Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes;

Competition Trademarks and Monopolies (3rd Ed.) Section 70.1. 19. Plaintiff's inequitable conduct before

Services. Act effective October 1, 1986, ch. 86-220, § 70, 1 Fla.Laws 1603, 1660 (codified as amended at Fla

...Liability under the Bert Harris Act In a footnote, the new majority also rejects the trial court's alternative finding of liability under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act because Mr. Huff "clearly failed to submit the `bona-fide, valid appraisal supporting the claim' required by the Act." Section 70.001, Florida Statutes, does not define the terms "bona fide, valid appraisal." The majority concludes, without citation to any authority, that Mr....

...isal of a water and waste water system based on the engineer's experience with other water and waste water systems. Id. at 503-04. Although this Court was interpreting a different statute in that case, its reasoning applied to the same terms used in section 70.001....

...d lumber, from the construction or destruction of a structure. [2] A conditional use is a use identified in the zoning regulations which may be approved subject to filing the appropriate applications and site plans. [3] The Bert Harris Act, found in section 70.001, Florida Statutes (1997), creates a separate and distinct cause of action for property owners where governmental regulation has "inordinately burdened" the property, but does not amount to a "taking" under the Florida or federal constitutions....

...Department of Environmental Regulation, 601 So.2d 1223, 1227 n. 4 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 613 So.2d 3 (Fla.1992). [5] In light of the complete reversal of the inverse condemnation judgment, we have also considered the trial court's alternative finding of liability under the "Bert Harris Act," § 70.001 et seq., Fla....

...Reeves, of Davis, Schnitker, Reeves & Browning, P.A., Madison, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. Citrus County appeals a non-final order determining that it had "inordinately burdened" real property owned by Halls River Development Inc., as that term is used in the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...2002-A-10) described above have directly restricted or limited use of the Halls River's real property such that Halls River is permanently unable to obtain Halls River's reasonable investment expectations for the use of Halls River's real property as defined by F.S. 70.001(3)(b) or alternatively such that Halls River is left with existing "uses" as defined by F.S. 70.001(3)(b) that are unreasonable with the result that Halls River is permanently placed in a position of having to bear a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public which, in fairness, should be borne by the public at large....

...ANALYSIS The Harris Act, enacted in 1995, created a new cause of action allowing property owners who suffer inordinate regulatory burdens to existing or reasonably foreseeable land uses to be compensated by the government entity creating the burden. § 70.001(1), (2), (5)(a), Fla....

...to specific uses of their property. It creates a statutory remedy "when a new *420 law, rule, regulation or ordinance ..., as applied, unfairly affects real property" by inordinately burdening an existing use or a vested right to use real property. § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The inordinate burden must be to such an extent that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable investment-backed expectations for the existing use (or vested right) of the property as a whole. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...(2005); Palm Beach Polo Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 918 So.2d 988, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). A Harris Act claim must be presented within one year from the time the law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue. § 70.001(11), Fla. Stat. (2005). At least 180 days before filing a lawsuit, written notice of the claim must be given to the appropriate governmental entity. § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). When the presuit notice is received, the government has 180 days to consider its options, which include retracting or modifying its action, taking no action, or granting relief in a variety of ways and making an offer to settle. § 70.001(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). Before the expiration of this period, unless a settlement offer is accepted by the property owner, the governmental entity is required to issue a written "ripeness" decision, identifying the allowable uses for the property. § 70.001(4)(a), (5)(a), Fla....

..."The ripeness decision, as a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review, and the matter shall be deemed ripe or final for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section, notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies." § 70.001(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). If the governmental entity maintains its earlier decision, the property owner may file a claim for damages in the trial court. § 70.001(5)(b), Fla....

...Upon compliance with the procedural requirements of the Harris Act, the court must determine whether an existing or vested use exists and whether the regulation has "inordinately burdened" the real property. If the court so finds, a jury determines the amount of damages suffered by the property owner. § 70.001(6), Fla....

...A property owner is also "inordinately burdened" if the property owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable, so that the property owner permanently bears a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005). The existence of a "vested right" is determined by applying the principles of equitable estoppel and substantive due process under statutory or common law. § 70.001(3)(a), Fla....

...ic vegetation, and to preserve and enhance it by increasing the property's water levels by one foot above existing levels. Polo appeals this judgment. We dispose first of Polo's claim that it is entitled to compensation under the Bert J. Harris Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes. That statute creates a cause of action where a law, regulation, or ordinance, as applied inordinately burdens, restricts, or limits use of property without amounting to a taking. Section 70.001(2) provides: When a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property, *995 the property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value.... Section 70.001(3)(e) provides, in part: The terms "inordinate burden" or "inordinately burdened" mean that an action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is perm...

...vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. The statute defines "existing use" in section 70.001(3)(b) as follows: The term "existing use" means an actual, present use or activity on the real property, including periods of inactivity which are normally associated with, or are incidental to, the nature or type of use or activity or...

...This is an appeal from a non-final order determining that appellant, City of Jacksonville’s construction and operation of a fire station on city property “inordinately burdened” the Smiths’ adjacent property, entitling them to relief pursuant to section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012), the Bert J....

...operty. The court directed that a jury be impaneled to determine the total amount of compensation due to appellees for the loss in value of their property resulting from the construction of the fire station. This appeal followed. The Bert Harris Act Section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012), provides in pertinent part: (1) This act may be cited as the “Bert J....

...in fairness should be borne by the public at large. (Emphasis added). The specific language of the Act indicates that in order to have a cause of action under the Act, governmental action must be directly “applied” to the claimant’s property. § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. The statutory language requires a claimant to demonstrate both an action of a governmental entity and that the action “inordinately burdened” the property in question. § 70.001(2), Fla. Stat. To constitute an inordinate burden, the governmental action must “directly restrict[ ] or limit[ ] the use of real property.” § 70.001(3)(e)l, Fla....

...� to justify its interpretation that a cause of action may exist based on governmental use of the government’s own property without the application of a rule, regulation or ordinance directly limiting or restricting the use of plaintiffs property. § 70.001(3)(d), Fla....

...Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992)). The expressed legislative intent, as well as numerous other sections of the Act, indicate the Harris Act only applies when rules, ordinances, or regulations are actually applied to the property in question. In Section 70.001(1), Florida Statutes, the Legislature stated: [I]t is the intent of the Legislature that, as a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings, the Legislature herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property. (Emphasis added). Section 70.001(11) of the Act states: “A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented *892 more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue.” § 70.001(11), Fla....

...to a specific piece of property). This section concerning the statute of limitations would make no sense if a cause of action could be triggered by a governmental action in reference to another person’s property. The legislation further states at section 70.001(3)(e)2, Florida Statutes: “In determining whether reasonable, investment-backed expectations are inordinately burdened, consideration may be given to the factual circumstances leading to the time elapsed between enactment of the law...

...slative recognition that “some laws, regulations, and ordinances ... as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States . Constitution.” § 70.001(1), Fla....

...he well-settled proposition that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity, such as the waiver in the Act, must be strictly construed, with any ambiguity concerning the scope of the Act resolved in favor of the government and against the claimant. See § 70.001(13), Fla....

...These issues have no relevance to appellees' ability to maintain a Harris cause of action and will not be addressed within this opinion. . Any action under the Harris Act based on this rezoning of the property, if such course of action existed, would be untimely. § 70.001(11), Fla....

...it to allow Best to put its property to such a use. *140 Best alleged, and the trial court ultimately found, that County and DEP's denials "inordinately burdened" Best's property under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes, (the "Harris Act") and constituted an inverse condemnation of said property....

...ective Jan. 1, 2001). There is no other subdivision of rule 9.130 which would be a valid basis for jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation portion of the present appeal. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.130. [1] With regard to the Harris Act, it is true that section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes, provides, "A governmental entity may take an interlocutory appeal of the court's determination that the action of the governmental entity has resulted in an inordinate burden." § 70.001(6)(a), Fla....

...Arpen, Jr., Deputy General *591 Counsel, and Dylan T. Reingold, Assistant General Counsel, Jacksonville, for Appellant. Jeb T. Branham, Jacksonville, for Appellees. BENTON, J. The City of Jacksonville appeals the non-final jury impanelment order entered in a case Harold Coffield brought pursuant to section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2006), the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act (the "Act"). We have jurisdiction. See § 70.001(6)(a), Fla....

...built. *593 On November 20, 2006, Mr. Coffield conveyed the property to a wholly owned entity, Windsong Place, LLC (the LLC). On December 19, 2006, Mr. Coffield and his alter ego, the LLC, filed in circuit court, purporting to set out a claim under section 70.001, Florida Statutes, against the City, and alleging damages in the amount of $2,212,000 as a result of their inability to proceed with the proposed development, which the complaint attributed to the closure of Windsong Place as a public road....

...ct to the restriction. See generally Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). As for Mr. Coffield personally, the City contends, the Act provides that only the "property owner" is eligible for relief, and section 70.001(3)(f) of the Act defines "property owner" as "the person who holds legal title to the real property at issue." By the time the lawsuit was filed, Mr....

...On this assumption, it properly fell to the circuit court to "determine whether an existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed and, if so, whether, considering the settlement offer and ripeness decision, the [City had] inordinately burdened the real property." § 70.001(6)(a), Fla....

...d that government action has permanently precluded the claimant from attaining "the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property" are conclusions of law. § 70.001(3)(e) & (6)(a), Fla....

...g State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.2001))). Although, in important respects, we disagree with the learned trial judge's legal analysis, we begin, with deference to the trial court's fact finding, from the same statutory premise. IV. Section 70.001, Florida Statutes provides a remedy for property owners whose property has been "inordinately burden[ed]" by government action that does not, however, rise to the level of a constitutional taking. § 70.001(1), Fla....

...The Act provides: "When a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened[ [3] ] an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled to relief...." § 70.001(2), Fla....

...The Act imports an important body of case law, however, when it provides that the "existence of a `vested right' is to be determined by applying the principles of equitable estoppel or substantive due process under the common law or by applying the statutory law of this state." § 70.001(3)(a), Fla....

...h are suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property." § 70.001(3)(b), Fla....

...Coffield's intentions to subdivide the parcel into eight lots and build single family houses were "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses...." Id. This was error. Plainly eight single-family lots were never "an actual, present use or activity on the real property." § 70.001(3)(b), Fla....

...Coffield learned that an application had been filed to close the only roadway providing ingress and egress to the property, development of the property into eight single-family lots was, if still a possibility, by no means a "reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative," use of the property. § 70.001(3)(b), Fla....

...The City's enactment of the Ordinance closing and abandoning the roadway, followed by the letter of September 26, 2006, did not inordinately burden any "reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property ...." § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...His assumptions that the application would be denied and that, in any event, he would not lose access to a critical portion of the roadway were incorrect and unsupported. He was not prevented from attaining any "reasonable, investment-backed expectation" of developing the property. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...operty owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...Miami Beach, 591 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); City of Fort Pierce v. Dickerson, 588 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). For these reasons we affirm the trial court's denial in all respects. [1] Affirmed. NOTES [1] Mr. Frye's argument on appeal involving his property rights under section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2008), was not raised below and cannot be raised on appeal....

...nt of such claims and all costs of suit[] and in addition thereto all reasonable attorney's fees " (emphasis added)). The laws of Florida are replete with references by the Florida Legislature to the recovery of costs and attorney's fees. See, e.g., § 70.001(6)(c)(1), Fla....

...Driggers, Dothan, Alabama, for Appellant. David A. Theriaque, Brent Spain and Leslie E. Bryson of Theriaque, Voreck & Spain, Tallahassee, for Appellee. WOLF, J. We decide for the first time whether a property owner can state a cause of action under section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2006), otherwise known as the "Bert J....

...reasonable investment-backed expectations were to develop the property "in accordance with the local rules and regulations for GC-1 zoning as then administered by the [City], which created an `existing use' in the Subject Property as defined in F.S. § 70.001(3);" and (3) the City had "applied its new Ordinance to the Subject Property and/or take[n] the position that the new Ordinance is applicable" to the property....

...rty owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large.... § 70.001(1)-(3), Fla....

...and not as one party or the other would like to have them written."). As reflected above, the plain and unambiguous language of the Bert Harris Act establishes the Act is limited to "as-applied" challenges, as opposed to facial challenges. Indeed, section 70.001(1), Florida Statutes, states the Bert Harris Act provides for relief "when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance ..., as applied, *76 unfairly affects real property." (Emphasis added); cf....

...of action under the Bert Harris Act. The plain language of the statute applies to more than specific government actions denying development requests. The Act defines "action of a government entity" as " including action on an application or permit." § 70.001(3)(d), Fla....

...owner to seek relief under the Act because the impact of the change was "readily ascertainable"). Furthermore, as argued by M & H, the Bert Harris Act specifically provides that claims made under it are separate and distinct from the law of takings. § 70.001(1), Fla....

...Where the government enacts laws which reduce a property owner's value, in my view, that is an "action of a governmental entity" that can "inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution...." § 70.001(1)-(3), Fla....

Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act. § 70.001, Fla. Stat. Because the grandfather provision

...*321 Before LEVY, RAMIREZ and WELLS, JJ. LEVY, Judge. Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. ("Royal World") brought suit against the City of Miami Beach ("the City") pursuant to The Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act ("the Harris Act" or "the Act"), Section 70.001, Florida Statutes, contending that the City's newly-adopted ordinances had the effect of denying Royal World all economically viable use of its property. The City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Royal World could not maintain the action in light of Section 13 of the Act which provides: "This section does not affect the sovereign immunity of government." § 70.001(13), Fla....

...In the instant case, the legislative intent of the Harris Act is evident within the first section of the Act which clearly provides that the statute was intended to protect private property interests against "inordinately burdensome" governmental regulation, which do not necessarily amount to a constitutional taking. § 70.001(1), Fla....

...se of action from the law of takings, the Legislature herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property. § 70.001(1), Fla....

...If the legislature had not intended that civil actions for damages be prosecuted in such a manner, there would be no reason for the inclusion of such public entities within the definition of employer.... Jones, 766 So.2d at 1109. Similarly, in the instant case, we find that a fair reading of Section 70.001(1), Florida Statutes, evinces a sufficiently clear legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity as to a private property owner whose property rights are inordinately burdened, restricted, or limited by government actions where the go...

...sovereign immunity benefits the City in the instant case, and governmental entities in general, otherwise enjoy. In light of the clear intent of the statute and the pertinent rules of statutory construction, the trial court erred in construing *323 Section 70.001(13), Florida Statutes, to bar a cause of action against a governmental agency....

...y of Miami Beach to grant totally unjustified and illegal height variances through the device of a sweetheart "settlement" of a spurious action by the hotel owner against the City under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act, § 70.001, et seq., Fla....

legislature left intact the provisions of former Section 70.01 of the 1965 Florida Statutes (renumbered in

...��s adjacent property. In 2012, Hardee County granted the phosphate mining company a special exception to the land use designation that would decrease the quarter-mile setback to as little as 150 feet. FINR brought a claim under the Bert Harris Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012), against Hardee County seeking $38 million in damages for devaluation of its property for use as a neurological rehabilitation center....

...Plain Meaning The Act was intended “as a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings ... for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.” § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). An existing use includes “actual, present use or activity” on the land and “reasonably foreseeable, nonspecula-tive land uses” which increase the fair market value of the property. § 70.001(3)(b)l.-2., Fla. Stat. A vested right is determined under the principles of equitable estoppel or substantive due process. § 70.001(3)(a), Fla. Stat. • The Act provides that the government action must “directly restrict[ ] or limit[ ] the use of real property” for the property to be considered “inordinately burdened.” § 70.001(3)(e)l., Fla....

...t inappropriate, amendments enacted shortly after controversies as to the interpretation of the original act arise may be considered useful guidance for the original intent. Lowry, 473 So.2d at 1250 ; Betts, 928 So.2d at 1210 . The 2015 Amendment to section 70.001(3)(f) made clear that the Act does not apply to property owners whose parcel is not “the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity.” Ch....

...On the City's motion, the court dismissed the third amended complaint with prejudice. It found, among other reasons, that Sosa failed to comply with the prerequisites *982 for bringing a Harris Act claim. This appeal followed. The Harris Act, codified in section 70.001, Florida Statutes (1997), creates a distinct and independent cause of action for aggrieved property owners. § 70.001(1), (5)(a), Fla....

...c use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the real property caused by the action of government, as provided in this section. § 70.001(2), Fla....

...must present the claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity. The property owner must submit, along with the claim, a bona fide, valid appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real property.... § 70.001(4)(a), Fla....

...3d DCA 1963) (compliance with court order waives right to appeal, even if compliance expressly conditioned on reservation of right to appeal). NOTES [1] The instant action was not brought under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2003), because the acts of Appellant preceded the effective date of this legislation....

...urt finding in favor of Pacetta, LLC., Down The Hatch, Inc., and Mar-Tim, Inc., (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Pacetta”) on their claim for damages under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act (Harris Act), *28 section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...The Harris Act enables property owners to seek relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of its real property caused by government action, when a “specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened ... a vested right to a specific use of real property”. § 70.001(2). The Act defines the term “action of a governmental entity” as meaning “a specific ac *29 tion of a governmental entity which affects real property”. § 70.001(3)(d). The Act further defines the term “inordinate burden” as meaning, inter alia, government action that restricts or limits a vested right to a specific use of the property. § 70.001(3)(e). A vested right can be established through the application of the principle of equitable estoppel. § 70.001(3)(a)....

...Fernandez of Pacific Legal Foundation, Coral Gables, Amicus Curiae. SHARP, W., Senior Judge. Brevard County (the County) appeals a non-final order, [1] which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the appellees, [2] after they brought suit against the County under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Act (the Act), section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...uffer with wetlands ranging from fifteen to fifty feet, depending on the type of wetland. As a result Douglas cancelled the contract. Appellees submitted a Notice of Claim for $760,000 to the County for reduction in value of the Property pursuant to section 70.001(4) of the Act....

...In the Act, the Legislature expressed its recognition that in some instances, laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and its political subdivisions, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking. § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. The Legislature determined that there was an important state interest in protecting private property owners from these burdens, and provided relief in the Act by establishing a new cause of action, where none previously existed. [5] § 70.001(1), (9), Fla. Stat. Where property is inordinately burdened by a regulation, the Act provides relief to the owner. § 70.001(2). It requires the state and its political subdivisions to, inter alia, waive, modify, transfer, purchase or financially compensate the property owner by entering into a settlement agreement providing relief, as enumerated in section 70.001(4)(c)....

...Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558-559, 34 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721 (1914). See also Munao, Munao, Munao and Munao v. Homeowners Association of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park, Inc., 740 So.2d 73, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In enacting section 70.001, the Legislature acted within its authority and for the benefit of its citizens as a whole....

...nd enlarges the judiciary's interpretation of a taking under the Florida Constitution. We reject this contention as well because the Act clearly provides that the Legislature has established a new cause of action, independent from a taking, sections 70.001(1), (9); and that it is not a taking. § 70.001(13)....

...We must therefore remand to the trial court for its review to make these findings as required by the Act. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part. PLEUS, C.J., and MONACO, J., concur. NOTES [1] See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(viii). Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii) was added to make rule 9.130 consistent with section 70.001(6)(a), which permits a governmental entity to take an interlocutory appeal of a determination that a government action has resulted in an inordinate burden....

...[5] The law of regulatory takings is insufficient to provide relief to private property owners unless those owners were either ousted from, or deprived of, all beneficial use of their property. Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). [6] § 70.001(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). [7] § 70.001(4), Fla. Stat. (2004). [8] § 70.001(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). [9] § 70.001(4)(d), (5)—(12), Fla....

...Backman of Adorno & Yoss, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Harriet R. Lewis of Weiss Serota Helfman Guedes Pastoriza Cole & Boniske, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. STONE, J. Russo Associates, Inc. (Russo) brought this action under the Harris Private Property Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes, against the City of Dania Beach Code Enforcement Board (Dania)....

...The city code enforcement board held a hearing on the citation's merits and found Russo in violation of the ordinance; an order was affirmed by the circuit court. Russo presented its written claim on October 10, 2002, to the head of the governmental entity, the mayor of Dania Beach, pursuant to section 70.001(11), Florida Statutes....

...Russo filed its complaint on February 6, 2004. Dania maintains that the statute mandates a cause of action be filed "less than one year after the subject ordinance was first applied by the City to Plaintiff's Property" and that Russo was, therefore, acting in contravention of Florida Statutes Section 70.001 in filing its lawsuit. The statute does not expressly address a statute of limitations. Section 70.001(4)(a) states that "[n]ot less than 180 days prior to filing an action under this section against a governmental entity, a property owner who seeks compensation under this section must present the claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity." Section 70.001(11) continues with the pronouncement that "[a] cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at...

...e of action from the law of takings, the legislature herein provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property." § 70.001(1), Fla....

...The statute additionally describes various settlement scenarios available during this period and sets forth the procedure an entity is to follow when a settlement offer is not accepted. In that case, the governmental entity is to issue a ripeness decision identifying allowable uses for the subject property. § 70.001(5)(a), Fla....

...We note that the catch-all four-year statute of limitations found within section 95.11(3)(p) has been held to govern inverse condemnation actions. Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 666 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since the intention of section 70.001 is to provide an additional remedy when governmental action does not rise to the level of taking, it is not reasonable to infer a far more restrictive statute of limitation, effectively that of six months....

...circuit court, and one month between the last order of our court affirming the trial court's order affirming the violation and the presentation of the claim to the mayor), tolling the clock for the period that Russo had pursued relief in the courts. Section 70.001(4)(a) mandated that Russo was required to wait another 180 days from October 10, 2002, before he could file suit....

narrow waiver of sovereign immunity, see § 70.001(13), and such waiver statutes are strictly construed

...claim should be dismissed based on a procedural deficiency. (Doc. No. 31). A. The Bert Harris Act The Florida Legislature adopted the Bert Harris Act with the intention of creating a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings. See § 70.001(1), Fla....

...nited States Constitution. See id. The Bert Harris Act requires a citizen seeking compensation under the Bert Harris Act to, not less than 180 days prior to filing a complaint, present the claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity. See § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). During the 180-day-notice period, the governmental entity must make a written settlement offer to the property owner. See § 70.001(4)(c), Fla....

...al entity's action. See id. [1] During the 180-day-notice period, unless the property owner accepts a settlement offer, the governmental entity is required to issue a written ripeness decision that identifies the allowable uses for the property. See § 70.001(5)(a), Fla....

...The ripeness decision, as a matter of law, is the last prerequisite to judicial review. See id. If the property owner rejects the settlement offer and the ripeness decision of the governmental entity, then the property owner may file a claim for compensation in the circuit court. See § 70.001(5)(b), Fla....

...Stat. (1999). If the circuit court determines that the action of the governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property, the property owner is entitled to relief. See § 70.001(2), Fla....

...Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in its determination that section 73.091, rather than section 67.041, governed the City’s request for costs. 3 AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED. WALLIS, J., and HERNDON, L.D., Associate Judge, concur. . § 70.001, Fla. Stat. (2010). . See § 70.001(6)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2010), which states: In any action filed pursuant to this section, the governmental entity or entities are entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by the governmental entity or entities fro...

...matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; — or (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001 (6)(a), Florida Statutes; or (ix) the issue of forum non conve-niens....

241 So. 3d 181, 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (citing § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (1995)). To prevail under the Act

...vested rights in the property. The Bert Harris Act provides a cause of action when a law, rule, regulation, or ordinance established by the state "or a political entity in the state" inordinately burdens real property without amounting to a taking. § 70.001, Fla....

...The presuit procedure had apparently been satisfied by CCPC by the time the *238 two parties entered into the settlement agreement. CCPC had sent the County notice of its Bert Harris claim along with a valid appraisal on May 7, 2003, as required by the statute. See § 70.001(4)(a)....

...reement was intended to settle its Bert Harris claim and that certain provisions of the agreement contravened the application of "a statute," requiring the parties to file a joint action in the circuit court to obtain approval of the settlement. See § 70.001(4)(d)(2)....

...uit for relief under the Bert Harris Act. The trial court dismissed CCPC's petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory relief based on its finding that although Charlotte County had been put on notice of a potential claim pursuant to § 70.001, Fla....

...probably need to first address the issues raised in the request for declaratory relief before reaching a decision on the petition for writ of mandamus. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 70.001, Fla....

...sue a writ of certiorari pursuant to Article V, Section 5. The circuit court dismissed Liberty's petition, and Liberty now seeks review in this court.1 1 Liberty also filed a separate action against the City alleging (1) a count under section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2020), (2) a count for a 3  II....

...William J. and Judith A. Holmes, past owners and operators of a construction and debris landfill, appeal from a final judgment denying their claim for damages under the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act, ("Bert Harris Act"), section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...action limiting the use of real property "such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation *830 for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use" of the property. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...vested right to a specific use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the real property caused by the action of the government. § 70.001(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). The Act provides that the action must be filed within one year of the application of the ordinance to the subject property. § 70.001(11). Additionally, the owner must file a presuit notice to the political entity at least 180 days prior to filing the action. § 70.001 (4)(a)....

...Turkali’s parcel before and after the enactment of the new use restrictions. 3 As such, the appraisal did not provide the City and the County the means by which to evaluate the potential claim for the purpose of making a settlement offer prior to the filing of a suit. See § 70.001(4)(c) (“During the ......

...Having determined that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint, we need not reach the issue of whether a variance must be sought and denied as a condition precedent to filing an “as applied” challenge to the ordinance. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur. . § 70.001, Fla....

...On June 6, 2008, Plaintiff appealed the City Planner's decision to the Board of Adjustment for Key West. Id. at 8. The Key West City Attorney, however, instructed the City Clerk not to agenda Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal, and on October 24, 2008, Plaintiff served his section 70.001 "180 day Notice of Claim on Key West." Id....

...in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; (ix) the issue of forum non conveniens; (x) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes; o...

...Backman and Roy Taub, of Greenspoon Marder, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and Geoffrey A. Pette, of Pette, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee. NARDELLA, J. This appeal involves a claim under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act (“Bert Harris Act” or “Act”), section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...7 the County’s argument, we begin with the requirements of the Bert Harris Act. The Act provides a mechanism to compensate landowners whose property is affected by government action not rising to the level of a taking. § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2012).4 To prevail under the Act, a property owner must prove that “a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property.” § 70.001(2), Fla....

...foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable for the subject real property . . . which have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property.” § 70.001(3)(b)2., Fla....

...ernmental entities [that] has directly restricted or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property . . . .” § 70.001(3)(e)1., Fla....

...An exception exists for specific nonfinal orders listed and described in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, among which are nonfinal orders determining “that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes.” Fla....

...titled to workers’ compensation immunity; (vi) whether to certify a class; (vii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; (viii) the issue of forum non conveniens; (ix) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes;...

...as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; or (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; or (ix) the issue of forum non conve-niens....

...Indian River County, intending to build a concrete batch plant. When the landowner bought the land, it was zoned as light industrial, and a concrete batch plant was an allowable use under the then-existing land 1 The Bert Harris Act is codified in section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2008). development regulations....

...Doing so precluded the landowner from building a concrete batch plant on the property as planned. The landowner sued the County under the Bert Harris Act, seeking compensation for the loss of his ability to construct the concrete batch plant, attaching an appraisal report in support. See § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat....

...The Bert Harris Act addresses circumstances when the government enacts laws, regulations or ordinances that “may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution.” § 70.001(1), Fla....

...stricted, limited, or prohibited. The award of compensation shall include a reasonable award of prejudgment interest from the date the claim was presented to the governmental entity or entities as provided in subsection (4). § 70.001(6)(b), Fla....

...owner had the ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed expectation”; and 2) “the fair market value of the real property, as it existed 5 at the time of the governmental action at issue, as inordinately burdened.” § 70.001(6)(b), Fla....

...sting or vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. § 70.001(3)(e) Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). The damages provision under section 70.001(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), read along with the definition of inordinate burden, tells us that “as inordinately burdened” essentially means as though the owner did not have the ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed...

...feasibility to demonstrate that it was not the highest and best use, and the appraiser—whose testimony relied upon the the economist’s analysis— sought to value the property as something other than a concrete batch plant. Neither expert offered testimony complying with section 70.001(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). We note that the County was not without remedy following the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of the economist and the appraiser....

...violated the trial court’s interpretation of the statute’s “as though the owner had the ability to attain the reasonable investment-backed expectation” language, we further note that any such testimony would not implicate the full damages calculation under section 70.001(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...August 15, 2019 pretrial hearing and ruled on the motion in limine as to the appraiser in a September 20, 2019 pretrial order. 7 appraisal that supports the claim and demonstrates the loss in fair market value to the real property.” § 70.001(4)(a), Fla....

...trial concerning the property’s value. But the County’s position conflicts with the entire purpose of a trial on damages to determine the compensation amount. The statute references only that the appraisal must demonstrate the loss in the fair market value. § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat....

...amendment of its comprehensive future land use plan destroyed any reasonable economic use of their land, a large, undeveloped acreage in a rural area known as North Belle Meade. They sought compensation under the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Act, § 70.001, Fla....

...Hussey v. Collier Cnty., 883 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (table decision). -3-  In July 2004, the Husseys gave the County notice that they would seek compensation under the Harris Act. See § 70.001(4)(a), Fla....

...DeSoto Cnty., 133 So. 3d 577, 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citing Wendler v. City of St. Augustine, 108 So. 3d 1141, 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 122 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2013)). The Act contains a tolling provision, albeit one that is somewhat confusing. Section 70.001(11) provides: (11) A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to...

...If an owner seeks relief from the governmental action through lawfully available administrative or judicial proceedings, the time for bringing an action under this section is tolled until the conclusion of such proceedings. § 70.001(11), Fla....

...ed on September 15, 2004, the date the First District affirmed the DOAH determination that the RFMD amendments were proper, thereby ending the Husseys' administrative and judicial proceeding. We agree that, pursuant to the tolling provision in subsection 70.001(11), this was the date that the cause of action accrued, i.e., it was "when the last element constituting the cause of action occurred." See § 95.031(1); Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 666 So. 2d 171, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Therefore, the Husseys' September 11, 2008, lawsuit was filed within the limitations period. II. Notice of Harris Act claim. Section 70.001(11), quoted above, requires that property owners notify the governmental entity of their Harris Act claim within one year after the regulation is applied to their property, else they lose the right to pursue a cause of action....

...M & H had informal discussions with the city about obtaining a construction permit, after which the city explained that, 1 As noted in the discussion of the statute of limitations, the County conceded that the administrative and judicial process that invoked the tolling period in section 70.001(11) ended with the First District's affirmance of DOAH's final order on September 15, 2004....

...Cf. Sarasota Welfare Home, 666 So. 2d at 172-73. But as we explained in our earlier discussion, the Harris Act tolls the time for filing an action while an owner seeks relief "through lawfully available administrative or judicial proceedings." See § 70.001(11)....

...(A) – (B) [No Change] (C) determine (i) – (vii) [No Change] (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; or (ix) the issue of forum non conveniens.; (x) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes; or...

envisioned by the legislature.”). However, section 70.001(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), contains a

...V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The one-year statute of limitations for Bert Hands Act claims has expired for all plaintiffs similarly situated to Petitioners with claims which accrued prior to the October 2015 effective date of the 2015 amendment to the Act. See § 70.001(11), Fla....

...[11] The complaint contains two paragraphs numbered as "204"; one appears on page 43 and the other on page 44. [12] In 1995, the Florida Legislature enacted the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Act, which was designed to provide a remedy "as a separate and distinct cause of action from the law of takings." § 70.001, FLA. STAT. (1995). See Russo Assocs., Inc. v. City of Dania Beach Code Enforcement Bd., 920 So.2d 716, 717 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)(noting that "the intention of section 70.001 is to provide an additional remedy when governmental action does not rise to the level of taking....

...2 The then- existing version of the Harris Act required “action of a governmental entity.” Because GSK never asked the City to act through a permit or ——————————————————————————————————————————— 1 See § 70.001, Fla....

...ations, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights without amounting to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution.” § 70.001(1), Fla....

...The first subsection of the Harris Act states that the “Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights . . . .” § 70.001(1), Fla....

...state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.” Id. (emphasis added). 4  The second subsection focuses on “specific action of a governmental entity,” and “specific use” of real property. Id. § 70.001(2) (emphasis added). Similarly, the third subsection provides that the “term ‘action of a governmental entity’ means a specific action of a governmental entity which affects real property, including action on an application or permit.” Id. § 70.001(3) (emphasis added). And the “terms ‘inordinate burden’ or ‘inordinately burdened’ mean that an action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted or limited the use of real property . . . .” Id. § 70.001(3)(e) (emphasis added). Finally, a later subsection provides that a “cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue.” Id. § 70.001(11) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute’s plain language establishes that a claim under the Harris Act does not ripen until the governmental entity specifically applies the law or ordinance to the property in question....

...After being asked to withdraw its application for rezoning, GolfRock filed an action for declaratory judgment against Lee County. The complaint alleged that "[i]n order to assert its private property rights under Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution... or under the statutory protection of Section 70.001, Florida Statutes..., the 'Bert J....

...olfRock filed an action for declaratory judgment against Lee County. The complaint alleged that "[i]n order to assert its private property rights under Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution . . . or under the statutory protection of Section 70.001, Florida Statutes ....

...The Act establishes a limited cause of action for the “property owner” against a governmental entity “[w]hen a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property[.]” § 70.001(2), Fla....

...judgment motion, arguing that Dean Wish could not maintain the lawsuit because it no longer owned the property. The trial court agreed and granted Lee County’s motion, holding that Dean Wish was no longer the “property owner,” defined under section 70.001(3)(f) of the Act as “the person who holds legal title to the real property.” The Second District affirmed the judgment in a written opinion. Dean Wish, 326 So. 3d 840. Accordingly, Dean Wish could no longer maintain its action against Lee County. Lee County, having prevailed on the merits, moved the Second District for an award of its appellate attorney fees under section 70.001(6)(c)2....

...governmental entity or entities and the property owner during the 90- day-notice period or the 150-day-notice period. the Act, the “property owner” must send notice of its claim to the “head of the governmental entity” from which it seeks compensation. § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016). In turn, the governmental entity must respond to the notice within the presuit notice period with a settlement offer. § 70.001(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2016). 3 § 70.001(6)(c)2., Fla....

...settlement offer could not trigger the Act’s fee provision because the “property owner” did not fail to accept an offer. The Second District denied Lee County’s motion for appellate fees, writing: Appellee’s motion for attorneys’ fees under section 70.001(6)(c)(2), Florida Statutes . . . is . . . denied because the statute did not apply when the trial court rendered the order on appeal and the Appellee moved for fees. See § 70.001(6)(c)(2) (“In any action filed pursuant to this section, the governmental entity or entities are entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney fees ....

...Although Lee County was unsuccessful in its quest for appellate fees, it believed it was still entitled to recover its trial court fees for the time expended in the suit pre-appeal. Accordingly, it proceeded on its motion for trial court fees under section 70.001(6)(c)2., arguing that it was the prevailing party; it made a bona fide settlement offer as required by the Act; and Dean Wish could not rely on the Act’s inapplicability as a shield to the fee-shifting section therein....

.... In those cases, the statute awarded “prevailing party” attorney’s fees and the defendant was the “prevailing party.” See e.g. Diamond; Mack v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 321 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Conversely, Section 70.001(6)(c)(2) says that only the “property owner” must pay the County’s attorney’s fees. On motion for rehearing, Lee County argued that the Second District was concerned solely with appellate attorney fees and thus had examined only whether the Act applied at any point during the appeal....

...pellate fees. Dean Wish attempts to distinguish Diamond Aircraft by noting that the fee- 5 shifting statute contemplated by the Florida Supreme Court required only a finding that the movant was the prevailing party. Whereas here, section 70.001(6)(c)2. requires, in addition to the government being a prevailing party, that the government show that the “property owner” rejected a bona fide settlement offer....

...have resolved the claim fairly to” Dean Wish “if the settlement offer had been accepted by” Dean Wish, “based upon the knowledge available to” Lee County and Dean Wish “during the 90-day- notice period or the 150-day-notice period.” § 70.001(6)(c)2., Fla....

ORFINGER, C.J. Donna R. Wendler, Scott Wendler, and Wendler Properties III, Inc. (collectively, “the Wendlers”), brought this action against the City of St. Augustine under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2010) (“Harris Act”)....

...2010. The following month, the Wendlers submitted a Harris Act claim to the City. The Harris Act allows property owners to be compensated by a governmental entity if a government regulation inordinately burdens an existing or vested property right. § 70.001, Fla....

...3 *1144 The Harris Act, enacted in 1995, created a new cause of action allowing property owners who suffer inordinate regulatory burdens to existing or reasonably foreseeable land uses to be compensated by the governmental entity creating the burden. § 70.001(1), (2), (5)(a), Fla....

...overnmental entity that directly restricts or limits the use of real property. Id. at 421 . A Harris Act claim must be presented within one year from the time the law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the subject property. § 70.001(11), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). At least 180 days prior to filing a lawsuit, the owner must submit a presuit notice to the appropriate governmental entity. § 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). Following receipt of the presuit notice, the government has 180 days to consider its options, which include retracting or modifying its action, taking no action, or granting relief in a variety of ways and making an offer to settle. § 70.001(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). Before this 180-day period expires, unless a settlement offer is accepted by the property owner, the governmental entity is required to issue a written “ripeness” decision, identifying the allowable uses for the property. § 70.001(4)(a), (5)(a), Fla....

...“The ripeness decision, as a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to judicial review, and the matter shall be deemed ripe or final for the purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section, notwithstanding the availability of other administrative remedies.” § 70.001(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); Halls River, 8 So.3d at 420 . After receiving the ripeness decision, the property owner may file an action for damages. § 70.001(5)(b), Fla....

...Provided that the procedural requirements of the Harris Act are satisfied, the court then determines whether an existing or vested use exists and whether the regulation has “inordinately burdened” the real property. If the court so finds, a jury determines the amount of damages suffered by the property owner. § 70.001(6), Fla....

...As such, we conclude that the impact .of the Ordinance was not readily ascertainable until the Wendlers’ demolition applications were denied on December 5, 2007. Still a question remains regarding the timeliness of the complaint filed on July 14, 2011. Section 70.001(11), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: A came of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue....

...nclusion of such proceedings. *1146 (emphasis added). The Wendlers argue that tolling under the Harris Act applies to the presentation of a claim "with the City, and not to the filing of the cause of action in court. In contrast, the City interprets section 70.001(11) as providing an affected property owner the option of filing a claim with the appropriate government entity within one year of the permit denial or choosing to litigate the permit denial issue, thereby, foregoing the “claim” ro...

...ris Act. HARB denied the Wendlers’ demolition permits on December 5, 2007, first applying the Ordinance to the Wendler Property. The Wendlers timely presented their Harris Act claim to the City on May 11, 2010. Given the tolling provision found in section 70.001(11), only six months had elapsed (five months between the time of the citation and the first challenge in circuit court on May 23, 2008, and one month between their voluntary dismissal of the petition for writ of certiorari (April 5, 2...

...Because the Wendlers’ Harris Act claim and action were timely filed, we reverse the final judgment dismissing their suit and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SAWAYA and COHEN, JJ., concur. . The Legislature substantially amended section 70.001, effective July 1, 2011. See ch. 2011-191, §§ 1 & 3, Laws of Fla. The amendments "apply prospectively only and do not apply to any claim or action filed under s. 70.001, Florida Statutes, which is pending on the effective date of this act (July 1, 2011).” Ch....

...rdinately burdened' property”). . But see Turkali v. City of Safety Harbor, 93 So.3d 493, 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("The [Harris] Act provides that the action must be filed within one year of the application of the ordinance to the subject property. § 70.001(11).” (emphasis added)).

...We affirm the second and third issues without further comment. As for the first issue, we conclude that the trial court reversibly erred and remand for further proceedings. 1 The Bert J. Harris, Jr. Property Rights Protection Act is codified in section 70.001 of the Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Holding that the court erred in finding no violation of the Harris Act, we reverse and remand. Analysis The Harris Act was enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1995 as a mechanism to protect and compensate any landowner whose property is affected by government action not rising to the level of a taking. §°70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). To prevail under the Harris Act, the property owner must prove that “a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property.” § 70.001(2), Fla....

...court must first consider whether a claimed “existing use of the real property” or a claimed “vested right to a specific use of the real property” actually existed. If it finds either, it must next determine whether the government action inordinately burdened the property. § 70.001(6)(a), Fla. Stat. If the court also finds that that there was an inordinate burden, then it must impanel a jury to determine the total amount of compensation to the property owner for the loss caused by the inordinate burden to the property. § 70.001(6)(b), Fla....

...erty and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property. § 70.001(3)(b), Fla....

...conclude that the term relates to whether the actual land use is nonspeculative without concern to economics. The phrase “nonspeculative” appears in the definition of “existing use” as follows: “reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses . . .” § 70.001(3)(b), Fla....

...ing or vested uses that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. . . . § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...is “separate and distinct . . . from the law of takings” and, to that end, also provides that “[t]his section may not necessarily be construed under the case law regarding takings if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a taking.” §§ 70.001(1); 70.001(9), Fla....

...EVA, Judge. Collier County seeks review of an order denying approval of a joint settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement). Approval of the Settlement Agreement was sought pursuant to the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2008) 1 *37 (the Bert Harris Act), and the Settlement Agreement attempted to resolve alleged Bert Harris Act and regulatory taking claims....

...4 During the pendency of the appeals, the County and the Property Owners entered into a Settlement Agreement, dated February 12, 2018. The parties filed motions with this court seeking remand for the trial court to consider approval of the Settlement Agreement, pursuant to section 70.001(4)(d)(2), which requires court approval of a Bert Harris Act presuit settlement agreement when it would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute....

...result in contravening laws and regulations, but that it did not protect the public interest served by the contravened laws and regulations. As such, the court concluded the Settlement Agreement did not comply with the statutory standard set out in section 70.001(4)(d)(2). We agree with the result of disapproving the Settlement Agreement, but because it clearly does not comply with the timeline provided for presuit settlement agreements set out in section 70.001(4)....

...hen a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity of the state, as applied, has inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property without amounting to a taking. § 70.001(l)-(2). The Act provides for a mandatory presuit procedure, set out in section 70.001(4), pursuant to which the property owner must present written notice of its Bert Harris Act claim to the relevant governmental entity not less than 180 days 5 prior to filing a lawsuit under the Act. During that 180-day period, unless extended by agreement of the parties, the governmental entity shall make a written settlement offer to effectuate the remedies enumerated in section 70.001(4)(c)(l)-(ll)....

...ions in density or use, transfer of developmental rights, land swaps, payments in lieu of onsite mitigation, location on the least sensitive portion of the property, issuance of a variance, and purchase of the real property by a governmental entity. § 70.001(4)(c) (listing the types of relief which may be included in a settlement offer and implemented by the governmental entity if the settlement offer is accepted). If the governmental entity and property owner enter into a settlement agreement under section 70.001(4) which would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute that would otherwise apply to the subject property, the parties to the settlement agreement must file an action in the circuit court seeking approval of the se...

...lement agreement “to ensure that the relief granted protects the public interest served by the statute at issue and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property.” § 70.001(4)(2). If the property owner rejects the settlement offer by the governmental entity, the owner may file a claim for compensation in the circuit court. § 70.001(5)(b). 6 In this case, the trial court rightly questioned whether it had jurisdiction to conduct a section 70.001(4)(d) review of the Settlement Agreement....

...The settlement agreement addressed several disputes between the county and property owner, including claims raised in a previously-filed lawsuit which did not include a Bert Harris Act claim for damages. Id. When the property owner sought a writ of mandamus compelling the county to comply with the section 70.001(4)(d)(2) approv *40 al procedures, the county argued that the settlement agreement did not and could not have settled the Bert Harris Act claim because the owner had not filed a lawsuit under the Bert Harris Act....

...eeking compensation under the Bert Harris Act, and the Settlement Agreement was entered into a full four-and-a-half years later. Though the trial court erred in determining it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Settlement Agreement under section 70.001(4)(d)(2), a review of the clear, unambiguous language of section 70.001(4) leads us to conclude that the denial of approval of the Agreement is nonetheless the correct result. The Bert Harris Act seeks to encourage settlement and, in fact, requires that the relevant governmental agency present the property owner with a settlement offer during the Act’s presuit period. § 70.001(4)(c). To further encourage such early settlement, the Act sets out available remedies which may result in contravening otherwise applicable regulations and statutes. § 70.001(4)(c). When a settlement agreement incorporates remedies that result in the contravention of a statute, the parties must obtain court approval of the settlement agreement through the procedure set out in section 70.001(4)(d)(2). When the parties are unable to reach a settlement agreement, and after the ripeness prerequisite has been met, the property owner may “file a claim for compensation in the circuit court.” § 70.001(5)(b) (emphasis added). At the point of filing the circuit court action for compensation, the section 70.001(4)(c) presuit settlement negotiations have concluded, and the issue remaining pertains to whether the property owner is entitled to compensation and, if so, how much. While the parties may well choose to enter into settlement negotiations during the pendency of the compensation lawsuit, such negotiations do not take place pursuant to the section 70.001(4) presuit settlement procedures, including the procedure providing for contravention of statutes. See § 70.001(8) (“This section does not supplant methods agreed to by the parties and lawfully available for arbitration, mediation, or other forms of alternative dispute resolution, and governmental entities are encouraged to utilize such methods to augment or facilitate the processes and actions contemplated by this section.”). The Bert Harris Act sets forth a specific timeline for providing notice of a claim, presentation of a settlement offer, and filing of a lawsuit for compensation. § 70.001(4)-(5). The timeline as to when a governmental entity shall make a written settlement offer to effectuate the available remedies set out in section 70.001(4)(c)(l)-(11) is clear and unambiguous, and courts are without power to construe this unam *41 biguous statute in a way which would extend its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications....

...To do so would be contrary to the intent of the legislature to encourage early settlement of Bert Harris Act claims. Conclusion As the Settlement Agreement at issue in this case does not comply with the clear and unambiguous presuit settlement time-line set forth in section 70.001(4), and as the trial court was constrained from extending the availability of section 70.001(4) presuit settlements, the trial court was without jurisdiction to review and approve the Settlement Agreement pursuant to section 70.001(4)(d)(2)....

...the 2008 version of the Bert Harris Act for purposes of this appeal. Though amendments were made to the Act after the filing of the lawsuit but prior to the date of the Settlement Agreement, including a reduction of the presuit period identified in section 70.001(4) from 180 days to 150 days, these amendments are not material to the resolution of this case....

....Hussey v. Collier Cnty., No. 2D 11-1223 (Fla. 2d DCA filed Mar. 11, 2011), and Hussey v. Collier Cnty., 2D11-1224 (Fla. 2d DCA filed Mar. 11, 2011). . Amendments made to the Bert Harris Act, effective July 1, 2011, reduced the presuit period identified in section 70.001(4) from 180 days to 150 days. For property classified as agricultural, the notice period is 90 days. § 70.001(4)(a). . Section 70.001(5) includes an additional "ripeness decision” prerequisite to filing a lawsuit for compensation....

Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act. § 70.001, Fla. Stat. Because the grandfather provision

Protection Act (“Harris Act”), as codified in section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2010) (count IV). In January

...osa County. Jan Shackelford, Judge. June 12, 2024 PER CURIAM. Appellant challenges the amended final judgment that denied its claims brought under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...m to the City for $14,590,000 alleging diminution in value to its property under the Harris Act. Because of the amendments, Appellant alleged that any building’s height would be limited to 75 feet. The claim included an appraisal as required by subsection 70.001(4)(a) of the Harris Act. The City made a $12,000 settlement offer and issued a statement of allowable uses. See § 70.001(4), (5)(a), Fla....

...Appellant’s claim, Appellant sued the City under the Harris Act bringing two counts for relief. After protracted litigation the trial court entered a 61-page amended final judgment. In the amended final judgment, the trial court determined that the City was entitled under section 70.001(6)(c)2....

...1st DCA 2009) (citations omitted). Therefore, while we otherwise affirm the judgment in favor of the City, it is necessary to vacate paragraph 13 on page 60 of the amended final judgment where the trial court determined that the City is entitled to reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under section 70.001(6)(c)2. That leaves open the City’s request for an award of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees under section 70.001(6)(c)2., which along with the City’s motion for appellate costs and fees, must be determined in a manner consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part. B.L....

...resolution of an adversary proceeding filed in bankruptcy court and granting Hardee County's motion to dismiss FINR's original complaint with prejudice. We affirm the denial of abatement without further comment. However, because the Bert Harris Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2013), provides a cause of action for a real property owner who suffers an inordinate burden on the existing use or a vested right to a specific use of their real property as a result of government action directed...

...PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On January 4, 2013, FINR and its related entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection to allow for reorganization. In April 2013 FINR presented Hardee County with a notice of claim and appraisal under the Act, see section 70.001(4)(a), complaining about the burdensome effects of the reduced setback for mining operations on its property....

...owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the real property caused by the action of government, as provided in this section. § 70.001 (emphasis added)....

...that are unreasonable such that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large. § 70.001(3)(e)(1) (emphasis added)....

...d would defeat the legislature's stated intent. See Hayes v. State, 750 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1999) (explaining that courts "are not at liberty to add words to statutes that were not placed there by the [l]egislature"). The cause of action created by section 70.001(2) contains no requirement that the regulation giving rise to the inordinate burden directly affect the burdened property....

...We decline to follow Smith. By holding that governmental action under the Act is limited to "those types of actions which would support a regulatory taking," the Smith majority construed the Act too narrowly. Id. at 891. Furthermore by reading into 2Section 70.001(6) sets forth two phases for Bert Harris Act claims: the trial court first determines "whether an existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed and, if so, whether, considering th...

...ief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state . . . as applied, unfairly affects real property" but does not "amount[] to a taking under the State Constitution or the United States Constitution." See § 70.001(1)....

...It is clear from the plain language of the Act that property owners do not have to show that a taking has occurred. Thus "government action," which is defined in the Act as "a specific action of a governmental entity which affects real property," is not properly limited to actions which amount to a regulatory taking. See § 70.001(3)(d)....

...al property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property existed and, if so, whether, considering the settlement offer and statement of allowable uses, the governmental entity or entities have inordinately burdened the real property." § 70.001(6)(a); see also City of Jacksonville v....

Attorney General BM/tals 1 Section 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. 2 Section 70.001(4)(a), Fla. Stat. If complete

...olfRock filed an action for declaratory judgment against Lee County. The complaint alleged that "[i]n order to assert its private property rights under Article X, Section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution . . . or under the statutory protection of Section 70.001, Florida Statutes ....

...Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act is evident from the first section of the act, which clearly provides that the statute was intended to protect private property interests against "inordinately burdensome" governmental regulations that do not necessarily amount to a constitutional taking. 6 Section 70.001 (1), Florida Statutes, provides for relief or payment of compensation "when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance" unfairly affects real property....

...A municipal charter consists of the creative act and all laws in force relating to the corporation, whether in defining its powers or regulating the method of their exercise. 7 Thus, the provisions of the Charter of the Town of Lauderdale By The Sea are laws within the scope of section 70.001 , Florida Statutes, and can give rise to liability for any inordinate burden the charter provisions impose on real property "for the good of the public" when "in fairness [this disproportionate share of the burden] should be borne by t...

...ipality shall place the proposed amendment contained in the ordinance or petition to a vote of the electors at the next general election held within the municipality or at a special election called for such purpose." 2 See Ch. 95-181, Laws of Fla. 3 Section 70.001 (2), Fla. Stat. 4 Section 70.001 (1), Fla. Stat. 5 Reynolds v. State, 842 So. 2d 46 , 49 (Fla. 2002); State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105 , 109 (Fla. 2002). 6 Section 70.001 (1), Fla. Stat. And see Royal World Metropolitan, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 863 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2003). 7 12 Fla. Jur. 2d Counties and Municipal Corporations s. 22. 8 Section 70.001 (6)(a), Fla....

...ctively eliminated despite being similarly situated to neighboring properties in both location and structural ability to host murals. 5 Karenza filed a complaint against the City of Miami asserting one count under the Bert J. Harris Act, section 70.001(1), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...Karenza allegedly declined to cede all control of its mural property rights to Dacra/MDDA, and argues that, as a result of Karenza’s refusal, the private developer manipulated the ordinance amendment process to eliminate Karenza’s property from the special Geographical Area. 6 Section 70.001(2) of the Bert J....

...2d DCA 2021); Ocean Concrete, Inc. v. Indian River Cnty., Bd of Cnty. Comm'rs, 241 So. 3d 181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). If it finds either, “it must next determine whether the government action inordinately burdened the property.” Ocean Concrete, 241 So. 3d at 186 (quoting § 70.001(6)(a), Fla. Stat....

...investment- backed expectations as a matter of law, and 3) whether damages result from those findings.8 We therefore reverse the summary judgment orders and remand for further proceedings. As the trial court found that Karenza had an 8 Section 70.001(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2017), provides: The terms “inordinate burden” and “inordinately burdened”: 1....

county. Id. at 844-45. The court construed section 70.001(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2018), of the Bert

...is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; (viiivii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; (ixviii) the issue of forum non conveniens; or (x) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes;...

...Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1222 (Fla. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). 6 Florida statutory law further expands protection for private property rights under the “Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act.” See § 70.001(1), Fla....

...City of Boca Raton (“the City”). Appellants’ complaint alleged that the City’s actions inordinately burdened their existing use of the subject properties so as to require compensation under the Bert J. Harris Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2018) (“the Bert Harris Act” or “the Act”). The City responded that: (1) Appellants had not satisfied the Act’s pre- suit notice requirements because they had changed their theory of recovery and allege...

...of supplemental land development regulations (“LDRs”). Such zoning regulations, if adopted, would for the first time have allowed multi-family residential development on the subject properties. This action (or inaction) led Appellants to file pre-suit Notices of Claim, pursuant to section 70.001(4)(a)....

...After recounting the City’s actions/inaction since the 2010 Comprehensive Plan amendment, the complaint alleged: The City’s actions alleged in the Amended Complaint inordinately burden an “existing use” of the Subject Properties (“existing use” defined as in § 70.001(3)(b)2., Fla....

...City of Jacksonville v. Coffield, 18 So. 3d 589, 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). The Bert Harris Act “provides for relief, or payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state . . . unfairly affects real property.” § 70.001(1), Fla. Stat. (2018). The Act expressly states that it is predicated on “specific action of a governmental entity [that] has inordinately burdened an existing use of a real property or a vested right to a specific use of real property . . . .” § 70.001(2), Fla. Stat. (2018). For purposes of the Bert Harris Act, “[t]he term ‘action of a governmental entity’ means a specific action of a governmental entity which affects real property, including action on an application or permit.” § 70.001(3)(d), Fla....

...limited the use of real property such that the property owner is permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to a specific use of the real property . . . .” § 70.001(3)(e)1., Fla....

...uses which are suitable for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and which have created an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property.” § 70.001(3)(b)2., Fla....

...Although under the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes, the district courts clearly have such appellate jurisdiction, current rule 9.030(b)(1) does not expressly provide for. it. Thus, we amend the rule to rectify this problem. New subdivision (a)(3)(C)(viii) is added to rule 9.130 to make the rule consistent with section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; or (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes....

...P.I.E., LLC, appeals an order that dismissed its amended complaint with prejudice. We affirm the dismissal as to count II of the amended complaint but reverse the dismissal as to count I. Count I alleged a claim under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act. See § 70.001, Fla. Stat. (2007) (the “Bert Harris Act”). The trial court granted De-Soto County’s motion to dismiss this count, reasoning that the claim was untimely under the one-year period contained in subsection 70.001(11). That subsection states: “A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue.” § 70.001(11) (emphasis added)....

...alleges that the oral vote denying its permit application was not reduced to a written decision, i.e., DeSoto County Resolution 2007-12, until March 28, 2007. The Bert Harris Act contains some relatively complex presuit requirements. The property owner must submit a claim in writing to the head of the governmental entity. § 70.001(4)(a). If the matter is not resolved during the presuit period, the property owner can file its lawsuit in circuit court. § 70.001(5). However, such a cause of action “may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue.” § 70.001(11)....

...eted in the context of a legal system where orders on written pleadings and applications are reduced to writing, signed, and “rendered” by filing in an appropriate public record. See, e.g., Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(h). There is little question that section 70.001(11) would be easier to apply and interpret if it were written in more traditional legal language....

...City of Safety Harbor, 93 So.3d 493, 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), could be read to establish a one-year statute of limitations. See Turkali, 93 So.3d at 494 (“The Act provides that the action must be filed within one year of the application of the ordinance to the subject property. § 70.001(11).”)....

...r appellee. KLINGENSMITH, J. DHBH Atlantic L.L.C. and 60 ½ LLC (collectively referred to as “appellants”) appeal a final order dismissing their complaint with prejudice under the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2019) (“Harris Act”), against appellee City of Delray Beach (“Delray”)....

...suggested by the previous ordinance. Delray provided notice to all affected property owners within the Limited Height Area of the adoption of the 2018 Ordinance and reminded them they had “only one (1) year from receipt of this notice to pursue any rights established in Section 70.001, Florida Statutes.” A few days before the expiration of the one-year deadline for claims, appellants submitted a joint claim letter to Delray under the Harris Act. The letter identified DHBH and 60 ½ separately but referred to t...

...“If an exhibit attached to a complaint negates the pleader’s cause of action, the plain language of the document will control and may be the basis for a motion to dismiss.” Warren v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 662 So. 2d 1387, 1388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The Harris Act, codified in section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2019), allows property owners to be compensated by a governmental entity if a government regulation inordinately burdens an existing or vested property right....

...he property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair market value of the real property caused by the action of government, as provided in this section. § 70.001(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). The Harris Act requires the owner of an affected property to file a claim within one year of the application of the ordinance to the subject property. § 70.001(11), Fla. Stat. (2019). Additionally, the owner must file a pre-suit notice to the political entity at least 150 days prior to filing the action. § 70.001(4)(a), Fla....

...The Harris Act restricts a property owner to making a claim only as to property over which it holds legal title, defining “property owner” as “the person who holds legal title to the real property that is the subject of and directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity.” § 70.001(3)(f), Fla....

...3d at 186; Sosa, 762 So. 2d at 982. The Harris Act states, “The award of compensation shall be determined by calculating the difference in the fair market value of the real property, as it existed at the time of the governmental action at issue . . . .” § 70.001(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Under section 70.001(1): The Legislature recognizes that some laws, regulations, and ordinances of the state and political entities in the state, as applied, may inordinately burden, restrict, or limit private property rights ....

...3d at 909 (Makar, J., dissenting)). 5  The Harris Act’s plain language establishes that the determination of the fair market value of the property must be measured at the time when the governmental action first affected the property. See § 70.001(6)(b). The Harris Act also specifically states that enactment of a law or regulation applies to the property only when notice is provided to the owners. § 70.001(11)(a)1., Fla....

...Because appellants made a legally deficient joint claim, the only cure would be for DHBH and 60 ½ to separately submit their claims. If that were to occur, any new claim submitted to Delray and the court would be outside the statute’s one-year limitation. See § 70.001(11) (“A cause of action may not be commenced under this section if the claim is presented more than 1 year after a law or regulation is first applied by the governmental entity to the property at issue.”). The trial court properly d...

...titled to workers’ compensation immunity; (vi) whether to certify a class; (vii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; (viii) the issue of forum non conveniens; (ix) that, as a matter of law, a settlement agreement is unenforceable, is set aside, or never existed; or...

Medicaid Services, Medicare Claims Processing Manual, § 70.1 (2020). Both Park Place and Bay- front had the

...or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; (viii) that a governmental entity has taken action that has inordinately burdened real property within the meaning of section 70.001(6)(a), Florida Statutes; (ix) the issue of forum non conveniens; (x) that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes; or...

Because the settlement agreement is a product of section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012), known as the “Bert

...r Ranch, LLC, Conservation Land Group, LLC, (the two “Property Owners”), the City of Dunnellon, and the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO), f/k/a the Department of Community Affairs. The settlement agreement was entered pursuant to section 70.001, Florida Statutes (2012), known as the “Bert J....

...eement] protects the public interest served by the statute at issue [section 163.3184, Florida, Statutes (2012) ] and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property,” section 70.001(4)(d)2., Florida Statutes (2012), we reverse and remand for further proceedings....

...The Florida Legislature enacted the Bert Harris Act in 1995, as part of Chapter 95-181, Laws of Florida, to protect property owners “when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property.” § 70.001(1), Fla....

...(2012)- The Bert Harris Act created a new cause of action for property owners, against 'the government, to compensate the owner when an existing use of the owner’s property “or a vested right to a specific use of real property” is “inordinately burdened” by a new governmental regulation. § 70.001(2), Fla....

...o long as the “relief granted” protects the “public interest - served by the regulations at issue” • and is “the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real property.” § 70.001(4)(c)l., (d)l., Fla....

...“Whenever a governmental entity enters into a settlement agreement under this section which would have the- effect of'contravening the application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property,” circuit court approval is required. *314 § 70.001(4)(d)2., Fla....

...perty.” Id. Notably, the Bert Harris Act expressly grants circuit judges broad power to “enter any orders necessary to effectuate the purposes of this section and to make final determinations to effectuate relief available under this section.” § 70.001(7)(a), Fla....

...lly amending the comprehensive plan without following the notice, public participation and state, review requirements in that statute for local comprehensive plan amendments, the parties to the agreement sought circuit court approval, as required by section 70.001(4)(d)2....

...ng an evidentia-ry hearing. The circuit court appears to have accepted the Property Owners’ arguments, and approved the settlement agreement without taking any evidence and without elaboration in the order on review. Clearly, the plain language of section 70.001(4)(d)2....

...The teim “inordinate burden” as defined in the Bert Harris Act requires factual determinations regarding the “vested rights” of the owners at the time of the new regulation, as well as the owners’ “investment-backed expectations” based Upon existing uses or vested rights in the property. § 70.001(3)(e), Fla....

...(2012). The statute also directs that the “existence of a ‘vested right’ is to be determined by applying the principles of equitable estoppel or- substantive due process under the common law or by applying the statutory law of this state.” § 70.001(3)(a), Fla....

...ce of “development order[s], a variance, special exception, or other extraordinary relief’ even when the relief “would have the effect of contravening the application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to the subject real property ....”§ 70.001(4)(c)l., (4)(c)9., (4)(d)2., Fla....