Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...gree of control over its subsidiary that the activities of the subsidiary were in fact the activities of the parent within the state is substituted service of process permitted." 340 So.2d at 546 . 17 Although these cases involved Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.181, the substituted service of process statute which was in effect before the current long-arm statute was enacted, decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...1 Pol-skie sought to obtain personal jurisdiction over Seasafe Transport through its wholly owned subsidiary, Seasafe, Inc., a Florida corporation located in Miami. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the 1984 amendments to Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 were not applicable and that Seasafe Transport had no connection with Florida sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction under the statutes in effect when the cause of action arose. DISCUSSION Retroactive Application of the 1984 Amendments In 1984, the Florida legislature amended Fla.Stat. §§ 48.081(5), 48.181(3) and 48.193....

...would decide the issue otherwise.” Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, the district court did not err in declining to apply the 1984 amendments to this case. Jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) Alternatively, Polskie claims that Seasafe Transport is subject to Florida jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.-193 (1983) by virtue of “doing business” in the state....

...The district court did not determine whether Seasafe Transport was doing business in Florida. Instead, it found there was no “connexity” between the Florida activities and the relationship between Pol-skie and Seasafe Transport (R. 221-22). Sections 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) required “connexity” in addition to the “doing business” requirement....

...Polskie was sued by the owners of the lost cargo in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Polskie filed a third-party action against Seasafe Transport which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 2 . Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 48.181 provided that: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations...

...nal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors to any person, firm, or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (1983) (emphasis added)....

...t ruled that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to show that Doric Navigation, a non-resident defendant, was doing sufficient business in Florida to give rise to a cause of action based upon Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.181 (West 1969)....

...ocal Miami trade publication. Therefore due process will not be offended by the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over APL. B. Insufficiency of Service of Process In Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968), Judge Fulton said that under § 48.181 of the Florida Statutes one may serve the Secretary of State of Florida as the agent of a foreign corporation when the cause of action arose out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the activities of the foreign corporation in Florida....

...er to further its general course of business in shipping justifies the use of Florida's substituted service of process upon the secretary of state. As recited in International Graphics ". . . the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., (was) that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State." This legislative intent, as well as defendant's activities within Florida for pecuniary benefit, permit the use of substituted service of process....

...or the merchandise in question. The trial court entered a judgment and order denying defendant's motion to dismiss, essentially concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service under sec. 48.181, F.S....

...Kephart v. Pickens, Fla.App. 1972, 271 So.2d 163. [3] Although defendant seeks a reversal predicated primarily upon the contention that a single sale of goods to a Florida corporation does not constitute "doing business" within the meaning of sec. 48.181, F.S., we do not perceive the disposition of this appeal to turn upon this determination....

...The issue to be resolved is whether the plaintiff has met the burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service of process so as to withstand a motion to dismiss, i.e. has the plaintiff alleged (and proven) all requisite jurisdictional facts justifying the applicability of the long-arm statute, sec. 48.181, F.S....

...[3] It is well settled that an appeal court will affirm an order of the trial court on appeal consistent with any theory revealed by the record, regardless of the reason stated in the order under review. [4] The statute invoked by the plaintiff in this cause, § 48.181, F.S., provides for substituted service of process upon nonresidents operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on "a business or business venture in the state"....

...m statute". The trial judge dismissed the complaint upon a finding that the defendants did not have the minimal contacts in Florida sufficient to subject them to substitute service. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed relying upon § 48.181, Fla. Stat., which provides: "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country...

...ts pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A nonresident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit. Even if the activities of the defendant were not sufficient to constitute a business or business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can still be acquired under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) if such defendant sells, consigns or leases within this State personal property through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. If Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) is complied with, even a single sale, consignment or lease raises a conclusive presumption that the defendant is operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this State. Thus, a defendant may be carrying on a business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3), although that defendant is not carrying on a business or business venture pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). The method of service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 (3) is identical to that explained under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). Turning now to the applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant was conducting a general course of business activity in this State....

...Greenwald, 149 So.2d 586 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). The record does not reflect any acts taken by the plaintiff in this State on behalf of the defendants. We do not hold that plaintiff cannot, by appropriate proof, meet its burden to show applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). We merely hold that plaintiff has failed to do so. Upon a proper showing, plaintiff should be afforded a further opportunity to attempt service pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1). Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) applies only if a nonresident person, firm or corporation "sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property ...". Defendants contend that the personal property, to-wit: the stock, was exchanged, not sold, and therefore Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be used to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants....

...Based on the statement of legislative intent in the preamble, we reject defendant's contention that "exchange" does not fall within the ambit of "sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever ...". In addition to requiring defendant to be a nonresident person selling intangible personal property, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) also requires the sale to be "through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors ...". This requirement was first interpreted in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, 144 So.2d 512 (Fla.3d DCA 1962), wherein the plaintiff attempted to obtain service of process under Fla. Stat. § 47.16 (now Fla. Stat. § 48.181) on a foreign corporation which published magazines and sold them to independent contractors in Florida, *565 which sold the magazines to newsstands, which in turn sold them to the general public. In the holding that there was no jurisdiction over the defendant publishing company, the court stated: "In order to authorize service under § 47.16(1) [now § 48.181(1)], upon the Secretary of State as provided by § 47.30 [now § 48.161], the party attempting to perfect such service must demonstrate either (1) that the foreign corporation has some degree of control over the personal property referred to in § 47.16(2) [now § 48.181(3)] supra, in the hands of the `brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors' selling or distributing the personal property in this State or (2) that the foreign corporation has some degree of control over the `brokers, jobbers, wholesaler...

...n carrier or mail to independent wholesalers or dealers throughout the United States, one of which was located in Florida. In holding that the Canadian newspaper publisher was not amenable to substitute service or process in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) because it had not been shown that the defendant had some degree of control over the wholesalers or distributors who were selling the property in Florida or over the property in their hands, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Talcott v....

...the law in Florida because of (1) a subsequent amendment to the Long Arm Statute and (2) a subsequent case decided by the Supreme Court of Florida, DeVanney v. Rumsch, Fla. 1969, 228 So.2d 904, which plaintiffs read as broadening the application of Section 48.181. We think Fawcett is alive and well in Florida. "The changes in former Section 47.16 in effect at the time Fawcett was decided and present Section 48.181, insofar as the issue in the instant case is concerned, *566 are changes in phraseology only....

...esalers and distributors in the state." Even though this Court has not expressly adopted the views in the cases cited herein, such views have been the established law in this State. We adopt these views and refuse to expand the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3). Furthermore, we hold that the requisite control, as explained herein, is also applicable to § 48.181(1), where the nonresident is doing business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. Applying the established interpretation of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) to the facts in the case at bar, the plaintiff must carry the burden of showing that the defendant has some degree of control over the plaintiff broker or control over the stock in the hands of the broker. Unless this is done, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be relied upon to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant....

...By retaining ownership of the property, the seller can change or cancel the listing, even though such action may result in further litigation. Therefore, the requirement that the business be conducted "through a broker" has been satisfied. The final requirement of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) is that property be sold, leased or consigned to any "person, firm or corporation in this state"....

...satisfied. The gist of plaintiff's argument is that the residence of the purchaser is determinative of the question of whether defendant is selling property to a person or corporation in this State. Under the plaintiff's interpretation of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3), a person in California who sells personal property through a broker in California to a person vacationing in California will be susceptible to jurisdiction in Florida if the vacationer happens to be a Florida resident....

...Such an interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional. Cases from the District Courts of Appeal and Federal courts have been cited by the parties for the proposition that if the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors are doing business under § 48.181(1), and the nonresident defendant has control over the brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, then the nonresident is doing business in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3). The facts in the case at bar illustrate the fallacy of such an argument. In this case, the broker is a business broker in Florida doing business under § 48.181(1), and the nonresident defendant has control over the broker; however, no facts were presented to show that the business conducted by the broker in Florida was conducted for the benefit of the nonresident defendant, as opposed to other clients of the broker....

...t takes place in this State. The general rules of the law of contracts control the determination as to the place of sale, lease or consignment. Since the exchange agreement was executed in Illinois, and the closing took place in Illinois, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3) cannot be utilized to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants....

...show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit.” Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1975) (emphasis added) (construing materially identical statutory language in Florida’s service-of-process statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1)).8 7 The Frasers do not contend on appeal that J&B Tours falls under any of the statute’s other provisions for specific jurisdiction, and we agree that it does not. 8 “Florida’s long-arm statute i...

...corporation," which provides in pertinent part: Process against any corporation may be served in accordance with Chapter 48 and Chapter 49. Turning to Chapter 48, plaintiff refers the Court to the appropriate long-arm statutes. *1166 The first one, Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1979) provides: The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all f...

...The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. (emphasis supplied) In addition to Section 48.181, in 1973 the Florida legislature enacted a second long-arm statute, Section 48.193, which substantially duplicates the operative language of the older statute and provides in pertinent part: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resi...

...Compare Youngblood v. Citrus Association of the New York Cotton Exchange, 276 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cert. denied, 285 So.2d 26 (Fla.1973) and Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corporation, 361 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (discussing § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

...Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F.Supp. 1235 (N.D.Fla.1975); Donnelly v. Kellogg Company, 293 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968). [4] Since the language of the newer long-arm statute (i. e. § 48.193) is not materially different from that contained in the older act (§ 48.181) with respect to jurisdiction based upon business contacts with the state, the restrictive Florida approach is equally applicable no matter which jurisdictional basis is invoked....

...ountry, including Florida, it is not unreasonable that defendant could have anticipated defending itself in this forum as a result of its activities in this state. After evaluating the nature and scope of the contacts required by Florida Statutes, §§ 48.181 and 48.193, the Court concludes that jurisdiction thereunder, when applied to these facts, does not offend federal notions of due process....

...§ 48.193(1)(g). Plaintiffs in products liability actions typically utilize § 48.193(1)(f) to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer. It thus appears that § 48.193 was enacted to broaden jurisdiction to areas not previously covered by § 48.181....

...Mallard, supra at 241 and n.3. This development has eliminated the necessity of choosing between a state or federal interpretation of the statutes. The result should now be the same under either construction. [5] This is so only when jurisdiction is obtained under § 48.181 or 48.193(1)(a)....

...ncing the plaintiffs' rights to forums with the burdens connected with requiring Nissan-Japan to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum courts. SPECIFIC STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES Florida [72-1159-Civ-CA] Plaintiff relies primarily on Florida Statutes § 48.181 and secondarily on § 42.182 for providing jurisdiction over Nissan-Japan to the Courts in Florida....

...itrust claims. [30] Thus, it is appropriate to look to these long-arm statutes in this inquiry. Plaintiff urges that the contacts of Nissan-Japan treated elsewhere within this memorandum opinion constitute doing or transacting business under F. S.A. § 48.181....

...diary, Nissan-USA. Given the strictness in recognizing corporate separateness and identity by the Fifth Circuit and Florida, this Court finds that Nissan-USA is not the "alter ego" of Nissan-Japan. [32] However, this Court finds that Florida Statute § 48.181 provides for jurisdiction over Nissan in Florida courts since Nissan-Japan is carrying on a business or business venture within Florida as these terms are applied within Florida and by virtue of the control Nissan-Japan can potentially exercise over the affairs of Nissan-USA within Florida. Transacting business through intermediaries under § 48.181(3) was at issue in Talcott v....

...[33] Talcott was a libel case in which the libelous publication was printed in Canada but distributed through independent wholesalers in Florida. The Fifth Circuit relied on Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, [34] for the proposition that foreign publishers should be amenable to the jurisdiction of Florida courts under § 48.181(3) only if they retain some degree of control over the distributors or over the property in their hands. However, DeVaney v. Rumsch, [35] broadened § 48.181....

...[37] *852 It cannot be questioned that Nissan-Japan has derived substantial pecuniary benefit from sales of its automobiles in Florida. Consequently, the DeVaney pecuniary benefit test has been met. Also, the cause of action arises out of or is incidental to the activities of Nissan-Japan in Florida since under F.S.A. § 48.181(3) Nissan-Japan is conclusively presumed to be carrying on a business venture in Florida because Nissan-USA is a wholesaler or distributor through which Nissan-Japan is selling its product and any injury due to alleged price fixing would arise out of the sale of Datsuns in Florida. Another approach is determining whether the corporation is doing or transacting business in Florida because of the control it exercises over Nissan-USA. This control approach comes within the meaning of § 48.181....

...Watts [38] was a wrongful death action against a foreign manufacturer with a wholly owned subsidiary doing business in Florida. Despite the formal separateness of the companies the Deere & Co. Court held the manufacturer subject to jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 47.16 [the predecessor of § 48.181] due to the degree of control the parent was capable of exerting over the operations and policies of the subsidiary since many of the same people held offices in both corporations....

...is capable of asserting substantial control over the affairs of its subsidiary. [39] For this reason and the profits Nissan-Japan derives from the sales of its products in Florida the substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State provided for by Fla. Stat. § 48.181 was proper....

...148 (E.D.N.Y.1971); Albert Levine Assoc. v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F.Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y.1970); Chemical Specialties Sales Corp. v. Basic, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 1106 (D. C.Conn.1968; Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa-Romeo S. p. A., 244 F.Supp. 70 (S.D. N.Y.1965). [31] § 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...Savoy Electronics, 290 F.Supp. 240 (S.D.Fla.1967). [33] 427 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1970). [34] 144 So.2d 512 (3rd D.C.A.Fla.1962). [35] 228 So.2d 904 (Fla.1969). [36] DeVaney was a medical malpractice case in which the question to be answered was whether § 48.181 applied to persons practicing a profession in the State as well as to those engaging in business in the State....

...19, 1965. Florida Statutes *420 § 48.182, F.S.A. (set out supra footnote 2), sought to be used to obtain service on the defendant, was enacted in 1970 and has an effective date of July 1, 1970. Service attempted under Florida Statutes § 48.161 and § 48.181, F.S.A. was quashed by the United States District Court. No question has been raised on appeal or in this certificate concerning § 48.161 or § 48.181....

...udice and a decision of a District Court of Appeal or of the Supreme Court, regardless of which statute may have been the basis for the decision sub judice. Since petitioner has shown that the decision sub judice had to be based on either Fla. Stat. § 48.181 or § 48.182, and such decision if based upon § 48.181 would conflict with Fawcett Publications, Inc....

...s, or control over the personal property in the hands of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, before a nonresident can be held to be doing business in this State through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) or § 48.181(3)....

...The decision sub judice conflicts with Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, supra , and Dinsmore v. Blumenthal, supra . Whereas a parent company has "control" over a subsidiary, a manufacturer does not necessarily have "control" over a sole distributor. Fla. Stat. § 47.16(2) [now § 48.181(3)] was enacted as a legislative response to Berkman v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 246 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.1957) affg., 142 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), wherein it was held that Fla. Stat. § 47.16(1) [now § 48.181(1)] was inadequate to serve as a basis to assert jurisdiction in this State over a parent company whose subsidiary was doing business in this State. We do not hold that respondent cannot, by appropriate proof, meet its burden of proof to show applicability of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) or § 48.181(3)....

...We merely hold that respondent has failed to do so. Upon a proper showing, respondent should be afforded a further opportunity to attempt service. Having reached the conclusion that petitioner failed to sustain the propriety of substitute service pursuant to § 48.181, we must decide whether petitioner is subject to jurisdiction under § 48.182 which provides: "48.182 Service on nonresidents committing a wrongful act outside the state which causes injury within the state....

...ld be embodied in the district court's decision to affirm without opinion. An analysis of the opinion indicates that it has ruled on each of the following areas of law. (1) The majority finds as a fact that the plaintiff has not yet properly invoked Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes, because the element of "control" has not been proved on the record before us....

...ael, and the trial court directed that the motion for attorney's fees would be treated as a third-party claim. *488 The Motion For Attorney's Fees—Round 2 Security Pacific then re-served the Visolys under the Non-Resident Businessman's Statute. See § 48.181, Fla....

...ses of the dominant corporation." Id. at 733 (quoting Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 181 (5th Cir.1981))(emphasis added); see also Aquila Steel Corp. v. Fontana, 585 So.2d 426, 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)(addressing substituted service under section 48.181 and whether fact that party served was wholly-owned subsidiary of party for whom service was intended, court states: "Only where there is a showing by plaintiff that the parent corporation exercised such a degree of control over its su...

...where the breach occurs. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934). The question of whether the defendant is "conducting a business or business venture" in Florida is irrelevant because service is being made under Section 48.193 rather than Section 48.181....

...ed to avoid a declaration of unconstitutionality or grave doubts on that score. Armstrong v. City of Edgewater, 157 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1963). Therefore, we determine that the requirements of doing business and connexity as delineated in Florida Statute § 48.181 (1971), F.S.A., must be read in pari materia with Florida Statute § 48.081 (1971), F.S.A....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...contacts. Wherefore, as appellants argue that connexity is not required, while in fact it is required, and as no showing of connexity has been made, service cannot be sustained under Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A., when read in pari materia with § 48.181 (1971)....

...Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). [2] See, e.g., Cal. Code Civ.P. § 410.10 (Supp. 1971). [3] See Bayitch, Conflict of Laws, Florida 1968-69, 24 U.Miami L.Rev. 434, 454 (1970). [4] See cases cited note 1, supra. [5] See Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) (1971), F.S.A....

...Duncan, Gainesville, for respondents. BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 218 So.2d 238. The decision sought to be reviewed holds that Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., providing for constructive service of process "does not apply to persons practicing a profession in this State in contrast to engaging in business in this State." Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., provides: "The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations, an...

...of carrying on * * * personal business activity in this state for * * * pecuniary benefit or livelihood." The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., [2] upheld service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., on an individual who came into the state to participate in the proceeds of an uncle's estate. The Court held: [3] "There is no question that the provision of Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...ong others, are specifically referred to in the Statutes, and regulated as, "professions." Presumably the decision under review would result in anyone having professional status being immune from constructive service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., for torts resulting from their acts. We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, *907 F.S.A., to be that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State....

...ployment and conduct of carrying on business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. The District Court reversed the trial court and ordered any service of process had, or attempted, against respondent quashed on the ground that Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., was "inapplicable to a nonresident who has been engaged in only a profession in Florida and not a business * * *." This holding made it unnecessary for the District Court to pass on the efficacy of successive efforts to obtain service under the Statute without filing new actions....

...failure to comply with the Statute. The same judge who entered the two prior orders quashing service and dismissing the complaint as to Dr. Rumsch, also entered the order under review allowing additional time to perfect service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...There is no contention that the original complaint is defective or that Dr. Rumsch's rights have been adversely affected in this procedure. Under the circumstances we hold it unnecessary for petitioners to have refiled after each attempted service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...t isolated activity within this state, all within the meaning of paragraphs 48.193(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as subsection 48.193(2) of the same statute. We disagree. Florida decisions under the closely related provisions of subsection 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as section 48.193, have held that the presence of a subsidiary corporation within Florida is not enough, without more, to subject a non-Florida parent corporation to long-arm jurisdiction within this state. See MacMillan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (§ 48.181); see also Phillips v....

...It involves the tragic death of a South Florida boy in a swimming lagoon at the Atlantis, which is an international tourist attraction in close proximity to South Florida, marketed heavily in Florida, and where 14% of all guests are from Florida. iii. § 48.181(3) Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants come within the purview of § 48.181(3), which provides that a party who "sells, consigns, or leases ......

...Island Vacations for reservations and bookings services. Thus, if this provision operates to confer personal jurisdiction in this case at all, it does so only with respect to Sun Bahamas. The parties' briefs regarding this issue address only whether § 48.181(3) confers general or specific personal jurisdiction and, consequently, whether a showing of "connexity" is also required....

...Because the parties have not briefed these issues nor developed the factual record on these points, and because the Court has determined that both defendants' are subject to general personal jurisdiction under 48.193(2), the Court need not, and therefore does not, reach plaintiff's alternative theory under 48.181(3)....

...Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Lyster v. Round, 276 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Elmex and Lyster, however, are inapplicable to the case at bar because those two cases construed a different long-arm statute (Section 48.181) than the one now before us. The provisions of Section 48.181 apply to nonresident persons who "carry on a business or business venture in this state." Those words were interpreted by Elmex and Lyster as requiring a continuous, systematic activity with the forum by the out-of-state business enterprise. The statutory language of Section 48.193, however, is much broader in scope than that of Section 48.181....

...Frye of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf & Barkin, Tampa, for appellee-McDowell Mfg. Co. WALDEN, Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal by plaintiff-appellant, whose complaint against the non-resident McDowell Manufacturing Co., defendant-appellee, was dismissed on grounds the court had no jurisdiction under F.S. 48.181 (1973) and F.S. 48.193 (1973) We reverse. The pertinent statutory sections are: "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state "(1) The acceptance by ......

...distributors in Florida for at least five years, and grossed thereby at least $13,000 per year. It is proven by defendant, by its own statement, that it received a pecuniary benefit from the transactions. That is evidence of "doing business" under F.S. 48.181 (1973), DeVaney v....

...1971), the affidavit states there were several acts here. The defendant not having made a showing that jurisdiction should not attach under the Florida long arm statute, the plaintiff was under no burden to present counter affidavits in addition to its complaint. Defendant contends F.S. 48.181(3), supra, did not apply, claiming a distinction between selling "to" distributors and selling "through" them. However, defendant's representative came to Florida to see plaintiff about the products plaintiff had bought; defendant's interest in its product extended through the distributor to the ultimate purchaser. We find the requirements of F.S. 48.181(3), supra, were fully met for jurisdiction to attach....

...48.193(1)(g) to give the trial court jurisdiction over the defendant to consider, among other items of the complaint, the validity of the claimed contract. We make no decision upon the validity of the contract; that consideration remains the sole prerogative of the trial court at this stage of the proceeding. We hold that F.S. 48.181 and 48.193 (1973) apply to render appellee subject to jurisdiction....

...tions of citizenship contained in Holder's Counterclaim which Gappa and Rackstraw assailed in their motion. Moreover, even under Florida law a plaintiff may invoke personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by pleading either the language of § 48.181, see Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.070(i); see also Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), or by alleging sufficient substantive facts to support personal jurisdiction under § 48.181....

...rsuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served *760 pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A non-resident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit." Id....

...[3] See also Electro Engineering Products Co. Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...The court granted Harrington's motion for vacatur and relief from judgment and granted the dissolution of garnishment and sanctions. The court found that Labbee failed to properly plead "the actual statutory language or allegations of the ultimate facts" under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), thereby failing to invoke jurisdiction over Harrington....

...Ltd., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000); Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So.2d 190, 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The issue on appeal is whether Labbee's complaint is facially sufficient in setting forth jurisdictional allegations giving rise to the use of substituted service on the Secretary of State under section 48.181. [2] This issue requires us to accept *682 all allegations in the complaint as true and confine our review to the four corners of the pleading. See Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So.2d 859, 860-61 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Section 48.181, one of Florida's long-arm statutes, permits Florida's Secretary of State to accept service on behalf of nonresidents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state. ß 48.181, Fla....

...sidents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts when the nonresidents engage in the foregoing business activity, but also applies to nonresidents who engage in tortious acts in Florida. ß 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Furthermore, sections 48.193 and 48.181 "provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents." A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). While section 48.181 permits service to be effected on the Secretary of State, section 48.193 contemplates personal service. Id. Since Labbee served Harrington through the use of substituted service upon the Secretary of State, our review is limited to whether Labbee made the necessary jurisdictional allegations under section 48.181....

...seeking to invoke the provisions of the long-arm statute. Elmex, 325 So.2d at 61. To determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate for substituted service, the complaint must either plead a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the language of section 48.181 or allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the statute....

...Strasser Constr. v. Linn, 97 So.2d 458, 459 (Fla.1957). To effect valid substituted service of process, Labbee's complaint must sufficiently allege that Harrington operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this state. See ß 48.181, Fla....

...l property for profit until he sold it to Labbee. Accepting these allegations as true, we find that both the renting of the property and the sale of such an investment property sufficiently describes a business venture. The legislative intent behind section 48.181 was to regard non-residents who have availed themselves of the privilege of "dealing in goods, services, or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain," as operating a business or business venture....

...The second issue is whether Labbee's allegation that Harrington was a resident of Puerto Rico sufficiently satisfies the requirement of pleading that a person must be a resident of any other state or country, or a resident of the state who subsequently becomes a nonresident or conceals his whereabouts. See ß 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2003). Pleading that Harrington is a resident of Puerto Rico is the factual equivalent of pleading that Harrington is a "resident[] of any other state or country." ß 48.181, Fla....

...2d DCA 1980); Arvanetes v. Gilbert, 143 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)(noting that a lease attached to complaint was part of the complaint for all purposes). We find that Labbee met her burden of sufficiently alleging ultimate facts to invoke jurisdiction under section 48.181....

...We reverse the order dismissing Labbee's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and reinstate the final judgment in favor of Labbee in the amount of $18,923. Reversed. NOTES [1] Subsequently, both Bazo and Cobo were dismissed from the lawsuit. [2] Section 48.181 states, in relevant part: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually or associated together ..., who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations, and any person who is a resident of the stat...

...constitutes an appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the Secretary of State of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or proceeding against them, ... arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture may be served. ß 48.181, Fla....

...The flight attendants, now certified as a class, sued numerous defendants (TMA included) for strict liability, implied warranty, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation and conspiracy to misrepresent and to commit fraud. [2] In the instant case, the flight attendants relied on sections 48.181(3) and 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) as the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over TMA. Section 48.181(3) deems a person, firm or corporation *941 to be engaged in substantial activities and conducting business in this state if tangible or intangible personal property is sold, consigned or leased through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors....

...n the second amended complaint. The plaintiffs' failure to respond with a counter-affidavit or other sworn proof [5] establishing the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction defeated the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over TMA pursuant to section 48.181(3)....

...The Association will respond to unsolicited requests for information or publications from Florida residents, although such requests have been few in number. Having seven members of a non-profit trade association within Florida does not rise to the level of doing business in Florida for purposes of sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Petersburg, for appellee. BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge. Appellee/plaintiff filed a complaint based on a contract to sell a business located in Florida. He attempted to serve appellant/defendant, who was residing in California at that time, under Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...It is well established that Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Lyster v. Round, 276 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Wm. E. Strasser Const. Corp. v. Linn, 97 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1957). To perfect service pursuant to Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statute....

...and that the defendant is either a resident of a foreign state or country, a resident of Florida who subsequently becomes a nonresident, or a resident of Florida who conceals his whereabouts. See O'Connell v. Loach, 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), Section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984) (emphasis supplied) (codifying in part ch. 84-2, § 3, Laws of Fla.). On May 30, 1984, the plaintiffs refiled their actions. [2] The plaintiffs served AMC and Jeep pursuant to sections 48.181 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1983) (as amended by chapter 84-2, Laws of Florida)....

...a law. [4] The plaintiffs' actions do not arise out of AMC's and Jeep's activities in Florida — the accident occurred in the Cayman Islands and the Jeep CJ-5 was neither manufactured nor sold in Florida. Prior to the 1984 amendments, both sections 48.181 and 48.193 required that there be a "connexity" between the cause of action and the defendant corporation's activities in Florida....

...ress and unequivocal statement" from the legislature indicating a different intent. [6] See Fleeman, 342 So.2d at 818. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying *275 AMC and Jeep's motions to dismiss is reversed. Reversed. NOTES [1] Section 48.181(3) was amended in the following manner: (3) Any person, firm, or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors to a...

...l be conclusively presumed to be both engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state, and operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business or business venture in this state. Ch. 84-2, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 48.181(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984)). It is not clear, and we need not decide, what effect, if any, the amendments of chapter 84-2 will have on the "engrafted" requirement of section 48.181 that the cause of action arise out of the foreign corporation's business activities in Florida. See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 388 So.2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Manus v. Manus, 193 So.2d 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (construing § 47.16, Fla. Stat. (1965) (predecessor to § 48.181)). Courts have held that section 48.181 (titled " Service on nonresident engaging in business in state" (emphasis supplied)) provides a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-residents independent from the bases provided by section 48.193 (which is titled "Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state" (emphasis supplied))....

...Appellees instituted this action in the Circuit Court of Volusia County praying for judgment against appellant for the full amount of the check held by them. They obtained constructive service of process on appellant under the long-arm statute of our state pursuant to the provisions of F.S. Section 48.181(1), F.S.A., as follows: "The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corpor...

...ealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State....

...ited in order to demonstrate the applicability of the statute. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that on the record before us the trial court erred in holding that process has been constructively served on appellant under the provisions of F.S. Section 48.181(1), F.S.A., and that the court has jurisdiction over his person....

...(Doc. 26) For the reasons stated below, the motion to reconsider and the motion to quash service of process are GRANTED. I. Procedural Background On May 26, 1989, plaintiffs attempted to serve Nissan Ltd. with process pursuant to Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1987), which provide for a method of substituted service of process....

...l of documents abroad, then the Hague Service Convention applies." At ___, 108 S.Ct. at 2108, 100 L.Ed.2d at 731. The applicable Florida law here comes from Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1987), "Method of substituted service on nonresident," and Section 48.181, "Service on nonresident engaging in business in state." The latter section provides that where a defendant engages in business within Florida, the Secretary of State is the agent for process in any action involving such business. § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, I interpret the Convention to disallow direct service by mail. The plaintiffs' service is inadequate under the Convention. IV. Use of Nissan U.S.A. as Agent For Process Consideration of this issue also requires that I review the application of Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes (1987). That section, together with subsection 48.181(1), provides that if a nonresident defendant does business in the forum through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors," then service on such jobber, distributor, etc., is proper as service on an agent for process....

...Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In McCurdy, the court, after ruling that plaintiff had not met the burden of "clearly proving that [defendant] was amenable to substituted service of process pursuant to F.S. § 48.181," held that the motion below to quash should have been granted. McCurdy, supra, 340 So.2d at 546. Since plaintiffs have not alleged any facts which would support finding Nissan U.S.A. as Nissan, Ltd.'s agent under Section 48.181(3), that provision is inapplicable....

...o file the requisite affidavit of compliance in accordance with Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977); and (b) insufficient facts were alleged in the complaint to justify the use of substituted service over a nonresident doing business in Florida. § 48.181, Fla....

...isdictional and completion of service without it is not sufficient. Secondly, the plaintiff's bare allegation that the defendant was "doing business in Florida" is insufficient to render the defendant amenable to substituted service of process under Section 48.181, supra....

...2d DCA 1978). Failure to do so requires quashal of the service of process. Defendant's second contention in its motion to dismiss was that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to justify jurisdiction under the substituted service of process statute, Section 48.181, supra, or the long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...However, we distinguish that case from the present in that a motion for continuance at least requests temporal relief and is therefore more than a "neutral and innocuous piece of paper." [3] Decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 should apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...1969, 228 So.2d 904, holding that the "professional-business" distinction made in connection with the imposition of ethical and moral obligations on professional persons had no validity and was not applicable insofar as the constructive-service statute, Section 48.181, Fla....

...The pertinent act of contracting to insure property or risk located within this state did not occur within Florida. The statute does not appear to require this by its language. Such a construction would be more apposite for the "doing business" statute, F.S. § 48.181 (1977), rather than the "long-arm" statute, F.S....

...Appellees Henry Duzinski and Irene Duzinski are the parents of Andrew Duzinski. They filed suit in the Circuit Court of Okaloosa County, alleging that defendant, appellant here, was subject to service of process under Florida's "long-arm statutes", specifically F.S. 48.161, 48.181 and 48.182....

...not doing business in the State of Florida at the time of the act complained of, but who subsequently commenced doing business in this State and was doing business at the time suit was filed, subject to service of process pursuant to Florida Statute 48.181 or any other applicable statute? An excellent discussion of Florida's "long-arm statutes" is found in an opinion of our sister court of the Fourth District in Youngblood v....

...1957, 97 So.2d 458; Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, supra; Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Sup.Ct.Fla. 1961, 128 So.2d 594; Viking Superior Corporation v. W.T. Grant Company, supra; and Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, Fla.App.3rd 1971, 253 So.2d 902) Florida Statute 48.181 (Florida Statutes 1971) reads (insofar as material to the issues herein involved) as follows: "(1) The acceptance by * * * all foreign corporations * * * of the privilege extended by law to nonresidents and others to operate, conduct, engage i...

...hat the appellees failed to prove that appellant, prior to the happening of the event giving rise to this action, operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this State or had an office or agency in the State. (F.S. 48.181(1)) They also failed to prove that appellant, prior to said event, sold, consigned, or leased any tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corporation in the State. (F.S. 48.181 (3)) Appellees do not even claim that appellant had or has a resident agent or officer in the State. (F.S. 48.181(2)) It is noted that the statute (48.181(1)) specifically restricts service upon the Secretary of State to actions or proceedings "arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture"....

...oing business within this State invalid and ineffectual. * * *" 128 So.2d at pages 599-600) In Giannini Controls Corporation v. Eubanks, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1966, 190 So.2d 171, the Supreme Court considered former Florida Statute 47.16, the predecessor of F.S. 48.181, here involved, and there, discussing Zirin v....

...a again, in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Simari, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1966, 191 So.2d 427, discussing the same statutes as heretofore mentioned (former F.S. 47.17, the predecessor of F.S. 48.081, F.S. 1971; and former F.S. 47.16, the predecessor of F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971) held that those statutes were intended to apply "only to obligations or causes of action which arose out of the activities of the corporation in the State", resting their decision on the due process provision of the Constitution of the United States....

...or cause connected with the activities of this foreign corporation in this state, we cannot reach the question of whether or not this foreign corporation was doing business in this state." (193 So.2d at pages 237-238) (For other cases holding that F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, is applicable only to suits resulting from the foreign corporation's activities within the State, see Viking Superior Corporation v....

...1969, 228 So.2d 904 and Eder Instrument Co. v. Allen, Fla. App.3rd 1971, 253 So.2d 902, and the numerous cases and authorities therein cited) Appellees urge that although they failed to prove that appellant was doing business in the State of Florida, within the meaning of F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, at the time of the incident giving rise to the cause of action, nevertheless upon it being proven that appellant subsequently commenced doing business in the State the statute became applicable, and the appellant subject to service of process thereunder....

...which did not arise out of the corporation's business or activities in the State, then a subsequent commencement of doing business in the State after accrual of the cause of action cannot afford a basis for substituted service under Florida Statute 48.181 (formerly F.S....

...tate of Florida at the time of the act complained of but which subsequently commenced doing business in this State and was doing business in this State at the *645 time suit was filed, is not subject to service of process pursuant to Florida Statute 48.181. Appellees next contend that even if service could not be effected pursuant to F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1971, nevertheless service was properly effected pursuant to Florida Statute 48.182, Florida Statutes 1971....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...contacts. Wherefore, as appellants argue that connexity is not required, while in fact it is required, and as no showing of connexity has been made, service cannot be sustained under Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A., when read in pari materia with § 48.181 (1971)....

...1st DCA 1973), the court held that an isolated act which, from any objective viewpoint, could not be held to constitute the operation, conduct, engagement in or carrying on a business or business venture, is not sufficient to activate the provisions of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The plaintiff filed its complaint against Travel Coach, Inc., a Florida corporation, Horace and one Robertson, seeking to recover the sum of $25,174.49 alleged to be due, owing and unpaid. Service of process on Horace, a nonresident, was made pursuant to Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...r proceeding against them * * * arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture * * *". Defendant contends that he was not engaged in a business or a business venture within the meaning of Section 48.181, so that service of process thereunder was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court....

...The individual acts of the defendant, either when considered alone or coupled with the activities of Travel Coach, create sufficient minimum contacts so as to make the defendant amenable to process consistent with traditional notions of justice and fair play. Affirmed. WALDEN and OWEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...m state result in consequences within the state. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957). See discussion, infra. [3] Provisions formerly contained in F.S. Section 47.16, F.S.A., are now embodied in F.S. Section 48.181, F.S.A.

...o provide any information regarding Rodriguez. Consequently, having been unable to comply with the requirements of section 48.081, Kurzbard served Mecca, a domestic corporation, through substituted service on Florida's Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2005), one of Florida's long-arm statutes....

...nts prescribed by the applicable long-arm statute. See Labbee, 913 So.2d at 682 ("To determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate for substituted service, the complaint must either plead a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to the language of section 48.181 or allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the statute."); see also Weiler v....

...Furthermore, "long-arm statutes are strictly construed and require the plaintiffs to clearly bring themselves within the ambit of the statutes." Id. at 682-83. In this instance, since Kurzbard served Mecca through substituted service on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, we must determine whether Kurzbard made the necessary jurisdictional allegations in his complaint to clearly bring himself within the ambit of the statute. Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, permits Florida's Secretary of State to accept service on behalf of a nonresident defendant or a resident defendant who subsequently becomes a non-resident or who conceals his or her whereabouts and who engages in or carries on a business venture in the state. § 48.181, Fla....

...Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true, as we are required to do, Labbee, 913 So.2d at 682, Mecca is a Florida corporation, and thus, the portion of the statute accepting service on behalf a non-resident defendant is inapplicable to this case. Consequently, the only way for Kurzbard to avail himself of section 48.181 was to properly plead that Mecca, through its officers or agents, was concealing its whereabouts....

...the registered office open from 10:00 a.m. to 12 noon each day, except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (3) keep one or more registered agents on whom process may be served during these designated hours. § 48.091, Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] Section 48.181 states, in relevant part: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign co...

...constitutes an appointment by the persons and foreign corporations of the Secretary of State of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture may be served. § 48.181(1), Fla....

...We find merit in appellant's attack on jurisdiction for the reasons hereafter stated. Much attention has been given by the parties to the sufficiency of "minimum contacts" within the State of Florida by the appellant to establish it was "doing business" within the contemplation of Section 48.181(1) [1] or 48.193(1)(a), [2] Florida Statutes; *857 also as to whether or not the failure of payment constituted a breach of contract within the purview of 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...On remand this will, of necessity, again be addressed by the trial court. It should also be noted that this is not a case involving constructive service of process under Chapter 49, Florida Statutes. The complaint alleges one or more of the grounds for long arm jurisdiction of the appellant under either Section 48.181 or 48.193....

...ly required by Section 48.194. The record only shows that service of process was duly made and evidenced on the Secretary of State. Jurisdiction of the Florida courts over a nonresident "doing business" in this state is authorized by either Sections 48.181(1) or 48.193(1)(a). If the plaintiff chooses substituted service on the Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), then perfection of such substituted service requires full compliance with one of the alternative methods provided by Section 48.161....

...The lower court erred in denying appellant's motions to dismiss and quash service of process. The final judgment is therefore set aside and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. HOBSON, Acting C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...ts pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.191(1), it is necessary to determine whether the individual or corporate defendant, was carrying on a business or business venture in this State. The activities of the person sought to be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit. DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969). A non-resident defendant, which engages the services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors, can be doing business in this State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1) if the nonresident defendant, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit." Id....

...[3] See also Electro Engineering Products Co. Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...nted Mr. David's motion and quashed the attempted service by publication. On June 14, 2000, Mr. Massey filed a motion for leave to file a second amended *232 complaint in order to add allegations that would permit service of Mr. David under sections 48.181(1) and 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000), viz., that Mr....

...The order also directed the clerk to issue an alias summons for Mr. David. On July 18, 2001, almost a month after entry of summary judgment for Ruden McClosky on the amended complaint, [10] Mr. Massey filed an affidavit of compliance indicating that he had met the requirements for service under section 48.181(1). Following service pursuant to section 48.181(1), Mr....

...Green, Jr., Wesley A. Fink, Daytona Beach, for appellees. BOYER, Chief Judge. Appellant, named as defendant in a negligence action filed by appellees, appeals from an order denying its motion to quash substituted service of process effected under F.S. § 48.181, one of Florida's "longarm" statutes....

...nt. Plaintiffs, citing Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Association, Fla. App. 4th 1976, 325 So.2d 58, successfully argued before the trial court that the allegations of their complaint were sufficient to invoke the application of F.S. § 48.181....

...1975, 324 So.2d 625, 627, to the contrary, control of VWoA by appellant may not be inferred merely from the status of the former as a wholly owned subsidiary of the latter. Thus, because appellees did not maintain their burden of clearly proving that appellant was amenable to substituted service of process pursuant to F.S. § 48.181, the motion to quash should have been granted....

...sident foreign corporation in this instance. In our opinion, plaintiff's attempted service was defective under these circumstances and the court below did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiff's reliance upon Sections 48.081 [1] and 48.181(1) [2] is misplaced, since *603 the purported service of process failed to comply with the requirements of these statutes....

...We have recently reaffirmed the established law that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under Section 48.181(1)....

...iction where there was no showing that the corporation had been doing business in Florida or that the cause of action arose from the corporation's activities in this state. The court held that the "connexity" requirement for service of process under Section 48.181(1) applied equally as well to Section 48.081(1). Likewise, in the instant case, there has been no showing that service was properly effected under either Sections 48.081(1) or 48.181(1)....

...In addition, the out-of-state corporation utilized Florida attorneys and accountants in preparation for the uncompleted closing on the sale of the stock. The court, in Compuguide, found these contacts insufficient to invoke the provisions of Florida Statute § 48.181(1) (service upon a nonresident engaged in business in Florida). The operative langauge of section 48.181(1) has been found to be identical to the language of section 48.193(1)(a), the statute at issue here. Cases interpreting section 48.181(1) have been deemed to be applicable to section 48.193(1)(a)....

...Scott Kirk, Orlando, for appellant. Sidney H. Parrish, Winter Park, for appellees. *750 SHARP, Judge. Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd., a Canadian business organization, appeals the lower court's determination that it had personal jurisdiction over Mac Millan pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), or section 48.182, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...the plaintiff's injury in Florida. However, it is well established that section 48.193 applies only to causes of action which accrued after its effective date: July 1973. [2] Since the plaintiff was injured in 1972, section 48.193 is not applicable. Section 48.181 has no time application problems in this case, but it requires a finding that the non-resident party sought to be served was engaging in business in Florida, or was making intrastate sales directly in Florida or through jobbers it "controlled." This statute provides: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons ......

...ducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Interstate or international sales to persons in Florida, no matter how numerous and ongoing, do not establish engaging in business or a business venture in Florida for purposes of section 48.181, [3] unless the nonresident is shown to have "control" or to have exercised "control" over the person selling the goods in Florida. [4] Mac Millan's doing business through its Florida subsidiary is the sole element established in this record on that point. That is an insufficient basis to support a finding of "doing business" or "control" for purposes of section 48.181....

...Atlas Van Lines, a foreign corporation doing business in Florida, brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate [1] a default judgment in favor of appellee. We reverse. The relevant facts are undisputed. Appellee-plaintiff utilized the "substituted service" authorized by § 48.181, F.S.A., (the "long arm" statute) when suing a foreign corporation....

...It is the latter under which the trial court now apparently asserts jurisdiction over her person. According to the affidavit of compliance filed by the attorney for plaintiff Graves, substituted service was effected under the provisions of Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes. Section 48.181 allowed substituted service of process on nonresidents engaged in business in the state and obviously has no application to the instant case....

....A. DOWNEY, Judge. Appellant, Derrick Waverly Moo Young, sued appellees, Air Canada and Venezolana International de Aviacion, S.A., both foreign corporations, in the Broward County circuit court and attempted to obtain service of process pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...FERGUSON, Judge (concurring to certification). Although I would adhere to the position that this case, based on an interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981), does not present the same question as was before the court in General Tire, which was decided under Section 48.181, I agree to certify the question as one of great public importance....

...Florida, if at all, was by independent contractors. The court granted the motion to quash service and dismissed. The complaint was twice amended and plaintiff then obtained substituted service of process on the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ot belong in Florida. The record does not clearly reflect which provision of the Florida long-arm statute the plaintiff sought to employ in bringing the defendants within the jurisdiction of the court. The summonses directed to the defendants recite Section 48.181 as authority for their issuance; the affidavit filed by plaintiff to show compliance with statutory requirements relating to substituted service on non-residents refers to Sections 48.181 and 48.193....

...For service to be effective under Section 48.193, the defendant must be personally served out-of-state pursuant to Section 48.194. Since the defendants were not personally served, jurisdiction could not have been acquired via Section 48.193. Nor was service effective under Section 48.181, which was the provision actually relied upon by plaintiff....

...fering to sell the book to 500 alumni, [2] that the book was made available for sale by catalog mail order through bookstores within the state, and that a copy of the book may be found in the Dade County Public Library. The jurisdictional test under Section 48.181 was recently articulated by this court in Caribe & Panama Investments v....

...3d DCA 1979): We have recently reaffirmed the established law that a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under Section 48.181(1) ......

...The trial court refused to quash service of process on the defendant bank. The bank takes this interlocutory appeal. The issue presented for review is whether substituted service of process made on a national bank as a foreign corporation under Florida's long-arm statute [Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)] should be quashed where the complaint fails to allege any facts tending to show that (1) the national bank was doing business or conducting a business venture in Florida, and (2) the cause of action sued up...

...The complaint fails to allege that Chase Manhattan committed any of these acts in Florida while doing business or conducting a business venture in Florida. Chase Manhattan moved to quash the substituted service of process made upon it for failure to comply with Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...the laws of the United States, that its principal office was in New York City, and that it had no offices, branches, employees or records in Florida. The plaintiff filed no affidavits or other sworn proof. The trial court denied the motion to quash. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides for substituted service of process on a foreign corporation who carries on a business or business venture in this state for "any action or proceeding against them, or any of them, arising out of an...

...Loach, 194 So.2d 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Lake Erie Chemical Co. v. Stinson, 162 So.2d 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). See also James v. Kush, 157 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). In the instant case, the plaintiff's complaint falls woefully short of invoking Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), sufficient to withstand a motion to quash the substituted service of process....

...The Fourth District refused to accept this interpretation, finding that to do so would turn every case into a "constitutional problem of defining, according to the facts of each particular case `minimum contacts.'" Id. at 508. The court held that the requirements of doing business and connexity raised in section 48.181 must be read in pari materia with section 48.081, and stated: Under this construction, Florida Statute § 48.081, F.S.A....

...seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., supra. This party must show, when attempting to serve a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the State of Florida, that the requirements of Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...Dixon, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell, and James F. Crowder, Jr., Miami, for appellees. Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and SWANN, JJ. SWANN, Judge. Robert McCarthy takes this interlocutory appeal from a Circuit Court order which denied his motion to quash service of process served under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...the Hialeah-Miami Springs Bank was liable for such loss. The Hialeah-Miami Springs Bank filed a third party complaint against Robert McCarthy seeking indemnity against any damage it might be required to pay and served process on him under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...y realizing pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act for such purpose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts." (Emphasis added) * * * There is no question that the provision of Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...watch and ring. We conclude that he was engaged in a series of similar acts done for the purpose of realizing a pecuniary benefit within the State of Florida or otherwise accomplishing an object and that service of process upon him under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...The contract of guaranty had been entered into by appellant and the Bank of America International of Florida in Dade County in 1977. Appellant specifically contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions because (a) Simantob was not engaged in a business or a business venture within the meaning of § 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), [2] so that service of process pursuant to § 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977) [3] was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and (b) the allegations contained in the affidavit filed by the appell...

...w the propriety of substituted service of process under the long-arm statute. After careful review of the record in this cause, we have determined that the execution of the guaranty by Simantob constitutes "doing business" under the long-arm statute § 48.181 since the said act initiated and was an integral part of a series of obligations owed by other parties to the plaintiff bank....

...e motions to dismiss and abate the action; defendant failed to make the proper showing and the jurisdictional facts were properly taken as true for the purpose of resolving the motions. Affirmed. NOTES [1] Hereinafter referred to as "Simantob." [2] "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state "(1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or countr...

...Hyman, Jr., Miami, for appellee. Before HAVERFIELD, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ. PEARSON, Judge. The question presented by this appeal is whether the attempted substituted service of the plaintiff/appellee upon the defendant/appellant, pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), was sufficient to secure jurisdiction of the defendant....

...ns was issued and returned unexecuted by an individual who is not shown to have been appointed by the court. Another summons was issued with directions to serve the Secretary of State as the defendant's statutory resident agent, pursuant to Sections 48.181 and 48.161, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Appellant urges that no ground for substituted service under the statute appears *317 in the record. Appellee urges that the issuance of three summonses, all of which were returned unserved, is sufficient to show that defendant was concealing his whereabouts as set forth as a basis for substituted service in Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...closing date. As a result of these charges, a lien was placed against the Cohls' apartment. The Cohls filed suit in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida. [1] Service of *1353 process was obtained by serving the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Realty Corp., Benedetto Nuzzo and Leon Goldapple filed a special appearance for the purpose of contesting the court's jurisdiction over their persons. The trial court denied the motion as to all defendants and this appeal ensued. Before moving to the main issue, it should be noted that plaintiffs elected to proceed under Section 48.181 as opposed to Section 48.193. Section 48.181 specifically deals with non-residents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state....

...e.g., the commission of a tort within the state, which will also subject non-residents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. Of particular significance in this case is the fact that the statutes provide for different methods of service of process. Section 48.181 holds that certain enumerated conduct ......

...An affidavit of the officer shall be filed, stating the time, manner, and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent evidence, in determining whether service has been properly made. It is readily apparent that Sections 48.181 and 48.193 provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Section 48.181 permits process to be served upon the Secretary of State, while 48.193 requires process to be served in the usual manner upon an individual, albeit out of state....

...The allegations in the complaint suggest that plaintiffs might have proceeded under either statute. However, the record discloses that all three defendants were served by substituted service of process through the office of the Secretary of State. Thus, we limit our review to the perspective of Section 48.181 and look to see whether plaintiffs have shown that defendants carried on or engaged in a business or business venture within the state....

...aint. We therefore accept all the plaintiffs' allegations as true and center our attention on whether these allegations contain sufficient jurisdictional facts to obtain personal jurisdiction over all or any of the defendants. To successfully employ Section 48.181, plaintiffs must show that defendants operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on a business or business venture in this state....

...This distinction was highlighted by the court in State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67 So.2d 619, 620 (Fla. 1953): There is a vast difference between the words "a business" and the words "business venture" as used in Section 47.16, [the predecessor to Section 48.181], supra....

...Arguably, such an allegation might subject an individual to long-arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193, Florida *1356 Statutes (1979), (the commission of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation within the state), but plaintiffs chose not to pursue this path. Thus, we too confine our inquiry to Section 48.181 and look for allegations that either party individually engaged in a business or business venture within the state....

...d the alleged injuries sufficient to support their contention that this Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not properly asserted jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (long-arm statute), as they have made an insufficient showing of Defendants doing business in Florida....

...the merchandise in question. The trial court entered a judgment and order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, essentially concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden of presenting facts sufficient to justify substituted service under sec. 48.181, F.S....

...It is well settled that an appeal court will affirm an order of the trial court on appeal consistent with any theory revealed by the record, regardless of the reason stated in the order under review. . The statute invoked by the plaintiff in this cause, § 48.181, F.S., provides for substituted service of process upon nonresidents operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on “a business or business venture in the state”....

...Although several issues have been raised on appeal, the issue of proper service is dispositive. All parties agree that the appellants were not served individually with process. They all agree that service was attempted pursuant to § 48.161, Florida Statutes (1991) and § 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991). These statutes allow for substitute service on nonresidents of the State of Florida. Section 48.181 is sometimes called the "long arm" statute....

...use of action, there was no jurisdiction and substituted service was not perfected. Even if Ruthenberg had made the correct allegations, he still failed to meet the requirements of section 48.161 for effecting substitute service. Sections 48.161 and 48.181 must be read together for service to be effective....

...ion packages in homes they own in Hernando County. He argues that they are required to register with the Secretary of State and designate a registered agent. Since no agent was appointed, Ruthenberg had to proceed with substitute service pursuant to section 48.181....

...Ruthenberg never alleged that the cause of action arose out of the appellants' business activities within the state. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Jamison, 353 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Failure to make this allegation means that the appellants are not amenable to substituted service of process under section 48.181....

...ion. The motion to dismiss and the evidence adduced in the sworn affidavit in support thereof established a prima facie showing that the defendant's conduct and actions did not make it amenable to service of process under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.181, F.S....

...This is a diversity suit for malicious prosecution, abuse of prosecution, and invasion of privacy. The law of Florida is applicable. The other defendants, including the Church, for purposes of this motion, have been served. On September 8, 1981 plaintiffs filed an affidavit of compliance with Florida Statute 48.181, which in relevant part is as follows: 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state (1) The acceptance by any person or persons individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country,...

...Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971). Even if the statute is strictly construed, the Court finds that plaintiffs' evidence supporting allegations of jurisdiction herein outweighs defendants' counter evidence and justifies constructive service in Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...venture in Florida, or to have an office or agency in the state." The inquiry concerns the nature, not extent, of a defendant's activities in the state. Florida courts have shown a willingness to liberally construe "business venture" under Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...Upon consideration of the file as a whole, including but not limited to the particular evidence reviewed above, the Court is convinced that plaintiffs have met the burden of alleging and sufficiently establishing those material facts which support constructive service of process in Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. 48.181....

...Second, the legislature may want to consider what steps should be authorized when (as may become increasingly common) the process server is prevented by security personnel or other security measures from reaching the defending party's residence or place of work. IV. The plaintiffs also served defendant under section 48.181, Florida Statutes, which provides for service of process on a nonresident engaged in business in Florida. The defendant moved to quash this service as well. Section 48.181 allows service on the secretary of state where, among other things, individuals "associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country ... carry on a business or business venture in this state...." Id. § 48.181(1)....

...hip which was involved in the development of a Florida shipping center. However, the defendant's deposition refutes this claim. The defendant is not himself a limited partner of New Bermor. [3] The plaintiffs argue that service was permissible under section 48.181 because the defendant is also an officer and director of the Florida corporation which serves as the general partner of the Florida limited partnership....

...Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot and Ronald P. Weil, Miami, for appellees. Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Mega Trading, Ltd., a Florida limited partnership, sued Jack Klein, a New Jersey resident. Service of process was made pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...m despite an extension of time to perfect service. As a result, Delancy proceeded to seek substituted service. Delancy filed an amended complaint, which stated the necessary requirements for substituted service in compliance with sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, and further filed a motion for another extension of time to *79 perfect service....

...reabouts. In response, Delancy argued that the substituted service was sufficient. The trial court quashed service of process, and dismissed the complaint finding that the affidavit did not demonstrate due diligence. This appeal ensued. II. ANALYSIS Section 48.181(1) provides for substituted service on residents who conceal their whereabouts and engage in a business in Florida....

...ssing the complaint. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] The amended Complaint alleged that Tobias owned and operated an apartment business in Miami-Dade County, but that Delancy had been unable to serve Tobias as he was concealing his whereabouts. [2] Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, provides that any person doing business in this state is amenable to service of process on the Secretary of State if that person is concealing his or her whereabouts: [A]ny person ......

...These claims were consolidated for pre-trial purposes and are consolidated for purposes of this appeal. Although the six complaints do not specify a sole basis upon which personal jurisdiction is predicated, in the hearing before the trial judge and on appeal, appellees have exclusively relied on Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, [1] to confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident appellant. The requisites for service under section 48.181(1) are as follows: First, "a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the non-resident defendant was doing business in Florida." Caribe & Panama Investments v....

...this state, reference must be made to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(f), requiring that "averments of time and place are material... ." It argues, among other things, that because the dates of product exposure anteceded the effective date of section 48.181(1), or its predecessor, the statute must be deemed inapplicable as a means of asserting jurisdiction....

...The court explained that "allegations of time and place are necessary ... only where their absence renders a pleading so vague and ambiguous that the defendant cannot adequately frame an answer." Id. at 912. We agree and adopt the Copeland analysis to the issue raised. An additional requirement for service under section 48.181(1) is that a plaintiff must allege "that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business before jurisdiction attaches under section 48.181(1)." Caribe & Panama Investments, 375 So.2d at 603....

...doing of business in Florida and the cause of action sued upon. We have considered the remaining points and determine them to be without merit and therefore affirm. [4] Affirmed in part and reversed in part. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.181(1), authorizing service on a nonresident defendant engaging in business in this state, provides: The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association,...

...e attempts were equally unsuccessful. Thereafter, as *939 the record indicates, during a sixty-day extension of Rule 4(j)’s 120-day period for service granted by the district court, Manufacturers perfected substituted service pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.181(1) (1991), 2 which stated in pertinent part: • The acceptance by any person ......

...4 We conclude that Rule 4 provided both substituted service and personal service as a means for Manufacturers to perfect service of process and that Manufacturers has established a prima facie case of perfecting substituted service under Fla.Stat. § 48.181(1)....

...2 .In stating that Manufacturers has perfected substituted service under Florida law, we mean, as we indicate infra, that Manufacturers has established a prima facie case that it has done so. 3 . Manufacturers perfected substituted service under Fla.Stat. 48.181(1) by using the procedure set forth in Fla.Stat....

...The affidavit further recited that the manager reported by telephone call to affiant and stated that the defendants live in Peru but he had instructions from them not to write to them or contact them in any way. Appellee then attempted to effect substituted service of process under F.S. 48.161 and F.S. 48.181, F.S.A....

...cts showing that defendants or any one of them were subject to such statutory authorized service of process. Appellee relies on the affidavit which alleges concealment by appellants of their whereabouts for service of process under F.S. 48.161 and F.S. 48.181, F.S.A....

...The cause of action alleged in the complaint arose from an accident which occurred on July 18, 1971, on lands owned by appellants. The complaint was filed on June 15, 1972, and at that time service could not be effected on the non-resident appellants. The then existing Florida long-arm statute, § 48.181, Florida Statutes, provided no means for obtaining jurisdiction over the persons of appellants....

...onal grounds. The order appealed operated to subject the appellant to substituted service of process and thereby the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. We affirm the order appealed, and hold that the appellant is subject to service of process under § 48.181, Fla....

...Many of the purchasers would, in advance of placing an order, request the company to send a list of prices and specifications, which the company would send by return mail. The appellant is not a subsidiary and owns no subsidiary corporations. The statute involved is § 48.181, Fla....

...eign corporation for a period of years systematically and continuously participated in the sale of a product to customers within and throughout the state, such a corporation comes within the constitutional requisites of "doing business" set forth in § 48.181, Fla....

...[1] So long as there is a "minimum contact" with this jurisdiction, the determinative question is whether goods are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary benefit of the person providing or otherwise dealing with those goods, DeVaney v. Rumsch, Fla. 1969, 228 So.2d 904, under the "doing business" long-arm statute, § 48.181....

...services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the state in anticipation of economic gain, is to be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., supra. The appellee has properly, we think, phrased the general rule to be applied. A foreign corporation, not licensed to do business in Florida is amenable to service of process and the jurisdiction of Florida courts under § 48.181, Fla....

...ply, Inc., of Fort Walton Beach, Florida, who sold the said helmet to the City of Fort Walton Beach, Florida" who furnished it to Andrew Thomas Duzinski. Plaintiffs attempted to obtain substituted service of process on defendant under F.S. 48.161, F.S. 48.181 and F.S....

...cated in 30 different Florida cities. F.S. 48.161 relates only to procedure and F.S. 48.182 was not enacted until after the occurrence of the accident giving rise to this controversy. Therefore, the only statute with which we are concerned here is F.S. 48.181, Florida Statutes 1969, which provides: "48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...bbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state." We will consider the three subsections of F.S. 48.181 in reverse order: Subsection (3) becomes applicable only when the nonresident person, firm, or *487 corporation sells, consigns, or leases tangible or intangible personal property through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors....

...t shipment be to their retail outlets in Florida be construed as either brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors in this state, nevertheless there is no evidence of the requisite control, therefore the plaintiffs may not rely for service upon F.S. 48.181(3)....

...This situation is unlike that of giving a listing to a broker wherein the seller's control over the listing agreement and the broker continues. ( Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., supra) Continuing in inverse order of consideration, it is not even contended that subsection (2) of F.S. 48.181 is here applicable. *488 We now turn our consideration to F.S. 48.181(1)....

...s state, to retailers in Florida, when no control is retained by the foreign corporate seller, does not constitute operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in Florida within the meaning and contemplation of F.S. 48.181(1)....

...In the Fawcett case the foreign corporation sold its product (magazines) to "independent contractors" in Florida, which sold to news-stands, which in turn sold to the general public. That activity was held not sufficient to authorize substituted service pursuant to F.S. 48.181(1)....

...erest in the product ends when it is sold, delivered and paid for. If this reasoning is sound then the sales sub judice directly to retailers in Florida and to the major league baseball teams in Florida would not be sufficient to invoke the aid of F.S. 48.181(1)....

...no showing at all that the plaintiff's cause of action against defendant arose out of an obligation or cause connected *489 in any manner with defendant's activities in this state. It has been repeatedly held that in order to invoke application of F.S. 48.181 it is necessary that the alleged cause of action arise out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the activities of the nonresident in the state of Florida....

...of presenting facts which clearly justify the applicability of the statute. ( American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, supra, and cases therein cited) Plaintiffs having failed to demonstrate the applicability of either of the three subsections of F.S. 48.181 and this court having determined in the prior appeal hereinabove mentioned the inapplicability of F.S....

...Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975) and AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1976), requiring control by the nonresident defendant over the distributor before the nonresident can be held to be doing business within the state pursuant to Section 48.181(1) or (2)....

...In Dinsmore there was no showing that the nonresident defendant established minimal contacts so as to subject it to personal service within the forum state. The facts in Dinsmore showed only one isolated exchange of stock outside the State of Florida. Clearly, as the Supreme Court stated, the provisions of Section 48.181(1) were not met by plaintiff since there was no showing that the defendant was conducting a general course of business activity within the State of Florida....

...sident carry on a general course of business activity within the forum state. Yet Dinsmore continues, although subsection (1) does not expressly require control, [1] "... we hold that the requisite control, as explained herein, is also applicable to § 48.181(1), where the nonresident is doing business through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors." Id....

...3d DCA 1962), which Dinsmore and Morejon cite with approval) over magazine distributors in Florida. Nevertheless no violence would be done to any constitutional principle if American Baseball Cap were held amenable to suit in Florida, yet because of the limited construction placed upon Section 48.181(1), a resident who alleges serious injury caused by a defectively manufactured baseball helmet, placed into interstate commerce by a national manufacturer, has no access to the courts within the state where he resides....

...*491 I concur that the question is one of great public importance. NOTES [1] Indeed, when subsection (1) was first enacted by Ch. 57-747, Laws of Florida, the legislative intent was expressed in the preamble to the act as follows: AN ACT to amend Section 47.16, Florida Statutes, [the predecessor statute to 48.181] to include foreign manufacturers doing business in Florida through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors....

...[1] The law firm served process on Waxoyl by substituted service on the secretary of state. See § 48.161, Fla. Stat. (1995). The law firm took the position that Waxoyl was a nonresident which was engaging in business or a business venture within Florida. See id. § 48.181(1)....

...se. McLean Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Winslow Loudermilk Corp., 469 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (citations omitted). It is our view that on this record, there is an adequate showing that Waxoyl was engaged in business within Florida for purposes of section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...In doing so, Waxoyl was furthering its own business interests. See Nichols v. Paulucci, 652 So.2d 389, 393-94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We think these activities amount to the conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in Florida for purposes of section 48.181(1), where the present lawsuit arises out of that same transaction....

...appellee, Virgil Allison, d/b/a Allison Distributing Co., (hereafter sometimes called Allison) or to quash service of process on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because appellant was not amenable to substituted service of process under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the long arm statute....

...Virgil Allison." It gives him a 30 day dealer cancellation notice and directs him to contact the writer (whose name is illegible) or "Mr. Ken Harrington at the Oak Brook office." There is no counter affidavit in rebuttal of the two affidavits of Allison. The Florida long arm statute, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to quash and dismiss the appellee's third party complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the appellant. *666 The appellee sought to obtain jurisdiction over the appellant pursuant to the provisions of Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ecific acts done by the appellant within the state. The only allegations applicable to jurisdiction were those which stated that appellant was a resident of Indiana and engaged in business in Florida. In order to serve a foreign resident pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975), the complaint must adequately allege that the cause of action arose from business activities conducted within this state....

...mplaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court's order because Szilagyi failed to establish that WCTU is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida under Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, specifically sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...1983); Compania Anonima Simantob v. Bank of Am. Int'l, 373 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 1980). A plaintiff may only invoke the court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by means of substituted service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983), when the defendant engages in business activities within the state....

...ase to another railroad company, ended up in this state and was involved in an accident. It is obvious that such contact does not amount "to operat[ing], conduct[ing], engag[ing] in, or carry[ing] on a business or business venture in the state... ." § 48.181(1), Fla....

...carrying on of a business or business venture is not sufficient to activate the [long-arm] statute."). Once WCTU made a prima facie showing in its motion to dismiss that it conducts no business in the state, has no offices or agents in Florida, see § 48.181(2), Fla. Stat. (1983), and did not lease the boxcar through any broker, jobber, wholesaler or distributor to "any person, firm, or corporation" in Florida, § 48.181(3), the burden shifted to Szilagyi to prove the jurisdictional allegations of her complaint....

...jurisdiction over the person by opposing affidavits, testimony or documents."). Consequently, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash the service of process made in accordance with section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1983), pursuant to section 48.181....

...Consequently, the court should have granted WCTU's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)(2). Since Szilagyi failed to meet her burden of proving the jurisdictional allegations of her complaint after WCTU had made a prima facie showing that the jurisdiction asserted under both sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), was improper, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction....

...Appellant is a foreign corporation not authorized to transact business in the State of Florida. Plaintiff apparently attempted several times to obtain service upon appellant and twice amended his complaint in an effort to plead matters which would permit substituted service of process under either Section 48.181, F.S....

...Respondent, representing the consortium, sent Castle Pools a letter advising it that the lien was invalid. Nevertheless, eight months later, Castle Pools commenced a foreclosure action on the lien. Neither respondent nor the consortium had notice of this action because Castle Pools used section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991), or the "long arm statute" to effect service of process....

...nction in this case. ANSTEAD, J., concurs. NOTES [1] In Pelycado Onroerend Goed B.V. v. Ruthenberg, 635 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), the district court found that Castle Pools failed to strictly comply with the requirements of sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991), and set aside the foreclosure sale....

...ue. We affirm. Contrary to the appellants' contention, the amended complaint filed by Nereo Agostinelli (Agostinelli) contains sufficient "long-arm" jurisdictional allegations to establish in personam jurisdiction over Core and Cherokee. By alleging § 48.181(3) and § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...NOTES [1] Actually, the amended complaint has two separate paragraphs which could arguably be jurisdictional allegations. In paragraph 3, plaintiff alleges: "This action is properly brought in the Circuit County [sic] of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, pursuant to Fla. Statute § 48.181(3)." Later he alleges in paragraph 11: "Pursuant to Florida Long Arm Statute § 48.193(a), Florida has personal jurisdiction over CHEROKEE INTERNATIONAL, INC....

...1977); National League for Nursing v. Bluestone, 388 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). Although the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaints might support substituted service of process through the office of the Secretary of *241 State as provided in Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), our review of the order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants is limited to whether the jurisdictional requisites of Section 48.193, necessary predicates to service under Section 48.194, have been met....

...No appearance for Appellee. QUINCE, Judge. Joyce Newberry appeals the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse because the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to allow substituted service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The dog that bit Ms. Rife is owned by Ms. Newberry but has no connection with the business except it was kept on the business premises during Ms. Newberry's absence. Service of process for Ms. Newberry was made on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 48.181 provides that a nonresident who accepts the benefits of doing business in Florida appoints the Secretary of State as agent for service of process in any action arising out of, connected with, or incident to the business venture. We find Joyce Newberry does not meet the criteria for substituted service on the Secretary of State. In order to serve a nonresident pursuant to section 48.181, the complaint must allege specific facts which show that the defendant is conducting business in Florida and that the cause of action arose from business activities within this state....

...is not amenable to suit in the manner attempted here. See Unterman v. Brown, 169 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). Neither the allegations in the complaint nor the evidence presented at the hearing permits Rife to obtain jurisdiction over Newberry under section 48.181....

...rp. as a corporate non-resident of Florida was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business. As such, the substituted service of process accomplished in this case on the Florida Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1977), as the method of serving said defendant must fall and the complaint herein is subject to dismissal with leave to amend....

...The deal was closed in Chicago, and appellant, having not received its commission, instituted this action in the Dade County Circuit Court. Substituted service of process was obtained upon the defendants pursuant to the "long-arm" statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 48.181, 48.182 and 48.161, F.S.A.; however, on May 3, 1973 the trial court quashed process as to all defendants....

...minimal contacts between the non-resident defendants and the state of Florida did not exist to enable a Florida court to exercise jurisdiction comporting with due process standards of substantial justice and fair play. Appellant relies on Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), F.S.A....

...h is insufficient to constitute carrying on a business or business venture in this state. See Lyster v. Round, Fla.App. 1973, 276 So.2d 186; Hayes v. Greenwald, Fla.App. 1963, 149 So.2d 586. We think this line of argument ignores the clear effect of Section 48.181(3), supra....

...substituted *484 service. Cf. Clark v. Realty Investment Center, Inc., Fla.App. 1971, 252 So.2d 589. We think that it does. In Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Rand, Fla.App. 1962, 144 So.2d 512, this court stated that in order to obtain service under § 48.181(3) it must be demonstrated that either (1) a foreign corporation has some degree of control over the personal property in the hands of a broker selling or distributing the personal property in this state or (2) the foreign corporation has s...

...The appellant is Maxwell Sayet, M.D., d/b/a Atlantic Chemical Laboratories. He appeals an order quashing service upon a third-party defendant, Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. of Memphis, Tennessee. The Blood Bank is the appellee here. Service on the appellee was attempted pursuant to F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...s each year [1] and that the transmission of an infectious disease from contaminated blood, as in this case, occurs in one out of every 500 transfusions. [2] The Supreme Court of Florida in DeVaney v. Rumsch, Fla. 1969, 228 So.2d 904, reviewing F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...Rumsch, supra, the Supreme Court adopted the pecuniary benefit theory saying: "The determinative question is whether goods, property or services are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary benefit of the person providing or otherwise dealing in those goods, property or services." In further discussion of F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...the Supreme Court of Florida in DeVaney v. Rumsch, supra, stated that anyone who exercises the privilege of entry into the state in anticipation of economic gain is subject to service of process. * * * * * * "We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., to be that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida State § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State." In obtaining a large volume of sales of their product Interstate Blood Bank systematically and continuously participated *145 in economic activity within the state over a period of years....

...In the course of their economic activity in the state they received the benefits and protections of the Law of Florida and whereas the product dealt with here afforded some risk to the citizens of this state, we hold that they came within the requisites of "doing business" set forth in F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...Under Florida law, to serve a foreign corporation that is alleged to be doing business within the State of Florida, a plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint on the Florida Secretary of State and on the foreign corporation at its overseas offices. See Fla. Stat. §§ 48.181(1), 48.161; McClenon, 726 F.Supp....

...Therefore, under Schlunk, the Hague Service Convention applies, and CMSA must be served pursuant to the Convention. B. Service Upon a Subsidiary [3] Plaintiffs claim they have properly served CMSA through its Florida subsidiaries, CMSI and CMMS. Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3. Florida Statutes sections 48.181(3) and 48.181(1), provide that if a nonresident defendant does business in the forum through "brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors," then service through such an entity is proper as service on an agent of process....

...Plaintiffs have merely relied upon the fact that CMSI and CMMS are subsidiaries of CMSA, and thus have not met their burden of proving proper service of process. Further, because Plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts that would support a finding that CMSI or CMMS are agents of CMSA under Section 48.181, that section is inapplicable....

...to conform to the provisions of the [Hague Service Convention]." Therefore, regardless of whether CMSA is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, CMSA must still be served pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. [4] Pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.181(2), Florida law provides for serving process on a particular agent designated by a foreign corporation who is doing business in the state. However, in this case, service was made on the registered agent of CMSI and CMMS, subsidiaries of CMSA. However, CMSA has not designated CMSI or CMMS's agent as its agent for service of process in Florida. Therefore, section 48.181(2) is inapplicable....

...226 (1915); see also Fla.Stat. § 95.051 (1975). Defendant Itkin's affidavit (filed September 18, 1975) shows that he was "doing business" in Florida at the time of the alleged malpractice, and was therefore amenable to service of process under Fla.Stat. § 48.181....

...In lieu of additional evidence, plaintiff has submitted a further memorandum in support of its position. Service of process on defendant herein was attempted under Florida's recently enacted "long-arm" statute, § 48.193 of the Florida Statutes. Under the old long-arm act, F.S. § 48.181, acceptance of the privilege "to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state" could subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of the state's courts....

...While these allegations do not track the language of any specific long-arm statute, see Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.070(i), Georgia Bus's counsel asserts on appeal, without contradiction, that the only statutory basis for long-arm jurisdiction argued below was section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...ices, Inc., maintained a contract of liability insurance over its fleet of vehicles through a liability insurance agency located in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. The trial court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction of Georgia Bus under section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...First Florida Business Consultants, 338 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). Moreover, to perfect service pursuant to the long-arm statutes, the complaint must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statutes. Id. Before service may be effected under section 48.181, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that the nonresident defendant was doing business in Florida and that the cause of action sued upon arose out of such business. This is known as the "connexity" requirement. Nicolet, Inc. v. Benton, 467 So.2d 1046, 1048-9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). We find that the connexity requirement of section 48.181(1) was not sufficiently alleged in the complaints, nor did appellees offer sufficient proof below satisfying the connexity requirement....

...there any other evidence that such contract, should it exist, contemplates any Florida activity or relationship whatsoever. Accordingly, we agree with Georgia Bus that the trial court erred in sustaining personal jurisdiction over Georgia Bus under section 48.181(1), because the complaints fail to allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by the statute and because appellees failed to introduce the evidentiary facts necessary to support the statutory requirements when the complaint was attacked by motion to dismiss....

...Nor was it shown that appellee recommended this product for use in jails. Appellee, a foreign corporation, had not qualified to do business within the state. [1] Therefore, appellants were required to bring appellee within one of the two Florida "long-arm" statutes, sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979). Section 48.181 basically provides for the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which is "doing business" within the state....

...Section 48.193 sets out specific acts, including that of conducting a business, which may subject a foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction. Section 48.193 specifically limits jurisdiction to causes of action arising from the enumerated acts. Although section 48.181 does not expressly impose the same limitation, Florida district courts have interpreted the statute as including the requirement that the cause of action be related to the business activities of the foreign corporation....

...A maid informed him that Alvarez and his wife were out of town. Liberty Mutual filed an amended complaint on August 3, 1994, with the additional *759 allegation that Mercy Lu was concealing its whereabouts. The insurance company then effected service pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1993), which authorizes service of process on the Secretary of State as the agent for a resident who conceals his whereabouts....

...ees) went into occupancy under the lease and by that conduct validated it. Although the fourth amended complaint contains jurisdictional allegations to the effect appellees did business in Florida by taking occupancy under the lease in Jacksonville, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, the trial court separately tried the jurisdictional issues and determined *484 them favorably to the Bank in advance of the trial on the merits....

...implementation as the law in Florida. Plaintiff’s service of process upon Defendant was valid if it was perfected prior to November 1, 2013, in accordance with one of the three options indicated. This would include service according to sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes, because the Hague Convention did not yet apply between the U.S. and Colombia, and strict compliance with the IASC was not required. Substitute service under sections 48.161, 48.171 and 48.181 In certain circumstances, substitute service of process may be effected upon either a nonresident or a party who conceals his or her whereabouts. The method for effecting substitute process on parties is outlined in sections 48.161, 48.171 and 48.181. Section 48.161 requires substituted service be evidenced by: (1) registered or certified mailing to the nonresident of (a) a notice of such substituted service and (b) a copy of the process, which must be evidenced by (c) the filing of th...

...return showing service on the nonresident within or without the state of Florida. § 48.161, Fla. Stat. (2013); Conde v. Prof'l Mediquip of Fla., Inc., 436 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (citing P.S.R. Assocs. v. Artcraft- Heath, 364 So. 2d 855, 857-58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)). Section 48.181 sets forth the jurisdictional requirements for substituted service of process....

...These requirements are that “the defendant conducts business in Florida and is either a (1) non-resident, (2) resident of Florida who subsequently became a non-resident, or (3) resident of Florida concealing his or her whereabouts.” Pinero v. Yam Margate, L.L.C., 825 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1265 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing § 48.181, Fla....

...ellee First Investment Corporation's *140 (FIC) second amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. [1] FIC's second amended complaint fails to set forth sufficient allegations which demonstrate that Sheikh Suroor is amenable to suit in Florida under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The complaint also described actions taken and statements made by Peccany through its sole shareholder, Sheikh Suroor. Sheikh Suroor was not personally served with process. Instead, FIC utilized our substitute service statutes, sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...or lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the complaint (1) failed to meet the strict procedural requirements for substitute service provided in section 48.161, (2) failed to include sufficient jurisdictional allegations to satisfy the requirements of section 48.181, and (3) failed to establish the required connexity between Sheikh Suroor and Florida. In concluding that reversal is required, we need only address the second argument. Nonresidents who take advantage of the privilege of engaging in a business or a business venture in Florida are subject to substitute service under section 48.181....

...ng been personally served with process if the defendant operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida, or has an office or agency in Florida, and the cause of action arose from these business activities. See § 48.181(1), Fla....

...representatives of FIC while in Orange County concerning the development of the property; and (5) contracted to have services performed in Orange County. The trial court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to sustain FIC's burden under section 48.181 of alleging that Sheikh Suroor was doing business in Florida....

...Cayman Overseas Reinsurance Association, Ltd., 460 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the first district determined that a guaranty agreement in which an individual agreed to guaranty an obligation of a corporation was sufficient to render the individual amenable to the long arm jurisdiction under section 48.181....

...itute service and to dismiss FIC's second amended complaint. ORDER REVERSED, MATTER REMANDED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] Review of this order is proper pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. [2] Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in relevant part: 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state....

...pread use of the Internet have sent the investigative technique of a call to directory assistance the way of the horse and buggy and the eight track stereo. As to the corporate defendant, Quebec, Inc., the plaintiffs have conceded error. Pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), the plaintiffs properly served Quebec, Inc....

...Therefore, in resolving the instant motions, the Court must carefully analyze the Amended Complaint and the parties' affidavits. Plaintiffs have alleged in their Amended Complaint that defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Florida Statutes §§ 48.193(1)(a) and (g), 48.193(2), 48.181(1) and 48.181(3)....

...In this case defendants were served pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.161, which provides for substituted service of process on nonresidents. Therefore, if this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants, jurisdiction must arise from the other alleged bases for personal jurisdiction, Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181(1) or 48.181(3), and not from § 48.193. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 states, in relevant part, the following: (1) The acceptance by ......

...d activities within this state and operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state. In order to establish personal jurisdiction over defendants in this case, plaintiff must prove the elements of either § 48.181(1) or § 48.181(3). As set forth in the quoted text above, the elements of § 48.181(1) include the following: first, defendants either accepted the privilege to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on their business in Florida; or defendants accepted the privilege to have an office or agency in Florida; and second, this action arises out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to defendants' business activities or office in Florida. If plaintiff makes such proof, valid service was made on the Secretary of State. Proof of § 48.181(3) requires proof that (1) defendants sold, consigned, or leased personal property; (2) to any person, firm, or corporation in Florida....

...Parties seeking to invoke the long arm statute must bring themselves clearly within the language of the statute in order to render the substituted service of process effective against the defendant. Id. A plaintiff who attempts to serve under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 must allege or prove the necessary prerequisites to securing personal jurisdiction as specified in the statute....

...d challenged the general allegations in the Amended Complaint and have filed detailed affidavits. Plaintiffs must prove by affidavit, see Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502, that the requirements of doing business and connexity, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.181, exist....

...Even if GATCO's signature on the telex from defendants was an acceptance that formed a contract, the formation of the contract in Florida does not automatically lead to a finding that, after substituted service, a Court in Florida would have personal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to § 48.181....

...Second, the contract in DeMarco involved performance in Florida: the guarantor was a resident of Florida at the time that he signed a guarantee in Florida agreeing to be personally liable for the obligations of another. The alleged contract in the instant case involved performance outside of Florida. As mentioned, supra, § 48.181(1) requires that a defendant operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state....

...Having carefully considered the entire record and reviewed the law cited by the parties and other relevant law, the Court has concluded that it does not have personal jurisdiction over these defendants based on the facts and circumstances of this case. For personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1), plaintiffs must show that defendants accepted the privilege to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in Florida....

...Even if the Fernandina Beach to San Jose operation was deemed sufficient evidence of accepting the privilege of doing business in Florida, the operation does not involve defendant Bruce Brothers at all and the instant case does not arise from that operation, as is required by Fla.Stat. 48.181(1). For personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(3), plaintiffs must prove that defendants sold, consigned, or leased personal property to any person, firm, or corporation in Florida. Plaintiffs argue that the towage agreement was a "lease" arrangement. Defendants categorically state that Fla.Stat. 48.181(3) does not apply....

...ATCO barge. The charter arrangement, which provided for defendants' crew to operate the tug and control the barge, is clearly not simply a "lease." Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the charter agreement is the same as a lease for the purposes of § 48.181(3)....

...The allegations that Tugs has other contacts with Florida do not remedy the lack of personal jurisdiction as to defendant Tugs. "Where a nonresident defendant is not qualified to do business in the state, the party attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under § 48.181 must show the requirements of doing business and connexity. " Santos, 697 F.Supp. at 282 (emphasis added); Rose's Stores, Inc. v. Cherry, 526 So.2d 749, 752 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transport A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 971 (11th Cir.1986). Personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.181 does not exist over a nonresident defendant if the cause of action brought by plaintiffs is not premised on acts or omissions that were performed or were to be performed in Florida....

...ions of the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, any analysis of the question of whether jurisdiction in personam has been acquired over a foreign corporation must necessarily start with an analysis of the statutes. Id. at 508 (footnote omitted). Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983) provides in part: (1) The acceptance by any person or ......

...which the long arm statute could operate. To the same effect is the holding in American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. discharged, 366 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1979), involving analysis of subsections (1) and (3) of section 48.181, Florida Statutes, where the court found that lack of control over both the product and its Florida handler was fatal to long arm jurisdiction....

...By this interlocutory appeal, appellant seeks review of the order of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss the cause of action on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over his person. The trial court determined that the appellant, the defendant below, was subject to substituted service of process under § 48.181(1), Florida Statutes....

...Two years later, CORAL brought the suit below against the appellant in the Circuit Court for Duval County for breach of the contractual obligation of the guarantee. The appellant, no longer a Florida resident, was served by substituted service of process under the long-arm statute of our state pursuant to the provisions of § 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, as follows: (1) The acceptance by any person or persons, individually, or associated together as a co-partnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all forei...

...Under the facts presented in the instant case, there is ample support for the trial court's determination that the appellant had accepted the privilege of engaging in a business or business venture in this state so as to be subject to the exercise of Florida's long-arm jurisdiction under § 48.181(1)....

...NIMMONS, J., dissents with written opinion. NIMMONS, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree that the single act of DeMarco's signing the subject agreement in Florida was sufficient to sustain the trial court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction under Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, where performance of the agreement's obligations was to occur in the Cayman Islands, home of the obligee, Coral....

...Moreover, the Florida long-arm statutes are strictly construed and the burden is on the party invoking jurisdiction to prove that the use of the long-arm statute is appropriate. Oriental Imports, 701 F.2d at 891. In the instant case, the plaintiff has invoked jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193. Sections 48.181(1) and 48.193(1)(a) permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant only where the claims arise out of business transacted in the state....

...utes. Section 48.193(3) states: "Only causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated in this section may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this action." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Section 48.181(1) authorizes personal jurisdiction of a foreign corporation for causes of action " arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to business or business venture" conducted in Florida....

...“If, after reasonable diligence, service of process cannot be completed under subsection (1) or subsection (2), service of prodess may be effected by service upon the Secretary of State as agent of the limited liability company as provided for in s. 48.181.” § 48.062(3), Fla....

...4th DCA 2014) (affirming where trial court accepted plaintiffs untimely filed affidavit of compliance where counsel explained the reason for delay and had moved to extend time for filing). *1124 We reject the plaintiffs position that it was not required to comply with either section. Section 48.062(3) refers to section 48.181,Florida Statutes (2014). When substituted service is made under section 48.181,the requirements of section 48.161 also apply....

...the service “and -the action taken regarding the. service.” Since the Legislature did not incorporate section (c) of the uniform act .to- guide the Secretary, or detail the specific action to be taken, we look to section 48.062’s reference to section 48.181,and its link to section 48.161 as set forth above....

...stitute service. Her *1125 nandez, 32 So.3d at 698 . First, the plaintiff failed to amend its complaint to allege the requisite allegations to support substitute service. Second, the plaintiff failed to comply with section 48.161, applicable through section 48.181....

...Inc., a Delaware corporation, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant is conducting a lottery by the mailing of various paraphernalia to the citizens of Florida. Service of process was attempted to be accomplished pursuant to the provisions of F.S. § 48.181 (1969), F.S.A....

...at 1240." Unlike the facts in Hanson, defendant Reader's Digest has availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. [6] Florida Law Reader's Digest makes no contention that the subject statute, F.S. § 48.181 (1969), F.S.A., is defective; it contends vigorously that its activities are beyond the statute's reach, citing Lake v....

...Two years later Mediscience successfully moved to set aside the final judgment, on the ground that Section 48.161(1), Florida Statutes, requires the Secretary of State's return of service, which, absent the original summons, had not been achieved. Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes use of substituted service when suing a foreign corporation, on claims arising out of its business, by serving process on the Secretary of State as its "appointed" agent....

...nts. The two statutory sections are complementary and must be read in pari materia with each other. Atlas Van Lines, Inc. v. Rossmoore, 271 So.2d 31, 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). If the plaintiff chooses substituted service on the Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), then perfection of such substituted service requires full compliance with one of the alternative methods provided by Section 48.161....

...[the defendant] might be called upon to defend an action in Florida.” Id. The parties dispute which Florida long-arm statute applies. Plaintiff Orlando Peruyero (“Peruyero”) cites several of Florida’s long-arm statutes&emdash; Fla. Stat. § 48.181 , § 48.182, § 48.193, and § 47.16&emdash; that confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant BAE (“BAE”)....

...Integrity Staffing filed an amended complaint alleging that the Merritts were Florida residents who were "concealing their location." It effected substituted service of process on the defendants by delivering it to the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2012)....

jurisdiction over [Pomerantz] pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.181 or § 48.193. ...” Purcell, on authority of Florida

...summer home and interests in real estate. Travelers then attempted substituted service of process by: (a) serving the appellee's father at the father's address in Dade County; [1] and (b) by perfecting service upon the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), after counsel for Travelers filed an affidavit stating that the appellee could not be personally served, despite repeated efforts, because he was believed to be concealing himself....

...a, a foreign corporation, a two count complaint alleging (1) that the bank slandered the plaintiff, and (2) converted to its own use and damaged his automobile. Substituted service of process was made upon Citizens and Southern Bank pursuant to F.S. § 48.181 F.S.A....

...Thereafter, appellant filed its motion to quash the service of process upon it and dismiss the complaint on the ground that it never had been engaged in business in the State of Florida and, therefore, was not amenable to substituted service of process under the provisions of law pursuant to F.S. § 48.181 F.S.A....

...See Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Smith, Fla. 1965, 176 So.2d 903. By relying upon the base allegations, we find plaintiff to have failed to meet the burden of presenting a situation clearly justifying the use of a substituted service of process pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.181, F.S.A....

...The partial record brought before us does not disclose whether the complaint was later amended to include Goff and McGee in their capacity as trustees. Both are essential parties. Nor does the record disclose whether decree pro confesso was entered against Mrs. McGee, a nonresident served under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1967), F.S.A....

...bility was grounded upon the theory of negligence in the control and maintenance of the airstrip. Service of process upon the defendant-appellant corporation was attempted by (1) substituted service of process upon the Secretary of State pursuant to § 48.181, Fla....

...diction over the person. *891 A hearing was conducted thereon and thereafter the trial judge entered the herein appealed order denying these defense motions and specifically finding therein that service of process was effected properly pursuant to §§ 48.181 and 48.081 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. On appeal, defendant-appellant first contends that the trial judge erred in finding that service of process was sufficient under § 48.181, Fla. Stat. We find this point has merit. It is well established that in order to obtain jurisdiction under § 48.181, Fla....

...Plaintiff in the case at bar having been injured on an airstrip located on Chub Cay, Bahamas and the defendant corporation's liability being based on the negligent maintenance thereof, we have determined that the trial judge erred in finding that the substituted service of process upon the Secretary of State pursuant to § 48.181 Fla....

...ave arisen out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business being transacted within the state." For the reasons cited hereinabove, the herein appealed order finding that service of process properly was perfected under § 48.181 Fla....

...The non-final order under review denying Firestone's motions to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is reversed upon a holding that the plaintiff failed to allege or prove the prerequisites to securing personal jurisdiction over Firestone under either section 48.181 or section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981), since (1) the complaint lacks even an allegation that Firestone, a nonresident corporation, `operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida' and that the action arises therefrom so as to authorize substituted service of process under section 48.181, National League for Nursing v....

...been properly served. Green Emerald argued that the substitute service of process on the Secretary of State was defective because Fannie Mae did not plead the requisite jurisdictional allegations in its complaint. Specifically, Green Emerald argued that under section 48.181, Fannie Mae's substitute service of process was not valid because Fannie Mae failed to allege in its complaint that Green Emerald was either a nonresident of Florida or a resident which had concealed its whereabouts....

...At the hearing, Green Emerald made the same arguments that it had raised in its motion. Fannie Mae argued that it had properly effected substitute service because it had complied with the service requirements set forth in section 605.0117. Fannie Mae contended that it was unnecessary for it to comply with section 48.181 concerning substitute service because (1) section 48.181 applies only to service on nonresidents of Florida and (2) section 605.0117 created an independent method for service of process -3- on limited liability companies.2 Without providing any explanation, the trial court denied the motion to quash and vacate. On appeal, the parties make the same arguments.3 II. DISCUSSION Initially, we note that Fannie Mae's argument that section 48.181 only applies to nonresidents of Florida is belied by the text of the statute. See § 48.181(1) (stating that the Florida Secretary of State is permitted to accept substituted service on behalf of "any person who is a resident of the state and ....

...-4- allegations to support substitute service." (citing Alhussain, 712 So. 2d 806)). "The burden of pleading facts that support, as a matter of law, the applicability of substituted service falls on the party seeking to invoke the provisions of [section 48.181]." Mecca, 954 So....

...Here, because Fannie Mae attempted to serve Green Emerald through substituted service on the Secretary of State under chapter 48, we must determine whether Fannie Mae pleaded the necessary jurisdictional allegations to fall within the ambit of the statute. Section 48.181(1) permits the Secretary of State to accept service for any nonresident defendant or Florida resident who either (1) conceals his whereabouts or (2) previously conducted business in Florida but subsequently becomes a nonresident. See also Mecca, 954 So....

...at 265 (citing Jupiter House, 198 So. 3d at 1124). Finally, although neither party brought it to our attention, we note from our own review of chapter 48 that section 48.062 provides for service on limited liability companies and refers to section 48.181.4 It states that "if, after reasonable diligence, service of process cannot be completed . . . , service of process may be effected by service upon the Secretary of State as agent of the limited liability company as provided for in s. 48.181." § 48.062(3). 4 Like section 605.0117, section 48.062 was enacted as part of the law that created the Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act....

...comply with the requirements for substitute service against a domestic corporation. Specifically, Defendant argues that because it is a company, long arm service of process in the instant case should have been performed pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.181, titled "Service on Nonresident Engaging in Business in State", rather than Florida Statutes § 48.161, titled "Method of Substituted Service on Nonresident", as was specified in the return of service affidavit of Plaintiff's process server. The jurisdictional requirements of Fla. Stat. § 48.181 are that the defendant conducts business in Florida and is either a(1) nonresident, (2) resident of Florida who subsequently became a nonresident, or (3) resident of Florida concealing his or her whereabouts. See Fla. Stat. § 48.181; Alvarado v....

...The burden of pleading facts that support the applicability of substitute service falls on the party seeking to invoke the provisions of the long-arm statute. Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2005). Defendant argues that to effectuate service under F.S. § 48.181(1) a party must plead that the company, through its officers or agents, was concealing its whereabouts. Because the Third Amended Complaint does not contain any such allegation, Plaintiff's substituted service in the instant case would not satisfy the strict construction of Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1)....

...t court is located or where service is made." Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(1). Florida service of process on a corporation doing business in the State of Florida is governed by Fla. Stat. § 48.081(1). Long arm service on corporations is governed by Fla. Stat. § 48.181, which states that it governs service on "any person who is a resident of the state and who subsequently......

...Spencer Boat Co., Inc. v. Liutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1974) [1] . The Court finds that Plaintiff attempted to perform substitute service pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.161, when he should have performed substitute service pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.181(1)....

...1967, Section 542.12, F.S.A., are also permissible when used in professions or trades. The basis of our reasoning is the same as that found in Judge Mann's dissenting opinion in Akey v. Murphy, Fla.App. 1969, 229 So.2d 276. We find support of our opinion in the interpretation given the term "business" as used in F.S. 1967, Section 48.181, F.S.A., in the case of DeVaney v....

...business venture in the State of Florida and that they are both amenable to process under Chapter 48 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Service of process on the non-resident defendants was attempted by serving the Secretary of State in accordance with Section 48.181, supra....

...racts, is engaged in a business venture in the State of Florida so as to make it amenable to service of process under the "long arm" statute (Ch. 48 Fla. Stat. F.S.A.)? We hold that such a foreign corporation is not amenable to the long-arm statute. Section 48.181, supra, provides for substituted service of process upon the Secretary of State for non-residents who operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in Florida when the cause of action arises out of any transaction or operation connected with such business or business venture....

...ufficient to establish jurisdiction under the "long-arm" statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1985). The holding of mortgages on real estate in Florida and collecting payments on those mortgages does not subject appellant to jurisdiction under section 48.181, 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...All Coverage Underwriters, Inc., 200 So.2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), is misplaced for two reasons: first, Lomas was not decided under section 48.193(1)(f)1; and second, the corporate defendant in that case was found to be "doing business" in Florida (under the statutory predecessor to section 48.181), based on the fact that it was engaged in the financing and construction of improvements to real property in Florida under an arrangement with its wholly-owned subsidiary with offices in Miami, and was also engaged in a "business venture" in Florida under the existing section 47.16, Florida Statutes....

rule. For instance, as relevant to this case, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2012), authorizes substitute

...eto. Defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that this Court lacks in personam jurisdiction over it. In its earlier motion to dismiss, which this Court denied, defendant made the argument that Florida's current long arm statutes, § 48.181 and § 48.193, Fla.Stat....

...submitted by defendant. Defendant first argues that the plaintiff's injury in this case did not result from the defendant's, or its predecessor's pre 1969 activities in Florida and, therefore, cannot, pursuant to Florida's current long arm statutes § 48.181 and § 48.193, form the basis for in personam jurisdiction for any act which occurred prior to 1969....

...dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person and for insufficiency of service of process. We have jurisdiction. Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a) (3)(C)(i). We reverse the order of the trial court upon a holding that (1) substituted service of process under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), utilized in the present case by the plaintiff, was not authorized where Bluestone's complaint was devoid of allegations that the defendant is not a resident of Florida and that the cause of action arises from the defendant's activities conducted in this state, Esberger v. First Florida Business Consultants, Inc., 338 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); (2) if, arguendo, Bluestone's pleading had been sufficient to make Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), applicable ab initio, shifting the burden to the defendant to show, by prima facie proof, its inapplicability, Electro Engineering Products Co., Inc....

...It is the appellant's contention that service should have been quashed and the case dismissed because the appellee failed to meet its burden of proof to show that the appellant was carrying on a business or business venture within the State of Florida in order to effectuate service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...the agent's authority has been revoked or the agent cannot be found or served with the exercise of reasonable diligence, service of process may be effected by service upon the Secretary of State as agent of the limited partnership as provided for in s. 48.181, or process may be served as provided in ss. 48.071 and 48.21. § 48.061(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). Gladis's counsel testified that he did not serve the Secretary of State because H & F had failed to register as required under section 620.169, Florida Statutes (2002). However, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2002), does not require registration to render the Secretary of State an agent of a nonresident for the purposes of service of process. Section 48.181(1) provides: The acceptance by any person or persons, individually or associated together as a copartnership or any other form or type of association, who are residents of any other state or country, and all foreign corporations, and a...

...The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if *650 served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. § 48.181(1), Fla....

...Appellants, nonresident defendants, appeal a nonfinal order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because appellee alleged the appellants were doing business in Florida but failed to allege any connection between the business and the cause of action, we must reverse. § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

...is for subjecting appellant to jurisdiction in Florida, the court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss. Prior to the amendment of section 48.193, Florida Statutes, in 1984, for long-arm jurisdiction to attach under either that enactment or section 48.181 it was necessary that there be connexity between the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's activities within the state of Florida....

...bile. Appellee alleged that the helmet failed to cushion sufficiently the resulting impact, resulting in severe head injury. The issue, as posed by the parties, is whether the Florida courts acquired jurisdiction over appellants pursuant to Sections 48.181 or 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979). [1] Section 48.181(1) provides: 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business of state....

...Appellants were engaged in the business of promoting and soliciting sales of motorcycle helmets in Florida when the retailer, 441 Cycle Shop, bought the helmet from Dixie International and sold it to appellee as well as when appellee was injured. We hold that this satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of Section 48.181 and accordingly affirm the trial court's order....

...Appeal in General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co., 388 So.2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). LETTS, C.J., GLICKSTEIN, J., and SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Service of process upon either appellant pursuant to Section 48.181 is not an issue....

...ubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co., 388 So.2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). See also American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. discharged, 366 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1979). Nevertheless, we do not believe that Section 48.181 was intended to permit a manufacturer to promote and sell its products in Florida and be subject to the jurisdiction of Florida courts only when it sells directly to a Florida enterprise and be immune from jurisdiction merely because i...

..., dismissing it from the cause upon the ground that the defendant American Marine, Ltd. is a foreign corporation which did not do business in the State of Florida and that therefore service of summons had not been effectively made pursuant to F.S.A. § 48.181. We hold that the affidavits on file are sufficient to demonstrate that the appellee American Marine, Ltd. was doing business in the State of Florida and that the attempted service of process upon American Marine, Ltd. pursuant to F.S.A. § 48.181 was sufficient....

...doing business in the State of Florida within the meaning of the minimum contracts rule as announced in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and the Florida cases interpreting our own statute (F.S.A. § 48.181) in the light of that decision....

...Compare with Delray Beach Aviation Corp. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 332 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.1964). The order dismissing American Marine, Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation, from this cause is reversed as is that portion of the order which quashed service of process pursuant to F.S.A. § 48.181, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order denying the motion to dismiss and sustaining the service pursuant to statute....

...1964, 169 So.2d 851, wherein the court stated in its opinion that the signing of a note is not a sufficient act, in and of itself, to constitute "carrying on or engaging in a business or business venture". But the Odell case was concerned with the requirements of Florida's long-arm statute, F.S. Section 48.181, F.S.A., which applies to nonresident persons or corporations who "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture" in the state....

...Rule to Show Cause was effected as to them on August 3, 1977, by service upon the Secretary of State in compliance with Section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1975), thus giving us personal jurisdiction over respondents under Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...stered agent and registered office in accordance with chapter 607.” In addition, section 48.081(3)(a) permits that “process may be served on the agent designated by the corporation under s. 48.091.” § 48.081(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010); see also § 48.181(2), Fla....

...Therefore, service upon Van Heusden in Melbourne was sufficient also as to the corporation. Likewise, § 48.061(1) F.S.A. provides that service upon one partner is valid as to other partners, and service upon Van Heusden was sufficient as to Beck. We recognize that § 48.081 F.S.A. is read in pari materia with § 48.181, F.S.A., Youngblood v....

...However, the complaint fails to allege that Farouki, individually, did business in Florida, had become a nonresident, or was concealing his whereabouts. After failing to personally serve process on Farouki, Attel substituted service on Florida's secretary of state, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...If it fails to do so then a motion to quash process should be granted." Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So.2d 961, 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); see Wiggam, 562 So.2d at 390; Ferguson v. McWilliams, 483 So.2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). In the instant case, Attel substituted service under section 48.181(1), which provides, inter alia, that Florida's secretary of state can accept service for any former Florida resident who previously conducted business in Florida but subsequently becomes a nonresident, or any Florida resident who conceals his or her whereabouts. § 48.181(1)....

...d service. Id.; Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(h); see Drake, 353 So.2d at 964. Because Attel failed to plead the required actual statutory language or to allege the ultimate facts that invoke the statute, he could not perfect substituted service on Farouki. § 48.181(1); Fla....

...to the law of the state. Consequently, the Plaintiff has attempted to serve process on Defendant Kellogg Company under two sections of the Florida “Long Arm” statutes: First, by substituted service by serving the Secretary of Státe pursuant to § 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S....

...ce in a state of a wholly-owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation sufficient basis to assert jurisdiction over the parent company.” Subsequently, the Florida Legislature did this by adding subsection (2) to former § 47.16 (now subsection (3) of § 48.181) so as to encompass distributors, jobbers, wholesalers, and brokers for foreign corporations....

...2d 529 (Fla.App.1963), it would be presumed that Kellogg Company was doing business in Florida. The next question to be answered is whether the cause of action must arise out of the foreign corporation’s activities within the state. The very language of § 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., shows that the cause of action must arise out of or be incidental to the corporation’s activities within the state....

...Kellogg Sales, the Kellogg subsidiary in Florida. Therefore, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s cause of action neither arose out of nor was incidental to Kellogg’s activities in Florida and that substituted service of process pursuant to § 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., was invalid....

...The basic difficulty with DOR's new theory is the total lack of case precedent or statutory authority. An indication of the weakness of its position is DOR's reliance on such inappropriate authorities as: cases interpreting the Florida long-arm statute (Section 48.181, Florida Statutes) to allow suit against a nonresident corporation based on activities performed in Florida; [6] cases applying the "minimum connection" or "nexus" standard to determine minimum requirements satisfying due process and i...

...Taylor failed to make payments as required by the note and CommerceBank filed a complaint. CommerceBank attempted service of process on Taylor in New York, but it was returned unclaimed. On February 21, 1985, CommerceBank filed an amended complaint for nonpayment pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (Supp.1984), in an attempt to invoke jurisdiction over Taylor as a nonresident engaging in business in Florida. Service of process was attempted at his New York home address and his New York work address. Pursuant to section 48.181, process was also served on the Secretary of State of Florida as a substitute for personal service on Taylor....

...This was followed by a letter dated December 9, 1987, which proposed a settlement of $15,000. On March 2, 1994, Taylor moved to set aside the 1985 judgment against him for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted Taylor’s motion to vacate the final judgment finding that CommerceBank failed to properly plead section 48.181 in its amended complaint and, thereby, failed to invoke jurisdiction over Taylor. CommerceBank contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that it did not properly plead that Taylor was engaging in business in Florida as required by section 48.181....

...Rule 1.070(i), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure (1984), states that “[w]hen service of process is to be made on nonresidents of Florida, it is sufficient to plead the basis for service in the language of the statutes without pleading the facts supporting service.” To perfect service pursuant to section 48.181, the plaintiff is required to allege that the defendant is either a resident of a foreign state or country, a resident of Florida who subsequently becomes a nonresident, or a resident of Florida who conceals his whereabouts and that the cause of action arises from business activities conducted in Florida. See Esberger v. First Fla. Business Consultants, Inc., 338 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); O’Connell v. Loach, 203 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Section 48.181 describes what constitutes conducting business activities in Florida as “to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state.” “The single act of signing a contractual agreement within the foru...

...Moreover, the execution of a promissory note “has been construed as a business venture.” International Graphics, Inc. v. MTA Travel Ways, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 598, 604 (S.D.Fla.1976). In the instant case, the amended complaint followed the language of section 48.181 and specifically alleged that Taylor was no longer a resident of Florida or was concealing his whereabouts and that he executed and delivered a promissory note to CommerceBank in Dade County, Florida, due and payable in Dade County, which note Taylor failed and refused to pay....

...Louis by serving an officer of the company in Jacksonville, Florida, Plaintiff being under the impression at that time that it was the distributor of the scraper in question. Substituted service was attempted on Deere and Company under F.S. §§ 48.161 *295 and 48.181, P.S.A., Florida’s “long arm’ statutes....

...Subsequently, it was discovered that John Deere of Baltimore was the distributor, and service was attempted on it under the same statutes. Defendant bases his motions on the grounds that Deere and Company and John Deere of Baltimore are not subject to service of process under F.S. §§ 48.-161 and 48.181, F.S.A....

...urts. Donnelly v. Kellogg Co., 293 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968); Federal Insurance Co. v. Michigan Wheel Co., 267 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.Fla.1967). This is so even though the corporation sells products in Florida through a distributor and, thus, under F.S. § 48.181(3), F.S....

...arose out of a transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the activities of either Deere and Co. or John Deere of Baltimore in Florida, and, therefore, jurisdiction over these defendants could not be obtained under F.S. §§ 48.161 and 48.181, F.S.A....

...The Court concludes that the attempted service of process on Deere and Company and John Deere of Baltimore was insufficient to subject these defendants to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court. Having so concluded, the Court deems it unnecessary at this time to consider the question whether F.S. §§ 48.-161 and 48.181, F.S.A....

...Everything Haughey argues that Island Sea-Faris does in this state is, in reality, done by Royal Caribbean and other cruise lines. Haughey tries to ascribe Royal Caribbean’s activities to Island Sea-Faris by alleging that Royal Caribbean was Island Sea-Faris’ broker, relying on section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ntractual obligations of the United States company is sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction *1172 in Florida. That issue has not been addressed. I also believe that the service of process in this case is insufficient. The plaintiff relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...The plaintiff contends that the defendant was formerly present in this state, and left the state. As already explained, that theory is contradicted by the documents which were filed of record. It was the United States company that was present in Florida, not the British company. Because section 48.181, Florida Statutes is inapplicable to this case, it does not appear that service of process was validly accomplished....

...uired to enable the court to make an effective determination of such a motion. The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant is concealing his whereabouts, and has attempted to serve process on the defendant pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.161 and § 48.181, which provide for substituted service on a person who conceals his whereabouts....

...4(f)(3) out of an abundance of caution. Plaintiff then sent a copy of its Summons and Complaint to the Florida Secretary of State (“SOS”) for the purpose of serving Defendant via substituted service of process pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.161 and 48.181....

...al Registered Mail-Return Receipt Requested. (Id.) On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff moved for an enlargement of time to serve Defendant and to file an affidavit in support of substituted service of process pursuant to Fla. Stat. Fla. Stat. § 48.161 and 48.181....

...For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Court-Directed Alternative Service of Process. II. Mlotion for Enlargement of Time and Motion to Quash There are two pending motions relevant to Plaintiffs attempt to serve Defendant under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 through service of process on the Florida’s SOC. First, Plaintiff seeks an enlargement of time to complete service on Defendant and file an affidavit in support of service under Fla. Stat. §§ 48.161 , 48.181. Second, Defendant moves to quash Plaintiffs attempt of substituted service of process on the Florida SOC, under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 , on the basis that Defendant is not amenable to such service because it is not engaging in business activity in Florida....

...Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 924 (11th Cir. 2003)(“Thus, because service [by registered mail] was prohibited by Austrian law, Prewitt could not have effectively served OPEC under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(C)(ii).”). Plaintiffs also attempted substituted service pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.181. “In order to serve a nonresident defendant pursuant to section 48.181, the complaint must allege specific facts which show that the defendant is conducting business in Florida and that the cause of action arose from business activities in this state.” Newberry v. Rife, 675 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the cause of action arose from business activities in the state of Florida. Accordingly, any service pursuant to § 48.181 must be quashed....

...Defendant was required by the explicit terms of each shipping invoice to make payment to a California address. The distributorship agreement states that Florida law shall be applied, but is silent as to forum or venue. The question before the Court for resolution is the applicability of the Florida Long Arm Statute § 48.181 and § 48.193....

...We affirm the order dismissing the complaint because we agree with the trial court that the defendant was not operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business in Florida so as to subject it, as here, to substituted service of process through the Secretary of State under Section 48.181(1), Fla....

...Subsequently, the court denied Appellant’s motion to vacate the default, set aside the foreclosure judgment and cancel the foreclosure sale. The issue on appeal is whether proper service was effected. Appellee claims it properly served process by following the procedures outlined in sections 48.181 and 48.151, Florida Statutes (2012). It claims that Appellant was served when a process server delivered the summons and complaint to Florida’s Secretary of State. Appellant claims that service should have been perfected pursuant to sections 48.181 and 48.161, Florida Statutes (2012), and because it was not, Appellant received nothing from either Appellee or the Secretary of State. It is undisputed that Appellant is a nonresident bank engaged in business in this state. As such, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, Florida’s Secretary of State is the agent “on whom all process in any action or proceeding against [Appellant] ......

KLEIN, J. Appellant defendants were served in Texas under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), by substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State....

...unsuccessful. As it turned out, defendants had not occupied that address for a number of months. Without doing anything further, plaintiff alleged that the defendants were concealing their whereabouts and served the Florida Secretary of State under section 48.181....

...Their-motion challenging jurisdiction thereunder was supported by their separate affidavits stating their non-residence; that they had no office or place of business in Florida and had no interest other than through ownership of stock of the corporation. By § 48.181 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., the engaging in business in Florida (in the manner and respects set out in the statute) will make a non-resident subject to be served by substituted service. Subsection (3)of § 48.181 provides among other things that one selling tangible or intangible property through a broker will be conclusively presumed to be engaged in business or a business venture in Florida....

...l defendants could not be had by service upon the corporation’s resident agent, was denied. Hence this appeal. \¥e have examined the Florida Statutes pertaining to service of process on nonresident individuals, and particularly section 48.071 and section 48.181 and chapter 49, and after examining the record before us, we must conclude that the statutes have not been complied with in effecting service *438 upon the appellants, and their motion to dismiss as to them should have been granted....

...Piechalak, 343 So.2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Griffis v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 333 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); (2) the plaintiffs have similarly failed to sufficiently allege jurisdictional facts to clearly justify service upon these defendants under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979) (in effect since 1957), see Electro Engineering Products Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla.1977); Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association of Ft. Lauderdale, 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); (3) if, ar-guendo, the plaintiffs’ pleading had been sufficient to make Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), applicable ab initio, shifting the burden to the defendants to show, by prima facie proof, its inapplicability, Electro Engineering Products Co., Inc....

...lure to maintain such an agent or because the agent cannot be found or served with the exercise of reasonable diligence, service of process may be effected by service upon the Secretary of State as agent of the limited partnership as provided for in s. 48.181." The undisputed facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows....

...t which Counné claimed in her 1.540 motion she resided at all material times. Unable to locate 818's agent at either its registered address or the residence of its sole manager and agent, Neiman served the Secretary of State under the provisions of section 48.181, which accepted service on 818's behalf....

...Counné occupied the subject premises as her full time residence. . . . . 8. Specifically, this action was commenced on March 30, 2007; thereafter, Ms. Counné paid, and Ms. Neiman accepted, payments [on April 6 and June 6, 2007]. . . . . 16. Florida Statute 48.181 only permits service of process upon the Secretary of State as agent for "any person who is a resident of the state and who subsequently becomes a nonresident of the state or conceals . . . her whereabouts. . . .". [sic] Counné concedes that section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2007), provides that any person doing business in this state as a partner agrees to service of process on the Secretary of State if that person is concealing his or her whereabouts: ....

...by failing to make the required monthly mortgage payments. Unable to serve 818 either at the location of its purported resident agent or the *662 condominium unit, [2] Neiman sought to serve the company by substituted service of process, pursuant to section 48.181(1) of the Florida Statutes (2007), alleging that "[818] ha[d] concealed its whereabouts while engaging in or carrying on a business venture within the State of Florida." 818's sole principal and managing member, Esther Counné, counter...

...of the Florida Secretary of State. § 608.416, Fla. Stat. (2007). A breach of this obligation by a Florida limited liability company constitutes the appointment of the Secretary of State as the company's substituted agent for service of process. See § 48.181(1); All Mobile Video, Inc....

...e, according to the return of service, "[neither the] corporation [n]or registered agent are [] located at [this] address." As a matter of law, then, 818 designated the Florida Secretary of State as its resident agent for the service of process. See § 48.181(1)....

...�renders the attempted service invalid. The facts of this case closely mirror All Mobile Video. In All Mobile Video, as in the case before us, the plaintiff sought to effectuate substituted service of process on All Mobile Video pursuant to sections 48.181(1) and 48.161(1) of the Florida Statutes (1999)....

business in this state within the meaning of F.S. § 48.181, F.S.A. See Woodring v. Crown Engineering Co.

time of the accrual of the cause of action, or Section 48.181, still in effect, could be utilized by appel-lee

...as their agent was insufficient because Walton Building Supply Co. was not their agent but only a purchaser in a seller-purchaser relationship. In support of its motion, Industrial Lubricants filed an affidavit from its president that the sole relationship was a buy-sell arrangement. Ceco relies upon Fla.Stat. § 48.181, F.S.A....

...In Cornelius, the court found that there was sufficient proof in the record to support the conclusion of the trial judge that the foreign corporation was engaged in a “business venture” in Florida and therefore subject to process under Fla.Stat. § 47.16 (1957), F.S.A., the predecessor to § 48.181 (1967)....

PEARSON, Judge. The issue of law presented by this interlocutory appeal is whether a foreign insurer neither licensed to do, nor engaged in, business within this state may be served pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. This is an interlocutory appeal contesting the trial court’s decision allowing service of process on appellant-defendant, Thogus Products Company, Inc., pursuant to Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., commonly known as “Florida’s long arm statute.” Upon consideration of the facts, the briefs, and the record filed in this cause, the order appealed from is affirmed on the basis of State ex rel....

...ot retroactive. See Connell v. Ott Research & Development, Inc., 363 So.2d 163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). In the opinion on that first appeal, by footnote the court stated it was not called upon to decide whether substituted service could be made under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides for service on non-residents engaged in business in this state. 1 In an amended complaint filed by the plaintiff, as a predicate for serving the nonresident defendants under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), it was alleged: “4....

...ade County, Florida. All negotiations and transactions relative to this action occurred in Dade County, Florida, where and when defendants were residing. Defendants are amenable to service of process pursuant to Florida Statutes, Sections 48.161 and 48.181 as defendants were residents of Florida when said transactions took place and defendants are now residents of Georgia....

...Plaintiff is informed and believes further that defendant, GAIL M. CON-NELL, while a resident of the State of Florida had worked, been employed and had conducted business or business ventures.” Service made on the defendants thereafter, pursuant to said Section 48.181 was not opposed by the defendant Thomas Connell, but his wife Gail Connell challenged the validity of such service, by a motion to quash supported by two affidavits....

...Her isolated act of co-signing the note to the bank for no personal business purpose or benefit to her, but solely as an accommodation of the husband, did not amount to her engaging in business or business venture in Florida such as would make her amenable, as a subsequent nonresident, to service of process under said Section 48.181....

...2d DCA 1963); Odell v. Signer, 169 So.2d 851, 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Uible v. Landstreet, 392 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1968); Spencer Boat Co., Inc. v. Lieutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1974). As a predicate for serving the nonresident Gail Connell under said Section 48.181, the amended complaint presented only conclusionary allegations, alleging that the “defendants” conducted business or a business venture in Florida, and, on information and belief, that while a resident of Florida Gail Connell had been employed and conducted business or business venture there....

...ce upon her; and it was error to deny her motion to quash. The order appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order quashing the substituted service on the defendant-appellant Gail Con-nell. It is so ordered. . § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

...motion to quash service of process and vacate the clerk’s default in the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. The plaintiff below, Green Tree Servicing, LLC, (“GTS”) attempted to serve Green Emerald through substitute service on the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2016). We reverse for two reasons. First, GTS failed to allege the requisite jurisdictional grounds for substitute service provided under section 48.181(1)....

...under sections 48.062(1) and (2). Jupiter House, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 198 So. 3d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). In order to perfect substitute service through the Secretary of State, the complaint must allege one of two jurisdictional grounds provided under section 48.181(1)....

...i) file an affidavit of compliance. Id. at 1123. In this case, GTS’s complaint merely alleges that Green Emerald owns the subject property, so GTS has failed to allege either of the jurisdictional grounds for substitute service provided under section 48.181(1). Furthermore, the record does not reflect that GTS complied with section 48.161(1) by (i) sending notice of service to Green Emerald via certified or registered mail, (ii) filing the return receipt from Green Emerald, and (iii) filing an affidavit of compliance....

...AM. This is an appeal from an order quashing service of process upon the appellee. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the appellants made a sufficient showing that appellee was engaged in a business venture in Florida, within the meaning of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), so as to establish jurisdiction over the appellee....

action. The long-arm statute in this case is section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides for

...American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F.Supp. 568, 572 (S.D.Fla.1978) (district court found foreign defendant subject to personal jurisdiction where it "engaged in a general course of business in Florida for pecuniary benefit under another name"). 1. Jurisdiction Under Sections 48.193(2) and 48.181(3) As discussed in Section II.A, supra, the reach of Florida's general jurisdiction statute extends to the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause....

...Plaintiffs also argue that Herradura's lack of presence in Florida is not dispositive, as Herradura transacts business through subsidiaries, affiliates and/or independent contractors. See Pls.' Response at 6-10, citing cases which discuss Fla. Stat. Section 48.181(3) (presumption of substantial business activities)....

...209. As a holding company, ESR does not actively engage in any activity within Florida that could be found to create minimum contacts within the jurisdiction. Plaintiffs base their argument for personal jurisdiction over ESR on Sections 48.193(2) and 48.181(3) of the Florida long-arm statute, claiming that ESR directly, or through its subsidiaries and affiliates, conducts systematic and continuous business in Florida....

...on based on an affiliate or independent contractor's business contacts. Cf. Dinsmore, 314 So.2d at 564 (continuous or systematic business activities through its affiliates or independent contractors subject a principle to personal jurisdiction under Section 48.181(3)); Meier, 288 F.3d at 1272-73; Universal Caribbean, 543 So.2d at 448 (Florida company served as the largest booking agent for non-resident resort owner)....

...a physical presence in this jurisdiction. [5] Thus, the Court declines to give these distinctions significant weight on top of the sporadic and isolated contacts already found to be insufficient for general jurisdiction under Sections 48.193(2) and 48.181(3) in Section II.B.1, supra....

Marine, Ltd., 258 So.2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); § 48.-181, Fla.Stat. (1983); see also Kravitz v. Gebrueder

...The plaintiff, Don Wright, by his complaint sought a declaration of his rights and injunctive relief pursuant to a contract between Wright and the Syndicate whereby Wright would produce, and the Syndicate would distribute, newspaper cartoons. Service of process was attempted pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

...laintiffs served copies of the summons and complaint on CT Corporation, the designated agent of YMC USA. Florida law provides for serving process on a particular agent designated by a foreign corporation who is doing business in the state. Fla.Stat. § 48.181(2) (1989)....

...Hughes of The Law Office of Joseph Hughes, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We reverse the order denying the former tenant’s motion to quash service of process in this breach of lease action. The tenant has established that substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2020), was not authorized in this case because the tenant was not “operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture” in Florida within the meaning of the statute. Id. We are bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1975), that “[t]he activities of the person sought to be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. [section] 48.181(1) must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit.” See also DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So. 2d 904, 906–07 (Fla. 1969) (“We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute [section] 48.181, ....

...oods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service under Florida Statute [section] 48.181, ....

...constituted engaging in business allowing for substituted service under the statute), and McCarthy v. Little River Bank and Trust Co., 224 So. 2d 338, 341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (holding that participating in the proceeds of an uncle’s estate constitutes a business venture under section 48.181). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. GROSS, KUNTZ and ARTAU, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....

trial court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1991), but reverse that

...a degree of control over its subsidiary that the activities of the subsidiary were in fact the activities of the parent within the state is substituted service of process permitted.” 340 So.2d at 546 . Although these cases involved Fla. Stat.Ann. § 48.181, the substituted service of process statute which was in effect before the current long-arm statute was enacted, decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 apply to Section 48.193(l)(a)....

...ed by two non-resident defendants due to the defendants’ negligence. “The mere ownership and maintenance of real property [by a non-resident] does not constitute a ‘business’ or a ‘business venture’ within the meaning of § 47.16(1) [now 48.181(1)], Florida Statutes, F.S.A.” sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction through substituted service of process over the non-resident....

...And where a complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to invoke personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the complaint may be properly dismissed. O’Connell v. Loach, 194 So.2d 700 (Fla.2d DCA 1967). The plaintiffs contend that the defendants are amenable to suit by substituted service of process under Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1975), because the accident in this case happened in an apartment building which the defendants operated for profit as lessors....

...Margules, 98 So.2d 394 (Fla.3d DCA 1957). The fact that the defendants may have divested themselves of the subject property prior to the filing of the complaint herein is of no moment since the crucial question is whether the defendants were amenable to suit in this state under Section 48.181(1) Florida Statutes (1975), at the time the cause of action arose....

PEARSON, Judge. This interlocutory appeal is from an order denying appellant Compuguide Corporation’s motion to dismiss on the ground that attempted service of process under F. S.A. § 48.181 was not effective....

...support the determination made in the trial court. Appellant contends that the facts before the trial court affirmatively show that ap-pellee has not carried its burden of showing facts which would make the appellant amenable to process under F.S.A. § 48.181, Zirin v....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. § 48.161(1), Fla.Stat. (1995); § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat....

...rd L. Jones, would have been subject to service of process as either a user of the public highways of Florida, so as to come within the purview of § 48.171, Fla.Stats., F.S.A. or as engaging in business in the State of Florida within the meaning of § 48.181, Fla.Stats., F.S.A....

...Namer, 225 So.2d 442 (Fla.App. 1st, 1969) that actions “ex con-tractu”, as well as actions “ex delicto”, arising from an automobile accident come within the purview of Fla.Stats. § 48.171. Secondly, it is our opinion that Jones’ actions fall within the purview of § 48.181 which concerns engaging in business within the State of Florida....

...aim arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984) (emphasis supplied) (codifying in part ch. 84-2, § 3, Laws of Fla.). On May 30, 1984, the plaintiffs refiled their actions. 2 The plaintiffs served AMC and Jeep pursuant to sections 48.181 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1983) (as amended by chapter 84-2, Laws of Florida)....

...w. 4 The plaintiffs’ actions do not arise out of AMC’s and Jeep’s activities in Florida — the accident occurred in the Cayman Islands and the Jeep CJ-5 was neither manufactured nor sold in Florida. Prior to the 1984 amendments, both sections 48.181 and 48.-193 required that there be a “connexity” between the cause of action and the defendant corporation’s activities in Florida....

...xpress and unequivocal statement” from the legislature indicating a different intent. 6 See Fleeman, 342 So.2d at 818 . For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order deny *275 ing AMC and Jeep’s motions to dismiss is reversed. Reversed. . Section 48.181(3) was amended in the following manner: (3) Any person, firm, or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors to a...

...venture in this state. Ch. 84-2, § 2, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 48.-181(3), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1984)). It is not clear, and we need not decide, what effect, if any, the amendments of chapter 84-2 will have on the “engrafted” requirement of *273 section 48.181 that the cause of action arise out of the foreign corporation’s business activities in Florida. See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co., 388 So.2d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Manus v. Manus, 193 So.2d 236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (construing § 47.16, Fla. Stat. (1965) (predecessor to § 48.181)). Courts have held that section 48.181 (titled “Service on nonresident engaging in business in state” (emphasis supplied)) provides a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-residents independent from the bases provided by section 48.193 (which is titled "...

...that the verdict and judgment were supported by competent substantial evidence. In appeal No. 69-938, filed by N. G. Godshall, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the substituted service which was obtained upon him under § 48.181, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., as having engaged in business or a business venture, in Florida, out of which the action arose....

...1 Nor would estoppel by judgment apply, with reference to service under the statute, in the absence of a showing that the issue of doing business in Florida not only was tried in the prior case, but was related there to the cause of action asserted here, as required by § 48.181....

...ntirety it appears that the acquisition, operation and disposal of the motel property in Florida amounted to doing business or a business venture by Godshall, sufficient to justify the trial court in sustaining the substituted service upon him under § 48.181....

SMITH, Judge. An interlocutory appeal from an order sustaining jurisdiction of a foreign manufacturer under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975)....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100 (Fla.1955) and § 48.181(3), Fla.Stat....

quash service of process under Florida Statutes § 48.181, F.S.A. 228 So.2d 451. Petitioner contends that

...is whether goods, property or services are dealt with within the state for the pecuniary benefit of the person providing or otherwise dealing in those goods, property or services.... We hold the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A....

...in, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service ... in suits resulting from their activity within the State.” DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904, 906, 907 (Fla.1969) (emphasis added). Although DeVaney concerned section 48.181, it has been concluded that decisions as to what constitutes doing business under section 48.181 should apply to section 48.193(1)(a)....

supports the service of process under the terms of Section 48.181(3), F.S.1967, F.S.A., which provides: “Any

...tute prevails with regard to service upon a party not a resident of or found within the state. In this case, constructive service of process upon the Florida Secretary of State was carried out upon the Mexican corporation on April 27th per Fla.Stat. § 48.181....

...Even though plaintiff pleads the elements of § 48.193(l)(g), he recognizes that the statute does not apply to a cause of action accruing in 1970-1972. He argues that an action sufficient to establish minimum contacts under § 48.193 should be sufficient under 48.181, which was in effect at the time....

...cited with approval in Martin Blumenthal Assoc., Inc. v. Dinsmore, 289 So.2d 481 (Fla.App.1974). It would seem, therefore, that the Florida courts are amenable to an interpretation of wrongful act which would include breach of contract. 3. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 This long-arm statute was in effect at the time of the acts complained of and continues in effect now....

...usiness. Even if plaintiff had not competently alleged that the defendant has been doing business in Florida, there is authority to support the finding that he has sufficiently alleged “business venture,” the alternative requirement of Fla.Stat. § 48.181, in his claim concerning the execution of the promissory notes....

...Co., 264 So.2d 842 (Fla. App.1972), it was held that a nonresident’s contracting with an in-state hospital for services, thereby implying that the services were to be paid for, constituted a form of business under the “business venture” language of Fla.Stat. § 48.181....

...it. McCarthy v. Little River Bank & Trust Co., 224 So.2d 338 (Fla.App.1969). The U.S.C.A. Fifth Circuit has characterized the purchase of a vessel as a business venture under this Florida statute. Flying Saucers, Inc. v. Moody, supra (concerning § 48.181(3)....

...However, the case at issue can be distinguished because Spencer’s decision was based upon the defendant’s lack of pecuniary benefit in the Florida transaction. (“. . . [Ijntent on the part of the nonresident to seek pecuniary benefit is essential to long-arm jurisdiction under the statute [Fla.Stat. § 48.181].”) 2 The purchase of the boat was held to be wholly unrelated to any business venture or any other undertaking for pecuniary benefit....

...Another U.S.C.A. 5th Circuit case brought against a purchaser suggests that in personam jurisdiction may be invoked as to the individual officer James Dubin. In Costin v. Olen, 449 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1971), substituted service of process under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 was upheld as upon the president of a foreign corporation which purchased a Florida corporation....

...CONCLUSION On the basis of the foregoing analysis of law, this Court finds that the Florida long-arm statutes can be construed to encompass defendant’s activities under Fla.Stat. § 48.-182 with “wrongful act” interpreted to include a breach of contract, and under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 as a business venture as per defendant Consejeros de Viajes Mexico as well as “doing business” as per defendant Consejeros de Viajes Mexico d/b/a Mexico Travel Advisors....

...Florida courts have also claimed that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving the obligations of contracts enacted within the state. According to the Supreme Court of Florida, “. . . the intent of the Legislature in enacting Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., [was] that any individual or corporation who has exercised the privilege of practicing a profession or otherwise dealing in goods, services or property, whether in a professional or nonprofessional capacity, within the State in anticipation of economic gain, be regarded as operating a business or business venture for the purpose of service of process under Florida Statute § 48.181, F.S.A., in suits resulting from their activity within the State.” 4 This legislative intent as well as the aforementioned state interest seems to indicate that actions by sellers should be allowed where payment for sales over a period of...

...d the alleged injuries sufficient to support their contention that this Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants. In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not properly asserted jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (long-arm statute), as they have made an insufficient showing of Defendants doing business in Florida....

foreclosure action. 3 . See section 48.181(1) of the Florida Statutes, which authorizes

...The flight attendants, now certified as a class, sued numerous defendants (TMA included) for strict liability, implied warranty, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation and conspiracy to misrepresent and to commit fraud. 2 In the instant case, the flight attendants relied on sections 48.181(3) and 48.193(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) as the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over TMA. Section 48.181(3) deems a person, firm or corporation *941 to be engaged in substantial activities and conducting business in this state if tangible or intangible personal property is sold, consigned or leased through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors....

...n the second amended complaint. The plaintiffs’ failure to respond with a counter-affidavit or other sworn proof 5 establishing the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction defeated the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over TMA pursuant to section 48.181(3)....

...Upon having difficulty locating Alhussain, ap-pellee successfully sought several orders permitting him to extend the time to serve Alhussain with the complaint. More than two years after filing suit, appellee substituted service on Florida’s Secretary of State, pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...t must allege the jurisdictional requirements prescribed by statute. If it fails to do so, then a motion to quash process should be granted. See also Wiggam v. Bamford, 562 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Here, appellee substituted service under section 48.181(1), which provides that *807 Florida’s Secretary of State can accept service for any former Florida resident who previously conducted business in Florida but subsequently becomes a nonresident or any Florida resident who conceals his or her whereabouts....

...ssory notes which were secured by appellant’s real property in Lee County. Appellant argues that the complaint is fatally defective for purposes of substituted service because it does not set forth all of the jurisdictional allegations required by section 48.181. We agree. Section 620.30, Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes substituted service of process on any general partner in a limited partnership pursuant to section 48.181. To meet the jurisdictional requirements of section 48.181, the plaintiff is required to allege that the cause of action arises from business activities conducted in the state and that the defendant is a resident of another state or country, a resident of Florida who subsequently becomes a nonresident, or a resident of Florida who conceals his whereabouts....

of the State of Florida in accordance with section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1981).1 Appel-lee did

PER CURIAM. By this interlocutory appeal, review is sought of an order quashing service on the appellee, Investment Bank S.A.L. of Beirut, Lebanon. Service was attempted pursuant to the provisions of § 48.181, Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...and Seaboard Continental Corporation, but the letters of credit were not to be released from escrow unless the transaction “closed”. It is apparent from the record that the contract was not closed. Therefore, the letters of credit did not become viable and would not constitute a doing of business within the provisions of § 48.181, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., to justify substituted service by serving the *556 Secretary of State....

...e of discretion standard). First, the trial court erred in concluding that Gaynor Hill’s claims did not arise out of'business activity within the meaning of the substitute service statute. The substitute service statute provides, in relevant part: 48.181 Service on nonresident engaging in business in state (1) The acceptance by ......

...ns ... of the Secretary of State of the state as their agent on whom all process in any action or proceeding against them ... arising out of any transaction or operation connected with or incidental to the business or business venture may be served. § 48.181(1), Fla....

...The issue of whether the Allans concealed their whereabouts or evaded service was irrelevant because the substitute service statute applies to a “resident of the state ... who subsequently becomes a nonresident,” regardless of whether that nonresident conceals his whereabouts or evades service. See § 48.181(1)....

...The court reasoned, among other things, that the document was titled an “Affidavit” and referred to the signer as “affiant.” Id. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the default judgment. REVERSED and REMANDED. LAWSON and JACOBUS, JJ., concur. . See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b)(4) (2011). . See § 48.181(1), Fla....

SHARP, Judge. Hunter appeals from a dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the appellee, Challenge Machinery Company. The trial court relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983) 1 and the requirement of “connexity.” We affirm....

...John Deere Co., 264 So.2d 419 (Fla.1972); Weatherhead Co. v. Coletti, 392 So.2d 1342 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980), approved, 409 So.2d 1026 (Fla.1982); Mac Millan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Tako v. Mayer Rothkopf Industries, Inc., 388 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980). Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983) governs and this statute has been interpreted to contain *988 a “connexity” requirement....

...sold in 1957 and its sale was to a user. Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher Druckgusswaremfabrik, 442 So.2d 985 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983) is also distinguishable because there jurisdiction was based upon section 48.193(l)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981) and not section 48.181. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, J., and BOARDMAN, E.F., Associate Judge, concur. . § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat....

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977). The motions were

...The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. Fla. Stat. § 48.181 (1)....

...ucts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida, or has an office or agency in Florida, and the cause of action arose from these business activities.” Suroor v. First Inv. Corp., 700 So.2d 139, 140 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997). Section 48.181, like subsection 48.193(1), requires that “connexity” exist between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in Florida. Hertz Corp. v. Abadlia, 489 So.2d 753, 754 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985). Sections 48.193 and 48.181 “provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents,” A.B.L....

...Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980), and when service is effectuated using substituted service upon the Secretary of State, “review is limited to whether [the plaintiff] made the necessary jurisdictional allegations under section 48.181,” Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005). To determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate when a Defendant is served using substituted service, the complaint must either plead a basis for jurisdiction using the language of section 48.181 or allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy the statute....

...In line with the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Drs. Forero and Mahomedy. Plaintiff served Defendants via substituted service on Florida’s Secretary of State. Plaintiff was thus obligated to plead a basis for jurisdiction in accordance with Section 48.181....

...n that its activities within the State of Florida are insufficient to render it amenable to the jurisdiction of the lower court is affirmed. Our review of the facts which were before the trial court *520 compels the conclusion that the provisions of Section 48.181(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as construed in the well reasoned opinion of Judge Mager writing for the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Horace v....

...Substituted service was made on the two non-resident defendants to the third party complaint, as provided for under § 48.161 Fla.Stat., F.S.A., on the ground of their having availed themselves of the privilege “to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture” in this state. § 48.181 Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

long-arm jurisdiction over General pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1999), we reverse. In its

...Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 motion to vacate the final default judgment entered against him. The defendant’s motion primarily argued that the final default judgment was void because the plaintiff’s service on the defendant through the Florida Secretary of State under section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2014), was insufficient....

...The plaintiff’s Michigan process servers filed affidavits opining that the defendant was avoiding service. The plaintiff obtained from the clerk of court an alias summons directing that service upon the defendant be made upon the Florida Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2014), which provides, in pertinent part: The acceptance by any person or persons ....

...As such, [the defendant] meets none of the conditions precedent to permit service through the Secretary of State, and as such there was no service on [the defendant], and the Court never had jurisdiction over him. Given these undisputed facts, § 48.181, Florida Statutes, could not be applied to [the defendant], or complied with by the Plaintiff....

...In response, the plaintiff did not present any evidence to counter the defendant’s affidavit and testimony. Instead, the plaintiff argued that it properly obtained substituted service on the defendant through the Florida Secretary of State in accordance with section 48.181(1) merely because its complaint alleged that the defendant was a nonresident conducting business in Florida. The circuit court entered a written order denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the final default judgment....

...This appeal followed. The defendant argues that he provided sworn unrefuted testimony that he is not conducting business in the State of Florida and is not avoiding service, and therefore substituted service on him through the Florida Secretary of State under section 48.181(1) was insufficient....

...Rueben H. Donnelley Corp., 415 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (“[T]he plaintiff’s bare allegation that the defendant was ‘doing business in Florida’ is insufficient to render the defendant amenable to substituted service of process under Section 48.181 ....

...defendant’s corporation was not a party to those assignment agreements. The defendant also provided sworn unrefuted testimony that he is not avoiding service. Because substituted service on the defendant through the Florida Secretary of State under section 48.181(1) was insufficient, the final default judgment against the defendant was void, and the circuit court should have granted the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment....

...the default against the defendant. See Ardt v. America’s Senior Fin. Servs., Inc., 885 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (reversing denial of defendants’ motion to set aside final judgment under rule 1.540(b) where defendants were served in another state under section 48.181 by substituted service on the Florida Secretary of State, but section 48.181’s requirements were not met). Reversed and remanded. KLINGENSMITH and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing....

...If jurisdiction had been properly obtained pursuant to section 48.193(l)(a) it would have been because of the fact that appellant was doing business in the state of Florida. However, because the parties agreed that personal service could not be effected pursuant to section 48.193(l)(a) we must look to section 48.181 which provides for service on a nonresident engaging in business in this state, and to section 48.194 which provides for personal service on persons outside of this state....

...Service by publication was improper in this case because the appellee did not establish that personal service upon the appellant could not be effected. Appellee did not establish this because, as stated above, appellee faded to .allege that he attempted but failed to effect service under section 48.181, or under section 48.194....

Secretary of State on September 3, 2020. See § 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2020) (providing the requisites

...in Florida. In that regard, they have operated, conducted, engaged in or carried on a business or business venture in this state.” Tire Group’s counsel served all of the defendants through the Secretary of State, pursuant to sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1999), and sent a copy of the complaint and summonses to each of the defendants at the address of one of the corporate defendants in Brazil....

...erly mail service of process to the individual defendants. In order to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate, the trial court must first decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within section 48.181, which allows service of process on non-residents engaging in business in Florida....

...5th DCA 1996) (“A plaintiff may not use substituted service of process allowed by sections 48.161 and 48.171 unless it is shown that efforts have been made to find the defendant .” The same requirements apply to service of process under sections 48.161 and 48.181)....

...It appears from the agreed facts that at the time of the filing of this action appellant was not and is not presently a resident of this State. Constructive service was attempted to be made by the plaintiffs upon appellant under the provisions of Section 47.16(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. [now 48.181]....

...rvice of process therein provided were applicable to the facts in this action. This motion was granted by the trial court on February 17, 1967. A second attempt was then made by plaintiffs to serve this appellant with process under the provisions of Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...aid first order of dismissal no new suit or complaint had been filed against the appellant. Additionally, said order observed that in any event the return of service of process was defective because a return receipt had not been filed as required by Section 48.181, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the statute pursuant to which plaintiff had attempted service upon the appellant....

...f Civil Procedure, suggested by either appellant or appellees. It will be remembered that in both of appellant’s successful motions to dismiss and *240 quash service of process, appellant urged that Section 47.16(1), Florida Statutes, F. S.A. [now 48.181], does not apply to persons practicing a profession in this State in contrast to engaging in business in this State....

Inc., 401 So.2d 1163 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), see Horace v. American

...on a non-resident. Northwest did not perfect service of process pursuant to section 48.194, Florida Statutes, as is contemplated by section 48.-193, but rather served the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.161. Northwest apparently relied on section 48.181, Florida Statutes, rather than section 48.-193(l)(d)....

...Although Alexander continued to service the policy after Northwest moved to Florida, Alexander advised Northwest that it would not renew the policy and that Northwest should find an insurance agent in Florida. It is clear that Alexander did not do business in Florida and had no intent to begin. Service of process pursuant to section 48.181, Florida Statutes, was not authorized....

...es of DNA were in fact those of Daye. However, this joint affidavit was filed ahead of GRS’ second amended complaint to support its prior theory that Daye’s alleged indirect business engagements vis- à-vis DNA subjected it to jurisdiction under section 48.181(3)....

service under Florida s Long Arm” Statute, Section 48.181 (formerly Section 47.16), Florida Statutes

...It argued that the asbestos-containing products to which Kerness was exposed were manufactured and distributed before 1984; that the prior version of Florida’s long-arm statute applied; 3 and that the Kerness pleadings did not meet the connexity requirement of the pri- or statute. Section 48.181 required that a plaintiff demonstrate that the cause of ac *502 tion arose from doing business in Florida, or that the cause of action had some other connection to a specified act committed in Florida....

...Fourteen foreign corporations were originally defendants in this case. All claims have been settled except those with Fibreboard. . Plaintiffs provided the trial court with depositions that showed that Fibreboard products were utilized in Florida during the years of 1944-1946. .Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1961), provides: (1) The acceptance by ......

...is not proper under this statute. Having reached the conclusion that Fruehauf failed to sustain the propriety of substitute service under Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1973), the question becomes whether Birmingham is subject to jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (1957). Section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes reads: (3) Any person, firm or corporation which sells, consigns, or leases by any means whatsoever tangible or intangible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Application of § 48.181 requires the alleged injury be occasioned by defendant's business activities within the state....

...In Morejon the Florida Supreme Court held that a Florida resident who had been injured and sought to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer failed to sustain propriety of substituted service of process on the Secretary of State pursuant to § 48.181 subsections (1) and (3) because plaintiff failed to show that the manufacturer exercised control over wholesalers, distributors or brokers of its products or control over the actual manufactured items in such person's possession. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Third Party Complaint is dismissed since the third party plaintiff may not avail itself to jurisdiction under § 48.193 because the negligent acts occurred before July 1, 1970. Furthermore, § 48.181 does not save the Third Party Complaint here since the third party plaintiff failed to allege the manufacturer exercised control over its wholesalers, distributors or brokers in this state....

personam jurisdiction over the appellees under Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1977), which the appellant

...This appeal is from an order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person. The sole question is whether or not the appellant had sufficient minimum contact to entitle the appellee (plaintiff) to perfect substituted service of process, pursuant to § 48.181, Fla.Stat....

subject to service of process under that section or § 48.181. See Excel Handbag Co., Inc. v. Edison Brothers

...notice of interlocutory appeal- as a petition for common law certiorari insofar as it seeks review of those parts of the order dealing with Forest’s cross-claim. IC Bank and ICB Corporation urge the following points: (1) Under Sections 48.161 and 48.181, Florida Statutes (1975), the complaint and cross-claim fail to make a showing that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Florida, and (2) the cross-claim is an improper cross-claim under Fla.R.Civ.P....

...The allegations show that IC Bank and ICB Corporation were engaged in a business venture in this State dealing with real property located within this State. It is also clear that the suit brought against IC Bank and ICB Corporation arose out of their activities within the State. We therefore hold that the requirements of Section 48.181 have been met and that the trial court correctly denied appellants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction....

...ppellee in Florida in an attempt to resolve problems with the machine’s performance. Appellee eventually filed a third party action against appellant, alleging a breach of warranty, and appellant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes, provides for substituted service of process 1 and the attachment of jurisdiction with regard to nonresident defendants upon: The acceptance by ... foreign corporations ... of the privilege extended by law to non-residents and others to operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the state In applying § 48.181(1) the courts have routinely focused on whether there exists a general course of business activity for pecuniary gain within the state. See e.g., Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assoc. Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla.1975); DeVaney v. Rumsch, 228 So.2d 904 (Fla.1969); Lyster v. Round, 276 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). But § 48.181(1) also expressly applies to foreign corporations which “engage in ......

...isdiction over the nonresident defendant. Compare Woodring v. Crown Engineering Co., 141 So.2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). The present case likewise contains sufficient factors so as to establish a “business venture” in Florida within the purview of § 48.181(1)....

...to require personal service of process. See e.g., National League for Nursing v. Bluestone, 388 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Bradford White Corp. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 372 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In the present case the parties rely solely upon § 48.181(1).

...- 12 -  Tall Tower is correct that a single transaction for profit can constitute engaging in a business venture. See Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Labbee dealt with another long-arm statute, section 48.181, Florida Statutes (2003), that also applies to "nonresidents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state." Labbee, 913 So....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Volkswagenwerk Atkiengelselischaft v. McCurdy, 340 So.2d 544 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 48.181(1), Fla.Stat....

...did not do any business in Florida during 1968, nor did Masters, Inc. have agents, officers, employees or offices in the State of Florida during 1968. Therefore the issue on appeal may be stated thusly: whether service of process on the Secretary of State, pursuant to § 48.181(1) Fla.Stat., F.S.A., is effective upon a foreign corporation which was doing business in the State during the time when the cause of action arose, but which did not maintain minimal business contacts within the state at the time of service of process? We must answer this question in the affirmative....

...What we have in the present case is a situation wherein the defendant corporation has withdrawn from doing business in Florida, and has ceased to maintain minimum business contacts at a time after the cause of action arose. The “long-arm” statute, § 48.181(1), supra, was in full force and effect at the time of the injury....

of State, pursuant to the long-arm statute. Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (2001). The record on

...The appellants’ (third party defendants in the trial court) Motion To Quash Service of Process and Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction was denied. They appeal. We reverse. Service upon appellants, non-residents of the State of Florida, was attempted via the long arm statute, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1969)....

...fice and place of business in Pennsylvania. Substituted service was made on Chinetti in the manner prescribed in Section 48.081, Florida Statutes (1975), on the basis of it being a foreign corporation engaged ■ in business in Florida. See Sections 48.181, 48.193 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ngs, ordered that Chinetti’s motion to dismiss be denied, and setting the time for answer by said defendant. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, on the ground that it was not subject to service under Section 48.181(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...cases that Brunel and MC2 themselves rely on, even if Epstein were avoiding service, there are other methods of substitute service that would perhaps be more applicable here. See Delancy v. Tobias, 26 So. 3d 77, 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that service pursuant to section 48.181(1), which allows for substitute service on residents who conceal their whereabouts, was proper where plaintiff made a showing of diligent inquiry to ascertain defendant’s whereabouts); Hull v. Lending House, Inc., 19 So....

through the secretary of state is also authorized by § 48.181. See American Motors Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474

PER CURIAM. We reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to abate and motion to quash for lack of in personam jurisdiction. There was a total lack of connexity. We do this upon the authority of section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983); section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983); American Motors Corp....

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, in a breach of contract action, sought substituted service upon foreign defendants pursuant to the provisions of Section 48.181 of the Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he purchased the stock from the defendant in Florida, and that the defendant engaged in a business venture in Florida. Plaintiff obtained service of process on the defendant under the “long arm statute”, Section 48.181, Florida Statutes....

...check on a business interest defendant had there, and in which the plaintiff was involved under a contract with defendant. Defendant did not file counter affidavits in rebuttal of plaintiff’s affidavit and deposition. The Florida long arm statute, Section 48.181, Forida Statutes, provides in pertinent part as follows: “The acceptance by ....

...the date of the sale. In the case sub judice, the allegedly defective part was sold to Wylain in 1966, before section 48.182 became effective in 1970. Therefore, this statute also does not apply to these cases. *483 The remaining long arm statute is section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...not subject to service of process on the Secretary of State by virtue of § 48.-181(1), F.S.1971. But the trial court simultaneously held that Beckham, Transli-near’s president, had engaged in such activity and so was subject to jurisdiction under § 48.181(1)....

...It is doubtful whether service of process on the defendant Suroor Bin Mohammed A1 Nahyan through the Secretary of State was proper in light of the sparseness of the allegations contained in the complaint that the defendant was conducting business in Florida within the terms of section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes; nevertheless, the rationale of Gleneagle Ship Management Co....