Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Robert Vezina, III of Vezina, Lawrence and Piscitelli, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Respondents. PARIENTE, J. The issue in this case is whether the State is required to pay a lawful judgment arising from a breach of contract action. In order to decide this issue we must interpret section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2005), on which the Department of Environmental Protection relied in refusing to pay the judgment against it. In ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC v. State, 958 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the First District Court of Appeal held that section 11.066 does not prevent the State or a state agency from paying a judgment in the absence of a specific appropriation but certified the following question to be one of great public importance: DOES SECTION 11.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY WHERE JUDGMENTS HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST THE STATE OR ONE OF *1262 ITS AGENCIES IN A CONTRACT ACTION? Id. at 1038. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that section 11.066 was not intended to require a specific legislative appropriation before a governmental entity can be required to pay a valid judgment entered into for breach of contract with a private entity....

...for $628,543. The basis for the breach of contract action against DEP, the amount of the judgment, and the validity of the judgment are not at issue in this case. The issue here concerns DEP's refusal to pay the judgment based on its assertion that section 11.066 prohibits a state agency from paying any judgment unless there is a specific appropriation by the Legislature for that judgment. In December 2005, ContractPoint filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the trial court seeking to compel DEP and Florida's Chief Financial Officer to pay the judgment. Based on its interpretation of 11.066, the trial court denied ContractPoint's petition, finding no clear duty on the part of DEP to pay the judgment without a specific appropriation for that purpose....

...tutes and that the interpretation urged by the State would defeat that very purpose by rendering "all public/private contracts illusory." ContractPoint, 958 So.2d at 1038. Accordingly, the First District concluded that the Legislature did not intend section 11.066 to apply to actions in contract and, therefore, held that the statute did not prohibit payment of the breach of contract judgment by DEP....

...ugh its Division of Recreation and Parks to "grant privileges, leases, concessions, and permits for the use of land for the accommodation of visitors in the various parks, monuments, and memorials." [1] This statute was in effect before enactment of section 11.066 and has remained in effect ever since....

...In fact, it was primarily ContractPoint's expenditures made toward performing under this contract that formed the basis of the final judgment in this case. We must now answer the question posed by the First District Court of Appeal and decide whether section 11.066 was intended to apply to breach of contract judgments and thus prohibits DEP from paying the judgment obtained by ContractPoint in this case. ANALYSIS Interpretation of Section 11.066 The question presented by the First District involves an issue of statutory interpretation, which is subject to de novo review. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2007). Specifically, the Court must determine whether section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2005), applies to contract actions and bars enforcement of judgments entered on breach of contract claims against the State or its agencies if there is no specific legislative appropriation to pay the judgment....

...We are not asked to decide whether the Legislature or the executive branch could or should place limits on the amount it will pay or when it will pay if it breaches contracts it enters into with private entities. That is not the judiciary's prerogative. The only question before us is whether section 11.066 plainly evinces an intent to shield the State from paying any valid judgment entered against it in a breach of contract action unless and until there is a specific legislative appropriation to pay that judgment. The Florida Legislature originally enacted section 11.066 in 1991 as part of "An Act relating to fiscal affairs of the state." See ch. 91-109, § 40, Laws of Fla. Although located in a chapter dealing generally with "Legislative Organization, Procedures and Staffing," section 11.066 is entitled "Suits seeking monetary damages against the state or its agencies; payment of judgments; appropriations required" and provides: (1) As used in this section, the term "appropriation made by law" has the same meaning as in s....

...If the language of the statute is "clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning" there is no need to resort to statutory construction. Id.; accord Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992). In interpreting section 11.066, however, we cannot read subsection (3) in isolation, but must read it within the context of the entire section in order to ascertain legislative intent for the provision....

...the public health, safety, or welfare, is presumed to be acting to prevent a public harm. A person may rebut this presumption in a suit seeking monetary damages from the state or a state agency only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. § 11.066(2), Fla....

...When considered as a whole, with the express indication of the "evil to be corrected" in subsection (2), in the context of the broad statutory scheme conferring contracting authority upon its agencies, and in light of the legislative history of the enactment, the Legislature's apparent intent in section 11.066 is to preclude payment of judgments for monetary damages arising out of the State's exercise of its police powers unless an appropriation exists. The legislative history of section 11.066 confirms that the provision addresses the State's exercise of its police powers....

...It can be seen that the elements of the law given prominence in the staff analysis were suits for monetary damages stated in conjunction with the State's exercise of its police power. Other legislative materials relating to the original enactment of section 11.066 also suggest that one impetus for the statute was the many attempts to recover judgments for claims arising out of the State's exercise of its police powers during the Citrus Canker Eradication Program in the mid-1980s. [5] Subsequently, the Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement for CS/SB 822 (Apr. 5, 2001), discussing the proposed amendment of section 11.066, explains generally that the statute "relates to suits seeking monetary damages against the state or state agencies." [6] This staff analysis goes on to again explain: "When the state or a state agency is exercising its inherent police...

...Additionally, no contemporaneous amendments were enacted to limit or alter state agencies' contracting authority in the vast array of contracting statutes which then, and now, provide broad contracting authority to state agencies, including DEP. [7] And despite DEP taking the position *1268 that section 11.066 broadly applies to all judgments entered against the State, there has been no contention made that the specific statutory scheme relating to tort suits and judgments against the State pursuant to section 768.28, Florida Statutes, is affected by section 11.066. [8] In our view, this further supports the conclusion that section 11.066 was not intended to broadly limit the payment of all judgments, but only those entered against the State arising from actions it took in the exercise of its police powers. Pan-Am as Established Precedent Finally, the actions of the Legislature in enacting this legislation in 1991 must also be read in the context of this Court's then-existing precedent. Seven years before the 1991 enactment of section 11.066, this Court issued its opinion in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp....

...s breach of that contract." Id. In reaching *1269 that result, we rejected the State's contention that "mutuality of remedy is satisfied by petitioner's opportunity to bring a claims bill before the legislature." Id. DEP urges the Court to find that section 11.066 is a clear reassertion of limited sovereign immunity as to breach of contract judgments and a statutory prohibition of enforcement of those judgments. However, if the Legislature truly intended to reassert sovereign immunity as to breach of contract judgments in section 11.066, and to overrule clear prior precedent that has been relied on for many years by the courts of this state (as well as those entities contracting with the State), we expect that such intent would have been specifically stated within the...

...[10] Furthermore, "the legislature is *1270 presumed to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version." Jones, 793 So.2d at 917 (emphasis supplied) (quoting City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Fla.2000)). We conclude that section 11.066 does not express a clear intent to nullify our decision in Pan-Am and those decisions that follow it, and does not express a clear intent to reimpose any aspect of sovereign immunity as to express, written contracts entered into by the State or its agencies....

...Under the principles announced in Pan-Am, a contract that grants one party the right to sue, but also affords the other party the right to declare that it has no legal obligation to pay, is void for lack of mutuality of remedy. See Pan-Am, 471 So.2d at 5. That is essentially the same situation created by an application of section 11.066 to bar payment of a validly obtained judgment arising from breach of an express, written contract....

...clusion that the Legislature would never have intended the result reached by the dissent, a result that authorizes the State to avoid its validly entered contracts and the monetary consequences resulting from any breach. [11] If we were to interpret section 11.066(3) in isolation as prohibiting payment of valid breach of contract judgments, thereby rendering express, written contracts entered into by the State under legislatively granted authority essentially illusory and unenforceable, that result would be untenable and contrary to the Legislature's overall intent. The sounder and more reasoned interpretation, viewing the statute in its entirety, in light of the overall legislative scheme of encouraging private/public partnerships, and keeping in mind the history of this provision, is that section 11.066 is not applicable to breach of contract judgments. THIS CASE In this case, we acknowledge that the attempted enforcement of the judgment began by ContractPoint's filing of a petition for writ of mandamus. The trial court denied the petition because under section 11.066, as interpreted by that court, no clear legal duty appeared on the part of the State or its agency to pay the judgment absent an appropriation. Contrary to the dissent's view, the issue before us is not whether the trial court properly denied the petition for writ of mandamus but rather, as set forth in the certified question, what is the correct statutory construction of section 11.066....

...public property, "mandamus is the proper, and indeed only, vehicle for enforcing a judgment against a governmental entity"). [12] Because the trial court did not have the benefit of the decisions of either the district court or this Court construing section 11.066, the trial court's denial of the writ was not erroneous....

...iation, has no place in a statutory construction analysis. In fact, this is not a choice the State has been forced to make in any other case that has been called to our attention involving a lawful breach of contract judgment, either before or after section 11.066 was enacted in 1991....

...eating a chilling effect on business between the State and the private sector. But that would be a legislative decision to reach after weighing all the policy considerations, both pro and con. In our view, that was not the basis for the enactment of section 11.066, which provides no clear indication that the Legislature intended it to apply to breach of contract judgments....

...In this case, it chose to authorize DEP to privatize certain services, such as in the concessions contract at issue here. However, DEP breached its contract and a judgment was entered against it. Therefore, the only issue we are deciding is whether section 11.066 shields DEP from having to pay that judgment absent a specific legislative appropriation. Having reviewed the actual language of the statute, the history of its enactment, and our prior case law, we conclude that section 11.066 was never intended to act as a shield to prevent a state agency from paying a lawful judgment arising from the breach of a contract that it was expressly authorized to enter. Accordingly, for all the reasons stated, we conclude that section 11.066 was not intended to and does not apply to valid judgments arising from the breach of a legislatively authorized express, written contract by the State or any of its agencies....

...In answering the certified question, the majority relies heavily on this Court's decision in Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Department of Corrections, 471 So.2d 4 (Fla.1984). I believe that the majority's reliance on this case is mistaken. The plain language of section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2001), is applicable in the instant case and requires the conclusion that the trial court properly denied ContractPoint's petition for a writ of mandamus....

...I would answer the certified *1273 question in the affirmative and quash the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC v. State, 958 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The question certified by the First District asks, "Does Section 11.066, Florida Statutes, apply where judgments have been entered against the State or one of its agencies in a contract action?" ContractPoint, 958 So.2d at 1038. The majority answers that "section 11.066 was not intended to require a specific legislative appropriation before a governmental entity can be required to pay a valid judgment entered into for breach of contract with a private entity." Majority op....

...partment of Environmental Protection (DEP) to pay a judgment resulting from a breach of contract action. Considering the certified question in the context of the issue on appeal in this case, the First District has asked this Court to decide whether section 11.066 is to be given its plain and obvious meaning where the statute states that a valid defense to a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the State or a State agency to pay a monetary judgment is that there is not a specific appropriation made by law to pay the judgment. I would answer that section 11.066 is to be given its plain and obvious meaning, and thus the trial court did not err in denying ContractPoint's petition for a writ of mandamus. As set out in the majority opinion, section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in full: (1) As used in this section, the term "appropriation made by law" has the same meaning as in s....

...is `clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning' there is no need to resort to statutory construction.'" Majority op. at 1265 (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). The majority and I part ways because I find that section 11.066 is clear and unambiguous. Subsection (4) of section 11.066 expressly answers the question before this Court. That subsection provides that "it is a defense to an alternative writ of mandamus issued to enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency that there is no appropriation made by law to pay the judgment." § 11.066(4), Fla....

...or a state agency, the sole remedy of the judgment creditor, if there has not otherwise been an appropriation made by law to pay the judgment, is to petition the Legislature in accordance with its rules to seek an appropriation to pay the judgment. § 11.066(3), Fla....

...ajority op. at 1266. This analysis does not defer properly to the Legislature's constitutional authority to draft legislation. The statute repeatedly refers to "monetary damages under the judgment of any court" and "a judgment for monetary damages." § 11.066(3)-(4)....

...phrase to include monetary judgments from breach of contract actions. Rather, the Court has an obligation to apply the statute as written. Similarly, even if the majority is correct in believing that citrus canker litigation inspired the drafting of section 11.066, there is no qualification in the statute limiting its effect to judgments arising from citrus canker-related causes of action....

...cuss the process of executing a monetary judgment, the issue currently at hand. This Court is not at liberty to read extra provisions into a statute. The Legislature could have excluded monetary judgments from breach of contract actions and narrowed section 11.066 to judgments arising from the State's use of its police power mentioned in subsection (2), but it did not....

...nd until told to do otherwise by the Legislature. Again, "[t]he legislative history of a statute is irrelevant where the wording of a statute is clear." Aetna, 609 So.2d at 1317. The First District and the majority of this Court also determined that section 11.066 should be found inapplicable to judgments arising from breach of contract actions in part because the statute does not express a legislative intent to overturn twenty-two years of case law subjecting the State to breach of contract actions. ContractPoint, 958 So.2d at 1037; majority op. at 1268-70. Again, I disagree and would apply the plain language of section 11.066....

...ity op. at 1269-70 n. 10, are helpful and informative where a statute would otherwise be subject to multiple meanings but gratuitous where the statutory language is clear. Second, I disagree with the majority's assessment of the relationship between section 11.066 and this Court's decision in Pan-Am Tobacco....

...Importantly, however, the Pan-Am Tobacco decision did not address the distinct issue of whether the Legislature abrogated the State's sovereign immunity in the context of a separate legal proceeding to enforce a judgment from a breach of contract action. [13] Accordingly, section 11.066 addressed a distinct legal issue and did not overrule *1277 Pan-Am Tobacco....

...ty. The likelihood that a judgment debtor will pay a legally binding judgment in the event of a breach is a practical factor to be considered when entering any contract but not a legally required element of a contract. Applying the plain language of section 11.066(4) would not relieve the State from obligations assumed by contract....

...State Turnpike Auth., 106 So.2d 421, 424 (Fla.1958) ("[T]he immunity of the sovereign is a part of the public policy of the state. It is enforced as a protection of the public against profligate encroachments on the public treasury."). Arguably, the majority's decision that section 11.066 is not a defense to a mandamus proceeding to enforce a monetary judgment arising from a breach of contract action leads to an absurd result....

...Seminole County Sheriff's Dept., 936 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) ("Mandamus may not be used to establish *1279 rights.... Instead, a party petitioning for a writ of mandamus must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief...."). Under the scheme set forth in section 11.066, the contract action is an important step toward recovery by means of a petition for a writ of mandamus where the Legislature has appropriated funds to compensate an injured party or by means of a petition in the Legislature where it has not yet appropriated funds to pay the judgment....

...gation to enforce a judgment. I would answer the certified question in the affirmative and quash the decision of the First District. The trial court did not err in denying ContractPoint's petition for a writ of mandamus on the basis that pursuant to section 11.066, the CFO did not have a clear legal duty to pay the judgment without an appropriation for that purpose....

...9). The provision was later transferred to section 258.007, Florida Statutes (1979). [2] Of particular note, we are neither aware of, nor have we been provided with, any cases in which the State has sought to avoid enforcement of a judgment based on section 11.066, since the provision was enacted in 1991....

...ution may be levied upon the property so condemned and any other property of the petitioner in the same manner as executions are levied in common-law actions." § 74.091, Fla. Stat. (2007). [4] In fact, the only other Florida case that has discussed section 11.066 is Haire v....

...imit compensation for citrus trees removed in the citrus canker eradication program to funds that had been specifically appropriated for such purpose (section 581.1845, Florida Statutes (2003)), "is nothing more than a reiteration of the language in section 11.066(3)." Id. at 785. [5] The tape recording of proceedings held March 14, 1991, by the Senate Appropriations Committee, discussing C/S for SB 2128, a bill which contained similar provisions to those codified in section 11.066, and for which HB 2313 was substituted, discloses a specific discussion of the citrus canker claims as the impetus for the legislation, noting that the judicial branch had awarded judgments for citrus canker activities by the State....

...(2007) (Florida Turnpike Enterprise); § 402.7305, Fla. Stat. (2007) (Dep't of Children and Family Services); § 409.908(18), Fla. Stat. (2007) (Agency for Health Care Administration for transportation services); § 944.105(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (Dep't of Corrections). Other statutes enacted since 11.066 are consistent with an expansion of the State's contracting authority....

...ct. To the contrary, the amount of tort judgments or for that matter the amount of judgments arising out of the exercise of its police power may be difficult to assess and are unpredictable, reinforcing our conclusion of the narrow intended reach of section 11.066....

...tent of the contracting parties. We also emphasize that when the State enters into a contract with a private entity, it can place parameters on the payment of damages as we have previously pointed out. However, the only question before us is whether section 11.066 plainly evinces an intent to shield the State from payment of all valid judgments entered against it in breach of contract actions unless and until there is a specific legislative appropriation to pay that judgment....

...In each of the cases cited by the majority in footnote 9, the lawsuit was brought to establish the State's liability for damages or interest, generally under a tort or contract theory. None concerned an action to enforce a judgment. As the majority acknowledges, the applicability of section 11.066 to an action to enforce a judgment against the State appears to be an issue of first impression. [14] Moreover, if conflict exists between section 11.066 and Pan-Am Tobacco, the Legislature can replace common law with a duly enacted statute....

...24 As to the Tribe's claims that may fall outside of 284.30, Florida law provides that neither the state nor its state agencies shall pay any monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by law. See Fla. Stat. 11.066....

...vailability of appropriated funds does not relieve the State from its responsibility to provide full and just compensation. The State conceded this point during oral argument, observing that this is nothing more than a reiteration of the language in section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2003), which expressly provides that "[n]either the state nor any of its agencies *786 shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by l...

...The contract was to last for 30 years, with two 10-year renewal options based on satisfactory service. In August 2005, appellant brought suit against DEP for wrongful termination of the contract. Following a jury trial, judgment was entered against DEP for $628,543. However, DEP refused to pay the judgment asserting section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2001), barred payment. The relevant portion of section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2001), provides: (1) As used in this section, the term "appropriation made by law" has the same meaning as in s....

...In December 2005, appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus seeking to compel Florida's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to pay the damage award. The trial court entered a final order denying the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, stating that in the face of the clear language of section 11.066, appellees did not have a clear legal duty to pay the judgment to appellants without a specific appropriation for that purpose. This timely appeal followed. Whether appellant had a clear legal right to enforce the monetary judgment and, thus, was entitled to mandamus relief rests on this court's interpretation of whether section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2001), is applicable to an action based on a breach of contract....

...We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract. Id. at 5. The trial court determined that section 11.066, Florida Statutes (1991), superseded the decision in Pan-Am Tobacco. Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, section 11.066 does not express any legislative intent to overturn 22 years of case law subjecting the state to breach of contract actions....

...lp enhance the use and potential of the state park system. § 258.015(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The Legislature could not, on the one hand, intend to make all public/private contracts illusory as the trial court effectively found it did in section 11.066, and, at the same time, direct DEP to provide incentives for partnerships with private organizations that necessarily entail entering into public/private contracts....

...Nor is it clear how DEP will comply if, in fact, there is not a legislative appropriation to cover the judgment (a determination which appears to have been made by the trial court in applying the statutory provisions). Accordingly, we certify the following question to be one of great public importance: DOES SECTION 11.066, FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY WHERE JUDGMENTS HAVE BEEN ENTERED AGAINST THE STATE OR ONE OF ITS AGENCIES IN A CONTRACT ACTION? BARFIELD and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur....

...Palm Beach County Case The Palm Beach County final judgment provided that “[ejxecution shall not issue on this judgment absent further order of this Court.” The Mendez class moved for a “further order.” They made two arguments. First, the class contended that section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2000), 1 which prohibits the execution of judgments against the State and its agencies, should be interpreted in light of a property owner’s right to receive full and just compensation for a taking, and that another statute, section 74.091, Florida Statutes (2000), 2 serves as an exception to the prohibition in takings *607 cases. Second, and alternatively, they argued that section 11.066 was unconstitutional as applied to takings judgments as an infringement on the power of the judiciary to determine full compensation....

...The trial court granted the class’s motion and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution after “the conclusion of all appellate proceedings arising from” the final judgment. The court noted that neither party disputed that the Department’s taking was an exercise of the State’s police powers, making it appear that section 11.066 required the class to obtain a legislative appropriation. However, the court reasoned that the language in subsection 11.066(4) — “Notwithstanding s....

...After considering the State’s constitutional guaranty of full and fair compensation for takings, and that such compensation is compulsory, the trial court held that the section 74.091 exception applied, so that the class could seek execution of their judgment against the Department without going through the section 11.066 appropriations process. The court did not reach “the question of whether section 11.066 is unconstitutional.” Broward County Case In the Broward final judgment, the trial court stated the amount of the award, followed by the language “for which let execution issue.” The Department moved to preclude issuance of a writ of execution. The circuit court granted the Department’s motion. It “conclud[ed] that [s]ee-tions 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes, govern on the issue regarding execution on the Final Judgment in this case,” and declined to follow the ruling of the Palm Beach circuit court. Instead, the court held that section 11.066 “[took] precedence over [s]ection 74.091, even in these circumstances.” The class’s remedy, the court wrote, was that provided by section 11.066 — the appropriations process. If the class went through that process and could not secure an appropriation, “this Court may permit execution to issue.” Finally, the court held that section 11.066(3) was constitutional as applied....

...demnation cases. 829 So.2d at 931 . However, that case cannot be extended to control the application of chapter 74 because chapter 73 does not contain a limitation on its application similar to section 74.011. II Both classes argued that subsections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (2000), are unconstitutional as applied to their cases. First, they asserted that subsections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutionally restrict the right of Palm Beach and Bro-ward homeowners to recover payment of full and just compensation....

...1st DCA 2008) (“The preservation of error requirement is not ordinarily completed until the aggrieved party has obtained a ruling on the motion or objection made in the lower tribunal.” (citation omitted)). With respect to the Broward County class, these as-applied constitutional challenges to section 11.066 are not yet ripe. Article X, section 6(a), of the Florida Constitution provides: “No private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner....” The class argued that *609 section 11.066 is unconstitutional as applied because it limits their ability to secure the full payment to which they are entitled....

...ance is not ripe until the plaintiff has obtained a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the plaintiffs property.”). Because the Broward County class has not yet availed itself of the appropriation process contemplated by section 11.066, its as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute is not ripe for review....

...We reverse that portion of the Palm Beach County order allowing execution against the Department and remand to the circuit courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also reverse that portion of the Broward County order holding that section 11.066(3) was constitutional as applied, because the issue was not yet ripe....

...ued against the state or its agencies. Moreover, it is a defense to an alternative writ of mandamus issued to enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency that there is no appropriation made by law to pay the judgment. § 11.066, Fla....

Communications Act Amendments of 1952, Pub.L. No. 82-554, § 11, 66 Stat. 711, 717 (codified as amended at 47 U.S

...ted as permitting the provider to include untimely charges in its bill. Thousands of analogous examples can be found throughout Florida's constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g., Art. III, § 8(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. Stat. § 11.062(2)(a); § 11.066(4); § 11.70(3)(d); § 14.29(3)(b), (12); § 20.04(7)(a); § 20.19(6)(f); § 20.23(2)(a)3; § 27.34(2); § 27.711(3); § 28.241(3),(4); § 29.004(10)(d); § 39.012; § 39.013(2); § 44.06(2); § 63.0423(5) and (6); § 90.604....

...vailability of appropriated funds does not relieve the State from its responsibility to provide full and just compensation. The State conceded this point during oral argument, observing that this is nothing more than a reiteration of the language in section 11.066(3), Florida Statutes (2003), which expressly provides that “[n]either the state nor any of its agencies *786 shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by...

...As to the Tribe's claims that may fall outside of § 284.30, Florida law provides that neither the state nor its state agencies shall pay any monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by law. See Fla. Stat. § 11.066....

...1986). As to the Tribe’s claims that may fall outside of § 284.30, Florida law provides that neither the state nor its state agencies shall pay any monetary 16 damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by law. See Fla. Stat. § 11.066....

...State will have to pay that amount. Since then, the Third District has agreed that the statutory compensation does not eliminate the remedy of inverse condemnation. See Lopez-Brignoni, 114 So.3d at 1141-42. We adhere to these cases. Applicability of Section 11.066(2) The Department claims that the trial court erred in the takings trial by failing to apply the presumption contained in section 11.066(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the burden of proof to overcome that presumption....

...Thus, the presumption of mere “harm,” as opposed to imminent dangerousness, does not render the taking non-compensable. The Department’s position has been soundly rejected both by the Legislature and by all courts considering the issue. Even if section 11.066(2) applied, however, there was undisputed evidence before the trial court that the State acted within its police power to destroy the uninfected trees, which were not imminently dangerous to the public as that concept has been interpreted since Corneal . As the trial court noted, the evidence was overwhelming on this issue. Thus, if the presumption of section 11.066(2) had been applied, the plaintiffs’ evidence overwhelmingly rebutted any claim that the harm was the type of dangerous harm which would preclude compensation for the taking of the trees. Because section 11.066(2) applies only to the presumption of public harm, it is not applicable to the question of damages....

refused to pay “based on its assertion that section 11.066 prohibits a state agency from paying any judgment

Legislature to appropriate such funds pursuant to section 11.066, Florida Statutes? GROSS, HAZOURI and CONNER

...Although the judgments have long been final and the Department claimed that it would be "happy to pay the three judgments," the Department asserted that it is unable to make payment until the legislature appropriates the funds as required by sections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...refused to take affirmative action to obtain an appropriation and has taken a position that has resulted in the governor vetoing a legislative appropriation that the Lee Homeowners had requested. Further, the Lee Homeowners argued that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional as applied. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a thorough order1 that addressed at length the Takings Clause, the pertinent statutes, and the applicable case law, together with the evidence that the parties presented. The court determined that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional as applied and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Department to pay the judgments....

...s argument." (Order p. 7) We agree with the trial court's well-reasoned decision and affirm. I. Introduction The question before this court is whether the trial court erred in declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of mandamus compelling payment. Sections 11.066(3) and (4) provide as follows: (3) Neither the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made...

...Moreover, it is a defense to an alternative writ of mandamus issued to enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency that there is no appropriation made by law to pay the judgment. Under section 11.066(3), a court may not require a state agency to pay a judgment for monetary damages absent an appropriation made by the legislature. In the event of nonpayment of a monetary judgment due to a lack of appropriation, the judgment creditor must petition the legislature for an appropriation. Id. Section 11.066(4) expressly prohibits the courts from issuing a writ of execution or using any common-law remedy against the state agency to enforce the monetary judgment. And, in the event a court issues an alternative writ of mandamus to compel payment, section 11.066(4) provides that the lack of an appropriation is a valid defense. The difficulty with these provisions is that despite the constitutional imperative in the Takings Clause, they give the legislature the sole discretion to decide whether and when to make an appropriation....

...And if an appropriation is made, it is subject to the governor's sole discretion to veto it. By doing so, application of these statutory provisions could subject payment of a takings judgment to the whim of the legislature and governor. And this could result in sections 11.066(3) and (4) effectively abrogating judgment creditors' constitutional rights to full compensation under the Takings Clause. -4-  II....

...enging the judgments, and Governor Scott line-item vetoed the appropriation in apparent reliance on those statements on June 2, 2017. On June 8, 2017, the Lee Homeowners filed a petition for writ of mandamus or to declare sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional in the trial court. The court issued an alternative writ and held a hearing on the petition....

...y are without an adequate remedy at law because the legislature has not been able to successfully pass an appropriation resulting in payment. But the court also determined that, despite the Lee Homeowners' satisfaction of these elements, sections 11.066(3) and (4) precluded the court from issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Department to pay the judgments. The trial court then examined sections 11.066(3) and (4) and held that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied....

...However, the Department has not established that it lacks the ability to satisfy the judgments in full or in part. Instead, the Department's position is that it is not legally authorized (or required) to pay the judgments until the legislature appropriates the funds for that purpose as required by sections 11.066(3) and (4). Based on the evidence presented the trial court found that the Department failed to demonstrate an actual inability to pay....

...even the most basic of efforts to secure an appropriation of funds to pay" the judgments. (Order p. 15) B. The Alleged Failure to Exhaust Legal Remedies The Department next argues that the constitutionality challenge to sections 11.066(3) and (4) was not ripe because the Lee Homeowners did not file a claim bill under section 11.066(3). However, section 11.066(3) does not mention a claim bill but merely states: "To enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency, the sole remedy of the judgment creditor, if there has not otherwise been an appropriation made by...

...legislative term, but it was vetoed by the Governor apparently based on the Department's incorrect position that the judgments were not final. Moreover, the evidence before the trial court established that the Department had not previously raised section 11.066 as an impediment to paying other judgments. Based on the -8- analysis in Bogorff and the circumstances here, we conclude that the constitutionality challenge to sections 11.066(3) and (4) was ripe. C. The Constitutionality of Sections 11.066(3) and (4) The trial court found sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied because the provisions (1) unconstitutionally restrict the Lee Homeowners' rights to payment of full compensation for a governmental taking of their property under article X, section 6(a), of the Flori...

...For purposes of this opinion, we address the first two findings because they are the most compelling. 1. Right to full compensation for a governmental taking of property under art. X, § 6(a) In finding sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional on this basis, the trial court reasoned, in part, as follows: As stated in Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc....

...e the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the people. Id. at 486 (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960)). Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) to prevent or limit payment of the three judgments awarded to [the Lee - 10 -  Homeowners] in this constitutional takings proceeding similarly "run[s] afoul" of the self-executing, constitutional mandate that requires it....

.... While the Legislature may permissibly implement the constitutional mandate in order to further protect the constitutional right to full compensation for a taking, or to make the right more readily available, §§ 11.066(3) and (4) do precisely the opposite. Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) to preclude issuance of a writ of execution will preclude the efforts of the Lee Homeowners to secure their constitutional right to payment of full compensation, and subject the...

...ly making the subject guarantee of full compensation under our State Constitution an illusory promise with no guarantee of compliance. Accordingly, the interpretation and suggested application of §§ 11.066 (3) and (4) must yield to Article X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. (Order pp. 46-47) (footnotes omitted). The Department raises three challenges to this analysis. First, it argues that the Takings Clause does not trump sections 11.066(3) and (4) because those sections are premised on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which predates the constitution....

...on; and that it is up to the legislature to decide whether to make an appropriation. We agree with the trial court that these statutes, as applied here, are contrary to the Takings Clause. Second, the Department argues that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are reasonable restrictions on the means by which a takings judgment may be paid....

...Reichman, 53 So. 3d 339, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that like other constitutional rights, the right to habeas relief is subject to reasonable restrictions."). However, based on the evidence presented sections 11.066(3) and (4)'s restrictions, as applied, completely deprive the Lee Homeowners of their rights to full - 12 - compensation for the government's taking....

...o Florida cases declaring unconstitutional a statute that provides a process for payment of a governmental obligation. The Department asserts that the cases cited by the trial court involve instances of no compensation for a taking while sections 11.066(3) and (4) merely regulate the process for obtaining compensation. However, the Department mischaracterizes the result of sections 11.066(3) and (4) under the circumstances here. As applied, the statues are being used as a shield against required compensation established by the final judgments and in accordance with the Takings Clause. 2. Separation of powers under article II, section 3; and the power of the judiciary under article V, section 1 In finding sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional on this basis, the trial court reasoned, in part, as follows: Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) also sets them at odds with another long-settled and well-enshrined principle; the determination of full compensation is a judicial function that cannot constitutionally be performed by t...

...the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry. 170 So. 2d at 852 (quoting Baltimore & [O.R.] Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 349, 368 (193[6])) (emphasis in original). To the extent that §§ 11.066(3) and (4) are interpreted to permit the Legislature (by the appropriations process) to control the amount of compensation, if any, that [the Lee Homeowners] will actually receive under their lawfully-...

...establish procedures for payment of its constitutional obligation, it does not have the luxury of avoiding it. Should the Class fail in obtaining a writ of mandamus, pursuant to section 11.066(4), the constitutional issue will ripen, and [t]he courts will be left with no choice but to enforce Article X, section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution. Bogorff II, 191 So. 3d at 51[6].[4] (Order pp. 54-56) 4Bogorff v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 191 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). - 15 -  The Department argues that sections 11.066(3) and (4) do not implicate the judicial function of determining just compensation for a taking. The Department asserts that the judiciary has already determined just compensation by entering a judgment for damages pursuant to a jury verdict. The Department claims that sections 11.066(3) and (4) "relate solely to the payment and the appropriation of state funds for the amounts previously judicially determined, a matter within the exclusive purview of the legislative, not the judicial, branch." However, these provisions allow the legislature to exercise its discretion to determine whether, when, and in what amount to pay constitutional takings judgments. In this way, sections 11.066(3) and (4) expand the legislature's power beyond the payment and appropriation of state funds for amounts previously determined....

...in the spending of - 16 - appropriated funds." Dep't of Children & Families v. K.R., 946 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). However, by specifying a defense to issuance of a writ of mandamus, section 11.066(4) itself recognizes the authority of the judicial branch to issue a writ of mandamus compelling a state agency to pay a valid judgment against it....

...execution against the Department's property. It also challenges the portion of the order allowing the Lee Homeowners to conduct a deposition in aid of execution and to submit a list of executable property to the trial court. The Department argues that these rulings violate section 11.066(4) and the Department's protection as a sovereign. However, we have considered both of these arguments and conclude that both authorities cited by the Department yield to the Lee Homeowners' constitutional rights to be compensated for the governmental taking....

...execution. IV. Conclusion - 17 -  After considering all arguments made by the Department, we conclude that the trial court did not err in declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of mandamus compelling payment. Applying sections 11.066(3) and (4) to prevent the trial court from issuing a writ of mandamus would preclude the Lee Homeowners from securing their constitutional rights to payment of full compensation under article X, section 6(a), of the Florida Constitution....

...on appeal. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concurs. BADALAMENTI, Judge, Concurring specially. I fully concur in the opinion of the court. I write separately to suggest that the legislature consider certain amendments to section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2015). As an initial matter, our holding subsections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied comes after careful determination that no other grounds were available to enforce the final judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs here....

...require enabling legislation to be effective"). Even still, this case illustrates that the operation of even a self-executing constitutional provision has its challenges. With the challenges presented in this case in mind, the legislature may wish to consider amending section 11.066 to take steps to accelerate the finality of constitutionally-based final judgments entered against the state and its agencies in our state's courts of law....

...And the position of a state agency should not be, as here, that it owes no duty to assist takings plaintiffs with the process of receiving payment of constitutionally-based monetary judgments. Specifically, the legislature may first consider amending section 11.066 to include that the state and its agencies provide immediate, accurate, and ongoing information to the legislature until constitutionally-based monetary judgments are paid in full....

...Although the judgments have long been final and the Department claimed that it would be "happy to pay the three judgments," the Department asserted that it is unable to make payment until the legislature appropriates the funds as required by sections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...refused to take affirmative action to obtain an appropriation and has taken a position that has resulted in the governor vetoing a legislative appropriation that the Lee Homeowners had requested. Further, the Lee Homeowners argued that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional as applied. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a thorough order1 that addressed at length the Takings Clause, the pertinent statutes, and the applicable case law, together with the evidence that the parties presented. The court determined that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are unconstitutional as applied and issued a writ of mandamus directing the Department to pay the judgments....

...s argument." (Order p. 7) We agree with the trial court's well-reasoned decision and affirm. I. Introduction The question before this court is whether the trial court erred in declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of mandamus compelling payment. Sections 11.066(3) and (4) provide as follows: (3) Neither the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made...

...Moreover, it is a defense to an alternative writ of mandamus issued to enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency that there is no appropriation made by law to pay the judgment. Under section 11.066(3), a court may not require a state agency to pay a judgment for monetary damages absent an appropriation made by the legislature. In the event of nonpayment of a monetary judgment due to a lack of appropriation, the judgment creditor must petition the legislature for an appropriation. Id. Section 11.066(4) expressly prohibits the courts from issuing a writ of execution or using any common-law remedy against the state agency to enforce the monetary judgment. And, in the event a court issues an alternative writ of mandamus to compel payment, section 11.066(4) provides that the lack of an appropriation is a valid defense. The difficulty with these provisions is that despite the constitutional imperative in the Takings Clause, they give the legislature the sole discretion to decide whether and when to make an appropriation....

...And if an appropriation is made, it is subject to the governor's sole discretion to veto it. By doing so, application of these statutory provisions could subject payment of a takings judgment to the whim of the legislature and governor. And this could result in sections 11.066(3) and (4) effectively abrogating judgment creditors' constitutional rights to full compensation under the Takings Clause. -4-  II....

...enging the judgments, and Governor Scott line-item vetoed the appropriation in apparent reliance on those statements on June 2, 2017. On June 8, 2017, the Lee Homeowners filed a petition for writ of mandamus or to declare sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional in the trial court. The court issued an alternative writ and held a hearing on the petition....

...y are without an adequate remedy at law because the legislature has not been able to successfully pass an appropriation resulting in payment. But the court also determined that, despite the Lee Homeowners' satisfaction of these elements, sections 11.066(3) and (4) precluded the court from issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Department to pay the judgments. The trial court then examined sections 11.066(3) and (4) and held that the statutes were unconstitutional as applied....

...However, the Department has not established that it lacks the ability to satisfy the judgments in full or in part. Instead, the Department's position is that it is not legally authorized (or required) to pay the judgments until the legislature appropriates the funds for that purpose as required by sections 11.066(3) and (4). Based on the evidence presented the trial court found that the Department failed to demonstrate an actual inability to pay....

...even the most basic of efforts to secure an appropriation of funds to pay" the judgments. (Order p. 15) B. The Alleged Failure to Exhaust Legal Remedies The Department next argues that the constitutionality challenge to sections 11.066(3) and (4) was not ripe because the Lee Homeowners did not file a claim bill under section 11.066(3). However, section 11.066(3) does not mention a claim bill but merely states: "To enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency, the sole remedy of the judgment creditor, if there has not otherwise been an appropriation made by...

...legislative term, but it was vetoed by the Governor apparently based on the Department's incorrect position that the judgments were not final. Moreover, the evidence before the trial court established that the Department had not previously raised section 11.066 as an impediment to paying other judgments. Based on the -8- analysis in Bogorff and the circumstances here, we conclude that the constitutionality challenge to sections 11.066(3) and (4) was ripe. C. The Constitutionality of Sections 11.066(3) and (4) The trial court found sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied because the provisions (1) unconstitutionally restrict the Lee Homeowners' rights to payment of full compensation for a governmental taking of their property under article X, section 6(a), of the Flori...

...For purposes of this opinion, we address the first two findings because they are the most compelling. 1. Right to full compensation for a governmental taking of property under art. X, § 6(a) In finding sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional on this basis, the trial court reasoned, in part, as follows: As stated in Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc....

...e the power to nullify the will of the people expressed in their constitution, the most sacrosanct of all expressions of the people. Id. at 486 (quoting Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960)). Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) to prevent or limit payment of the three judgments awarded to [the Lee - 10 -  Homeowners] in this constitutional takings proceeding similarly "run[s] afoul" of the self-executing, constitutional mandate that requires it....

.... While the Legislature may permissibly implement the constitutional mandate in order to further protect the constitutional right to full compensation for a taking, or to make the right more readily available, §§ 11.066(3) and (4) do precisely the opposite. Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) to preclude issuance of a writ of execution will preclude the efforts of the Lee Homeowners to secure their constitutional right to payment of full compensation, and subject the...

...ly making the subject guarantee of full compensation under our State Constitution an illusory promise with no guarantee of compliance. Accordingly, the interpretation and suggested application of §§ 11.066 (3) and (4) must yield to Article X, § 6(a), Fla. Const. (Order pp. 46-47) (footnotes omitted). The Department raises three challenges to this analysis. First, it argues that the Takings Clause does not trump sections 11.066(3) and (4) because those sections are premised on the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which predates the constitution....

...on; and that it is up to the legislature to decide whether to make an appropriation. We agree with the trial court that these statutes, as applied here, are contrary to the Takings Clause. Second, the Department argues that sections 11.066(3) and (4) are reasonable restrictions on the means by which a takings judgment may be paid....

...Reichman, 53 So. 3d 339, 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) ("The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that like other constitutional rights, the right to habeas relief is subject to reasonable restrictions."). However, based on the evidence presented sections 11.066(3) and (4)'s restrictions, as applied, completely deprive the Lee Homeowners of their rights to full - 12 - compensation for the government's taking....

...o Florida cases declaring unconstitutional a statute that provides a process for payment of a governmental obligation. The Department asserts that the cases cited by the trial court involve instances of no compensation for a taking while sections 11.066(3) and (4) merely regulate the process for obtaining compensation. However, the Department mischaracterizes the result of sections 11.066(3) and (4) under the circumstances here. As applied, the statues are being used as a shield against required compensation established by the final judgments and in accordance with the Takings Clause. 2. Separation of powers under article II, section 3; and the power of the judiciary under article V, section 1 In finding sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional on this basis, the trial court reasoned, in part, as follows: Application of §§ 11.066(3) and (4) also sets them at odds with another long-settled and well-enshrined principle; the determination of full compensation is a judicial function that cannot constitutionally be performed by t...

...the ascertainment of that is a judicial inquiry. 170 So. 2d at 852 (quoting Baltimore & [O.R.] Co. v. U.S., 298 U.S. 349, 368 (193[6])) (emphasis in original). To the extent that §§ 11.066(3) and (4) are interpreted to permit the Legislature (by the appropriations process) to control the amount of compensation, if any, that [the Lee Homeowners] will actually receive under their lawfully-...

...establish procedures for payment of its constitutional obligation, it does not have the luxury of avoiding it. Should the Class fail in obtaining a writ of mandamus, pursuant to section 11.066(4), the constitutional issue will ripen, and [t]he courts will be left with no choice but to enforce Article X, section 6(a) of the Florida Constitution. Bogorff II, 191 So. 3d at 51[6].[4] (Order pp. 54-56) 4Bogorff v. Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 191 So. 3d 512 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). - 15 -  The Department argues that sections 11.066(3) and (4) do not implicate the judicial function of determining just compensation for a taking. The Department asserts that the judiciary has already determined just compensation by entering a judgment for damages pursuant to a jury verdict. The Department claims that sections 11.066(3) and (4) "relate solely to the payment and the appropriation of state funds for the amounts previously judicially determined, a matter within the exclusive purview of the legislative, not the judicial, branch." However, these provisions allow the legislature to exercise its discretion to determine whether, when, and in what amount to pay constitutional takings judgments. In this way, sections 11.066(3) and (4) expand the legislature's power beyond the payment and appropriation of state funds for amounts previously determined....

...in the spending of - 16 - appropriated funds." Dep't of Children & Families v. K.R., 946 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). However, by specifying a defense to issuance of a writ of mandamus, section 11.066(4) itself recognizes the authority of the judicial branch to issue a writ of mandamus compelling a state agency to pay a valid judgment against it....

...execution against the Department's property. It also challenges the portion of the order allowing the Lee Homeowners to conduct a deposition in aid of execution and to submit a list of executable property to the trial court. The Department argues that these rulings violate section 11.066(4) and the Department's protection as a sovereign. However, we have considered both of these arguments and conclude that both authorities cited by the Department yield to the Lee Homeowners' constitutional rights to be compensated for the governmental taking....

...execution. IV. Conclusion - 17 -  After considering all arguments made by the Department, we conclude that the trial court did not err in declaring sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied to the Lee Homeowners' takings judgments and in issuing a writ of mandamus compelling payment. Applying sections 11.066(3) and (4) to prevent the trial court from issuing a writ of mandamus would preclude the Lee Homeowners from securing their constitutional rights to payment of full compensation under article X, section 6(a), of the Florida Constitution....

...on appeal. Affirmed. NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concurs. BADALAMENTI, Judge, Concurring specially. I fully concur in the opinion of the court. I write separately to suggest that the legislature consider certain amendments to section 11.066, Florida Statutes (2015). As an initial matter, our holding subsections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied comes after careful determination that no other grounds were available to enforce the final judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs here....

...require enabling legislation to be effective"). Even still, this case illustrates that the operation of even a self-executing constitutional provision has its challenges. With the challenges presented in this case in mind, the legislature may wish to consider amending section 11.066 to take steps to accelerate the finality of constitutionally-based final judgments entered against the state and its agencies in our state's courts of law....

...And the position of a state agency should not be, as here, that it owes no duty to assist takings plaintiffs with the process of receiving payment of constitutionally-based monetary judgments. Specifically, the legislature may first consider amending section 11.066 to include that the state and its agencies provide immediate, accurate, and ongoing information to the legislature until constitutionally-based monetary judgments are paid in full....

...In the latest chapter of “The Book of Citrus Canker” litigation, the class of Broward County homeowners whose healthy trees were destroyed in the Citrus Canker Eradication Program (“Class”) appeal an order that denied its motion to declare sections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes, unconstitutional, and its motion for relief from those statutory provisions. We conclude that the constitutional issue remains unripe and affirm. The Class and Class counsel hold final judgments for money damages and attorney’s fees, respectively, against the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“Department”). The circuit court previously granted the Department’s motion to preclude issuance of a writ of execution. See § 11.066(4), Fla. Stat. (2015). We upheld that decision. Dep’t of Agric. v. Mendez, 98 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), rev. denied, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012). But, we reversed the court’s declaration that section 11.066(3) was constitutional “as applied” because the Class had “not yet availed itself of the appropriation process contemplated by section 11.066.” Id....

...In short, the constitutional issue was not ripe. The Department and the Attorney General, who has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Department, contend that the issue remains unripe as the Class has not pursued a claim bill.1 We disagree. Nothing in section 11.066(3) refers to a claim bill....

...The trial court denied the motion. The Class now appeals. It argues that it fulfilled subsection (3) and our mandate to pursue a legislative appropriation. Accordingly, the Class argues the constitutional issue is now ripe, and asks us to declare sections 11.066(3) and (4) unconstitutional as applied....

...constitutionality and the other to its unconstitutionality, the former rather than the latter must be adopted. State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 518 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Gray v. Cent. Fla. Lumber Co., 140 So. 320, 323 (Fla. 1932)). Subsection (3) of section 11.066, Florida Statutes, provides: (3) Neither the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by law....

...if there has not otherwise been an appropriation made by law to 3  pay the judgment, is to petition the Legislature in accordance with its rules to seek an appropriation to pay the judgment. § 11.066(3), Fla....

...its agencies. Moreover, it is a defense to an alternative writ of mandamus issued to enforce a judgment for monetary damages against the state or a state agency that there is no appropriation made by law to pay the judgment. § 11.066(4), Fla....

...would have said so. See Haskins v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 898 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). It did not. Subsection (4) provides yet another alternative method for the Class to obtain payment of its judgment. We pause to comment on the importance of section 11.066 to provide a means for compensation for the Department’s taking of the Class members’ property....

...Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 623 (Fla. 1990). While the government has the ability to establish procedures for payment of its constitutional obligation, it does not have the luxury of avoiding it. Should the Class fail in obtaining a writ of mandamus, pursuant to section 11.066(4), the constitutional issue will ripen, and the courts will be left with no choice but to enforce Article X, section 6(a), of the Florida Constitution. The Class obtained a money judgment for property taken by the Department many years ago....

...For this reason, we decline to reach the constitutional issue at this time. Our affirmance does not preclude the Class from again seeking a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional should it become necessary, but only after it has exhausted the legislative remedies available to it through section 11.066. Affirmed without prejudice. TAYLOR and CONNER, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 5 

...ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC , 986 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 2008), a party brought a breach of contract action against the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the court entered a monetary judgment against DEP. However, DEP refused to pay the judgment, asserting payment was barred by section 11.066(3), which states "[n]either the state nor any of its agencies shall pay or be required to pay monetary damages under the judgment *787 of any court except pursuant to an appropriation made by law." Id. The prevailing party then filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel Florida's Chief Financial Officer to pay the damage award. Id. The trial court denied the petition, finding section 11.066(3) barred payment. This court reversed, finding section 11.066(3) did not pertain to contract actions. Id. at 1038. The supreme court affirmed, finding section 11.066 was intended to apply only to claims based on the exercise of the State's police power, and to apply it to breach of contract cases would render governmental contracts illusory....

...appropriated funds exist with which to pay and satisfy the constitutional takings judgments. The judgments are final, but the Lee County and Broward County classes are currently in their respective circuit courts seeking writs of mandamus to compel payment or, in the alternative, declarations that sections 11.066(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (2016), are unconstitutional as applied. Section 11.066(3) requires “an appropriation made by law” for compelling payment of judgments against the State or its agencies, while section 11.066(4) provides that the lack of an “appropriation made by law to pay the judgment” is a defense to a writ of mandamus....