Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...rsay and thus were inadmissible and incompetent. As a further basis for granting APM’s motion, the court pointed to cases interpreting the “[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state” provision of the Florida long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b), as requiring a claim of injury in Florida, something the complaint 9 did not allege....

...natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: ... (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute, which provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state . . . whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...process requirement of minimum contacts for general jurisdiction, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984), such that “if the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is also satisfied.” Woods v....

...either of the two latter grounds would be without prejudice). 2 . In Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir.1982), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit. 3 . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(l)(b) (West Supp.1990)....

...In Byrd , the residence of the plaintiff is not clear from the opinion. Regardless, the residence of the plaintiff is irrelevant because the Florida statute applies to "[a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state_” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(l)(b) (West Supp.1990)....

..., Florida. 5. The Plaintiff performed the services, but the Defendant has refused to pay. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant for damages and costs of court. Parthenais sought to obtain jurisdiction over Venetian Salami under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if h...

...e defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Florida in order to satisfy due process. The court held that jurisdiction over Venetian Salami had been obtained because the complaint alleged facts sufficient to fall within the scope of section 48.193(1)(g) and that when these allegations were challenged, they were backed by affidavit....

..."such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). In essence, the court below held that the requisite minimum contacts are built into section 48.193. Otherwise, the statute would be held unconstitutional. We respectfully disagree. By enacting section 48.193, the legislature has determined the requisite basis for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants as far as Florida is concerned....

...Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). In that case, Burger *501 King, a Florida corporation, sued a Michigan resident for breach of a franchise agreement. Burger King sought to obtain jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g) by asserting that the defendant failed to make required payments under the agreement in Florida....

...If Parthenais's position is correct, the United States Supreme Court engaged in an unnecessary exercise of factual analysis because the parties had stipulated before the court of appeals that the court had jurisdiction over the defendant for purposes of section 48.193. Id. at 470 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. at 2181 n. 12. In a case involving an effort to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident under section 48.193, the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated: Admittedly, if the general principles of contract law can be applied so as to find a breach of the contract in Florida, then a literal reading of the statute would suggest that Florida has jurisdiction over the son-in-law....

...(Citations omitted.) As in the instant case, the plaintiff in Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), sought to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident debtor on allegations that there was a breach of contract to pay the plaintiff money. The Second District Court of Appeal explained: Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a person is subject to the jurisdiction of the court if he "[b]reaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." In Madax International Corp....

...Case Co., 360 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Id. at 874. We approve of the foregoing analyses in Scordilis, Unger, and Osborn. The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts....

...Harlo Products Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 360 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In each of these cases the complaint contained allegations sufficient to bring the defendant within the scope of section 48.193....

...isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2006). We find no basis to assert jurisdiction over Yarmuth. First, Snow briefly argues that Yarmuth is subject to jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) because it conspired with and acted through its agents DirecTV and Stump, which committed 6 tortious acts in Florida....

...agency relationship where Yarmuth was the principal and Stump was its agent, as would be required to subject Yarmuth to jurisdiction in Florida for Stump’s actions. Accordingly, we find no basis to subject Yarmuth to personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b). Equally unpersuasive is Snow’s argument for jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(f)....

...7 subject to jurisdiction because it caused injury to him in Florida.4 However, we are required to read the statute as the Florida Supreme Court would. Cable/Home Commc’n, 902 F.2d at 856. The Florida Supreme Court has held that § 48.193(1)(f) applies only when a defendant’s out of state actions cause personal injury or damage to physical property in the State of Florida. See Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. 1987). Because Snow does not allege that he sustained any personal injury or damage to his physical property, Yarmuth cannot be reached under § 48.193(1)(f). Finally, Snow argues that the statute’s general jurisdiction provision applies to Yarmuth. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) (2006)....

...General jurisdiction does not require a connection between a defendant’s activities and the cause of action. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 1872 n.9, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984). Florida courts have held the term “substantial and not isolated activity” used in § 48.193(2) means “continuous and systematic general business contact” with Florida, a term used by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros to determine whether general jurisdiction was permissible 4 A Yarmuth employee admitted to accessing Snow’s website, which was hosted on Globat’s servers....

...ion, when balanced against Yarmuth’s lack of a physical presence in Florida, its non-solicitation of Florida clients, and its deriving less than one percent of its revenues from matters connected with Florida. Yarmuth falls outside the scope of § 48.193(2). Because Yarmuth is not subject to jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm 6 Snow’s attorney also provided an affidavit and transcript documenting a Yarmuth attorney’s attempt to depose in Florida a wi...

...5  The district court granted the Sun Defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds that the Florida long-arm statute did not provide general jurisdiction over subsidiary or agent corporations. The court stated that nothing in the language of § 48.193(2) supports plaintiffs’ argument that the activities of the Sun Defendants’ agents may be imputed to the defendants to satisfy the requirements of the statute....

...Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996)). 1. Florida Long Arm Statute Plaintiffs argue that the Sun Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction under the general jurisdiction5 provision of the Florida long-arm statute. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(2)(2002)....

...based on an agent’s activities. Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872- 73 & n. 9 (1984). See Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). 7 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1) states that “[a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ....

...The plaintiffs brought a personal injury suit against Universal Caribbean, the non-resident corporation that owned the foreign resort allegedly involved in the injury. Universal Caribbean moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that general jurisdiction was proper under section 48.193(2) based on the activities of a Florida subsidiary established by Universal Caribbean as a domestic booking agent for its resort. Upon reviewing the functions of the subsidiary and its ties to the foreign parent corporati...

...rtising 10 did engage in substantial activity in this state” through its subsidiary. Id. at 448. The court went on to hold that the foreign corporation was subject to general jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2) based upon the activities of its Florida subsidiary....

...Ultra Flo Filtration Sys., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (M.D. Fla. 1998). In Polymers, a Florida federal district court determined that general jurisdiction could not be exercised over a parent corporation based on the activities of its Florida subsidiary because § 48.193(2) “limits jurisdiction to acts of the defendant itself.” Id....

...likely that Pesaplastic, an appeal from a 1982 district court case, was analyzed under the pre-1984 statute, which did not differentiate between specific and general jurisdiction. Even if the general jurisdiction provision had existed, Pesaplastic does not mention § 48.193(2), much less limit its exercise....

...So.2d at 448 (citing Windels, Marx, Davies and Ives v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 510 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); American Motors Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474 So.2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)). 13 sought jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a), one of several specific jurisdiction provisions, claiming that a foreign parent “conducted business” in Florida through a local subsidiary. See id. at 1521. The court was not asked and, therefore, did not address § 48.193(2).10 b....

...sufficiently established that the Sun Defendants, through their own actions13 and through the actions of the Florida Subsidiaries, have engaged in “substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida and are, therefore, subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2). 2....

...Appeal absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise. Id. “Florida’s long-arm statute is to be strictly construed.” Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying Florida law). A. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) Florida’s long-arm statute provides for both general and specific personal jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)–(2). General personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant “is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state . . . whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Id. § 48.193(2). General personal jurisdiction is based on a defendant’s substantial activity in Florida without regard to where the cause of action arose....

...25  Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 26 of 39 contacts related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. See id. Louis Vuitton relies on the “tortious acts within Florida” provision in § 48.193(1)(a)(2) of Florida’s long- arm statute. Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) provides that a nonresident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida “for any cause of action arising from . . . [c]omitting a tortious act within [Florida].” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (emphasis added)....

...ida. Similar to Louis Vuitton’s case, our precedent in Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2008), involved a website-trademark infringement claim against a nonresident defendant and Florida’s same “tortious act” provision§ 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...The district court granted the motion for lack of jurisdiction over defendant Lovelady in Florida. Id. Reversing, this Court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in Florida over defendant Lovelady under the “tortious acts” provision in § 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...at 1283 (citing Posner, 178 F.3d at 1216–17 (collecting Florida cases and adopting Florida courts’ broad interpretation of the long-arm statute that permits personal jurisdiction over 7 Lovelady construed a previous version of the statute, where the tortious acts provision was codified at Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b). In 2013, the Florida legislature amended the statute and moved the tortious acts provision to its present location at Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

... Case: 12-12501 Date Filed: 12/02/2013 Page: 28 of 39 nonresident “defendants committing tortious acts outside the state that cause injury in Florida”)). 9 Furthermore, Lovelady instructs that, under the “tortious acts” provision in § 48.193(1)(a)(2), a trademark infringement on an Internet website causes injury and occurs in Florida “by virtue of the website’s accessibility in Florida.” Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1283....

...accessibility in Florida.” Id. 1283 (emphasis added). Applying our precedent in Lovelady, we conclude that under Florida law where Mosseri created the websites and posted the alleged infringing material does not matter. For purposes of § 48.193(1)(a)(2), the issue is whether Mosseri’s tortious acts caused injury in Florida....

...In summary, Mosseri’s tortious acts on behalf of JEM Marketing caused injury in Florida and thus occurred there because Mosseri’s trademark infringing goods were not only accessible on the website, but were sold to Florida customers through that website. This satisfies § 48.193(1)(a)(2)’s requirements for specific personal jurisdiction over Mosseri. B....

...The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, for a change of venue to Michigan. The district court determined that the facts alleged in the complaint supported jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(b) (1989) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

...154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A. Long-Arm Statute The Florida Long-Arm Statute permits a federal or state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in certain enumerated situations. In pertinent part 48.193 provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of th...

...nonresident defendant intentionally interfered with business relationship in Florida); Carida v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., 424 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (personal jurisdiction 648 So.2d at 242 ("Doe only addressed the "corporate shield' doctrine: section 48.193(1)(b) does not subject an employee to personal jurisdiction who has performed a negligent act outside of the state solely in his corporate capacity even if the injury occurs in Florida"); Allerton, 635 So.2d at 39 (In Doe "the...

...their individual capacities"). The corporate shield doctrine has not been raised as a defense in this case. Therefore, Doe and its progeny are inapposite. This court previously determined that Florida law interpreting the reach of § 48.193(1)(b) was unclear....

...Because the present case is factually distinct, we believe the Florida Supreme Court would find neither Phillips nor Kennedy controlling. the statute when the plaintiff has alleged negligence remains unclear. We therefore follow the rule of Sun Bank: "jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) "[is] not limited to a situation where an act in Florida cause[s] an injury in Florida but also ......

...to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony or documents." Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1390, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat. ch. 48.193 (1993), provides in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself ......

...We address each subsection seriatim. 1. Carrying on a Business or Business Venture in Florida Sculptchair first asserts personal jurisdiction over Chair Decor of Canada, Benny Bien, Mary Bien, Phyliss Rich, Deena Rich, and Chair Decor of Sunrise, Florida via section 48.193(1)(a), which provides for personal jurisdiction over defendants who are "carrying on a business or a business venture" or have an office or agency in Florida....

...or otherwise within the meaning of subsection (a) of the Florida long-arm statute. 2. Causing Injury to Persons or Property Within Florida Sculptchair next argues that the defendants caused it economic injury under section 48.193(1)(f)(1) and (2) by their soliciting and/or marketing efforts in Florida. It is well-established, however, that mere economic injury without accompanying personal injury or property injury does not confer personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants under section 48.193(1)(f)....

...Therm-O- Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992, 993-94 (Fla.1987)). Because Sculptchair has neither alleged nor proven personal injury or property damage aside from the purely economic loss pleaded in its complaint, we find no basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over any of the defendants under section 48.193(1)(f). 3. Breaching a Contract in Florida Sculptchair next seeks to invoke section 48.193(1)(g), which provides for personal jurisdiction over persons breaching a contract within Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida, as a means of invoking...

...name, we hold Chair Decor of Canada to the continuing contractual obligations undertaken by its corporate predecessor in interest. As such, we conclude that Sculptchair has met its burden of proving personal jurisdiction over Chair Decor of Canada under section 48.193(1)(g). B....

...The conflict issue presented in this case is whether making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State can constitute "committing a tortious act" within Florida to subject a nonresident defendant to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), of Florida's long-arm statute. For the reasons that follow, we hold that "committing a tortious act" within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur by making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State, provided that the tort alleged arises from such communications....

...rm. Wendt claimed that he relied to his detriment on legal advice Horowitz had given. *1255 To establish personal jurisdiction over Horowitz as a nonresident defendant, Wendt's amended third-party complaint alleged that jurisdiction was proper under section 48.193(1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(f)(1), Florida Statutes (1999). [3] See Horowitz, 751 So.2d at 85. Specifically, regarding section 48.193(1)(b) Wendt alleged jurisdiction was proper concerning Horowitz because Horowitz: Committed a tortious act in Florida by (1) negligently responding in writing to an investigation by the Division of Securities relating to the alleged sa...

...iction without indicating which specific section of the long-arm statute was applicable. See id. Horowitz appealed to the Fifth District, which reversed and remanded. See id. at 86. The Fifth District held that jurisdiction was improper under either section 48.193(1)(a) or section 48.193(1)(b). [5] See id. at 85. Regarding the application of section 48.193(1)(a), the Fifth District held that "[b]rief phone calls and letters initiated in Michigan and performed wholly in Michigan, and the preparation of loan documents, all done on behalf of a Canadian client doing business in Florida, does...

...The Fifth District also held that the affidavit Horowitz filed in support of his motion to dismiss refuted the allegations made in the third-party first amended complaint. See id. at 86. Moreover, the Fifth District held that personal jurisdiction was not proper under section 48.193(1)(b), because no tortious act was committed in Florida....

...suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (citations and footnote omitted). At issue in this case is the first prong— that is, whether Wendt's complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b). Wendt asserts that jurisdiction over Horowitz is proper under section 48.193(1)(b), which confers personal jurisdiction over parties that commit a "tortious act" in Florida. Section 48.193(1)(b) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural...

...Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (citations omitted). The question presented in this case is whether making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida from outside of the State can constitute "committing a tortious act" under section 48.193(1)(b). The Fourth District has held that physical presence is not required in order to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...For example, in Carida, 424 So.2d at 851, the plaintiff, a Florida resident, asserted that the nonresident defendant committed a tortious act in Florida by virtue of his slanderous telephone conversations made to the plaintiff. The Fourth District held that committing a tortious act under section 48.193(1)(b) did not require that a physical tort occur in this State....

...tort of defamation. See id. In reversing the trial court's order of dismissal, the Fourth District held that "[m]aking a defamatory statement to a listener in Florida, even via telephone" constitutes the commission of a tortious act for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...See id. The Second District held that the tortious act occurred in Florida where the interception occurred because that is where the recorded communication was uttered, and thus, the out-of-state defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). See id. [6] The Fifth District has taken a more restrictive view of "committing a tortious act" to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), suggesting that a nonresident defendant must be physically present to commit a tortious act....

...For example, in McLean Financial Corp. v. Winslow Loudermilk Corp., 509 So.2d 1373, 1374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), the Fifth District held that making fraudulent representations in Virginia by telephone to a Florida resident was insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...5th DCA 1991) (holding that the "mere act of communicating with the promisee in Florida, in an effort to convince the promisee not to insist on contractual rights, does not constitute commission of a tortious act in this state"). This Court recently addressed the application of section 48.193(1)(b) to a nonresident defendant who was not physically present in Florida in Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 582....

...jurisdiction of Florida courts." Id. Because in *1260 Execu-Tech the defendant was not physically present in Florida, implicit in Execu-Tech is the notion that physical presence in Florida is not required to "commit a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b). What was implicit in Execu-Tech we now make explicit. First, in order to "commit a tortious act" in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, "committing a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. However, the cause of action must arise from the communications. This predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1). [7] See § 48.193(1) (stating that "[a]ny person ......

...to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts "). Although we hold that telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if the alleged cause of action arises from the communications, we expressly do not determine whether personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) has been established in this case....

...If the complaint does state a cause of action, then it must be determined whether the alleged cause of action arises from these communications. [8] We thus quash the Fifth District's decision to the extent that it concludes that physical presence is required to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Rather, if committed at all, these acts were committed in Michigan. Horowitz, 751 So.2d at 86 (citations omitted). Therefore, I do not agree with quashing the Fifth District's opinion "to the extent that it concludes that physical presence is required to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)." Majority op....

...4th DCA), review granted, 797 So.2d 584 (Fla. 2001), which also is in conflict with the Fifth District's decision in this case. We have accepted review in Acquadro. [2] We do not decide the broader issue of whether injury alone satisfies the requirement of section 48.193(1)(b), as that issue is not the basis for this Court's jurisdiction. However, we note that the federal courts that have addressed this issue, although acknowledging the confusion among Florida's district courts, have adopted a broad construction of section 48.193(1)(b), holding that the commission of torts out of state that cause an injury to an instate resident satisfies Florida's long-arm statute....

...Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir.1976); Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (5th Cir.1975); Hollingsworth v. Iwerks Entm't, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 473, 478 (M.D.Fla.1996); Interfase Mktg., Inc. v. Pioneer Techs. Group, Inc., 774 F.Supp. 1355, 1357 (M.D.Fla.1991). [3] Section 48.193(1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(f)(1), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits...

...le in commercial and securities laws and which through its agent Horowitz engaged in the activities and committed the acts described in paragraph 4 hereof. [5] The parties agreed in the Fifth District that jurisdiction in this case turns upon either section 48.193(1)(a) or 48.193(1)(b). See Horowitz, 751 So.2d at 85. Therefore, the jurisdictional allegations referring to section 48.193(1)(f)(1) were not discussed by the Fifth District, and we decline to address the application of section 48.193(1)(f)(1) in this opinion....

...[6] However, in Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. v. Ward, 696 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the Second District held that sending debt collection letters and making phone calls from out of state to a Florida resident is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...The Second District did not consider whether the cause of action alleged arose from sending the debt collection letters and making phone calls. We note that in dicta in Texas Guaranteed, the Second District stated that injury alone does not satisfy section 48.193(1)(b), whereas in Koch, the Second District conversely stated that injury alone does satisfy section 48.193(1)(b). [7] This is in contrast to the general jurisdiction statute, section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, which does not require connexity between the defendant's activities and the cause of action....

...ears to have treated them collectively for purposes of its personal jurisdiction analysis. Moreover, the parties in this case have not argued before this Court that a distinction should be made between the satisfaction of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) for Horowtiz's alleged acts and the law firm's alleged acts....

...any of the following acts: .... (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. .... (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1). 10  The Florida long-arm statute provides two bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction: specific and general jurisdiction....

...§ 1333.10 Oldfield alleged that the events surrounding and giving rise to his injuries occurred at sea and had the requisite nexus to maritime activity. Oldfield averred that the court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the Florida Long-Arm Statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, because Pueblo was engaged in business within the state of Florida.11 After receiving an extension of time to complete service, Oldfield filed a notice with the district court on March 9, 2006, stating that Pueblo had been successfully served with process on February 7, 2006....

...(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. 11 The Florida Long Arm Statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, provides, in relevant part, Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if...

...iction over the nonresident defendant. Id. 1. The Florida Long-Arm Statute The Florida “long-arm” statute permits the state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who commit certain specific acts. Fla. Stat. § 48.193. For example, § (1)(b) of the statute permits a Florida court to assert jurisdiction over any person who “commit[s] a tortious act within this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b). Carman claims that jurisdiction over then nonresident Lovelady is appropriate under this section of the Florida statute....

...contention that he did not commit any tort because he did not actually create the website; his employee did. He does not address the cases cited by Carman, nor make any argument about where the injury from the tort occurred, if there was one. We have held that §48.193(b) of the Florida long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant who commits a tort outside of the state that causes injury inside the state....

...This “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984), and the litigation Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976). 2 Because the court holds that Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b) is satisfied, we do not address Carman’s assertions that jurisdiction lies under other sections of the statute as well. 6 results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A....

...lifeguard. The complaint asserted original subject matter jurisdiction through diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The complaint asserted general personal jurisdiction over the Defendants under Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2), on the basis that they engaged in “substantial and not 1 The complaint named Wyndham International, Inc....

...isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...tchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 561, 564 (Fla. 1975)); April Indus., Inc. v. Levy, 411 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that § 48.193(2) requires “a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit”). In this case, Stubbs asserts that the requisite contacts for general personal jurisdiction existed by virtue of both direct contacts betwe...

...Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). A defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute in two ways: first, section 48.193(1)(a) lists acts that subject a defendant to specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a); and second, section 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction— that is, jurisdiction over any claims against a defendant, whether or not they involve the defendant’s activities in Florida—if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida, id. § 48.193(2). Because Carmouche does not argue that the events that gave rise to her suit confer specific personal jurisdiction over Tamborlee, we need only consider whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 5  Case: 14-14325 Date Filed: 06/15/2015 Page: 6 of 10 48.193(2). And “[t]he reach of [section 48.193(2)] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fraser, 594 F.3d at 846. So, to determine whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 48.193(2), we “need only determine whether the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over [Tamborlee] would exceed constitutional bounds.” Id. “A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreig...

...anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...The Insurance Policies Posner has alleged facts, unrebutted by Salem, that establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over Salem under the Florida long-arm statute. The long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to those who "[c]ommit[ ] a tortious act within th[e] state." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...Several of the Florida district courts of appeal have concluded that (1)(b) does not extend jurisdiction to the out-of-state defendant under these circumstances. See, e.g., Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. v. Ward, 696 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.1997) ("The occurrence of injury alone in Florida does not satisfy section 48.193(1)(b)"); McLean Fin....

...The Florida long-arm statute, therefore, does not extend jurisdiction to SMC's claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Salem. 11 failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(g)....

...s and personal jurisdiction were appropriate under section 626.906(4), relying on the Third District's decision in Winterthur. Barnhardt also asserted that Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over Alfa under Florida's general long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005). Specifically, Barnhardt argued that personal jurisdiction was available under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), based on Alfa's alleged contacts with Florida....

...isdiction" and denied Alfa's *591 motion to quash. Borden, 884 So.2d at 234-35. On appeal, the Second District reversed. The Second District first addressed Barnhardt's assertion that Florida courts had personal jurisdiction over Alfa under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and determined that this argument "not only has no merit but also was not raised below and, therefore, is waived." Id....

...Personal jurisdiction refers to whether the actions of an individual or business entity as set forth in the applicable statutes permit the court to exercise jurisdiction in a lawsuit brought against the individual or business entity in this state. See generally § 48.193; White v....

...(1995)); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Frederick, 654 So.2d 656, 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (concluding that presence in Florida of insured resident of another state when policy was renewed was insufficient to support in personam jurisdiction over insurer pursuant to sections 48.193 and 626.906); Bookman, 614 So.2d at 1182 (concluding that section 626.906 "only applies to policies held by Florida residents"); Drake v....

...1st DCA 1976) (stating that section 626.906 requires "the issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of this State"). [8] We also decline to address Barnhardt's assertion that the Second District erred in determining that Barnhardt's argument that Alfa is subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 has been waived and, if not waived, has no merit....

...is sufficiently clear and direct to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. As noted above, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act is codified in part II, chapter 501, Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida's long-arm statute is codified in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The charges against Appleton and Nippon were still pending at the time the present complaint was filed. [3] See, e.g., Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). [4] Florida's long-arm stature provides in relevant part as follows: 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state.— (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident or this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and,...

...Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. § 48.193(1), Fla....

...Doe's complaint charges Thompson with gross negligence in failing to take adequate security measures to make the store reasonably safe. Doe seeks personal jurisdiction over Thompson, a resident of Texas. The trial court determined that personal jurisdiction existed under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...ary hearing on the issue of jurisdiction. Id. at 503. The district court in the instant case determined that the statutory requirement, the first step in the Venetian Salami inquiry, was not met. We agree, based on the clear language of the statute. Section 48.193 provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal re...

...The instant case, by contrast, presents the question whether long-arm jurisdiction exists over Thompson, not whether a cause of action exists against him. Doe may have a cause of action against Thompson, but the court does not have personal jurisdiction over him in Florida. We conclude that section 48.193 does not apply to Thompson....

...eals to narrowly focus on the issue of whether defamatory posts about a Florida corporation on an out-of-state website by the operator of the website constitute the commission of a tortious act within Florida under the long-arm statute, specifically section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2007). [2] Accordingly, we rephrase the certified question as follows: DOES A NONRESIDENT COMMIT A TORTIOUS ACT WITHIN FLORIDA FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 48.193(1)(b) WHEN HE OR SHE MAKES ALLEGEDLY DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ABOUT A COMPANY WITH ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN FLORIDA BY POSTING THOSE STATEMENTS ON A WEBSITE, WHERE THE WEBSITE POSTS CONTAINING THE STATEMENTS ARE ACCESSIBLE AND ACCESSED IN FLORIDA? We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative. We conclude that posting defamatory material on a website alone does not constitute the commission of a tortious act within Florida for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Rather, the material posted on the website about a Florida resident must not only be accessible in Florida, but also be accessed in Florida in order to constitute the commission of the tortious act of defamation within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...ther the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate under Florida's long-arm statute; and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process. Id. at *2. In determining whether Marshall was subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the long-arm statute, the district court noted that the Eleventh Circuit had established that an out-of-state defendant's commission of a tort that produces an injury in Florida was sufficient for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...1166). *1206 Regarding the first part of the inquiry, the Eleventh Circuit stated that Florida's long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a tortious act committed within Florida. Id. at 1296 (citing § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Also, a defendant could commit a tortious act within Florida by sending telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida, provided the cause of action arose from those communications. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "Marshall thus would be subject to jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) if her allegedly defamatory postings on her website constituted electronic communications `into Florida.'" Id....

...requirements for long-arm jurisdiction." Id. After reviewing both Florida case law and federal district court case law, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "Florida law is unsettled regarding whether Marshall's actions would meet the requirements of § 48.193(1)(b)." Id....

...ANALYSIS We first distinguish the subject of the certified question from the issue of whether exercising jurisdiction over Marshall would violate due process. We next examine the relevant provision of Florida's long-arm statute. Then we review the relevant case law interpreting section 48.193(1)(b)....

...New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000)). In Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), this Court recognized that the federal due process analysis is not built into Florida's long-arm statute: "The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts." Id. at 502. At issue in this case is the first prong—that is, whether ISC's complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida's long-arm statute. ISC contends that jurisdiction over Marshall is proper under section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida's long arm statute....

...nder the long-arm statute. Accordingly, it is our responsibility to construe the statute based on the actual language as guided by our precedent. We now turn to an examination of the relevant case law, discussing first the relevant case law applying section 48.193(1)(b) in the non-Web context and then the cases involving section 48.193(1)(b) in the Web context. Relevant Case Law Applying Section 48.193(1)(b) to Telephonic, Electronic, or Written Communications In Wendt, this Court considered the meaning of "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state" under section 48.193(1)(b). Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1258. In particular, the question before this Court in Wendt was whether "making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida from outside of the State can constitute `committing a tortious act' under section 48.193(1)(b)." Id....

...were performed in Michigan. Id. at 1256. After reviewing relevant case law, this Court held that a defendant's physical presence is not necessary to commit a tortious act in Florida. Id. at 1260. Rather, "`committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida." Id. (emphasis added). "However, the cause of action must arise from the communications"—"[t]his predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1)." Id. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that, under Wendt, Marshall would be subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if her allegedly defamatory posts on her website constituted electronic communications "into Florida." Internet Solutions Corp., 557 F.3d at 1296....

...[7] Other courts, both state and federal, applying Florida law have also held that communications made during a telephone call between a person in Florida and an out-of-state defendant constitute telephonic communications into Florida and confer personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under section 48.193(1)(b), provided the cause of action arose from the telephonic communication as required by *1209 the statute and clarified in Wendt....

...See, e.g., Hou v. United Airlines Corp., No. 806CV-1502-T-27TGW, 2006 WL 2884963, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Oct.10, 2006) (holding that alleged fraudulent statements by the defendants that occurred during a telephone call initiated by the plaintiff satisfied section 48.193(1)(b) (citing Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260)); OSI Indus., Inc. v. Carter, 834 So.2d 362, 364-65 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding that a nonresident defendant who called plaintiff in Florida and allegedly made misrepresentations during the conversation satisfied 48.193(1)(b))....

...ement of a traditional intentional tort under the common law. Id. at 248. Courts have also held that electronic communications over the Internet in the form of e-mails and chat room conversations into Florida give rise to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) on the basis of Wendt. In the e-mail context, a Fifth District Court of Appeal case applied section 48.193(1)(b) to an out-of-state defendant who sent an e-mail that allegedly defamed a Florida resident to various members of a veterans' association, some of whom lived in Florida....

...as recipients. Id. The court stated that "[a] complaint that alleges a nonresident committed a tortious act based on communications directed into Florida telephonically, electronically, or in writing sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)." Id....

...ct in Florida can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. Id. at 562-63. The Fourth District concluded that the alleged defamatory comments in the chat room were sufficient to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b) because "the communications that form the basis of the allegations in this case are analogous to cases previously decided by this court and certainly fit within the recent Supreme Court's discussion of electronic communications." Id....

...is directing his or her communication to a specific group of individuals, much like a person speaking during a telephone conference call, as in Acquadro , or a person sending an e-mail to multiple recipients, as in Price . Relevant Case Law Applying Section 48.193(1)(b) to the World Wide Web The question of whether a posting on a website, which is located on the World Wide Web, constitutes an electronic communication into Florida is a more difficult one than telephone calls, e-mails, chat rooms,...

...Because this structure facilitates easy access to information stored throughout the world, the World Wide Web has become one of the most popular and most used Internet programs. Id. With the unique context of the Web in mind, we now review the cases that have applied section 48.193(1)(b) in this context....

...The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants published more than a dozen false stories about them and subjected them to false and defamatory articles. Id. at 1243-44. The federal district court held that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to satisfy section 48.193(1)(b), stating: While ... Xcentric does not transact any business, have any agents in Florida, or maintain any offices in Florida, this is not determinative under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...information on the restricted portion of the defendant's website. Id. The defendant sold a small number of the subscriptions to the restricted portion of the website to Florida residents. Id. at 1383. The court held that long-arm jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(b) was not proper, finding that "selling subscriptions to an internet site to an unknown, relatively small number of Florida residents, without more, does not... constitute the commission of a tortious act in Florida under § 48.193(1)(b)." Alternate Energy Corp., 328 F.Supp.2d at 1383. The court distinguished the case from Becker and Wendt because they involved instances where Florida courts found that personal jurisdiction existed under § 48.193(1)(b)....

...he internet is sufficient to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute because publication of the allegedly injurious statements and omissions is an electronic communication accessible to Florida residents." Id. (citing § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...A review of the relevant case law reveals that courts interpreting Florida law in the context of the Web have applied differing approaches. Some courts appear to have interpreted Wendt's statement that "`committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida," 822 So.2d at 1260, as requiring that the defendant direct the communications into Florida or otherwise target Florida....

...At least one other court, however, has taken a far more expansive view by holding that merely posting material online "is an electronic communication accessible to Florida residents." Richards, 2008 WL 4889623, at *4. Having reviewed the relevant case law interpreting section 48.193(1)(b), we now turn to an analysis of when a nonresident defendant commits the tortious act of defamation within Florida in the unique context of the Web. Interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(b) in the Context of the World Wide Web The operative statutory language is "committing a tortious act within the state." § 48.193(1)(b). In Wendt, this Court interpreted section 48.193(1)(b) to include electronic communication "into" the state....

...erial is published. Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood Equity Partners, L.P., 960 So.2d 854, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("A telephonic, electronic, or written communication is deemed `published' in Florida, subjecting the publisher to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes if the communication was made into this state by a person outside the state, even if that person has no other contacts with the state." (citing Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1258))....

...Thus, once the allegedly defamatory material is published in Florida, Marshall has committed the tortious act of defamation within Florida for purposes of Florida's long-arm statute. [11] We emphasize that we are only asked to address the first step of the inquiry— whether section 48.193(1)(b) applies to confer personal jurisdiction....

...TS ABOUT A COMPANY WITH ITS PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS IN FLORIDA ON A NON-COMMERCIAL WEBSITE OWNED AND OPERATED BY A NONRESIDENT WITH NO OTHER CONNECTIONS TO FLORIDA CONSTITUTE COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUS ACT WITHIN FLORIDA FOR PURPOSES OF FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(b)? Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.2009). [3] Section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida's long-arm statute provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself...

...f he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: . . . . (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...nection with the website, and had never directed any communication (telephonic or written) into Florida for business purposes in connection with the website. [6] We do not decide the broader issue of whether injury alone satisfies the requirement of section 48.193(1)(b). We do recognize that the federal courts have adopted this broad construction of section 48.193(1)(b), holding that the commission of a tortious act out of state that causes an injury to an in-state resident satisfies Florida's long-arm statute....

...ugh an agent: ... commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act. ..."). Florida's long-arm statute, however, does not include a similar exemption. Florida courts have applied section 48.193(1)(b) to defamation causes of action, and the Legislature has not amended the statute to include a defamation exemption or afford special treatment for defamation claims....

...The district court found this contractual clause insufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction under the law of the forum state, Florida. The trial court then granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the requirements of the Florida Long-Arm Statute, Fla.Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (West 1969 and Cumm.Ann....

...This aspect of federal common law, favoring the enforcement of conferral of personal jurisdiction clauses, differs sharply from Florida law. In Florida, conferral of personal jurisdiction clauses are not enforced unless an independent ground for personal jurisdiction exists under the Florida Long Arm Statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193 (West 1969 and Cumm.Ann.Supp....

...-arm statute. Among the several listed bases, the Florida long-arm statute allows Florida courts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who breach a contract by failing to perform acts in Florida as required by the contract. 17 Fla.Stat. § 48.193(l)(g)....

...17 Although these cases involved Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.181, the substituted service of process statute which was in effect before the current long-arm statute was enacted, decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...Instead, the activities show merely a correspondent banking relationship coupled with a passive investment in federal funds. We conclude that these activities of Maduro & Curiel's Bank do not amount to conducting a business in Florida sufficient for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction under Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.193(1)(a)....

...orida courts to exercise jurisdiction. The banks involved in those cases, however, unlike Maduro & Curiel's Bank, allegedly made affirmative commitments to purchase particular securities. 21 Plaintiff contends that jurisdiction may be asserted under Section 48.193(1)(b), which authorizes jurisdiction over one who "commits a tortious act within this state." The district court found that Maduro & Curiel's Bank, contrary to the terms of the commercial collection agreements, either obtained the appr...

..."[The dealer] has committed no act in Florida, tortious or otherwise .... [T]he occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not satisfy the statutory test." 352 So.2d at 134 . See April Industries, Inc. v. Levy, 411 So.2d 303, 305-06 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (no jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b) where alleged wrong occurred outside Florida). Cf. Watts v. Haun, 393 So.2d 54 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (jurisdiction where act essential for tort occurred in Florida). We conclude that jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b) is not appropriate here. 23 Under Section 48.193(1)(f)(1), Florida courts may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who causes injury in Florida by an act outside the state, if at the time of the injury the defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within Florida which resulted in the injury....

...Maduro & Curiel's Bank was not engaged in solicitation or service activities within the state of Florida. It did not solicit business or advertise in Florida, and its service activities were locally based in the Netherlands Antilles. Therefore jurisdiction over Maduro & Curiel's Bank cannot be sustained under Section 48.193(1)(f)(1). 24 The judgment is reversed and the case is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 25 REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 Three sections of the Florida long-arm statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. Secs. 48.193(1)(a), (b), and (f)(1), are involved (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natur...

...1 Pol-skie sought to obtain personal jurisdiction over Seasafe Transport through its wholly owned subsidiary, Seasafe, Inc., a Florida corporation located in Miami. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that the 1984 amendments to Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 were not applicable and that Seasafe Transport had no connection with Florida sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction under the statutes in effect when the cause of action arose. DISCUSSION Retroactive Application of the 1984 Amendments In 1984, the Florida legislature amended Fla.Stat. §§ 48.081(5), 48.181(3) and 48.193....

...the issue otherwise.” Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, the district court did not err in declining to apply the 1984 amendments to this case. Jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) Alternatively, Polskie claims that Seasafe Transport is subject to Florida jurisdiction under Fla.Stat....

...The district court did not determine whether Seasafe Transport was doing business in Florida. Instead, it found there was no “connexity” between the Florida activities and the relationship between Pol-skie and Seasafe Transport (R. 221-22). Sections 48.181 and 48.193 (1983) required “connexity” in addition to the “doing business” requirement....

...rs to any person, firm, or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.181 (1983) (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1983 version of section 48.193 provided: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his persona...

...his pleadings demands affirmative relief on other causes of action, in which event the plaintiff may assert any cause of action against the defendant, regardless of its basis, by amended pleadings pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1983)....

...See also Engineered Storage Systems, Inc. v. National Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Guritz v. American Motivate, Inc., 386 So.2d 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The allegations of the complaint are sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...It is this conduct and connection with Florida, in addition to the contractual obligation to render payments in this state, that establishes the minimum contacts necessary to assume jurisdiction over the defendant. See also Lacy v. Force V. Corp., 403 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Thus the application of section 48.193 here satisfied the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution....

...AFFIRMED. SHARP, J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting. An interesting legal question is whether a Florida creditor can perfect a Florida court's jurisdiction over a foreign debtor based on service of process under section 48.193, Florida Statutes, when the complaint alleges that the foreign debtor's failure to pay money to the Florida creditor in Florida breached "a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." (§ 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...Stated another way: is the failure to pay money in Florida a sufficient "contact" with the state of Florida to permit a Florida court to acquire in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant and enter a valid general money judgment against the non-resident debtor based on service of process under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes? In National Equipment Leasing, Inc....

...risdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts. * * * * * * (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...orange juice. In its motion to dismiss, Citrovale challenged the court's personal jurisdiction over it under the minimum contacts requirement imposed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, and under Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193, Fla.Stat....

...the jurisdictional aspects of long-arm statutes are those in effect when the cause of action accrues." Thus, she maintains that: 1) the requirements of section 47.30, Florida *288 Statutes (1955), were met and 2) the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the cross-petitioner under section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1977), because that provision was in effect at the time her cause of action accrued, when her injury manifested itself. This Court has consistently held that neither section 48.193 nor its predecessor section 48.182, which became effective in 1970, can be applied retroactively to allow service under its provisions as to an alleged wrongful act committed prior to the enactment of the statute....

...A long-arm statute not only prescribes the manner of service to be utilized in connection with a nonresident over which a court may exercise in personam jurisdiction, such a statute also sets forth the acts which will subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of a state's courts. Compare, e.g., sections 48.193(1) and (2) (set forth acts which submit nonresident to jurisdiction of Florida courts) with section 48.193(3) (provides manner of service of process to be utilized to effect personal jurisdiction under section 48.193)....

...urts of this state. See 409 So.2d at 1027. The DES ingested by Ms. Conley's mother had to have been manufactured and distributed between 1947 [15] and the last date of ingestion in 1956, well before the effective date of the statutory predecessor of section 48.193....

...rts must engage in a two-part analysis. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). The court must first determine whether the party has alleged facts sufficient to fall within the scope of Florida's *620 long arm statute, section 48.193, and if so, whether the federal constitutional due process requirements of minimum contacts have been met....

...Cf. Ciba-Geigy Ltd. v. The Fish Peddler, Inc., 691 So.2d 1111, 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 699 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1997). Plaintiffs assert that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over defendant based on the general jurisdiction statute, section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...This "continuous and systematic" contacts standard was the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros as sufficient to fulfill the due process requirements of minimum contacts when asserting general jurisdiction. 466 U.S. at 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868. Because section 48.193(2) requires this high threshold, if the defendant's activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is also satisfied. See Universal Caribbean, 543 So.2d at 448; Nichols, 652 So.2d at 391; American Overseas, 632 So.2d at 1127-28; see also Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 (recognizing that some bases of jurisdiction found in section 48.193 would satisfy minimum contacts concerns)....

...ential business relationships in this state, all within its ongoing *621 commercial relationship with Florida, defendant "engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state" as is required to establish general jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(2)....

...While any one of these activities alone may not be deemed sufficient, considered collectively, they establish personal jurisdiction. See Nichols, 652 So.2d at 392-93. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in not finding personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to section 48.193(2)....

...Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.1990); Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 919 (11th Cir.1989). Sun Bank argues that Bunstein is subject to jurisdiction in Florida under two provisions of the Florida long-arm statute, sections 48.193(l)(b) and 48.193(l)(f)(l): (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representa...

...(f) Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury ...: 1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state;.... Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 48.193(l)(b) and 48.-193(l)(f)(l) (West 1990). The argument under the latter provision in the statute is easily dismissed. The Florida Supreme Court has decided that a purely economic injury of the sort alleged in this case is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a defendant under § 48.193(l)(f). Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992 (Fla.1987). The question whether jurisdiction exists under § 48.193(l)(b) is more difficult. On the question where a tort occurs for purposes of § 48.193(l)(b), the Florida Supreme Court has not settled an apparent conflict between the district courts....

...Mann, 460 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1984); Carida v. Holy Cross Hospital, Inc., 424 So.2d 849 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1982). However, one district court has held that the occurrence of injury in Florida is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b), Phillips v....

...5th Dist.Ct.App.1987). Florida law interpreting the statute is therefore unclear. However, in two cases decided shortly after the adoption of the current version of Florida’s long-arm statute, this court’s predecessor held that jurisdiction under § 48.193(l)(b) “was not limited to a situation where an act in Florida caused an injury in Florida but also ......

...RES and GSK, both located in Georgia, initially filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or transfer venue, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because the complaint failed to allege a basis for such jurisdiction under Florida's long arm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The question certified by the district court [1] is overly broad. Therefore, we rephrase the question as follows: CAN A FLORIDA COURT EXERCISE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER THE OBJECTION OF A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT WHO HAS DONE NONE OF THE ACTS SPECIFIED IN FLORIDA'S LONG ARM STATUTE, SECTION 48.193, FLORIDA STATUTES, BUT WHO IS A PARTY TO A CONTRACT WHICH DESIGNATES FLORIDA AS THE FORUM FOR ANY SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION? We answer this question in the negative and quash the decision of the district court below....

...filed a complaint in the circuit court of Palm Beach County against McRae and Shephard alleging a breach of the contract, and obtained service of process on McRae in Mississippi pursuant to section 48.194. McRae filed a motion to quash service on the grounds that having done none of the acts specified in section 48.193 (Florida's long arm statute), the suit should be dismissed because the court had no personal jurisdiction over him....

...We reasoned that such clauses should be enforced because they "merely present the court with a legitimate reason to refrain from exercising that jurisdiction." Id. at 439-40 (emphasis supplied). Implicit in our holding is the fact that Florida had jurisdiction, presumably section 48.193(1)(c), Florida Statutes....

...We point out that the forum selection clause at issue here is not an attempt to "oust" Florida of its jurisdiction. To the contrary, it is an attempt to establish personal jurisdiction in the first instance over an objecting defendant who has done none of the acts set forth in section 48.193....

...It is only after the court properly has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant that the criteria set forth in Manrique concerning the enforceability of a forum selection clause comes into play. Sub judice, McRae's motion to quash service on the grounds that he had engaged in none of the acts set forth in section 48.193 should have been granted by the trial court....

...on arising out of said contract?" 481 So.2d at 946. [2] The record does show that respondent has an office in Florida. Respondent urges that an independent basis exists for Florida to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the petitioner pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir.2009). A Florida court has specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident of Florida to determine a cause of action arising from the non-resident’s commission of a tortious act in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(b)....

...In doing so, we conclude that the facts as alleged in the complaint preclude Allerton's reliance upon the "corporate shield doctrine" and indicate that he has submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...s Constitutions. The motion alleged that, because no facts could be pled indicating sufficient contacts with Florida to confer personal jurisdiction, the complaint should be dismissed as to him. The trial court denied the motion without elaboration. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1991) provides, in pertinent part: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself ......

...t. See Doe, 620 So.2d at 1005 (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989)). The first step of that inquiry is to determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193(1). Although the trial court herein did not specify under which portion of the statute it found jurisdiction to lie, jurisdiction could properly be found pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), i.e., the commission of a tortious act within this state....

...n Florida."). Allerton strongly maintained at the oral argument of this case that International Harvester is no longer good law, arguing that Doe expressly overruled its holding that injury in Florida alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...entional misconduct of a nonresident corporate employee expressly aimed at him, of the right to obtain personal jurisdiction over that employee in a Florida court. We decline to so hold, and we conclude that jurisdiction was properly exercised under section 48.193(1)(b) in this case....

...We therefore turn to Florida’s long-arm statute to determine whether a Florida court could exercise jurisdiction over J&B Tours in this case. Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 626–27. The Frasers argue that J&B Tours was subject to the district court’s general jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) and, in the alternative, that the court had specific jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims against J&B Tours under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). 1. General Jurisdiction Under Section 48.193(2) Section 48.193(2) of Florida’s long-arm statute provides: “A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdicti...

...at 412 n.5. The Frasers are North and South Carolina residents who neither suffered harm in Florida nor alleged negligence on the part of J&B Tours in Florida. 9  2. Specific Jurisdiction Under Section 48.193(1)(a) The specific-jurisdiction provision of Florida’s long-arm statute states, in relevant part, that a defendant “submits himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from” the defendant’s activities “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...In support of their argument that J&B Tours conducted business in Florida, the Frasers rely on the same contacts that they alleged to be “continuous and systematic” for the purposes of the general-jurisdiction analysis. To establish a court’s specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a), however, a nonresident defendant’s activities “must ....

...jurisdiction,” Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627, and in the absence of any allegation that J&B Tours’ solicitation activities in Florida influenced the Frasers’ decision to charter the Sundance, we cannot conclude that their claims “aris[e] from” those activities under § 48.193(1). 11  The Frasers also argue that J&B Tours’ contacts with Florida satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Although we are skeptical of this contention, see discussion infra Part II.B.2, we need not address it here. Section 48.193(1)(a) “requires more activities or contacts to sustain service of process than are ....

...the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. (emphasis supplied) In addition to Section 48.181, in 1973 the Florida legislature enacted a second long-arm statute, Section 48.193, which substantially duplicates the operative language of the older statute and provides in pertinent part: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumera...

...Winters Government Securities Corporation, 361 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (discussing § 48.181, Fla.Stat. only), with *1168 Joyce Brothers Storage & Van Company v. Piechalak, 343 So.2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and Dublin Company v. Peninsular Supply Company, 309 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (discussing § 48.193, Fla.Stat.)....

...American President Lines, 452 F.Supp. 568 (S.D.Fla.1978); Escambia Treating Company v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F.Supp. 1235 (N.D.Fla.1975); Donnelly v. Kellogg Company, 293 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.Fla.1968). [4] Since the language of the newer long-arm statute (i. e. § 48.193) is not materially different from that contained in the older act (§ 48.181) with respect to jurisdiction based upon business contacts with the state, the restrictive Florida approach is equally applicable no matter which jurisdictional basis is invoked....

...ing Florida, it is not unreasonable that defendant could have anticipated defending itself in this forum as a result of its activities in this state. After evaluating the nature and scope of the contacts required by Florida Statutes, §§ 48.181 and 48.193, the Court concludes that jurisdiction thereunder, when applied to these facts, does not offend federal notions of due process....

...Accordingly, the state law standard should also apply in a federal question case where service is sought pursuant to state law. [3] The entire statute is a generally successful effort to formulate a comprehensive plan by which non-residents can be subjected to jurisdiction by the Florida courts. In its entirety, § 48.193 subjects the nonresident to Florida jurisdiction arising out of seven separate kinds of contacts with this state: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts en...

...(4) Nothing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereinafter provided by law. Although plaintiff exclusively relies upon that clause in the statute that predicates long arm jurisdiction upon the doing of business in this state, § 48.193(1)(a), there are other connections which will obviate the need to prove that a nonresident is conducting business in Florida. For example, a sufficient connection might be one in which the cause of action arises out of the commission of a tortious act within this state by the nonresident defendant § 48.193(1)(b), or when the nonresident breaches a contract in this state. § 48.193(1)(g). Plaintiffs in products liability actions typically utilize § 48.193(1)(f) to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident manufacturer. It thus appears that § 48.193 was enacted to broaden jurisdiction to areas not previously covered by § 48.181....

...Mallard, supra at 241 and n.3. This development has eliminated the necessity of choosing between a state or federal interpretation of the statutes. The result should now be the same under either construction. [5] This is so only when jurisdiction is obtained under § 48.181 or 48.193(1)(a). A different standard may apply where jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to another provision of § 48.193. See note 3, supra. [6] The Harlo action was brought under § 48.193(1)(f)(2), the products liability section, and not § 48.193(1)(a), as is the case herein....

...r that it had minimum contacts with Florida. Id. at 1330. Consequently, the statute was ruled unconstitutional as applied. [7] Although never specified by the plaintiff/appellant in his brief, jurisdiction in Hyco was also apparently predicated upon § 48.193(1)(f)....

...Babcock sued Whatmore on October 18, 1995, alleging that the judgments remained unpaid and sought to have both judgments aggregated into a single judgment. She acknowledged in her complaint that Whatmore is a resident of Asheville, North Carolina, but invoked Florida's jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(e) of Florida's "long arm" statute....

...rough the filing of a counterclaim. Notwithstanding, I concur in the result of the court's decision because to penalize the defendant in this case for "putting the cart before the horse" would place form over substance. WELLS, J., concurs. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), states in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and,...

...The Florida Supreme Court recently held that to decide whether in personam jurisdiction lies over a foreign defendant courts must determine compliance with both Florida's long arm statute and the constitutional due process test of minimum contacts. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989). Florida Statute Section 48.193 provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural perso...

...* * * * * * (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat. Section 48.193 (1989)....

...All other jurisdictional allegations are offered by Plaintiff as relating to the litigation (specific jurisdiction) and will be addressed below. Plaintiff does not assert that this cause of action arose from the alleged solicitation efforts of Defendant. A. Florida Statute Section 48.193(2) This subsection addresses personal jurisdiction where a defendant is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state. Plaintiff has provided no authority upon which his claims of general jurisdiction can be based, but has alleged that Defendant has "engaged in substantial activity in the state." Such an allegation tracks the language of Section 48.193(2)....

...ff has not described a duration or a quantitative extent of Defendant's activities, the acts alleged cannot be deemed as *585 engaging in business continuously or systematically. Hence, the contacts as alleged are not substantial. B. Florida Statute 48.193(1)(f) These same allegations must also fail under subsection (1)(f)....

...Aetna was then cited by our Eleventh Circuit for the same principle. Sun Bank v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 926 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1991). "The Florida Supreme Court has decided that a purely economic injury of the sort alleged in this case is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over a defendant under s. 48.193(1)(f)." Id. at 1033. The Court notes that Plaintiff has alleged no personal injury or property damage, but only breach of contract. There is therefore no personal jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(f) on the basis of Defendant "actively soliciting business" within this state....

...SPECIFIC JURISDICTION As discussed above, a plaintiff failing to establish a defendant's continuous and systematic contacts with the forum may nonetheless obtain personal jurisdiction over an out of state defendant if contacts exist which gave rise to the action. A. Florida Statute Section 48.193(1)(g) In attempting to show specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff Prentice alleges that Defendant Prentice Colour, Inc., breached a contract to be performed in the forum state....

...1989). Defendant first contends that his mailing of the letters from Connecticut to Florida does not constitute the commission of a tort "within this state" for the purpose of subjecting him to the long arm jurisdiction of the Florida courts under subsection 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...1993), slanderous statements made during a telephone call placed to a Florida number were found to provide a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction over the nonresident caller. We do not agree that Carida was overruled by Doe because Doe only addressed the "corporate shield" doctrine: section 48.193(1)(b) does not subject an employee to personal jurisdiction who has performed a negligent act outside of the state solely in his corporate capacity even if the injury occurs in Florida....

...First, a defendant is subject to “specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida”—for conduct specifically enumerated in the statute. Id. at 1204 (citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a))....

...s in 6  Case: 16-15569 Date Filed: 08/23/2018 Page: 7 of 29 Florida—if the defendant engages in ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ in Florida.” Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)). Whether specific or general, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must comport with due process....

...ted to render the value of his shares in MI worthless. Process was served upon appellants Price and Law in Georgia, after which they moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The denial of that motion resulted in this appeal. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1983) authorizes personal service on a non-resident who: (a) Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state....

...ution. Godfrey v. Neumann, 373 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1979). The Florida courts have consistently held that a plaintiff seeking to assert long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident must allege in his complaint sufficient facts to fall within the language of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...that the conspiracy was successful in taking clients from Butler and, as a result, Butler was damaged. Jurisdictional Allegations Regarding Czyzyk’s Contacts with Florida The amended complaint alleged that jurisdiction was proper over Czyzyk under section 48.193(l)(b), Florida Statutes, because he committed a tortious act within this state....

...ep analysis to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant. First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...If the affidavits can be harmonized, the court can resolve the jurisdiction issue based upon facts which are essentially undisputed. Id. at 502-03 . Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, where the person commits any of the acts enumerated in the subsection within Florida and the cause of action arose from the act. A Florida court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant who commits “a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...See M. Rohr, Personal Jurisdiction in Florida: Some Problems and Proposals, 5 Nova L.J. 365, 371, 463 (1981). At this time, however, personal service upon the defendant is the only way to obtain a valid enforceable in personam judgment against him. Section 48.193(1)(g) would submit the defendant in the instant case to the jurisdiction of this court....

...I concur in the decision of the Court holding that under sections 49.011 and 49.021, Florida Statutes (1983), service of process by publication is not available under the facts of this case. While it is conceded that the defendant committed acts subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the Florida court under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983), the method of service of process used in this case was legally inadequate to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant....

...must be answered in the negative. But it should be noted that had personal service of process been effected upon the defendant, the court could legally have asserted in personam jurisdiction over the defendant under the statutory authority found in section 48.193(1)(g)....

...enever personal service of process is unavailable, and that Bedford's action fell squarely within the provisions of section 49.011(5). According to the majority, the only proper way to have achieved in personam jurisdiction over this defendant is by section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), Florida's general long-arm statute. This section asserts the jurisdiction of the Florida courts over any "person" who does any of a number of enumerated acts for any cause of action arising from the doing of such acts. Subsection 2 of section 48.193 concerns the method of service of process authorized by the statute. It provides that "[s]ervice of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section [section 48.193] may be made by personally serving the process outside this state, as provided in section 48.194." (Emphasis added). The word "may" in the statute is clearly permissive, and I would disapprove those cases that hold to the contrary. Further, my conclusion that section 48.193 is not the exclusive means of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident is supported by subsection (4), which provides that "[n]othing contained in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process in any ot...

...Therefore, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of the Acquadros' motion to dismiss. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS I. The conflict issue in this case is whether the Fourth District erred in concluding that personal jurisdiction was proper over two out-of-state residents based on section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999). [10] Recently, in Wendt, we addressed *670 a substantially similar issue, and concluded: [I]n order to "commit a tortious act" in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, "committing a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. However, the cause of action must arise from the communications. This predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1). See § 48.193(1) (stating that "[a]ny person......

...Petitioners explain that the defamation claim was brought only against Rose Acquadro. Therefore, petitioners allege that the Fourth District's decision may be read as holding that statements made via telephone into Florida resulting in claims for false arrest or malicious prosecution are sufficient for jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), and that this holding conflicts with this Court's decision in Thompson, the Fifth District's decisions in McLean Financial, Texas Guaranteed, and Intercontinental Corp....

...and the Second District's decisions in Phillips and Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. Our decision in Wendt expressly disapproves of McLean Financial and Intercontinental Corp. to the extent that those cases require physical presence in Florida in order to establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). See Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. Moreover, as explained above, the Wendt opinion expressly holds that "telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if the alleged cause of action arises from the communications." Id....

...Acquadro, in his affidavit contesting jurisdiction, denied speaking to representatives from Bonnie Towing. Although Dr. Acquadro denied lying to the police and the prosecutor, he never denied his involvement in the telephone communications with individuals in Florida which form the basis of the tort claims. Section 48.193 does not, as petitioners argue, distinguish among the universe of possible torts. Instead, the statute provides that any person who commits a tortious act in this state submits himself or herself to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of this state. See § 48.193(1), Fla....

...2d DCA 1979).] We approve of the foregoing analyses in [ Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) ], [ Unger v. Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) ], and Osborn. The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts....

...A court then must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between our forum state and the defendant to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements-in short, whether a nonresident defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in Florida. [10] Section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and,...

...(b) Committing a tortious act within this state. [11] Similarly, the Second District in Koch considered whether a tape-recorded telephone call between a nonresident defendant and a Florida resident plaintiff could serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). See 710 So.2d at 6. The Second District held that the tortious act occurred in Florida because the interception occurred where the communication was uttered, and thus the nonresident defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). See id. Thus, we approve the Second District's decision in Koch because like Wendt, the decision held that a telephonic communication into Florida can constitute a tortious act under section 48.193(1)(b). Yet, in Texas Guaranteed Student Loan, the Second District held that sending debt collection letters and making telephone calls from out of state to a Florida resident is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...nge assemblies to Ford knowing that they were to be incorporated into automobiles manufactured by Ford and knew that some of these automobiles would be shipped to Florida and sold. The Atwood company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1977), which enumerates the acts subjecting persons to the jurisdiction of Florida courts, does not provide for jurisdiction in a situation such as the one alleged in the third party complaint....

...ed. Implicit in the trial court's order, however, is a holding that the statute is intended to apply, because the court proceeded to rule on the question — not presented by the motion to dismiss — of the statute's constitutionality. The court held section 48.193(1)(f)2., Florida Statutes (1977), "unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case," citing Harlo Products Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 360 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Thus, there are two issues in this case: first, whether the statute was intended to apply; second, whether it may be applied consistently with due process. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides for jurisdiction of Florida courts over persons, including nonresidents, who perform certain enumerated acts: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or t...

...Furthermore, even though the injured Florida plaintiffs are out of the lawsuit, the remaining dispute being between Ford and Atwood, we hold that Florida as the place of injury has a sufficient interest in the litigation to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident part manufacturer. The circuit court erred in holding section 48.193(1)(f)2 unconstitutional under the facts of this case....

...einstated. It is so ordered. ADKINS, OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. SUNDBERG, C.J., dissents with an opinion with which ENGLAND, J., concurs. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice, dissenting. I do not believe that utilization of Florida's "long arm" statute, section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1977), to assert jurisdiction over the Atwood company, a foreign car components manufacturer, meets with due process requirements as delineated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp....

...It was sold at auction in Florida and eventually sold to the Yarbroughs by the Jacksonville dealer. Pickard has no nexus with Florida, other than the servicing of a car that eventually was sold to a Florida resident and then caused injury in Florida. Jack Pickard argues Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1975) is unconstitutional as applied here....

...also the situation in which a foreign tortious act causes injury within the forum. See generally, Buckley v. New York Post Corporation, 373 F.2d 175, 178-9 (2d Cir.1967). Since we agree with the district court that the Florida courts would construe section 48.193(1)(b) to allow the assertion of jurisdiction over the Company for an alleged libel published in `The Washington Post' and circulated in Florida, it is unnecessary for jurisdictional purposes to discuss the Company's contention that the libel occurred in Washington, D.C." 515 F.2d at 1211-1212....

...tious acts giving rise to the injurious consequences which occurred." 543 F.2d at 1109. Both federal cases involved a foreign defendant and injury in Florida. Both cases found personal jurisdiction appropriate. Nevertheless here the clear wording of Section 48.193(1)(b) — the commission of "a tortious act within this state" — requires a different result....

...Rebozo at 1214. Such a holding however ignores the admonition in Hanson that application of the minimal contacts doctrine "will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity... ." 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1240. In conclusion, we hold Section 48.193(1)(f)2 is unconstitutional in its application to the circumstances of this case....

...Regardless of that finding based upon appellees' concession, appellees were dismissed from appellant's action solely on the trial judge's finding that they had not personally committed acts within the state of Florida to bring them within the terms of Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991). In this, we conclude the court erred. Section 48.193 provides as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his...

...she has successfully alleged that any member of that conspiracy committed tortious acts in Florida in furtherance of that conspiracy, then all of the conspirators are subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Florida through its long-arm statute, section 48.193, which provides that any person, whether or not a resident of Florida, who personally or through an agent, commits a tortious act within Florida submits to the personal jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising out of the tortious act committed in Florida....

...Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1971); Farnell v. State, 214 So.2d 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Martinez v. State, 413 So.2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We conclude that the well-established rules of criminal conspiracy comport with our application of section 48.193 in this case....

...nt, the Society had made all payments in Punta Gorda. He also alleged that the Society was a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Osborn sought to obtain jurisdiction over the Society pursuant to the provisions of Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977). The Society, however, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, concluding that the allegations of the complaint were insufficient to subject the Society to jurisdiction under the statute. Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a person is subject to the jurisdiction of the court if he "[b]reaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." In Madax International Corp....

...re both satisfied. See Posner, 178 F.3d at 1214 (citing Sculptchair, Inc., 94 F.3d at 626 ). Florida’s long-arm statute recognizes two kinds of personal jurisdiction over defendants: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193 (1)-(2)....

...A non-resident defendant may be subject to specific personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute if the claim asserted against the defendant arises from its forum-related contacts and if those contacts fall in one of the nine enumerated categories listed under section 48.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...e they each committed tor-tious acts within Florida and/or committed tortious acts directed at Florida and caused injury to GolTV in Florida 6 (see Am. Compl. ¶ 4Í)—“[cjommitting a tor-tious act” being one of the .nine enumerated acts' under section 48.193(l)(a), 7 Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)(2) (alteration added). Additionally, Plaintiffs allege the Court has specific jurisdiction over Conmebol and Full Play because section 48.193(l)(a)(2) supports personal jurisdiction over a defendant where co-eonspira-tors commit acts in Florida in furtherance of a conspiracy even when the defendant did.not commit any acts in or have any relevant contacts with Florida....

...ded; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the long-arm statute provides a defendant’s contacts may be based not only on the defendant’s personal activities, but also on the actions of the defendant’s agents. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a) (stating a person submits him or herself to personal jurisdiction under the statute when he/she “personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection”)....

...ida.” United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted) (citing cases); see also Execu-Tech Bus. Sys. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 586 (Fla. 2000). D. Jurisdiction over Conmebol Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1....

...ities. Because Plaintiffs have not met the requirements of the long-arm statute, the Court does not determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Conmebol would comport with due process. E. Jurisdiction over Full Play Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1....

...), but finds -the.Declaration and Plaintiffs' Response demonstrate there was an injury in Florida (see Resp. 40-41; see generally Gutierrez Deck). . The Amended Complaint states there is also specific jurisdiction over Conmebol under Florida Statute section 48.193(l)(a)(l) because Conmebol “operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida,” in relation to its promotion and commercialization of the club tournaments. (Am. Compl. ¶ 48). Plaintiffs do not mention section 48.193(l)(a)(l) or address Conmebol's arguments on that provision anywhere in their Response....

...sider Conmebol is subject to jurisdiction in part based on the actions of its officials. {See Resp. 54-57). . In defending against the allegation Conme-bol operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida under section 48.193(l)(a)(l), .Florida Statutes, Conmebol' admits....

...Aetna sued Therm-O-Disc for damages in separate counts of negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, and strict liability. Aetna sought to obtain jurisdiction over Therm-O-Disc by virtue of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. While agreeing in part with the trial court, the First District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether jurisdiction could be obtained under section 48.193(1)(g). Aetna was dissatisfied with this decision and petitioned this Court for review of the district court's analysis that jurisdiction could not be obtained under section 48.193(1)(f). Aetna contended that Therm-O-Disc was subject to jurisdiction under one or more of three subsections of the long-arm statute. 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...actured by an out-of-state company. The hoist crane failed, and the Florida corporation sued the manufacturer for damages incurred in replacing the defective equipment and for lost production time. The court held that the word injury as set forth in section 48.193(1)(f) was not confined solely to bodily injury or physical property damage but also included the economic damages alleged by the hoist crane purchaser....

...ctured by the nonresident anywhere. Presumably, these would include tortious acts and breaches of contract outside the state involving merely financial losses in commercial transactions. If this were the intent of the Florida Legislature in enacting section 48.193(1)(f), why then did the legislature also enact section 48.193(1)(b) (authorizing jurisdiction over anyone who commits a tort within this state) and section 48.193(1)(g) (authorizing jurisdiction over anyone who breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform an act required by the contract to be performed in this state ), given that the usual remedy in such cases is an award of damages f...

...Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1987), recently ruled that a buyer under a contract for goods could not recover economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to property other than the allegedly defective goods. We hold that the provisions of section 48.193(1)(f) contemplate personal injury or physical property damage....

...Bauer in circuit court in Broward County, Florida for breach of the settlement agreement. Dr. Bauer filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the Motion to Dismiss. Appellants seek to obtain jurisdiction over Dr. Bauer under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes (2001), which provide: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself...

...such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Alternatively, Appellants seek to obtain jurisdiction over Dr. Bauer under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2001), which confers personal jurisdiction for: (g) breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state....

...See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989); see also Woods v. Nova Co. Belize Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The court must first determine whether the party has alleged facts sufficient to fall within the scope of section 48.193, Florida Statutes, and second, whether the federal constitutional due process requirements of minimum contacts have been met. Woods, 739 So.2d at 619-20. Both parts must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. In order to determine whether Dr. Bauer is subject to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a), his activities must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in Florida for pecuniary benefit....

...Travel Opportunities is distinguishable from the instant case in that Dr. Bauer contacted Appellants in Florida and initiated numerous business transactions in Florida. Dr. Bauer argues that the time period over which his transactions took place (approximately one year) is insufficient to invoke section 48.193(1)(a)....

...As additional grounds for our holding we find that Dr. Bauer's activities in Florida are substantial and not isolated. He initiated and maintained continuous and systematic business contact in Florida for pecuniary gain. Therefore, the court has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Bauer pursuant to section 48.193(2). If a defendant's actions meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), then the test of minimum contacts is also satisfied. Woods, 739 So.2d at 620. Since this Court has determined that Dr. Bauer is subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a) and (2), we do not need to reach whether Dr. Bauer is subject to personal jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(g)....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989); Kin *601 Yong Lung Indus. Co. v. Temple, 816 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The first inquiry is whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to subject the defendant to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...Venetian Salami also sets forth the procedures for the parties and the trial court to use when a defendant argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading a basis for jurisdiction under section 48.193. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502. The plaintiff may do so either by tracking the language of section 48.193 without pleading supporting facts, id., or by alleging specific facts that demonstrate that the defendant's actions fit within one or more subsections of section 48.193....

...Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502; Kin Yong Lung Indus. Co., 816 So.2d at 666; Capital One Fin. Corp., 709 So.2d at 640; Lampe, 652 So.2d at 425. In this case, the jurisdictional allegations in the Estate's complaint are sufficient to allege long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005). The allegations that Hilltopper and Centennial were doing business in Florida and operating a nursing home in Florida are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 48.193(2), which imposes jurisdiction on "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state." In addition, the allegations that Hilltopper and Centennial were operating the nursing home and tortiously injured Cutchin while doing so were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 48.193(1)(a), which imposes jurisdiction on a defendant that operates or conducts business in the state, and section 48.193(1)(b), which imposes jurisdiction on a defendant that commits a tortious act within the state....

...f the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, supra at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239. In 1985, after the decision in Helicopteros, the Florida Legislature amended section 48.193, Florida Statutes, to add, in current subsection (2), a provision for the exercise of general jurisdiction over nonresidents by the courts of this state. Section 48.193(2) provides that a nonresident defendant "who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state" is subject to jurisdiction in Florida "whether or not the claim rises from that activity." The Florida courts have harmonized the language of section 48.193(2) with the constitutional due process requirements enunciated in Helicopteros by holding that substantial and not isolated activity means "continuous and systematic general business contacts" as articulated in Helicopteros....

...vity'"); Sanabira v. Pyburn, 557 So.2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) ("defendants' vessel sporadic visits and other contacts with Florida did not constitute the `continuous and systematic' activity necessary to sustain a claim of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)"); Ranger Nationwide, Inc....

...Appellants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion. To subject an out-of-state defendant to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts, two criteria must be met: (1) the defendant must have performed one of the acts in the Florida Long-arm Statute, § 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991), from which the cause of action arises, and (2) the defendant must have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State of Florida to satisfy principles of due process. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989). Appellants do not argue that minimum contacts are lacking. Thus, the only question before the court is whether the appellant performed one of the acts enumerated in section 48.193 from which the cause of action arises. The appellee asserts that the appellants have subjected themselves to personal jurisdiction by virtue of section 48.193(1)(a), which provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, hi...

...Sending a telefax to Beale Marine in Florida incorrectly representing that $4,000,000 in coverage existed for the M/V Adria in the event of total loss. 8. Corresponding with Beale Marine and offering advice and assistance regarding claims handling. To invoke long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under section 48.193(1)(a), the activities of the corporation "must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefits." Foster, Pepper & Riviera v. Hansard, 611 So.2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We agree with the trial court that the above activities do constitute conducting business in this state within the parameters of section 48.193(1)(a)....

...The case law indicates that solicitation is one factor the courts consider in deciding whether a company is conducting business in the state. For example, in Canron Corp. v. Holt, 444 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court held the defendant was "doing business" under section 48.193(1)(a) where it had regularly solicited business in Florida through direct mail and by sending its sales persons to visit Florida customers, had a service representative residing in Florida, and conducted training for its product....

...NOTES [1] According to the complaint, Nelson Hurst Marine Limited is the successor-in-interest to Citicorp. [2] Although appellee also pled jurisdiction under subsection (d), it did not argue the applicability of that subsection in the trial court. Appellee did not plead or argue jurisdiction under subsection (f). [3] Section 48.193(1)(f)(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides for personal jurisdiction where the defendant has "[c]aus[ed] injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury ......

...the Miracle Principals' allegations as to the trial court's lack of personal jurisdiction over them. Although this case involves long-arm jurisdiction, the appellants, as third-party plaintiffs below, were not relying on Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), to establish jurisdiction over the Miracle Principals....

...[2] We note that it is unusual for a trial court to dismiss a complaint "with prejudice" upon a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [3] Under the general, two-step process: "First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of [section 48.193]; and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient `minimum contacts' are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements." Venetian Salami Co....

...Paulucci, 652 So.2d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 659 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1995), and cert. denied, -516 U.S. 1046, 116 S.Ct. 707, 133 L.Ed.2d 662 (1996). Instead, the state relies primarily on its claim that the subsidiaries were simply agents for the parent corporations. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or...

...The plaintiff may fulfill this requirement either by alleging the language of the statute in the complaint without pleading supporting facts or by alleging specific facts indicating that the defendant's actions fit within one of the sections of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193....

...ting the burden back to the plaintiff to submit affidavits establishing the basis for jurisdiction. Id. On appeal, the Attorney General argues that the trial court should have exercised long-arm jurisdiction over the individual appellees pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) Florida Statutes (2001), which provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits...

...the same deference. Id. (citing Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp. A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 970 (11th Cir.1986)). Florida's long-arm statute provides for specific personal jurisdiction over defendants who commit one of a series of acts. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1). Where a defendant is found to have undertaken one of the acts enumerated in Florida Statute Section 48.193(1), and the cause of action arises from or relates to that act, the long-arm statute has been met....

...Nida, 118 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1231 (M.D.Fla.2000); see also Becker v. Hooshmand, 841 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). This Court limits its analysis of Spiderwebart's contacts with Florida to the long-arm statute's tortious act provision because that provision is both "applicable and sufficient." FLA. STAT. § 48.193(b); Cable/Home Commc'n v....

...does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: . . . . (b) Committing a tortious act within this state . . . FLA. STAT. § 48.193. Copyright infringement is widely recognized as a tortious act within the context of 48.193(b)....

...v. Network Prod's, 902 F.2d at 854 (finding tortious act provision of Florida long-arm statute applicable, where defendant allegedly violated copyright and communications laws). Thus, the sole question at issue is whether, for purposes of construing 48.193(1)(b), Spiderwebart's alleged copyright infringement occurred "within this state." *1321 The Florida Supreme Court has found that a defendant's physical presence is not required to commit a tortious act within the state; indeed, a nonresident...

...the cause of action arises from such communication. Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, 347 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1244-1245 (M.D.Fla.2004) (citing Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1260 (Fla.2002) and the connexity requirement of FLA. STAT. § 48.193)....

...ry in Florida because website was accessible by Florida residents); see also KVAR Energy Savings, Inc. v. Tri-State Energy Solutions, No. 6:08-cv-85-Orl-19KRS, 2009 WL 103645, at *11 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 15, 2009) (holding that specific jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b) applies where website displays alleged trademark infringement and is accessible in Florida); see also Richards v....

...requiring that a website actually be accessed—rather than merely be accessible—by a Florida resident. Internet Solutions Corp., 39 So.3d at 1215-16. Unless satisfied, the website communication cannot constitute a tortious activity in Florida under 48.193(1)(b)....

...Given that intellectual property infringement is at issue in Smith's claim against Spiderwebart, the accessibility test is more appropriate. Under the accessibility test, the Court finds Spiderwebart's supposed online sale of the Rose Guitar image to constitute a tortious act committed in Florida under 48.193(1)(b)....

...In Licciardello, a personal manager for music artists posted a musician's trademarked name and picture on his website without permission. 544 F.3d at 1282. Reviewing a motion to dismiss the musician's trademark infringement claim, the Licciardello court found personal jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(b) valid because the music manager's website was accessible in Florida....

...# 13-1 at ¶ 7). As regards the connexity requirement, the Court preliminarily finds that this requirement has been met. First, both Smith's copyright infringement claim and the alleged conduct of Spiderwebart implicating the tortious act provision of 48.193(1) involve the same Rose Guitar image....

...Second, both concern the same act of posting that image online for sale. Indeed, at issue in both is the same alleged act of copyright infringement. Thus, Smith's copyright claim unquestionably relates to and arises from Spiderwebart's contacts with Florida under 48.193(1)(b), because Spiderwebart's contacts are nothing more than the copyright infringement alleged in Smith's complaint....

of Florida’s long-arm jurisdiction statute (section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes (2015)). Cortez alleged

...Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, and Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for appellees. ALDERMAN, Justice. This cause is before us to review an interlocutory order of the circuit court of Palm Beach County upholding the constitutionality of section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...[1] We treat the interlocutory appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari and take jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Burnsed v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 290 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1974). [2] The sole question for our consideration is whether subsection (1)(b) of section 48.193 (Florida's "long arm" statute), which provides that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has committed a tort in Florida may be acquired by personally serving the nonresident outside of Florida, is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirement of the due process clause of the federal constitution. *922 We hold that section 48.193(1)(b) is constitutional and deny the writ....

...The complaint alleged that these injuries were the result of Willie's negligence in jumping from the pool's diving board onto Mrs. Neumann's back. Willie and his father are Canadian citizens, residing in Toronto, and they were vacationing at the condominium complex at the time of the alleged accident. Relying on section 48.193(1)(b) to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendants, the plaintiffs had Willie's father personally served with a copy of the complaint, along with a copy of the summons, at his office in Toronto. Willie and his father filed a motion to quash process and service of summons, arguing, among other things, that section 48.193(1)(b) is unconstitutional on the ground that personal jurisdiction cannot be constitutionally obtained over a nonresident for a single isolated alleged tortious act because it does not meet the "minimum contacts" test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The circuit court found section 48.193(1)(b) to be constitutional and denied the motion to quash as to Willie's father....

...In cases under these statutes in state and federal courts, jurisdiction on the basis of a single tort has been uniformly upheld. 86 S.Ct. at 3, 15 L.Ed.2d at 43. Even prior to the decision in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co ., "long arm" statutes with provisions similar to section 48.193(1)(b) had been sustained against constitutional attack in other states. See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), and Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). We hold that section 48.193(1)(b) is constitutional because we find that by committing a tort in Florida a nonresident establishes sufficient "minimum contacts" with Florida to justify the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over him by personally serving him outside the state. Accordingly, the writ is denied. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...Her success in defeating the gift was the result of undue influence and the intentional interference with the rights of Mrs. Haun and Bryan, Jr. *56 Mrs. Watts is a resident of New York. Therefore, the plaintiffs sought to obtain jurisdiction over her person by substituted service pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), which reads as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that pers...

...lorida and take Bryan, Sr., back to New York. Therefore, we hold that the complaint sufficiently demonstrates that Mrs. Watts committed a substantial aspect of the alleged tort in Florida. This is enough to subject her to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Georgia Savings and Loan Service Corp. v. Delwood Estates, Inc., 315 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). See also Dublin Company v. Peninsular Supply Co., 309 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In order to sustain in personam jurisdiction over Cosmopolitan, appellee relies on Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, which provides: "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he...

...(Emphasis added) The above provision, as with other provisions of Florida's long arm statute, must be strictly construed in order to guarantee compliance with due process requirements. Dublin v. Peninsular Supply Co., supra. The caselaw interpreting Section 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...e's report and recommendation is due to be adopted, confirmed, and made a part of this Order. The Defendants' objections focus on two areas: (1) the Magistrate Judge erred in finding personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, because the alleged contract which is at the heart of this case was not capable of being performed in Florida; and (2) the Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts demonstrating that the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired....

...da Supreme Court would. [29] Therefore, this Court must strictly construe the statute, [30] and the burden of proving the facts which make the statute applicable to the Defendants is on the Plaintiff. [31] Florida's long arm statute, Florida Statute § 48.193(1), provides in relevant part: [a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ....

...[30] Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. [31] Restorative Prods., Inc. v. Mmar Med. Group, Inc., No. 94-1920 CIV-T-17A, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18695, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Oct. 18, 1995); Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D.Fla.1981). [32] Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1995)....

...tortious act within Florida, caused injury to a business in Florida, breached a contract in Florida, and engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida, bringing his actions within Florida’s long-arm statute, as codified at Fla. Stat. § 48.193 ....

...nto a liquid petroleum storage tank which was sold to Public Gas Company, that this tank was installed at the Sea Horse Motel, and that it was later involved in a gas explosion. Personal service was attempted on Weatherhead in Cleveland, Ohio, under section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ns in the amended complaints and the third-party complaint were entirely insufficient and (2) the product manufactured by Weatherhead was made and distributed in the 1950s, well before the 1970 effective date of the original statutory predecessor of section 48.193....

...On remand the trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing and again granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has appealed. Plaintiff makes essentially two contentions in support of the proposition that the Florida courts have long-arm jurisdiction over IASCO. First, plaintiff contends that several provisions of section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1989), are satisfied....

...as engaged in a business or business venture in this state; had an office or agency in this state; used real property within this state; and was engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, all within the meaning of paragraphs 48.193(1)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as subsection 48.193(2) of the same statute. We disagree. Florida decisions under the closely related provisions of subsection 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1989), as well as section 48.193, have held that the presence of a subsidiary corporation within Florida is not enough, without more, to subject a non-Florida parent corporation to long-arm jurisdiction within this state. See MacMillan-Bloedel, Ltd. v. Canada, 391 So.2d 749 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (§ 48.181); see also Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So.2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA) (§ 48.193), review denied, 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988); McLean Financial Corp. v. Winslow Loudermilk Corp., 509 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (§ 48.193)....

...[3] Aside from Cam Air's activities within Florida, the only other action singled out by plaintiff is that IASCO handled the accounting and payroll functions for Cam Air at IASCO's California facility. Those activities do not rise to the level necessary to satisfy section 48.193....

...ies carried out by the Florida subsidiaries within the state. [10] Florida's Long-Arm Statute Plaintiff alleges this Court has personal jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to three different provisions of Florida's long-arm statute, as follows: i. § 48.193(1)(a) Plaintiff argues that defendants come within the purview of § 48.193(1)(a), which gives the Court jurisdiction over a party who either directly or through an agent operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in Florida, or has an office or agency within the state....

...Humphreys to view rooms and make her reservations on-line. The websites were not created or maintained by either defendant directly, but rather were created and maintained for them by other entities. Hence, there must be connexity between the on-line reservation and the cause of action. ii. § 48.193(2) Plaintiff also argues that defendants come within the purview of § 48.193(2), which give the Court jurisdiction over a party who is engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity" within Florida. There is no connexity requirement under this subsection, and "general" personal jurisdiction attaches regardless of whether or not the cause of action "arises from" the activity within the state. § 48.193(2), Fla....

...Lauderdale, Florida. And it is undisputed that all of this has been going on in Florida for several years. Thus, under the facts of this case, the Court finds that Sun Hotels is engaged in "substantial and not isolated" activity in Florida within the meaning of § 48.193(2)....

...ight not qualify under this subsection. Because the parties have not briefed these issues nor developed the factual record on these points, and because the Court has determined that both defendants' are subject to general personal jurisdiction under 48.193(2), the Court need not, and therefore does not, reach plaintiff's alternative theory under 48.181(3)....

...Lacy brings this interlocutory appeal from an order denying his motion to abate, which asserted lack of personal jurisdiction over him. He argues that the court's assumption of jurisdiction, pursuant to the applicable provision of Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(g), [1] is erroneous because (1) he did not breach his contract by failing to perform acts in Florida required of him by his contract, or (2) alternatively, Section 48.193(1)(g) is unconstitutional in its application to the circumstances in this case due to the fact that appellant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements, as evidenced by Lacy's unrefuted affidavit in support of his motion....

...The provisions of Section 48.181 apply to nonresident persons who "carry on a business or business venture in this state." Those words were interpreted by Elmex and Lyster as requiring a continuous, systematic activity with the forum by the out-of-state business enterprise. The statutory language of Section 48.193, however, is much broader in scope than that of Section 48.181. Service upon a nonresident defendant can be made under Section 48.193 for a number of reasons; the operating or conducting of a "business or business venture in this state" is only one of several activities delineated by that statute. Lacy's reliance upon Hyco is, however, far more supportive of his position. The Third District's opinion in Hyco — unlike those in Elmex and Lyster — addressed the constitutionality of Section 48.193 as applied to the facts before it, and determined that a hoist manufactured by the defendant in Ohio, and later placed onto a trailer in Pennsylvania by a different corporation, which in turn sold the trailer to a company located in Fl...

...[6] The allegations in the complaint before us — unlike those in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. or Ford Motor Co. — ground the forum's jurisdiction on that provision of the statute relating to a breach of "contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state ...", Section 48.193(1)(g), and not upon the statute's provisions pertaining to products liability, as provided under Section 48.193(1)(f)2....

...r state. Consequently, his conduct in connection with the forum is such that he should reasonably anticipate being brought into Florida to defend any alleged breach of the contract. Finally, we consider that the legislature, through its enactment of Section 48.193, has expressed an important policy consideration that Florida residents, whose contracts are to be performed in this state, shall be protected here from any potential breach of their contracts by out-of-state persons. AFFIRMED. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J. and McCORD, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...y, or that the statements, if made, would establish the tort of defamation. Making a defamatory statement to a listener in Florida, even via telephone, constitutes the commission of a tort in Florida within the meaning of Florida's long-arm statute. § 48.193(1)(b) Fla....

...We find that Zitlin's three year involvement with Achievers, as well as her subsequent involvement with Nutri Herb Inc., establishes that Zitlin had "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with Florida sufficient to fall within the ambit of section 48.193(2)....

...the defendants. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Florida court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs established jurisdiction pursuant to sections 48.193(1)(f)1. and 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, and that because the defendants have minimum contacts with the state of Florida, all due process requirements had been satisfied....

...Two inquiries must be made when deciding whether a Florida court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident: First, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of one of the various jurisdictional criteria contained in Florida's long-arm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...5th DCA 2002) (citations omitted); see Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co. Ltd., 752 So.2d 582 (Fla.2000); Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989). Resolution of the first issue requires statutory analysis of Florida's long-arm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes, which bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts....

...In order to satisfy the first inquiry, it is permissible to plead the pertinent language of the statute in the complaint without specifically pleading the facts that support the statutory allegations. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(h); Shainwald; see also Harris v. Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.C., 831 So.2d 706 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 48.193 provides two categories of personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction, conferred under section 48.193(1), and general jurisdiction, conferred under section 48.193(2)....

...ss Clause. This analysis imposes a more restrictive requirement than the statutory analysis. Execu-Tech. In Shainwald, this court discussed the procedure the parties must follow to properly raise and litigate the issue of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193: A defendant from a foreign jurisdiction may contest jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss....

...Because the plaintiffs allege that the Florida court has both specific and general jurisdiction, each category will be discussed. Statutory Analysis: Resolution of the First Inquiry Specific Jurisdiction The plaintiffs in the instant case allege specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)1., which provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is...

...We conclude that the plaintiffs' complaint contains sufficient allegations relating to specific jurisdiction to bring the action within the ambit of the statute. General Jurisdiction General jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is conferred on Florida courts pursuant to section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Unlike the provisions of section 48.193(1), section 48.193(2) does not require a nexus between the cause of action and the defendants' contacts with the state....

...As to general jurisdiction, the due process requirement of minimum contacts is determined by application of the continuous and systematic contacts standard enunciated by the Court in Helicopteros. See Dean v. Johns, 789 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Woods. As we have previously indicated, section 48.193(2), which governs general jurisdiction, incorporates this high standard and, therefore, sufficient minimum contacts exist if we find that the requirements of the statute are met....

...incident in the instant case immediately after purchase; 3) the aerial transport of Florida residents into, out of, and within the state; and 4) the refueling, maintenance, and repair of their planes in Florida. We conclude that the requirements of section 48.193(2) have been met so that the Florida court has general jurisdiction over the defendants. Conclusion The complaint filed by the plaintiffs alleges sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193 and sufficient minimum contacts have been established to satisfy the requirements of due process....

...Co. WALDEN, Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal by plaintiff-appellant, whose complaint against the non-resident McDowell Manufacturing Co., defendant-appellee, was dismissed on grounds the court had no jurisdiction under F.S. 48.181 (1973) and F.S. 48.193 (1973) We reverse....

...ible personal property, through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors to any person, firm or corporation in this state shall be conclusively presumed to be operating, conducting, engaging in or carrying on a business venture in this state." "48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person a...

...to the ultimate purchaser. We find the requirements of F.S. 48.181(3), supra, were fully met for jurisdiction to attach. Defendant argued further that any alleged contract between it and plaintiff could not support a finding of jurisdiction under F.S. 48.193(1)(a) and (g), supra, on the ground there was no consideration for such a contract....

...he ground there was no consideration, the trial court dismissed on the ground of no jurisdiction. Defendant has indicated that at least something occurred upon which appellant might attempt a claim in contract. We hold the occurrence applies under F.S. 48.193(1)(g) to give the trial court jurisdiction over the defendant to consider, among other items of the complaint, the validity of the claimed contract. We make no decision upon the validity of the contract; that consideration remains the sole prerogative of the trial court at this stage of the proceeding. We hold that F.S. 48.181 and 48.193 (1973) apply to render appellee subject to jurisdiction....

...Gappa and Rackstraw's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Gappa and Rackstraw argue that the Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over them because they are not Florida citizens as alleged by Holder and because Holder cannot use the Florida Long Arm Statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193, as a basis for personal jurisdiction because he did not allege § 48.193 as a basis for personal jurisdiction in his pleading....

...ged joint venture project in Miami Beach, Florida. In order to obtain jurisdiction over the foreign defendants, the plaintiff stated: 5. DEFENDANT GICSA and DEFENDANT CABABIE are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 48.193 by virtue of doing the following acts: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business venture in the state or having an office or agency in this state; (b) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform act...

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d at 503; Washington Capital Corp. v. Milandco, Ltd., Inc., 695 So.2d at 841; AG Rotors, Inc... v. Haverfield Corp., 585 So.2d at 430. Here, the plaintiff properly pleaded the basis for jurisdiction by quoting subsections (1)(a), (1)(g), and (2) of the long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...GICSA's position is that since the joint venture's proposal was not accepted by the City of Miami Beach, it follows that there was never any joint venture and thus, for purposes of Florida's long-arm statute, no "business venture in this state...." § 48.193(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...We determine that the long-arm statute has not been complied with and, thus, it is unnecessary for us to reach the second issue. The appellant asserts that long-arm jurisdiction may be asserted under either of two statutory long-arm provisions, sections 48.193(2) and 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1991). Section 48.193(2) provides, A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...In a remarkably similar case involving a seaman's personal injury accident occurring at sea, the Third District Court of Appeal held that sporadic visits to Florida by the defendant's vessels did not constitute the "continued and systematic activity necessary to sustain a claim of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes." Spanier, supra at 83....

...ded to invitations to bid which it had not solicited. Absent a continued and sustained effort to procure business, or actual procurement of business, these activities are insufficient to constitute substantial activities within the state of Florida. Section 48.193(1)(f) is the other statutory provision relied on by the appellant to assert that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellee....

...financing statements against every trade style, affiliate or other name used by its clients for billing purposes. The trial court denied Milberg's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellee asserts that jurisdiction lies over Milberg under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (2) of Florida's long-arm statute. [1] In order to invoke long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under section 48.193(1)(a), the "activities of [the] corporation ......

...ot be subject to suit in every location where those debtors decide to relocate. Given these facts, we conclude that Milberg's isolated acts were not sufficient to invoke the long-arm jurisdiction of this state. Because there is no jurisdiction under section 48.193, we do not address the issue of whether Milberg had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida....

...ompliance with both Florida's long-arm statute and constitutional due process test of minimum contacts). Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Milberg's motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] Section 48.193 provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural perso...

...he wife's attorney, the husband contends that the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction. We agree and reverse. The wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage [1] and had the husband served *383 with process in North Dakota under sections 48.193 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1981), Florida's Long Arm Statute. Section 48.193 says in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural perso...

...The complaint did not allege that the parties had maintained a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of the action or that the defendant had resided in this state preceding the commencement of this action, nor did it contain any allegation that would bring it within the ambit of section 48.193....

...A default was entered against him following which the court entered the judgment appealed from. The petition for dissolution contains no allegation to show that service of process under the long arm statute is appropriate here. Failure to adequately allege in the complaint a basis for long arm jurisdiction under 48.193 voids any service of process made pursuant to section 48.194, with the result that there was no in personam jurisdiction over the respondent husband....

...State, 454 So.2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA, 1984) but they are occasionally cited, nevertheless. We reject the view expressed in the special concurring opinion to the effect that service of process to dissolve a marriage cannot be obtained under the long arm statute. Section 48.193(1)(e) of Florida's long-arm statute provides in part that a person submits himself (herself) to the jurisdiction of the court for any cause of action arising from the doing of certain enumerated acts, among which is the maintenance of...

...marital domicile in this state, as does the claim for alimony, child support, or division of property on which it depends. The claim for attorney's fees, where properly allowable, also arises out of that relationship when the marriage is dissolved. Section 48.193 permits personal service of process upon absent spouses "[w]ith respect to proceedings for alimony, child support or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage ..." under certain specified conditions....

...Clearly then, the legislature has said that where personal service (albeit under the long-arm statute) is available, that service shall be used for both the dissolution action and the money demands. In Palmer v. Palmer, 353 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) the court noted that prior to the enactment of section 48.193(1)(e) and (2), and 48.194, a plaintiff had to obtain personal service of process upon a defendant by serving the defendant personally in Florida....

...By this service plaintiff achieved in personam jurisdiction. Where personal service was impossible the only alternative open to plaintiff was to obtain service of process by publication. This type of service resulted in only in rem jurisdiction. The Palmer court recognized that with the enactment of § 48.193 a plaintiff in a dissolution of marriage action now has three methods by which he or she may serve a spouse: in-state personal service, long-arm personal service and constructive service, depending on "the alternative available and the option of the plaintiff." Id....

...achieved. It is clear that in-state personal service (a single process) will subject a properly served defendant to the jurisdiction of the court for purposes of dissolving the marriage as well as for the appropriate money demands and child custody. Section 48.193(2) makes no distinction between in-state personal service and out-of-state personal service, but rather treats them the same way, viz: (2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this stat...

...McGee, 156 Fla. 346, 22 So.2d 788 (1945); Huguenor v. Huguenor, 420 So.2d 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Mayo v. Mayo, 344 So.2d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). In Schroeder v. Schroeder, 430 So.2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the court suggested that personal service under section 48.193(1)(e) was appropriate in suits for alimony where such proceedings are also seeking a decree of dissolution....

...ry framework for all forms of service is to employ the method which is best calculated to apprise the defendant of the pendency of the litigation, there is neither a statutory nor a due process reason to not approve the use of long-arm service under § 48.193 for the dissolution itself, at least in cases where alimony, child support or division of property is sought in connection with the dissolution....

...utional requirements pertaining to due process of law. [11] When applicable, and properly perfected, jurisdiction acquired under a long-arm statute can support a money or other in personam judgment. The general Florida long arm statutes are sections 48.193 and 48.194, Florida Statutes. [12] In relevant part section 48.193 provides as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person,...

...However, it recites that the child Raymond had resided with the husband in North Dakota since July or August, 1981, and serves to illustrate the insufficiency of the wife's compliance with essential requirements of the UCCJA. (2) AS TO CHILD SUPPORT: The minimum contacts or acts which section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires for use of the long-arm statute in those domestic relations matters to which it applies, which includes child support, [16] are that (1) the defendant "maintain a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action" or that (2) "the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not." The language in section 48.193(3), Florida Statutes, qualifies and restricts "the acts or omissions" enumerated in section 48.193(1)(e) [and in the other subheadings under section 48.193(1)] so that "only causes of action arising from" such acts or omissions (minimum contacts) occurring in Florida may be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction is based on the long-arm statute....

...and their nexus to the cause of actions covered by the long-arm statute; the general long arm statute (§ 48.191(1)(e)) does not apply to causes of action to dissolve a marriage or claims for attorney's fees. [18] The general *391 long arm statute (§ 48.193(1)(e)) applies only to independent actions for support of dependents (§ 61.09, Fla....

...Accordingly, jurisdiction over the dissolution cause of action itself can only be obtained either by personal service of process under section 48.031, Florida Statutes, or by service of process by publication under section 49.011(4), Florida Statutes, but not under section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes....

...Because of inherent limitations in the concept of state territorial jurisdiction service of process of a state court made in a foreign state by a foreign sheriff does not and cannot have the same effect as the perfection of jurisdiction of a Florida court by personal service of process in Florida by a Florida sheriff. Section 48.193(1) enumerates certain causes of action and correlates them with certain acts (minimum contacts) with which the legislature perceives the causes of action have the nexus required by constitutional due process concepts....

...ell, A & S Trucking, Dewline and Ranger Nationwide. Personal service was effected against Ranger Nationwide through its designated agent for that purpose in Florida. As to Genkerell, A & S Trucking and Dewline, the plaintiffs perfected service under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides that: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdicti...

...Hence, the orders as to Ranger Nationwide are affirmed. [2] *1089 We reach a different conclusion as to Genkerell, A & S Trucking and Dewline. While, as we pointed out in American Motors Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474 So.2d 271 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the new version of section 48.193(2) enacted in 1985 explicitly no longer requires "connexity" between Florida activity and the cause of action, an element noticeably absent in this case, both the statute and the Constitution, see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A....

...These contacts fall far short of the "continuous and systematic" activity, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), which, in common with cases interpreting a Wisconsin statute virtually identical to section 48.193(2), we hold is required to satisfy the "substantial and not isolated" test....

...Marcus of Law Offices of Gerald Beyer, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. DOWNEY, Judge. Appellee filed an amended complaint against appellants seeking damages for fraud, breach of contract and for violation of the Florida Securities Law. Appellants' motion to quash service of process obtained via Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1975), and their motion to dismiss were denied and this interlocutory appeal ensued....

...uture Contracts. Attached to said affidavit was a list of said contracts, the dates and amounts thereof. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellants' motion to quash service, holding that the evidence presented showed jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975). We think the trial court erred in finding jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(g) based upon the proof adduced....

...Comparing the proof with Section (1)(g) of the statute, we find proof of a breach of contract, but not a breach of a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Thus, if jurisdiction were based solely upon 48.193(1)(g), we would reverse the order under consideration. However, the trial court's finding that jurisdiction attaches by virtue of Section 48.193(1)(a), is supported by the proof....

...ustify the use of this method of service of process. [2] However, we believe the language used by the Supreme Court of Florida in Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975), authorizes the finding of jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in the case at hand. [3] Paraphrasing the pertinent part of Section 48.193(1)(a), it provides that any person, whether a resident or non-resident, who engages in a business venture in this State thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state....

...Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...LVENT INSURER DOING BUSINESS IN FLORIDA MAY BE SHIFTED TO GEORGIA INSURERS INSOLVENCY POOL SO AS TO SATISFY THE MINIMUM CONTACTS REQUIREMENT OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND VEST JURISDICTION BY THE FLORIDA COURTS OVER THE GEORGIA INSOLVENCY POOL UNDER SECTION 48.193, FLORIDA STATUTES? We answer the certified question in the negative and disapprove the opinion of the district court....

...a nonresident that will give rise to personal jurisdiction. [4] There is no question that Allied, which was authorized to do business in Florida and was "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture," id. at subsection 48.193(1)(a), in Florida, satisfies both section 48.193 and the due process requirements needed to subject Allied to the personal jurisdiction of this state....

...tion." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579-80, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980). This is not a situation where Allied acted as an agent of GIIP, thus clearly satisfying section 48.193....

...nefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239-40. GIIP did not transact business, maintain offices, supply goods, commit torts, own real property, or do anything of the kind in this state. Thus, subsections 48.193(1)(a) through (c) of the long-arm statute clearly are not met. In addition, GIIP did not enter into a contract to insure a person in this state. § 48.193(1)(d)....

...GIIP's statutory obligations to cover its member insolvent insurers' contractual obligations cannot be deemed as contractual in nature, thus amounting to "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the *1268 contract to be performed in this state." § 48.193(1)(g); see South Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Underwood, 527 So.2d 931 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (Cowart, J., concurring). Moreover, GIIP's activities clearly are not so substantial or continuous to give rise to general jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(2). Therefore, GIIP's activities do not fall within the purview of Florida's long-arm statute. Even if the requirements of section 48.193 were satisfied, the minimum contacts requirements of due process are not met in this case....

...FIGA appealed and the district court held that, under a wrongful death action, multiple survivors have only a single claim under section 631.57, Florida Statutes (1991). Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Bentley, 583 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 593 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1991). [4] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and,...

...nth Amendment.” Id. at 1521 , quoting Washington v. Norton Manufacturing, Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 , 99 S.Ct. 2886 , 61 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979). Accordingly, we look first to the Florida long-arm statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193, for guidance. Cronin alleged that jurisdiction over the contract claim was proper under § 48.193(l)(g)....

..., and that Cronin had relied upon Car-gill. R. 12 at 41-43. After a careful review of the record, including the pretrial order, the instructions as a whole, and the argument of counsel, we conclude that the theory was fairly presented to the jury. . Section 48.193(l)(g) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his perso...

...Florida's Long Arm Statute As mentioned above, a district court must engage in a two-part analysis in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Jurisdiction must exist under Florida's long arm statute (Fla.Stat. § 48.193) and under Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis....

...the defendants carried on a business in Florida; (2) the defendants committed a tort in Florida; and (3) the defendants committed an act outside of Florida that caused injury to a Florida resident. MeterLogic derives these arguments from Fla. Stat. § 48.193, Florida's long arm statute....

...e corporate parents under these provisions. 1. Carrying on a Business in Florida It is clear from the affidavits submitted by the corporate parents that KCPL, KLT, and KLT, Inc. have never had an office or agency in Florida as required by Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), and MeterLogic does not show otherwise. See Latz Affidavit at ¶¶ 5-7; Orman Affidavit at ¶¶ 6-12; Wasson Affidavit at ¶¶ 6-12. As a result, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) authorizes jurisdiction over KCPL, KLT, and KLT, Inc....

...KLT's and KLT, Inc.'s affidavits in support of their motions make similar statements. See Orman Affidavit at ¶¶ 6, 7; Wasson Affidavit at ¶¶ 6, 7. If the corporate parents have never carried on a business venture in Florida directly, then MeterLogic can establish jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) only if the corporate parents could be held responsible for their subsidiaries' (CS and TS) activities in Florida....

...Alternatively, the plaintiff can show that it is proper for the court to pierce the corporate veil. As discussed below, MeterLogic has established neither an agency nor a piercing scenario. As such, it cannot establish jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). 2. Committing a Tort in Florida MeterLogic also argues that Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b) provides the court with personal jurisdiction over the corporate parents....

...epresentation, and promissory estoppel. The court has reviewed the relevant pleadings and affidavits and has found no facts in the record from which it can conclude that KCPL, KTL, or KTL, Inc. engaged in any of these torts directly. Like Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) (the "carrying on a business prong" of Florida's long arm statute), whether MeterLogic can establish personal jurisdiction under the "tortious activity" subsection depends on whether it can establish an agency relationship between the...

...As such, MeterLogic has failed to establish that an agency relationship existed between CS and TS and KCPL, KLT, and KLT, Inc., and it cannot avail itself of the doctrine of apparent authority to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction by the court pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) or (b)....

...Sawyer Industries, Inc., 84 So.2d 21, 24 (1955). Because MeterLogic has failed to allege or establish by affidavit or otherwise that CS and TS are the alter egos of KCPL, KLT, or KLT, Inc., the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over KCPL, KLT, or KLT, Inc. under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) or (b)....

...name was listed as customer on utility bill, parent paid for joint venture's expenses, and parent was guarantor of joint venture on a bank loan). Accordingly, the court has no personal jurisdiction over KCPL, *1359 KLT, or KLT, Inc. under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) or (b). 3. Causing Injury in Florida As a final basis for jurisdiction, MeterLogic contends that Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f) authorizes the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate parents because MeterLogic's injuries occurred in Florida. MeterLogic's argument fails because Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f) does not confer jurisdiction when the plaintiff's injuries are merely economic, as they are in this case. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 629 (11th Cir.1996); Musiker v. Projectavision, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 292, 297 (S.D.Fla. 1997) (finding no basis for personal jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f) where plaintiff alleged only economic injury). Under this provision, a plaintiff must claim personal injury or property damage in its complaint. Because MeterLogic has failed to make such an allegation, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f) confers no basis for personal jurisdiction over KCPL, KLT, or KLT, Inc....

...ents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state. ß 48.181, Fla. Stat. (2003); Pelycado Onroerend Goed B.V. v. Ruthenberg, 635 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). It should be recognized that Labbee did not proceed under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2003), which not only subjects nonresidents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts when the nonresidents engage in the foregoing business activity, but also applies to nonresidents who engage in tortious acts in Florida. ß 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). Furthermore, sections 48.193 and 48.181 "provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents." A.B.L. Realty Corp. v. Cohl, 384 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). While section 48.181 permits service to be effected on the Secretary of State, section 48.193 contemplates personal service....

...It also alleged that Canale and Jacana had subjected themselves to Florida long-arm jurisdiction by: (1) carrying on a business in Florida, (2) committing torts in Florida, (3) breaching a contract in Florida, and (4) engaging in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(g), (2), Fla....

...If so, the court must then examine whether the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with Florida in order to satisfy due process requirements. Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584. The Florida long-arm statute provides for two types of personal jurisdiction: general, § 48.193(2), and specific, § 48.193(1)....

...7 (11th Cir.1990). Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires a causal connection between the defendant's activities in Florida and the plaintiff's cause of action, a requirement known as "connexity." Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. General jurisdiction: § 48.193(2) As a preliminary matter, we note that the plaintiffs' allegation of general jurisdiction seems superfluous in this case....

...otion to dismiss. The complaint tracked the language of the statute and alleged: "Defendants Canale and Jacana are subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida for having engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the State pursuant to F.S. 48.193(2)." This bare assertion was sufficient to meet the plaintiffs' initial burden of pleading jurisdiction....

...2d DCA 1995) (discussing what activities in the state might support general jurisdiction). For these reasons, the circuit court's holding that the defendants were subject to its general personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute was incorrect. Specific Jurisdiction A. Conducting a Business in Florida, § 48.193(1)(a) The plaintiffs' complaint asserted that Canale and Jacana breached two contracts—an initial confidentiality agreement entered into at the outset of the parties' relationship, and an Independent Contractor Agreement executed after negotiation....

...early everything else in their relationship. The verified amended complaint alleged facts that might support specific jurisdiction in Florida based on "operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state." § 48.193(1)(a)....

...imile and email communication with Florida." The first problem with this ruling is that the authority cited by the court for this proposition, Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, dealt with long-arm jurisdiction based on committing a tort in Florida, § 48.193(1)(b), not jurisdiction based on doing business in Florida. The holding in Wendt was specific to tort-based causes of action: First, in order to "commit a tortious act" in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, "committing a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. Id. at 1260. We do not make a blanket suggestion that the reasoning in Wendt could never be used to analyze whether section 48.193(1)(a) confers jurisdiction on the basis of a defendant doing business in Florida. But cf. Carlyle v. Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., 842 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (noting that the statutory basis conferring jurisdiction over the defendant would have to be under section 48.193(1)(b), and stating that "[b]y the trial *469 court's announced reliance on Wendt, it apparently came to the same conclusion")....

...ue of communications originating in another state, the Wendt court emphasized that jurisdiction in a particular case turns on the nature of the communications themselves. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. The reason is the connexity requirement set forth in section 48.193(1), which provides for long-arm jurisdiction for any cause of action "arising from the doing of any of the following acts." Thus, the Wendt court held, the tort cause of action at issue there had to arise from the communications on which the plaintiff was attempting to predicate long-arm jurisdiction....

...That being the case, the court was obliged to hold a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve the fact disputes. See Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 503; Bellairs v. Mohrmann, 716 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). We reverse the portion of the order finding jurisdiction over Canale and Jacana under section 48.193(1)(a), and we remand for an evidentiary hearing....

...the alleged communications. If it so finds, it must then determine whether the defendants had "minimum contacts" with Florida sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. See Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584. B. Committing a Tortious Act in Florida, § 48.193(1)(b)....

...ed in the civil conspiracy. None of the conspiracy allegations against Jacana established how this alleged tort was committed in Florida. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the order that found Jacana subject to jurisdiction in Florida pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...But the circuit court's order did not reflect that it had analyzed whether this action constituted sufficient "minimum contacts" necessary to satisfy due process. See Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the order finding that jurisdiction over Canale was proper under section 48.193(1)(b) and remand this issue for further proceedings....

...defendants), challenge the trial court's non-final order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse because appellee, Milandco (plaintiff), did not meet its burden of establishing long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The plaintiff may allege the basis for service either by utilizing the language of the statute without pleading supporting facts, see Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.070(i); Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502, or by alleging specific facts demonstrating that the defendant's actions fit within one or more of the subsections of section 48.193, Florida's long-arm statute....

...4th DCA 1991). WCC and Wolgin argue that neither step of the Venetian Salami inquiry has been satisfied in this case. They assert that plaintiff has neither met its burden of proving that defendants are subject to this state's long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 nor demonstrated that subjecting defendants to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction would comport with due process requirements. We first examine the statutory bases that plaintiff claims subject WCC and Wolgin to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction. As to defendant WCC, plaintiff relies on subsection 48.193(1)(g), which provides in pertinent part that a defendant is subject to long-arm jurisdiction if defendant breaches "a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...(1995) (emphasis supplied.) It is not enough that a foreign defendant merely contract with a Florida resident. See McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540, 543 (Fla.1987); SDM Corp. v. Kevco Fin. Corp., 540 So.2d 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In order to establish long-arm jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1)(g), a plaintiff must establish that the "defendant failed to perform an act or acts whose performance was to be in Florida and that such breach formed the basis for the cause of action for which relief is sought by the plaintiff." Cosmopolitan Health Spa, Inc....

...in Florida to a woman hospitalized in Florida. The eleventh circuit found that because the failure to provide insurance coverage would *842 have been a breach of the defendant's obligation to perform acts in Florida, the statutory requirements of subsection 48.193(1)(g) were satisfied. [2] In Unger, allegations of the breach of an agreement to make payment in Florida were sufficient to comport with the statutory requirements of subsection 48.193(1)(g). 513 So.2d at 676. [3] In Harris v. Caribank, 536 So.2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), the fact that payment on a guaranty agreement was to be to a Florida bank was sufficient to support long-arm jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1)(g)....

...Other contacts that WCC and Wolgin may have had with Florida, such as inspecting the property, while relevant to due process considerations under the second Venetian Salami step, do not establish the essential jurisdictional facts required for compliance with subsection 48.193(1)(g). Plaintiff's failure to establish compliance with subsection 48.193(1)(g), the subsection upon which it relied as to WCC, required the granting of the motion to dismiss as to WCC. See Venetian Salami; Unc Ardco, 685 So.2d at 30; cf. Tallmadge v. Mortgage Fin. Group, Inc., 625 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). As to Wolgin, plaintiff argues that Wolgin was subject to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to subsection 48.193(1)(f)1. Subsection 48.193(1)(f)1 states in pertinent part that a defendant causing injury to persons or property within Florida may be subject to long-arm jurisdiction if, at the time of the injury, the defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state....

...ach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the burden never shifted to Wolgin to controvert the allegations. Nevertheless, Wolgin, in his affidavit, specifically denied engaging in solicitation activities within this state, a prerequisite for the invocation of subsection 48.193(1)(f)1. Plaintiff never controverted that assertion. *843 Further, plaintiff's reliance on subsection 48.193(1)(f) is misplaced. Our supreme court has held that subsection 48.193(1)(f) contemplates personal injury or physical damages and does not apply to economic damages within the state....

...e time or prior to hearing the motion to quash. Certainly, for appellate purposes, it would have been far more efficient to address all jurisdictional issues at the same time rather than seriatim. [2] These facts would also presumably fall within subsection 48.193(1)(d) as "contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting." § 48.193(1)(d), Fla....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 503 (Fla.1989); SDM Corp. v. Kevco Fin. Corp.; 540 So.2d 931, 932 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). More is required. See Harris v. Caribank, 536 So.2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). [4] Plaintiff is not arguing that Wolgin committed a tortious act within this state; thus, subsection 48.193(1)(g) is not applicable.

...The flight attendants, now certified as a class, sued numerous defendants (TMA included) for strict liability, implied warranty, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation and conspiracy to misrepresent and to commit fraud. [2] In the instant case, the flight attendants relied on sections 48.181(3) and 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) as the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over TMA....

...Section 48.181(3) deems a person, firm or corporation *941 to be engaged in substantial activities and conducting business in this state if tangible or intangible personal property is sold, consigned or leased through brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors. Section 48.193(1)(b) authorizes the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction for the commission of a tortious act within the state....

...ong-arm jurisdiction over TMA pursuant to section 48.181(3). Similarly, the failure to bring forth any sworn proof of the commission of a tortious act by TMA in the state of Florida defeated the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over TMA pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...The Association will respond to unsolicited requests for information or publications from Florida residents, although such requests have been few in number. Having seven members of a non-profit trade association within Florida does not rise to the level of doing business in Florida for purposes of sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). In order to determine whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the Court must first determine whether there is a basis for jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...* * * * * * (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat. § 48.193....

...v. L-J, Inc., 898 F.Supp. 894, 900 (S.D.Fla. 1995). Where a defendant conducts isolated, insubstantial business in Florida, the plaintiff *1228 must show that its cause of action arises from the defendant's business activity in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a),(2)....

...In-State Effects of Tort (Trademark Infringement) Committed Out of State The various lower Florida courts are deeply divided on the issue of whether a tortious act committed outside the state resulting in injury inside the state subjects the actor to jurisdiction in Florida under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b). Posner, 178 F.3d at 1216. In the absence of a clear precedent of the Florida Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will apply the broader construction of § 48.193....

...APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS California Nida's contacts with Florida are more than sufficient to satisfy both the Florida Long-Arm Statute and the Due Process Clause. The Court addresses these in turn. A. The Florida Long-Arm Statute Florida Nida has met its burden of demonstrating long-arm jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...f fair play and substantial justice" under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990). Florida Statute Section 48.193 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural perso...

...urts of different states. 2 Both husband and wife had contacts with the states of Florida and New Jersey. On February 25, 1994 the husband sued for divorce in state court in Florida. On March 14 the wife was served with process under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 , which provides that, for persons maintaining a matrimonial domicile in the state, Florida has personal jurisdiction with respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage....

...court. It determined the place of jurisdiction as New Jersey. 30 The husband contends that the Florida judgment controls because it was first in time and that the Florida court had in personam jurisdiction over the wife, pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (1)(e)....

...The circuit court denied the motions and, on appeal, this court reversed, holding: Having elected to so proceed [under section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1981)], the plaintiffs were required to plead and prove, which they failed to do, that the cause of action alleged arose from the doing of any of the acts set forth in Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Following the release of our mandate and prior to any further action by the trial court, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on May 29, 1984, in order to take advantage of amendments to chapter 48, Florida Statutes (1983). Significant to this case is an addition to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), [1] which provides: *273 (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla....

...[4] The plaintiffs' actions do not arise out of AMC's and Jeep's activities in Florida — the accident occurred in the Cayman Islands and the Jeep CJ-5 was neither manufactured nor sold in Florida. Prior to the 1984 amendments, both sections 48.181 and 48.193 required that there be a "connexity" between the cause of action and the defendant corporation's activities in Florida....

...Aetna Insurance Co., 372 So.2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). No such "connexity" exists in the present case. With respect to a defendant "engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state," the 1984 amendments eliminated the requirement of section 48.193 that the cause of action have some connection to the defendant's activities in Florida. See Ch. 84-2, § 3, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 48.193(2); Fla....

...(1965) (predecessor to § 48.181)). Courts have held that section 48.181 (titled " Service on nonresident engaging in business in state" (emphasis supplied)) provides a basis for establishing personal jurisdiction over non-residents independent from the bases provided by section 48.193 (which is titled "Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state" (emphasis supplied))....

...John Deere Co., 264 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1972), the supreme court stated, in answer to a question certified from the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 451 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1971), that section 48.182, Florida Statutes (1970) (predecessor to sections 48.193 and 48.194), "operates to create a new remedy ......

...The issue on this appeal is whether a guarantee of a contractual obligation requiring payment to be made to a creditor in Florida constitutes sufficient contact with Florida to permit this state to exercise jurisdiction over the guarantor under Florida's long arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Rubaii asserted his claim for brokerage services in connection with the Iraq contract. Dr. Rubaii then brought suit in Florida to invoke Lakewood Pipe's guarantee of Federal Supply's brokerage obligations. He obtained service of process against Lakewood Pipe in Texas under the Florida long arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Rubaii was executed in Florida, that any sums due him were payable here in Florida where he resided. The court further concluded that since Lakewood Pipe, as assignee, stood in the shoes of Federal Supply, it was obligated to make payment in Florida, and that this constituted sufficient contact to bring Lakewood Pipe within Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...tion over Lakewood. Thus, we reverse the trial court's order denying Lakewood Pipe's motion to quash service of process, remand, and direct the court to determine if Lakewood had other contacts which would enable Florida to assert jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)....

...Rubaii will have the burden of establishing jurisdiction "by affidavit or other proof and not just by reiteration of the complaint." Dublin Co. v. Penninsular Supply Co., 309 So.2d 207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). GRIMES, C.J., and SHAFER, ROBERT T., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Delcher served Madax under Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1977), which states: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if...

...New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000) (quoting Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 499). The statutory prong of Venetian Salami "is governed by Florida's long-arm statute and bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts." Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584; § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...ts. "Commission of a tort for the purpose of establishing long-arm jurisdiction does not require physical entry into the state, rather `telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) if the alleged cause of action arises from the communications.'" Fletcher Jones West Shara, Ltd....

...Rotta, 919 So.2d 685, 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260). "The plaintiff need only show that the defendant's contact with the State resulted in . . . a tortious act." Gerber Trade Fin., Inc. v. Bayou Dock Seafood Co., 917 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); see § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...e been met. Therefore, Florida also has long-arm jurisdiction over the Machtinger defendants because O'Donnell's fraudulent misrepresentations were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Wilcox v. Stout, 637 So.2d at 335. Affirmed. [2] NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005), provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he...

...Heineken, the former husband, appeals a non-final order denying his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction. Rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i), Fla.R.App.P. Because we conclude that the former husband is not subject to the jurisdiction of Florida courts under the Florida longarm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1995), we reverse....

...The trial court also noted that the parties considered Florida their legal residence until 1992. While no statutory basis for asserting personal jurisdiction is stated in the order on appeal, the former wife argues that jurisdiction exists under either of two sections of the Florida long-arm statute, sections 48.193(1)(e) and 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1995). We cannot agree. Jurisdiction under Long-Arm Statute Section 48.193(1)(e) provides that, with respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support or division of property in a dissolution action or with respect to "an independent action for support of defendants," jurisdiction is established by the defen...

...e instant action. In Garrett, the parties were married in Florida in 1974, had a daughter in Florida in 1978, moved to Texas in 1986, and lived there together until their separation in 1991. Id. at 992. In rejecting the wife's contention that, under section 48.193(1)(e), the Florida trial court had jurisdiction over the husband, then domiciled in Indiana, the court held that the language in section 48.193(1)(e), which reads "if the defendant resided in this case preceding the commencement of the action," cannot be interpreted "so literally as to grant jurisdiction over any parties to a dissolution proceeding where the spouses had ever resided in Florida for any length of time." Id....

...alifornia court could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident noncustodial parent who failed to pay support for child residing in California with custodial parent). The Garrett court distinguished cases which upheld jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(e) where "the matrimonial domicile had been in Florida and one spouse continued to maintain residence in Florida after the parties separated," 668 So.2d at 994, and ruled that when the parties jointly abandoned Florida as their state of residence, they lost the "protection" of this long-arm jurisdiction provision. Id. Further, section 48.193(2) cannot be a basis for establishing jurisdiction over the appellant here. This long-arm provision subjects to the jurisdiction of Florida courts a party "who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state ... whether or not the claim arises from that activity." § 48.193(2), Fla.Stat....

...rida driver's license and a Florida voter registration card until 1993. These limited past contacts, however, do not constitute "substantial and not isolated" activities within the state sufficient to subject appellant to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...Florida’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over non-residents under two circumstances. First, a non-resident submits himself to Florida’s specific jurisdiction by performing any of the acts enumerated by the long-arm statute. Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193 (l)(a)(l)-(9)....

...Second, a nonresident submits himself to Florida’s general jurisdiction by “engaging] in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise ... whether or not the [plaintiffs] claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...be performed in Florida. (Doc. 20, ¶¶ 16(a)-(d)). Regardless of which enumerated-act through which a plaintiff asserts specific jurisdiction, the complaint must allege a cause of action “arising from” that enumerated act in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)....

...The investors assigned their right, title and interest in the Offering, the Subscription Agreement and in White Oak to Plaintiff. (Am.Compl.¶ 48, Exh. I). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over all Defendants pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b) for committing a tortious act within the State of Florida and because Defendants engage in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida....

...A determination of whether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists requires a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must consider the jurisdictional question under the Florida state long-arm statute. Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir.1996); see also Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)....

...Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Robinson, 74 F.3d at 256. 1. Florida's Long-Arm Statute Florida's long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1), Florida Statutes....

...d, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: ... (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Furthermore, the Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Id. at 891. Sierra argues that the Court has specific jurisdiction over Defendants under Florida's long-arm statute, which provides for jurisdiction against defendants who "commit[ ] a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Defendants intended for the potential investors to rely upon those passed-on representations and omissions. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 18, 67-68. Accordingly, the Amended Complaint has sufficiently alleged a tortious act committed by a telephone call into Florida as a basis for Florida long-arm jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

..."B" at ¶ 2.). It could also be argued that, by allegedly breaching the Subscription Agreements, White Oak is alleged to have breached a contract that was to be performed in Florida, providing an additional basis for long-arm jurisdiction against White Oak. See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...client attorney's fees. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the motion of April Industries to quash service and dismiss Levy's complaint for lack of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation pursuant to Sections 48.193(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After hearing, the trial court awarded the contested property to appellee Levy, and April Industries appeals. In Florida, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be obtained if it is established that (1) the defendant committed one of the acts listed in paragraphs (a) through (g) of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes and the act committed gave rise to the action sued on, and (2) the method of service of process comports with statutory requirements....

...University of Kentucky, 390 So.2d 433 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); Caribe & Panama Investments v. Christensen, 375 So.2d 601 (Fla.3d DCA 1979). [2] In his complaint to *305 enforce the New York judgment awarding attorney's fees, Levy alleges two grounds for subjecting April Industries to long-arm jurisdiction, Section 48.193(1)(a), doing business or having an agency in the state and Section 48.193(1)(b), committing a tortious act within the state. We find the facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to sustain jurisdiction on either ground and reverse without reaching the issue of sufficiency of service of process. As to the first ground for long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a), we reject Levy's argument that the presence of a corporation's personal property in Florida pursuant to an escrow agreement entered into outside of Florida, and the control of that property by a Florida escrowee according to the...

...The escrow arrangement is neither an agreement for sale of property in Florida or sale of foreign property to Florida residents for profit, nor is it evidence of continuing business ventures within the State. Accordingly, we find that April Industries is not subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a). We also find that April Industries is not subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(b), for committing a tortious act within the State....

...95 (1945), see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980); WorldWide Volkswagon v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977), and recent interpretation of Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm statute enacted Ch....

...To establish personal jurisdiction over Enic, PLC, the foreign defendant, the Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-pronged test. Procedural in nature, the first prong requires the plaintiff to initially plead sufficient factual allegations to subject the defendant to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes *890 (2002), Florida's Long Arm Statute....

...v. J.S. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989) (holding that the requisite minimum contacts are not built into the long-arm statute). If a defendant meets the high threshold of "substantial and not isolated activity within the state" as required under section 48.193(2), minimum contact is also met. Woods v. Nova Companies Belize, Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). PRONG I: FLORIDA'S LONG ARM PERSONAL JURISDICTION In order to support long arm personal jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes, (2002), the Plaintiffs "must first allege sufficient facts in the complaint in support of long arm jurisdiction." John Scott, 670 F.Supp....

...s long arm statute is inapplicable to it. Id. The burden then shifts back to the Plaintiffs to prove a basis for personal jurisdiction. Venetian, 554 So.2d at 502-503. The Plaintiffs allege in the instant case that personal jurisdiction exists under section 48.193(1)(a), (b) and (g), Florida Statutes....

...ction can be established over Enic, PLC. Personal jurisdiction exists when any person, who personally or through an agent, either carries on a business in Florida or breaches a contract by failing to perform acts required to be performed in Florida. § 48.193(1)(a), (g), Fla....

...f to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts. The order denying Enic, PLC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reversed and we remand for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. SHARP, W. and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2002), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or...

...Failure to do so requires quashal of the service of process. Defendant's second contention in its motion to dismiss was that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to justify jurisdiction under the substituted service of process statute, Section 48.181, supra, or the long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...However, we distinguish that case from the present in that a motion for continuance at least requests temporal relief and is therefore more than a "neutral and innocuous piece of paper." [3] Decisions concerning what constituted doing business under Section 48.181 should apply to Section 48.193(1)(a)....

...See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 631 (11th Cir.1996). In order for a court to exercise general jurisdiction in Florida, the contacts must be especially pervasive and substantial to satisfy section two of the Florida long-arm statute 48.193. General Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis S.A., 205 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1343 (S.D.Fla.2002); see Florida Statutes § 48.193(2)....

...1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); see Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1999); Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc., 710 So.2d 716, 720 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1998). A finding that a defendant's activities satisfy section 48.193(2)'s requirements also necessitates a finding that minimum contacts exist. See Universal *1346 Caribbean Estab. v. Bard, 543 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989). Therefore, the analysis of jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) and the Due Process clause merge....

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193. With respect to sections 48.193(1)(a) and 48.193(2), Plaintiff points to evidence that Ventura purchased $1.2 million of pornography filmed in Florida by Florida residents and that Ventura sent a business representative to Florida on one or two occasions to meet with independent contractors....

...TB regularly sent employees to Florida for an industry trade show. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence showing that any of Ventura or TB's visits to Florida relate to Plaintiff's cause of action, thus this evidence has no bearing under Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)....

...is for the plaintiff's cause of action and the defendant's business activity in the state"). Moreover, regardless of whether Ventura's purchases of pornography or TB's purchases of services from Florida entities establish personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida law is clear that the "[m]ere purchase of goods within the state of Florida by a non-resident without more [is] insufficient to satisfy the due process requirements of minimum contacts." Marsh Supermarkets, Inc....

....C. v. Loadmaster Aluminum Boat Trailers, Inc., 832 So.2d 822, 823 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002) (same); Bruzzone Roldos v. Americargo Lines, Inc., 698 So.2d 1368, 1369 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1997) (same). Likewise, given that the analysis of jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) and the Due Process clause merge, Ventura and TB's purchases from Florida entities do not, standing alone, warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction over them....

...559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (noting that for general jurisdiction the defendant's conduct must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there"). Likewise, the Court rejects Plaintiff's argument that personal jurisdiction can be asserted over Ventura and TB pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(b)....

...y not an inhabitant of the state, that state law provision may be used to bring a foreign party within the jurisdiction of the Federal court. 2 Florida law permits service of process on foreign defendants under certain circumstances. E.g., Fla.Stat. 48.193 (Supp.1990)....

...from its stock exchange and allegedly exceed $26 million. The two claims asserted are "professional negligence" and "negligent misrepresentation." The second amended complaint asserts that in personam jurisdiction against DTGP is proper pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes, because DTGP committed a tortious act within the state and because DTGP carried on business within the state....

...or was not a party to the engagement contract between Gencor ACP and DTGP. We must affirm on the issue of jurisdiction. In its second amended complaint, Gencor claims there is jurisdiction over DTGP because DTGP committed "tortious acts" in Florida. § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...The Wendt court also pointed out that the making of false telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida from outside the state will constitute "committing a tortious act" only if the alleged cause of action "arises from" the communications because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1)....

...The OSI Industries court concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether the tort was actually committed in order to determine jurisdiction and that allegations of a misrepresentation communicated from outside Florida into Florida would qualify as "committing a tortious act within this State" under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Soileau of Spielvogel & Goldman, P.A., Merritt Island, for appellee. COBB, Judge. The appellants, David R. Kane, George F. Mann and Marvin H. Adler, guarantors on a defaulted note payable in Brevard County, Florida, were personally served with process in New York, New Jersey and Illinois, respectively, pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...3d DCA 1982). The statute, by its clear and unequivocal terms, fits the instant factual situation. A guaranty is a contract and appellants breached their contracts, which were required to be performed in Florida. The real question is whether or not section 48.193(1)(g) applied to nonresident guarantors such as Kane, Mann and Adler, comports with constitutional due process under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution....

...Rather, as the Supreme Court said in World-Wide Volkswagen, "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." [2] (Emphasis in original.) Other Florida appellate courts have upheld and applied section 48.193(1)(g) in situations where an out-of-state party to a contract requiring performance within this state has breached that contract....

...2d DCA 1979). For that matter, so has this court, although that can be discerned only from the dissent. James Carroll Associates v. Video Applications, Inc., 421 So.2d 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(g) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his p...

...re of defendant to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state, provided only that the nonresident defendant has been properly served. Madax International Corporation v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., supra ; § 48.193(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1979). [1] Where jurisdiction over the party is satisfied pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(g), the court need not determine whether the defendant also operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business in the state pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statute (1979)....

...Dunham, 342 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Dublin Company v. Peninsular Supply Company, 309 So.2d 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). See also Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (jurisdiction could not be invoked under Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes because no breach of contract in this state; act as required by the contract was to be performed in another state)....

...his state for a cause of action arising from the doing of one of those acts. [3] *116 The order denying defendant's motion to abate for lack of jurisdiction over the person is Affirmed. NOTES [1] There is no challenge here to service of process. [2] 48.193....

...is state. [3] Appellants call our attention to two cases from a sister district, Lakewood Pipe of Texas, Inc. v. Rubaii, 379 So.2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) and Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), which suggest that if Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes is interpreted to subject a nonresident to jurisdiction of this state for a breach of contract in this state without a showing of other minimum contacts, the subsection might be unconstitutional, citing International Shoe Co....

...isfy constitutional requirements. See Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1981); Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.Fla. 1981); Kellan v. Holster, 518 F. Supp. 175 (M.D.Fla. 1981). Federal court review of Section 48.193(1)(g), alone, as a sole basis for jurisdiction over a nonresident has been limited, but Poston v....

...American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.Fla. 1978), seems to agree with the Second District's holding in Lakewood Pipe, supra and Osborn v. University Society, Inc. supra, that constitutional requirements are not met by relying solely on Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes. In Ford Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., 392 So.2d 1305 (Fla. 1981), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of subsection 48.193(1)(f) (doing of an act or an omission outside the state by a nonresident defendant which causes injury to a person within the state), with a specific holding that the International Shoe minimum contact test can be met even though there is no direct presence or activity of the defendant within the borders of Florida. But see strong dissent of Justice Sundberg with which Justice England concurs. Applying the rationale of Ford Motor Co., supra, subsection 48.193(1)(g) could likewise be found not offensive to traditional notions of due process and fair play....

...The propriety of long-arm jurisdiction in Florida is examined by means of a two-step analysis. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant has met at least one of the long-arm jurisdictional criteria set forth in § 48.193....

...stice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278, 283 (1940)). The burden of demonstrating the applicability of § 48.193 may initially be met by pleading facts within a jurisdictional basis contained in the statute....

...corporation, was conducting business in Florida by both its own operations and through the operations of its agents, WDWCo. and LBVC. These allegations were sufficient to state a prima facie case of jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(a). They were, however, directly and completely contradicted by the affidavit of Marsha Reed, the Company's corporate secretary. The Company's status as parent of WDWCo. and LBVC was, without more, ineffective to establish long-arm jurisdiction under § 48.193. See Qualley v. International Air Serv. Co., 595 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that the mere presence of a parent corporation's wholly-owned subsidiary in Florida is insufficient to bring the parent within § 48.193), cause dismissed, 605 So.2d 1265 (Fla.1992)....

...Winslow Loudermilk Corporation, 469 So.2d 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), this court affirmed the trial court's finding that McLean Savings and Loan was engaged in a course of business in Florida providing permanent loan financing and was subject to long arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...We find that the plaintiffs, when challenged, failed to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations against appellants in the complaint. First, appellants, as distinguished from McLean Savings and Loan Association, were not "doing business" within the State of Florida under Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Second, the "tortious act" alleged, being the making of fraudulent representations in Virginia, by telephone, was not committed in the State of Florida as required by Section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes. See Freedom Savings and Loan Association v. Ormandy & Associates, Inc., 479 So.2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); April Industries, Inc. v. Levy, 411 So.2d 303 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Finally, Section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes, which concerns an injury within the State of Florida arising out of an act or omission occurring outside Florida, does not apply because that statute requires, and the facts in this case do not show, physical i...

...American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F.Supp. 568, 571 (S.D.Fla.1978). See also, Washington v. Norton Manufacturing, Inc., 588 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1979). (Valid service of process does not necessarily confer in personam jurisdiction over a defendant in federal court). Florida Statute (F.S.) § 48.193 (1977) entitled "Acts subjecting persons to jurisdictions of courts of state" provides as follows: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this su...

...The M/V "Domburgh" was in a Jacksonville, Florida shipyard at the time of renewal of the protection and indemnity policy, an unremarkable event since the vessel was engaged in scheduled service in and out of Florida ports. The Court concludes, therefore, that Shipowners is amenable to service of process pursuant to F.S. 48.193(1)(d)....

.... upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state . . service may . . . be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule." The method for service of process upon a defendant amenable to service under F.S. 48.193(1)(d) is provided for in F.S. 48.193(2) wherein it states: Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in F.S. 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as if it had been personally served within this state. [F.S. § 48.193(2) (1977)]....

...American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F.Supp. 568, 572 (S.D. Fla.1978). Florida courts have not yet construed the Florida Long Arm Statute as to "(d) Contracts to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting." F.S. § 48.193(1)(d) (1977)....

...The pertinent act of contracting to insure property or risk located within this state did not occur within Florida. The statute does not appear to require this by its language. Such a construction would be more apposite for the "doing business" statute, F.S. § 48.181 (1977), rather than the "long-arm" statute, F.S. § 48.193 (1977)....

...Before WELLS, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. WELLS, Judge. Rafael Gadea, appeals from an order granting with prejudice Star Cruises, Ltd.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because Gadea has failed to demonstrate jurisdiction over Star under either section 48.193(1) or 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes, we affirm....

...("NCL"), a Star subsidiary, [1] which planned to acquire ownership of the vessel from Star for use in the American market. Gadea sued Seaking, NCL, and Star claiming, as to Star, unseaworthiness and general maritime negligence. Jurisdiction over Star was asserted under sections 48.193(1) and 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes. The court below, finding no basis for jurisdiction under either provision, dismissed the action. We agree with this assessment. General Jurisdiction under Section 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes Section 48.193(2) of the Florida Statutes provides that "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of...

...4th DCA 2006) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)); Philip J. Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 8.7 (2007 ed.) (stating that "[t]he phrase `substantial and not isolated activity' in section 48.193(2) refers to a `continuous and systematic general business contact' with the state")....

...uises in NCL's brochures and its listing of NCL's reservation number as a contact number for booking Star Cruises. None of these contacts, taken individually or as a whole, constitutes substantial activity within this state on Star's part to satisfy section 48.193(2) requirements....

...misrepresentations connected with the sale of its business. The foreign parent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court examined whether the subsidiary could be said to be the agent of the parent so as to subject it to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)....

...ry's payroll; and which represented its relationship with its subsidiary as a "joint venture," stating in a website article that it was acting through a subsidiary, was not engaged in substantial business activity in this state within the meaning of section 48.193(2) because the parent did "not exert sufficient control over [the subsidiary] to justify jurisdiction"); see Faro Techs., Inc....

...ary to establish personal jurisdiction"); see also Abramson v. Walt Disney Co., 132 Fed.Appx. 273, 276-77 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005)(concluding that a foreign parent corporation did not conduct business in Florida so as to subject it to jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) even though the chairman of the foreign parent's board of directors had stated in internet articles and letters to shareholders that he was directly involved in operations in Florida and that all of the parent-related enterprises we...

...nd because the sole function of the Florida subsidiary was to act as a tour operator for the parent's Antigua resort); see also Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1268-76 (11th Cir.2002)(finding long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) where two Florida subsidiaries existed solely to serve a Bahamian hotel and other resorts owned by a parent corporation by soliciting and coordinating reservations and all advertising and marketing; by purchasing all United States g...

...Although it does have a Florida subsidiary which it owns though a number of intermediary subsidiaries, it does not exercise the level of control over that subsidiary, which does substantial business of its own, to subject Star to jurisdiction in this state under section 48.193(2). Specific Jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1) of the Florida Statutes Gadea claims that Star is also subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(1)(a) [3] which "confers jurisdiction over parties who operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state or have an office or agency in this state for any cause of action arising from the `doing of those acts....

...3d DCA 2005)(stating that "for specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff [must] . . . show that the defendant's contact within the State resulted in, among several other options, a tortious act"). Thus, on this record, it is clear that as to either a claim of general or specific jurisdiction, the requirements of section 48.193 have not been met....

...iations for that acquisition, or the acquisition itself, took place. In fact, the press releases suggest that it did not take place in Florida but elsewhere as Star gobbled up the stock in NCL's parent company from shareholders around the world. [3] Section 48.193(1)(a) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural...

...manufacturer and assembler of that certain 1974 dump trailer which they sold outright or by consignment to Defendant, DADE TRUCK SALES INCORPORATED. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant CITY WELDING & MANUFACTURING COMPANY, pursuant to F.S.A. Section 48.193 and other applicable Florida Statutes." Plaintiff-appellee Rotex International Corporation does not specify in its brief any applicable statute, but contents itself with the statement that the facts of the case bring defendant City Wel...

...It is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to make the grounds for jurisdiction appear. The portion of the complaint quoted gives no fact except that the manufacturer sold the dump trailer to Dade Truck Sales. Such an allegation is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Under one of the provisions of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1975), the activities of City Welding outside of the state may subject it to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts where such acts cause injury to persons or property within the state....

...DEFENDANT HYCO MANUFACTURING COMPANY The complaint alleges, with regard to jurisdiction over defendant Hyco Manufacturing, that: "8. Defendant, HYCO MANUFACTURING COMPANY, is an Ohio corporation, licensed to or doing business in the State of Florida, pursuant to F.S.A. 48.193 and applicable case law thereunder, this Court has jurisdiction over it....

...use of their respective roles in the approval and execution of the contract. Orange Co. of Florida was not named as a party. The second amended complaint filed by Orange Co. attempted to assert "long arm jurisdiction" over the appellants pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...After the trial court denied both motions to dismiss, Stimmel and the remaining appellants filed timely appeals which have been consolidated. The parties agree that under the facts of this case, if the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over the appellants, it was acquired pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b). Section 48.193(1)(b) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his perso...

...ntained in an Ohio bank account which belonged to Orange Co. of Florida. Thus, any tortious acts committed by the appellants occurred in Ohio. Orange Co. argues that the trial court could acquire long arm jurisdiction over the appellants pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) because the alleged tortious conduct of the appellants caused Orange Co....

...financial injury in Florida. We disagree. Although the fact that an injury occurs in Florida is crucial to a determination of when a cause of action accrued, the occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not satisfy the statutory test of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...In arguing that an injury was sustained in Florida, Orange Co.'s reliance on International Harvester Co. v. Mann, 460 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), is misplaced. In Mann, our sister court stated that the "commission of a tort " for purposes of establishing long arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) does not require physical entry into the state, but merely requires that the place of injury be in Florida. Since we find that Mann is factually distinguishable from the case at bar, we decline to agree or disagree with the Mann court's interpretation of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Because no part of the appellants' alleged tortious conduct occurred in Florida and no injury resulting from the appellants' alleged conduct was suffered by Orange Co. in Florida, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the appellants pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983). Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. Id. at 891. Florida Statute Section 48.193 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural perso...

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat. § 48.193....

...advertised in Florida regarding the alleged infringing panels, or that the cause of action otherwise arose from the operation of a business by TAI in the state of Florida. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over TAI may not be asserted under Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(a). See generally Limardo v. Corporacion Intercontinental, 590 F.Supp. 1109, 1111 (S.D.Fla. 1984) (section 48.193(1)(a) permits jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation only where the claims arise out of business transacted in the state). Jurisdiction also does not exist under section 48.193(1)(f), as this section does not permit jurisdiction over nonresidents for acts arising outside the state which cause financial injury within the state, in the absence of personal injury or property damage....

...Hutton & Co., 926 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.1991), citing, Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992, 993-994 (Fla.1987). Subsection (1)(b) permits jurisdiction where the nonresident commits a tortious act within this state. See 48.193(1)(b)....

...arties to do the same, that TAI has solicited business or advertised in Florida regarding the alleged infringing panels, or that TAI has otherwise committed a tortious act within the state. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction is not appropriate under Section 48.193(1)(b). Section 48.193(2) permits the court to exercise personal jurisdiction, regardless of whether or not the claim arises from defendant's activity within the state, if the defendant is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...e purchase of a machine for manufacturing the alleged infringing product from FLC in middle to late 1991. Purchases and two sales of unrelated products in the state are insufficient to permit the court to exercise general jurisdiction over TAI under section 48.193(2)....

...at 584 (under section 49.193(2), courts have not "evince[d] any willingness or rationale to find solicitation activities alone sufficient grounds for the assertion of general jurisdiction."). Compare Noury v. Vitek Mfg. Co., 730 F.Supp. 1573 (S.D.Fla.1990) (defendants' activities sufficient for personal jurisdiction under 48.193(2) where defendants took telephone orders from Florida since 1983 and shipped products directly to Florida in response to those orders, defendants' products were used by doctors and hospitals in Florida on a regular basis, defendants advertise...

...inquiry for determining whether a Florida court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

..."Both parts must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant." Am. Fin. Trading Corp. v. Bauer, 828 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Under Florida's long-arm statute, a party is subject to jurisdiction in Florida by "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. A defendant's physical presence in this state is not required in order to "commit a tortious act" within Florida. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260. Committing a tortious act within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur by making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State, provided that the tort alleged arises from such communications. Id. at 1253. Section 48.193(1)(b) "encompasses conduct where the defendant acts outside Florida to directly cause injury or damage a person within this state." Korman v. Kent, 821 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (emphasis added). However, in Korman, this court was careful to explain that section 48.193(1)(b) does not apply merely because a Florida resident suffers damages: "If the Legislature intended for this provision to encompass all tortious acts which were complete outside Florida, but ultimately have consequences here only beca...

...tes the defense to the counterclaim. We therefore deny the motion to dismiss the appeal. We thus proceed to the issue of jurisdiction over Hale. Hale contends that he did not commit a tort in Florida. Arch asserts jurisdiction over Hale either under section 48.193(1)(b) or section 48.193(2). [1] We consider both sections. Section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes, provides Florida jurisdiction where a defendant commits a tortious act in Florida....

...ion of that list occurred between Nevada and Arizona. As explained above, this action did not constitute the commission of a tortious act in Florida. See, e.g., Korman, 821 So.2d at 411. Arch also argues that Florida has jurisdiction over Hale under section 48.193(2), which provides: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...Even if the time of his consulting work is added, that ended in April 2003, two years prior to the filing of the suit against him. Since that time Hale has not engaged in any activity in this state. Therefore, he is not subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...WHEN THERE IS NO OVERREACHING, NO CONTRAVENTION OF STATED PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FORUM IS NEITHER REMOTE NOR ALIEN? In the consolidated matters before us, the trial court in one case, in effect, found jurisdiction to exist under the long arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981), thereby rendering the in personam jurisdiction by contract agreement moot....

...deMco. The note provided that its provisions were to be construed in accordance with the laws of the state of Florida. According to the allegations contained in the amended complaint, venue and jurisdiction were vested in the lower court pursuant to section 48.193, Fla. Stat. (1997) by virtue of the appellants' breach of contract in failing to pay C.S. Engineered the amounts due under the promissory note and guaranty in Florida. It was further alleged that the appellants violated section 48.193(1)(a) by operating, conducting, engaging in and carrying on a business venture in the state of Florida, namely by marketing and selling the traffic control devices to various governmental entities within the state....

...The requisite basis of the Florida courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, lies in meeting the imperatives of a two-pronged test: (1) The defendant must satisfy the statutory requirements of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, and (2) the defendant must meet the constitutional due process requirement of showing minimum contacts with the state of Florida. Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 allows, among other things, a Florida court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in Florida for that defendant's breach of a contract in Florida. *1130 See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The appellants concede that their alleged failure to make payments on the promissory note in Florida is sufficient to subject them to the jurisdiction of the court, pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g) of Florida's long-arm statute, but deny that the constitutional requirement of the two-pronged test has been met....

...In accordance with our earlier holdings in Marsh, O'Brien, Alan Richard and Payless, the lower court may not do so. We therefore reverse the order under review with directions that the trial court dismiss this action without prejudice for C.S. Engineered to refile in the appropriate jurisdiction. Reversed. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(g) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural...

...ges for special transportation of items to the hotel, special arrangements for guests, and special needs of the hotel when requested. In the instant case, appellees attempted service on defendant Universal Caribbean under both sections 48.081(5) and 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the latter of which provides: (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Because that service was made personally on the corporation and we find that section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to consider whether service was proper on Universal Caribbean through Limited as business agent, under section 48.081(5), Florida Statutes (1987)....

..., which occurs where the defendant is present in, resides in, or has its principal place of business in Florida, or through application of the state’s long-arm statute because, oftentimes, the defendant has committed a tortious act in Florida. See § 48.193, Fla....

...Petitioner sued respondent in the circuit court in and for Pinellas County, seeking recovery under his insurance policy for medical and lost wage benefits. Respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), was denied by the trial court. The district court reversed, reasoning that the trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over respondent because the requirements of section 48.193(1)(d) were not met. We agree. Section 48.193(1)(d) grants Florida courts jurisdiction over persons who contract "to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting." (emphasis supplied). The insurance policy in question contains a provision that limits its coverage to the fifty states and between their ports. Petitioner argues that issuance of the policy with this territorial coverage brings respondent within the purview of section 48.193(1)(d), as the risk insured against under his policy included the possibility of an accident occurring within any of the states, including Florida....

...At the time this contract was entered into, both parties were located in Michigan, not Florida. The property covered under the policy and the risk insured against were likewise in Michigan, not Florida. These facts clearly negate the applicability of section 48.193(1)(d). Accepting petitioner's interpretation of section 48.193(1)(d), that the "risk located within this state at the time of contracting" is coterminus with the policy's territorial coverage, would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution....

...The company was aware that the risk of loss was coextensive with the policy territory and that a loss could occur anywhere in the country. The fact that the loss occurred in Florida was a foreseeable consequence of issuing the policy with the unrestricted territory language. Thus, the Florida long arm statute, section 48.193(1)(d), should apply to National Grange....

...We approve the decision below and disapprove the decision reached in National Grange. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs. ADKINS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Meyer alleges that the combination of section 48.193(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), and the language of the insurance policy provides the courts of the state of Florida with long arm jurisdiction over ACIA. I agree. Section 48.193 provides: (1) Any person ......

...plies only to occurrences, accidents and losses during the policy term ... The territory includes the states and between their ports; property protection insurance applies only in the state of Michigan. The controlling term is the word risk found in section 48.193(1)(d)....

...It is clear from the language of the insurance policy that the "risk(s)" insured against are "occurrences, accidents and losses," and that the territory within which said risks are insured is "the states." Thus, the plain language of this contract brings it within the scope of section 48.193(1)(d), inasmuch as Florida is one of "the states" referred to in the contract, and the risk of an accident *1317 occurring within this state was one of the risks insured against "at the time of contracting." This interpretation is in full accordance with National Grange Mutual Insurance Co....

...The company was aware that the risk of loss was coextensive with the policy territory and that a loss could occur anywhere in the country. The fact that the loss occurred in Florida was a foreseeable consequence of issuing the policy with the unrestricted territory language. Thus, the Florida long arm statute, section 48.193(1)(d), should apply to National Grange....

...ts to exercise jurisdiction. Lakewood Pipe of Texas, Inc. v. Rubaii, 379 So.2d 475, 478 (2d Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979). On remand, the trial court decided that it lacked jurisdiction over Lakewood Pipe under Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.193(1)(g) (West Supp.1981)....

...In this case, the Florida trial court's order dismissing for want of personal jurisdiction operates as a final judgment on the merits. The Florida trial court ruled that Florida does not have personal jurisdiction over Lakewood Pipe under Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.193(1)(g) (West Supp.1981) (action for breach of contract)....

...Our reference to the contract claims includes Rubaii's claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and an accounting for profits. Our reference to the tort claims includes his allegations of conversion, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud. We also hold that Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.193(1)(d) (West Supp.1981) (insurance contracts) does not provide for jurisdiction in this case 2 Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 48.193 (West Supp.1981) provides in part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he is a natural pe...

...t dealer, Gary Massey Chevrolet, Inc., after he had obtained the "key number" for the automobile from the Ohio automobile dealer, Jack Maxton Chevrolet, Inc., appellee. Appellant sued both dealers, asserting personal jurisdiction over appellee under section 48.193(1)(f)2., Florida Statutes....

...t a portion of `long arm' statute" would unconstitutionally violate the "minimum contacts" requirements of Electro Engineering Products Co., Inc. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977). Appellant twice amended her complaint, alleging jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f), and also alleging that the court had "in rem" jurisdiction over appellee's insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify appellee....

...We affirm the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but not for the precise reasons stated by the trial court. Although the question has apparently been overlooked by both parties and the trial court, appellant may not allege jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)2., because this subsection was intended to provide *45 jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers or dealers who place into the stream of commerce defective products which cause injury to persons or property within the State of Florida....

...r manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or consumption resulted in injury to persons or property within this state (thus tracking the language of section 48.193(1)(f)2.) fulfills the "minimum contacts" requirement, to the extent that the sufficiency of the pleadings are challenged....

...[5] Of course, where the proof submitted in support of the defendant's motion to dismiss contravenes this allegation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the allegation, by affidavit, deposition or other proof. As noted earlier, appellant may not, under the circumstances, plead jurisdiction over appellee under section 48.193(1)(f)2., and we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal on that basis....

...4th DCA 1972), cert. den. 276 So.2d 168 (1973). We approve the trial court's determination that appellant's theory of "in rem" jurisdiction has no legal basis in Florida. We also approve its determination that appellant has not sufficiently alleged jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)2., but for the reason set out in this opinion....

...hols, NTS, NTS/Florida Residential Properties, Inc., Orlando Lake Forest, Inc., and Banc One Mortgage Corporation. The complaint asserted that the court had personal jurisdiction over all named defendants pursuant *391 to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Against Banc One, the complaint asserted a count for breach of guaranty and loan documents (Count VII). Finally, the complaint asserted a count for declaratory judgment against all named defendants (Count IX). In the trial court, the appellees relied upon sections 48.193(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1991), to support their contention that the trial court possessed jurisdiction over Nichols and NTS. On appeal, however, the appellees rely only upon section 48.193(2). [2] In August 1992, when the appellees filed this action, section 48.193(2) provided: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla....

...ated to, the defendant's contacts with the state. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 n. 9. See also White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So.2d 886, 888 n. 3 (Fla. 1990). The due process standard of Helicopteros applies in this case because section 48.193(2) requires no causal connection between a plaintiff's claim and the defendant's contacts with the state. See American Overseas Marine Corp. v. Patterson, 632 So.2d at 1127-28. We shall discuss separately the provisions of section 48.193(2) as applied to Nichols and NTS. *392 Personal Jurisdiction over Nichols The record evidence supports the trial court's ruling that Nichols' activities within the state of Florida were sufficient to subject him to the trial court's jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...One relative to the mortgage which the bank held on the OLF joint venture's real property. [4] We recognize that, standing alone, any one of Nichols' contacts with the state of Florida might not constitute substantial activity within the meaning of section 48.193(2)....

...nc., was formed for an improper purpose. Cf. Woods v. Jorgensen, 522 So.2d 935, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Based on the record evidence, however, we conclude that the trial court properly ruled that it had acquired personal jurisdiction over NTS under section 48.193(2)....

...International Air Service Co., 595 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d DCA) (California parent company's mere performance of accounting and payroll functions for subsidiary doing business in Miami was insufficient activity to subject parent company to jurisdiction under section 48.193), cause dismissed, 605 So.2d 1265 (Fla....

...NOTES [1] Appellate review of this order is proper pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. [2] The appellees apparently concede that Nichols and NTS are not subject to the trial court's jurisdiction under any of the provisions of section 48.193(1)....

...ctivities within the state, we reject the appellees' suggestion that a nonresident's mere status as a general partner in a Florida limited partnership necessarily subjects the nonresident to the general jurisdiction of the courts of this state under section 48.193(2). In contrast, where the cause of action arises out of the limited partnership's active conduct of business in Florida, the nonresident general partner will be subject to the specific jurisdiction of Florida's courts under section 48.193(1)....

...ccasionally visited and which he sold in March 1992. [5] By itself, ownership of property is insufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, unless the cause of action arose out of such ownership. See 48.193(1)(c), Fla....

...e. Thompson filed a motion to quash process and service of process and a motion to abate for lack of personal jurisdiction. Thompson asserted that the amended complaint failed to allege a basis for invoking long-arm jurisdiction over him pursuant to section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes (1987), and that under Florida law, jurisdiction does not lie over an individual because of acts performed in his capacity as a representative of a corporation unless the individual transacts business on his own account *1180 within the state....

...(2) if so, whether sufficient "minimum contacts" are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. Unger v. Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) rev. denied, 520 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1988). Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes (1987) states, in pertinent part: 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or 2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. Appellee relies primarily upon section 48.193(1)(b) to uphold the trial court's ruling in this matter. [1] We recognize that whether jurisdiction lies under section 48.193(1)(b) is not clearly settled. This court has held that the occurrence of injury in Florida standing alone is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) and that part of a defendant's tortious conduct must occur in this state....

...denied 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988); Jack Pickard *1181 Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We recognize that some Florida courts have held that the commission of a tort for purposes of establishing long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) does not require physical entry into or tortious conduct within this state, but only requires that injury or damages occur within Florida....

...Holy Cross Hospital, Inc., 424 So.2d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). We certify conflict with these cases. Further, we would point out that application of the contrary authority which holds that a foreign tortious act causing injury in Florida gives rise to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) would raise a substantial issue of whether Florida could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Thompson....

...2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). See also International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). However, because we hold that the trial court is without jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) we need not reach the issue of whether Florida may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Thompson....

...g Thompson's motion to quash process and service of process and denying his motion to abate for lack of personal jurisdiction, and to enter an order granting Thompson's motions. REVERSED and REMANDED. GOSHORN, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(a) is inapplicable because Thompson's uncontroverted affidavit establishes that Thompson was not personally operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state and that he did not have an office or agency in this state. Section 48.193(1)(f) is similarly inapplicable because Thompson's affidavit establishes that he, personally, was neither engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state, nor were any products, materials, or things processed, serviced,...

...of Palm Beach ("Development") appeals an order of the trial court dismissing its complaint filed against Building Materials Holding Corporation ("BMHC") for lack of personal jurisdiction over BMHC. We affirm because BMHC was not subject to jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...to the credibility of witnesses." Evans v. Thornton, 898 So.2d 151, 152 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). Thus, with respect to the determination of facts, we defer to the trial court. With respect to the application of those facts to the law, we review de novo. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, is the long-arm statute of this state and provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this sub...

...If those affidavits conflict, then it is incumbent on the trial court to hold a hearing to resolve the conflicts in the evidence and determine the jurisdictional issue. Id. Thus, an evidentiary hearing under Venetian Salami resolves the factual disputes necessary to determine jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 as well as whether minimum contacts exist to satisfy due process concerns. *1161 Here, the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show personal jurisdiction under either section 48.193(1)(a) or (2). It alleged that the defendant conducted business in the state through a joint venture relationship with WBC, and those same allegations would also sustain jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(2) as they would show that the defendant conducted substantial business activity within the state....

...We agree with BMHC that all of the elements of a joint venture were not proven. Nevertheless, that does not end the inquiry, as the type of business relationship actually existing could still result in subjecting BMHC to jurisdiction pursuant to an agency theory under section 48.193(1)(a)....

...International Air Service Co., Ltd., 595 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the control of a parent over a subsidiary may permit the conclusion that the subsidiary is acting as the agent of the parent, thus subjecting the parent to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1) and supporting "minimum contacts." The level of control must be very high, however....

...misrepresentations connected with the sale of its business. The foreign parent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court examined whether the subsidiary could be said to be the agent of the parent so as to subject it to jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)....

...When we compare the control of BMHC over WBC, it is significantly less than what was determined insufficient in Enic or in Kramer. BMHC did not control the daily operations of WBC. The "operational control" necessary to subject the parent to jurisdiction under the agency theory of section 48.193(1) is not present. See also Walt Disney Co. v. Nelson, 677 So.2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Therefore, BMHC was not subject to Florida jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1). Jurisdiction over BMHC is also not present under the "substantial business activity" provisions of section 48.193(2)....

...Florida, and guaranteed a $13 million loan for the joint venture. Because of its extensive contacts, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that NTS itself had engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity within this state...." See § 48.193(2), Fla....

...First, we address jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants Tinlin, Allan, Nicolazzo, and Williams. The appellees sued the nonresidents as individuals, not as officers and directors of the Society and the Foundation. The appellees sought personal jurisdiction over these four nonresident officers and directors pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The "corporate shield" doctrine draws a "distinction between a corporate officer acting on one's own and a corporate officer acting on behalf of one's corporation." Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 1993). Because the nonresidents were acting in their corporate capacity, section 48.193 is not applicable and the court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. See Doe, 620 So.2d at 1006 (nonresident president of corporation not subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 when president's *570 actions were within scope of his employment)....

...The trial court correctly concluded that Bridgestone had subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under the general provision in the long arm statute. As the trial court held, Bridgestone was engaged in "substantial and not isolated" business activities in Florida. § 48.193(2), Fla....

...The trial court was also correct in holding that personal jurisdiction could be asserted against Bridgestone for its mishandling of the recall. This was a specific act that could support the exercise of jurisdiction under any one of three sections of the long arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(a), (b), (f), Fla....

...That Deltona manipulated the blind filing system in Collier County so that all the quiet title suits would be heard by one judge. 4. That Deltona failed to plead a valid cause of action for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over the appellants who are not subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...d thus failed to plead a valid cause of action for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over them. The appellants argue, and Deltona agrees, that they are not subject to long-arm jurisdiction because they have not done any of the enumerated acts of section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1987), which would subject them to personal, long-arm jurisdiction....

...The appellants admit that since they reside in foreign countries they are not amenable to personal service within the state of Florida. See, § 48.031, Fla. Stat. (1985). They also have not done any of the specific acts which would submit them to personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, section 48.193....

...herbicide due to Proficol's allegedly negligent misidentification of the herbicide. Transport claims that the district court may exert personal jurisdiction over Proficol under the tort prong of Florida's long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 48.193(1)(b), and Rule 4(k)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., the national long-arm statute....

...Transport's complaint. Transport brings this appeal which we review de novo. See Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.1998). II. In order to assert jurisdiction over Proficol under Section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida's long-arm statute, Transport must show that Proficol committed a tort in Florida....

...Id. Plaintiffs sought to assert personal jurisdiction over the South Carolina company under Florida's long-arm statute, contending that the company had committed a "tortious act" in Florida thereby triggering jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. ch. 48.193(1)(b)....

...is a "tortious act" within the meaning of the Florida long-arm statute. Id. at 1146. The court reasoned that, by selling batteries to the recycler, the South Carolina company had "helped create the serious environmental hazard" in violation of federal law, a tort within the meaning of Section 48.193(1)(b)....

...exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Neither its sales nor its purchases are sufficient to subject Proficol to the jurisdiction of this court under Rule 4(k)(2). IV. Jurisdiction predicated upon Section 48.193(b)(1) is not warranted in this case because the defendant has not committed a tort within the state of Florida....

...entative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: . . . (d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting. § 48.193(1)(d), Fla....

...The affidavits are not, therefore, in "direct conflict." Glovegold sufficiently demonstrated a statutory basis for jurisdiction, and the trial court erred by not finding as much. Nevertheless, Florida's long-arm statute will apply in this case only if the cause of action arises from one of the contacts enumerated in section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1999), here, the contract to insure the ANTHENOR EXPRESS while she was located in a Florida port....

...that Freeman had entrusted the automobile to Rowe and was not liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The first question presented is whether there was a basis for asserting jurisdiction over Kimbrough under Florida's Long Arm Statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983). Even though section 48.193 contains an exhaustive list of acts or omissions upon which courts in this state can assert jurisdiction over out-of-state residents, Rowe's pleadings contain no allegations of the jurisdictional grounds for proceeding against Kimbrough. This court has previously held that failure to adequately allege in the complaint a basis for invoking long arm jurisdiction under 48.193 voids any service of process made pursuant to section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...defendant was a Florida resident. We disagree. Personal jurisdiction *869 must exist over Kimbrough, not another party in the same action. The complaint failed to allege entrustment which, by itself, would not subject Kimbrough to jurisdiction under section 48.193....

...See Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). First, the court must consider whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the control of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2002), i.e., whether defendant performed any of the acts delineated in the statute....

...In addition, courts are required to strictly construe the long-arm statute. See Camp Illahee Investors, Inc. v. Blackman, 28 Fla. L. Weekly D2672 (Fla. 2d DCA Nov.19, 2003). In the complaint, appellee alleged that appellant was doing business in Florida, an act which will subject one to personal jurisdiction. See § 48.193(1)(a) (one is subject to personal jurisdiction as a result of "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or *734 carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.")....

...Stiger of Penalta & Stiger, P.A., Boca Raton, for appellee Ocean World, S.A. GROSS, C.J. We reverse the circuit court's order denying defendant Columbia University's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We hold that there is not personal jurisdiction under either subsections 48.193(1)(c) or (2), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...She has never been a Florida resident. She has never maintained a place of business or office in Florida. The circuit court denied Columbia's motion to dismiss without explanation. To evaluate the issue of personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2007), Florida courts must engage in the two-part analysis set forth in Venetian Salami Co....

...Because we have concluded that there are insufficient facts to create long-arm jurisdiction, we do not reach the issue of Columbia's minimum contacts with Florida. Ocean World asserts two statutory bases for jurisdiction. First, that Columbia "personally or through an agent" committed a "tortious act within this state" under section 48.193(1)(b). Second, that Columbia is subject to general jurisdiction because it is "engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state" under section 48.193(2). For specific jurisdiction over Columbia to exist under section 48.193(1)(b), the University, through an agent, must have committed a tortious act in Florida....

...Rather, the tort occurred in the countries where the contracts at issue were to be performed. Id. That case also held that Reiss did not have those minimum contacts with Florida necessary to support personal jurisdiction. If there is no jurisdiction over Reiss, the purported tortfeasor, there can be no jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) over Columbia, which supposedly acted through Reiss. We next consider the issue of general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...vity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity." An assertion of general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) requires a "showing of `continuous and systematic general business contacts'" with this state....

...Int'l Specialty Imports, Inc., 869 So.2d 732, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction present a "much higher threshold" than those contacts necessary to support specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1). See Seabra, 869 So.2d at 734. One reason for requiring a more rigorous showing to establish general jurisdiction is because jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) does not require that a lawsuit's cause of action arise from activity within Florida, or that there be any connection between the claim and the defendant's Florida activities. See, e.g., Camp Illahee Investors, Inc. v. Blackman, 870 So.2d 80, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("This section [48.193(2) ] `does not require connexity between a defendant's activities and the cause of action.'") (quoting Woods v....

...and a significant portion of its vendors operated in Florida. [2] Additionally, the resort's Florida subsidiary solicited and coordinated reservations *794 for over 50% of the resort's guests. Id. at 1361-62. To establish general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), Ocean World relies on four types of activities....

...twork, is sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over Columbia, because the school is doing business on the internet and soliciting students from Florida. However, Columbia is correct that its internet program does not satisfy the requirements of section 48.193(2) because it does not amount to "substantial and not isolated activity within this state." (Emphasis added)....

...Leonard Fitness, Inc., 523 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1348 (M.D.Fla.2007); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir.2003). Third, Ocean World contends that Columbia's property interests in Florida support a finding of general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...ection of the donor and does not depend on the acquiescence or even knowledge of the receiving party. Nothing demonstrates such a pervasive, commercial property ownership that would amount to a continuous and systematic business activity in Florida. Section 48.193(1)(c) would support a finding of specific jurisdiction for a cause of action arising from owning, using, or possessing real property in Florida, but there is no contention here that Ocean World's causes of action arose from such ownership by Columbia....

...Brown, 716 So.2d 868, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Many of the Columbia's lawsuits in Florida were actions to enforce foreign judgments. There is no indication that Columbia engaged in a pervasive litigation business that subjected it to jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...anization, including arrangements under which it regularly transferred animals to them for adoption in Florida); Banco Inversion, S.A. v. Celtic Fin. Corp., S.A., 907 So.2d 704, 710 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, where it solicited consulting and other services from a Florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in Florida) (citing Industrial Cas....

...Banco Cont'l, S.A. v. Transcom Bank, Ltd., 922 So.2d 395 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that defendant's bank account and open line of credit in Florida utilized to transfer money in international commerce was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, where defendant operated its business in Honduras, had no employees or agents in Florida, and did not advertise or solicit business in Florida); Dev....

...Witmer, 724 So.2d 722, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (holding defendants, who operated a boat tour in the Bahamas for which tickets are sold by Florida-based cruise lines on board their vessels, did not have the level of business in Florida to confer jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)); Hobbs v....

...The plaintiff may satisfy this initial burden either by alleging the language of the statute without pleading supporting facts, or by alleging specific facts that indicate that the defendant's actions fit within one of the sections of Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193....

...(f) Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: 1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; ... § 48.193, Fla. Stat. The initial threshold was satisfied in the complaint by alleging facts that indicate that the defendant's actions fit within one of the sections of Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193....

...tiff's economic interest). The Florida Supreme Court recently clarified this issue and noted that: In order to commit a tortious act in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, committing a *563 tortious act in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida....

...In that letter Mayapple acknowledged that it had succeeded to the rights of Mr. Lahr. *1538 DISCUSSION Both Defendants assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction over them, in that they contend there are insufficient contacts with the State of Florida to satisfy the long-arm statute. Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, commonly known as the long-arm statute, subjects to Florida jurisdiction any person: "Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." The q...

...ute to those facts. In deciding whether jurisdiction is conferred on this Court over these non-resident defendants, two questions must be posed and answered in the affirmative: First, the Court must find that Defendants are amenable to service under § 48.193(1)(g), and, additionally, does the assertion of jurisdiction comport with due process....

...should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." (Cite omitted) (Footnotes omitted) (Emphasis added). Allegations that Defendant failed to make payments, per the contract, in Florida is sufficient to bring this action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(g)....

...s provision for either statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 , 1338 (1982). Accordingly, Rule 4(e) directs us to the Florida long-arm statute in order to determine the amenability of nonresident defendants-appellants to jurisdiction in Florida. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1987); see Bangor Punta Operations, Inc....

...Since the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, “federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.” Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel’s Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983). The Florida Supreme Court has explicated section 48.193, explaining that complying with the long-arm statute and determining federal constitutional minimum contacts are discrete analy-ses: By enacting section 48.193, the legislature has determined the requisite basis for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants as far as Florida is concerned....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 500 (Fla.1989). Without addressing the potential appropriateness of other provisions of the Florida long-arm statute to nonresidents Kenny and Network, we limit our analysis to the tortious act provision because it is applicable and sufficient. 40 Fla.Stat. § 48.193(l)(b)....

...fendants-appellants, we must analyze this long-arm jurisdiction under the due process requirements of the federal constitution. The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts,” although implicit within some of the provisions are sufficient facts, which, if proved, would suffice....

...mself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(l)(b)....

...The final two transactions giving rise to this litigation are alleged to have taken place on January 4 and 6, 1977. However, the written confirmations of those two transactions were returned to appellee unsigned on February 3, 1977. Service of process was made pursuant to Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Florida" and they were sufficient to show appellants had "breached contracts in the State of Florida by failing to perform acts required by the Contracts to be performed in this state." Thus, it is clear the trial court found jurisdiction based upon Section 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(g), Florida Statutes (1975). We think the court erred in finding jurisdiction based upon Section 48.193(1)(g) for the reasons set forth in a very similar case decided this same date in Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corporation, Fla.App., 361 So.2d 757, Case No. 77-1635. However, we approve his finding of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...y the use of this method of service *763 of process. [2] However, we believe the language used by the Supreme Court of Florida in Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975), authorizes the finding of jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, in the case at hand. [3] Paraphrasing the pertinent part of Section 48.193(1)(a), it provides that any person, whether a resident or non-resident, who engages in a business venture in this State thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state....

...Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Gonas, Florida's Long Arm Statutes: Federal Versus State Construction, 52 Fla.B.J. 292 (1975). [4] The reference to Section 48.191(1) is erroneous; the citation should be to Section 48.181(1). Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) and Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975) have the same language, "operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in this state." Therefore, interpretation of the language in Section 48.181(1), Florida Statutes (1971) likewise would be applicable to Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975).

...Hogue, 817 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the court stated that The determination of jurisdiction involves a two part inquiry. First, it must be determined whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, Florida's long arm statute. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). If the allegations are within the ambit of the statute, it must then be determined whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Florida Statute section 48.193(1)(g) provides that statutory long-arm jurisdiction may be asserted over a nonresident for "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Failure to pay a contr...

...n unresolved in Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1253 n. 2 (Fla.2002), whether injury alone to a Florida plaintiff caused by a tortious act committed outside the *856 state is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under Section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida long-arm statute....

...Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000). Our inquiry requires us to first determine whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of any section of the Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193, Fla....

...(2005), and, if so, whether sufficient minimum contacts are demonstrated to satisfy due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584. Maplewood contends that the courts of this state can lawfully assert personal jurisdiction over the defendants in this case under section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida's long-arm statute (2005)....

...4th DCA 1998)("Florida courts subscribe to the rule that the tort of libel occurs wherever the offending material is circulated."). A telephonic, electronic, or written communication is deemed "published" in Florida, subjecting the publisher to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes if the communication was made into this state by a person outside the state, even if that person has no other contacts with the state....

...4th DCA 2001)(telephone conversations made into Florida), approved, 851 So.2d 665 (Fla. 2003).) In this case, Maplewood is unable to offer any proof that the Casita entities published the injurious statements within Florida. Accordingly, Maplewood's effort to assert jurisdiction over the Casita entities under section 48.193(1)(b) fails. Maplewood argues that authority from one of our sister courts analyzes the exercise of personal jurisdiction based upon intentional torts under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes using broader concepts....

...Mann, 460 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). But see Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d at 1006 (noting disapproval on other grounds). Maplewood urges that in these cases, the First District Court of Appeal approved personal jurisdiction over the respective defendants under section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes based upon a tort committed solely outside the territorial boundaries of this state which was "intended to cause injury" in Florida. In Maplewood's words, "targeted and intentional tortious acts aimed at Florida [are sufficient to] establish the requisite minimum contacts and comport with the requirements of due process of law under Fla. Stat. 48.193(1)(b)." We are not so sanguine about Maplewood's reading of the facts of these cases....

..."); see also Pluess-Staufer Indus., Inc. v. Rollason Eng'g & Manuf., Inc., 635 So.2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)("Long-arm statutes are to be strictly construed."). However, because we hold that the trial court is without jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, we need not reach the issue of whether Florida may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the Casita entities....

...Gabriel and Margaret Cazares brought this suit against Mary Sue Hubbard and The Church of Scientology of California, Inc. (the Church) for damages based on alleged malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and invasion of privacy. Hubbard, a resident of California, was served with process in that state pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), which asserts "long arm" jurisdiction over a nonresident who, personally or through an agent, commits a tortious act within this state....

...I would hold that a motion for change of venue filed after a challenge to personal jurisdiction does not waive such challenge. This suit was filed in three counts: I) malicious prosecution; II) abuse of process; and III) invasion of privacy. Service of process was attempted on appellant pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion to dismiss, prompting this appeal. Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256-57 (Fla. 2002). Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, is the long-arm statute of this state and provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this sub...

...inquiry for determining whether a Florida court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

..."substantial and not isolated activity within this state" or has minimum contacts with this state sufficient to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Carib-USA by our courts. Dorsett's complaint alleged that jurisdiction existed under section 48.193 because Carib-USA was engaged in substantial activity within this state, operated vessels in the waters of this state, and was engaged in the business of carrying cargo to and from Florida on the vessel, United Star....

...American sued Pellerito in Dade County for breach of contract and failure to make payments on the open account and also sued on the dishonored instrument. The complaint alleged that Pellerito had submitted itself to jurisdiction in Florida under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1987). Pellerito moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that American had not alleged the elements required by section 48.193, and that, even if properly pled, the contacts between Pellerito and the state of Florida were not sufficient to satisfy basic due process requirements. Section 48.193 provides that: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural *428 person, his p...

...Accord, Itel-Pas, Inc. v. Jones, 389 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). American alleged that payment was due in Dade County, Florida, and that Pellerito had breached the contract by failing to pay. Its complaint therefore met the pleading requirements of section 48.193....

...d received ample notice from the documents and dealings with American that it might be subject to suit in Florida. The trial court's denial of Pellerito's motion to dismiss was therefore proper, both under an analysis of the pleading requirements of section 48.193 and the due process requirements set forth in Burger King....

...By allowing this action to proceed in Florida while a related action proceeded in Massachusetts, duplicative lawsuits would exist which would be a waste of time, energy, and money for both parties and the court system. 9. This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Bay State under Florida's Long Arm Statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1991), because Bay State does not have sufficient contacts with Florida....

...Given that TSI cannot match resources with Bay State and its parent BCBSMA, Bay State is in a much stronger position to litigate and transport witnesses and evidence to a distant forum. 6. Bay State has sufficient contacts with Florida to subject it to personal jurisdiction in Florida under Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1991)....

...Second, the Court must find that assertion of jurisdiction over KSH comports with the requirements of due process. Id. Only if both of these are found to be true, can this Court take jurisdiction over KSH. Plaintiff relies on two sections of the Florida long-arm statute to claim jurisdiction. Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(g) (1989) subjects any person "breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state" to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(b) (1989) subjects any person who commits a tortious act within the state to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. In the present case, § 48.193(1)(g) is not applicable....

...KSH is not listed anywhere in the agreement as being a party thereto. KSH is only mentioned as "Equipment Supplier." In addition, no officer or representative of KSH ever signed the lease agreement between Coastal and Interfase. Since there is no evidence of a contract between KSH and Interfase, § 48.193(1)(g) can not be relied upon to justify jurisdiction of this Court over KSH. The amended complaint, however, does allege sufficient facts to justify jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b)....

...es as the result of these alleged misrepresentations occurred within the state. Upon review of the amended complaint, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to subject KSH to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to § 48.193(1)(b)....

...It is only fair that they be subjected to the burden of legal action in Florida courts as well. These factors alone establish sufficient minimum contacts with Florida necessary to satisfy due process. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM Since personal jurisdiction over KSH is established pursuant to § 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida long-arm statute and since the minimum contacts requirement of due process is satisfied, the Court must next address whether Interfase has failed to state a cause of action against KSH in Counts II, IV, and VI....

...ustice." Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A. Jurisdiction Under Florida's Long-Arm Statute Oxford asserts that subsections (1)(b) and (1)(f) of Florida's long-arm statute, *1366 section 48.193, Fla. Stat., permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Net Trade. Subsection (1)(b) allows jurisdiction to be exercised over any person who has "committ[ed] a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...ide the issue otherwise." Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1983). [4] The narrower interpretation is that injury in Florida caused by an act done in another state is not sufficient in itself to satisfy § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat.. See Posner, 178 F.3d at 1216. [5] Because the court finds that Subsection (1)(b) of § 48.193, Fla....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), in order to determine whether personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in Florida is proper, the trial court must examine the specific factual allegations set forth in a complaint to determine: (1) whether the facts set forth one or more of the predicate acts enumerated in section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes; and, if so, then (2) whether the facts set forth the defendant's minimum contacts with Florida necessary to satisfy federal constitutional due process requirements. Cohn v. Woolin, 971 So.2d 868 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes sets forth several actions which subject a non-resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts....

...the laws of that state. Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So.2d 190, 195-196 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). *766 Here, as for the first prong of the Venetian Salami analysis, Aspsoft alleged that jurisdiction was proper pursuant to sections 48.193(1)(a) & (g) of the Florida Statutes, which reads, in relevant part: 48.193....

...ng, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. * * * (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. § 48.193(1)(a) & (g), Fla....

...Neither party has argued the 12(b)(6) motion in these pleadings. II. RULE 12(b)(2) MOTION Determining whether a court has jurisdiction over the person involves a two-part analysis. First, the court must consider the jurisdictional question under the state long-arm statute, in this case Fla.Stat. § 48.193....

...Defendants' arguments are mainly directed at whether their contacts with the state are substantial enough to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction, apparently unaware that plaintiff is invoking the tort portion of the Florida long-arm statute. The Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193, provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person,...

...Addis, 782 F.2d 902, 903 (11th Cir.1986), the Eleventh Circuit, deciding where the cause of action arose for purposes of statute of limitations, said that although the cases are not clear, where a person informs a news reporter, the tort of libel and slander can occur where the material is circulated. Finally, § 48.193(1)(b) was held to apply to fraudulent representations which allegedly occurred during telephone conversations between plaintiff, a Florida investor, and defendants, Missouri sellers of stock....

...While Davis' affidavit refers to the actors as "they," Davis never expressly says that defendant Lebau made any statement and this Court is not convinced that he did. However, considering the pleadings and the affidavits in the light most favorable to plaintiff, this Court finds that the tort provision of § 48.193 applies to *1262 both defendants....

...is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: * * * * * * (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(b) (West Supp....

...courts carries the burden of proving facts showing jurisdiction to be proper. Oriental Imports & Exports, 701 F.2d at 891. The plaintiff here alleges that the defendant committed a tort within the state, making personal jurisdiction proper under subsection 48.193(1)(b)....

...reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). An assertion of specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, as is sought here under § 48.193(1)(b), requires that the defendant have "fair warning that a particular *818 activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v....

...We agree with the trial court that: (1) Sufficient jurisdictional facts were established to find that Florida does have jurisdiction over appellant under the long arm statute; and (2) sufficient minimum contacts were established to satisfy the requirements of due process. Under one section of the long arm statute, section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), jurisdiction is proper when a defendant commits a tort within the State of Florida....

...Mottershead on the ground that there was no basis for the Florida long arm jurisdiction attempted upon him. [1] We agree and affirm. To make a long story short enough for these purposes, of the two possible statutory bases for substituted service on the appellee, section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), requires doing "business ... in this state," and "connexity" between that business and the asserted cause of action, while section 48.193(2), in lieu of connexity, requires a substantially heightened degree of Florida activity. See Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Because (a) there is no connexity under section 48.193(1)(a) between the present claim, which arose during the doctor's discrete, non-Florida activities on the high seas, and whatever he did in Florida, [2] and (b) his incidental, almost entirely personal contacts with this state between voyages come nowhere close to the "substantial and nonisolated activit[ies] within this state" required by section 48.193(2), [3] see American Overseas Marine Corp....

...3d DCA 1991). Affirmed. NOTES [1] The case against Carnival remains pending below. [2] In light of these determinations, it is unnecessary directly to pass upon the very problematic issues of whether his activities constituted even doing business under section 48.193(1)(a) or satisfied the minimum contacts requirement of the constitution....

...Dilbeck executed a promissory note to The First National Bank of Kissimmee. Though only Durham was a Florida resident, both men were present at the Bank when the note was executed. When the note became in default, the Bank filed suit and, acting pursuant to a "long arm" statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1973), served Dilbeck in accordance with Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...The motion was granted and this appeal followed. The Bank contends that Dilbeck was subject to the jurisdiction on at least one of the following two theories. First, Dilbeck's act of signing the note constituted engaging in a business or a business venture, within the meaning of Section 48.193(1)(a). Second, Dilbeck's failure to repay the note was a breach of contract within the meaning of Section 48.193(1)(g)....

...The note does not mention the place of payment so it is payable at the residence of the payee. See, e.g., Florida Forms, Inc. v. Barkett Computer Serv., Inc., 311 So.2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Dilbeck was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1973), and the judgment quashing service of process was erroneous....

...The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent evidence, in determining whether service has been properly made. In order to utilize this statute the complaint must allege a valid cause of action for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1989). Hargrave v. Hargrave, 495 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Wynn v. Aeta Life Ins. Co., 400 So.2d 144, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). See § 48.193(3). In fact, Florida courts have consistently held that the "[f]ailure to adequately allege in the complaint a basis for long arm jurisdiction under 48.193 voids any service of process made pursuant to section 48.194......

...e sufficient jurisdictional facts. It is well-settled that in order to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate, the trial court must first decide whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...against the defendants on the EXTEND Service Contracts claims. Hobbs filed a motion to dismiss AFSLIC for lack of personal jurisdiction, contending that AFSLIC was not subject to the trial court's jurisdiction pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...Unger v. Publisher Entry Service, Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 520 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1988). Hobbs first contends that the evidence presented below established that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over AFSLIC under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1991). In May 1993, the date the instant action was filed, section 48.193 provided: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal re...

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. § 48.193(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (1991). Hobbs' uncontradicted affidavit effectively refuted any allegation that AFSLIC engaged in an act which would subject it to the court's jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)....

...ATF Lines, 550 So.2d 174, 175-76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Newton v. Bryan, 433 So.2d 577, 578-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Specifically, the affidavit established that AFSLIC neither engaged in business, nor maintained an office, in the state of Florida. See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). AFSLIC did not own or possess real property in Florida, although it did hold a mortgage on certain real property in Orange County. See § 48.193(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] AFSLIC's predecessor had contracted to insure a Florida resident, but the plaintiffs' action against AFSLIC did not arise from this act as required under section 48.193(1). See § 48.193(1)(d), Fla....

...AFSLIC had not entered into any contract which required performance in Florida, and it did not have a contractual relationship with the plaintiffs. Further, AFSLIC did not issue the EXTEND Service Contracts which formed the basis of the plaintiffs' action against AFSLIC, nor was AFSLIC licensed to write such policies. See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1991). The affidavit further established that AFSLIC was not engaged in substantial activity within the state of Florida such as to subject AFSLIC to jurisdiction under section 48.193(2). As indicated above, "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, ... is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity." § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Section 48.193(2) requires "continued and systematic activity" on the part of the defendant within the state of Florida, such as "a continued solicitation and procurement of business." Price v....

...Point Marine, Inc., 610 So.2d 1339, 1341-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (quoting Spanier v. Suisse-Outremer Reederei A.G., 557 So.2d 83, 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)). "Sporadic activities or visits will not constitute `substantial and not isolated activity'" under section 48.193(2)....

...Florida), and (3) maintaining a certificate of authority to transact insurance in the state of Florida. See § 624.401, Fla. Stat. (1991). These isolated acts are not sufficiently substantial to subject AFSLIC to the trial court's jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...ion to review the trial court's nonfinal order to the extent that the order determined the trial court's personal jurisdiction over AFSLIC. [2] §§ 631.001 — 399, Fla. Stat. (1991). [3] After the plaintiffs' action accrued, the legislature amended section 48.193(1)(c), effective October 1, 1993, to subject a defendant to jurisdiction if a plaintiff's cause of action arose from the defendant "[o]wning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within this state." § 48.193(1)(c), Fla....

...rvice mark in interstate commerce; has been continuously reporting to Plaintiff at its offices in Tampa, FL; and because Defendant has been doing business in Tampa, FL, and is, therefore, subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Statute, § 48.193....

...Throughout the course of the contract, Hogan kept itself apprised of QDA's activities through telephone calls, letters, and telefax. QDA was not successful in obtaining an investor. When Hogan sold the note, QDA sued in Dade County for its contractual fee. In its complaint, QDA alleged that jurisdiction lay pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1989), because Hogan had breached a contract in Florida by "failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Hogan moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction alleging tha...

...nless those agents transact business on their own account in the state, as opposed to engaging in business as representatives of the corporation, they are not engaged in business so as to be individually subject to the state's long-arm statute. Sec. 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...We hold that cross/appellee failed to plead facts sufficient to justify application of the long-arm statute to the individual cross/appellants. We need not, therefore, address the other issues raised by the appeal. Reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint as to the individual defendants. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Fla....

...labama applies to the claims against Dr. Oh since Alabama has the most significant relationships to the case, and the statute of limitations under Alabama law bars this action. We hold that the court had personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997), there were sufficient minimum contacts by Dr....

...Oh has sent thousands of reports to hundreds of referring Florida doctors and has made hundreds of telephone calls to Florida regarding Florida patients. Dr. Oh also owns two pieces of property in Florida, including rental property. II. Personal Jurisdiction Under Section 48.193 "In determining whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate in a given case, two inquiries must be made....

...ss requirements." Execu-Tech Business Systems, Inc. v. New Oji Paper Company, Ltd., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000)(quoting *1076 Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989)). The court has personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997). There are alternative grounds for jurisdiction under sections 48.193(1)(b) ("Committing a tortious act within this state."), 48.193(1)(f)2 ("Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use"), and 48.193(2) ("A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity"). Either of these three grounds will support personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh. A. Tortious Act, § 48.193(1)(b) Dr....

...Accordingly, Doe is not applicable, and International Harvester and Carida remain good law applicable to the circumstances of this case. See Allerton v. Florida Department of Insurance, 635 So.2d 36, 39-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (personal jurisdiction sustained under section 48.193(1)(b) even though tortious activities, which were aimed at Florida, were conducted out of state; distinguishing Doe and citing International Harvester); Silver, 648 So.2d at 242 ("We do not agree that Carida was overruled by Doe because Doe only addressed the `corporate shield' doctrine"). Federal courts have also held, subsequent to Doe, that physical presence is not required to obtain personal jurisdiction. See Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., *1077 74 F.3d 253, 255-57 (11th Cir.1996)(personal jurisdiction established under § 48.193(1)(b) over nonresident attorneys who negligently drafted and accountant who negligently reviewed a will and trust documents intended to be administered in Florida; attorneys and accountant reside and licensed to practice only in Michigan; documents were delivered by mail in Florida and executed in Florida); Kim v. Keenan, 71 F.Supp.2d 1228, 1233 (M.D.Fla.1999)(Florida resident obtained personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(1)(b) over Georgia lawyers for malpractice claim, alleging failure to timely pursue action against state of Georgia; "[a]s in Robinson, the injury ultimately occurred in Florida when Plaintiffs suffered damages resulting from the alleged foreign malpractice"). In Walter Lorenz Surgical, Inc. v. Teague, 721 So.2d 358, 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), this Court, sustaining personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), described the appropriate inquiry to determine whether the alleged tort occurred within this state: [T]he trial court should decide first, whether Leibinger [individual defendant] has engaged in acts or omissions that injured Lo...

...Accordingly, the alleged tort by Dr. Oh occurred in Florida rather than Alabama, even though he was not physically present in Florida. As in Allerton, International Harvester, Silver, and Carida, there is personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh. B. Reports Used, § 48.193(1)(f)2. In Thomas Jefferson University v. Romer, 710 So.2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the court held that a Pennsylvania laboratory's negligent performance and reporting of genetic test results subjected it to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)2....

...Dean's medical history, performed tests in Alabama, and rendered a written report and analysis containing his diagnosis and recommendation that were used in Florida in the ordinary course of Dr. Johns' treatment of Mrs. Dean. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh is also satisfied under section 48.193(1)(f)2. C. General Jurisdiction, § 48.193(2) As stated in Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), "substantial and not isolated activity" under section 48.193(2) means "continuous and systematic general business contact" with Florida....

...Oh), does not apply to this case. Bates, 509 So.2d at 1115 ("The borrowing statute will only come into play if it is determined that the cause of action arose in another state."). V. Conclusion The court had personal jurisdiction over Dr. Oh pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997), there were sufficient minimum contacts by Dr....

...The First Step: Within the Ambit of Florida’s Long-Arm Statute? As the first step in a two-step process, it must initially be determined if sufficient facts exist to confer either specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, is Florida’s long-arm statute and addresses both specific and general jurisdiction. The long-arm statute “bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts.” Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla.2010) (citations omitted). Section 48.193(1), which addresses specific jurisdiction, states: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts. § 48.193(1), Fla....

...For purposes of this appeal, however, only two of the enumerated acts are relevant: “[ojperating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state,” and “[c]omitting a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193(l)(a) & (b), Fla. Stats., respectively. Section 48.193(2), addresses general jurisdiction in Florida, and states: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. § 48.193(2), Fla....

...copteros. 5 See Garris v. Thomasville-Thomas Cnty. Humane Soc’y, Inc., 941 So.2d 540, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (‘"When ... the question whether a Florida court has ‘general’ jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant arises under section 48.193(2), these separate inquiries (long-arm statute and minimum contacts) merge.”); Woods, 739 So.2d at 620 (“Because section 48.193(2) requires [the] high threshold [of substantial, continuous, and systematic business contacts], if the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is also satisfied.”); Kertesz v....

...ully avail itself of the benefits of Florida’s laws). In Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d at 1203 , the Florida Supreme Court addressed the type of internet activity which falls under the “tortious act” section of Florida’s long-arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...As previously stated, the Florida Supreme Court has articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 . First, the court must determine whether the complaint satisfies the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...her] position. The burden is then placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained. Id. Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1) where the defendant committed any of the acts enumerated in the subsection within Florida and the cause of action arose from the act. A nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction where he or she “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state.” 48.193(2), Fla....

...“[C]ourts are required to strictly construe the long-arm statute.” Seabra v. Intl. Specialty Imports, Inc., 869 So.2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Additionally, a court can exercise jurisdiction only if it is “reasonable.” See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 113 , 107 S.Ct. 1026 . A. Specific Jurisdiction (Section 48.193(1)) In order to determine whether Florida has specific personal jurisdiction over Caiazzo, each of the three counts must be analyzed to determine whether the requirements of the long-arm statute have been satisfied....

...in Florida from November 2004 and December 2005.” While this jurisdictional allegation can fairly be described as “barebones,” both parties agree that Caiazzo resided in, and ran his business from, Florida from November 2004 to December 2005. This allegation falls clearly under section 48.193(l)(a), which states that Florida has jurisdiction over a person who “[o]perat[es], conduces], en-gagers] in, or carries] on a business or business venture in this state or ha[s] an office or agency in this state.” § 48.193(l)(a), Fla....

...trade claims (counts I and III). The trial court also has specific personal jurisdiction over count II, ARA’s defamation claim. A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant where he or she “[c]ommit[s] a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193(l)(b), Fla....

...In order to commit a tortious act within this *258 state, a defendants physical presence in Florida is not required. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260 . “[T]elephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(b) if the alleged cause of action arises from the communications .......

...Based upon these allegations, Caiazzo could reasonably anticipate being haled into a Florida court to defend himself. Additionally, for the same reasons previously articulated for counts I and III, exercise of jurisdiction over Caiazzo is reasonable. B. General Jurisdiction (Section 48.193(2)) While we find specific jurisdiction over all three counts, we write here to clarify how a general jurisdiction analysis differs from a specific jurisdiction analysis and to show how the trial court’s finding of general jurisdiction constituted error....

...The amended complaint does not establish general jurisdiction over Caiazzo. Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction where he “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state” regardless of whether the claim arises from that activity. 48.193(2), Fla....

...at 416 , 104 *259 S.Ct. 1868 ); Seabra, 869 So.2d at 784 . “The continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to confer general jurisdiction present a much higher threshold than those contacts necessary to support specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1).” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So.3d 788, 792 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is because “jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) does not require that a lawsuit’s cause of action arise from activity within Florida, or that there be any connection between the claim and the defendant’s Florida activities.” Id....

...In Venetian Salami, the Florida Supreme Court held that Florida’s long-arm statute does not necessarily encompass constitutional due process requirements. Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 (Fla.1989). The supreme court stated: The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts....

...We note that Zippo was a federal district court case out of Pennsylvania, the reasoning *255 of which has never been adopted by either the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. . While Florida courts have addressed the type of internet activity that falls under section 48.193(l)(a) (tortious acts), see Internet Solutions, 39 So.3d 1201 , and the type of *260 internet activity that will constitute minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction, see Renaissance Health, 982 So.2d 739 , only one Florida case has addressed the issue of websites and general jurisdiction....

...urs; and, if the contract does not expressly provide for a place of payment, it is implied that payment is to be made at the residence of the creditor. See, e.g., Crescent Beach, Inc. v. Jarvis, 435 So.2d 396 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Second, she employs section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides that a person is subject to Florida's jurisdiction if that person "[b]reaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." A...

...Consequently, the plaintiff cannot employ the long arm statute to achieve in personam jurisdiction over the defendant in Florida. Contra Engineered Storage Systems v. National Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Accordingly, the order on appeal is REVERSED. DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...onal exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state. The determination of jurisdiction involves a two part inquiry. First, it must be determined whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...nsaction either. Accordingly, because we see no "substantial connection" between Christus and Florida, we reverse the order denying the motion to dismiss. REVERSED. SHARP, W. and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Christus concedes jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1)(g), which provides that a person subjects him or herself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state by "Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." [2]...

...Edward sued Neely for recording a telephone conversation between the two without Edward's permission in violation of the Florida Security of Communications Act (the Act). See § 934.03, Fla. Stat. (2002). Neely recorded the call from his office in Nebraska. We reverse because section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), does not provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who recorded the call from his Nebraska office without engaging in any actions inside Florida....

...We held that a Florida court possessed personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who recorded a telephone conversation with a person in Florida because the recording of the conversation was the commission of a tortious act within this state for purposes of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...oint of reception and recordation in the foreign state. We concluded that the act of interception under the Act was sufficient to constitute the commission of a tortious act in Florida and thus was sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). Id. *248 Our holding in Koch failed to provide a strict construction of section 48.193(1)(b)....

...It is clear that the trial court in this case simply followed our ruling in Koch. Because Edward relied on our opinion in Koch as the exclusive basis for jurisdiction in the trial court, we reverse and remand this case. If Edward believes he can allege another statutory basis for long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 in good faith, he should be permitted to do so....

...ive a civil remedy under section 934.10 of the Act for an illegal recording of a telephone conversation. Edward's only allegation to establish jurisdiction over Neely was that the recording in Nebraska constituted a tortious act within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...[1] In September 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss and denied it. It is clear that our holding in Koch was critical to the trial court's decision and that Edward was relying exclusively on the theory that Neely had committed a tortious act in Florida, authorizing jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Koch was working at least part-time in Florida, this court's analysis did not focus on the theory that she was doing business in Florida or that she had caused injury to a person in Florida from a location outside this state while engaged in business solicitation activities. See, e.g., § 48.193(1)(a), (f), Fla. Stat. (1997). Instead, we focused on whether the single, recorded telephone call was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b) for committing a tortious act within Florida and the minimum contacts required to satisfy constitutional due process....

...may be appropriate for some legal purposes, but we conclude it is insufficient, standing alone, to support a claim that a person in a distant state or country committed a tortious act within Florida as required to support long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...orida, the court necessarily must review the allegations of the complaint to determine if a cause of action is stated). Nevertheless, our holding today is limited to the issue of whether the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) under the allegations Edward presents....

...Before a Florida court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a two-stage inquiry is conducted. During the first stage, the court determines whether sufficient jurisdictional facts exist to support the exercise of jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193....

...See Silver Rose Entm't, Inc. v. Clay County, 646 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("In keeping with the rule of decision which forbids reaching constitutional questions when cases can be disposed of on statutory grounds, we turn first to ... [the] statutory claim."). *252 Section 48.193(1)(b) provides that a person may be subject to the personal jurisdiction of a Florida court for "committing a tortious act within this state." The Florida Supreme Court first applied this statute to permit the exercise of personal juri...

...person outside the State of Florida would expect to create a cause of action in Florida. Although a defendant's presence in Florida is not always required to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, see Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260, if we construe section 48.193(1)(b) strictly, as we are required to do, we are not convinced that the isolated act of recording a telephone call in another state in violation of a Florida statute is enough to constitute a "tortious act within this state" for purposes of the long-arm statute....

...If the legislature could create a statutory cause of action that deemed an action in another state to have occurred in Florida, and then use that deemed action as the basis to find tortious conduct in Florida justifying jurisdiction over the defendant, then section 48.193(1)(b) would permit practically any *253 regulated act committed anywhere in the world affecting a person in Florida to subject the actor to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida even if that person had no other contacts with the state. No doubt such a broad application of the statute would be held unconstitutional as applied in many scenarios under Woodson. We have no basis to believe that the legislature intended such an expansive interpretation of section 48.193(1)(b), and we decline to give it that interpretation today. We accordingly recede from our decision in Koch to the extent we held that an extraterritorial violation of the Florida Security of Communications Act was sufficient, standing alone, to support personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...VILLANTI, WALLACE, LaROSE, and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Thus, it is unlikely that the activities of the foundation would be sufficient to subject Neely to jurisdiction in Florida on the theory that he was operating a business in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(a)....

...rlo and that other forklifts in its possession in Florida contained the component manufactured by Harlo. Following a hearing, Harlo's motion to dismiss was denied. Case contends that the facts alleged in its amended complaint clearly bring it within Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1977), which states: "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and,...

...Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or or use, and the use or consumption resulted in the injury." Harlo admits that it comes within the scope of Section 48.193(1)(f)2 but that the application of this Section to the facts of this case is unconstitutional because the mere presence in Florida of Harlo's product is not sufficient contact for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over it by a Florida court....

...cause the pharmacist did not purposely avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Florida and did not have minimum contacts with Florida. *1330 In Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), we held that Section 48.193(1)(f)2 was unconstitutional as applied to a North Carolina automobile dealer, who serviced a car owned by Avis who later sold it at auction in Florida to a Florida resident who was injured in Florida, for the reasons set forth in the Dunn and Hanson cases....

...er business activities in Florida, are unrefuted by Case. There are no allegations showing that Harlo purposely availed itself of the privilege of carrying on business activities in Florida nor that it had minimum contacts with Florida. We hold that Section 48.193(1)(f)2 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case....

...Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514 (citing Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983)); Cable/Home, 902 F.2d at 856. In this instance, the relevant portion of the long-arm is its "Tortious Act Provision." [2] FLA.STAT.ANN. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...cts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself ... to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts:.... (b) Committing a tortious act in this state. FLA.STAT.ANN. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...In the present case, we do not reach the issue of minimum contacts because Mr. McKinney did not establish a statutory basis for long-arm jurisdiction. Mr. McKinney had the burden of alleging facts which, if proven to be true, would support specific personal jurisdiction over Resource Healthcare under section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (2003) (conferring jurisdiction for any cause of action arising from the "doing of" specifically enumerated acts in Florida), or general personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) (conferring jurisdiction over parties who engage in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida)....

...McKinney to provide sworn proof establishing sufficient facts to bring Resource Healthcare within the reach of the long-arm statute. The sworn testimony in the depositions filed by Mr. McKinney failed to establish those facts under either a theory of specific jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1) (by doing certain acts in Florida), or a theory of general jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(2) (by engaging in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida). A review of Mr. McKinney's complaint, at best, implicates only three statutory bases to confer long-arm jurisdiction over Resource Healthcare: (1) pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) based on allegations that Resource Healthcare committed torts in Florida; (2) pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a) based on allegations that Mr. McKinney's claims arose from a business that Resource Healthcare was operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on in Florida; and (3) pursuant to section 48.193(2) based on allegations that Resource Healthcare operated Glen Oaks Health Care, i.e., engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida....

...The affidavit refuted the allegation that Resource Healthcare ever established, conducted, managed, operated, or maintained Glen Oaks Health Care, and the deposition testimony did not establish otherwise. Thus, Mr. McKinney failed to establish long-arm jurisdiction over Resource Healthcare under section 48.193(1)(b). The jurisdictional reach of section 48.193(1)(a) was equally unavailing in the present matter....

...The deposition testimony failed to establish that Resource Healthcare did any of the foregoing acts. Likewise, the deposition testimony failed to establish that Resource Healthcare engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within Florida as required in order to bring it within the ambit of section 48.193(2)....

...s nonprofit subsidiary that was the licensee of the Glen Oaks Health Care Center. Ownership of a resident subsidiary corporation by an out-of-state parent corporation, without more, has been repeatedly deemed insufficient to meet the requirements of section 48.193....

...5th DCA 1996) (holding parent corporation's ownership of a subsidiary which conducted business in the state, without more, insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction); Qualley v. Int'l Air Serv. Co., 595 So.2d 194, 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding requirements of section 48.193 were not met for parent corporation which owned a subsidiary actively involved in business in Florida, even though parent corporation also performed certain accounting and payroll functions for its subsidiary)....

...s interference with contract (causing Frank and Broward Marine to breach the Asset Purchase Agreement). The complaint also alleged that appellant Carlyle, a resident of Michigan, was subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 Fla....

...ing in or carrying on a business in this state, or that he was engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state. Thus, the statutory basis for long-arm personal jurisdiction over appellant, if any, necessarily would have to be under section 48.193(1)(b), i.e., "committing a tortious act within this state." By the trial court's announced reliance on Wendt, it apparently came to the same conclusion. Although appellant clearly was not physically present in Florida when the alleged torts were committed, Wendt held that "committing a tortious act" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through a nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic or written communications into Florida, the physical presence of the defendant in Florida not being required....

...written communications to Frank's Florida lawyers. That argument overlooks, however, the further holding of the Wendt court that "... the cause of action must arise from the communications *1017 ... because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1)." In the Wendt case, as well as in each of the cases of Carida v....

...l requires service in triplicate of letters rogatory, which must be sent through and officially sealed by a "Central Authority" in each State of destination where the process is to be served. Plaintiffs rely on the provisions of the Florida Statutes Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm statute, and 15 U.S.C....

...state in which the district court sits. Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D.Fla.1981). The court must first look to the applicable state long-arm statute. Groome v. Feyh, 651 F.Supp. 249, 250-51 (S.D.Fla.1986). Florida Statutes Section 48.193 provides in relevant part: 1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person,...

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of *1249 this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1989)....

...ention requirements. Personal Jurisdiction In order to invoke the substantial activity provision of the Florida long-arm statute, plaintiffs must show that the defendant has engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity" with Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) (1989)....

...s for an annual meeting of Full Service to be sent out to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, based on these substantial activities within the State of Florida, Defendant Bustelo is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court *1250 pursuant to Florida Statutes section 48.193(2) (1989). Plaintiffs have also shown that Defendant Hamernik has committed tortious acts within the State of Florida which renders Hamernik subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Florida Statutes section 48.193(1)(b) (1989)....

...ormation when she attended a meeting where fraudulent misrepresentations were made to Plaintiff Pizzabiocche. These tortious acts clearly caused injury within the State of Florida and make Hamernik amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court based on section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes....

...s jurisdiction. Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1977); Young v. Young, 382 So.2d 355 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Tucker's first motion to quash should have been granted whether jurisdiction was claimed under section 48.071 or 48.193 because the record failed to show proper service of process on Tucker under either statute. Section 48.193 requires service by a sheriff in Tucker's state, pursuant to section 48.194....

...Service under section 48.071 requires proof that copies of the process were sent by registered or certified mail to the defendant. On August 25, 1978, the plaintiff belatedly filed the proof of service pursuant to section 48.071; but has not sought to complete service pursuant to section 48.193....

...the Lynne Ellen. Tucker told him Tucker was the owner, Joyce was the captain, and Tucker was aware that Dianne Electric was doing repair work on his boat. This status of the record would have been enough to establish jurisdiction over Tucker, under section 48.193(1)(g) had service been accomplished under section 48.194....

...Strict compliance with the steps outlined in the statutes for obtaining personal jurisdiction over non-residents not personally served in this state is required. McAlice v. Kirsch , Parish Mortgage Corporation v. Davis . The "reach" of section 48.071 is considerably "shorter" than section 48.193....

...NOTES [1] The appellant labeled this pleading a "Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Set Aside Default," but for purposes of this appeal, we ruled that it should be treated as a motion for relief from a final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). [2] Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). [3] §§ 48.071 and 48.193, Fla....

...er either Sections 48.081(1) or 48.181(1). The bare allegation in the complaint that the defendant has conducted business in Florida is not sufficient to overcome the defendant's affidavit to the contrary. Service of process was also defective under Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1977) (the Florida "long arm" statute) where the plaintiff failed to personally serve the defendant out of state pursuant to Section 48.194. Although Section 48.193(g) authorizes service upon non-residents who breach a contract required to be performed in this state, the exclusive method of service in such case is provided for in Section 48.194....

...Von Benecke is not a resident of Florida. However, under Florida's long arm statute, a Florida court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident where (insofar as pertinent here) the cause of action arises from the defendant's "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Where a Florida-based company is in the business of selling cruises which depart from Florida, sail into international waters, and return to Florida, plainly the company is engaged in business in Florida. The same analysis holds true for a ship's physician who, under a contract of employment, sails on such a ship. See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...onclude that the trial court should have dismissed the Blackmans' first amended complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The allegations of the first amended complaint establish that the only possible bases for jurisdiction are under sections 48.193(1)(a) or 48.193(2) of the long-arm statute. Section 48.193(1)(a) provides as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she i...

...of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. Section 48.193(2) states as follows: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...2d DCA 1996) (discussing the elements necessary to establish apparent or actual agency); State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So.2d 851, 854 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that control by the principal *85 over the agent is a necessary element of agency). The Blackmans' second argument is premised on section 48.193(1), which confers jurisdiction for "any cause of action arising from the doing of" any of the enumerated items, such as conducting business in Florida. By its terms, section 48.193(1) requires connexity between the defendant's activities and the cause of action....

...nd video shows that took place in Florida during one week per year. Rather, the claims arose out of alleged torts that occurred in North Carolina while the Blackmans' daughters attended the camp. Even if the undisputed facts fell within the ambit of section 48.193(1), Camp Illahee must have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements....

...ult of the yearly reunion and video shows is insufficient to establish that it could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Florida for the allegedly tortious conduct occurring in North Carolina. A second potential basis for jurisdiction is section 48.193(2), which provides that a defendant is subject to a Florida court's jurisdiction when the defendant "is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state ......

...fice of plaintiff. See Madax Int'l Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., 342 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); James A. Knowles, Inc. v. Imperial Lumber Co., 238 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). The jurisdictional prerequisites of section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), were fulfilled in that the complaint contains allegations to the effect that, in the words of that statute, defendant breached "a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contrac...

...diction in Florida). We do not agree with defendant's argument that Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), requires a different result. While Osborn, in contrast to Madax, holds that fulfillment of the prerequisites of section 48.193(1)(g) is not enough by itself to vest personal jurisdiction in Florida, Osborn supports the result we reach here....

...y anticipate being haled into court" in the state asserting personal jurisdiction over him. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 501 (1980).) On the other hand, in this case not only were the section 48.193(1)(g) prerequisites fulfilled by the contract in effect requiring defendant to pay plaintiff in Florida, but also the contract called for defendant to provide regular weekly reports to plaintiff in Florida and specifically provided for...

...Under these circumstances we conclude that the defendant should, as required by World-Wide Volkswagen, reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Florida for breach of the contract. In addition, in this case the aspect found to be lacking in McRae exists by virtue of the fulfillment of the prerequisites of section 48.193(1)(g)....

...Thus, we agree with Jefferson Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Greenman Group, Inc., 531 So.2d 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) which upheld Florida jurisdiction over a dispute apparently involving a breach of a contract in which the parties had agreed to Florida jurisdiction and the prerequisites of section 48.193(1)(g) had been fulfilled....

...Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264 , 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2002) ). 4 To establish the Court's personal jurisdiction over Honda, Plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to withstand a directed verdict that Honda is within the reach of Florida's long-arm statute, Florida Statute § 48.193....

...posed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction on the facts alleged could violate Honda's due process rights as well. See Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842 , 846 (11th Cir. 2010) ("The reach of [ Florida Statute 48.193(2) ] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citation omitted)....

...Plaintiffs contend that Honda has engaged in conduct that subjects it to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to three provisions of Florida's long-arm statute: 1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in [Florida] or having an office or agency in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(1). 2. Committing a tortious act within [Florida] Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(2)....

...[t]he defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or ... [p]roducts, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(6). Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege, as Section 49.193(1)(a)(1) requires, that Honda operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on business within Florida or had an office or agency within Florida 6 Nor do they allege, as Section 48.193(1)(a)(6) requires, 7 that they suffered any personal injury or physical property damage....

...eam of commerce" theory. They point out that Honda "has delivered a defective product into Florida for placement in the stream of commerce" (DE 98 at 7) such that specific personal jurisdiction over the Florida Plaintiffs' claims inheres pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...committing a tortious act in this state[.]" (DE 98 at 6). But these generalized statements-devoid of specificity as to Honda and in tension with specific allegations elsewhere in the Complaint-do not support an inference that Honda committed a tortious act in Florida as contemplated by Section 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...out-of-state defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction because "delivery of a defective product into Florida for placement in the stream of commerce ... constitute[d] 'committing a tortious act within this state' as provided" in the predecessor to Section 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...m to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to three provisions of Florida's long-arm statute: 1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in [Florida] or having an office or agency in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(1). 2. Committing a tortious act within [Florida] Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(2)....

...[t]he defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or ... [p]roducts, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within *1228 this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(6). As discussed above in relation to Honda's motion, the Complaint does not provide enough detail to support personal jurisdiction under either Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) or 48.193(1)(a)(6). There are no allegations in the Complaint that Atmel or Continental operated, conducted, engaged in, or carried on business in Florida or had an office or agency in Florida as Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) requires. Likewise, the Complaint does not claim that Plaintiffs suffered any personal injury or physical property damage as Section 48.193(1)(a)(6) requires....

...and September 2, 2009. (DE 50 ¶ 177). Plaintiffs claim these allegations establish that the Airbag Manufacturer Defendants committed tortious acts within Florida such that the Court may exercise specific 15 personal jurisdiction in comportment with Section 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...violate RNUR's due process rights. Id. at 1550 (emphasis in original). This holding-that a French corporation facing FSIA claims had sufficiently entered the United States' "stream of commerce" for due process purposes-is inapplicable to the Court's Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) analysis, where the relevant forum is Florida and not the United States....

...conduct substantial business in this District." (DE 50 ¶ 26). However, the Complaint contains no detail to support this statement as to Honda, leaving the Court unable to infer which of Honda's contacts with Florida support specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a)(1). It is well settled that allegations of economic injury alone do not establish the type of injury to persons or property within Florida required to establish personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a)(6)....

...erty damage' within the State of Florida." Aetna, 511 So.2d at 994 (interpreting predecessor to Fla. Stat. § 49.193 (1)(a)(6) ); accord. Hatton v. Chrysler Canada, Inc., 937 F.Supp.2d 1356 , 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (applying predecessor to Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(6) to exercise personal jurisdiction where plaintiffs sued after suffering physical injuries during accident); Reflection Mfg., LLC v....

...a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction" there. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760 . The mere presence of Atmel and Continental press releases on websites accessible in Florida does not establish personal jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(2) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

...2008), the Eleventh Circuit found that a Florida district court had specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who allegedly infringed the trademark of a Florida citizen on a website created by the defendant in another state. The Court found specific jurisdiction under Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(b) (current version at Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(2) ) because the alleged tortious conduct occurred in Florida " by virtue of the website's accessibility in Florida." Id....

...Here, however, Plaintiffs' alleged injuries in Florida do not flow from the accessibility in Florida of the press releases on Atmel and Continental's websites, but from the presence of the allegedly defective ASICs and ACUs in Plaintiffs' vehicles. Moreover, in finding personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(2) in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A....

...The trust specially appeared and moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction with affidavits reflecting that the trust has engaged in no activity in Florida other than to make this one loan to Paramount. Plaintiffs did not file any counter affidavits. Plaintiffs argued that Florida had jurisdiction over the trust by virtue of section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which gives Florida jurisdiction over a party who commits a tortious act in Florida....

...Sara validly contends that she was erroneously served in Tennessee pursuant to § 48.194, Fla. Stat. (1979). [*] The use of this statute requires that Aetna must have alleged a valid cause of action for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (1979). See § 48.193(2) and (3), Fla. Stat.; Gaskill v. May Bros., *146 Inc., 372 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); P.S.R. Assoc. v. Artcraft-Health, 364 So.2d 855, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The failure to adequately allege a basis for long arm jurisdiction under § 48.193, Fla....

...Stat., with the result there would be no in personam jurisdiction over Sara. See Gaskill, 372 So.2d at 99. In order to plead a valid cause of action for the exercise of long arm jurisdiction, Aetna must first allege sufficient facts to fall within the actual language of § 48.193, Fla....

...icial Circuit in Miami Dade County, Florida was the exclusive venue and jurisdiction for any action arising from, related to or in connection with the contract.... The jurisprudence of long-arm jurisdiction in Florida has traditionally been based on section 48.193, Florida Statutes. In Venetian Salami, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the acts required by section 48.193 to confer on Florida courts personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, were not coextensive with those minimum contacts necessary to satisfy Due Process....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1989). Rather, to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction exists, two inquiries must be made. First, a court must determine whether "the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of [section 48.193]; and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient `minimum contacts' are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements." Id....

...Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)). Generally, an agreement alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on Florida courts. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540 (Fla.1987). Decided in 1987, McRae addressed only section 48.193 and determined that "[c]onspicuously absent from the long arm statute is any provision for submission to in personam jurisdiction merely by contractual agreement." Id....

...Cushman & Assocs., Inc., 2006 WL 2599130, at *6 (M.D.Fla. May 15, 2006) (determining that section 685.102 provided an additional basis for jurisdiction). In section 685.102, the Legislature, by its clear terms, granted parties the very right that McRae and its progeny found conspicuously absent in section 48.193; the right to confer personal jurisdiction by agreement....

...ission to in personam jurisdiction merely by contractual agreement." See Four Star Resorts Bahamas, Ltd. v. Allegro Resorts Mgmt. Servs., Ltd., 811 So.2d 809, 811 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). These references, however, merely parrot the rule as it relates to section 48.193 and, we believe, have no effect on the impact of sections 685.101-.102.

...Bolton of Moore, Hill, and Westmoreland, Pensacola, for appellee. BARFIELD, Judge. W.R. Edwards, Jr. and Diane D. Edwards appeal from a nonfinal order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff sought jurisdiction over defendants under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), by alleging that they "were conducting, engaging in and carrying on a business or business venture in this state with an office or agency in this state....

...Legal Analysis When deciding whether a Florida court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident two inquiries must be made: First, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of one of the various jurisdictional criteria contained in Florida's long-arm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...5th DCA 2003) (quoting Law Offices of Sybil Shainwald v. Barro, 817 So.2d 873, 875-76 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)); see also Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989). "Resolution of the first issue requires statutory analysis of Florida's longarm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes, which bestows broad jurisdiction on Florida courts.... Section 48.193 provides two categories of personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction, conferred under section 48.193(1), and general jurisdiction, conferred under section 48.193(2)." Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp., 842 So.2d at 193 (citing Christus St....

...This analysis imposes a more restrictive requirement than the statutory analysis." Id. A. Defendants' conduct does not give rise to personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. Mr. Miller argues that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to assert specific jurisdiction over Defendants under sections 48.193(1)(a), (1)(b) and (1)(f), which provide: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or...

...ged in solicitation or service activities within this state; (2) Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. § 48.193, Fla. Stat. However, none of these bases for specific jurisdiction are supported in this case. First, Defendants cannot be subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a) because Defendants do not operate, conduct, engage in, or carry on a business or business venture in the State of Florida, nor do Defendants have an office or agency in this state....

...tion was ultimately exerted because organization solicited contributions from *1333 Florida residents using local television stations and Internet websites). Therefore, the Court concludes that there is no specific jurisdiction over Defendants under Section 48.193(1)(a). Second, Mr. Miller asserts that specific jurisdiction over Defendants is proper under Section 48.193(1)(b), which confers personal jurisdiction over parties who commit a "tortious act" in the State of Florida....

...Miller resided in Florida are sufficient to assert jurisdiction over Defendants. In support of his position, Mr. Miller relies upon Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252 (Fla.2002), a Florida Supreme Court opinion which held that "`committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendants' telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida." Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260....

...ction under these circumstances the cause of action must arise from the communications. Id. "First, in order to `commit a tortious act' in Florida, a defendant's physical presence is not required. Second, `committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida." Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260....

...In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the cause of action in this case does not arise out of the electronic communication between Mr. Miller and Mr. Berman. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that specific personal jurisdiction exists over Defendants pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f). Clearly personal jurisdiction cannot be exerted over Defendants under section 48.193(1)(f) because Defendants did not engage in "solicitation or service activities within the state," nor have any "[p]roducts, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured" by Defendants anywhere been used or consumed in the state of Florida....

...In addition to his assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants, Mr. Miller claims that the court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute. "General jurisdiction over a foreign defendant" is conferred on Florida courts pursuant to section 48.193(2)....

...not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. "Unlike the provisions of section 48.193(1), section 48.193(2) does not require a nexus between the cause of action and the defendants' contacts with the state." Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp., 842 So.2d at 194 (internal citations omitted)....

...See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989) (providing that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists where: (1) the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes; and (2) the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy constitutional due process concerns)....

...In Armaly, this court held that the PMA contract properly vests jurisdiction of these disputes in Florida courts and satisfies the requirements of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), in regard to "long-arm" service of process pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...in this state or having an office or agency in this state. (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. . . . . . (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (West Supp.1986)....

...ortious act section of the statute, as to defendants Feyh and Cann. The court finds, however, under the reasoning employed in Carida, that long-arm jurisdiction may extend to the actions of the defendant Fugitt, as a matter of state law, pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b), the tortious act section of the long-arm jurisdiction statute....

...The court, in Compuguide, found these contacts insufficient to invoke the provisions of Florida Statute § 48.181(1) (service upon a nonresident engaged in business in Florida). The operative langauge of section 48.181(1) has been found to be identical to the language of section 48.193(1)(a), the statute at issue here. Cases interpreting section 48.181(1) have been deemed to be applicable to section 48.193(1)(a)....

...Here, the only allegation is that the corporation is engaged in business in Florida, there is no connection alleged to have existed between the business conducted in Florida, and the harm which the plaintiff claims he has suffered. A recent change in section 48.193, the Florida long-arm statute at issue in this case, casts some doubt as to whether connexity is still a requirement under Florida law. In 1984, the Florida Legislature amended section 48.193 and appears to have eliminated the connexity requirement....

...The amended statute applies to all actions which accrued subsequent to the effective date of the statute. The effective date of the statute was April 25, 1984. Id. In the case before this court the acts complained of occurred in 1986. Therefore, the amended version of Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a) applies, rather than the former version of the statute....

...e agents of the corporation in order to bootstrap jurisdiction over agents being sued in their individual capacities. Excel Handbag Company, Inc. v. Edison Brothers Stores, Inc., 428 So.2d 348, 350 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983). Under the prior version of § 48.193(1)(a) there would not have existed sufficient connexity between Florida and the individual defendants to permit application of Florida long-arm jurisdiction, thereby making it unnecessary for the court to engage in consideration of federal due process requirements. The result under the new version of the statute is uncertain. Speculation as to the degree of connexity required, if any, under the amended version of § 48.193(1)(a), would necessarily place this court in the posture of making Florida law....

...ndant(s) is offensive to the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. For the reasons set forth above, the court has determined that, under Florida law, personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Feyh and Cann, may not be premised on subsection 48.193(1)(b) (commission of a tortious act in Florida). Additionally, as to any of the three defendants, jurisdiction may not be based on subsection 48.193(1)(g) (breaching a contract by failing to perform an act required by the contract to be performed in Florida)....

...ant Fugitt, this court must now measure defendant Fugitt's contacts against the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Additionally, due to the uncertainty regarding the degree of connexity required by the new Florida long-arm statute, in so far as section 48.193(1)(a) (the doing business provision), is concerned, the court will consider the requirements of due process in determining whether there exists in personam jurisdiction as to any of the defendants under the doing business subsection of the Florida long-arm statute....

...Robert Cann, to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction is GRANTED. The plaintiff's complaint stands DISMISSED, without prejudice. NOTES [1] In addition to subsections (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(g), the defendants also referred to subsection (1)(f) of section 48.193....

...place of shipment outside Florida, to its subsidiary. The subsidiary took delivery of the lumber in Jacksonville and stored it in its warehouse. From there, the lumber passed into the stream of intrastate commerce where it ultimately (allegedly) caused the plaintiff's injuries in Florida. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979), apparently gives the best basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over the appellant in this case....

...The appellant manufactured the allegedly defective lumber; its products were being used in Florida in the ordinary course of business; and the defective lumber allegedly caused the plaintiff's injury in Florida. However, it is well established that section 48.193 applies only to causes of action which accrued after its effective date: July 1973. [2] Since the plaintiff was injured in 1972, section 48.193 is not applicable....

...48.182 to this case may appear anomalous because this statute was repealed effective July 1973 and the suit was not filed until 1977. However this result is necessary to avoid creating a span of time between the effective dates of section 48.182 and section 48.193, when no "Long-Arm" statute would be in effect. The Legislature repealed section 48.182 effective on the date section 48.193 took effect, obviously intending there would be no such "gap" period. However, judicial interpretation has limited section 48.193 to causes accruing after its effective date....

...Long-Arm Jurisdiction & Minimum Contacts In order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient facts which bring the action within the purview of the applicable long-arm statute, in this case section 48.193(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...ellant with the required minimum contacts necessary under the fourteenth amendment. Meyer v. Auto Club Insurance Association, 492 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 1986). We can find no acts by the appellant which would place her within the Florida long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...are to be "turned over" to the appellee is, likewise, insufficient to show that the business is operated in Florida or that the appellant breached a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida. § 48.193(1)(a) and (g), Fla....

...tarily, not because of fraud or trick, and not to appear in court on an unrelated matter. Appellant is mistaken when he contests the court's personal jurisdiction of him on the ground that he lacks connection with the state of the kinds set forth in section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...In the instant case, the complaint alleges that Industrial Casualty breached the contract in Florida by failing to pay Consultant Associates for services it rendered. We find that the complaint alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring this action within Florida's long arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...Florida Statutes §§ 688.001, et seq. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is proper based upon diversity of citizenship. *1261 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003). The alleged grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction over Whitlock are Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a), (g) and (2), and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution....

...v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). "Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Id. 1. Florida Long-Arm Jurisdiction Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2003) provides that: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...Belize Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This "continuous and systematic" contacts requirement is sufficient to fulfill the constitutional due process requirements of minimum contacts. Id. Therefore, if Whitlock's activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), the minimum contacts prong of the jurisdictional analysis is also satisfied and this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Whitlock. Id. *1263 Here, the record in the above-styled cause establishes that Whitlock engaged in the necessary continuous and systematic business activities with Florida to satisfy § 48.193(2)....

...onsent to the personal jurisdiction of a court through a variety of legal arrangements (quotations and citations omitted)). In conclusion, the Court finds that it may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Whitlock pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution....

...1st DCA 1995), approved, 698 So.2d 1194 (Fla.1997); Datamatic Services Corp. v. Bescos, 484 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), disapproved on other grounds, McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540 (Fla.1987). [2] Florida's Long Arm Statute is inapplicable because the child was conceived in Illinois. See § 48.193(1)(h), Fla....

...In advancing this argument, GECC overlooks the trial court's valid assertion of in personam jurisdiction over it. We find that this assertion of personal jurisdiction over GECC clearly comports with the mandates of the Federal and Florida Due Process Clause. [4] See § 48.193(2), Fla....

...3d DCA 1984). Applying that rule to the allegations of NYS's complaint, the statute of limitations on NYS's action could not have begun to run until Patafio either became a resident of Florida, did business in Florida, or acquired property in Florida. See § 48.193, Fla....

...a prohibits the Court from finding personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute. Plaintiffs respond that Defendants have established sufficient contacts *1233 with Florida to comport with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of sections 48.1939(1)(a), (b), and (f)(1). See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (West 1999). Florida's long-arm statute is set forth under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (West 1999)....

...efendant outside this State, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: 1. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state. Id. Plaintiffs base personal jurisdiction over Defendants primarily on Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1)(b) (West 1999), which permits jurisdiction based on tortious conduct....

...Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983). However, Florida courts are "deeply divided" on the issue of whether a tortious act committed outside the state resulting in injury in the state produces personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b). Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216. While mindful of this rift in the Florida circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has found that "jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) `[is] not limited to a situation where an act in Florida cause[s] an injury in Florida but also ......

...cordance with Florida law. (Aff. of Patrick Dekle ¶ 11.) As in Robinson, the injury ultimately occurred in Florida when Plaintiffs suffered damages resulting from the alleged foreign malpractice. In light of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of § 48.193(1)(b) and the close relationship of the facts in this case to those in Robinson, Defendants' arguments *1234 fail under the first prong of personal jurisdiction analysis. Moreover, personal jurisdiction is proper under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...As the Court cannot decipher whether this Internet web-site existed at the time of the alleged malpractice and breach of contract, Plaintiffs arguments must fail in this respect. Plaintiffs also maintain that jurisdiction is proper under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193(f)(1)....

...1058 (M.D.Fla.1993), that jurisdiction is not proper under section (1)(f) where financial harm is the sole injury. In the present case, Plaintiffs' right to potential future compensation is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction under section (1)(f). In light of the above finding that personal jurisdiction exists under § 48.193(1)(a), (b), the *1235 Court must address the issues surrounding due process....

...ve not failed to do any act in Florida and are not otherwise subject to service of process issued by the circuit court. Bryan did not file any affidavits in support of jurisdiction. Bryan obtained service over the Newtons under a "long-arm" statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in part as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that...

...ictional allegations, then the defendant's motion to abate for lack of jurisdiction should be granted. Hickok Teaching Systems v. Equitech Training Systems, Inc., 421 So.2d 772 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Here, Bryan obtained service of process pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g) on the basis that the Newtons had breached a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state....

...Bryan was then required to substantiate his jurisdictional allegations which he did not do. *579 Because Bryan did not substantiate the allegation that the Newtons failed to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state, jurisdiction was not properly obtained under section 48.193(1)(g)....

...[2] On remand, the trial court must determine, after a full evidentiary hearing, the residence of the wife. Also, even if the wife is a Florida resident, such a fact would not, ipso facto, result in personal jurisdiction over the wife under the applicable provisions of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes (1991). Section 48.193 provides in pertinent part as follows: 48.193....

...Hargrave, 495 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Laney v. Laney, 487 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Mouzon v. Mouzon, 458 So.2d 381 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). [4] On remand, the husband must amend his petition for dissolution to allege the requisite jurisdictional requirements of section 48.193(1)(e) and the wife must be properly served pursuant to section 48.194 of the Florida Statutes (1991)....

...[2] See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 53 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1951). We note that in McIntyre the court equated domicile with the necessary residency requirement to file a dissolution of marriage action. [3] If the husband cannot plead and sustain service under section 48.193(1)(e), service by publication pursuant to section 49.021, Florida Statutes (1991) would be proper only as to matters for which publication is authorized provided all procedural requirements are complied with....

...fendant, whether they involve the defendant’s activities in Florida — if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2015) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2))....

...s that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida — if the claim asserted against the defendant arises from the defendant’s contacts with Florida, and those contacts fall within' one of the enumerated categories set forth in section 48.193(l)(a)....

...In determining whether the Court has personal jurisdiction over non-residents Projectavision and Maslow, the Court must apply a two-part analysis. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir.1996). The Court must first determine whether the Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193, Fla....

...[2] Each subsection of the Florida long-arm statute will be addressed separately. A. Carrying on a Business or Business Venture in Florida or Having an Office or Agency in This State. It is clear from the affidavits presented to the Court that Projectavision did not have an office or agency in Florida as required by § 48.193(1)(a)....

...l course of business in Florida for pecuniary benefit. The Court cannot conclude that the sum of the alleged activities constitutes "a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit" sufficient for personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)....

...ly contacts consisted of letters and telephone calls from Kentucky or Indiana into Florida and a single meeting attended by defendants' counsel in Florida). Musiker, therefore, cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over Projectavision and Maslow under § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...Committing a Tortious Act Within This State For purposes of this statutory analysis, the Court will assume that Projectavision and Maslow engaged in the tortious activity alleged in the Complaint. For personal jurisdiction to attach under the "tortious activity" subsection of the Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Having concluded that no substantial aspect of the alleged tort was committed in Florida, the Court need not address whether the injury to Musiker, if any, took place in Florida. C. Causing Injury to Persons or Property Within Florida Musiker argues the applicability of § 48.193(1)(f), Fla....

...Stat., which authorizes personal jurisdiction, in some instances, where injury occurs within Florida as the result of an act or omission by a defendant outside the state. However, mere economic injury without accompanying personal or property injury does not confer personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants under § 48.193(1)(f)....

...Aetna Life & Casualty Company v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla.1987). Musiker has not alleged personal injury or property damage in his Complaint. [9] Accordingly, there is no basis for personal jurisdiction over Projectavision and Maslow under § 48.193(1)(f). D. Substantial and Not Isolated Activity Within This State Finally, Musiker seems to indicate that jurisdiction may exist under § 48.193(2), which requires "substantial and not isolated activity" within Florida....

...Musiker via mail and fax and a presentation by Maslow to stockbrokers in Florida. These acts do not constitute "substantial and not isolated conduct" by Projectavision and Maslow which would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2)....

...o Lara because, as a result of their personal supervision or training of Dickey, which occurred in Florida, they knew or should have known that Dickey was a careless and dangerous driver. The trial court determined that Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2011), provided a basis for personal jurisdiction over the Airgas employees in Florida....

...Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The first step of the Venetian Salami analysis may involve a burden shift. First, the plaintiff must plead the basis for personal jurisdiction pursuant to the applicable long-arm statute — here, section 48.193....

...The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or 2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. § 48.193(1), Fla....

...ctions and conduct within Florida, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in Florida was precluded. In Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1993), this Court addressed the concept of an individual acting “personally” in-state as required by section 48.193....

...ining, or supervision of Dickey in Florida. The corporate shield doctrine, therefore, is inapplicable and does not exclude the Airgas employees from the exercise of personal jurisdiction by Florida courts. Our precedent and the statutory language of section 48.193 have never suggested that an actor who is present in Florida and commits tortious acts in-state is excepted from personal jurisdiction because he or she works on behalf of a corporation....

...Rather, our case law holds that a nonresident employee-defendant who works only outside of Florida, commits no acts in Florida, and has no personal connection with Florida will not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts simply because he or she is a corporate officer or employee. The explicit language of section 48.193(l)(b) clearly establishes that if one is personally present in Florida and commits a tort in Florida, one is subject to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts....

...f of a corporate employer or not, the corporate shield doctrine does not operate as a bar to personal jurisdiction in Florida over the individual defendant. Jurisdiction properly applies to “any person” who commits torts “within this state.” § 48.193, Fla....

...The plaintiffs allege that the Airgas employees acted tortiously within Florida, and the Airgas employees do not refute these allegations. We conclude, therefore, that the Airgas employees here are subject to the personal jurisdiction of Florida courts pursuant to section 48.193....

...ement that at the company "the buck stops here.” See Doe, 620 So.2d at 1006 . . See Hurt v. Kitroser, 50 So.3d 62, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (Farmer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Fourth District’s decision departs from the statutory language of section 48.193).

...The trial court dismissed the complaint against Walker based on lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. For purposes of personal jurisdiction, a person who commits a tortious act within Florida submits himself to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Quality Christmas Tree Co., Inc., (Quality), a Texas corporation, appeals the trial court's *1223 order denying its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse. [1] In determining whether jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant under section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1995), Florida's long-arm statute, two requirements must be met....

...The complaint alleged that Quality had agreed to purchase 5,915 hibiscus plants from Florico for $19,075. Florico shipped the plants to Texas but Quality failed to pay the agreed upon purchase price. In its complaint, Florico alleged jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1995), [2] stating that Quality failed to make payment in Florida as required by the contract....

...Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Quality's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. REVERSED and REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(1). [2] Section 48.193 enumerates certain actions which will subject nonresident defendants to jurisdiction in Florida courts....

...the denial of their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and to quash service of process. The appellee/plaintiff (Zara), a Florida physician, had invoked jurisdiction over these New York financial planners (Jasper) under subsections 48.193(1)(a), (1)(g), and (2), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...rm Statute. Further, after Jasper's motion and affidavits had sufficiently shown a lack of long-arm jurisdiction, Zara's responses failed to put forth any other facts which would support jurisdiction under either subsection (1)(a), (1)(g), or (2) of section 48.193. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989). Zara has not disputed Jasper's sworn factual proffers that under subsection 48.193(1)(a) he did not operate, conduct, engage in or carry on a business or business venture in Florida or have an office or agency here; that under subsection 48.193(1)(g) he did not breach a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed here; and, that under subsection 48.193(2) he did not engage in substantial, but only isolated, activity within this state....

...e bags of seed. The Florida corporation later sold the seed to two Florida residents, who in turn sued Pennington. Based partially on these allegations, Pennington contended that Murrow was subject to the jurisdiction of Florida's courts pursuant to § 48.193, Fla....

...*159 See also Guritz v. American Motivate, Inc., 386 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Thus, the initial inquiry is whether the allegations of the complaint are facially sufficient to support long arm jurisdiction pursuant to the actual language of § 48.193. Pennington's only meaningful argument on appeal concerns the applicability of § 48.193(1)(f)2, which reads as follows: 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed. 1283 (1958). For example, in Life Laboratories, Inc. v. Valdes, 387 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), the court pointed out the applicability of the "purposefully avails" test in construing § 48.193(1)(f)2, Fla....

...See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295, 297, 100 S.Ct. at 566, 567. Instead, it is readily apparent that Murrow has "purposely availed" itself of acting or conducting activities in Florida, and accordingly, Florida's exercise of long arm jurisdiction over Murrow, pursuant to § 48.193(1)(f)2, Fla....

...Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir.1973), reh. denied, 474 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.1973) (citations omitted). It is the first inquiry with which we are concerned in this case. The eleventh circuit court is concerned specifically with the applicability of section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use, and the use or consumption resulted in the injury. Interpreting section 48.193(1)(f)2 in the past, we said, to acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident pursuant to this section of Florida's Long Arm statute, the plaintiff must initially allege in the complaint sufficient jurisdictional facts to show that the nonre...

...purchased in Florida. We are unpersuaded and instead agree with the district court in Kravitz v. Gebrueder Pletscher Druck-Gusswaremfabrik, 442 So.2d 985 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), that such an interpretation of the statute is too restrictive. We think that section 48.193(1)(f)2 cannot necessarily be read in isolation to derive legislative intent....

...We do not think the legislature intended to deny a person the right to maintain an action in Florida, where the cause of action accrued and where the defendants are allegedly engaged in solicitation activities and promoting or distributing the same product as *1046 that which caused the injury in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(f)1....

...r lack of personal jurisdiction and motion to quash service of process. We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). Because TGSLC's acts were not sufficient to subject it to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1995), we reverse....

...ing telephone calls to Mr. Ward while he was in Florida. The complaint also alleged that TGSLC conducted business within Florida, and that all or part of the transactions complained of occurred in Hillsborough County, Florida. Mr. Ward contends that section 48.193(1)(a)-(b) confers jurisdiction over TGSLC....

...The enumerated acts include, in pertinent part: "(a) [o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state;" and "(b) [c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(a)-(b), Fla....

...Ward did not file an affidavit in response to TGSLC's motion to abate/dismiss and supporting affidavit. The assertions in TGSLC's affidavit refute the allegation in the complaint that TGSLC conducts business in Florida. To invoke Florida's long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under section 48.193(1)(a), the corporation's activities must be considered collectively and must show a general course of business activity in Florida for pecuniary benefits....

...Without more, TGSLC's actions in mailing debt collection letters and making telephone calls to Florida regarding a loan made to Mr. Ward by TGSLC do not demonstrate a general course of business activity in Florida for pecuniary benefits. Thus, jurisdiction does not exist under section 48.193(1)(a). Similarly, Mr. Ward has failed to establish that jurisdiction exists under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...Ward in Florida and from false statements allegedly made by TGSLC to credit reporting agencies. The complaint, however, fails to allege that any of the tortious conduct occurred in Florida. The occurrence of injury alone in Florida does not satisfy section 48.193(1)(b)....

...To establish personal jurisdiction, part of the defendant's tortious conduct must occur in Florida. Bower v. C.J. Timm Inv. Co., 630 So.2d 678 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Because we have determined that TGSLC is not subject to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193, it is not necessary to address the second inquiry as to whether sufficient minimum contacts have been demonstrated *933 to satisfy due process requirements....

...Alleging that the lessee had failed to make rental payments and that the lessor's then principal place of business was in Sanford, in Seminole County, Florida, the lessor sued the lessee in that county and served process on lessee in Georgia under a provision of the Florida long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...rida law; [1] under Florida law the payments are to be made where the payee resides or maintains his principal place of business and that is the proper place of payment and the place where the breach of contract for non-payment occurs, [2] and under section 48.193(1)(g) a person submits himself to the *1370 jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the breach of contract resulting from failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state....

...286, 287, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980). Plaintiffs amended complaint satisfies both prongs of the Venetian Salami inquiry with regard to Lucky Seven. First, the allegations are sufficient to bring Lucky Seven within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute. [2] See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...4th DCA 2000); Tallmadge v. Mortgage Fin. Group, Inc., 625 So.2d 1313, 1313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The record of the evidentiary hearing with conflicting facts resolved in favor of the trial court's decision also shows facts sufficient to meet the provisions of section 48.193(1)(g) to establish jurisdiction over Lucky Seven....

...Because the individual defendants were acting in their representative capacity on behalf of the limited liability company in executing the brokerage agreement, the circuit court correctly determined that it could not have personal jurisdiction over them under section 48.193(1)(g)....

...ty to contract allegedly breached). There still remains plaintiffs claim against the individual defendants for fraudulent inducement of the contract as a basis for jurisdiction, however. To lay jurisdiction under the "tortious activity" provision of section 48.193(1)(b) over the individual defendants, we agree that it is not necessary that the individual defendants actually commit physical acts within the state of Florida to be subject to jurisdiction. See Execu-Tech, 752 So.2d at 584. It is also true, however, as our supreme court has just held, that "`committing a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida." Wendt v....

...in light of Wendt. The court is authorized to take additional evidence in this regard if it be so advised. At this time, we therefore reverse only the order dismissing Lucky Seven. WARNER, J., and ROBY, WILLIAM L., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 48.193(1), Fla....

...reeing that actions against the guarantor may be brought in St. Johns County, Florida. The trial court denied the guarantor's motion to dismiss and the guarantor appeals. We reverse. Two inquires must be made in determining whether long-arm statute (§ 48.193, Fla....

...g affidavits, the Bank met its burden of showing jurisdiction based solely on the guaranty agreement attached to the complaint. C. Whether the facts as shown from the guaranty agreement show a basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the guarantor under section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...cumentary evidence that the trial court has jurisdiction over the guarantor. In the matter of proof, a plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the court via the long-arm statute does not satisfy the requirement of section 48.193, Florida Statutes, by alleging facts which show only a possibility of jurisdiction....

...While the guaranty agreement attached to the complaint may have indicated the possibility of jurisdiction, the Bank did not prove jurisdiction and thus did not meet its burden. GUARANTOR'S MINIMUM CONTACTS The Bank contends that the facts show that the guarantor is subject to long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, because the guarantor signed the guaranty agreement in Florida and the guarantor agreed to make payment on the promissory note obligation in the event of a default. Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natura...

...At the hearing on Lavin's motion to dismiss, the trial court heard argument from both sides and denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. As grounds, the court stated in pertinent part: Plaintiff also asserts that long-arm jurisdiction over Lavin is appropriate pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(b), which states that a person is subject to the jurisdiction of Florida's courts if the person commits a tort in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...Just as in Acquadro, although Lavin states in his affidavit that he denies that he made any misrepresentations to Plaintiff, Lavin does not deny that he may have called Plaintiff in Florida. As it is the telephone conversation that is the asserted basis of jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b), and Lavin does not deny that he called Plaintiff in Florida, pursuant to Acquadro, this Court has long-arm jurisdiction over Lavin....

...If the affidavits cannot be reconciled to enable the trial court to decide the issue on undisputed facts, then a limited evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the jurisdiction issue. Id. at 503. Carter alleges a statutory basis for jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which states: (1)Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if...

...roof shifted to [the plaintiff] to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] had in fact committed the tort of civil conspiracy *368 within Florida and was therefore subject to this Court's long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(b)[.] Id....

...engaged in telephone conversations with persons in Florida, in which one of the appellants defamed plaintiff and both made statements which were the basis of claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. Personal jurisdiction was alleged under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), which subjects a non-resident who commits a tortious act within Florida to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts....

...The first part of this inquiry is not an issue in this appeal. During the proceedings below, Concord conceded that QSR's complaint, which included a count for breach of contract, alleged sufficient facts to bring it within the scope of subsection (1)(g) of Florida's long-arm statute. See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...Perhaps the best example of this is the Supreme Court's analysis in Burger King. Rudzewicz was a Michigan resident who allegedly breached a franchise agreement that he had entered into with Burger King, a Florida corporation. See 471 U.S. at 464, 105 S.Ct. 2174. Burger King filed suit in Florida, relying upon section 48.193(1)(g) of Florida's long-arm statute, and Rudzewicz sought to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction....

...s" contacts with the State of Florida to subject Concord to general jurisdiction, QSR did not include any such allegation in its complaint or make this argument during the proceedings below. Instead, QSR sought to bring its claim within the scope of section 48.193(1)(g), breach of contract in the State of Florida....

...Aetna Life and Casualty Company (Aetna) appeals an order granting appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that "there are insufficient allegations to bring Defendant within the provisions of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes." We agree and reverse....

...Noting that it was not clear from the purchasing manager's affidavit whether Therm-O-Disc's district manager visited ECU in connection with the contract described in the amended complaint, the court gave Aetna fifteen days within which to file a further affidavit. Instead, Aetna filed this appeal. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981), lists the acts which will subject a person to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the specified acts....

...injury to a Florida corporation or its subrogee. Hyco Manufacturing Company v. Rotex Industrial Corporation, 355 So.2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). However, Aetna has sufficiently pled jurisdictional facts showing that Therm-O-Disc's conduct falls within section 48.193(1)(g), which provides that a person who "[b]reaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state" subjects himself "to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any c...

...The reasonable foreseeability factor is frequently applied to force a nonresident defendant to answer a suit within the forum if it "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum...." (cites omitted). In Lacy, the allegations in the complaint grounded jurisdiction on section 48.193(1)(g), based upon delivery to a Florida corporation of a printing press which did not conform to the specifications in the contract....

...deemed a fortuitous, nondeliberate act, since "he purposefully employed the normal channels of commerce as a conduit to market his product in another state." 403 So.2d at 1056. The Lacy court considered that the legislature, through its enactment of section 48.193, has expressed an important policy consideration that Florida residents whose contracts are to be performed in this state shall be protected here from any potential *89 breach of their contracts by out-of-state persons....

...act breach, upon which in personam jurisdiction over appellee appears to rest. [3] BOOTH, C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING BARFIELD, Judge. In its motion for rehearing, appellant asserts that this court improperly interpreted section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1981), misapprehended the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Hyco Manufacturing Company v....

...Murrow Brothers Seed Company, Inc., 400 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Yale Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gulfstream Galvanizing and Finishing, Inc., 481 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Appellant argues that the latter case "represents the proper interpretation of § 48.193(1)(f) and case law construing said section." We reject appellant's assertions and the construction placed upon the statute by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Yale Industrial Products. In Yale, the court found that the complaint properly pled jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f)(2) where it alleged that defective equipment manufactured by Yale was sole to Material, a Florida corporation, and then to Gulfstream, a Florida corporation, and that the equipment caused "injury" to Gulfstream (damages for failed components and lost production time). The court rejected Yale's contention that the "injury to persons or property" to which the statute refers must consist of bodily injury or physical property damage, citing Pennington in support of its finding that the term "injury" as used in section 48.193(1)(f)(2) "is not confined solely to bodily injury or physical property damage, but also includes the type of damages alleged by Gulfstream." 481 So.2d at 1306. Pennington involved a suit for breach of implied warranty, negligence and false labeling of seed. This court held that the defendant/third-party plaintiff properly alleged jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f)(2) over a third-party defendant who "processed soybean seed which was delivered to and used in Florida in the ordinary course of commerce, and the use of that seed resulted in injury to persons or property within this state." 400 So.2d at 159....

...he plaintiff in that case involved a physical accident which did not take place in Florida, so that no matter what the financial ramifications in Florida of the accident in Ecuador, plaintiffs not only did not, but could not plead jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(f). 355 So.2d at 473. Our construction of the statute is based on logic and the plain meaning of the language of section 48.193, not on the holding in Hyco....

...As to appellant's assertion that the instant decision has created interdistrict conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision in Yale Industrial Products, we again note the factual distinctions, but feel compelled to address what we consider to be an improper interpretation of section 48.193(1)(f)(2) which would appear to make the statute vulnerable to constitutional challenge....

...specific subsections of the long arm statute. The court sets out the factual allegations of "the complaint" and without further discussion declares, "The relevant section of [the] statute, against which the activities of Yale are to be measured, is section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1981)." 481 So.2d at 1305. Notwithstanding the possibility that jurisdiction might properly have been based on another subsection of the statute, [1] the court interpreted section 48.193(1)(f)(2) to allow a suit for products liability where the only "injury" alleged is financial....

...This interpretation ignores the law in Florida with regard to products liability [2] and the plain language of the subsection at issue, as well as its relationship *91 to the other subsections of the long arm statute. [3] We find the more logical interpretation of section 48.193, and one that is in better harmony with the body of Florida law and the constitutional requirements of due process, to be that the Florida Legislature intended to subject to the jurisdiction of Florida courts those who act within this...

...its South Carolina plant, the product was delivered in Florida. The court held that this demonstrated sufficient "connexity" between Canron's business activities in Florida and the cause of action sued upon. It should be noted, however, that the finding of personal jurisdiction in Canron was based on section 48.193(1)(a) ("doing business" in Florida), and that the record indicates a continuous course of dealing between Canron and the Florida corporation over many years....

...If the complaint is so amended, and the jurisdictional allegations are properly challenged, appellant will then be required to prove its allegations. [1] Because the status of the parties is unclear, we cannot tell whether jurisdiction was or could have been pled under 48.193(1)(a) (doing business in Florida) or under 48.193(1)(g) (delivery of nonconforming goods)....

...The allegations of the complaint and the allegations of the motion to dismiss filed by Yale suggest that jurisdiction might have been based on one or both of these subsections. Although the court noted that the determination of Material's status as Yale's distributor was not relevant to a showing of jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(f)(2), and makes no specific determination that the equipment was sold by Yale to Material in Florida (only that Yale sold "products directly to a Florida customer, Material"), both of these determinations would be relevant to a showing of jurisdiction under subsections (a) and/or (g)....

...ctured by the nonresident anywhere. Presumably, these would include tortious acts and breaches of contract outside the state involving merely financial losses in commercial transactions. If this were the intent of the Florida Legislature in enacting section 48.193(1)(f), why then did the legislature also enact section 48.193(1)(b) (authorizing jurisdiction over anyone who commits a tort within this state) and section 48.193(1)(g) (authorizing jurisdiction over anyone who breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform an act required by the contract to be performed in this state ), given that the usual remedy in such cases is an award of damages f...

...DISCUSSION Defendants allege that personal jurisdiction is lacking because no party has the requisite minimum contacts with the State of Florida. Also, Defendants controvert Plaintiff's application of Florida's long-arm statute, claiming that they are not subject to the provisions of Ch. 48.193, Florida Statutes. A. Florida Long-Arm Statute In this case, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to *477 Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm statute. Thus, the Court must look first to Section 48.193. Florida Statute Section 48.193 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural perso...

...Products, materials, or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade or use. (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla.Stat. Section 48.193 (1995)....

...The Court relies on Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983) in stating that Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on Plaintiff. 1. Ch. 48.193(1)(f) The Court notes that in Aetna Life & Casualty Company v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So.2d 992, 993-94 (Fla.1987), the Florida Supreme Court held that Ch. 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes, does not apply when the alleged injury is financial and there are no allegations of personal injury or physical property damage. The subject of this case is financial damage alone. *478 2. Ch. 48.193(1)(g) As to Ch. 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not alleged a breach of contract. This section of the long-arm statute cannot apply to this case. 3. Ch. 48.193(1)(b) In making its determination as to Ch. 48.193(1)(b), the Court first looks to the facts alleged in the Complaint....

...McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 514 N.E.2d 116 (1987); Hammond v. Butler, Means, Evins & Brown, 300 S.C. 458, 388 S.E.2d 796, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 952, 111 S.Ct. 373, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 (1990). This Court further notes that federal cases have held that jurisdiction under Ch. 48.193(1)(b) is not limited to a situation where an act in Florida caused an injury in Florida but also.......

...Although Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a substantial aspect of the alleged tort was committed by the non-resident Defendants in Florida, L.O.T.I. Group Productions v. Lund, 907 F.Supp. 1528, 1532 (S.D.Fla. 1995), the Court concludes that Defendants' actions meet the statutory requirement of Ch. 48.193(1)(b)....

...the light most favorable to Benages, and the uncontroverted facts, Benages cannot establish that Smith PLC was the alter ego of the Smith U.S. Defendants. In the instant case, Benages relied on the "alter ego theory," not Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2009), to establish personal jurisdiction over Smith PLC....

...Accordingly, we reverse the order under review and remand with instructions to enter an order granting Smith PLC's Motion to Dismiss. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] As Benages was traveling under the alter ego theory of long-arm jurisdiction, not section 48.193, it was not required to establish the "two-step process for establishing long-arm jurisdiction as set forth in Venetian Salami Co....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989)." Bellairs v. Mohrmann, 716 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The two-step process is as follows: "First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of [section 48.193]; and if it does, the next inquiry is whether sufficient `minimum contacts' are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements." Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502 (quoting Unger v....

...¶ 3), in its opposition memorandum Plaintiff confines its argument regarding satisfaction of Florida's long-arm statute to the contention that Defendant has "committed a tortious act in this state." ( See Doc. 25 at 7). Thus, the Court limits its analysis to this argument. [3] Plaintiff relies on section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which provides for jurisdiction in this state over any person who "commit[s] a tortious act within this state" where the cause of action arises from that act....

...(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 40). In North American Philips Corp. v. American Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1994), the Federal Circuit examined whether a tortious act had been committed in Illinois, where the long arm statute — paralleling section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes — provided for jurisdiction "`as to any cause of action arising from' ....

...Conclusion In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) filed by the Defendant, Instantpublisher.com, is GRANTED and this case is hereby DIMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall close this file. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides for specific personal jurisdiction over persons who "conduct[] . . . a business or business venture in this state. . . ." [2] Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides for general personal jurisdiction over "a defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state....

...stablished by the complaint and affidavit are legally insufficient to show personal jurisdiction over Defendants. He argues that the undisputed facts shown thereby are sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants pursuant to section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...te at the time of contracting. * * * * * * (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Sutton argues that jurisdiction was established under each of these subparagraphs of section 48.193(1), and that, in any event, the court erred in not granting an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed facts. Although the Smith affidavit obviously disputed certain facts in the sworn complaint, we conclude that the undisputed facts were sufficient to support the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Appellees under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), and thus do not reach Appellant's arguments regarding subparagraphs (d) and (g)....

...et out by the supreme court in Venetian Salami Company v. J.S. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989). First, the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the section 48.193, Florida Statutes, the Florida long-arm statute....

...sistent with the intent of the agreement that Sutton transfer all compensation received from golf-related activities to the partnership for the benefit of the joint venture. These undisputed facts place the joint business venture within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), as they show that the members of the joint venture were operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on the business venture in Florida. Having found sufficient undisputed jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a), we turn now to the remaining inquiry, as set out in Venetian Salami, into whether Appellees had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to meet due process requirements....

...Both prongs must be satisfied for the court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. A. Long-Arm Statute Florida’s long-arm statute authorizes an exercise of personal jurisdiction where a claim arises from a defendant “Committing a tortious act within this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(2)....

...cts” provision of the long-arm statute with another, independent basis for jurisdiction—“Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)(l)....

...And Florida’s long-arm 1 statute expressly incorporates this well-established principle by stating that the acts enumerated in the statute, including committing a tortious act within the state, may give rise to personal jurisdiction when done “personally or through an agent.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Meier, 288 F.3d at 1270 & n....

...Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Defendants object to this court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them because they contend first, their activities do not fall within the ambit of Florida long-arm statute 48.193(1)(g); and second, even if Section 48.193(1)(g) applies, defendants' contacts in or with Florida are insufficient to satisfy constitutional due process concerns. The issue of in personam jurisdiction in a federal diversity action is governed by the law of the state in which the federal court sits, Gordon v. John Deere Co., 466 F.2d 1200, 1200 (5th Cir.1972), and *615 thus this court looks to Section 48.193(1)(g) for guidance....

...y cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following: .... Breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Defendants submit that they are not amenable to service under Section 48.193(1)(g) because the plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate that the subject contract required the defendants to perform any acts in Florida. Florida courts require substantial proof before they are willing to authorize in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under Section 48.193(1)(g)....

...te the factual allegations in the complaint." Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., 519 F.Supp. 1162, 1168 (S.D.Fla.1981) (relying on Cosmopolitan ). Under the Cosmopolitan/Bloom test, the plaintiff must first allege facts which clearly justify the application of Section 48.193(1)(g) as a matter of law....

...Belcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., 342 So.2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977). The court finds that these allegations and pleadings are sufficient to satisfy the initial pleading requirements of the Cosmopolitan/Bloom test in general, and Section 48.193(1)(g) in particular....

...licable. The complaint clearly shows that at least one of the agreements in question—the Promissory Note—requires payment to plaintiff in Florida. This constitutes the performance of an act in Florida the failure of which falls within the ambit of Section 48.193(1)(g)....

...Lakewood Pipe moved to quash service of process, and the appellate court complied, holding that a guarantee of a contractual obligation requiring payment to be made to a creditor in Florida does not constitute sufficient contact with Florida to permit that state to exercise jurisdiction over the guarantor under Section 48.193(1)(g)....

...is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: * * * * * * (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(b) (West Supp....

...carries the burden of proving facts showing jurisdiction to be proper. Oriental Imports & Exports, 701 F.2d at 891. The plaintiff here alleges that the defendant committed several torts within the state, making personal jurisdiction proper under subsection 48.193(1)(b)....

...*578 In International Harvester Co. v. Mann, 460 So.2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984), the court stated that "a plaintiff seeking to assert long-arm jurisdiction over a non-resident must allege in his complaint sufficient facts to fall within the language of § 48.193 Fla.Stat." The court can find no support for the defendant's contention that the failure to identify the particular long-arm statute by number renders the complaint "fatally defective." Nor can the court find merit in defendant's argument t...

...should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here." World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). An assertion of specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, as is sought here under § 48.193(1)(b), requires that the defendant have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." Shaffer v....

...Seebach, Jr., and Laurie Seebach. (a) Rule 12(b)(2) Motion of Henry F. Seebach, Jr., and Laurie Seebach. As before, the court will rule on the jurisdictional issue before considering whether the claim was stated by the complaint. In testing jurisdiction under § 48.193 Fla.Stat., the plaintiff must initially allege in the complaint sufficient jurisdictional facts to show compliance with the statute....

...We disagree. Appellee concedes that if the same rack had been purchased in Florida there would be sufficient minimum contacts so as to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction. The issue presented by the facts is a very narrow one. Appellee argues that under Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981), [1] the purchase of a product *987 outside the state, which product is then brought into the state for private use, does not enter the state in the ordinary course of commerce or trade for jurisdictional purposes....

...Applying the Shoei rationale, we hold that the defendant's activities in the state, i.e., the sales to an independent Florida distributor of bicycle racks, the likes of which caused injury to a person within the state, constitute sufficient minimum contacts for the purpose of jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981), [3] without offending traditional due process requirements as set forth in International Shoe Co....

...re to the Florida Supreme Court under Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi). The motion for rehearing is otherwise denied. FERGUSON, Judge (concurring to certification). Although I would adhere to the position that this case, based on an interpretation of Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981), does not present the same question as was before the court in General Tire, which was decided under Section 48.181, I agree to certify the question as one of great public importance. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1981) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person and, if he...

...Although we are persuaded by Shoei in this decision, the precise issue which presents a conflict between Shoei and General Tire is not presented here. [4] We do not decide whether there would have been sufficient minimum contact for purpose of jurisdiction over the person under Section 48.193(1)(f)2 alone if defendant's bicycle racks had not been distributed in the State of Florida....

...v. Mowday, 431 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (defendant, an Illinois corporation, which supplied webbing material used in hot air balloon in which decedents were riding when they were killed, was not subject to jurisdiction of Florida courts under Section 48.193(1)(f)2 where defendant did no advertising and had no offices, agents, employees, representatives, distributors or salesmen in the state, and therefore did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process require...

...major supplier; and breaching their common-law duties of loyalty to Lorenz. Leibinger filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging the court's lack of personal jurisdiction over him. The lower court granted the motion to dismiss, and relying on section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), [1] concluded that [o]nce Leibinger filed his affidavit contesting the validity of the complaint's allegations concerning jurisdiction, the burden of proof shifted to Lorenz to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Leibinger had in fact committed the tort of civil conspiracy within Florida and was therefore subject to this Court's long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(b)[.] (Emphasis added.) We agree with appellant that the court applied an incorrect burden to Lorenz in granting the motion to dismiss....

...in Florida were "essential to the success of the tort." Id. (emphasis added). Accord Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 394 (11th Cir.1988). See also Musiker v. Projectavision, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 292, *360 296 (S.D.Fla.1997) (under section 48.193(1)(b), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants "`committed a substantial aspect of the alleged tort in Florida'") (emphasis added); Rebozo v....

...entry into the state, but only that Florida be the place of injury). Accord Koch v. Kimball, 710 So.2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Silver v. Levinson, 648 So.2d 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). REVERSED and REMANDED. ERVIN, MINER and KAHN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(b) provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal...

...g haled into court there. Corporacion Aero Angeles, S.A. v. Fernandez, 69 So.3d 295, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). With respect to Seuling, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of the long-arm statute. Under section 48.193(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2012), “a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of this state by ‘[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.’ ” Hartcourt Cos. v. Hogue, 817 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (quoting § 48.193(l)(g), Fla....

...ifornia property. As to the lawyer, Pirrotti, under the first step in the Venetian Salami analysis, there was no basis for long-arm jurisdiction because the complaint did not sufficiently allege that he committed a tortious act within Florida. Under section 48.193(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), long-arm jurisdiction may be exercised where the “cause of action aris[es] from ......

...Indeed, jurisdiction may be conferred “through the nonresident defendant’s telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida” so long as “the cause of action ... arise[s] from the communications.” Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260 . The wording of section 48.193(l)(b) links jurisdiction to the “arising” of a cause of action from a defendant’s commission of tortious acts in Florida....

...After the defendant later “told the Pennsylvania bank to withdraw” the letter of credit, the plaintiff sued the defendant for tortiously interfering with its business relationship with the Florida bank. Id. at 317 . Given these circumstances, the fifth district held that there was no jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(b) because the revocation of the letter of credit, “[t]he only act which might be deemed tortious[,] ......

...[the defendant] allegedly interfered were based in Florida”); PK Computers, Inc. v. Indep. Travel Agencies of Am., Inc., 656 So.2d 254, 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (recognizing that for there to be jurisdiction over a tortious interference claim under section 48.193(b), the interference must occur within the state or arise from oral statements directed at listeners within the state); Hunt v. Cornerstone Golf, Inc., 949 So.2d 228, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that under section 48.193(l)(b) a tortious interference claim arose not in Florida, but in Washington, D.C....

...be applied to obtain jurisdiction in the absence of the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state. Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). While the mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1989), Florida's long-arm statute, as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents will not automatically satisfy the due process minimum contacts requirement, the Florida Supreme Court has noted that "implic...

...hing appellants' minimum contacts with Florida after considering the pleadings and affidavits. The court lastly found that appellee also satisfied his burden of proof of establishing that Florida has long-arm jurisdiction over appellants pursuant to section 48.193....

...quid petroleum storage tank. The tank was installed at a Marathon Shores motel. In 1979, the tank exploded, causing serious personal injuries and extensive property damage. "Personal" service was attempted on Weatherhead in Cleveland, Ohio [7] under Section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1979), the provision of the long-arm statute which applies under some circumstances when a product manufactured elsewhere causes injury within the state of Florida....

...3d DCA 1980), and cases cited. [8] Second, and more significant, it was established that the product manufactured by Weatherhead was made and distributed sometime in the 1950s well before the 1970 effective date of the original statutory predecessor of Section 48.193....

...[1] The two resident limited partners filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer on the basis of improper venue. The trial court denied all of the motions. Each of the non-resident defendants was found to be subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of the court under section 48.193, Florida Statutes, by virtue of their having engaged in a business or business venture in Florida....

...We agree with appellants that the trial court erred in finding that jurisdiction was properly exercised over the two non-resident appellants based on either their having engaged in a business venture within the state of Florida, or on the limited partnership's ownership and use of property in the state of Florida. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, enumerates several acts which, if performed by a non-resident defendant or his agent, will subject the defendant to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts for any cause of action arising out of the doing of the act. Among the acts listed in section 48.193 are the following: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state....

...There is no indication in the record that Third National's assignment of the notes to Peoples in any way altered the condition that the notes be paid in Tennessee. Under these facts, the complaint filed by Peoples failed to allege sufficient facts which would establish any of the bases for long-arm jurisdiction enumerated in section 48.193(1)....

...evelopment and construction of townhouse units. Under the facts, we found the cause of action to have arisen out of the active conduct of business in Florida under the partnership agreement, subjecting the defendant to in personam jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)....

..., to confer Florida jurisdiction over the guarantors. Edwards v. Geosource, Inc., 473 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). [4] Aside from the two bases found by the trial court, the only other possible basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the appellants is section 48.193(1)(g), the breach of a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida....

...he appellants in Georgia guaranteed payment of a Tennessee debt. The fact that the Tennessee notes were executed by the partnership for the purpose of *864 purchasing property in Florida does not subject the appellants to long-arm jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(g), since the guaranty agreements do not require the performance of any acts within the state of Florida. Cf. Moltz v. Seneca Balance, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 612 (N.D.Fla. 1985) (finding non-resident guarantors to have had sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to permit the federal district court to exercise jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(g), where the underlying promissory note required payment to be made in Florida)....

...the case where the Notice of Objection to Referral to General Master constituted a general appearance and a waiver of the Husband's objections to the court's personal jurisdiction; and (3) the Husband is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2002), where he resided in Florida preceding the commencement of the dissolution proceedings and the testimony given by the Husband, his cousin, and his accountant concerning the Husband's legal residence was not credible....

...She also does not challenge that she was personally served in New York by the sheriff. Her sole basis to attack the judgment is that her nonresidency was not alleged in the complaint, and therefore, service of process upon her was invalid. [1] *1133 The focus of our analysis is Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193, enacted in 1973, which establishes the basis for personal service....

...For the first time in Florida, this statute authorized personal service outside the state on "[a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state" for any cause of action arising from any of the specified acts, which included "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." § 48.193(1)(b)....

...ts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in s. 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as if it had been personally served within this state. § 48.193(3). Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant may be obtained if it is established that the defendant committed one of the acts listed in paragraphs (a) through (g) of section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, (1993), the act committed gave rise to the action sued on and "the method of service of process comports with statutory requirements." April Industries, Inc....

...ufficient to plead the basis for service in the language of the statute without pleading the facts supporting service." See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). To plead the basis for personal service in this case under section 48.193, an allegation that the defendant committed a tortious act in Florida complies with the dictates of rule 1.070(h) and tracks the statutory language upon which service is based. [3] We hold that section 48.193 does not require an allegation of nonresidency in the complaint to render personal service valid, where the complaint contains a statement that the automobile accident occurred in Florida....

...As a nonresident owner, the defendant was subject to substituted service under section 48.171 if his motor vehicle was operated in this state with his consent, as long as his nonresidency was alleged in the complaint. When the plaintiff in Plummer argued that personal service was properly made under section 48.193, the court noted that to support personal service under the long arm statute, one of the "exhaustive list of acts" set forth in that statute must be alleged in the complaint. Because the owner of the motor vehicle in Plummer did not commit a tort in Florida, the defendant did not fall under subsection 48.193(1)(b) relied on here for personal service....

...Consequently, we reverse the trial court's order finding jurisdiction over Taskey and remand with instructions to grant Taskey's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. STEVENSON, GROSS, JJ., and LABARGA, JORGE, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and,...

...o attend his funeral. Hoyne set the motion to quash for hearing without filing a counter-affidavit. Although the complaint alleged that long-arm jurisdiction was based on substantial and not isolated activity within Florida, tracking the language of section 48.193(2), the trial court denied the motion based on its conclusion that the situs of the trust was Florida....

...See Price v. Point Marine, Inc., 610 So.2d 1339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (holding that sporadic visits do not constitute substantial activity). Furthermore, these visits were not the reasons argued by Hoyne. Hoyne contended that jurisdiction existed under section 48.193(4) because Lampe sought affirmative relief in the probate proceedings....

...Mandina & Ginsberg and Mark Ginsberg, Hollywood, for appellee. Before HUBBART and FERGUSON, JJ., and TILLMAN PEARSON (Ret.), Associate Judge. PER CURIAM. A plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the court via a long-arm statute does not satisfy the requirement of Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983) by alleging facts which show only a possibility of jurisdiction....

...ce because defendant could not reasonably anticipate being sued in Florida. (footnote omitted). Here, the complaint alleged that Aero Angeles breached a contract by failing to pay Fernandez a commission in this state, thus bringing the action within section 48.193(g) of the Florida long-arm statute: "Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Whether the trial court found that Aero Angeles agreed to pay Fernandez a commission is subject to debate....

...re denied. From that interlocutory order, Astra has perfected this appeal. The record reflects that Astra manufactured the gun in question and sold it to Garcia's predecessor in interest in the early 1960's. Astra was served with process pursuant to Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981), the Florida Long Arm Statute....

...ted the jurisdictional defect. It seems to us hypertechnical to suggest that it was waived and we hold that under the facts of this case the question was not waived. Astra's second contention presented by this appeal is that service of process under Section 48.193 was ineffective because *1033 1) the allegations of the third party complaint and counterclaim were insufficient to support resort to that method of service and 2) the wrongful acts complained of, if any, were not subject to the Long A...

...t in which the claimant was injured by the explosion of a petroleum tank maintained and serviced by the defendant gas company. Predictably, the gas company third partied Weatherhead Company, the manufacturer of the tank, who was served in Ohio under Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Furthermore, the court held the Long Arm Statute was not available for service of process in that case because the facts showed the tank in question was manufactured and distributed by Weatherhead in the 1950's, well before the effective date of the original statutory predecessor of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Florida’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over non-residents under two circumstances. First, a non-resident submits itself to Florida’s specific jurisdiction by performing any of the acts enumerated by' the -long-arm statute. Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193 (l)(a)(l)-(9)....

...Second, a non-resident submits itself to Florida’s general jurisdiction by “engaging] in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise ... whether or not the [plaintiffs] claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...Here, Plaintiffs have not established that the Court has either specific or general jurisdiction over Kavlico or Cirrus. iii. Specific jurisdiction In analyzing the issue of specific jurisdiction, a court must first determine whether one of the acts set out in section 48.193(1) of the Florida long-arm statute is applicable to the case at hand....

...the alleged acts as contemplated by the long-arm statute. Regardless of the enumerated act by which a plaintiff asserts specific jurisdiction, the complaint must allege a cause of action “arising from” that enumerated act in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)....

...13-CV-23766, 2015 WL 11018438 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2015) (same). 2. Committing a tortious act The Florida long-arm statute also provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who commits a tortious act in Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)(2)....

...3. Breach of contract The Florida long-arm statute confers specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who breaches “a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1); Advanced Bodycare Sols....

...onfer jurisdiction. 4. Causing injury to persons or property in Florida The Florida long-arm statute also provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who causes injury to persons or property within the state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)(6). Plaintiffs have not alleged personal injury within the *1326 state and therefore, they have not established that personal jurisdiction exists under Section 48.193(l)(a)(6)....

...stantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...ing the court's jurisdiction over their persons. The trial court denied the motion as to all defendants and this appeal ensued. Before moving to the main issue, it should be noted that plaintiffs elected to proceed under Section 48.181 as opposed to Section 48.193. Section 48.181 specifically deals with non-residents who engage in or carry on a business or business venture in the state. Section 48.193, on the other hand, in addition to listing the foregoing business activity, specifies other conduct, e.g., the commission of a tort within the state, which will also subject non-residents to the jurisdiction of Florida courts....

...erved. The acceptance of the privilege is signification of the agreement of the persons and foreign corporations that the process against them which is so served is of the same validity as if served personally on the persons or foreign corporations. Section 48.193(2) holds that: Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in s....

...An affidavit of the officer shall be filed, stating the time, manner, and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent evidence, in determining whether service has been properly made. It is readily apparent that Sections 48.181 and 48.193 provide different methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction over non-residents. Section 48.181 permits process to be served upon the Secretary of State, while 48.193 requires process to be served in the usual manner upon an individual, albeit out of state....

...Rather, plaintiffs contend that Nuzzo as president of the corporation, and Goldapple, [3] as secretary of the corporation, fraudulently misrepresented certain information to induce the sale. Arguably, such an allegation might subject an individual to long-arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193, Florida *1356 Statutes (1979), (the commission of the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation within the state), but plaintiffs chose not to pursue this path....

...ing in the Nevada action. The action against these nonresident defendants in Florida is based on the allegation that, in continuing the Nevada lawsuit after they knew that plaintiffs were not liable, they committed a tortious act within Florida. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...See Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 818, 121 S.Ct. 58, 148 L.Ed.2d 25 (2000). In Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1259 (Fla.2002), the supreme court explicitly rejected the notion that section 48.193(1)(b) necessarily requires that the nonresident actor be physically present within Florida in order to be subject to our jurisdiction for committing a tortious act here....

...III. Florida's Long-arm Statute Miot asserts that the exercise of jurisdiction over the three non-resident defendants is consistent with both the Florida long-arm statute and federal due process standards. The Florida long-arm statute, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193 (West 1981 & Supp.1993), states, in pertinent part, that a non-resident of Florida who, personally or through an agent, does any of the following acts, submits himself to the jurisdiction of Florida's courts for any cause of action arising from such acts: Operates, conducts, engages in, or carries on a business or a business venture in this state or has an office or agency in this state. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(a) (West 1981 & Supp.1993)....

...In this seaman's personal injury action which arose at sea and has no "connexity" to this state, the trial court held that the defendants' vessel's sporadic visits and other contacts with Florida did not constitute the "continuous and systematic" activity necessary to sustain a claim of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1985) (requiring "substantial and not isolated activity within this state")....

...Rather, a forum selection provision can be enforced only after an independent basis is established for the Florida court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the objecting, non-resident defendant. In McRae, the defendant had engaged in none of the acts set forth in section 48.193 so its motion to quash service should have been granted. Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes, sets forth specific acts subjecting a non-resident defendant to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. VVI alleged in its complaint that Holiday failed to pay amounts due to it and that "All amounts due and owing were payable in Orlando, Orange County, Florida." VVI points out that subsection 48.193(1)(g) provides for the assertion of jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for "breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required *289 by the contract to be performed in this state." Holiday initially counters...

...shifts to the plaintiff, to prove by affidavit, the basis upon which jurisdiction may be obtained. Accord Walt Disney Co. v. Nelson, 677 So.2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Holton v. Prosperity Bank of St. Augustine, 602 So.2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Subsection 48.193(1)(g) is based upon the premise that refusal to make contractually required payments in Florida causes foreseeable injury in Florida....

...silent as to the place of payment. It is well settled that the legal presumption that a debt is to be paid at the creditor's place of business in the absence of an express designation of the place of payment is sufficient to satisfy the language in 48.193(1)(g) that refers to contractual acts "required" to be performed in Florida....

...The jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, in alleging that "All amounts due and owing were payable in Orlando, Orange County," when considered in connection with the language of the purchase agreement, is legally sufficient to allege personal jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1)(g)....

...The contract additionally provided that the defendant would send weekly reports to the plaintiff's Pinellas County office. No place of payment was designated so that the place of payment would be at the Florida office of the plaintiff creditor. The appellate court noted that the prerequisites of subsection 48.193(1)(g) were fulfilled and went on to consider the constitutional requisites for personal jurisdiction....

...2d DCA 1979) where the constitutional requisites were not found. The court explained in Osborn that the execution of a contract with a Florida resident does not establish sufficient minimum contacts even where the defendant's failure to pay falls within the wording of subsection 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...Because Wall and Adsit are alleged to have committed purposeful, non fortuitous, intentional tortious acts on Wood and his associates located in Florida, the promoters are deemed to have subjected themselves to the long-arm jurisdiction of Florida courts under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...National Yellow Pages further alleged that A.V.C. sent at least 144 checks to it in Florida in continuous business transactions over a period exceeding three years. National Yellow Pages sought to obtain jurisdiction over A.V.C. pursuant to the provisions of section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1985)....

...First, the requirements of Florida's long-arm statute must be properly alleged. Second, jurisdiction still does not exist unless the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state to satisfy due process requirements. Lakewood Pipe. Florida's long-arm statute section 48.193(1)(g) provides that a person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state if he breaches "a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." A.V.C....

...However, in Burger King Corp., particularly in light of a provision in the franchise documents which provided all disputes would be governed by Florida law, the Supreme Court held that the federal district court in Florida properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g) over the Michigan franchisees....

...over Bayou and denying its Motion to Amend its Complaint. Consequently, the issues before this Court are whether Gerber's Complaint alleging that Bayou committed acts of Conversion and Civil Theft within Florida satisfies Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(b) and the constitutional minimum contacts requirement, and whether the circuit court should have allowed Gerber to amend its Complaint pursuant to Rule 1.190(a), to allege sufficient jurisdictional grounds....

...sdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute; and if it does, the court must then consider whether sufficient minimum contacts are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 502. Florida Statutes, section 48.193, provides two categories of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), which provides: "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida], whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, whether or not the claim arises from that activity[,]" § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2004), and specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), which confers jurisdiction over any person who commits a tortious act within Florida. § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). In the instant case, Gerber alleged specific jurisdiction over Bayou under section 48.193(1)(b), claiming Bayou's commission of a tort in Florida....

...sdiction standard where Gerber clearly alleged specific jurisdiction over Bayou. While it is true that under the general jurisdiction standard the defendant must be involved in substantial, not isolated, and continuous contacts within the State, see § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2004), for specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff need only show that the defendant's contact within the State resulted in, among several options, a tortious act. § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...On the undisputed facts, Bayou held the subject seafood in its name, in Miami, and refused Gerber's ownership claim and request to return the property. It is clear that Gerber alleged sufficient jurisdictional allegations to subject Bayou to personal jurisdiction in Florida courts under section 48.193(1)(b) to defend itself from a Conversion and a Civil Theft claim....

...occurred within Hillsborough County, Florida." And though SMLL and SMIL were alleged to be limited liability corporations existing under the laws of Nevada and the United Kingdom, respectively, the second amended complaint did not contain any reference to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2017)....

...f the long-arm statute. If it does, then the trial court must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts are shown to satisfy due process requirements." Id. (citation omitted) (citing Rautenberg v. Falz , 193 So.3d 924 , 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ). Section 48.193 lists the acts that may subject a nonresident defendant to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction. See § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(9)....

...Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. 2. Committing a tortious act within this state. .... 7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. § 48.193(1)(a)(1), (2), (7)....

...two-step inquiry. See Bellairs v. Mohrmann , 716 So.2d 320 , 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). However, because we hold that the second amended complaint lacks sufficient allegations to establish Florida's long-arm jurisdiction over SMLL and SMIL under either section 48.193 or the alter ego theory of long-arm jurisdiction, the Appellees'/Plaintiffs' reliance is misplaced. We will address each argument in turn. *146 A. Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) : Committing Tortious Acts in Florida The Appellees/Plaintiffs contend primarily that both SMLL and SMIL submitted themselves to the trial court's jurisdiction by committing various torts in Florida through their agent, JEA....

...At the outset, it is clear that the Appellees/Plaintiffs failed to make any specific allegations that SMLL and SMIL breached a fiduciary duty, aided and abetted such a breach, or conspired to facilitate one. While these are undoubtedly valid intentional torts that would fall under the scope of section 48.193(1)(a)(2), the Appellees/Plaintiffs simply failed to plead these claims....

...nd SMIL controlled the actions of the purported agent, JEA. Accordingly, we conclude that the second amended complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations for the trial court to exercise its long-arm jurisdiction over SMLL and SMIL under section 48.193(1)(a)(2). B. Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) : Maintaining an Office in Florida The Appellees/Plaintiffs next contend that SMLL submitted itself to the jurisdiction of Florida courts by "having an office" in Florida. 2 See § 48.193(1)(a)(1)....

...As stated earlier, Florida's long-arm statute grants jurisdiction "for any cause of action arising from ... [o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." Id. To sufficiently bring an action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1), it appears necessary to plead either that a nonresident entity has an office in Florida or, at a minimum, a "de facto office" in Florida....

...board members, the complaint's allegation that the corporation had a "de facto office" in the home of one of its board members was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Venetian Salami inquiry and bring the plaintiff's action within ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1) ); Premier Hotel Corp. v. M Grp. Resorts, S.A. , 753 So.2d 647 , 647-48 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the basis for jurisdiction was sufficiently shown under section 48.193(1)(a) because (1) the nonresident corporation had an office in Florida as shown by the corporate president's letterhead and business cards and (2) the corporation conceded to performing some services in Florida on the contract at issue)....

...See 515 So.2d at 1357 . Thus, because we must strictly construe the long-arm statute in favor of the nonresident defendant, we conclude that the second amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to subject SMLL to the trial court's jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(1)(a)(1). C. Section 48.193(1)(a)(7) : Breach of Contract The next issue is whether the second amended complaint contains sufficient allegations to allow the trial court to exercise its jurisdiction over SMLL based on a breach of contract theory. See § 48.193(1)(a)(7) ("A person ......

...without cause or justification." There are no other factual allegations that could establish that SMLL breached a contract. Accordingly, the Appellees/Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to subject SMLL to the exercise of the trial court's jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)(7)....

...Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over SMLL and SMIL based on an alter ego theory of long-arm jurisdiction. Conclusion Because the Appellees/Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege a basis for jurisdiction under either section 48.193 or the alter ego theory, we reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the second amended complaint and remand for further proceedings....

...ions contained in the initial dealer application or the six invoices at issue. We do not labor long over Nelson's jurisdictional argument as we find it to be without merit. The trial court clearly had in personam jurisdiction over Nelson pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g) Florida Statutes (1997) [1] for his alleged breach of the guaranty....

...ing an office *741 in the State of Florida; and/or (e) committing tortious acts in the State of Florida. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, because they did not fall within the ambit of the long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2007), and because they had so little contact with Florida that subjecting them to the jurisdiction of a Florida court would offend constitutional due process considerations....

..."Both parts must be satisfied for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant." Am. Fin. Trading Corp. v. Bauer, 828 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Looking first at the long-arm statute, we hold that the defendants are subject to Florida's jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), which allows a Florida court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who "personally or through an agent ....

...commit[ed] a tortious act within this state." In Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla.2002), the supreme court held that "making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into this State" can amount to the commission of a "tortious act within this state" under section 48.193(b), "provided that the tort alleged arises from such communications." A "defendant's physical presence" in Florida is not required to commit a tortious act in Florida under the long-arm statute....

...ida's long-arm statute."). Relying on Wendt, we held that defamatory comments posted in an internet chat room "that were targeted to Florida residents, or people likely to seek medical care" in Florida were electronic communications that fell within section 48.193(1)(b)....

...See also, Core Industries v. Agostinelli, 591 So.2d 207, 210 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (Farmer, J., dissenting); Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.Fla. 1981). The only relevant [9] portion of the long-arm statute involved here is section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...*1073 PSI was not a guarantor [10] of Callahan's obligations to Rollason under the Agreement. Rather, Rollason was a guarantor under the letter agreement. The record is totally devoid of any evidence that PSI had any duty or obligation to indemnify Rollason. That obligation belonged solely to Callahan under the Agreement. Section 48.193(1) requires that a cause of action must arise from doing one of the listed acts in that section....

...be futile. See Spradley at 613; Bill Williams Air Conditioning & Heating v. Haymarket Co-op Bank, 592 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). REVERSED. COBB and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction under Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). [2] § 48.193, Fla....

...At the same time, Rollason delivered in Florida a substantial cash payment to the Pluess-Staufer and Callahan representatives. [9] It is clear that PSI did not operate nor conduct a business in Florida, nor engage in substantial activities within the state. § 48.193(1)(a) and (2). Nor did PSI contract to insure a party in this state under 48.193(1)(d), as that section refers to risk insurance....

...co-defendant, Plus Products Corporation (against which the amended complaint is pending in the trial court) on various product liability theories. Valdes attempted to subject Life Laboratories to the long-arm jurisdiction of the Florida courts under Section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...[2] In order to invoke a statutory right, a pleader must either allege ultimate facts to activate the statute or show how the statute applies. 25 Fla.Jur. Pleadings § 57. Valdes' amended complaint did not do either but instead merely tracked the qualifying language in Section 48.193(1)(f)2 and, standing alone, this is insufficient....

...The amended complaint must be gauged by the foregoing allegation to determine whether Valdes pled sufficient ultimate jurisdictional facts to render Life Laboratories personally amenable to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. [3] The constitutionality of Section 48.193(1)(f)2, was sustained in Electro Engineering Products Co., Inc....

...559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Horace v. American National Bank and Trust Company, 251 So.2d 33 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). In Aero Mechanical Electronic Craftsman v. Parent, 366 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), that court articulated the test by which to activate Section 48.193(1)(f)2, as follows: We ......

...or that they controlled those determinations made by Plus Products. There were also no allegations that Life Laboratories distributed its products to Plus Products Corporation with the anticipation that the product would reach Florida. In construing Section 48.193(1)(f)2, a nexus more substantial than a mere possibility that a product might reach this state must be pled and, if controverted, overcome....

...Accordingly, we reverse the interlocutory order appealed from and remand the cause with directions to dismiss the amended complaint, without prejudice, for lack of in personam jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.R. App.P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). [2] 48.193 Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...Accordingly, the opinion dated May 16, 2012, is withdrawn, and the attached opinion is substituted therefor. The revised opinion — which does not affect the disposition of the case — reflects that the court considered and rejected the Appellee’s assertion of long-arm jurisdiction over the Appellants under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2010), as well as section 48.193(l)(a)....

...ownership of, leasing of, operation of, management of, and/or consultation with nursing homes, including PALM TERRACE OF LAKE-LAND, within the State of Florida. Based on such allegations, Ms. Knobloeh asserted that each of the Appellants was subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts in accordance with section 48.193(l)(a), (2), Florida Statutes (2010). Section 48.193(l)(a) provides that any person, whether or not a citizen of Florida, is subject to the jurisdiction of this state’s courts for any action arising out of “[operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business ve...

...See White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So.2d 886 , 889 n. 4 (Fla.1990) (“ ‘Connexity’ is the term courts have adopted to mean a link between a cause of action and the activities of a defendant in the forum state.”). If there is a basis for jurisdiction under section 48.193(1), the plaintiff must still establish that the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Florida to satisfy due process of law....

...The test is whether “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Section 48.193(2) provides that “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Section 48.193(2) “does not require connexity between a defendant’s activities and the cause of action.” Camp Illahee Investors, Inc....

...Thus the Appellants have little, if any, connection with Florida other than their indirect interests in the nursing home’s operating company and the interest of some of the New York trusts in the management company. That said, the Appellants agree that Ms. Knob-loch pleaded a basis under section 48.193 for service of process on the Appellants in New York....

...of nursing homes and the nonresident officers and employees of such entities. “Ownership of a resident subsidiary corporation by an out-of-state parent corporation, without more, has been repeatedly deemed insufficient to meet the requirements of section 48.193.” Res....

...Knobloch’s claims. Ms. Knobloch has failed to establish any connexity between the Appellants’ financial interests in the nursing home and the alleged abuse from which her claims arise. See Camp Illahee Investors, 870 So.2d at 85 (“By its terms, section 48.193(1) requires connexity between the defendant’s activities and the cause of action.”). Ms. Knobloch has also failed to show that the Appellants have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to establish personal jurisdiction over them here. Thus Ms. Knobloch did not prove a basis for long-arm jurisdiction over the Appellants under section 48.193(l)(a)....

...ng home, we conclude that Ms. Knobloch did not establish that the Appellants are engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida. Accordingly, Ms. Knobloch *183 did not prove a basis for long-arm jurisdiction against the Appellants under section 48.193(2)....

...This is an appeal from a non-final order denying appellants' motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The issue on appeal concerns whether appellants were engaged in a business venture or committed a tortious act within the state of Florida within the meaning of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...considered unreasonable *1193 by Medical Economics. The remaining count is an action for conspiracy against the same defendants. The jurisdictional allegations are: 4. That this court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193....

...view by Physicians. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. On appeal, the parties agree that resolution of the jurisdictional question centers on whether appellants were engaged in a business venture under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), or committed a tortious act within the state of Florida pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...attenuated and appellants' alleged invocation of the benefits and protections of Florida law is dubious. We need not decide this constitutional issue, however, because appellants' activities do not meet the requirements for jurisdiction contained in section 48.193(1)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes. Appellants' letters and telephone calls from Kentucky or Indiana into Florida seeking to convince ORMC to reduce their bills do not constitute "doing business in Florida" for purposes of 48.193(1), Florida Statutes....

...We conclude appellants were not engaged in a business venture in Florida; rather they were engaged in a business venture in Indiana or Kentucky that from time to time entailed communication with at least one Florida hospital. This will not support jurisdiction under 48.193(1)(a). We also reject appellee's tort theory of jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...1986); First National Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). We have considered McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1987), but do not find it controlling because in this case the court has in personam jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...rfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company. The issue below and here on appeal is whether or not the court has jurisdiction over Vancel who is a nonresident of the State of Florida. He *128 was served with process under Florida's long-arm statute, § 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...not advertised in Florida and has made no deliveries in Florida; that decedent was a customer of his but that any purchases made by him were made in Georgia and delivered to him in Georgia; that he was billed at his store in Thomas County, Georgia. § 48.193, Florida Statutes (1975), provides in pertinent part as follows: "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who ......

...95 (1945); Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. (A) Florida's Long Arm Statute Although Plaintiffs do not allege any particular provision under the Florida Long Arm Statute as a basis for the court's jurisdiction, their arguments indicate that they assert jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1) [5] . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1) (West 1994). Section 48.193(1) addresses specific jurisdiction, permitting jurisdiction over defendants who engage in certain enumerated acts which give rise to the particular litigation....

...within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. Id. In the present case, the memoranda, affidavits, and testimony presented for the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction demonstrate that Connor is not subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1). First, the evidence does not support Plaintiff's allegation that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 48.193(1)(a)....

...[7] There was no evidence *1533 presented or alleged that indicates Connor ever sold any of LOTI's products to any other Florida or United States resident. Finally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Long Arm Statute section 48.193(1)(f)....

...Connor because the Constitutional prong of the two-part analysis cannot be satisfied under the facts of this case. III. DUE PROCESS The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts." Cable/Home Communication Corp., 902 F.2d at 857....

...tapes in Florida, Defendant Connor has advertised and sold his own books to Florida residents, both under his own name and under his pseudonym `Jo Jo Gonzalez.'"). [5] The Plaintiff's arguments also indicate that Plaintiff seeks to assert jurisdiction under Section 48.193(2) which addresses the Court's ability to exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(2) (West 1994). Section 48.193(2) provides that the court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who is engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity within the state ......

...oof. Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transport, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986) ( citing Electro Engineering Products Co. v. Lewis, 352 So.2d 862 (Fla.1977)). JOHN SCOTT alleges in his responsive Motion that personal jurisdiction exists under Section 48.193(1)(a) and (1)(g) of Florida Statutes. Personal jurisdiction exists when any person, who personally or through an agent, either carries on a business in Florida or breaches a contract by failing to perform acts required to be performed in Florida. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(a), (g)....

...Specifically, Defendant Cilcorp alleges that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead personal jurisdiction as to Cilcorp, or to allege facts which might demonstrate general or specific jurisdiction as to Cilcorp under Florida Statute section 48.193(2)....

...ction is determined according to the law of the state in which the district court is situated. Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F.Supp. 1245 (M.D.Fla.1991). The court must first look to the applicable state long-arm statute, in this case Florida Statute section 48.193....

...Defendant Cilcorp's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also contends that Plaintiff has not alleged facts by which either "general" or "specific" jurisdiction such as would permit service of process under Florida Statutes sections 48.081(5) or 48.193(1)....

...No such assertions have been made by Defendant. Taken together in a non-commercial setting, these facts are sufficient to establish *401 "minimum contacts" and to provide Defendant with notice of the possibility of answering to a court in Florida. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(g); Burger King, 471 U.S....

...during the time period in question. Defendant Cilcorp's Motion to Dismiss argued that Plaintiff failed to plead personal jurisdiction as to Cilcorp, or to allege facts which might demonstrate general or specific jurisdiction as to Cilcorp under Florida Statute section 48.193(2)....

...ith no resident agent in Florida. III. RECONSIDERATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF PROCESS & SERVICE OF PROCESS Defendant Cilcorp's memorandum stated that Cilcorp had engaged in no activity which would make it susceptible to jurisdiction under Florida Statute section 48.193, Florida's Long-Arm Statute....

...In the absence of Florida Supreme Court precedent, federal courts must adhere to decisions of Florida’s intermediate courts. Id. (internal citations omitted). Wrave argues that it is not subject to either specific or general jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193 , and that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause [D.E....

...In response, Plaintiff has submitted a series of exhibits demonstrating Wrave’s contacts with Florida, mainly through its business ties with Florida-based cruise lines [D.E. 72], . 1. Specific Jurisdiction Plaintiff argues that Wrave is subject to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(a)(l), which confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims arising against a defendant who is “operating, • conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or...

...s conduct in Florida meets the criteria for specific jurisdiction [D.E. 71 at 3], but Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that Wrave is a business operating in this state, or that Wrave has an office or agency in Florida as required, by § 48.193(l)(a)(l)....

...General Jurisdiction A Florida court may also exercise jurisdiction over a defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise ... whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and lack of jurisdiction over the person. Prior to the court's ruling on this motion, both defendants were personally served in Illinois under the Florida long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987)); Maschinenfabrik Seydelmann v. Altman, 468 So.2d 286, 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Here, KYL concedes that there are sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring this action within the purview of the long-arm statute-specifically, section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1999), which applies to product liability suits....

...porations are totally dominated and controlled by, and serving merely as the alter egos of, appellant. Appellee sought damages for a claimed breach of the employment agreement. Appellant submitted an affidavit intended to negate the applicability of section 48.193, Florida Statutes, as a method by which personal jurisdiction might be obtained....

...y substantiated the necessary factual allegations so as to subject appellant to the jurisdiction of the Florida court. [4] We therefore affirm the order appealed. MILLS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Appellee's complaint did not expressly cite section 48.193, Florida Statutes, but the pleadings and affidavits indicate the factual basis upon which jurisdiction is asserted and the parties litigated the applicability of the statute....

...Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 918 (11th Cir.1989). In Florida law, a forum selection clause is not a sufficient basis for a conferral of personal jurisdiction unless there is an independent basis for personal jurisdiction under § 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000), Florida's long arm statute....

...ecisions of Florida's intermediate courts. Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627. Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed and when a defendant challenges jurisdiction the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove personal jurisdiction. Id. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 provides jurisdiction when a defendant engages in activity specifically enumerated in the statute or through substantial activity. Plaintiffs must establish that Simmons engaged in the activity enumerated in Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1) or had substantial activity in Florida under subsection (2). Plaintiffs do not contend that Simmons's actions fall under subsections (1)(b)-(f) or (h), and these appear to be inapposite under the circumstances. The relevant provisions of Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1) are as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, *1350 if he or she is a nat...

...or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. * * * * * * (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)....

...)(g) to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction absent a provision wherein Simmons consented to litigation in this forum. c. Substantial Activity Plaintiffs alternatively seek to prove that this Court has personal jurisdiction through Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) which states: (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. 8 Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...The Insurance Policies Posner has alleged facts, unrebutted by Salem, that establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction over Salem under the Florida long-arm statute. The long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to those who “[c]ommit[] a tortious act within th[e] state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...not extend jurisdiction to the out-of-state defendant under these circumstances. See, e.g., Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. v. Ward, 696 So. 2d 930, 932 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“The occurrence of injury alone in Florida does not satisfy section 48.193(1)(b)”); McLean Fin....

...negotiate the bonus dispute, bringing Salem within subsection (1)(g) of the long-arm statute, which covers defendants alleged to have “[b]reach[ed] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(g)....

...Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A. FLORIDA'S LONG-ARM STATUTE In this case, the RTC relies upon the following provision of the Florida's long-arm statute, Florida Statutes, Section 48.193: *359 (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: . . . . . (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(b) (West 1994)....

...stantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(2) (West 1994)....

...contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements. Id.; see also Kin Yong Lung Indus. Co. v. Temple, 816 So.2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The allegations of Ronstrom's complaint established that the only basis claimed for jurisdiction was under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himsel...

...at owns the Colonial Care Center and Rosenberg's and Rector's interest in Greystone is unavailing and does not establish that the Appellants conduct business in Florida so as to subject them to the long-arm jurisdiction of Florida courts pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a). Furthermore, assuming the undisputed jurisdictional facts fell within section 48.193(1)(a), the Appellants must have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements....

...To obtain in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading sufficient facts to permit Florida courts to exercise jurisdiction. Cosmopolitan Health Spa, Inc. v. Health Industries Inc., 362 So.2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that a foreign resident who breaches a contract in Florida, by failing to perform acts in Florida required by the contract, submits itself to the jurisdiction of Florida. However, to fall within the scope of section 48.193(1)(g), a foreign resident must have an association with Florida other than just being a party to a contract with a choice-of-law provision specifying Florida as the jurisdictional forum....

...Given Dunham and the above facts, it would appear that payments by the guarantors, the Harrises, were to be made in Florida. The fact that payment was to be made in Florida, and the fact that payment was not made, would appear to be enough to bring the Harrises within the scope of section 48.193(1)(a)....

...4, 1973. The Freys sought to obtain long-arm jurisdiction *99 over Sackett under section 48.182, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1970). Sackett moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but its motion was denied. At the outset, Sackett argues that section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979), is the applicable long-arm statute because Mr. Frey was not injured until 1980. Section 48.182 was repealed as of July 1, 1973, and replaced by section 48.193....

...e husband periodically comes to Florida to visit their daughter, and (7) the husband makes business trips to Florida. The husband filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the wife had failed to allege a sufficient basis under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), for Florida to exercise jurisdiction....

...The trial court denied his motion and found that Florida does have personal jurisdiction over him because he has significant contacts with the state. [1] The First District Court of Appeal vacated the order concerning personal jurisdiction and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. It held that section 48.193(1)(e) (the section of the statute discussing prior residence in Florida) required prior residence in Florida proximate in time to the commencement of the action....

...f this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage. § 48.193, Fla.Stat....

...through the Supreme Court's case law. Consistent with this, Florida *994 has enacted several such "long arm" statutes which enumerate the specific situations in which jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is proper. See Ch. 48, Fla.Stat. (1993). Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), is one of Florida's long arm statutes....

...Therefore, the relevant analysis in determining whether it was proper for the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over the husband in the instant case is to examine whether he or his conduct falls within one of the statutory sections. The wife argues that section 48.193(1)(e) confers jurisdiction in the instant case....

...s voluntary payment of support in this State, do not have relevance to whether or not the prior residence provision of the statute applies. Because the Garretts jointly abandoned Florida as their state of residence, the wife lost the "protection" of section 48.193(1)(e). Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993) does not provide a basis for Florida courts to exercise jurisdiction over the husband....

...Riera-Gomez, 899 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over a party, a trial court must first determine whether the Complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...ction over Defendant. Florida's statute provides that a person who "breaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state" are subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)....

...concedes that the allegations of its complaint asserted only that Laser was a Texas corporation and that Gentzler was an individual; however, C.E.S. relies on the exhibits attached to its complaint as pleading the basis of service over Laser in the language of section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1988), the Long-Arm Statute....

...gs did not sufficiently allege personal jurisdiction over Gentzler, the guarantor of the contract between C.E.S. and Laser. Herman v. Sunset Commercial Bank, 481 So.2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). C.E.S. argues that its complaint satisfied the language of section 48.193(1)(d) which provides for personal jurisdiction over any person: (1)(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting....

...Furr, Boca Raton, for appellee. BERANEK, Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal by defendant from an order relating to jurisdiction over the person. Plaintiff sued defendant, an out-of-state corporation, and effected service of process pursuant to § 48.193, the Florida Long-Arm Statute....

...ng already installed. The complaint also asserts the defendant's breach of warranty damaged the business reputation of the plaintiff and damages are also sought on this theory. The statute under which plaintiff sought to effect service of process is § 48.193, which provides in part as follows: "Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...As a result, the Court adopts, affirms, and approves the Report with the following modification. In addition to the grounds stated in the Report, the Court finds that it also does not have general personal jurisdiction over Iraco pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) because there is no evidence that Iraco on its own engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida. See Florida Statutes § 48.193(2). The only evidence that was presented showed that Defendant's agent engaged in some business activity in Florida. (Doc. No. 33 at 9-11). While Florida Statutes § 48.193(1) [2] creates specific jurisdiction as a result of the acts of an agent of a defendant, Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) [3] limits general jurisdiction to acts of the defendant itself. See Florida Statutes §§ 48.193(1), (2); see generally Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.1985) (limiting analysis to Florida Statutes § 48.193(1) in determining whether personal jurisdiction existed due to acts of agent). Florida Statutes § 48.193 *1012 is strictly construed to guarantee compliance with due process. See Steinhilber v. Lamoree, 825 F.Supp. 1003, 1005 (S.D.Fla.1992). Thus, the Court also does not have personal jurisdiction over Iraco pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) for this reason....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). In order to determine whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, the Court must first determine whether there is a basis for jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193....

...* * * * * * (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (emphasis supplied)....

...Doyle Electric Company, Inc., 733 F.2d 833, 836 (11th Cir.1984); Ja Dan, Inc. v. L-J, Inc., 898 F.Supp. 894, 900 (S.D.Fla. 1995). Where a defendant conducts isolated, insubstantial business in Florida, the plaintiff must show that its cause of action arises from the defendant's business activity in Florida. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), (2)....

...The Florida Long-Arm Statute Polymers has met its burden of proving facts which satisfy an initial criteria of the Florida long-arm statute. Iraco is a corporate "person" who is not a citizen of Florida who through an agent did acts enumerated in subsection (1) of Fla.Stat. § 48.193, specifically operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state, and thereby submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any cause of action arising from the doing of those acts....

...Therefore, there is an initial basis under the long-arm statute for asserting personal jurisdiction over Iraco for a cause of action that arises out of Iraco's Florida business. b. Polymer's Cause of Action Must Arise From Iraco's Acts But Florida's long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), extends personal jurisdiction to Iraco only if Polymers' declaratory judgment action arises out of Iraco's business activity in Florida....

...Moreover, Polymers has not proved that Iraco has engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state so as to make Iraco subject to personal jurisdiction regardless of whether Polymers' claim arises *1017 from that substantial activity. [4] See Fla.Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...ed in the report, and shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual findings on appeal. Oct. 16, 1998. NOTES [1] Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the other Defendants in this action. (Doc. No. 25, filed August 6, 1998). [2] Florida Statutes § 48.193(1) provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if h...

...his state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (a) Operating, conduct, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. [3] Florida Statutes § 48.193(2) provides as follows: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...The witnesses were not subject to cross examination, and the Court cannot assess their credibility. [4] Said differently, substantial and not isolated activity in Florida would have subjected Iraco to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts whether or not Polymers' claim arose from that activity. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...Appellee sued Fishkin alleging that he had tortiously interfered with an advantageous business relationship. Fishkin stated that if he had, he had done it in Pennsylvania, not Florida, and that there was no jurisdiction over him in the Florida court. The long arm statute, section 48.193(1)(b), gives jurisdiction to Florida courts over non-citizens or non-residents of this state if the accused "commits a tortious act within this state." The only act which might be deemed tortious would be causing the actual revocation of the letter of credit....

...As the court held in the controlling case of Madax International Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., 342 So.2d 1082 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), this breach, which amounted to the defendants' "failure to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state," under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(g), (1975), was sufficient to confer Florida jurisdiction over the defendants....

...Barnett, P.A., Hollywood, and Jon E. Krupnick of Krupnick & Campbell, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees-Mowday and Berg. Richard G. Collins, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee-Brandt. DOWNEY, Judge. This case involves an application of the Florida Long Arm Statute, specifically Section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Claiming a defect in the manufacture of the wagon, the owner sued Ford Motor Company in the Florida state court. Ford third partied Atwood Vacuum Machine Co., a foreign corporation, which had manufactured the door hinge assembly. Atwood was served with process by Ford under Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1977), and predictably moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction....

...Two inquiries must be made when deciding whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident. First, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of one of the various jurisdictional criteria contained in Florida's long-arm statute found in section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Sveriges Angfartygs Assurans Forening, 791 So.2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). In determining whether the complaint contains sufficient allegations relating to the criteria contained in section 48.193, the courts permit the plaintiff to initially plead the pertinent language of the statute as the basis for jurisdiction without the necessity of specifically pleading all of the supporting facts. See Venetian Salami. Shainwald does not contest that Barro sufficiently alleges in her complaint the statutory criteria contained in section 48.193(1)(a) ("[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state.") and section 48.193(1)(b) ("[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state.")....

...The appellant contends that the lower tribunal erred in denying her motion, in that the appellee's complaint failed to set forth sufficient allegations of ultimate fact to establish the Florida court's proper exercise of longarm jurisdiction over the appellant pursuant to section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...method of service). Obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant requires a two-pronged showing. First, the plaintiff must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the defendant within the coverage of the long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...of the United States Supreme Court. Youngblood v. Citrus Assocs. of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 276 So.2d 505, 507-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). As to the first part of the inquiry, Mrs. Brown contends that the allegations in her complaint satisfy section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which states: A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity....

...Brown has not alleged a satisfactory ground for personal jurisdiction pursuant to statutory subsection (2). The appellee does not suggest, nor do we find, that the appellant's filing the 1995 action in the Florida court would, by itself, satisfy any of the alternative grounds for jurisdiction set forth in section 48.193(1)(a)-(1)(h)....

...Formica personally showed the vessel to the prospective buyers on one occasion, and participated in the sea trial. Florida law allows long-arm jurisdiction, among other things, where a person is "engaging in ... a business or business venture in this state...." § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...Inc., 965 F.2d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir.1992); Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Company, Inc., 926 F.2d 1030, 1034-1035 (11th Cir.1991). I. JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS Colonial argues that Florida acquired jurisdiction over Magic Pan pursuant to sections 48.193(1)(a), (c), (g), and (2), Florida Statutes (1991). Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, provides in pertinent part: 48.193....

...* * * * * * (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. * * * * * * By enacting section 48.193, the Florida legislature has determined the requisite basis for obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, but it has not specifically addressed whether the federal constitutional *566 requirement of minimum contacts has been met....

...Rubaii, 379 So.2d 475, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In the instant case, both parties agree that payment under the guaranty was to be made in Florida. While failure to make such payment facially provides personal jurisdiction over Magic Pan pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), the mere failure to pay money in Florida, standing alone, is not sufficient to obtain jurisdiction consistent with due process over a nonresident defendant....

...5th DCA 1992), even where the guaranty contains a choice-of-law provision specifying Florida as a jurisdictional forum. McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1987); Holton, 602 So.2d at 662. We hold that, although Colonial has sufficiently alleged personal jurisdiction over Magic Pan pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Colonial must also satisfy the constitutional due process requirement of proving that Magic Pan has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida and that the assertion of personal jurisdiction would not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. With regard to Colonial's assertion that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to sections 48.193(1)(a) and (2), we conclude that the conflicting affidavits filed by Magic Pan and Colonial requires that an evidentiary hearing be held on that issue. We also reject Colonial's assertion that jurisdiction is proper pursuant to section 48.193(1)(c) because the instant cause of action against Magic Pan is not based upon its owning, using, or possessing any real property and because Colonial has not asserted that the guaranty was ineffective or unenforceable, which would make Magic Pan a joint tenant under the lease....

...merely for the purpose of guaranteeing the tenant's obligations under the lease. See Hamilton v. Business Assistance Consortium, Inc., 602 So.2d 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). In order to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over Magic Pan under sections 48.193(1)(a) and (g), the trial court must determine that Magic Pan possesses sufficient minimum contacts with Florida and that Florida's exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, in addition to finding that the statutory requirements of these sections have been met. On remand the trial court should also determine whether Magic Pan is engaged in substantial activity within Florida which would give rise to jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), as well as whether the constitutional due process requirements have been satisfied....

...The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals follows a two-prong test for determining whether a District Court has personal jurisdiction. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir.1996). First, Florida’s long arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193 , must provide a jurisdictional basis; second, there must be sufficient minimum contacts between the defendants and the forum state as to satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

...itted tortious acts within the state; caused injury to persons or property within the state by products used in commerce; and engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within the state. These allegations, accepted as true, satisfy Subsections 48.193(l)(a), (l)(b), (1)©(2), and (2)....

...ing that the formalities of effecting service were complied with, because neither the defendant nor the instant action have any relationship to the state of Florida. In other words, defendant argues that neither Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1979), nor notions of minimum contact grounded in due process would support a finding that the Court has obtained in personam jurisdiction of the defendant....

...onal muster. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., supra, at 1264. It appears from the Florida cases cited by plaintiff that the Florida long-arm statute authorizes out-of-state service upon a non-resident under the instant factual situation. Florida Statutes § 48.193 (1979), Florida's long-arm statute, provides in pertinent part as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby sub...

...da, and to do so within the first two months of the year 1981." Plaintiff contends that the failure to make such payment at Wildwood, Florida constituted a failure to perform an act "required by the contract to be performed in this state." Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(g) (1979)....

...1978), wherein the Third District Court of Appeal held that the mere allegation in the complaint that the defendants had breached their agreement to make payment in the state of Florida for services rendered to them by the plaintiff outside the state was sufficient to confer Florida jurisdiction under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(g) (1979)....

...As the court held in the controlling case of Madax International Corp. v. Delcher Intercontinental Moving Services, Inc., 342 So.2d 1082 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1977), this breach, which amounted to the defendants' `failure to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state,' under Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(g), (1975), was sufficient to confer Florida jurisdiction over the defendants....

...at 210; see also Wilks v. Swift & Company, 382 So.2d 1364 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1980). Thus, under Florida law, the allegation in the complaint that defendant promised to pay the $40,000 to plaintiff at Wildwood, Florida is sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(g)....

...e that he is subject to being sued there. Id. at 1269 n.16. This is particularly true where, as in the instant case, there is a nexus between the defendant's contact with the forum and the cause of action. There can be no doubt that Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(g), which predicates jurisdiction upon the breach of a contract within the state of Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed within the state of Florida, satisfies the due process requirements of the Constitution....

...Burch, 424 So.2d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Slidell v. Valentine, 298 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1980). Any attempted modification in the monetary obligations of the non-resident in such a case would be void and not entitled to full faith and credit. [1] Nor do we think that section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1985) alters the outcome in this case....

...Terrill Griffin, Orlando, and Terrill J. LaRue, Daytona Beach, for appellees. McCORD, Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to quash service of process upon appellants Lesch, Hoppe, Stockton and Borden, California residents, under § 48.193, Florida Statues (the long-arm statute)....

...t appellants. The then existing Florida long-arm statute, § 48.181, Florida Statutes, provided no means for obtaining jurisdiction over the persons of appellants. On July 14, 1972, appellants sold the land and subsequently the new long-arm statute, § 48.193, Florida Statutes, was enacted by the legislature and became effective July 1, 1973....

...ns of those statements in Florida — where the statements were made, where Oesterle voluntarily stepped outside his corporate role and placed his personal integrity on the line, and where the property involved is located. Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2001), states in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ......

...er the person. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.1990). (A) PERSONAL JURISDICTION Plaintiff bases jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship and asserts that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193, Florida's Long-Arm Statute....

...The determination of jurisdiction over the non-resident persons requires a two-part test by federal courts. Cable/Home Communication v. Network Productions, 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir.1990). First, this Court must inspect Florida's Long-Arm Statute, Fla.Stat. § 48.193 to consider the jurisdictional issue....

...Finally, where the affidavits conflict, the Court must construe all reasonable differences in favor of Plaintiff. Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir.1988). The Court now addresses whether a tort was committed in the State of Florida pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.193. Although Plaintiff failed to allege any specific section of the Florida Long-Arm Statute, it appears from Plaintiff's memorandum and supporting affidavit that Plaintiff seeks to assert personal jurisdiction under Fla.Stat. 48.193(1)(b). *1570 Florida Statutes section 48.193 provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.193 (1995)....

...relocated to Florida. Defendants argue that any alleged tortious activity regarding the tortious interference with Plaintiff's receipt of inheritance occurred prior to Plaintiff's relocation and should not fall within Florida's venue. See Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...Haun, 393 So.2d 54, 56 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.1981) (stating a complaint should be sufficiently broad to afford an inference that a tort occurred in Florida); see also Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So.2d 64 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.1988) (holding the occurrence of injury alone in a forum state does not satisfy Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(b))....

...da. The question, then, is whether Plaintiff has met his burden to affirmatively show the existence of libel and slander after his relocation to Florida, and whether these alleged statements constitute a tort committed within Florida under Fla.Stat. § 48.193....

...The Walker Court explained that a Rule 12(c) motion is an inappropriate method for resolving pretrial matters such as jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Rule 12(c) motion should be used to resolve the merits of a complaint. [2] Pursuant to Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(b), personal jurisdiction exists where a person "commit[s] a tortious act within this state." The Plaintiff never asserted that these transactions occurred subsequent to his relocation in Florida....

...NOTES [1] The other defendants include Edward E. Hubbard, Bernadette Hubbard, and the Waxoyl subsidiaries that had been defendants in the bankruptcy court proceeding. [2] This appeal does not involve any claim to predicate long-arm jurisdiction on section 48.193(1)(g), which authorizes long-arm jurisdiction over a person "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Id....

...Constitution.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir.2013) (altera *1238 tion added; citation omitted). Under the first prong of the analysis, federal courts must construe the Florida long-arm statute, Florida Statute section 48.193, as would the Florida Supreme Court; absent an indication the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, federal courts are also bound by decisions of the intermediate Florida courts....

...rriding Hard Candy’s choice of venue. (See id. 17-18). A. Specific Jurisdiction The Florida long-arm statute recognizes two kinds of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193 ....

...The statute confers specific jurisdiction over, a non-resident defendant if the claim asserted against the defendant arises from the defendant’s forum-related contacts (i.e., contacts with Florida), and those contacts fall within one of nine statutorily enumerated categories. See id. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...ith HCF and NEV’s contacts, satisfy two of the statute’s specific-jurisdiction categories: (1) “Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state,” id. § 48.193(1)(a)(1); and (2) “Committing a tortious act within this state,” id. § 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...General Jurisdiction The second type of jurisdiction, general jurisdiction, exists over a non-resident defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...Winters Gov't Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal *1254 Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 325 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). In the case sub judice Plaintiff relies on subsection 1(a) of the Florida Long Arm Statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193. Subsection 1(a) of Fla. Stat. § 48.193 provides as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural...

...e husband committed tortious conduct by abusing her during that stay. However, the couple's stay in Florida years earlier clearly did not "proximately precede the commencement of the action," see Shammay v. Shammay, 491 So.2d 284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); § 48.193(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Likewise, the instant allegation of tortious acts of abuse cannot provide the basis for the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction via section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ppellees' goods were destroyed. Appellees caused summons and complaint to be served on appellant, by having the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, serve same on the resident agent of appellant at his place of business in Chicago, pursuant to Sections 48.193 and 48.194, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The motion was denied and this appeal follows. Appellant contends that the court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person in that appellees have failed to allege any facts which would subject appellant to the jurisdiction of Florida courts, pursuant to Section 48.193, Florida Statute (1975), the long-arm statute....

...said statute. Henschel-Steinau Company v. Harry Schorr, Inc., 302 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). In the case at bar, appellees have failed to allege a cause of action against appellant arising from any acts or omissions enumerated within the text of Section 48.193. Such an allegation is a prerequisite to the availability of long-arm jurisdiction and insures the due process requirement of "minimum contacts." See Section 48.193(3), Florida Statutes (1975) and Dublin Company v....

...With that in mind, we are of the opinion that appellant did not have the requisite contacts with the State of Florida, as provided by our statute, and was thus beyond our jurisdiction. See Lewis v. Cues, Inc., 338 So.2d 241 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) and Section 48.193(1)(f)1., Florida Statutes (1975)....

...rcise personal jurisdiction over Reinitz. We hold that Florida courts do have jurisdiction and, accordingly, reverse the order. We begin our discussion with an analysis of the pertinent provision of our "long arm" statute and the facts of this case. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...We find that in either count of the complaint Damoth alleged a cause of action for fraud. See Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Perlman, 47 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1950). Further, we believe that the cause of action does "arise from" Reinitz' ownership of real property in this state as that term is envisioned by section 48.193(1)(c)....

...Here, the Shareholders filed a complaint which tracked the language of the long-arm statute and alleged in detail that the Board committed tortious acts in Palm Beach County and that the Board had substantial and not isolated activity in Palm Beach County. See §§ 48.193(1) and 48.193(2), Fla....

...ly if the nonresident has minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.... The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum contacts....

...Nylon Eng'g Resins, Inc., 896 F.Supp. 1190, 1193-94 (M.D.Fla.1995). Once the corporate shield doctrine is validly invoked, the overwhelming majority of the Board's contact with Florida is overlooked, much like the analysis of general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...court has ruled prior to an evidentiary hearing, appellate courts have reversed and remanded for the trial court to permit the plaintiff to amend."). Reversed. GUNTHER and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] High durability foldable cardboard boxes. [2] § 48.193, Fla....

...ess in Florida; and (9) travel to Florida except to occasionally attend Pallet board meeting and personal vacations. (Apx. 3-7). [4] The Board also successfully invokes Florida's corporate shield doctrine to further avoid specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...orporate shield doctrine fully applicable. See Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004 (Fla.1993); Oesterle v. Farish, 887 So.2d 412, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Additionally, the corporate shield doctrine negates most of the alleged general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)....

...d on the info I receive, I will re-arrange my schedule. The determination of jurisdiction involves a two part inquiry. First, it must be determined whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, Florida's long arm statute. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989). If the allegations are within the ambit of the statute, it must then be determined whether the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process. Id. Under section 48.193(1)(g), a person submits himself to the jurisdiction of this state by "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." Where a contract does not state the place wh...

...been terminated. Following Passeos's refusal of the demand, Keller sued Passeos. In response to Passeos's motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, Keller asserted that Passeos was subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides for jurisdiction over any person "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." The trial court agreed with Keller and denied Passeos's motion to dismiss....

...review." Execu-Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000). Here the question of law for our determination is whether the allegations made by Keller are a sufficient basis for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...The mere fact that an injury to a Florida resident may have resulted is insufficient to establish jurisdiction in the Florida courts. Tex. Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. v. Ward, 696 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (stating that "[t]he occurrence of injury alone in Florida does not satisfy section 48.193(1)(b)")....

...t in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). In that case, Burger King, a Florida corporation, sued a Michigan resident for breach of a franchise agreement. Burger King sought to obtain jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(g) by asserting that the defendant failed to make required payments under the agreement in Florida....

...t the place of residence of the payee. See First Nat'l Bank of Kissimmee v. Dunham, 342 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). Although not specifically alleged in her complaint, the failure to repay the loans implicates the breach of contract provision in section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...However, if the evidence presented by the parties conflicts, the trial court must then hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Here, the trial court should have held a properly noticed evidentiary hearing after respondent presented her sworn testimony. [4] Section 48.193 states in relevant part, (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is...

...Homeway Furniture Company of Mount Airy, Inc. ("Homeway Furniture"), and its shareholder, Teresa Nance, appeal an order denying their motion to dismiss the complaint of Mark Home for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse because Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2000), does not provide a basis for a Florida court to assert personal jurisdiction over these foreign defendants....

...Nance and Homeway Furniture in accordance with Florida's long-arm statute and principles of due process. In Florida, a case-specific determination of long-arm jurisdiction requires a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193; and (2) whether sufficient "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant and the forum state to satisfy constitutional due process requirements....

...exercise of jurisdiction, so we do not consider whether exercising jurisdiction would violate due process. Mr. Horne argues that the actions of Homeway Furniture and Ms. Nance may subject them to jurisdiction in this state under three subsections of section 48.193. First, Mr. Horne argues that section 48.193(1)(a) permits jurisdiction over the defendants because Homeway Furniture was operating or engaging in a business in this state....

...y after Florida client solicited their assistance); Travel Opportunities of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. v. Walter Karl List Mgmt., Inc., 726 So.2d 313 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding Florida court had no personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant under section 48.193(1)(a) when defendant advertised in international magazines that reached Florida and entered into contract with Florida plaintiff, but did not otherwise have business presence in Florida). Mr. Horne also argues that Florida courts can assert personal jurisdiction over *537 Homeway Furniture and Ms. Nance pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f)(2)....

...Nance committed intentional torts unrelated to the use of the furniture. We conclude that this section of the longarm statute does not apply under these circumstances. See Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Can., Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1981) (interpreting section 48.193(1)(f)(2) to permit jurisdiction over nonresident "if products that the nonresident processed, serviced or manufactured cause injury during use or consumption in Florida"). Finally, Mr. Horne argues that Ms. Nance and Homeway Furniture are subject to Florida's jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b)....

...l presence in the state is not a prerequisite to "commit[t]ing a tortious act within this state." Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla.2002). In Wendt, the court held that a person could commit a tortious act in Florida within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(b) by making telephonic, electronic, or written communications into *538 the state, provided those communications gave rise to the alleged tort....

...o a single report of an alleged crime to an out-of-state police department. This case does not involve defamation or defendants who made telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. Cases more analogous to this case have held that section 48.193(1)(b) is not satisfied even in the context of an intentional tort directed at a Florida resident when all of the actions taken to commit the tort occur out of state....

...2d DCA 1988) (involving breach of fiduciary duty); Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ormandy & Assocs., 479 So.2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (involving tortious interference with contractual relationship). Indeed, at least one jurist has expressed the opinion that because the language of section 48.193(1)(b) must be strictly construed, [3] it does not apply unless the nonresident defendant's acts or omissions specifically occur in this state....

...itical to the determination of agency"). This court has previously followed the general rule that, even in the context of intentional torts, the existence of an injury in Florida, standing alone, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b) when all of the defendant's tortious conduct occurred outside the state....

...[3] See Esberger v. First Fla. Bus. Consultants, 338 So.2d 561, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). [4] The Florida Supreme Court has yet to address this specific issue, although there is some language in Doe v. Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004 (Fla.1993), that suggests section 48.193 requires some personal action by the nonresident defendant or his or her agent within the state of Florida....

...substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida], whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of [Florida], whether or not the claim arises from that activity." Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2). Section 48.193(2)'s "substantial and not isolated activity" requirement is "the functional equivalent of the continuous and systematic contact requirement for general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment" to the United States Constitution. Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd. , 288 F.3d 1264 , 1269 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, in analyzing whether general jurisdiction is authorized under Section 48.193(2), the Court need only consider whether exercising such jurisdiction over Defendant comports with due process....

...Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. 2. Committing a tortious act within this state. ... 7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(1)-(7). The Court will address each argument in turn below. *1236 1) Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) - Engaging in Business in Florida a....

...18.) In relevant part, Section (1)(a)(1) provides that a party is subject to specific jurisdiction for a cause of action arising out of a party's "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in" Florida. Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(1)....

...aned from Florida clients." Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A. , 421 F.3d 1162 , 1167 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, considering the foregoing factors, the Court finds that Defendant has not engaged in business in Florida as defined by Section 48.193(1)(a)(1). First, the negotiations between Plaintiff's president, Rondald Ploog, and Defendant's chief executive officer, Brad Wolansky, in Orlando, Florida are insufficient to satisfy Section 48.193(1)(a)(1). Indeed, "this fact alone does not establish that [Defendant] was conducting or carrying on a business in Florida, as Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(1) requires...." Melgarejo v....

...Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant maintains an office, place of business, or business license in Florida. While Plaintiff has submitted evidence that approximately seven percent of Defendant's sales are made to Florida customers, the Court finds such sales insufficient to confer jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1). See Horizon , 421 F.3d at 1167-68 (finding no jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) where out-of-state defendant had no office, place of business, or business license in Florida and sales to Florida customers totaled less than 5 percent of total sales)....

...siness "as if in Florida," which is "insufficient under the plain text of the [long-arm] statute." Id. at 1167 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1)....

...monstrated that Defendant caused Plaintiff's relocation to Florida. Accordingly, Plaintiff's relocation of its principal place of business to Florida is insufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over Defendant under Florida's long-arm statute. 2) Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) - Committing a Tortious Act in Florida Plaintiff argues the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant pursuant to Section (1)(a)(2) of Florida's long-arm statute because the alleged tortious interference occurred in Florida....

...ith contract occurred in Florida. Thus, because specific jurisdiction is authorized under Section (1)(a)(2) of Florida's long-arm statute, the Court will address whether exercising such jurisdiction over Defendant comports with due process infra. 3) Section 48.193(1)(a)(7) - Breach of a Contract Requiring Acts to be Performed in Florida Plaintiff argues that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant failed to make payments owed to Plaintiff under the Referral Agreement....

...iff's Florida "address for all monthly sales data, payment reports, and remittances to Plaintiff" and made payments "to Plaintiff's Wells Fargo Bank account with a Florida address." (Doc. # 46, ¶ (7)(c)(i).) Plaintiff thus reasons that, pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(a)(7), specific jurisdiction over Defendant is authorized under Florida's long-arm statute because Defendant failed to continue making payments to Plaintiff's Florida bank account under the Referral Agreement....

...To the extent that Coremetrics and West Marine are still persuasive authorities, the Court declines to adopt such an expansive jurisdictional approach. To the extent that Plaintiff argues these actions constitute "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business" in Florida under Section 48.193(1)(a)(1), such conduct is insufficient to satisfy Florida's long-arm statute for the reasons discussed supra....

...eaboard System Railroad, Inc., and the machine was shipped to Seaboard's Tampa facility, at F.O.B. Canron's South Carolina plant. Canron takes the position that the evidence below was insufficient to show that it is "doing business" in Florida under section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and if it was "doing business" in Florida the evidence was insufficient to show that appellee's cause of action "arose from" such activity....

...allege sufficient facts to meet the statutory requirements for long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident and thereby rendered service of process void. Feder v. Feder, 526 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Rand v. Rand, 491 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987), states jurisdiction obtains only if the parties maintained a matrimonial domicile in the state at the time of commencement of the action or if the defendant resided in the state preceding the commencement of the action....

...J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540 (Fla.1987), [9] the Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified question in the negative: "Can a Florida court exercise in personam jurisdiction over the objection of a nonresident defendant who has done none of the acts specified in Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes, but who is a party to a contract which designates Florida as the forum for any subsequent litigation?" McRae, 511 So.2d at 541....

...t the vessel; and (3) upon the execution of the 1996 agreement, the respondent took delivery of the EAST WIND II in Florida. Johns Affid. at ¶¶ 2, 8, 13. These contacts do not establish jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...In fact, the contract in question provided only for the operation and maintenance of the vessel in Puerto Rico. See Pet.'s Pet'n to Compel at Ex. 1. The petitioners also have failed to make a sufficient showing under the general jurisdiction provision of Florida Statutes § 48.193(2)....

...e. See Northwestern Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So.2d 190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The court must first consider whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2002), i.e., whether defendant performed any of the acts delineated in the statute....

...Burtis, 785 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). "Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state" is one of the enumerated acts which will subject a person to jurisdiction in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(g)....

...s to support long-arm jurisdiction. See Burger King Corp. v. Holder, 844 F.Supp. 1528, 1531 (S.D.Fla.1993). Here, plaintiff claims that he has alleged sufficient substantive facts to support long-arm jurisdiction over McGrogan and K. Freyvogel under section 48.193(1)(b), Fla.Stat. Section 48.193(1)(b) affords personal jurisdiction over any person who commits a tortious act within the State of Florida....

...is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal place of business in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Therefore, the court must determine if mismanagement of a non-Florida corporation is a tort sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), Fla.Stat., and under the fundamental precepts of due process....

...Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1219-20 (11th Cir.1999), the court held that an allegation of injury to the business interest of a Florida plaintiff where that interest is located entirely outside of Florida does not confer personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b), Fla.Stat. Additionally, even if such a claim were sufficient under section 48.193(1)(b), McGrogan and K....

...New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 818, 121 S.Ct. 58, 148 L.Ed.2d 25 (2000). We apply a two-step process in analyzing the issue. First, does the plaintiff's complaint allege sufficient facts to bring the action within the reach of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2002)? Venetian Salami Co....

...The complaint does not allege that defendant is a nonresident of Florida, nor does it allege any of the other prerequisites to the applicability of that statute. Plaintiff asserts, however, that service of process was not made under section 48.171, but under the general long arm statute, section 48.193. Here too, The first question presented is whether there was a basis for asserting jurisdiction over [defendant] under Florida's Long Arm Statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983). Even though section 48.193 contains an exhaustive list of acts or omissions upon which courts in this state can assert jurisdiction over out-of-state residents, Rowe's pleadings contain no allegations of the jurisdictional grounds for proceeding against [defendant]. *1160 This court has previously held that failure to adequately allege in the complaint a basis for invoking long arm jurisdiction under 48.193 voids any service of process made pursuant to section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...erbicide due to Proficol’s allegedly negligent misidentification of the herbicide. Transport claims that the district court may exert personal jurisdiction over Proficol under the tort prong of Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. ch. 48.193(1)(b), and Rule 4(k)(2), Fed....

...statute and dismissed Transport’s complaint. Transport brings this appeal which we review de novo. See Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998). II. In order to assert jurisdiction over Proficol under Section 48.193(1)(b) of Florida’s long-arm statute, Transport must show that Proficol committed a tort in 3 Florida....

...Id. 4  Plaintiffs sought to assert personal jurisdiction over the South Carolina company under Florida’s long-arm statute, contending that the company had committed a “tortious act” in Florida thereby triggering jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. ch. 48.193(1)(b)....

...he Florida long-arm statute. Id. at 1146. The court reasoned that, by selling batteries to the recycler, the South Carolina company had “helped create the serious environmental hazard” in violation of federal law, a tort within the meaning of Section 48.193(1)(b)....

...United States to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Neither its sales nor its purchases are sufficient to subject Proficol to the jurisdiction of this court under Rule 4(k)(2). III. Jurisdiction predicated upon Section 48.193(b)(1) is not warranted in this case because the defendant has not committed a tort within the state of Florida....

...1st DCA 1994). Florida’s long-arm statute contains two provisions that provide a basis for personal jurisdiction – specific jurisdiction and 4 general jurisdiction. Appellee admits that the amended complaint does not support general jurisdiction. Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, confers specific jurisdiction over (1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection t...

...executive officer, alleging the officer failed to take adequate measures to prevent sexual assault. 620 So. 2d at 1004. The supreme court held that personal jurisdiction was not established, because “[the defendant’s] allegedly negligent actions are not 1 Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, enumerates other bases for specific jurisdiction, but only subsections (a)1....

...In the absence of an intentional tort, Appellee cannot rely on the intentional-tort exception to the corporate shield doctrine. 2 II. Whether the amended complaint alleged a cause of action arising from a business venture in Florida Section 48.193(1)(a)1. confers jurisdiction where a complaint alleges facts stating a cause of action that arises from “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.” § 48.193(1)(a)1., Fla....

...As Appellant’s sworn affidavit refuted any allegations of a personal business office or personal business venture, and as Appellee presented no evidence to counter that 12 affidavit, there was no basis for the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes. The corporate shield doctrine bars Florida courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over Appellant....

...ds federal in personam jurisdiction much further than the provisions for effective service under Rule 4(f). 58. Applying Rule 4(e) to the case sub judice, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the parties under Florida's long-arm statute, § 48.193, Fla.Stat., which more than meets the minimum requirements for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), and their progeny. 59. § 48.193(1)(g) provides that any person, whether or not a resident or citizen of the state of Florida, who personally or through an agent breaches a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida,...

...Moreover, the Florida courts are almost in unanimous agreement that in the absence of an express designation of place of payment, the legal presumption that a debt is to be paid at the creditor's place of business is sufficient to satisfy the language of Florida's long-arm provision, § 48.193(1)(g)....

...American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Engineered Storage Systems Inc. v. National Partitions and Interiors, Inc., 415 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). 64. Plaintiff's claim has therefore fulfilled three important elements required by § 48.193(1)(g): a. Sea Lift's claim satisfies the terms of § 48.193(1)(g), as Sea Lift alleges that RECOPE failed to "perform an act required to be performed" in Florida, i.e., payment of $265,000.00; b....

...ises from the "doing" of this act, i.e., failing to pay Sea Lift, in Florida, the amount of $265,000.00 on a contract which was solicited in Florida and which became binding in Florida; and c. The assertion of personal jurisdiction over RECOPE under 48.193(1)(g) satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause, as the solicitation in Florida of Sea Lift by RECOPE's agents, and the presumption that RECOPE was to pay Sea Lift in Florida, are prima facie significant and substantial contacts with the State....

...n the State, for a claim arising from these contacts with Florida. In considering the issue of in personam jurisdiction under a *465 similar set of facts, the federal district court for the Middle District of Florida came to the same conclusion that § 48.193(1)(g), as applied, meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause....

...To summarize, then, in Admiralty cases the Plaintiff may, under Rule 4(e), effect service of process "upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state" in any manner prescribed by "a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district is held." 66. The manner in which Sea Lift met the terms of § 48.193, Fla.Stat....

...finding Florida had personal jurisdiction over Hatfield. Pursuant to Venetian Salami, the court must determine whether the complaint pleads jurisdictional facts in order to sufficiently "bring the action within the ambit of the [long-arm] statute," section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...s as the *1243 course of dealing between the parties and the contractual obligations of the parties. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). If the defendant's activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts also are satisfied. Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). "Substantial and not isolated activity," as used in section 48.193(2), has been found to mean "continuous and systematic general business contact" with Florida....

...ob with a non-AutoNation dealership in Texas. In denying Whitlock's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court found that Whitlock had engaged in the necessary continuous and systematic business activities with Florida to satisfy section 48.193(2)....

...court because the child was conceived in Florida. However, nothing in section 61.1308 discusses conception as being a factor in determining subject matter jurisdiction. The father also argues that section 61.1308 should be read in para materia with section 48.193(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2001), which gives Florida courts in personam jurisdiction in paternity proceedings when the *483 parents "engag[e] in the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect to which a child may have been...

...The father also cites two out-of-state cases for the proposition that other states have recognized subject matter jurisdiction based on conception. In Perdomo v. Fuller, 1999 OK Civ.App. 11, 974 P.2d 185 (Okla.Civ.App. Div. 3 1998), an Oklahoma appellate court held that a personal jurisdiction statute, similar to section 48.193(1)(h), Florida Statutes which gave the court personal jurisdiction to determine paternity but not subject matter jurisdiction over child custody, conferred jurisdiction over the parties and the case because the child was conceived in Oklahoma....

...lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse the trial court's order because Szilagyi failed to establish that WCTU is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida under Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, specifically sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Consequently, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash the service of process made in accordance with section 48.161, Florida Statutes (1983), pursuant to section 48.181. In assessing Szilagyi's alternative claim, that the court may properly exercise jurisdiction over WCTU under section 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes (1983), the analysis and result is the same....

...tate, if, at or about the time of the injury, * * * * * * (2.) [p]roducts, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. § 48.193(1)(f)(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). In response to the allegations in Szilagyi's complaint, WCTU made what amounted to a prima facie showing that the jurisdiction alleged under section 48.193(1)(f)(2) was improper....

...Since Szilagyi relied solely upon her complaint to support jurisdiction under this section as well, and did not present any evidence, she failed to meet that burden. Consequently, the court should have granted WCTU's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)(2). Since Szilagyi failed to meet her burden of proving the jurisdictional allegations of her complaint after WCTU had made a prima facie showing that the jurisdiction asserted under both sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), was improper, the trial court erred in denying WCTU's motion to quash service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction....

...diate appellate courts, absent some indication the Florida Supreme Court would decide otherwise. Id. (citations omitted). Florida's long-arm statute provides for two distinct categories of personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction conferred under § 48.193(1) and general jurisdiction conferred under § 48.193(2)....

...diction over the defendant and does not specify under which section of Florida's long-arm statute jurisdiction is conferred. [12] In response to defendant's motion to dismiss, however, plaintiff argues that specific jurisdiction is appropriate under § 48.193(1)(a), (b), and (f)(1) and general jurisdiction is appropriate under § 48.193(2). A. Specific Jurisdiction 1. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(a) — Conducting a Business Florida Statutes section 48.193(1)(a) authorizes a Florida court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if the nonresident is "operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in [the] state" or if the nonresident has an office or agency in the state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...ge of overall revenue gleaned from Florida clients. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). In this case, the court cannot exercise specific jurisdiction over Paragon based on § 48.193(1)(a) regardless of whether Paragon's business activities are sufficient to constitute "operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture" in Florida because Crowe's claim does not arise from any of Paragon's business activities in Florida....

...of Florida because Crowe was considered for a position in sales, not operations. Thus, Crowe's cause of action does not arise out of Paragon's business activities in Florida and the court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over Paragon based on § 48.193(1)(a). 2. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(b) — Committing a Tort Florida Statutes section 48.193(1)(b) permits courts sitting in Florida to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident if the cause of action arises from the nonresident's commission of a tortious act within the state. See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(b); Wendt v....

...Instead, all of the defendant's actions supporting Crowe's claim of age discrimination occurred outside the state of Florida, specifically by Morabito in Paragon's California office. Specific jurisdiction, therefore, cannot attach to the defendant based on § 48.193(1)(b)....

...See Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Horne, 822 *1122 So.2d 533, 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (citing Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So.2d 64 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Freedom Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ormandy & Assocs., 479 So.2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)). 3. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(f) — Causing Injury to Persons or Property within Florida Florida Statutes section 48.193(1)(f)(1) provides that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes an injury within the state, "arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside [the] state, if, at or about the time of the injury . . . [t]he defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within [the] state." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(f)(1). In this case, the court may not exercise specific jurisdiction under this section for the same reason it could not under § 48.193(1)(a), i.e....

...The position thus was unconnected to Paragon's solicitation of affinity clients in Florida, which was performed by Jay Acker, or its service activities in Florida, which were performed by operations employees. B. General Jurisdiction: Florida Statutes Section 48.193(2) — Substantial and Not Isolated Activity in the State Florida Statutes section 48.193(2) provides that a Florida court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who engages in "substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida], whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. . . ." Fla Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...For jurisdiction to attach, these contacts must show a "general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit." Stubbs, 447 F.3d at 1361 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). [15] While the case law uses this same language in determining whether specific jurisdiction exists under § 48.193(1)(a), the level of business contacts required to establish general jurisdiction is greater than the level of contacts required to establish specific jurisdiction....

...nts. Horizon, 421 F.3d at 1167 (citations omitted). [16] The "continuous and systematic" contacts requirement is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional due process requirement of "minimum contacts." Autonation, 276 F.Supp.2d at 1262. Thus, because § 48.193(2) demands such a high threshold, if a defendant's activities meet the statutory requirements of this section, the minimum contacts due process standard is also satisfied....

...Florida has established a two-prong test for determining jurisdiction over the person. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989). The court must first determine whether the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to comply with Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The plaintiff alleged personal jurisdiction over the defendants as to counts one and two on the basis that they were "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...iction but was "without prejudice to refiling in an appropriate jurisdiction." Gilbert's motion for rehearing was denied and this appeal followed. Gilbert contends that Herne's failure to repay the note was a breach of contract within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1987). We agree and reverse the judgment under review. The failure of a nonresident who executes a promissory note to pay such note, which is payable within the state, is a "breach of contract in this state" within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(g)....

...Southeast Bank, 323 So.2d 628 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 333 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1976). That section adds to the reach of "long arm" statutes, any person "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state." § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...1st DCA 1985). Herne should have been aware of the duty being undertaken and the ramifications of a failure to perform. The pleadings in Herman failed to provide that basic information. Herne was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under section 48.193(1)(g)....

...Cohen of Grossman & Roth, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellees-Lisajane Romer and Kevin Romer. PER CURIAM. This is a non-final appeal from a trial court order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over appellant, Thomas Jefferson University. We affirm because there is both long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1995) and sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy constitutional due process requirements....

...1026, 1030, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945). While we affirm, we do so on the basis of section 48.193(1)(f)2, not section 48.193(1)(f)1....

...In addition to finding both (1)(b) and (f)(1) applicable, the trial court here found that TJU had sufficient contacts with Florida to be fairly *70 sued here. I shall consider first the applicability of the statutes and then the sufficiency of TJU's Florida contacts. I. Subsection 48.193(1)(b) Although I agree with the majority that subsection (1)(b)—the commission of a tortious act in Florida—does not provide jurisdiction in this case, I think it important to state our reasoning, especially in light of the conflicting decisions from Florida courts on the issue....

...The court's reading of (1)(b) today is thus consistent with the policy of strict construction of statutes dealing with personal jurisdiction, including long arm statutes. For these reasons, I agree with the majority that the trial judge erred in finding jurisdiction under (1)(b). II. Subsection 48.193(1)(f)(2) If jurisdiction exists under subdivision (1)(f), it must necessarily be found under (f)(2)....

...uld make suit here reasonably predictable, or that would be in accord with basic notions of fair play. I would quash this attempt at Florida jurisdiction over TJU and leave plaintiffs with their right to sue this defendant in Pennsylvania. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1995), provides that: "(1)Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits [that person] ......

..." [e.s.] For convenience I will refer to subdivision (1)(b) as "(1)(b)", to the entire subdivision (1)(f) as "(1)(f)", to subdivision (1)(f)(1) as "(f)(1)", and to subdivision (1)(f)(2) as "(f)(2)." [2] Plaintiffs argue that Watts v. Haun, 393 So.2d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), also reads section 48.193(1)(b) to extend to torts committed outside Florida but which result in injury here....

...Elizabeth W. Swarens, Tampa, for Appellee/Wife. SCHOONOVER, Judge. The appellant, John Leon Morgan, challenges that part of an interlocutory order which held that the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...the child support established by that decree. Ms. Morgan's sworn pleading did not allege that her former husband, *344 Technical Sergeant Morgan, was a resident of Florida, but alleged that he was subject to the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section 48.193....

...In response to Sergeant Morgan's special appearance and motion to dismiss because the pleading did not allege a basis for personal jurisdiction over him, Ms. Morgan filed an amended unsworn pleading. This pleading alleged that Sergeant Morgan was subject to the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to section 48.193 regardless of whether or not he was a current citizen or resident of Florida because he is the father of two children residing within the state and his failure to provide the children with adequate support affected them, their mother, and the state of Florida....

...inimum contacts are demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989). Ms. Morgan contends that the court acquired personal jurisdiction over Sergeant Morgan by virtue of the provisions of section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993), and that sufficient minimum contacts have been demonstrated to satisfy due process requirements. We disagree. Section 48.193 sets forth acts which subject a person to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts. In this case, we are concerned with 48.193(1)(e) which provides: With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrim...

...orida. She contends, however, that he was a resident of Florida prior to the commencement of the action and because the parties did not abandon their Florida residence, the court had personal jurisdiction over Sergeant Morgan under the provisions of section 48.193(1)(e)....

...In Garrett, the court held that in contrast to a situation where one party leaves the state and one remains, when both parties leave the state together, as in this case, and reside elsewhere together for a lengthy period of time, their joint abandonment of the state causes the wife to lose the protection of section 48.193(1)(e), and that statute does not provide a basis for Florida courts to exercise jurisdiction over the husband....

...*346 When a plaintiff seeks to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant by use of the long arm statute, in addition to showing that due process requirements have been met, he must demonstrate that the defendant has met at least one of the long arm jurisdiction requirements set forth in section 48.193....

...If the affidavits are factually reconcilable, the court can resolve the issue at that time. If not, an evidentiary hearing must be held. Venetian Salami Co., 554 So.2d at 503. Ms. Morgan's pleading alleged that the court had jurisdiction over Sergeant Morgan pursuant to section 48.193 but did not allege that jurisdiction existed because he had resided in the state of Florida prior to the commencement of her action....

...After the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to vacate the default, but denied the motion to quash service of process. Sunrise Assisted Living, Inc., first argues that the writ of garnishment does not contain allegations necessary to invoke the trial court's long-arm jurisdiction. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1997) sets forth the acts by which a nonresident subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state....

...iled to perform the requirements of the contract in Florida. Genesis' motion to dismiss simply denied it was doing business in Florida, and claimed South Carolina as its state of residence. Genesis was served pursuant to Florida's "Long Arm" statute § 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The plaintiff may satisfy this burden "`either by alleging the language of the statute without pleading supporting facts, or by alleging specific facts that indicate that the defendant's actions fit within one of the sections of Florida's long arm statute, section 48.193....

...to us. In determining whether the subject sales were made in Florida, the United States District Court applied our decision in Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975), which interpreted the Florida long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...When the Blankenships and the corporation allegedly defaulted on various obligations arising under the three agreements, Interim Services brought this action against them in the Dade County Circuit Court. Substituted service was effected through the secretary of state purportedly under section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides for personal jurisdiction over non-residents who [breach] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state....

...Indust., Inc., 573 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Unger v. Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.2d 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), review denied, 520 So.2d 586 (Fla.1988); Kane v. American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). This is because compliance with section 48.193(1)(g)—which we may assume arguendo—is insufficient, without substantially more, to establish the minimum contacts with the forum state also required, under the due process clause, to support service on a non-resident....

...Publisher Entry Serv., Inc., 513 So.2d 674, 675 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)); accord Execu-Tech Business Sys., Inc. v. New Oji Paper Co., 752 So.2d 582, 584 (Fla.2000). The statutory prong of the Venetian Salami standard is governed by Florida's long-arm statute. Wetzel contends that this case falls under section 48.193(1)(f)2., Florida Statutes (1999), which provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant: *1198 (f) Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either: 1....

...The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or 2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. (Italics supplied). In applying section 48.193(1)(f)2., it does not matter that Wetzel's death was caused by a class B display firework and that Kwongyuen shipped only class C fireworks into Florida....

...A defendant's connection to Florida making it amenable to suit under the long-arm statute is established by the defendant's "business activities in Florida" and not by focusing solely on how the product causing injury entered the state. See Davis v. Pyrofax Gas Corp., 492 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla.1986). Jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(f)2....

...Kwongyuen acted as a wholesaler in assembling 3,794 cases of fireworks from manufacturers for shipment to the Broward County purchaser. The conduct of a wholesaler in bringing together large quantities of goods for shipment amounts to "processing" of the goods within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(f)2....

...r's in time for distribution and use over the same July 4 weekend when Wetzel was injured. These fireworks were thus "used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use," "at or about the time of [Wetzel's] injury." § 48.193(1)(f)2, Fla....

...See id. The Michigan corporation did not handle the sales paperwork, except to receive copies of orders and shipping reports. See id. at 1293-94. This court held that the Michigan corporation *1199 did not "process" the product within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(f)....

...Hargrave, commenced on October 16, 1985. Appellant Mrs. Hargrave appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to quash service of process. At issue in the instant case is whether failure to allege proper jurisdictional facts under section 48.193(1)(e) results in void service of process....

...r. On November 19, 1985, Mrs. Hargrave by special appearance filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to quash service of process. It is the trial court's denial of Mrs. Hargrave's motion which is at issue in this interlocutory appeal. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1984), governs the instances in which an out-of-state party submits him or herself to the jurisdiction of a Florida court: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through...

...[long-arm] statutes has the burden of proving facts which clearly justify the use of such method of service." Citizens State Bank v. Winters Government Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 760, 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). A party seeking to effect service of process under section 48.193 must make specific allegations demonstrating sufficient jurisdictional facts. In particular, section 48.193 requires that a complaint must allege either that the defendant (the wife in this case) had resided in this state previous to the commencement of the action or that the parties had maintained a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of the action. A complaint must allege one of these factors and if it does not, any attempted service of process under section 48.193 is void....

...We held in Laney that the wife's failure to allege that either the couple had maintained a marital domicile in Florida at the time the action was brought or that the husband had resided in Florida prior to its commencement, resulted in void service of process under section 48.193(1)(e) and therefore the trial court's final judgment of dissolution should be vacated....

...Hargrave resided in Florida preceding the commencement of this action, his service of process was void and the trial court improperly denied Mrs. Hargrave's motion to dismiss and to quash service of process. Mr. Hargrave argues in the alternative that even if the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(e) to adjudicate his requests for division of property and primary custody it nonetheless had in rem jurisdiction under Chapter 49 to dissolve the marriage. In support of this contention, Mr. Hargrave cites Arnstein v. Arnstein, 422 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). In Arnstein a husband seeking a divorce attempted to effect personal service on his wife under section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...The Arnstein decision is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Arnstein the party seeking to effect long-arm jurisdiction sought only a dissolution of marriage. By contrast, Mr. Hargrave seeks custody of his child as well as division of property. Under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1985), where either of these two factors are sought, a sufficient jurisdictional predicate must be laid and this entails allegations of either marital domicile or that the defendant had resided in Florida prior to the commencement of the action....

...Arnstein might therefore be more persuasive for purposes of the instant case if Mr. Hargrave were merely seeking a divorce. But Mr. Hargrave's petition for dissolution of marriage indicates that he desires additional relief for which he has failed to satisfy his statutory burden under section 48.193....

...Two Worlds did not establish personal jurisdiction over Zylstra Two Worlds also contends on appeal that the Florida court has personal jurisdiction over Zylstra under the long-arm statute because Zylstra committed tortious acts within Florida, see § 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007), and because, alternatively, Zylstra's contacts within Florida are extensive and ongoing, see § 48.193(2)....

...Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla.2002). In order to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test. The first part of the test is whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193....

...aintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. (quoting Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1257). As to the first prong of the test, Two Worlds first relies on the specific long-arm jurisdiction set forth in section 48.193(1)(b), which requires that the defendant personally committed a tortious act within the state....

...llful acts," where defendants' sworn affidavits denied those acts and plaintiffs never rebutted defendants' sworn affidavits). Two Worlds claims that the recent holding in Marshall applies to the instant case to establish Two Worlds' compliance with section 48.193(1)(b)....

...any refuting evidence, personally making any posts on the website relating to Two Worlds. Therefore, the holding in Marshall is inapplicable to this case. Two Worlds also claims that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over Zylstra pursuant to section 48.193(2), the general jurisdiction provision of Florida's long-arm statute, which provides that "a defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, o...

...afitis v. Ara, 815 So.2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Zylstra testified that he has not lived in Florida since 1994 and that he comes to Florida only a few times a year to visit friends and family. His contacts in Florida are insufficient to satisfy section 48.193(2). See Radcliffe, 902 So.2d at 972 n. 4 (holding that "sporadic or occasional family vacations" to Florida are "insufficient" to establish general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2))....

...d that the broker then contacted the lender. The brokerage contract provided that the fee would be paid out of the closing proceeds. The undisputed facts are sufficient to satisfy both due process considerations and long arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes, on Appellee's breach of contract claim for failing to pay the fee....

...nuous and systematic general business contact between a defendant and the forum state. Id. Plaintiff asserts the existence of both specific and general jurisdiction. a. Specific Jurisdiction Plaintiff asserts specific jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193 (l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7), which states in pertinent part: A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself an...

...Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. 2. Committing a tortious act within this state. 7. Breaching a contract in, this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193 (l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7)....

...forum for pecuniary gain. In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs injuries stem from Defendant Giarla’s display and sale of Plaintiffs artwork in the forum. Accordingly, the Court finds that specific jurisdiction exists pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (l)(g). b. General Jurisdiction Next, Plaintiff asserts general jurisdiction pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2), which states: “a defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state ... is subject ‘to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from the activity.’” Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2)....

...On Pafco's appeal, we reverse the latter portion of the order. *904 We do so because it is clear—indeed, the appellees admitted at oral argument— that they were "engaged in substantial and not isolated," that is, continuous and systematic activity in Florida within the meaning of section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Cook, 519 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), review denied, 531 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1988) and cases cited. They are therefore "subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim [sued upon] arises from [their Florida] activity." § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). It simply does not matter where the claims involved in this case accrued or whether there was any so called "connexity" between them and this state. [3] § 48.193(2), Fla....

...No order of court is required. An affidavit of the officer shall be filed, stating the time, manner, and place of service. The court may consider the affidavit, or any other competent evidence, in determining whether service has been properly made. [2] 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state.— (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jur...

...The co-executor of Blair's estate filed this action against the partners of Crystal Sands seeking damages as a result of Blair's having made payment under the guaranty to First National. Personal service was made on John J. Fogarty in New York pursuant to Section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...ar property in question had been divested before the Florida judgment against Blair in 1978. The statute provides for service in "any cause of action arising from" various enumerated acts, including the conduct of a "business venture in this State." Section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...Carter, 834 So.2d 362 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Law Offices of Sybil Shainwald v. Barro, 817 So.2d 873 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). A comparison of the allegations in the petition and the facts adduced at the hearing reveals that the petition is not supported by the facts. The long-arm section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002) provides: 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state— (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or he...

...sufficient. Keveloh. Once established domicile continues until it is superceded by a new domicile. Wade (if party is a bona fide resident of state, mere absence intending to return will not divest courts of jurisdiction); Keveloh. The requirement in section 48.193(1)(e) that the parties maintain a "matrimonial domicile" at the time of the commencement of the action means, by definition, that their permanent place of matrimonial abode is in Florida....

...or her marriage. [11] *478 Additionally, even if the Florida farm could have been considered the parties' marital domicile at one time, Mark was not staying or living at the Florida farm at the time of the commencement of this action, as required by section 48.193(1)(e)....

...In the interim, the parties stayed together as husband and wife for brief periods of time in Colorado in May and the summer of 2002. Under these undisputed facts, the wife has failed to establish that the parties maintained a marital domicile in Florida at the time of the commencement of this action pursuant to section 48.193(1)(e). Nor can personal jurisdiction over the husband be established by the alternative clause in section 48.193(1)(e), which provides for personal jurisdiction over a person who is a "resident" of this state preceding the commencement of this action, because the wife's petition failed to allege this alternative means of jurisdiction....

...1st DCA 1993)(living in Florida from 1984 to 1986 insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction). We therefore must reverse the order and quash the service of process on the husband. REVERSED and SERVICE QUASHED. PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 48.193(1)(e), Fla....

...He said that Florida was clearly the wife's residence, but questioned whether there were sufficient (minimum) contacts to subject the husband to jurisdiction in Florida. Minimum contacts are not built into the long-arm statute. Venetian Salami v. J.S. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989). [7] Section 48.193(1) requires that the cause of action must arise from one of the enumerated statutory acts or omissions....

...Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed and when a defendant raises a meritorious challenge to jurisdiction the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove personal jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiffs claim Defendant Star is subject to the Court's jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193(2), 48.193(1)(a), and 48.193(1)(g). The Court finds that Star is subject to the Court's jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (a) Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business *1324 venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state. Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...erLogic, Inc. v. Copier Solutions, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1353-54 (S.D.Fla.,2000), the acquisition of the Florida subsidiary does subject the parent to the state's jurisdiction for any cause of action arising from that acquisition under Fla.Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)....

...tion according to the law of the state in which that court is situated. Pizzabiocche v. Vinelli, 772 F.Supp. 1245 (M.D.Fla.1991). In this case, Plaintiffs assert that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 48.193, Florida's Long-Arm Statute....

...is, may the Court exercise personal *1052 jurisdiction over nonresident Defendant Barnebey. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1516. 1. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION The Court now addresses whether a tort was committed in the State of Florida pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 48.193(1)(b), as asserted by Plaintiffs in the Response to Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16). Section 48.193 provides in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts: (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. Florida Statutes, Section 48.193 (1995)....

...Additionally, it appears that LRRL paid out $3,209.00 to Defendant Barnebey, also marked as "BOD meeting expenses" and "consulting." Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Barnebey's actions not only constitute an intentional tort within the meaning of Section 48.193(1)(b), but also evidence Defendant Barnebey's personal availment of the benefits and protections of the laws of the state of Florida....

...Thus, the Court concluded that the Defendant was protected by the corporate shield doctrine and that he could not be haled into court in Florida in his personal capacity. The Doe Court specifically noted, however, that in accordance with Florida Statutes, Section 48.193(1)(b), a non-resident corporate officer may be haled into court in Florida if it is alleged that he personally committed an intentional tort expressly aimed at the plaintiff in the forum state....

...Appellee then filed an amended complaint, basing personal jurisdiction on appellant's alleged breach of contract by failing to pay for the goods in Florida. Appellant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Florida Statute 48.193(1)(g) and filed affidavits in support of its contention that it did not breach the contract in Florida....

...Contrary to the appellants' contention, the amended complaint filed by Nereo Agostinelli (Agostinelli) contains sufficient "long-arm" jurisdictional allegations to establish in personam jurisdiction over Core and Cherokee. By alleging § 48.181(3) and § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...(1989), inter alia, Agostinelli's amended complaint can be construed as putting the defendant Cherokee on notice that Agostinelli is alleging that Cherokee's activities in Florida are substantial and not isolated so as to satisfy the connexity requirement with regard to pleading § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...It may have been signed by plaintiff in Florida; salary may have been sent to plaintiff in Florida; and the initial notice of termination was mailed to plaintiff in Florida — facts all largely irrelevant to the issue on jurisdiction actually raised. The pleading alleges [1] jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a), [2] Fla....

...They also asked the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issues. The court denied both their motion and the request for an evidentiary hearing. *210 On appeal defendants argue that without a connection between their in-state activities and the claim in suit, Florida lacks jurisdiction over them under § 48.193(1)(a). In response, plaintiff argues that their activities in Florida were substantial and not isolated; therefore § 48.193(2) relieves him of the connexity requirement. Because Core was subject to suit by virtue of its registration to do business and its resulting appointment of a resident agent in Florida, the only issue presented is whether Cherokee could be sued here. There can be no question that § 48.193(1)(a) requires a showing of a connection between plaintiff's claim and a defendant's Florida activities. [3] If that were not so, subsection (2) of § 48.193 would be superfluous, a conclusion we are not permitted to indulge about statutes....

...In paragraph 3, plaintiff alleges: "This action is properly brought in the Circuit County [sic] of the 17th Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida, pursuant to Fla. Statute § 48.181(3)." Later he alleges in paragraph 11: "Pursuant to Florida Long Arm Statute § 48.193(a), Florida has personal jurisdiction over CHEROKEE INTERNATIONAL, INC....

...Even if I were able to read paragraph 3 as a jurisdictional allegation within rule 1.070(i), I would find it insufficient to put defendant Cherokee on notice that its activities in Florida were being alleged to be substantial and not isolated so as to extinguish the connexity requirement under § 48.193(2)....

...Similarly in this case, Core has not raised any minimum contacts issue arising from its mere registration and appointment of a resident agent, thereby waiving any due process argument that it might have had. Hence Core is properly subject to this suit in Florida. [3] The opening part of subsection (1) of § 48.193 expressly says "for any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the following acts * * *." [4] Long-arm statutes and assertions of jurisdiction under them must be strictly construed in favor of the non-resident defendant....

...Strict construction means that, where the allegations of jurisdictional facts are capable of being construed both for and against jurisdiction, the trial court must as a matter of law construe them against jurisdiction. [5] On appeal, plaintiff also argues that jurisdiction exists under § 48.193(1)(g) ("breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state")....

...The check (which was actually mailed by the insurer to defendant in Alaska and cashed by him there) was to represent proceeds of insurance on the life of the insured, who was defendant's son and plaintiff's husband. At the time the alleged contract was made, defendant had come from Alaska to Florida for his son's funeral. Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1991), provides for Florida jurisdiction over a person not a resident of Florida under a cause of action arising from that person "[b]reaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the...

...Florida, engaged in substantial, ongoing activity within this state. 72. The actions and business activities in . . . Florida of [Extendicare] were . . . *62 substantial, continuous and constitute sufficient contacts to subject [them] to personal jurisdiction . . . [under] § 48.193 Fla....

...Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla.1989); Hilltopper Holding Corp. v. Estate of Cheryl Cutchin, 955 So.2d 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). In the first step, the court considers whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to subject the defendant to jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...uch that it would anticipate being haled into Florida's courts. Enic, PLC, 870 So.2d at 890; Hilltopper, 955 So.2d at 601. The parties agree that McGillen's second amended complaint alleged jurisdictional facts to support long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2004)....

...ion and defamation per se under Florida law in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. D.E. 1-3. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193(1)(b) 1 because Defendants posted defamatory materials concerning Plaintiffs on their website and through Buzzfeed’s mobile application, which were accessible and were accessed in Florida, and such conduct constitutes the commission of the tortious act of defamation for purposes of Florida’s long-arm statute under section 48.193. Id. ¶ 12. In addition, Plaintiffs alleged, that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193 because: a) Defendants have caused injury to persons or property within Florida, arising out of acts or omissions undertaken outside of the state and Defendants regularly solicit advertising and viewers within Florida; and b) Defendant...

...Id. In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendants because: (1) there is no’ statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193 , and (2) exercising jurisdiction over this action would not comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. B. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute Under Florida’s long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193 , a non-resident defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways....

...ver suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida—if the claim asserted against the defendant arises from the defendant’s contacts with Florida, and those contacts fall within one of the nine categories enumerated in section 48.193(1)(a). Id. Florida’s long-arm statute, specifically section 48.193(1)(a), provides, in relevant part, as follows: A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person ......

...Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at, or about the time of the injury, either: a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state[.] Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (1)(a)(2), (6). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193(1)(a)....

...Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Defendants posted defamatory materials concerning the Plaintiffs on their website (and through their mobile app), which materials were accessed in Florida, constituting the commission of the tortious act of defamation within Florida under section 48.193[.]” Id....

...Here, Plaintiffs explicitly allege in their Complaint that “[t]he Defendants posted defamatory materials concerning the Plaintiffs on their website (and through their mobile app), which materials were accessed in Florida, constituting the commission of the tortious act of defamation within Florida under section 48.193(1)(b).” D.E....

...Despite Defendants’ attempts to distinguish the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201 (Fla. 2010), this Court finds that the facts of Internet Solutions are analogous and guide the resolution of the parties’ dispute regarding the applicability of section 48.193(1)(a)(2) to this case. In Internet Solutions, the Florida. Supreme Court held, upon the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certifying a question to the Florida Supreme Court, that an out-of-state website operator was subject to personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1) for defamatory materials that were posted on Defendants’ website....

...In addition, Plaintiff Webzilla is located in Florida, and as such, Defendants have caused injury to a Florida resident through their acts that took place in this state. Therefore, under these facts, the requirements of Florida’s long-arm statute, Florida Statute section 48.193(1)(a)(2), are satisfied....

...9, 2017. . In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants based upon Defendants’ commission of a tortious act (see D.E. 1-3 ¶ 12); however, as their legal basis, Plaintiffs cite to Florida Statute section 48.193(1)(b), which appears to be the incorrect subsection. Based upon Plaintiffs' ongoing reference to Defendants' alleged commission of a tortious act within Florida throughout their Response, the Court will presume Plaintiffs intend to proceed under section 48.193(1)(a)(2)....

...subject to general jurisdiction in a foreign state. Upon review of Plaintiffs’ Complaint, however, it does not appear that Plaintiffs are seeking for this Court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193(2); therefore, the Court will only focus on whether she may exercise specific personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute....

...To see each other, the parties exchanged weekend visitations, alternating between Florida and Alabama. On May 24, 1993, the wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage and requested rehabilitative and lump sum alimony and attorney fees. The husband, who was served pursuant to Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes, moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and claimed that a matrimonial domicile had never been maintained in Florida and that the husband was at all times a resident of Alabama....

...f this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage. § 48.193(1)(e), Fla....

...jurisdiction in Florida by way of its long arm statute: When analyzing whether long arm jurisdiction is appropriate, two inquiries must be made. First, the complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), Florida's long arm statute....

...to determining the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 502-03. Id. at 292. In the present case, Taffee filed an unsworn complaint that never mentioned how Florida possessed jurisdiction over Hewitt. It did not even make reference to jurisdiction, much less section 48.193; it merely stated that Taffee was a Florida resident and that Hewitt was "an individual and financial advisor residing in or around Monterey, California." In the body of the complaint, Taffee alleged that Hewitt had held an investment...

...ry hearing on March 27, 1995. We therefore have elected to examine the substantive issue of whether Hewitt is subject to jurisdiction in Florida by way of the long arm statute. In doing so, we find that Hewitt's actions do not come within paragraphs 48.193(1)(b) or (g), contrary to Taffee's contentions....

...2d DCA), review denied, 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla.1988); see also Pluess-Staufer Indus., 635 So.2d at 1072 (stating that where defendant engaged in negotiations in Florida which resulted in the execution of an agreement in Florida, personal jurisdiction was improper under paragraph 48.193(1)(g) because the "execution of a contract in Florida by a nonresident, standing alone, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction under the long-arm statute"); Holton v. Prosperity Bank, 602 So.2d 659, 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (stating that even if defendant was required to honor another's payment obligation in Florida, that activity alone is not substantial enough to confer jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph 48.193(1)(g)); cf....

...n it." [4] In addition, we find that Taffee failed to meet her burden of proving, by counter affidavit, that Hewitt was subject to jurisdiction in Florida. Although Taffee claimed that Hewitt is subject to jurisdiction in Florida by way of paragraph 48.193(1)(b) and (g) because he allegedly committed torts in Florida and breached a contract in Florida, Taffee's affidavit fails to allege that Hewitt performed such acts....

...in Florida by indicating that Hewitt did, in fact, engage in business in Florida, at no time did Taffee assert that Hewitt should be subjected to general jurisdiction in Florida because of continuous and substantial business activity in Florida, see § 48.193(2), Fla.Stat. (1993), nor did she claim that Hewitt should be subjected to jurisdiction in Florida by way of paragraph 48.193(1)(a), for conducting or engaging in business in Florida.

...The issue presented on appeal is whether there exists personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Continental. I. BACKGROUND Transcom filed a complaint against Continental in Miami-Dade County, alleging that Continental is subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida because it: (1) breached a contract in Florida pursuant to section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2001); (2) conducted business in Florida through an agent, Inversiones Continental USA Corp. ("Inversiones USA"), which is located in Miami, Florida, pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a); and (3) maintained a correspondent account with UPB in Florida pursuant to section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...v. Hogue, 817 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Here, it is undisputed that Transcom's complaint satisfied the first prong of the jurisdictional analysis, namely that the complaint contain sufficient allegations to satisfy the statutory requirement of section 48.193(1)(g)....

...Therefore, we need only determine whether the constitutional component of the two-prong test has been met. Although Transcom relies on our decision in Construccion, that case addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction through a footnote reference to a long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...bank in Florida because the bank maintained correspondent bank accounts in Miami, Florida. Id. at 890. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, since the defendant bank had no office or agency in Florida, the seller would have to demonstrate, pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a) of the long-arm statute, that the defendant engaged in or carried on a business or business venture in the state....

...at 287, 100 S.Ct. 559. Therefore, we find that Continental's correspondent relationship with a Florida bank is insufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement. Accordingly, Continental's activities within Florida were also not substantial for purposes of section 48.193(2), and cannot subject Continental to the exercise of the court's general jurisdiction....

...he requisite minimum contacts with the State of Florida to satisfy the constitutional due process requirement, we reverse the non-final order denying Continental's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] Section 48.193, states, in relevant part: Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state....

...act to be performed in this state. . . . (2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, . . . is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. § 48.193, Fla....

...s, by personally serving them outside the State of Florida. Having elected to so proceed, the plaintiffs were required to plead and prove, which they failed to do, that the cause of action alleged arose from the doing of any of the acts set forth in Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...s provided in Section 48.181, Florida Statutes (1981), our review of the order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants is limited to whether the jurisdictional requisites of Section 48.193, necessary predicates to service under Section 48.194, have been met....

...Finally, the defendant's contacts within the forum state must be such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 631 (11th Cir.1996). Notably, XP Companies concedes that the requirements of Florida long-arm statute, Florida Statutes § 48.193(1), are met....

...As such, personal jurisdiction can be exercised over XP Companies. B. Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant XP Entertainment In order for a court to exercise general jurisdiction in Florida, the contacts must be especially pervasive and substantial to satisfy section two of the Florida long-arm statute 48.193. General Cigar Holdings, Inc. v. Altadis S.A., 205 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1343 (S.D.Fla.2002); see Florida Statutes.§ 48.193(2)....

...1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); see Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize, Ltd., 739 So.2d 617, 620 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1999); Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc., 710 So.2d 716, 720 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1998). A finding that a defendant's activities satisfy section 48.193(2)'s requirements also necessitates a finding that minimum contacts exist. See Universal Caribbean Estab. v. Bard, 543 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989). Therefore, the analysis of jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) and the Due Process clause merge....

...el against XP Apparel. With respect to general jurisdiction, Plaintiffs point to XP Apparel's substantial *1297 activities in Florida as grounds for asserting jurisdiction. It appears that Plaintiff is claiming specific jurisdiction under Fla. Stat. 48.193(1)(b) which provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself, and if he is a natural person, his persona...

...However, to the extent Plaintiffs are asserting personal jurisdiction for promissory estoppel under this provision of the long-arm statute, it would fail. [9] Notably, Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd ., which was decided prior to Wendt, went even further and interpreted Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(b) to mean that a defendant who commits a tort that causes injury in Florida is subject to personal jurisdiction even if the act that caused the injury occurred entirely out of state. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216-17 (11th Cir.1999). In other words, a tortious act committed outside of the state of Florida resulting in injury to a Florida resident confers personal jurisdiction under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(b)....

...nguage of the long-arm statute. Second, if the statute is applicable, the court must decide whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements. The applicable portion of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(f), Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself ......

...1st DCA 1977), a North Carolina auto dealer performed repair work on a vehicle pursuant to a Chrysler recall notice. The car was ultimately sold to Florida consumers, who filed a lawsuit in this state. Although the dealer challenged personal jurisdiction, it conceded that it came within the scope of section 48.193(1)(f)2 "which permits process upon a defendant who services a product used within this state, with resulting injury to the user." Id....

...This appeal arises from an order of the trial court denying Flight International Aviation Training Center, Inc.'s (hereinafter "FIATC") (a Georgia corporation), motion to abate for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse because we find that Rivera failed to establish a basis for invoking Florida's long-arm jurisdiction. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes. In order to determine long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the trial court must determine (1) whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the Florida long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes; and (2) whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between our forum state and the defendant to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements....

...nam claim for money damages against the corporation. We reverse. In this case, in which substituted service of process was attempted against Beta Real Corporation through the Secretary of State, the only arguable basis of in personam jurisdiction is section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that jurisdiction when the defendant has committed a "tortious act within this state." Since the appellant is charged only as an alleged recipient of fraudulent conveyances, [1] we must therefore decide the issue finessed in Dinn v....

...on. 10 Fla. Jur.2d Conspiracy — Civil Aspects § 2, at 330-31 (1997). [2] We find no merit whatever to the appellee's alternative contention that this action arises out of the ownership of the transferred property so as to confer jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...ficient minimum contacts exist between Florida and the defendant to satisfy due process requirements. Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1256; Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION Long-arm jurisdiction may be established pursuant to subsections 48.193(1)(b) and 48.193(1)(f)(2), Florida Statutes. Section 48.193(1)(b) provides that a defendant is within the scope of Florida's long-arm jurisdiction if he commits a tortious act within the state. Section 48.193(1)(f)(2) provides that a defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of Florida's courts when he causes injury within the state arising out of an act committed outside of the state if, at or about the time of the injury, "products materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the *364 ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use." The Florida Supreme Court has held that, under section 48.193(1)(b), in order to commit a tortious act "within this state," a defendant's physical presence is not required....

...in a nutritional supplement which was sold here, the sale of the product to Syntrax itself did not directly cause damage within this state. We, therefore, conclude that SWCI's actions are insufficient to bring it within Florida's jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b). We also conclude that jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(f)(2) was not established....

...Florida, it had engaged in "processing" under subsection (1)(f)(2). Id. at 1198. It explained that "[t]he conduct of a wholesaler in bringing together large quantities of goods for shipment, amounts to `processing' of the goods within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(f)2." Id....

...ith the Norephedrine. It also did not assemble and package large quantities of goods together as the defendant in Wetzel did. Given SWCI's minimal contact with the Norephedrine, we conclude that it did not engage in "processing" or "servicing" under section 48.193(1)(f)(2), and therefore did not subject itself to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction. MINIMUM CONTACTS In addition to failing to meet the jurisdiction requirements of either section 48.193(1)(b) or 48.193(1)(f)(2), we conclude that the plaintiff was unable to establish sufficient minimum contacts between SWCI and the State of Florida for Florida courts to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over SWCI....

...Suffice to say that our examination of the record before us reveals a dearth of evidence that appellant was doing business in the State of Florida. [2] Indeed, appellee *238 tacitly concedes that there is no such evidence, but urges that jurisdiction and service of process may be bottomed upon F.S. 48.193(1)(g), which provides in material part as follows: "Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits that person * * * to t...

...FRAMING THE ISSUES The circuit judge's comments and conclusions help us to frame the issues before us into two distinct questions. First, did the circuit court have long-arm -4- jurisdiction over Mr. Wiggins under section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2011)? Second, did Mr....

...m the affidavits in support of the motion to dismiss, and the transcripts and records submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss." Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1254. 1. Sufficiency of the complaint The long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2011), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of t...

...Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002). a. General Jurisdiction A plaintiff establishes general jurisdiction by showing that the defendant engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida, pursuant to section 48.193(2). General personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute arises when the defendant engages in substantial and not isolated activities in Florida and arises from a party's contacts in Florida that are unrelated to the litigation....

...Neither the complaint nor the allegations in Tigrent's counter-affidavit refute these claims. Indeed, there is nothing in the complaint, the affidavits, or the record that would suggest that Mr. Wiggins, individually, engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida such that general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2) would apply....

...Although a general jurisdictional analysis may apply to WCC, it clearly does not as to Mr. Wiggins. Thus, in the absence of general jurisdiction, our only inquiry is whether Mr. Wiggins is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b). b. Specific Jurisdiction That the injury must occur in Florida, although obviously a fundamental requirement of personal jurisdiction, is not, standing alone, determinative of specific personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)....

...ting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 (1985))). The specific inquiry is whether the nonresident defendant should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Florida. Venetian Salami, 554 So. 2d at 500. Section 48.193(1)(b) provides that a nonresident subjects himself to the personal jurisdiction of a Florida court by "committing a tortious act within this state." Thus, in order to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant...

...And most recently, in Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010), defamatory statements posted on a website in Washington State subjected the poster (who was also the owner and operator of the website) to personal jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b). In contrast, in Kountze v....

...In Wendt, for example, the cause of action—securities fraud—arose from communications directed into Florida to prospective investors. This connection between the act and the forum state has been called "connexity." See Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260 (" '[C]ommitting a tortious act' in Florida under section 48.193(1)(b) can occur through the nonresident defendant's telephonic, electronic, or written communications into Florida. However, the cause of action must arise from the communications. This predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193(1).")....

...the place where it is published."); Achievers Unlimited, Inc. v. Nutri Herb, Inc., 710 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that the making of defamatory statements to a listener in Florida via telephone constitutes the commission of a tort in Florida within the meaning of section 48.193(1)(b)); cf....

...ide that remedy shall be liberally administered and the aggrieved party may be put in as good position as if the other party had fully performed pursuant to Section 671.102, Florida Statutes. ..... 8. Defendant, American, has done acts enumerated in Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, which submit the defendant, American, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for a cause of action arising from the doing of said acts, which acts are more particularly described as follows: (a) engages in b...

...unsupported motion was sufficient to shift the burden to Electrodex to prove the allegations in the complaint which justify the application of the long arm statute. *62 We find that the allegations contained in Electrodex's complaint are sufficient. Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes provides that any person who personally or through an agent "[b]reaches a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state" submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state....

...complaint. The court in Elmex Corporation v. Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale, 325 So.2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), discussed the plaintiff's burden in invoking and the defendant's burden in challenging the application of Section 48.193(1)(g), Florida Statutes....

...able that the subject film would be aired in Florida, which in fact it was. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1515 (11th Cir.1990); Madera v. Hall, 717 F. Supp. 812, 817 (S.D.Fla. 1989). Consequently, the defendant was amenable to suit in Florida under Section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), as he prima facie committed a tort in Florida....

...The amended complaint now alleges, as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction, that the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action. It is Terry's contention that the undisputed conduct of the parties satisfies, with respect to Emir, the jurisdictional requirements of Florida's long-arm statute. Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1983) states in pertinent part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself...

...if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage. (Emphasis added) Section 48.193(1)(e) requires that the defendant in a dissolution action reside in this state preceding the commencement of that action....

...La Fuente, 343 So.2d 930 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Joyce Bros. Storage & Van Co. v. Piechalak, 343 So.2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). This result is not changed by the fact that the complaint herein alleges a breach of contract committed by the said defendant in Florida. Under Section 48.193(1)(g)(2), Florida Statutes (1977), service on the defendant herein would only have been good, based on such breach of contract, if the said defendant, unlike this case, had been personally served out of the state pursuant to Section 48.194, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity. Fla. Stat. § 48.193....

...Additionally, Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts that justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. Id. (citing Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir.1983)). 1. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(a)—Operating a Business To establish that a defendant is carrying on a business for the purposes of the long-arm statute, the activities of the defendant must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit....

...Moreover, the fact that other stores redeem Defendant's coupons is not enough to show that a general course of business *1337 within the state or that it receives a pecuniary benefit from the posting of the coupons. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over Defendant may not be asserted under Section 48.193(1)(a). 2. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(f)—Causing Injury to Persons or Property within Florida Jurisdiction also does not exist under Section 48.193(1)(f), as this section does not permit jurisdiction over nonresidents for acts arising outside the state that cause financial injury within the state, in the absence of personal injury or property damage....

...Moreover, subsection (1)(f) does not apply to situations in which only economic damages are suffered within the state. Prentice, 779 F.Supp. at 585. Plaintiff has not alleged personal injury or property damage, but only patent infringement; therefore, there is no personal jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(f). 3. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(2)— Substantial and not Isolated Activity in the State Section 48.193(2) permits the court to exercise personal jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the claim arises from the defendant's activities within the state, if the defendant is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2)....

...The affidavits and pleadings of record indicate that the contact the Defendant had with Florida was minimal. Specifically, it purchased flowers from various vendors in Florida periodically. This act, in itself, is not enough to find personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 4. Florida Statutes Section 48.193(1)(b)—Committing a Tort One of the events subjecting a party to jurisdiction under Florida long-arm statute is "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." Fla Stat. § 48.193(1)(b)....

...Patent Infringement is a tortious act within the meaning of this provision. However, Florida courts are divided on the issue of whether a tortious act committed outside the state resulting in injury in the state produces personal jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b). Kim, 71 F.Supp.2d at 1233. The Eleventh Circuit has found that "jurisdiction under Section 48.193(1)(b) `[is] not limited to a situation where an act cause[s] injury in Florida.'" Id....

...Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1256 (Fla.2002); Beta Drywall Acquisition, LLC v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 9 So.3d 651, 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). Golant claims that the trial court has jurisdiction over the Club based on multiple grounds specified in the Florida long arm statute. See § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2007). We address Golant's jurisdictional claim under section 48.193(1)(a) only. The long arm statute grants jurisdiction "for any cause of action arising from ... [o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." §§ 48.193(1), (1)(a), Fla....

...Thompson, 620 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1993)). To establish personal jurisdiction, both prongs of Venetian Salami must be satisfied. Beta Drywall, 9 So.3d at 653. We conclude that Golant's allegations are sufficient to satisfy both prongs of the Venetian Salami test with respect to section 48.193(1)(a), which confers long arm jurisdiction over a defendant for actions arising from "[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." To invoke long arm jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a), the activities of the corporation "must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the State for pecuniary benefit." Dinsmore v....

...See 554 So.2d at 502. Given that the Club maintains no physical office and that Club business is conducted largely, if not exclusively, from the homes of its Board members, we find persuasive Golant's argument that her home was a de facto office of the Club; thus, section 48.193(1)(a) jurisdiction is proper for "having an office ......

...This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants have had continuous and substantial business connections to the State of Florida, including conducting business with companies located in Florida. Defendants are further subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to: Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (Z)(a) because Defendants have conducted, engaged in and carried out business ventures within the State of Florida; § 48.193(l)(b) because Defendants have committed tortious acts within the State of Florida; and § 48.193(l)(g) by failing to perform acts required by a contract to be performed in the State of Florida. Moreover, Defendants are also subject to this Court’s personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(2) because Defendants have engaged in substantial and not isolated business activity within the State of Florida....

...BOOKMAN is now seeking a judgment against MERIDIAN, HUDSON and KAH, INCORPORATED, as the successor in interest to MERIDIAN, for these same medical expenses. Bookman has advanced two statutory bases for jurisdiction: (1) Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193(1)(d), (g), Florida Statutes; and (2) the Unauthorized Insurer's Process Law (UIPL), sections 626.905 and 626.906, Florida Statutes....

...[2] Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 ("Hague Service Convention"), [1969] 20 U.S. T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. [3] Plaintiffs allege that CMSA is subject to personal jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193. Under § 48.193(3), "[s]ervice of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in § 48.1...

...The trial court denied their motion to quash service of process and abate for lack of jurisdiction, and this appeal followed. *292 When analyzing whether long arm jurisdiction is appropriate, two inquiries must be made. First, the complaint must allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1993), Florida's long arm statute....

...nd that he did not engage in substantial, but only isolated, activity within this state, the trial court erred when it found defendant subject to jurisdiction in Florida). As for Grogan Trucking, we must analyze whether jurisdiction was proper under section 48.193, Florida's long arm statute, which states in relevant part: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himse...

...at or about the time of the injury, either: * * * * * * *293 2. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. § 48.193(1)(f)2, Fla.Stat....

...s truck and that when the negligently repaired rear drive axle separated from the vehicle on a Florida roadway, the vehicle rolled, causing her husband's death. She contends that these facts are sufficient to bring Grogan Trucking under subparagraph 48.193(1)(f)2, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...uch repair was accomplished "in the ordinary course of commerce, trade or use," and that the negligent repair caused Albert's accident. Although it is arguable that Nell alleged sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within subparagraph 48.193(1)(f)2, thus satisfying the first prong of the test for long arm jurisdiction, the analysis does not end there....

...Therefore, it is inconsequential that Grogan Trucking was aware of Albert's frequent trips to Florida. [5] Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in finding in personam jurisdiction over Grogan Trucking. Although Grogan Trucking arguably performed acts which fall within section 48.193, it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to subject it to the jurisdiction of this State....

...[2] While a sworn complaint can suffice as long as the complaint's allegations fairly address the defendant's contentions, see Sutton v. Smith, 603 So.2d 693, 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), in this case, Nell's complaint was unsworn. [3] Although Nell does not discuss the applicability of paragraph 48.193(1)(a) or (b) to these facts, we find that Grogan Trucking's actions do not fall within either category....

...Florida facility, paid claims for such treatment, agreed to have a continuing obligation to make payments in Florida, and supplied claim forms necessary for future contemplated dealings, the company was conducting business in Florida under paragraph 48.193(1)(a)); see also Thompson v. Doe, 596 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (stating that where the alleged tortious act occurred outside of the State of Florida resulting in an injury in Florida, a subsequent cause of action does not fall within the coverage of paragraph 48.193(1)(b)), approved, 620 So.2d 1004 (Fla....

...Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 919 (11th Cir.1989). The court will apply the personal jurisdiction test as set down in Proudfoot. First, the court must determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied the constraints of the Florida Long-Arm Statute, Florida Statutes § 48.193 (1989). Florida courts strictly construe their long-arm statute. See Citizens State Bank v. Winters Government Securities, Inc., 361 So.2d 760, 762 (Fla.Ct.App.1978). Plaintiffs allege that this court has jurisdiction under Florida Statutes § 48.193(2): "A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity." The nexus of this inquiry concerns whether defendants Vitek and Novamed have engaged in "substantial and not isolated activity." Plaintiffs point to the aggregate of defendants' activity as satisfying § 48.193(2)....

...n, defendants have scheduled another conference in Florida for this month). At these conferences, defendants distributed brochures related to their products. In light of the above facts, the court finds that defendants' activity in Florida satisfies § 48.193(2). In Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So.2d 1087 (Fla. *1575 Dist.Ct.App.), review denied sub nom. Cook v. Dewline, Inc., 531 So.2d 167 (1988), the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held that to satisfy the substantialness requirement of § 48.193(2) defendants' contacts must be "continuous and systematic." In that case, isolated trucking trips to Florida did not meet that standard and therefore could not confer jurisdiction under § 48.193(2)....

...eby GRANTED. The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to forthwith TRANSMIT this case and all the records pertaining thereto to the Clerk of Court of the Middle District of Florida. DONE and ORDERED. NOTES [1] Since jurisdiction exists pursuant to § 48.193(2), the court need not examine defendants' argument that Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(f)2 is unconstitutional as applied to them....

...purchaser of the investment units, and that neither Foster Pepper nor any of its partners or associates had any contacts with Florida in any way related to the subject matter of this action. The parties agree that the applicable long-arm statute is section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if h...

...esident defendant. Again, we disagree. A Florida court only has personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the plaintiff establishes: (1) sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes; and (2) that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due process....

...over a non-resident defendant." Carib-USA Ship Lines Bahamas Ltd. v. Dorsett, 935 So.2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Am. Fin. Trading Corp. v. Bauer, 828 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). With respect to the first part of this test, section 48.193 provides two ways to establish long-arm jurisdiction. First, jurisdiction may be established if a person "does any of the acts enumerated in" section 48.193(1), including committing a tortious act in Florida, operating a business in Florida, insuring a person in Florida, and other enumerated acts. The parties appear to agree that jurisdiction does not exist under section 48.193(1). As noted previously, the alleged tort occurred in Georgia. Second, jurisdiction may be established under section 48.193(2), which states: "A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity." Under section 48.193(2), the question is whether Snyder engaged in substantial activity in Florida....

...If this were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, then any tourist who had visited Florida could be haled into Florida's courts for his or her alleged negligent acts in another state. This would be inconsistent with the express language of section 48.193(2), which, again, requires a showing of "substantial and not isolated activity" in Florida....

...at the United States Coast Guard office in Miami, Florida. Appellee, Continental Insurance Company, provided insurance for the boat. The Florida long-arm statute distinguishes between transacting "business," and engaging in a "business venture." See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla....

...that is, the exercise of personal jurisdiction "over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum... ." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. at 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 n. 9; see § 48.193(2), Fla....

...Cook, 519 So.2d 1087, 1088-89 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied sub nom. Cook v. Dewline, Inc., 531 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1988). [3] Consequently there is no basis on which the insurer can predicate Florida jurisdiction on the commission of a tortious act within Florida. See § 48.193(1)(b), Fla....

...miss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i). Because Horowitz's acts are insufficient to subject Horowitz to Florida's long-arm jurisdiction under Section 48.193, Florida Statutes, we reverse....

...To determine whether nonresident defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of Florida's courts, two inquiries must be made. First, it must be determined that the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Section 48.193, Florida Statutes....

...The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The trial court did not, however, indicate which section of Florida's longarm statute Horowitz's conduct met. Wendt's jurisdictional allegations set out above contend that the court had personal jurisdiction by virtue of sections 48.193(1)(a), 48.193(1)(b), and 48.193(1)(f)(1), Florida Statutes. On appeal, however, the parties agree that resolution of the jurisdictional question centers on whether Horowitz engaged in a business venture under section 48.193(1)(a), or committed a tortious act within the state of Florida pursuant to section 48.193(1)(b). We will apply these two provisions to the facts in turn. Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: (1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself and, if he is a natura...

...sed in Florida does not, without more, show a general course of business activity in Florida for pecuniary benefit) with Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives v. Solitron Devices, 510 So.2d 1177, 1178-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)(stating that trial court, based on Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, could conclude it had personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendant law firm, based on its substantial activities in Florida, which included handling a tax case in Florida, actually performing work in Florida, and negotiating a loan in Florida)....

...rvices performed for a client within the State of Florida, the performance of such services might subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts." Hill, 762 F.Supp. at 935. Regrettably for Wendt, however, that is not the case here. Section 48.193(1)(b) does not give the trial court personal jurisdiction over Horowitz, either....

...cy of service of process on defendant. In lieu of additional evidence, plaintiff has submitted a further memorandum in support of its position. Service of process on defendant herein was attempted under Florida's recently enacted "long-arm" statute, § 48.193 of the Florida Statutes....

...ision in Blumenthal was subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court. Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Associates, Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla.1975). In view of the foregoing, this court concludes that Florida's courts would give the language of F.S. § 48.193(1)(a) the same construction that identical language under the earlier long-arm statute has been given. This conclusion is consistent with Georgia Savings & Loan Service Corp. v. Delwood, 315 So.2d 237 (Fla.App. 1st 1975), one of the few Florida cases dealing with new Section 48.193, placing a strict construction on the act....

...No appearance for respondent. HERSEY, Judge. Petitioner seeks certiorari review of an order quashing service of process. In dissolution proceedings petitioner inappropriately chose to effect personal service on his wife in New Jersey under the Long-Arm Statute. § 48.193(e) Fla....

...My concern, however, is that we may be encroaching upon the legislature's domain. Service of process is controlled by legislation. Personal service of process on out-of-state residents does not appear to be specifically authorized in dissolution actions. Section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...der is sought sufficient to protect that person's right to due process." § 741.30(6)(d)3, Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Because appellant, a Maryland resident, was not served *1131 in Florida, personal jurisdiction must be established through section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2005), Florida's long-arm statute....

...ulting services at Banco's Spanish offices, Celtic also logged extensive hours of consulting and performed other services from its Florida offices. Banco does not deny that Celtic may be entitled to compensation for the services rendered in Florida. Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a non-resident of the state submits to the jurisdiction of a Florida court for any cause of action arising from a variety of acts taken within the state....

...s venture in this state of having an office or agency in this state. (b) Committing a tortious act within this state. * * * (g) Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. [2] § 48.193(1)(a)-(b), (g), Fla....

..." Venetian Salami; Armaly v. Practice Mgmt. Assoc., 533 So.2d 920 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Ganiko v. Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Unger. The trial court also did not err in finding that Banco had the requisite minimum contacts with Florida. Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides that "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the c...

...ffices, Celtic also logged hundreds of hours in consulting and other services from its Florida office. Because we have confirmed jurisdiction under subsection (g), we do not reach whether Banco's oral contract with Celtic falls within the purview of section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

...[13] So ill-considered is Celtic's contract theory that it would not be valid even if this were a purely interstate dispute, instead of an international one. The breach of contract provision in Florida law is limited to contracts specifically requiring performance in Florida. See § 48.193(1)(g) ("by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed *717 [e.s.] in this state.")....

...ts cannot be reconciled. At no time was the need for an additional hearing, beyond that scheduled and conducted on July 10, 2003, requested of the court, nor is there any indication that the trial court would have denied such a hearing. [2] Although section 48.193(1)(g) is not stated in the order as a ground relied on by the trial court, Celtic also asserts jurisdiction under this subsection....

...her than safety standards."). [c.o.] [12] It is true that the HVB group is one of the major banking concerns in Europe, with offices also in Hong Kong, Vilnius and Singapore. That hardly renders it subject to suit in the United States, however. [13] § 48.193(1)(g), Fla....

...Nor was it shown that appellee recommended this product for use in jails. Appellee, a foreign corporation, had not qualified to do business within the state. [1] Therefore, appellants were required to bring appellee within one of the two Florida "long-arm" statutes, sections 48.181 and 48.193, Florida Statutes (1979). Section 48.181 basically provides for the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which is "doing business" within the state. Section 48.193 sets out specific acts, including that of conducting a business, which may subject a foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction. Section 48.193 specifically limits jurisdiction to causes of action arising from the enumerated acts....

...nd costs, and other relief. Soule, a resident of Virginia, was served by the Sheriff of Fairfax County, Virginia. He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over his person. The trial court denied the motion. Section 48.193(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1977), the long arm statute, provides for personal jurisdiction when: [w]ith respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or wit...

...e at the time of commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. Also relevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction in this case is Section 48.193(3), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides in pertinent part: "[o]nly causes of action arising from acts or omissions enumerated in this section may be asserted against the defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this section......