failing to avoid the accident. Deveau was cited for violating section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a hu...

...The appellant, Larry Popejoy, was riding his bicycle on a sidewalk when an automobile, which was pulling into a driveway, struck him. We hold that under the facts and circumstances of this negligence case the trial court erred in failing to give requested instructions encompassing the following two statutes: Section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (1989), 1 and section 316.2065(10), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...1st DCA 1988); see also Simmons v. Roorda, 601 So.2d 609 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Bradley v. Guy, 438 So.2d 854 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). REVERSED AND REMANDED. STONE, J., and WALDEN, JAMES H., Senior Judge, concur. FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion. . Section 316.130(15), Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a human-powered veh...

...ing in the middle of the road. In fact, it could be said that it was the defendant who stopped the officer. The officer testified that he stopped his vehicle because the defendant was standing in the middle of the road.” The court found that under section 316.130, Florida Statutes, the officer could have stopped the defendant for that fact alone. The court noted the officer was responding to a BOLO, the defendant fit the limited description given, was sweating profusely, out of breath, and located a short distance from the abandoned vehicle....

...When the officer spoke with the resident, she advised that she did not know the defendant, but gave no other indication that the defendant had done anything wrong. The trial court found the officer had probable cause that the defendant had violated section 316.130, Florida Statutes, which gave him cause to stop and detain him. However, none of the applicable subsections apply. Subsection (3) prohibits pedestrians from walking along or on a roadway where there are sidewalks. § 316.130(3), Fla....

...dispositive. We disagree. See Aikens v. State, 80 So. 3d 1121, 1122–23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); J.J.V. v. State, 17 So. 3d 881, 883 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). 5 walk along the shoulder when there are no sidewalks. Id. § 316.130(4). Once again, there was no evidence that sidewalks existed. Subsection (5) prohibits a person from standing in the portion of a roadway paved for vehicular traffic, but only if it is for the “purpose of soliciting a ride, employment, or business from the occupant of any vehicle.” Id. § 316.130(5)....

...There was no testimony that the defendant was soliciting anyone for anything. And, subsection (6) prohibits a person from standing on or near a street “for the purpose of soliciting the watching or guarding of any vehicle while parked or about to be parked.” Id. § 316.130(6). But, there was no testimony that the defendant was watching or guarding a vehicle. Further, “violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction.” Id. § 316.130(19)....

and infractions of pedestrian regulations, section 316.130, Florida Statutes; (2) Three dollars for all

than for the pedestrian (plaintiff). But see § 316.-130, Fla.Stat. (1977). We similarly affirm the court’s

and infractions of pedestrian regulations, section 316.-130, Florida Statutes; (2) Three dollars for all

...he child unless it 11 first found negligence of Mr. Seltzer, which it failed to do. Because the jury did not reach the question of comparative negligence, any error in the giving of the instruction on section 316.130(8) was harmless.”); Aetna Cas....

...Those background principles, we think, counsel against reading Smith too aggressively, or, more relevantly, expecting every reasonable officer to do so. 13  USCA11 Case: 18-14682 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 Page: 14 of 67 see id. § 316.130(18)....