The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Florida's Long-Arm Statute Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(a) states that "a person, whether . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . .
. . . conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction as required pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . determinations-are not subject to certiorari review, due process rights and rights afforded by section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, "defines the parameters by which a trial court . . . court's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction outside of the limited circumstances set forth in section 48.193 . . .
. . . We reverse because Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2018), does not provide . . . facts demonstrating that the defendant's actions fit within one or more of the subsections of section 48.193 . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a) 2., Fla. Stat. . . . In their response, they argued that section 48.193(1)(a) 2. was satisfied because the alleged acts caused . . .
. . . non-resident defendant who engaged in one of the enumerated acts listed under Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (alterations added). . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(1), (7). . . . contract itself must require performance in Florida in order to invoke Florida jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .
. . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; § 736.0202(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Venetian Salami Co. v. . . .
. . . that Appellants carried their initial burden by pleading long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . .
. . . not - by merely maintaining the website - submitted to long-arm jurisdiction in Florida under Section 48.193 . . . The Supreme Court of Florida has never claimed this unprecedented reach of Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), and . . . Under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, a non-resident submits to personal jurisdiction in Florida . . . Although Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) creates personal jurisdiction for a non-resident's "tortious act within . . .
. . . Robinson's affidavit are woefully inadequate to establish: specific jurisdiction, section 48.193(1)(a . . . ), Florida Statutes (2018) ; general jurisdiction, section 48.193(2) ; or minimum contacts under the . . .
. . . . § 48.193(2). . . . Section 48.193(2)'s "substantial and not isolated activity" requirement is "the functional equivalent . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(7). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1) requires...." Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A., 537 F. . . .
. . . . § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) and (1)(a)(6) (a) and (b) Under this statute, the court has personal jurisdiction . . . defendant if a plaintiff's claim is one "arising from" a tortious act committed within Florida under § 48.193 . . . The statute also allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1) (a) (6) (a) and ( . . .
. . . Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, confers specific jurisdiction over (1)(a) A person, whether or . . . the amended complaint alleged a cause of action arising from a business venture in Florida Section 48.193 . . . carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." § 48.193 . . . that affidavit, there was no basis for the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, enumerates other bases for specific jurisdiction, but only subsections . . .
. . . See § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(9). . . . While these are undoubtedly valid intentional torts that would fall under the scope of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) : Maintaining an Office in Florida The Appellees/Plaintiffs next contend that . . . See § 48.193(1)(a)(1). . . . To sufficiently bring an action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1), it appears necessary to . . .
. . . state statute governing personal jurisdiction here is Florida's long-arm statute, Florida Statutes § 48.193 . . .
. . . facts to support the trial court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Highland pursuant to section 48.193 . . . jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the purview of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . facts that demonstrate that the defendant's conduct fits within one or more subsections of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(a) provides, in part: A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, . . . that Highland committed a tortious act in Florida, thus satisfying specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .
. . . terms, granted parties the very right that McRae and its progeny found conspicuously absent in section 48.193 . . . "Further cementing the Jetbroadband holding, in 2013, the Florida legislature enacted section 48.193( . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)1-2, 7, Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . While this ground for jurisdiction resembles that laid out in section 48.193(1)(a) 7, Florida Statutes . . . Section 48.193(1)(a) 7 only extends jurisdiction when a party breaches a contract "by failing to perform . . . acts required by the contract to be performed" in Florida. § 48.193(1)(a) 7 (emphasis added). . . . Thus, Florida cannot assert jurisdiction based on section 48.193(1)(a) 7. . . .
. . . Instead, it applied section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2016), Florida's long-arm statute, which establishes . . .
. . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a) 2., Fla. Stat. . . . publication and therefore fail to constitute a tortious act under Florida's long-arm statute section 48.193 . . . we conclude that the Appellants failed to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy section 48.193 . . . or in writing sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction under [Florida's long-arm statute] section 48.193 . . . "The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(4) ; Pl.'s Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 4, n.2. . . .
. . . Stat. § 48.193(1). . . . ANN. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . ANN. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Ann . § 48.193(1)(a). . . . Id. at § 48.193(1)(b). . . .
. . . Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides a basis for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign . . . Here, the amended complaint does not track the language of section 48.193(2), nor does it allege facts . . . First, we are unpersuaded that section 48.193(1)(a)(7) is implicated, which requires a breach of contract . . . Thus, with respect to section 48.193(1)(a)(7), the complaint does not allege sufficient jurisdictional . . . Next, we address section 48.193(1)(a)(2), "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a) ). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2) ). . . .
. . . Florida Statute § 48.193 is Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute. . . .
. . . asbestos-containing products and that SWP is subject to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . . facts as pleaded were sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . Salami test, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . In this case, the Bolins asserted jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a) 6., Florida Statutes. . . . The assertion of jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)(6), Florida Statutes, is frequently referred . . .
. . . defendants is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Florida court pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1) -(2) ). . . . (quoting § 48.193(2) ). . . . previous version of the statute, where the tortious acts provision was codified at Florida Statute § 48.193 . . . Florida Legislature amended the statute and moved the tortious act provision to its present location at § 48.193 . . .
. . . sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute: section 48.193 . . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. . . . See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. . . . Specific Jurisdiction Section 48.193(1)(a) lists several specific acts that could subject a nonresident . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), the Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over . . . See § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2013). A similar result was reached in Clay v. AIG Aerospace Ins. . . .
. . . the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to fall within the scope of the long arm statute, section 48.193 . . . alleges that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendants pursuant to section 48.193 . . . this state by failing to perform acts required to by the contract to be performed in the state." § 48.193 . . .
. . . Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2016), lists the limited circumstances . . . however, either alone or in the aggregate, supports personal jurisdiction over Youssef under section 48.193 . . . visit friends and family neither constitutes "substantial and not isolated activity" under section 48.193 . . . And, on appeal, Zaitouni invites us to find some basis other than section 48.193 for the court's exercise . . . requires that the trial court have personal jurisdiction over the parties to the injunction, and section 48.193 . . .
. . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . See § 48.193(1)(a) 1.-9. (Fla. Stat. (2015). B. . . . Committing a tortious act within this state ...." § 48.193(1)(a) 1.-2., Fla. . . . See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . Committing a tortious act within Florida- section 48.193(1)(a)(3) Bantrab contends that, because the . . .
. . . in his or her complaint to establish the basis for the court's long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193, Florida Statutes. 4. . . . Because Parmenter failed to establish a basis for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .
. . . sufficient minimum contacts to subject them to jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a). . . .
. . . . §§ 48.193(1)-(2). . . . Compl. ¶ 4Í)—“[cjommitting a tor-tious act” being one of the .nine enumerated acts' under section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2) (alteration added). . . . Jurisdiction over Conmebol Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1. . . . Jurisdiction over Full Play Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1. . . .
. . . granted the motion, finding: (1) the plaintiff failed to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . (l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2013), for committing a tortious act in Florida and on section 48.193(l) . . . Section 48.193( l)(a) (2) — Committing a Tortious Act in Florida Personal jurisdiction under Florida’ . . . See § 48.193(l)(a)(l), (l)(a)(2). . . . Section 48.193(l)(a)(l) — Engaging in a Business Venture in Florida Stonepeak contends that the trial . . . For purposes of section 48.193(l)(a)(l), to demonstrate that a nonresident defendant is “carrying on . . .
. . . (1)(a)1. and 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2015), Section 48.193(1)(a)1. provides, in relevant part, that . . . Section 48.193(2) provides that a defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Section 48.193 provides two ways to establish long-arm jurisdiction: “specific” in which the alleged . . . under section 48.193(2). . . . Gilbert argues, alternatively, that specific jurisdiction was established pursuant to section 48.193( . . .
. . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(6). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .
. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a), (2). . . .
. . . the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . The plaintiffs alleged in .their amended complaint that jurisdiction was proper under section 48.193( . . . Florida’s long-arm statute provides for either “specific” jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(a) if . . . the nonresident defendant committed any of the acts enumerated under section 48.193(l)(a) in Florida, . . . (l)(a), which provides, in part, as follows:. 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts . . . , was renumbered in 2013 . as section 48.193(l)(a)2. . . . .
. . . Specifically, the County argued that the court did not have personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . The creditor asserted the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the lender under section 48.193, . . . In its amended complaint, the creditor alleged jurisdiction was proper under sections 48.193(l)(a)l. . . . At the hearing on the lender’s second motion to dismiss, the creditor clarified that section 48.193(l . . . conduct in Florida falls within the enumerated acts ■ listed in Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(l)(a) lists enumerated acts allowing'a Florida court to exercise specific jurisdiction . . .
. . . alleged that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over this action would not comport with the Due Process . . . Stat. § 48.193, a non-resident defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways. . . . Florida’s long-arm statute, specifically section 48.193(1)(a), provides, in relevant part, as follows . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), (6). . . .
. . . See § 48.193; Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Ruiz, 181 So.3d 513, 516-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). . . . If pleading a basis for specific jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1), due process considerations . . . the factual disputes and determines whether the plaintiff has proven both jurisdiction-under section 48.193 . . . Formerly section 48.193(1)(f). See ch. 2013-164, § 1, at 2012-13, Laws of Fla. . . . . contacts, we do not address whether she established facts supporting long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193. Plaintiff Tamara M. . . . The Act allows those who enforce it to take a pregnant woman into custody § 48.193. . . . See, e.g., §§ 48.08, 48.193(1)(c), 48.193(1)(d)2, 48.205(1m), 48.213, 48.347. . . .
. . . The first is governed .by Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2015), and the . . . or written communications into -Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(b) has since been -renumbered section 48.193(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2015). . . . .
. . . . § ] 48.193(l)(a) lists acts that subject a defendant to specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction . . . Stat. § ] 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction—that is, . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). Mr. . . . See id. at § 48.193(l)(b). . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 6. . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 6. . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . . (1)(a)(1) or 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . .
. . . Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193(l)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2013), provides in part that a . . . allegation that Moro failed to make a payment in Florida brings the action within the purview of section 48.193 . . .
. . . to a Wisconsin insured did not satisfy any of the subsections of Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . to produce evidence that Erie engaged in conduct that fell within one of the provisions of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193 sets forth requirements for both specific and general jurisdiction, either of which is . . . Section 48.193(1) lists the various ways in which this causal connection can be established and includes . . . subsection 48.193(1)(a)(7), which provides specific jurisdiction when a defendant “breach[es] a contract . . .
. . . Long-arm jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation when (1) the requirements of section 48.193, . . . Section 48.193 sets forth requirements for specific and general jurisdiction, either of which is sufficient . . . Section 48.193(2) provides for general jurisdiction over ' “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial . . . Thus, the satisfaction of section 48.193(2) also fulfills the second prong of the long-arm jurisdiction . . . In support of its argument that these business contacts are sufficient to satisfy section 48.193(2), . . .
. . . Among other things, section 48.193(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2013), the Florida long-arm statute, allows . . .
. . . . § 48.193 (2016)). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l) and (l)(a)(4). a. Fla. . . . Stat § 48.193(l)(a)(l) Subsection (a)(1) confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims . . . Stat § 48.193(l)(a)(4) Plaintiff further alleges that Windfeather is subject to specific jurisdiction . . . pursuant to § 48.193(l)(a)(4). . . .
. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). TCPA violations are tortious acts. Bagg v. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Meier, 288 F.3d at 1270 & n. 7; Wilcox v. . . .
. . . .” § 48.193, Fla. Stat.; Garris v. . . . that the complaint did not allege that CDI was subject to general Florida jurisdiction under ■ section 48.193 . . . However, neither of these specific acts would subject Intego to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . and neither of these specific acts would be sufficient to allege general jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . “The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in -section 48.193 as the basis for . . . . § 48.193(l)(a)l, 7, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . These allegations established engaging in business in Florida under section 48.193(l)(a)l of the Florida . . . to Defendant’s “failure to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” § 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193. . . .
. . . The provision of the Florida long-arm statute applicable in the present case is section 48.193(l)(a)3 . . . Fargo Bank, N.A., 32 So.3d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (explaining that 1993 amendment to section 48.193 . . . dismiss) were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute— section 48.193 . . .
. . . dismiss, “were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute — section 48.193 . . . Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); see also § 48.193(1)(a)(3), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 48.193; and (2) whether, exercising jurisdiction over the Defendant would violate the requirements . . .
. . . Venetian Salami resolves the factual disputes necessary to determine jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193, a non-resident defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways. . . . The general jurisdiction provision of the long-arm statute, Florida Statute § 48.193(2), provides: A . . . Thus, “if the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is . . . Alternatively, BTG points out that Florida Statute § 48.193(l)(a)(2) provides for specific jurisdiction . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(b) (current version at Fla. . . .
. . . sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of’ Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(2)). . . . with Florida, and those contacts fall within' one of the enumerated categories set forth in section 48.193 . . .
. . . .” § 48.193(l)(a)7„ Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)(2), (2), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . specific facts to show that the defendant’s actions fall within at least one of the subsections of section 48.193 . . . tortious interference in Florida, thus subjecting Rautenberg to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Rautenberg committed a tor-tious act in Florida that would provide for specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Falz failed to make sufficient allegations of general jurisdiction as to Rau-tenberg under section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(b), (f). . . .
. . . Section 48.193(l)(a)(6), Florida Statutes, states: Causing injury to persons or property within this . . .
. . . See § ,48.193(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .
. . . dismiss) were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute — section 48.193 . . .
. . . sufficient to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over the Father under Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .
. . . whether (1) there are sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the purview of [section 48.193 . . . The plaintiff may either track the language of section 48.193 without pleading supporting facts,. or . . . facts that demonstrate that the. defendant’s actions fit within one or more subsections of section. 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1) provides as follows: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state . . . defendant may also be established under the theory of “general jurisdiction” as provided in section 48.193 . . .
. . . Florida Statutes Section 48.193 provides for specific personal jurisdiction — ie., based on claims arising . . . Ann. § 48.193(l)(a)(l)(2). . . .
. . . be subject to personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute in two ways: first, section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a); and second, section 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general . . . in Florida — if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida, id. § 48.193 . . . And “[t]he reach of [section 48.193(2) ] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the . . . to determine whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Fountaine-Pajot under section 48.193 . . .
. . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a); and second, section 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general . . . in Florida — if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida, id. § 48.193 . . . need only consider whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 48.193 . . . And “[t]he reach of [section 48.193(2)] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the . . . So, to determine whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 48.193 . . .
. . . Jurisdiction over the Barbados defendants is invoked under section 48.193, Florida’s long arm statute . . . motion to dismiss concluding that the complaint satisfied the initial pleading requirements of section 48.193 . . . Knox and her daughter sought to secure jurisdiction over the Barbados defendants under section 48.193 . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Acquadro, 851 So.2d at 670, cites to section 48.193(l)(b), "committing a tortious act within this State . . .
. . . . § 48.193. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a), in support of personal jurisdiction arguing that under it, there is personal jurisdiction . . .
. . . of the analysis, federal courts must construe the Florida long-arm statute, Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193. . . . See id. § 48.193(1)(a). . . . (1)(a)(1); and (2) “Committing a tortious act within this state,” id. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .
. . . , or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to the following Florida statutes: (i) § 48.193 . . . this State while Defendant was engaged in solicitation of service activities within this State; (ii) § 48.193 . . . ., 126 So.3d 336, 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“[C]ommitting a tortious act within Florida under section 48.193 . . .
. . . Florida’s long-arm statute is codified at section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes; its interpretation . . . As the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff relies on subsection 48.193(l)(a)(2), which . . . As noted, such conduct is a “tortious act” within the meaning of subsection 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . .1999) (holding that the Eleventh Circuit’s “firmly established precedent ... interprets subsection [48.193 . . . Therefore, this Court need not determine whéther general jurisdiction exists under both subsection 48.193 . . .
. . . to allege facts that would subject Appellee to the jurisdiction of this State’s courts under section 48.193 . . .
. . . Our analysis begins with Florida’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2014 . . . burden of sufficiently pleading the basis for jurisdiction “either by tracking the language of section 48.193 . . . specific facts that demonstrate that the defendant’s actions fit within one or more subsections of section 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)6. . . . Id. § 48.193(2). . . . property damage, is insufficient to subject a non-resident defendant to personal jurisdiction under § 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(f), which later became § 48.193(l)(a)6). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)6; Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 511 So.2d at 994. . . .
. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7), which states in pertinent part: A person, whether or not a citizen . . . Stat. §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(g). b. . . . Stat. § 48.193(2), which states: “a defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .
. . . See § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Furthermore, personal jurisdiction gained under section 48.193 “does not confer subject matter jurisdiction . . .
. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(9). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). . . .
. . . Section 48.193(3), Florida Statutes (2013), states that persons outside of Florida who are subject to . . .
. . . Puigbo’s contention, however, misapprehends the interplay between the relevant provisions of sections 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . A person can commit a tort under § 48.193 by making “telephonic, electronic, or written communications . . . Stat. § 48.193 (providing jurisdiction for “any cause of action arising from” the enumerated acts). . . . Stat. § 48.193(6)(a). Premier has failed to argue that basis on appeal, so it is abandoned. . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(a), satisfies due process requirements, and confers personal jurisdiction on the DLC’s . . .
. . . . § 48.193. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2), then Plaintiff must show that Tamborlee engaged in substantial activity in Florida . . . (2), or specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1), noting that its business activities in Florida “boil . . .
. . . Sufficiency of the complaint The long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2011), provides, . . . Wiggins is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(l)(b). b. . . . See Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260 (“ ‘[Cjommitting a tortious act’ in Florida under section 48.193(l)(b) can . . . This predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193( . . . Florida via telephone constitutes the commission of a tort in Florida within the meaning of section 48.193 . . .
. . . of contract for failure to “perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” § 48.193 . . . the relevant consideration for determining whether Florida has jurisdiction over Olson under section 48.193 . . . The caselaw interpreting Section 48.193(l)(g), Fla. . . . Section 48.193(2) provides that: “A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Here, the undisputed evidence does not support a finding of general jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .
. . . fraudulent transfer, giving rise to a claim under section 726.108, is a “tortious act” under section 48.193 . . . jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed “a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193 . . .
. . . . § 48.193(l)(a) (emphasis added); see also Dev. Corp. of Palm Beach v. . . . Ann. § 48.193 — applies. . . . we overlay Taishan’s (TTP and TG’s) contacts with Florida and then analyze their sufficiency under § 48.193 . . . Conducting business within Florida Under § 48.193(l)(a)(l) TG is subject to jurisdiction in Florida for . . . we find § 48.193(l)(a)(l) satisfied, we do not need to address these alternative grounds for long-arm . . .
. . . . § 48.193, and that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause [D.E . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l), which confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims arising . . . business operating in this state, or that Wrave has an office or agency in Florida as required, by § 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .
. . . . § 48.193, which confers general jurisdiction, is the applicable long-arm statute because BAE engaged . . . Stat. § 48.193 does not apply because Decedent’s only exposure to asbestos occurred while working on . . . Stat. § 48.181, § 48.182, § 48.193, and § 47.16&emdash; that confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant . . . Pe-ruyero is trying to dress up a § 48.193 general jurisdiction analysis in § 47.16 specific jurisdiction . . .
. . . Id. at 1233, 1236 (citing § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2009)). . . .