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Florida Statute 20.19 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 20.19 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title IV
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Chapter 20
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 20.19
20.19 Department of Children and Families.There is created a Department of Children and Families.
(1) MISSION AND PURPOSE.
(a) The mission of the Department of Children and Families is to work in partnership with local communities to protect the vulnerable, promote strong and economically self-sufficient families, and advance personal and family recovery and resiliency.
(b) The department shall develop a strategic plan for fulfilling its mission and establish a set of measurable goals, objectives, performance standards and metrics, and quality assurance requirements to ensure that the department is accountable to the people of Florida. Such goals shall, at a minimum, include those specified in s. 409.986(2).
(c) To the extent allowed by law and within specific appropriations, the department shall deliver services by contract through private providers.
(2) SECRETARY OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; DEPUTY SECRETARY.
(a) The head of the department is the Secretary of Children and Families. The secretary is appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The secretary serves at the pleasure of the Governor.
(b) The secretary shall appoint a deputy secretary who shall act in the absence of the secretary. The deputy secretary is directly responsible to the secretary, performs such duties as are assigned by the secretary, and serves at the pleasure of the secretary.
(3) ASSISTANT SECRETARIES.
(a) Child welfare.
1. The secretary shall appoint an Assistant Secretary for Child Welfare to lead the department in carrying out its duties and responsibilities for child protection and child welfare. The assistant secretary shall serve at the pleasure of the secretary.
2. The assistant secretary must have at least 7 years of experience working in organizations that deliver child protective or child welfare services.
(b) Substance abuse and mental health.
1. The secretary shall appoint an Assistant Secretary for Substance Abuse and Mental Health. The assistant secretary shall serve at the pleasure of the secretary and must have expertise in both areas of responsibility.
2. The secretary shall appoint a Director for Substance Abuse and Mental Health who has the requisite expertise and experience to head the state’s Substance Abuse and Mental Health Program Office.
(4) SERVICES PROVIDED.
(a) The department, through offices, shall provide services relating to:
1. Adult protection.
2. Child care regulation.
3. Child welfare.
4. Domestic violence.
5. Economic self-sufficiency.
6. Homelessness.
7. Mental health.
8. Refugees.
9. Substance abuse.
(b) Offices of the department may be consolidated, restructured, or rearranged by the secretary, in consultation with the Executive Office of the Governor, provided any such consolidation, restructuring, or rearranging is capable of meeting functions and activities and achieving outcomes as delineated in state and federal laws, rules, and regulations. The secretary may appoint additional managers and administrators as he or she determines are necessary for the effective management of the department.
(c) Each fiscal year the secretary shall, in consultation with the relevant employee representatives, develop projections of the number of child abuse and neglect cases and shall include in the department’s legislative budget request a specific appropriation for funds and positions for the next fiscal year in order to provide an adequate number of full-time equivalent:
1. Child protection investigation workers so that caseloads do not exceed the Child Welfare League Standards by more than two cases; and
2. Child protection case workers so that caseloads do not exceed the Child Welfare League Standards by more than two cases.
(5) COMMUNITY ALLIANCES.
(a) The department shall, in consultation with local communities, establish a community alliance or similar group of the stakeholders, community leaders, client representatives and funders of human services in each county to provide a focal point for community participation and governance of community-based services. An alliance may cover more than one county when such arrangement is determined to provide for more effective representation. The community alliance shall represent the diversity of the community.
(b) The duties of the community alliance include, but are not limited to:
1. Joint planning for resource utilization in the community, including resources appropriated to the department and any funds that local funding sources choose to provide.
2. Needs assessment and establishment of community priorities for service delivery.
3. Determining community outcome goals to supplement state-required outcomes.
4. Serving as a catalyst for community resource development, including, but not limited to, identifying existing programs and services delivered by and assistance available from community-based and faith-based organizations, and encouraging the development and availability of such programs, services, and assistance by such organizations. The community alliance shall ensure that the community-based care lead agency is aware of such programs, services, and assistance and work to facilitate the lead agency’s appropriate use of these resources.
5. Providing for community education and advocacy on issues related to delivery of services.
6. Promoting prevention and early intervention services.
(c) The department shall ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the formation of each community alliance builds on the strengths of the existing community human services infrastructure.
(d) The membership of the community alliance in a county shall at a minimum be composed of the following:
1. A representative from the department.
2. A representative from county government.
3. A representative from the school district.
4. A representative from the county United Way.
5. A representative from the county sheriff’s office.
6. A representative from the circuit court corresponding to the county.
7. A representative from the county children’s board, if one exists.
8. A representative of a faith-based organization involved in efforts to prevent child maltreatment, strengthen families, or promote adoption.
(e) The community alliance shall adopt bylaws and may increase the membership of the alliance to include the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the community alliance is located, or his or her designee, the public defender for the judicial circuit in which the community alliance is located, or his or her designee, and other individuals and organizations who represent funding organizations, are community leaders, have knowledge of community-based service issues, or otherwise represent perspectives that will enable them to accomplish the duties listed in paragraph (b), if, in the judgment of the alliance, such change is necessary to adequately represent the diversity of the population within the community alliance service circuits.
(f) A member of the community alliance, other than a member specified in paragraph (d), may not receive payment for contractual services from the department or a community-based care lead agency.
(g) Members of the community alliances shall serve without compensation, but are entitled to receive reimbursement for per diem and travel expenses, as provided in s. 112.061. Payment may also be authorized for preapproved child care expenses or lost wages for members who are consumers of the department’s services and for preapproved child care expenses for other members who demonstrate hardship.
(h) Members of a community alliance are subject to the provisions of part III of chapter 112, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees.
(i) Actions taken by a community alliance must be consistent with department policy and state and federal laws, rules, and regulations.
(j) Alliance members shall annually submit a disclosure statement of services interests to the department’s inspector general. Any member who has an interest in a matter under consideration by the alliance must abstain from voting on that matter.
(k) All alliance meetings are open to the public pursuant to s. 286.011 and the public records provision of s. 119.07(1).
(6) CONSULTATION WITH COUNTIES ON MANDATED PROGRAMS.It is the intent of the Legislature that when county governments are required by law to participate in the funding of programs, the department shall consult with designated representatives of county governments in developing policies and service delivery plans for those programs.
History.s. 19, ch. 69-106; ss. 1, 2, ch. 70-441; ss. 1, 4, ch. 71-213; s. 1, ch. 73-99; s. 1, ch. 73-114; s. 1, ch. 74-107; ss. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 29, 31, 32, 34, ch. 75-48; ss. 1, 2, ch. 76-115; s. 1, ch. 77-174; ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 77-212; s. 4, ch. 78-323; s. 2, ch. 79-10; s. 1, ch. 79-26; s. 63, ch. 79-190; s. 1, ch. 79-265; ss. 1, 2, 5, ch. 79-287; s. 8, ch. 80-187; s. 1, ch. 80-202; s. 8, ch. 80-374; ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 81-83; ss. 7, 8, 9, ch. 81-184; ss. 1, 4, 5, ch. 81-237; s. 12, ch. 81-259; s. 1, ch. 81-290; ss. 1, 4, ch. 82-46; ss. 1, 2, ch. 82-100; s. 5, ch. 82-213; s. 1, ch. 83-89; ss. 1, 11, ch. 83-177; s. 1, ch. 83-181; s. 2, ch. 83-215; s. 3, ch. 83-216; s. 2, ch. 83-230; ss. 2, 3, ch. 83-265; ss. 13, 17, ch. 84-226; s. 3, ch. 85-80; s. 1, ch. 85-270; s. 1, ch. 86-66; s. 1, ch. 86-220; ss. 1, 2, ch. 87-140; s. 2, ch. 88-235; s. 9, ch. 88-337; s. 15, ch. 88-398; ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 89-1; ss. 1, 2, 3, ch. 89-92; s. 4, ch. 89-215; s. 2, ch. 89-296; s. 2, ch. 90-247; s. 1, ch. 90-339; s. 1, ch. 91-14; s. 1, ch. 91-158; s. 5, ch. 91-429; ss. 9, 110, ch. 92-33; s. 3, ch. 92-58; s. 1, ch. 92-174; s. 1, ch. 93-200; s. 3, ch. 94-124; s. 7, ch. 94-209; s. 1317, ch. 95-147; s. 9, ch. 95-153; s. 50, ch. 96-175; s. 5, ch. 96-403; s. 6, ch. 97-237; s. 28, ch. 97-286; s. 1, ch. 98-25; s. 1, ch. 98-137; s. 1, ch. 98-280; s. 120, ch. 98-403; s. 5, ch. 99-2; s. 1, ch. 99-7; s. 2, ch. 2000-135; s. 2, ch. 2000-139; s. 4, ch. 2000-158; s. 1, ch. 2001-68; s. 1, ch. 2002-63; ss. 3, 5, ch. 2003-279; s. 29, ch. 2003-399; s. 69, ch. 2004-267; s. 12, ch. 2004-269; s. 1, ch. 2004-356; s. 1, ch. 2005-3; s. 2, ch. 2005-152; s. 3, ch. 2006-50; s. 8, ch. 2006-171; s. 2, ch. 2012-84; s. 1, ch. 2014-224; s. 1, ch. 2020-152.

F.S. 20.19 on Google Scholar

F.S. 20.19 on Casetext

Amendments to 20.19


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 20.19
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S20.19 - OBSTRUCT - DELETE NO OFF OR PENALTY - I: N



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

UNITED STATES v. FIELDS,, 932 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . P. arts. 20.09, 20.19, and 21.01 ). Id. & n.4. . . .

COSCARELLI, v. ESQUARED HOSPITALITY LLC,, 364 F. Supp. 3d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . OA § 20.19(a). . . . Id. § 20.19(e). . . . See OA § 20.19(a). . . . OA § 20.19(e). . . . OA § 20.19(e). . . .

FREYRE, v. CHRONISTER, s s C., 910 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 20.19. This relationship is governed by the Grant Agreement. . . .

J. COOKS, v. STATE, 249 So. 3d 774 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . (Crim.) 20.19; Pizzo , 945 So.2d at 1207. . . .

RAMOS, Ed v. TELGIAN CORPORATION, 176 F. Supp. 3d 181 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)

. . . workweeks in a year),” such that his “overtime compensation rate [would] be based off an hourly rate of $20.19 . . . Plaintiffs contend that this hourly rate — $20.19 when he started and $24.03 immediately before his departure . . .

In B. Y. G. M. A, 176 So. 3d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 20.19, Fla. Stat. (2013) (“There is created a Department of Children and Families ... . . .

GRAHAM, v. STATE, 169 So. 3d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See §§ 20.19(l)(a), 39.001(l)(b)(l), 39.4085, and 39.521(l)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .

BLANCA TELEPHONE COMPANY, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 743 F.3d 860 (D.D.C. 2014)

. . . . § 20.19(d)(2) (2006). By the time the deadline arrived, however, few providers had complied. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 131 So. 3d 720 (Fla. 2013)

. . . of Material Involving Child Sexual Conduct); 19.3-19.6 (Unlawful Compensation to/by Public Servant); 20.19 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE, 123 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 2013)

. . . (amending § 20.19, Fla. Stat.); eh.2013-21, § 3, Laws of Fla. (creating § 39.522(3), Fla. . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. MITSUBISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES LTD., 946 F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Tex. 2013)

. . . the turbines would “disconnect if the grid voltage at the turbine dropped below 5%” because Parameter 20.19 . . . Yet Parameter 20.19 is based on a measurement of voltage on the generator side of-the padmount transformer . . . If not, Parameter 20.19 would be thousands of volts higher. . . . certification test applying a severe fault on the high side of the padmount transformer, Parameter 20.19 . . . GE argues that Larsen did not disclose these prior uses because the software, “Parameter 20.19”, was . . .

FHR TB, LLC, v. TB ISLE RESORT, LP., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . practical respects the hotel manager because all notices under the HMA are to go to FHRUSI (Section 20.19 . . .

ING BANK, v. TZE- HUEY WAH,, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (W.D. Wash. 2011)

. . . Prac., Real Estate § 20.19 (2d ed.2010), the Court enters a decree of foreclosure ordering that (a) the . . .

K. HICKS, v. CONCORDE CAREER COLLEGE,, 695 F. Supp. 2d 779 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)

. . . As a senior representative, Harrison’s starting salary was $20.19/hour or $42,000/year. . . . Based upon her verifiable experience, Nelson’s starting salary was set at $20.19/hour or $42,000/year . . . Similarly, Nelson was hired as a senior representative at $20.19/hour or $42,000/ year. . . . According to the record, Harrison was paid a starting salary of $42,000 or $20.19/hour when he was first . . .

CONNECTICUT, v. AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY INC. v., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)

. . . Gans, The American Law of Torts § 20.19 (Thomson West 2003) (“We deem it necessary to explain that a . . .

FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION v. JOHANNS, U. S. a k a, 618 F. Supp. 2d 778 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)

. . . $1,933,028, liabilities in the amount of $1,464,373, and tangible balance sheet equity of $528,655 (20.19% . . .

CORAL IMAGING SERVICES, a o a v. GEICO INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,, 955 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 11.062(2)(a); § 11.066(4); § 11.70(3)(d); § 14.29(3)(b), (12); § 20.04(7)(a); § 20.19(6)(f); § 20.23 . . .

L. WASHINGTON, Sr. E. L. L. Jr. D. L. E. L. L. Jr. D. v. BAUER,, 149 F. App'x 867 (11th Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 20.19, which changes the nature of its available § 1983 defenses as explained herein. . . .

TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS O. v. EARLE,, 388 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2004)

. . . P. art. 20.19-22. . . .

CRANDELL v. CAIN,, 421 F. Supp. 2d 928 (W.D. La. 2004)

. . . It then stayed around 20% in 1980 (18.87%) and 1990 (20.19%). Exhibits 1 and 2; Doc. 42, pg. 3. . . .

L. BRUMLEY, v. UNITED STATES, 55 Fed. Cl. 431 (Fed. Cl. 2003)

. . . . § 20.19. . . .

ANDERSON, v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES C. A., 248 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D. Miss. 2003)

. . . Resident Defendant, Elizabeth Nichols, represented to the Plaintiff that if she paid a monthly premium of $20.19 . . .

B. D. E. F. E. a v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES T. M., 829 So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Health and Rehabilitative Services (predecessor of the Department of Children and Family Services, see § 20.19 . . .

SMITH, v. COBB COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS v. Of v. A. L., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2002)

. . . Four has a deviation of -6.11%, Post Five has a deviation of -18.13%, Post Six has a deviation of -20.19% . . .

v. U. S., 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1226 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001)

. . . Plaintiffs’ Comments at 20.19 U.S.C. § 2331, which sets forth the eligibility requirements for NAFTA . . .

In CROWN BOOKS CORPORATION,, 269 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001)

. . . The PADC lease provides at Article 20.19 that: In the event either party hereto brings or commences legal . . .

In FELIPE, 229 B.R. 489 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . The contract rates were 20.19% and 21.00% respectively. . . . charged by these secured creditors over the past three to four months and used the contract rates of 20.19% . . .

In FACTOR VIII OR IX CONCENTRATE BLOOD PRODUCTS LITIGATION, 25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 1998)

. . . See Rotunda & Nowak 4 Ronald Rotunda & John Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 20.19 (noting that . . .

In OGLESBY, Jr. SSN XXX- XX- XXXX SSN XXX- XX- XXXX JONES, SSN XXX- XX- XXXX f k a SSN XXX- XX- XXXX, 221 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998)

. . . interest for similar loans in the region, which, according to the testimony at the hearing, would be 20.19% . . .

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, v. BRUNNER,, 707 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . .; see also § 20.19(4)(b)4., Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

DOE, Mr. DOE Sr. No. s A A v. CHILES, A., 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998)

. . . . §§ 20.19, 20.43 (West Supp. 1998). . . . .

PROCACCI COMMERCIAL REALTY, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, BDC, 690 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . As recently amended, section 20.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), redesignates the Department of Health . . .

Co. L. P. LTV Co. U. S. A USX WCI v. B. V N. V. W. U. S. A., 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 1126 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)

. . . Commerce used this percentage to establish an overall dumping margin of 20.19 percent. . . .

NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, L. P. LTV U. S. A USX WCI v. UNITED STATES, B. V. N. V. W. U. S. A., 870 F. Supp. 1130 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994)

. . . Commerce used this percentage to establish an overall dumping margin of 20.19 percent. . . .

S. JOHNSON v. DILLARD DEPT. STORES, INC., 836 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Tex. 1993)

. . . ANSWER: The Medicine Shoppe $ 329.00 Eekerd Drug $ 20.19 Harris Methodist Hospital $ 464.74 Mr. . . .

STATE Of DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, v. BROOKE In In In W. C. J. a k a W. C. J. a J. S. B. a P. H. a A. G. a R. H. a J. R. a O. W. a J. R. a O. W. a, 573 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . See sections 216.292(2) and 20.19(9)(b), Fla. Stat. . . . See section 20.19(9)(a) and (b). . . . Section 20.19(9) is a corollary to sections 216.023 and 216.031 which place responsibility for making . . . official in the executive branch of the government who serves at the pleasure of the Governor, see section 20.19 . . .

ZINERMON v. BURCH, 494 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1990)

. . . See § 20.19(6)(b)2 (creating statewide Human Rights Advocacy Committee of eight citizens, charged with . . .

SOUTH FLORIDA BLOOD SERVICE, INC. v. RASMUSSEN,, 467 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . See, e.g., § 20.19(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . See, e.g., § 20.19(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . .

M. TURRO, M. D. v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, COMMUNITY HOSPITAL OF NEW PORT RICHEY, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,, 458 So. 2d 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Section 20.19(4)(a), Florida Statutes. . . .

In HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY COMMITTEE FOR DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES FOR DISTRICT VIII, v. LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,, 457 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Appellant, the district VIII human rights advocacy committee, is an entity created under section 20.19 . . . Although this is a case of first impression, we believe that the statutory language of section 20.19( . . . field of operation described in section 20.-19(7)(g)l bolstered by the language set forth in section 20.19 . . . Section 20.19(7)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), mandates the creation of at least one district human . . . Id., § 20.19(4)(a). . § 20.19(7)(g)2, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1982). . . . .

DOCTORS OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL CENTER, INC. d b a v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,, 459 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . See Section 20.19(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). . See, Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc. v. . . .

J. B. SMITH, v. HIGHTOWER, B. G. L., 693 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1982)

. . . Ann. arts. 20.09-, 10, 20.19, 20.21. . . . .

B. SHINHOLSTER, v. GRAHAM,, 527 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D. Fla. 1981)

. . . of the report, notify the appropriate human rights advocacy committee, as established pursuant to s. 20.19 . . . defendants concede that the Statewide and District Human Rights Advocacy Committees established in Section 20.19 . . .

A. ATHANSON, v. J. MESKILL,, 523 F. Supp. 392 (D. Conn. 1981)

. . . The plaintiffs also claim that the assessed value of tax-exempt property in Connecticut is 20.19%, while . . .

UNITED STATES v. J. WHELAN, 456 F. Supp. 744 (D.N.J. 1978)

. . . Sentence Time Served Percent Basis for Release Served 774-71 360 mos. 72.690 mos. 20.19% In custody 6 . . .

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, a v. A. CALIFANO, Jr. HEW, 449 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Fla. 1978)

. . . Chapter 75-48, Laws of Florida 1975, Florida Statutes § 20.19. . . .

CASTANEDA, SHERIFF v. PARTIDA, 430 U.S. 482 (U.S. 1977)

. . . Proc., Art. 20.19 (1966). . . .

In J. N. a S. H. a, 279 So. 2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)

. . . See Sec. 20.19, F.S.1971, F.S.A. . . .

NORWALK CORE, a k a v. NORWALK BOARD OF EDUCATION, a k a, 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969)

. . . 46.5 24.5 27.95 36.16 3S.78 32.97 Cranbury .6 6.4 7.16 5.80 9.59 17.56 Fitch 12.8 13.1 12.80 18.11 20.19 . . .

C. T. DAY, v. E. WALKER, Jr. J. G. W. a M. a a, 206 F. Supp. 32 (W.D.N.C. 1962)

. . . warehouse was blocked more often and for longer periods than any other warehouse, Day succeeded in selling 20.19% . . .

ASHEVILLE TOBACCO BOARD OF TRADE, INC. a v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 294 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1961)

. . . The operator that ranked second (Day) with 20.19% in 1954, now ranks first with 27.78%, and so forth. . . .

ASHEVILLE TOBACCO BOARD OF TRADE, INC. a v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959)

. . . warehouse was blocked more often and for longer periods than any other warehouse, he succeeded in selling 20.19% . . .

A. PHELAN, v. MIDDLE STATES OIL CORPORATION KRAUSHAAR D. W. D. v. GLASS P. Jr. P., 220 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1955)

. . . 15 18.60 Skelly Oil Co..................... 5.28 28 18.86 Superior Oil Corp................ 1.06 5% 20.19 . . .

COMMONWEALTH SOUTHERN CORPORATION v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 134 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1943)

. . . cost of the property of the system as reflected on its books and that the preferred stock equalled 20.19% . . .

v. J. W., 133 Fla. 722 (Fla. 1938)

. . . 1926 23.63 No. 2263-A . 1927 26.75 No. 9234-A . 1928 28.30 No. 12319-A 1929 33.15 No. 2157-B . 1930 20.19 . . .

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. WEEKS, STATE TAX COMMISSIONER,, 297 U.S. 135 (U.S. 1936)

. . . Miles of all track (as of December 31, 1931) — 20.19%. 2. . . .

MASON v. UNITED STATES, 162 F. 23 (4th Cir. 1908)

. . . St. 1901, p. 20.19), with haying negligently and designedly permitted a violation of the law by another . . .

DAVIS v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO., 7 F. Cas. 150 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879)

. . . rendered a verdict for $1,-015.47, with interest thereon from April 17th, 1865, the principal being for $20.19 . . .