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Florida Statute 48.193 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 48.193 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Chapter 48
PROCESS AND SERVICE OF PROCESS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 48.193
48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts of state.
(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:
1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.
2. Committing a tortious act within this state.
3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within this state.
4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
5. With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.
6. Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either:
a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or
b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use.
7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.
8. With respect to a proceeding for paternity, engaging in the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect to which a child may have been conceived.
9. Entering into a contract that complies with s. 685.102.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an order issued, or a penalty or fine imposed, by an agency of another state is not enforceable against any person or entity incorporated or having its principal place of business in this state if the other state does not provide a mandatory right of review of the agency decision in a state court of competent jurisdiction.
(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.
(3) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in s. 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as if it had been personally served within this state.
(4) If a defendant in his or her pleadings demands affirmative relief on causes of action unrelated to the transaction forming the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant shall thereafter in that action be subject to the jurisdiction of the court for any cause of action, regardless of its basis, which the plaintiff may by amendment assert against the defendant.
(5) Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereinafter provided by law.
History.s. 1, ch. 73-179; s. 3, ch. 84-2; s. 3, ch. 88-176; s. 3, ch. 93-250; s. 281, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 2013-164; s. 2, ch. 2016-207.

F.S. 48.193 on Google Scholar

F.S. 48.193 on Casetext

Amendments to 48.193


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 48.193
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 48.193.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

PUBLISHING, INC. v. INTERACTIVE MEDIA CORP. d b a, 389 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Florida's Long-Arm Statute Florida's long-arm statute, Section 48.193(1)(a) states that "a person, whether . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . .

FOUNTAINBLEAU, LLC, a v. HIRE US, INC. a a, 273 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction as required pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . determinations-are not subject to certiorari review, due process rights and rights afforded by section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193, Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, "defines the parameters by which a trial court . . . court's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction outside of the limited circumstances set forth in section 48.193 . . .

KAMINSKY, v. HECHT a, 272 So. 3d 786 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . We reverse because Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2018), does not provide . . . facts demonstrating that the defendant's actions fit within one or more of the subsections of section 48.193 . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a) 2., Fla. Stat. . . . In their response, they argued that section 48.193(1)(a) 2. was satisfied because the alleged acts caused . . .

MILLER, v. GIZMODO MEDIA GROUP, LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . non-resident defendant who engaged in one of the enumerated acts listed under Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (alterations added). . . .

VERSILIA SUPPLY SERVICE SRL, v. M Y WAKU, a USA, LLC, v. M Y WAKU, a v. M Y WAKU, a, 371 F. Supp. 3d 1143 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(1), (7). . . . contract itself must require performance in Florida in order to invoke Florida jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .

MC TRUST, v. DE MISHAAN,, 273 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; § 736.0202(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Venetian Salami Co. v. . . .

RIZACK, As LLC, v. SIGNATURE BANK, N. A., 267 So. 3d 24 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . that Appellants carried their initial burden by pleading long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . .

VOLT, LLC, v. VOLT LIGHTING GROUP LLC,, 369 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . not - by merely maintaining the website - submitted to long-arm jurisdiction in Florida under Section 48.193 . . . The Supreme Court of Florida has never claimed this unprecedented reach of Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), and . . . Under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, a non-resident submits to personal jurisdiction in Florida . . . Although Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) creates personal jurisdiction for a non-resident's "tortious act within . . .

AIR SHUNT INSTRUMENT, INC. v. AIRFOIL INTERNATIONAL AIRCRAFT SPACE PARTS CO. WLL,, 273 So. 3d 104 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Robinson's affidavit are woefully inadequate to establish: specific jurisdiction, section 48.193(1)(a . . . ), Florida Statutes (2018) ; general jurisdiction, section 48.193(2) ; or minimum contacts under the . . .

RG GOLF WAREHOUSE, INC. v. GOLF WAREHOUSE, INC., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . . § 48.193(2). . . . Section 48.193(2)'s "substantial and not isolated activity" requirement is "the functional equivalent . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(7). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1) requires...." Melgarejo v. Pycsa Panama, S.A., 537 F. . . .

IN RE ZOSTAVAX ZOSTER VACCINE LIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION v. Co. v. Co., 358 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

. . . . § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) and (1)(a)(6) (a) and (b) Under this statute, the court has personal jurisdiction . . . defendant if a plaintiff's claim is one "arising from" a tortious act committed within Florida under § 48.193 . . . The statute also allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1) (a) (6) (a) and ( . . .

LAFRENIERE, v. CRAIG- MYERS,, 264 So. 3d 232 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 48.193(1)(a), Florida Statutes, confers specific jurisdiction over (1)(a) A person, whether or . . . the amended complaint alleged a cause of action arising from a business venture in Florida Section 48.193 . . . carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state." § 48.193 . . . that affidavit, there was no basis for the trial court to exercise specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1), Florida Statutes, enumerates other bases for specific jurisdiction, but only subsections . . .

E. ABDO, LLC M. LLC LLC, A v. ABDO, a, 263 So. 3d 141 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(9). . . . While these are undoubtedly valid intentional torts that would fall under the scope of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(a)(1) : Maintaining an Office in Florida The Appellees/Plaintiffs next contend that . . . See § 48.193(1)(a)(1). . . . To sufficiently bring an action within the ambit of section 48.193(1)(a)(1), it appears necessary to . . .

ROBEY, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N. A., 343 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . state statute governing personal jurisdiction here is Florida's long-arm statute, Florida Statutes § 48.193 . . .

HIGHLAND STUCCO AND LIME PRODUCTS, INC. v. ONORATO, 259 So. 3d 944 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . facts to support the trial court's exercise of specific jurisdiction over Highland pursuant to section 48.193 . . . jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the purview of Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . facts that demonstrate that the defendant's conduct fits within one or more subsections of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(a) provides, in part: A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, . . . that Highland committed a tortious act in Florida, thus satisfying specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .

LIENEMANN, v. CRUISE SHIP EXCURSIONS, INC., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . terms, granted parties the very right that McRae and its progeny found conspicuously absent in section 48.193 . . . "Further cementing the Jetbroadband holding, in 2013, the Florida legislature enacted section 48.193( . . .

WARE, v. CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., 258 So. 3d 478 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)1-2, 7, Fla. Stat. (2017). . . . While this ground for jurisdiction resembles that laid out in section 48.193(1)(a) 7, Florida Statutes . . . Section 48.193(1)(a) 7 only extends jurisdiction when a party breaches a contract "by failing to perform . . . acts required by the contract to be performed" in Florida. § 48.193(1)(a) 7 (emphasis added). . . . Thus, Florida cannot assert jurisdiction based on section 48.193(1)(a) 7. . . .

SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC. v. JV CHINA, INC., 257 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Instead, it applied section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2016), Florida's long-arm statute, which establishes . . .

ESTES, v. RODIN,, 259 So. 3d 183 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a) 2., Fla. Stat. . . . publication and therefore fail to constitute a tortious act under Florida's long-arm statute section 48.193 . . . we conclude that the Appellants failed to allege sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy section 48.193 . . . or in writing sufficiently alleges personal jurisdiction under [Florida's long-arm statute] section 48.193 . . . "The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for . . .

PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 336 F. Supp. 3d 474 (E.D. Pa. 2018)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(4) ; Pl.'s Opp. Mot. Dismiss at 4, n.2. . . .

ST. JOHNS VEIN CENTER, INC. a C- v. STREAMLINEMD LLC, M. G. CVDJBA, LLC,, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . Stat. § 48.193(1). . . . ANN. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . ANN. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Ann . § 48.193(1)(a). . . . Id. at § 48.193(1)(b). . . .

WOODRUFF- SAWYER CO. v. GHILOTTI Co- R., 255 So. 3d 423 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides a basis for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign . . . Here, the amended complaint does not track the language of section 48.193(2), nor does it allege facts . . . First, we are unpersuaded that section 48.193(1)(a)(7) is implicated, which requires a breach of contract . . . Thus, with respect to section 48.193(1)(a)(7), the complaint does not allege sufficient jurisdictional . . . Next, we address section 48.193(1)(a)(2), "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state." . . .

WAITE, Jr. Jr. v. ALL ACQUISITION CORP. f. k. a. a. k. a., 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a) ). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2) ). . . .

STARR INDEMNITY LIABILITY COMPANY, v. BRIGHTSTAR CORP., 324 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)

. . . Florida Statute § 48.193 is Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute. . . .

SOUTHERN WALL PRODUCTS, INC. v. E. BOLIN LLC,, 251 So. 3d 935 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . asbestos-containing products and that SWP is subject to specific personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . . facts as pleaded were sufficient to support personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . Salami test, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . In this case, the Bolins asserted jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193(1)(a) 6., Florida Statutes. . . . The assertion of jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)(6), Florida Statutes, is frequently referred . . .

DICKINSON WRIGHT, PLLC, a v. THIRD REEF HOLDINGS, LLC, a BFC- BSI, LLC, a, 244 So. 3d 303 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . defendants is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Florida court pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193 . . .

TICKLING KEYS, INC. v. TRANSAMERICA FINANCIAL ADVISORS, INC., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1) -(2) ). . . . (quoting § 48.193(2) ). . . . previous version of the statute, where the tortious acts provision was codified at Florida Statute § 48.193 . . . Florida Legislature amended the statute and moved the tortious act provision to its present location at § 48.193 . . .

FINCANTIERI- CANTIERI NAVALI ITALIANI S. P. A. v. YUZWA,, 241 So. 3d 938 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of Florida's long-arm statute: section 48.193 . . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2017) ; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. . . . See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. . . . Specific Jurisdiction Section 48.193(1)(a) lists several specific acts that could subject a nonresident . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. . . .

ROLLS- ROYCE, PLC, a v. SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC. a a a IAE AG, a a a, 239 So. 3d 709 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Under section 48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2013), the Florida courts have personal jurisdiction over . . . See § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2013). A similar result was reached in Clay v. AIG Aerospace Ins. . . .

Dr. An Q. LE, P. C. P. C. P. C. P. C. v. TRALONGO, LLC,, 239 So. 3d 704 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to fall within the scope of the long arm statute, section 48.193 . . . alleges that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendants pursuant to section 48.193 . . . this state by failing to perform acts required to by the contract to be performed in the state." § 48.193 . . .

YOUSSEF, v. ZAITOUNI, R. Y. A. Y. S. Y., 241 So. 3d 901 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2016), lists the limited circumstances . . . however, either alone or in the aggregate, supports personal jurisdiction over Youssef under section 48.193 . . . visit friends and family neither constitutes "substantial and not isolated activity" under section 48.193 . . . And, on appeal, Zaitouni invites us to find some basis other than section 48.193 for the court's exercise . . . requires that the trial court have personal jurisdiction over the parties to the injunction, and section 48.193 . . .

BANCO DE LOS TRABAJADORES, v. CORTEZ MORENO,, 237 So. 3d 1127 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 48.193(2), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . See § 48.193(1)(a) 1.-9. (Fla. Stat. (2015). B. . . . Committing a tortious act within this state ...." § 48.193(1)(a) 1.-2., Fla. . . . See § 48.193(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . Committing a tortious act within Florida- section 48.193(1)(a)(3) Bantrab contends that, because the . . .

SAMPSON FARM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, v. D. PARMENTER, A. S., 238 So. 3d 387 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . in his or her complaint to establish the basis for the court's long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193, Florida Statutes. 4. . . . Because Parmenter failed to establish a basis for the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .

QUEIROZ, v. BENTLEY BAY RETAIL, LLC,, 237 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . sufficient minimum contacts to subject them to jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

ORGANIZACION MISS AMERICA LATINA, INC. v. URQUIDI, LLC,, 712 F. App'x 945 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a). . . .

GOLTV, INC. LLP, v. FOX SPORTS LATIN AMERICA LTD., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . §§ 48.193(1)-(2). . . . Compl. ¶ 4Í)—“[cjommitting a tor-tious act” being one of the .nine enumerated acts' under section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2) (alteration added). . . . Jurisdiction over Conmebol Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1. . . . Jurisdiction over Full Play Under Florida Statute Section 48.193(l)(a)(2) 1. . . .

C. DOW, v. FIDELITY INVESTMENTS a k a LLC,, 226 So. 3d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . granted the motion, finding: (1) the plaintiff failed to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

STONEPEAK PARTNERS, LP, v. TALL TOWER CAPITAL, LLC,, 231 So. 3d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . (l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2013), for committing a tortious act in Florida and on section 48.193(l) . . . Section 48.193( l)(a) (2) — Committing a Tortious Act in Florida Personal jurisdiction under Florida’ . . . See § 48.193(l)(a)(l), (l)(a)(2). . . . Section 48.193(l)(a)(l) — Engaging in a Business Venture in Florida Stonepeak contends that the trial . . . For purposes of section 48.193(l)(a)(l), to demonstrate that a nonresident defendant is “carrying on . . .

AEGIS DEFENSE SERVICES, LLC, v. GILBERT,, 222 So. 3d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . (1)(a)1. and 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (2015), Section 48.193(1)(a)1. provides, in relevant part, that . . . Section 48.193(2) provides that a defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Section 48.193 provides two ways to establish long-arm jurisdiction: “specific” in which the alleged . . . under section 48.193(2). . . . Gilbert argues, alternatively, that specific jurisdiction was established pursuant to section 48.193( . . .

HINKLE v. CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(6). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .

MCCULLOUGH v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a), (2). . . .

FABRICA DE FIDEOS RIVOLI, S. A. v. FAMEX INVESTMENTS LIMITED,, 225 So. 3d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

WADLEY v. P. NAZELLI,, 223 So. 3d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The plaintiffs alleged in .their amended complaint that jurisdiction was proper under section 48.193( . . . Florida’s long-arm statute provides for either “specific” jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(a) if . . . the nonresident defendant committed any of the acts enumerated under section 48.193(l)(a) in Florida, . . . (l)(a), which provides, in part, as follows:. 48.193 Acts subjecting person to jurisdiction of courts . . . , was renumbered in 2013 . as section 48.193(l)(a)2. . . . .

COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND, NEW JERSEY, v. K. KWAP,, 220 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Specifically, the County argued that the court did not have personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

WELLS FARGO EQUIPMENT FINANCE, INC. v. BACJET, LLC, a A. a A. A. a ACP a LLC, a, 221 So. 3d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The creditor asserted the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the lender under section 48.193, . . . In its amended complaint, the creditor alleged jurisdiction was proper under sections 48.193(l)(a)l. . . . At the hearing on the lender’s second motion to dismiss, the creditor clarified that section 48.193(l . . . conduct in Florida falls within the enumerated acts ■ listed in Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(l)(a) lists enumerated acts allowing'a Florida court to exercise specific jurisdiction . . .

GUBAREV, v. BUZZFEED, INC., 253 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . alleged that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over this action would not comport with the Due Process . . . Stat. § 48.193, a non-resident defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways. . . . Florida’s long-arm statute, specifically section 48.193(1)(a), provides, in relevant part, as follows . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2), (6). . . .

VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT d b a AG, v. JONES,, 227 So. 3d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . See § 48.193; Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Ruiz, 181 So.3d 513, 516-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). . . . If pleading a basis for specific jurisdiction under subsection 48.193(1), due process considerations . . . the factual disputes and determines whether the plaintiff has proven both jurisdiction-under section 48.193 . . . Formerly section 48.193(1)(f). See ch. 2013-164, § 1, at 2012-13, Laws of Fla. . . . . contacts, we do not address whether she established facts supporting long-arm jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .

M. LOERTSCHER, v. ANDERSON, D., 259 F. Supp. 3d 902 (W.D. Wis. 2017)

. . . . § 48.193. Plaintiff Tamara M. . . . The Act allows those who enforce it to take a pregnant woman into custody § 48.193. . . . See, e.g., §§ 48.08, 48.193(1)(c), 48.193(1)(d)2, 48.205(1m), 48.213, 48.347. . . .

PHELAN, v. LAWHON,, 229 So. 3d 853 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The first is governed .by Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2015), and the . . . or written communications into -Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1)(b) has since been -renumbered section 48.193(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (2015). . . . .

WOLF, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. d. b. a., 683 F. App'x 786 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § ] 48.193(l)(a) lists acts that subject a defendant to specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction . . . Stat. § ] 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general personal jurisdiction—that is, . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). Mr. . . . See id. at § 48.193(l)(b). . . .

LEON, v. CONTINENTAL AG,, 301 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 6. . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). 6. . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . . (1)(a)(1) or 48.193(1)(a)(6). . . .

MORO AIRCRAFT LEASING, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL AVIATION MARKETING, INC., 206 So.3d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193(l)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2013), provides in part that a . . . allegation that Moro failed to make a payment in Florida brings the action within the purview of section 48.193 . . .

ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, v. LAROSE,, 202 So. 3d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . to a Wisconsin insured did not satisfy any of the subsections of Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . . to produce evidence that Erie engaged in conduct that fell within one of the provisions of section 48.193 . . . Section 48.193 sets forth requirements for both specific and general jurisdiction, either of which is . . . Section 48.193(1) lists the various ways in which this causal connection can be established and includes . . . subsection 48.193(1)(a)(7), which provides specific jurisdiction when a defendant “breach[es] a contract . . .

MAGWITCH, LLC, v. PUSSER S WEST INDIES LIMITED, a S., 200 So. 3d 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Long-arm jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation when (1) the requirements of section 48.193, . . . Section 48.193 sets forth requirements for specific and general jurisdiction, either of which is sufficient . . . Section 48.193(2) provides for general jurisdiction over ' “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial . . . Thus, the satisfaction of section 48.193(2) also fulfills the second prong of the long-arm jurisdiction . . . In support of its argument that these business contacts are sufficient to satisfy section 48.193(2), . . .

DYCK- O NEAL, INC. v. MONIZ,, 198 So. 3d 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Among other things, section 48.193(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2013), the Florida long-arm statute, allows . . .

BROWN, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, ET AL., 202 F. Supp. 3d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193 (2016)). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l) and (l)(a)(4). a. Fla. . . . Stat § 48.193(l)(a)(l) Subsection (a)(1) confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims . . . Stat § 48.193(l)(a)(4) Plaintiff further alleges that Windfeather is subject to specific jurisdiction . . . pursuant to § 48.193(l)(a)(4). . . .

KEIM, v. ADF MIDATLANTIC, LLC, a, 199 F. Supp. 3d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193(1)(a)(2). TCPA violations are tortious acts. Bagg v. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l). . . . Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) (emphasis added); see also Meier, 288 F.3d at 1270 & n. 7; Wilcox v. . . .

INTEGO SOFTWARE, LLC d b a v. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT, INC., 198 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 48.193, Fla. Stat.; Garris v. . . . that the complaint did not allege that CDI was subject to general Florida jurisdiction under ■ section 48.193 . . . However, neither of these specific acts would subject Intego to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . and neither of these specific acts would be sufficient to allege general jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . “The mere proof of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in -section 48.193 as the basis for . . . . § 48.193(l)(a)l, 7, Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . These allegations established engaging in business in Florida under section 48.193(l)(a)l of the Florida . . . to Defendant’s “failure to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” § 48.193 . . .

TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC. v. HERNANDEZ,, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193. . . .

DYCK- O NEAL, INC. v. ROJAS,, 197 So. 3d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The provision of the Florida long-arm statute applicable in the present case is section 48.193(l)(a)3 . . . Fargo Bank, N.A., 32 So.3d 194, 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (explaining that 1993 amendment to section 48.193 . . . dismiss) were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute— section 48.193 . . .

ALUIA, v. DYCK- O NEAL, INC., 205 So. 3d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . dismiss, “were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute — section 48.193 . . . Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555, 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015); see also § 48.193(1)(a)(3), Fla. . . .

U. S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, v. OAKMONT FINANCIAL, INC., 191 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193; and (2) whether, exercising jurisdiction over the Defendant would violate the requirements . . .

PACKAGING DISTRIBUTION RESOURCES, LLC. LLC. GT USA, LLC. LLC. v. DUKE REALTY LTD. D LLC. D, 194 So. 3d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Venetian Salami resolves the factual disputes necessary to determine jurisdiction pursuant to section 48.193 . . .

BTG PATENT HOLDINGS, LLC, v. GMBH, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193, a non-resident defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction in two ways. . . . The general jurisdiction provision of the long-arm statute, Florida Statute § 48.193(2), provides: A . . . Thus, “if the defendant’s activities meet the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts is . . . Alternatively, BTG points out that Florida Statute § 48.193(l)(a)(2) provides for specific jurisdiction . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(b) (current version at Fla. . . .

CASTILLO, v. CONCEPTO UNO OF MIAMI, INC., 193 So. 3d 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of’ Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

THOMPSON, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION d b a, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193(2)). . . . with Florida, and those contacts fall within' one of the enumerated categories set forth in section 48.193 . . .

CORNERSTONE INVESTMENT FUNDING, LLC, v. PAINTED POST GROUP, INC., 188 So. 3d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 48.193(l)(a)7„ Fla. Stat. (2013). . . .

RAUTENBERG, v. FALZ AG, Co. a, 193 So. 3d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)(2), (2), Fla. Stat. (2013). . . . specific facts to show that the defendant’s actions fall within at least one of the subsections of section 48.193 . . . tortious interference in Florida, thus subjecting Rautenberg to specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Rautenberg committed a tor-tious act in Florida that would provide for specific jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . Falz failed to make sufficient allegations of general jurisdiction as to Rau-tenberg under section 48.193 . . .

LOGOPAINT A S, v. SPORT SIGNS SI, USA,, 163 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D. Pa. 2016)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(b), (f). . . .

A. BROWN, v. BOTTLING GROUP, LLC d b a, 159 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . Section 48.193(l)(a)(6), Florida Statutes, states: Causing injury to persons or property within this . . .

KOTOURA a k a v. STERN,, 183 So. 3d 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § ,48.193(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

DYCK- O NEAL, INC. v. A. HUTHSING,, 181 So. 3d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . dismiss) were sufficient to bring the action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute — section 48.193 . . .

GUSTAFASSON, v. LEVINE,, 186 So. 3d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . sufficient to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over the Father under Florida’s long-arm statute, section 48.193 . . .

TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, v. RUIZ,, 181 So. 3d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . whether (1) there are sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the purview of [section 48.193 . . . The plaintiff may either track the language of section 48.193 without pleading supporting facts,. or . . . facts that demonstrate that the. defendant’s actions fit within one or more subsections of section. 48.193 . . . Section 48.193(1) provides as follows: Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state . . . defendant may also be established under the theory of “general jurisdiction” as provided in section 48.193 . . .

FREEDMAN, v. SUNTRUST BANKS, INC., 139 F. Supp. 3d 271 (D.D.C. 2015)

. . . Florida Statutes Section 48.193 provides for specific personal jurisdiction — ie., based on claims arising . . . Ann. § 48.193(l)(a)(l)(2). . . .

SCHULMAN, v. INSTITUTE FOR SHIPBOARD EDUCATION, d. b. a. LLC, a, 624 F. App'x 1002 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . be subject to personal jurisdiction under the Florida long-arm statute in two ways: first, section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a); and second, section 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general . . . in Florida — if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida, id. § 48.193 . . . And “[t]he reach of [section 48.193(2) ] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the . . . to determine whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Fountaine-Pajot under section 48.193 . . .

CARMOUCHE, v. TAMBORLEE MANAGEMENT, INC. d. b. a., 789 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2015)

. . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a); and second, section 48.193(2) provides that Florida courts may exercise general . . . in Florida — if the defendant engages in “substantial and not isolated activity” in Florida, id. § 48.193 . . . need only consider whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 48.193 . . . And “[t]he reach of [section 48.193(2)] extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the . . . So, to determine whether the district court had general jurisdiction over Tamborlee under section 48.193 . . .

KINGLAND ESTATES, LTD. v. DAVIS,, 170 So. 3d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Jurisdiction over the Barbados defendants is invoked under section 48.193, Florida’s long arm statute . . . motion to dismiss concluding that the complaint satisfied the initial pleading requirements of section 48.193 . . . Knox and her daughter sought to secure jurisdiction over the Barbados defendants under section 48.193 . . . Committing a tortious act within this state. § 48.193(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Acquadro, 851 So.2d at 670, cites to section 48.193(l)(b), "committing a tortious act within this State . . .

SENNE, v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981 (N.D. Cal. 2015)

. . . . § 48.193. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a), in support of personal jurisdiction arguing that under it, there is personal jurisdiction . . .

HARD CANDY, LLC, v. HARD CANDY FITNESS, LLC,, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1231 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . of the analysis, federal courts must construe the Florida long-arm statute, Florida Statute section 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193. . . . See id. § 48.193(1)(a). . . . (1)(a)(1); and (2) “Committing a tortious act within this state,” id. § 48.193(1)(a)(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .

TRACFONE WIRELESS, INC. v. L. ADAMS,, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . , or written communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . . subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to the following Florida statutes: (i) § 48.193 . . . this State while Defendant was engaged in solicitation of service activities within this State; (ii) § 48.193 . . . ., 126 So.3d 336, 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“[C]ommitting a tortious act within Florida under section 48.193 . . .

MIGHTY MEN OF GOD, INC. v. WORLD OUTREACH CHURCH OF MURFREESBORO TENNESSEE, INCORPORATED, G., 102 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . Florida’s long-arm statute is codified at section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes; its interpretation . . . As the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff relies on subsection 48.193(l)(a)(2), which . . . As noted, such conduct is a “tortious act” within the meaning of subsection 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . .1999) (holding that the Eleventh Circuit’s “firmly established precedent ... interprets subsection [48.193 . . . Therefore, this Court need not determine whéther general jurisdiction exists under both subsection 48.193 . . .

BRISTOW, v. A. BRISTOW,, 159 So. 3d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . to allege facts that would subject Appellee to the jurisdiction of this State’s courts under section 48.193 . . .

ROLLET, v. DE BIZEMONT,, 159 So. 3d 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Our analysis begins with Florida’s long-arm jurisdiction statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2014 . . . burden of sufficiently pleading the basis for jurisdiction “either by tracking the language of section 48.193 . . . specific facts that demonstrate that the defendant’s actions fit within one or more subsections of section 48.193 . . .

C. COURBOIN, v. SCOTT, LLC, LLC,, 596 F. App'x 729 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)6. . . . Id. § 48.193(2). . . . property damage, is insufficient to subject a non-resident defendant to personal jurisdiction under § 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(f), which later became § 48.193(l)(a)6). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)6; Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 511 So.2d at 994. . . .

PROU, v. GIARLA,, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7), which states in pertinent part: A person, whether or not a citizen . . . Stat. §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2) and (7). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(g). b. . . . Stat. § 48.193(2), which states: “a defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .

ARQUETTE, v. RUTTER,, 150 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2012). . . . Furthermore, personal jurisdiction gained under section 48.193 “does not confer subject matter jurisdiction . . .

CLAY, v. AIG AEROSPACE INSURANCE SERVICES, INC. v., 61 F. Supp. 3d 1255 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . §§ 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(9). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a). . . .

A. ALVARADO- FERNANDEZ, v. MAZOFF,, 151 So. 3d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 48.193(3), Florida Statutes (2013), states that persons outside of Florida who are subject to . . .

PUIGBO, v. MEDEX TRADING, LLC,, 209 So. 3d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Puigbo’s contention, however, misapprehends the interplay between the relevant provisions of sections 48.193 . . .

RMS TITANIC, INC. v. KINGSMEN CREATIVES, LTD, PTE, LTD,, 579 F. App'x 779 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(a)(l)-(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(2). . . . A person can commit a tort under § 48.193 by making “telephonic, electronic, or written communications . . . Stat. § 48.193 (providing jurisdiction for “any cause of action arising from” the enumerated acts). . . . Stat. § 48.193(6)(a). Premier has failed to argue that basis on appeal, so it is abandoned. . . .

SABO, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION, d. b. a. PLC, PLC, d. b. a. PLC, PLC,, 762 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(a), satisfies due process requirements, and confers personal jurisdiction on the DLC’s . . .

CARMOUCHE, v. CARNIVAL CORPORATION d b a d b a, 36 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193. . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . . Stat. § 48.193(2), then Plaintiff must show that Tamborlee engaged in substantial activity in Florida . . . (2), or specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1), noting that its business activities in Florida “boil . . .

K. WIGGINS, v. TIGRENT, INC. f k a a, 147 So. 3d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Sufficiency of the complaint The long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2011), provides, . . . Wiggins is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Florida under section 48.193(l)(b). b. . . . See Wendt, 822 So.2d at 1260 (“ ‘[Cjommitting a tortious act’ in Florida under section 48.193(l)(b) can . . . This predicate finding is necessary because of the connexity requirement contained in section 48.193( . . . Florida via telephone constitutes the commission of a tort in Florida within the meaning of section 48.193 . . .

R. OLSON, v. ROBBIE H., 141 So. 3d 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . of contract for failure to “perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” § 48.193 . . . the relevant consideration for determining whether Florida has jurisdiction over Olson under section 48.193 . . . The caselaw interpreting Section 48.193(l)(g), Fla. . . . Section 48.193(2) provides that: “A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity . . . Here, the undisputed evidence does not support a finding of general jurisdiction under section 48.193 . . .

EDWARDS a k a a k a D. v. AIRLINE SUPPORT GROUP, INC., 138 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . fraudulent transfer, giving rise to a claim under section 726.108, is a “tortious act” under section 48.193 . . . jurisdiction, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant committed “a tortious act within this state.” § 48.193 . . .

In CHINESE- MANUFACTURED DRYWALL PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION. An v. In v. In An v., 753 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193(l)(a) (emphasis added); see also Dev. Corp. of Palm Beach v. . . . Ann. § 48.193 — applies. . . . we overlay Taishan’s (TTP and TG’s) contacts with Florida and then analyze their sufficiency under § 48.193 . . . Conducting business within Florida Under § 48.193(l)(a)(l) TG is subject to jurisdiction in Florida for . . . we find § 48.193(l)(a)(l) satisfied, we do not need to address these alternative grounds for long-arm . . .

S. ARONSON, v. CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. d b a, 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193, and that the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause [D.E . . . Stat. § 48.193(l)(a)(l), which confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant for claims arising . . . business operating in this state, or that Wrave has an office or agency in Florida as required, by § 48.193 . . . Stat. § 48.193(2). . . .

PERUYERO, v. AIRBUS S. A. S. BAE PLC,, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 48.193, which confers general jurisdiction, is the applicable long-arm statute because BAE engaged . . . Stat. § 48.193 does not apply because Decedent’s only exposure to asbestos occurred while working on . . . Stat. § 48.181, § 48.182, § 48.193, and § 47.16&emdash; that confer personal jurisdiction over Defendant . . . Pe-ruyero is trying to dress up a § 48.193 general jurisdiction analysis in § 47.16 specific jurisdiction . . .

DOT SR v. TELESUR,, 136 So. 3d 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Id. at 1233, 1236 (citing § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (2009)). . . .