Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...family in Colombia. For that reason, and pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.703(1), CCRC-Middle Region asked to be permitted to withdraw and for the court to appoint in its place conflict-free registry counsel qualified under Fla. Stat. §§ 27.710 and 27.711. On October 22, 2003, the state postconviction court denied CCRC-Middle Region’s motion to withdraw....

...ida. The Florida Supreme Court denied Lugo’s abeyance motion on November 4, 2008. On November 10, 2008, Wasson moved to withdraw from his obligation to represent Lugo in state and federal postconviction proceedings pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.711....

...[Lugo].” Beyond that, Wasson alleged that an actual conflict of interest between himself and Lugo existed because Lugo had filed a bar grievance against him accusing him of misconduct. The State opposed Wasson’s motion to withdraw and argued that under Fla. Stat. § 27.711 Wasson’s appointment required him to represent Lugo “throughout all postconviction capital collateral proceedings, including federal habeas corpus proceedings until the capital defendant’s sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out, and the attorney is permitted to withdraw from such representation by a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Fla. Stat. § 27.711(2), (8)....

...ve history contained in the bill's Staff Analysis indicates that the Legislature intended to include both life felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by life in that term"); Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644, 654 (Fla.2002) (finding that "although section 27.711 indicates that the fee schedule set forth in subsection (3) is the `exclusive means of compensation,' the legislative history and staff analysis clearly contemplate, and indeed accommodate, fees in excess of the statutory schedule in cases where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist"); Ivey v....

...Section 27.7045, Florida Statutes, is created to read: 27.7045: Capital case proceedings; constitutionally deficient representation. Notwithstanding another provision of law, an attorney employed by the state or appointed pursuant to s. 27.711 may not represent a person charged with a capital offense at trial or on direct - 27 -  appeal or a person sentenced to death in a postconviction proceeding if, in two separate inst...

...jurisdiction to review the deficient representation determination has issued its final order affirming the second such determination. Ch. 2013-216, § 7, Laws of Fla. This provision disqualifies an attorney employed by the State or appointed by a court pursuant to section 27.711 from the representation of capital defendants for five years if: (1) in two separate capital postconviction proceedings, a court holds that State employed or appointed counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation; and...

...The Legislature also has delineated the qualifications and duties of these attorneys. The plain language of section 27.7045 reflects that the Legislature intended for the five-year prohibition to apply to all “attorney[s] employed by the state or appointed pursuant to s. 27.711,” which includes four groups of court-appointed counsel: (1) the public defender; (2) CCRC; (3) RCC; and (4) appointed registry counsel....

...Rather, it operates as a condition which, upon application, precludes an attorney from performing certain duties in a specific area of the law. - 32 - “attorney[s] employed by the state or appointed pursuant 27.711” to whom the disqualification provision of section 27.7045 applies, the statute merely modifies their statutorily enumerated qualifications....

...most recent postconviction motion, he filed a pro se petition seeking to invoke our all-writs jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(7) of the Florida Constitution. [9] Through this petition, Ventura requests that we: (1) Conduct a hearing under section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2007), to determine whether his appointed CCRC attorney incompetently and untimely filed his reply brief in the underlying postconviction appeal; (2) Grant him the opportunity to file a new rule 3.851 postconviction motion with the relevant circuit court; and (3) Appoint new postconviction counsel to represent him during this successive postconviction litigation. We deny this petition as meritless. Ventura invokes our supervisory authority under section 27.711(12) to monitor whether postconviction counsel is providing "quality representation." As previously stated, Ventura contends that his CCRC attorney untimely filed his reply brief in this case....

...diction to review all types of collateral proceedings in death penalty cases. " (emphasis supplied)); Coleman v. State, 930 So.2d 580, 580-81 (Fla.2006) (considering allegations with regard to the performance of assigned postconviction counsel under section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2005), and remanding to the circuit court with instructions for the assigned attorney to respond to these allegations)....

...Maas, the Executive Director of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in Capital Cases, sent Olive the contract detailing the terms and conditions of appointment as counsel in postconviction capital collateral proceedings ("the contract"), pursuant to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...e fee and costs limits in the Registry Act and Contract unconstitutionally curtailed the trial court's inherent power to ensure adequate representation." That is, Olive sought a determination that the limits on compensable hours and costs imposed by section 27.711 were unconstitutional in that they "prohibited" him from requesting compensation for time spent and costs incurred in excess of pre-established limits. In count II, Olive asserted that various limitations imposed by section 27.711 and in the contract would compel him to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct....

...neys available to represent postconviction defendants. Respondents filed motions to dismiss all counts of the amended complaint, and a memorandum of law asserting, inter alia, that Olive lacked standing to challenge the provisions of section 27.710, section 27.711, or the contract because "he had no contract, no client and no case to pursue." Respondents additionally maintained that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment because the claims were entirely specu...

...1st DCA 1991) (concluding that a trial court's decision to grant declaratory relief should be accorded great deference); Kelner v. Woody, 399 So.2d 35, 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (same). We now proceed to analyze the substance of the claims presented. Capped Fee Schedule In 1998, the Legislature enacted sections 27.710 and 27.711 which, as previously explained, provide for the maintenance of a registry of private attorneys to represent indigent death row defendants in postconviction proceedings, and establish the fee schedule and other guidelines which must be adhered to by these private attorneys, respectively....

...The purpose of this program was to "alleviate ... CCRC's backload of capital cases which have not been assigned to an attorney." Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 1328 Staff Analysis 1 (Mar. 3, 1998) (on file with comm.). Of particular contention in this case is the language in section 27.711(3), which dictates that "[t]he fee and payment schedule in this section is the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant." (Emphasis supplied.) The fee schedule is in turn set forth in subsection (4). [7] The *651 contract which the registry attorneys must sign upon appointment tracks the language in section 27.711(3)-(4), and incorporates the entire compensation scheme by reference....

...Thus, both the contract and the statutory language indicate that the compensation scheme outlined in the legislation constitutes the exclusive means of compensation. Olive's particular contention is that by agreeing that the fees and costs schedule established in section 27.711 encompasses the exclusive means of compensation, he would be waiving any further compensation to which he may be entitled....

...Respondents/appellees candidly conceded during oral arguments that Makemson, White, and Remeta were applicable to the present case and that, accordingly, in capital cases where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist, trial courts are authorized to award fees in excess of the statutory schedule set out in section 27.711(4). That Makemson and its progeny control this issue is expressly noted in a staff analysis forming part of the legislative history of section 27.711. Specifically, the Staff Analysis to SB 2054, which ultimately became chapter 99-221, Laws of Florida, amending sections 27.710 and 27.711, indicates the following under the heading "Other Constitutional Issues:" Section 27.711(4), F.S., provides for the hourly rate and maximum compensation of registry attorneys....

...dinary circumstances, interfere with the defendant's sixth amendment right `to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.'" Id[.] (citation omitted). Consequently, where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist, the fees caps established by s.27.711(4), F.S., and increased by the provisions of this bill, do not prevent a court from ordering payment above the maximum authorized....

...Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 2054 Staff Analysis 7 (March 17, 1999) (on file with comm.) (emphasis supplied); see also Arvelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So.2d *654 326, 328 (Fla.1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) (discussing 1999 amendments to section 27.711 and noting that the "staff analyses from both the Senate and the House specifically indicate that the legislature is concerned about compliance with this Court's decision in Makemson. "). Accordingly, although section 27.711 indicates that the fee schedule set forth in subsection (3) is the "exclusive means of compensation," the legislative history and staff analysis clearly contemplate, and indeed accommodate, fees in excess of the statutory schedule in cases where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist....

...made to allow compensation in excess of the fee caps, a statutory framework may run afoul of this Court's precedent in Makemson and its progeny. Thus, as to this issue, we conclude, consistent with Makemson, White, Remeta, the legislative history of section 27.711, and respondents/appellees' concessions, that trial courts are authorized to grant fees in excess of the statutory schedule where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist in capital collateral cases....

...s of a particular case, compensation within the statutory cap would be confiscatory of his or her time, energy and talent and violate the principles outlined in Makemson and its progeny. Ethical Concerns Olive next asserts that certain provisions of section 27.711 and the contract, on their face, would compel an appointed attorney to violate ethical duties with respect to the representation of a death row client....

...Maas from excluding his name from the registry list. The trial court granted the injunction and further indicated in its final order: [R]egardless of whether [Olive] may or may not have been deleted from the list or registry of attorneys eligible for appointment under Sections 27.710 and 27.711, Florida Statutes, [Olive] is entitled not to be excluded from the list or registry, in any shape or form, sent to trial courts pursuant to those sections....

...HARDING, J., dissenting. I dissent because Olive does not have standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in this case. Olive, unlike the many registry attorneys who have accepted appointment, may never represent a capital defendant pursuant to the provisions of section 27.711....

...clined to be limited by the terms of the contract," Olive expressly declined to represent Mungin. He therefore had no contract, no client, no case and no real facts to support his various claims. To the extent Olive believed that sections 27.710 and 27.711 provided for less than adequate compensation, he had no client who could assert that effective representation was impaired. Nor did he have a contract the lower court could construe, as he had refused to sign one. In sum, Olive had no contractual right then in doubt and no legal relationship that was affected by sections 27.710 and 27.711....

...Olive's claims for relief under counts I and II of the amended complaint were based entirely on speculation and hypothesis, rather than on a present controversy or state of facts. The very decisions on which Olive relied below to support his claim demonstrate that the appropriate means of challenging fee limits like those in section 27.711 is by undertaking and completing representation of the defendant, documenting the actual work performed in the case, justifying compensation in excess of the statutory fee limits, and then allowing a trial court to make an after-the-fact determination, based on the actual, existing record....

...WELLS, C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur. NOTES [1] Prior to initiating this action Olive had filed an earlier petition, in October 1998, before his appointment was revoked, seeking to invoke this Court's all writs jurisdiction and challenging the constitutionality of sections 27.710 and 27.711, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The hours billed by a contracting attorney under this subsection may include time devoted to representation of the defendant by another attorney who is qualified under s. 27.710 and who has been designated by the contracting attorney to assist him or her. § 27.711(4), Fla....

...expenses for continuing legal education that pertains to the representation of capital defendants. Upon approval by the trial court, the attorney is entitled to payment by the Comptroller for expenses for such tuition and continuing legal education. § 27.711(5)-(7), Fla. Stat. (2000). [8] Olive's objection specifically relates to section 27.711(9), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) (currently § 27.711(10), Fla....

...Stat. (2000)), which reads in pertinent part: "This section does not authorize an attorney who represents a capital defendant to file repetitive or frivolous pleadings that are not supported by law or by the facts of the case." Olive also challenges section 27.711(1)(c), explaining that "[p]ostconviction capital collateral proceedings......

...The Court held that the federal government could not insulate its laws from judicial scrutiny in such a way. See id. at 1051. The situation in this case is far different from that which the Court reviewed in Velazquez; there is no prohibition in sections 27.710 or 27.711 which would prohibit a registry attorney from making a good faith argument challenging the validity of a statute. [10] Olive's challenge relates to section 27.711(10), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) (currently § 27.711(11), Fla....

...[14] Indeed, count I of the amended complaint appears to be nothing more than a transparent attempt to have the trial court declare, on constitutional grounds and in advance of representation, that Olive was entitled to more money for fees and costs in representing Anthony Mungin than provided for by section 27.711 simply on the basis of Olive's belief that he would spend more time on the case than the statute contemplated....

...thical conflicts that might never occur even if Olive did represent Anthony Mungin. I note, however, that if and when actual disputes arise which require the interpretation of a signed contract for appointment as registry counsel, section 27.710, or section 27.711, courts will be available to address and resolve bona fide issues....

...is receiving quality representation. The court shall also receive and evaluate allegations that are made regarding the performance of assigned counsel." See Ch. 99-221, § 5, Laws of Fla., 1999 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (adding subsection (12) to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (1998 Supp.))....

...an abuse of discretion.”). We conclude that Howell has failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion. In particular, Howell has not alleged that the experts he sought to obtain could assist in any viable state claim. Moreover, sections 27.711(5) and (6) place monetary limits on payments for investigators and experts, and counsel must demonstrate that “extraordinary circumstances” are present in order to exceed the cap for compensating expert witnesses. § 27.711, Fla....

...i to the United States Supreme Court. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons *599 explained below, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney's fees pursuant to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...on the Ring issue he raised in Freeman's motion for rehearing. The petition for writ of certiorari was denied. After certiorari relief was denied, Tassone filed a motion in the circuit court for attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses pursuant to section 27.711, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...work on the petition for writ of certiorari. Tassone sought a total of $27,940.74 in fees and costs. The Department argued that the amount requested was unreasonable and should be limited to the statutory amount of $2,500 plus applicable costs. See § 27.711(4)(g), Fla....

...The trial court granted Tassone's motion and ordered the Department to pay the fees and costs. The Department filed this appeal, alleging that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by refusing to apply the maximum fee limit prescribed by the statute. LAW AND ANALYSIS Section 27.711, Florida Statutes (2005), governs the payment of fees to appointed counsel in postconviction capital proceedings, and is the "exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant." Id. § 27.711(3). Section 27.711(4) outlines the maximum amount an attorney is entitled to be compensated at each stage of the postconviction process. Section 27.711(4)(g) is particularly applicable in this case and provides: At the conclusion of the capital defendant's postconviction capital collateral proceedings in state court, the attorney is entitled to $100 per hour, up to a maximum of $2,500, after filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. In addition, the attorney may request up to a maximum of $15,000 for approved incidental costs, such as investigators. See id. § 27.711(5). The attorney may also be reimbursed up to $15,000 for miscellaneous expenses, such as copying and expert witness fees. See id. § 27.711(6)....

...ws of Florida, which clearly articulates the Legislature's concern with the fee caps in capital collateral cases. The legislative history states specifically that *601 "where unusual or extraordinary circumstances exist, the fees caps established by s. 27.711(4), F.S., and increased by the provisions of this bill, do not prevent a court from ordering payment above the maximum authorized." Fla....

...ees incurred in the preparation and filing of the petition for writ of certiorari and the reply brief in opposition. The trial court ordered the Department to pay Tassone the total amount of $27,940.74 in fees and miscellaneous expenses and cited to section 27.711(4)(a)-(d), (6), Florida Statutes....

...See Turner v. State, 888 So.2d 73, 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that constitutional challenge to a statute made for the first time on appeal would not warrant reversal of trial court's ruling). Tassone also argues that the statutory fee cap under section 27.711 is unconstitutional on its face because all death cases are extraordinary and unusual and attorney's fees should not be capped....

...solely by counsel who are willing to sign up for the registry, knowing its fee caps. Under section 27.710(3), Florida Statutes (2005), attorneys who join the registry must agree to abide by its terms and conditions, including the ceilings on fees in section 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Some attorneys regard compensation *604 under these caps to be inadequate under the circumstances of capital postconviction representation. See, e.g., State v. Demps, 846 So.2d 457, 457 (Fla. 2003) (addressing appeal of fee award by attorney who claimed he was entitled to compensation at rate higher than specified in section 27.711(4))....

...tute—as allowing for fees exceeding the caps. The statute provided that "[t]he fee and payment schedule in this section is the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant" in collateral proceedings. § 27.711(3), Fla....

...The Contract This case involves the same legal issue as Olive, but is based on different circumstances. In Olive, the attorney refused to sign the standard contract for registry counsel, fearing it would handcuff him to the statutory fee schedule. The contract "tracks the language in section 27.711(3)(4), and incorporates the entire compensation scheme by reference." Olive, 811 So.2d at 651....

...ed on the same issues. See Freeman v. Florida, 541 U.S. 1010, 124 S.Ct. 2069, 158 L.Ed.2d 620 (2004) (denying review). For the latter effort, he sought $27,940.74 in fees and costs—more than ten times the statutory maximum of $2,500 plus costs. See § 27.711(4)(g), Fla....

...Olive recognized that the Legislature generally intended for the statutory fee schedule to act as a ceiling, not a floor. The schedule is expressly identified as "the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant" in collateral proceedings. § 27.711(3), Fla....

...f desired, counsel should "seek further compensation from the Federal Government." Id. Additionally, the statute provides that compensation for attorneys who withdraw or are removed from a case "may not exceed the amounts specified in this section." § 27.711(8), Fla....

...This case illustrates how using the caps as a benchmark would differ from simply multiplying the attorney's actual hours worked by a competitive rate. The statute would have capped compensation here at "$100 per hour, up to a maximum of $2,500" plus costs. § 27.711(4)(g), Fla....

...billed amount of $27,940.74—until it reaches a level of compensation that can no longer be considered confiscatory. Without retaining the caps as the benchmark in these cases, we run the risk that courts will, contrary to the statutory directive in section 27.711, continually increase compensation for registry counsel to keep pace with the cost of living....

...2). [4] Section 27.7001, Florida Statutes, articulates the legislative intent in providing for collateral representation for persons sentenced to death: It is the intent of the Legislature to create part IV of this chapter, consisting of ss. 27.7001-27.711, inclusive, to provide for the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely m...

...The Legislature also has established a registry of private attorneys to represent persons in postconviction capital collateral proceedings. See § 27.710, Fla. Stat. (2002) (providing for the maintenance of a registry of private attorneys to represent death-sentenced individuals in postconviction proceedings). Section 27.711, Florida Statutes, establishes the terms and conditions of appointment of attorneys as counsel in postconviction capital collateral proceedings. In particular, section 27.711(1)(c) provides that as used in section 27.710 and in section 27.711, the term "postconviction capital collateral proceedings" is defined as follows: "Postconviction capital collateral proceedings" means one series of collateral litigation of an affirmed conviction and sentence of death, including the p...

...abeas corpus litigation with respect to the sentence. The term does not include repetitive or successive collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence of death which is affirmed by the Supreme Court and undisturbed by any collateral litigation. § 27.711(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). Moreover, section 27.711(11) limits the authority of registry counsel in much the same way that CCRC representation is limited by section 27.7001 as set out above: An attorney appointed under s....

...proceeding, a proceeding commenced under chapter 940, a proceeding challenging a conviction or sentence other than the conviction and sentence of death for which the appointment was made, or any civil litigation other than habeas corpus proceedings. § 27.711(11), Fla....

...(2002) (emphasis added). Hence, registry counsel are expressly prohibited from representing a *1070 capital defendant in a postconviction proceeding other than the capital proceeding for which counsel was appointed. The State relies upon the language of section 27.711, which specifically applies to registry counsel, and asserts that the Legislature would have logically intended the same restrictions on the scope of representation by both CCRC and registry attorneys....

...Chapter 27 simply does not expressly authorize CCRC to challenge a noncapital conviction and sentence. Moreover, when the statutes governing CCRC are read in conjunction with statutes governing registry counsel, the narrow scope of representation authorized by the statutory scheme becomes even more apparent. See § 27.711(11), Fla....

...and for conflict counsel appointed in capital postconviction proceedings, see section 27.704, Fla. Stat. (2000), [4] as well as *189 providing for judicial oversight and monitoring of assigned counsel's performance in postconviction proceedings. See § 27.711(12), Fla....

...denied, 133 S. Ct. 2762 (2013), as follows: 14. We note that valid statutory grounds existed upon which removal of McDermott as clemency counsel could have been sought. Chapter 940, Florida Statutes (2011), pertains to executive clemency. Section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes (2011), sets forth a prohibition for postconviction counsel appointed under chapter 27, such as McDermott, to represent defendants in chapter 940 proceedings and certain other proceedings—prohibitions that this Court has upheld....

...udicial approval, receive compensation in excess of the statutory fee schedule, despite the language to the contrary *199 in section 27.7002, Florida Statutes (2007). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The Florida Legislature enacted sections 27.710 and 27.711 of the Florida Statutes in 1998, creating a statewide registry of attorneys who possessed certain minimum qualifications and who were willing to enter into a contract to represent defendants in capital collateral proceedings. See Ch. 98-197, §§ 3-4, at 1741-45, Laws of Fla. (codified as §§ 27.710-27.711, Fla. Stat. (1999)) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Registry Act"). In 1999, Mark Olive sought a determination of his legal rights under section 27.711 as to the compensation that he could claim for representing death row inmate Anthony Mungin. The Registry Act limited compensable hours and provided that the fee schedule set forth in section 27.711 was the "exclusive means of compensate[ion]." § 27.711(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). The fee schedule, including the maximum amount payable for each stage of postconviction representation, was set forth in section 27.711(4)....

...the registry list. Id. at 657. Only weeks after we issued Olive I, the Legislature added section 27.7002 to the Registry Act. See ch.2002-31, § 2, at 674-75, Laws of Fla. This new provision provides that compensation above the amounts set forth in section 27.711 "is not authorized." § 27.7002(5), Fla....

...from the registry *200 any attorney who seeks fees in excess of the statutory cap and requires permanent removal of any attorney who declares that he or she cannot provide adequate or proper representation under the terms and conditions set forth in section 27.711....

...Olive I, he clearly has standing in the instant case. Second, Olive I does not foreclose the instant complaint for declaratory relief. In Olive I, we held that trial courts are authorized to grant fees in excess of the statutory schedule provided in section 27.711 "where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist in capital collateral cases," notwithstanding the statutory language that this fee schedule is "the exclusive means of compensation" for such attorneys. Id. at 654. The instant case involves section 27.7002, which provides that state funds cannot be used for compensation above the amounts set forth in section 27.711 and outlines sanctions that may be imposed on registry counsel who seek compensation in excess of the statutory schedule....

...Section 27.7002 As noted above, the Florida Legislature amended the Registry Act shortly after we decided Olive I by adding section 27.7002. At issue in this case is the language that limits "[t]he use of state funds for compensation of counsel ... to the amounts set forth in section 27.711," the capped fee schedule, and authorizes the permanent removal from the registry of any attorney who seeks compensation above the fee schedule....

...being afforded meaningful access to counsel in their collateral proceedings. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we conclude that in appropriate cases courts have inherent authority to grant compensation in excess of the statutory fee schedule provided in section 27.711 and attorneys may not be removed from the registry for requesting such compensation in those cases....

...pursuant to any provision of this chapter, to challenge in any form or manner the adequacy of the collateral representation provided. (2) With respect to counsel appointed to represent defendants in collateral proceedings pursuant to ss. 27.710 and 27.711, the sole method of assuring adequacy of representation provided shall be in accordance with the provisions of s. 27.711(12). (3) No provision of this chapter shall be construed to generate any right on behalf of any attorney appointed pursuant to s. 27.710, or seeking appointment pursuant to s. 27.710, to be compensated above the amounts provided in s. 27.711....

...(4) No attorney may be appointed, at state expense, to represent any defendant in collateral legal proceedings except as expressly authorized in this chapter. (5) The use of state funds for compensation of counsel appointed pursuant to s. 27.710 above the amounts set forth in s. 27.711 is not authorized. (6) The executive director of the Commission on Capital Cases is authorized to permanently remove from the registry of attorneys provided in ss. 27.710 and 27.711 any attorney who seeks compensation for services above the amounts provided in s. 27.711....

...(7) Any attorney who notifies any court, judge, state attorney, the Attorney General, or the executive director of the Commission on Capital Cases, that he or she cannot provide adequate or proper representation under the terms and conditions set forth in s. 27.711 shall be permanently disqualified from any attorney registry created under this chapter unless good cause arises after a change in circumstances....

...Thousands of analogous examples can be found throughout Florida's constitutional and statutory provisions. See, e.g., Art. III, § 8(a), Fla. Const.; Fla. Stat. § 11.062(2)(a); § 11.066(4); § 11.70(3)(d); § 14.29(3)(b), (12); § 20.04(7)(a); § 20.19(6)(f); § 20.23(2)(a)3; § 27.34(2); § 27.711(3); § 28.241(3),(4); § 29.004(10)(d); § 39.012; § 39.013(2); § 44.06(2); § 63.0423(5) and (6); § 90.604....

...is the safe-guarding of fundamental rights.” Maas v. Olive, 992 So.2d 196, 204 (Fla.2008) (Olive II) (quoting Rose, 361 So.2d at 137 ). We cited the doctrine of inherent judicial authority in considering the statutory scheme in sections 27.710 and 27.711 of the Florida Statutes (2007), which governs the statewide registry of attorneys who are qualified to represent defendants in capital collateral proceedings. See Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644 (Fla.2002) (Olive I). Section 27.711(4) limits the compensable hours available to registry attorneys and sets a maximum amount payable for each stage of postconviction representation. Additionally, section 27.711(3) provides that this fee and payment schedule is “the exclusive means of compensating a court-appointed attorney who represents a capital defendant.” We concluded that trial courts are authorized to grant attorney’s fees in exce...

...ject to the request, their positions were not binding on the court. In relevant part, the trial court then analyzed the claim as follows: 5. In order for this Court to approve the excess fees, such fees must be reasonable pursuant to Florida Statute § 27.711(13); 6. In order for the attorney to be entitled to the excess fees, this Court must also find that “extraordinary circumstances” exist, as required by Florida Statute § 27.711(6); 7....

...tiary hearing, and that the Defendant has not established that extraordinary or unusual circumstances existed that would have warranted an extra $1,844.00 investigator’s fees over and above the $15,000 already spent, as required by Florida Statute § 27.711(6)....

...��to ensure that an attorney who has served the public by defending the accused is not compensated in an amount which is confiscatory.” Makemson v. Martin Cnty., 491 So.2d 1109, 1115 (Fla.1986). In 1998, the Legislature enacted sections 27.710 and 27.711 of the Florida Statutes, which provide for a statewide registry of private attorneys who are available to represent indigent death row defendants in postconviction proceedings and establish the fee schedule that must be adhered to by private attorneys. The fee schedule provided in section 27.711(4) increased the fees that an attorney could receive in capital postconviction proceedings, and section 27.711(5) provided additional fee provisions pertaining to obtaining the assistance of an investigator: (5) An attorney who represents a capital defendant may use the services of one or more investigators to assist in representing a capital defendant. Upon approval by the trial court, the attorney is entitled to payment from the Chief Financial Officer of $40 per hour, up to a maximum of $15,000, for the purpose of paying for investigative services. § 27.711(5), Fla. Stat. (2011). 5 In Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644, 653 (Fla.2002), this Court held that trial courts are authorized to award fees in excess of the statutory schedule set out in section 27.711 in capital cases “where extraordinary or unusual circumstances ex-ist.” The Court stressed that at the heart of the matter was an indigent defendant’s right to competent and effective representation — a right that could be in j...

...Just., CS for SB 2054 Staff Analysis 7 (March 17, 1999), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/ data/session/1999/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/ SB2054.cj.pdf). Thus, as we held, the Legislature incorporated the standard set forth in Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1115 , into section 27.711 by “patently acknowledging] that unless room is made to allow compensation in excess of the fee caps, a statutory framework may run afoul of this Court’s precedent in Makemson and its progeny.” Olive, 811 So.2d at 654 ; see also Maas v....

...himself. However, by having an investigator perform these services, he actually saved the State money. In particular, under the statutory framework, if McClain would have undertaken such tasks, he would be entitled to $100 per hour for his time, see § 27.711(4), Fla. Stat. (2011) (setting the statutory rate for attorneys at $100 per hour), but by delegating the tasks to an investigator, he saved the State $60 per hour, see § 27.711(5), Fla....

...elled "Clemons.” . After this motion for reimbursement was denied, the trial court subsequently denied the motion for postconviction relief. Moore seeks review of the denial of relief in a sepa *897 rate appeal. See Moore v. State, No. SC12-459. . Section 27.711 has been amended at various times, including the amount of compensation to which defense counsel is entitled under section 27.711(4)....

...The transferee court shall treat the motion as if it had *581 been originally filed in that court on the date it was filed in this Court. The Court has considered the allegations concerning registry counsel Harrison in note 2 on page 3 of the petition. To monitor the performance of assigned counsel in accordance with section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2005), Harrison shall file in the circuit court a response to note 2 of the petition within thirty (30) days of the service of the petition....

...QUINCE, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., concur. CANADY, J., concurs with an opinion. LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. CANADY, J., concurring. Since 1998—when the Legislature adopted the statutory provisions relating to registry counsel—section 27.711(1)(c), Florida Statutes, has contained a definition of "[p]ostconviction capital collateral proceedings" which makes specific reference to "any authorized federal habeas corpus litigation with respect to [a] sentence [of death]." (Emph...

...Under the definition of postconviction capital collateral proceedings adopted by the Legislature, a section 1983 lawsuit is simply not included among those proceedings for which collateral representation may be made available pursuant to chapter 27, Florida Statutes. Although section 27.711(1)(c) is contained in the portion of part IV of chapter 27 that deals specifically with registry counsel, it nonetheless is relevant to the scope of the representation to be afforded not only by registry counsel but also by capital col...

...l counsel is then directly linked with the specific statement of intent identifying the limitations on collateral representation contained in the last sentence of the section. The relevance beyond the context of registry counsel of the definition in section 27.711(1)(c) is also evident from the specific provision the Legislature made in section 27.701(2) for "the responsibilities of the regional office of capital collateral counsel for the northern region" to "be met through a pilot program using only attorneys from the registry of attorneys maintained pursuant to s....

...s of the regional office of capital collateral counsel" as contemplated by section 27.701(2). In short, the statutory context points compellingly to the conclusion that the definition of "[p]ostconviction capital collateral proceedings" contained in section 27.711(1)(c) reflects a legislative understanding of the meaning of the limitations earlier set forth in section 27.7001—precluding "civil litigation"—rather than a legislative decision to impose a new special limitation that is only applicable to registry counsel. The definition in section 27.711(1)(c) thus is a positive statement of what the Legislature had previously stated negatively in the last sentence of section 27.7001....

...bridges the rights, privileges, or immunities provided by the United States Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [2] With regard to my colleague's reliance upon the definition of "Postconviction capital collateral proceedings" provided in section 27.711(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), I make two observations: (1) the Legislature explicitly restricted the application of that statute to registry counsel (i.e., by its own terms, the statute does not apply to CCRC), see § 27.711(1) ("As used in s. 27.710 and this section, the term . . . means. . . ." (each enumerated section deals exclusively with registry counsel) (emphasis supplied)); and (2) only a portion of section 27.711(1)(c) may be characterized as exhaustive, and a fair reading of this clause does not prohibit section 1983 actions filed in state or federal court....

BENTON, C.J. Antonio Melton appeals an order prohibiting his lawyer from appearing on his behalf, and striking as unauthorized a motion for collateral relief that the lawyer had filed. We reverse. We do not agree that section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes (2009) applies where private counsel is appearing pro bono publico....

...In response, the state filed a “Motion to Prohibit Registry Counsel from Representation and to Strike the Successive 3.850 Motion,” arguing that, because Mr. Doss was appointed in appellant’s capital case, he could not file a 3.850 motion in another, non-capital case. 3 The trial court agreed, citing section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes (2009), 4 and State v....

...he attorney has been appointed to represent him or her.” The Kilgore court did say that many sections in part IV of chapter 27 evinced an “intent to limit counsel’s role to capital postconviction proceedings,” 976 So.2d at 1069 , and invoked section 27.711(H), 5 stating (in obiter dicta) that “registry counsel are expressly prohibited from representing a capital defendant in a postconviction proceeding other than the capital proceeding for which counsel was appointed.” Id....

...individual in a collateral postconviction proceeding attacking the validity of a prior violent felony conviction that was used as an aggravator in support of a sentence of death.” Id. at 1070 . When read together with section 27.7002(4), however, section 27.711(11) merely prohibits registry counsel from representing a capital defendant in a non-capital proceeding at state expense....

...rney may be appointed, at state expense, to represent any defendant in collateral legal proceedings except as expressly authorized in this chapter.” § 27.7002(4), Fla. Stat. (2009). The statute does not say — and Kilgore did not decide — that section 27.711(11) prohibits private attorneys from representing a capital defendant in a non-capital case on a pro bono basis....

...Volusia County, 679 So.2d 729, 731 (Fla.1996) (noting the “long-established rule that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute either speaks plainly in this regard or cannot otherwise be given effect” (citing Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm’n, 354 So.2d 362 (Fla.1977))). Construction of section 27.711(11) properly begins, therefore, with acknowledgment of the venerable common law right parties able to retain counsel have to choose which counsel to engage....

...Even the Legislature’s competence in this area is circumscribed. See Art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. (“The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”). In sum, section 27.711(11) should not be interpreted to cut off the long-established right of a party to retain counsel of his or her choice. Reading the prohibition in section 27.711(11) in pari materia with section 27.7002(4), providing that “[n]o attorney may be appointed, at state expense, to represent any defendant in collateral legal proceedings except as expressly authorized in this chapter,” it is apparent that the Legislature intends to contain the costs of collateral representation, not to strip a disfavored group of rights all citizens have long enjoyed. Section 27.711(11) delimits the proceedings in which registry counsel may represent a capital defendant at state expense....

.... Section 27.7002(4), Florida Statutes (2009) provides that "[n]o attorney may be appointed, at state expense, to represent any defendant in collateral legal proceedings except as expressly authorized in this chapter,” (emphasis supplied), while section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes (2009) provides: An attorney appointed under s....

..."The doctrine of in pari materia requires that statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Zold v. Zold, 911 So.2d 1222, 1229 (Fla.2005). . The supreme court accepted the State’s argument that restrictions in section 27.711(11) would logically apply to CCRC, as well, saying that, although the statutes did not specifically prohibit CCRC from representing a capital defendant in a non-capital collateral challenge, neither did they expressly authorize CCRC to do so....

...r the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. The capital collateral regional counsel and the attorney appointed pursuant to s. 27.710 shall file only those post-conviction collateral actions authorized by statute. (emphasis supplied) Section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes, provides: An attorney appointed under s....

...her criminal convictions, because of its concerns about exhausting the public treasury. However, based on our research, the rarity of this issue would not translate into a significant concern for the public treasury. CCRC argues that the language of section 27.711(1)(c) clearly [7] permits it to seek to invalidate a prior criminal conviction, as part of its responsibility to collaterally challenge a death sentence....

...grees that the legislature has "clearly chosen to exclude from such state funded representation civil litigation, which includes collateral attacks on other criminal convictions, because of its concerns about exhausting the public treasury." Indeed, section 27.711(11), Florida Statutes, quoted in the majority opinion is clear: An attorney appointed under s....

...And, leaving the decision on a case-by-case basis to appoint counsel leads to inconsistent results. Arbelaez v. Butterworth, 738 So.2d 326, 330 (Fla.1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring) [6] See Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So.2d 404 (Fla.1998); Graham v. State, 372 So.2d 1363 (Fla.1979). [7] Section 27.711(1)(c) provides: (c) "Postconviction capital collateral proceedings" means one series of collateral litigation of an affirmed conviction and sentence of death, including the proceedings in the trial court that imposed the capital senten...

in his official capacity, asserting that section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes, contains “a state-created

...contracts of, and payments to, registry attorneys—objected to the billing, which totaled $12,010.00. In its written objection, JAC stated that these fees, combined with previously billed fees on this case, exceeded the $20,000.00 statutory cap set forth in section 27.711(4)(d), Florida Statutes (2017).1 On December 12, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion for fees....

...See § 27.710(1), Fla. Stat. Under the relevant statutes, a registry attorney may enlist a designated attorney for assistance on the case. See § 27.710(6). Like registry attorneys, designated attorneys may receive fees pursuant to the fee statute. § 27.711(4)....

...contracts of, and payments to, registry attorneys—objected to the billing, which totaled $12,010.00. In its written objection, JAC stated that these fees, combined with previously billed fees on this case, exceeded the $20,000.00 statutory cap set forth in section 27.711(4)(d), Florida Statutes (2017).1 On December 12, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion for fees....

...See § 27.710(1), Fla. Stat. Under the relevant statutes, a registry attorney may enlist a designated attorney for assistance on the case. See § 27.710(6). Like registry attorneys, designated attorneys may receive fees pursuant to the fee statute. § 27.711(4)....

...SC01-1301, the order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to George F. Schaefer in the amount of $26,180.00 is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to enter an order awarding fees and costs of $14,220.59, corresponding to the $100 hourly rate for fees specified in sections 27.703 and 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986). See also Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644 (Fla.2002). In ease no. SC02-302, the award of attorney’s fees and costs to Bill Salmon in the amount of $18,483.31 is affirmed, pursuant to sections 27.710(6) and 27.711(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...es as reduced to the hourly rate of $100 as long as we make clear the statutory authority for these amounts. Accordingly, we approve the award of fees both to Schaefer as registry counsel under section 27.710 and to Salmon as assistant counsel under section 27.711(4), and expressly recognize the unique circumstances of this case, in particular the Court’s orders of May 23, May 25, and May 27, 2000, requiring Salmon to remain as Demps’ counsel on appeal in order to prevent any unnecessary delay in the execution of the death warrant....

that along with the entitlement to counsel, section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2022), establishes a

...e for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions -8- challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed . . . .”). Barwick argues that along with the entitlement to counsel, section 27.711(12), Florida Statutes (2022), establishes a “statutory right to effective postconviction counsel.” Section 27.711(12) provides: The court shall monitor the performance of assigned counsel to ensure that the capital defendant is receiving quality representation....

...ed to, false or fraudulent billing, misconduct, failure to meet continuing legal education requirements, solicitation to receive compensation from the capital defendant, or failure to file appropriate motions in a timely manner. § 27.711(12), Fla. Stat. But Barwick ignores other provisions within chapter 27 that make it clear that the “quality representation” referenced in section 27.711(12) does not create a right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel. Section 27.711(10) plainly states that “[a]n action taken by an attorney who represents a capital defendant in postconviction capital collateral proceedings may not be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” § 27.711(10), Fla....

...enge in any form or manner the adequacy of the collateral representation provided,” and section 27.7002(2) provides that the “sole method of assuring adequacy of representation provided shall be in accordance with the provisions of s[ection] 27.711(12),” i.e., court monitoring....

...The fact that these provisions of chapter 27 expressly prohibit capital defendants from raising claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel or otherwise challenging the adequacy of their postconviction representation forecloses any argument that section 27.711(12) creates a right to effective postconviction counsel. Despite the plain language of these statutes, Barwick argues that this Court recognized the right to effective assistance of capital postconviction counsel when it stated in Spalding v....

...family in Colombia. For that reason, and pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.703(1), CCRC-Middle Region asked to be permitted to withdraw and for the court to appoint in its place conflict-free registry counsel qualified under Fla. Stat. §§ 27.710 and 27.711. On October 22, 2003, the state postconviction court denied CCRC-Middle Region’s motion to withdraw....

...ida. The Florida Supreme Court denied Lugo’s abeyance motion on November 4, 2008. On November 10, 2008, Wasson moved to withdraw from his obligation to represent Lugo in state and federal postconviction proceedings pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 27.711....

...[Lugo].” Beyond that, Wasson alleged that an actual conflict of interest between himself and Lugo existed because Lugo had filed a bar grievance against him accusing him of misconduct. The State opposed Wasson’s motion to withdraw and argued that under Fla. Stat. § 27.711 Wasson’s appointment required him to represent Lugo “throughout all postconviction capital collateral proceedings, including federal habeas corpus proceedings until the capital defendant’s sentence is reversed, reduced, or carried out, and the attorney is permitted to withdraw from such representation by a court of competent jurisdiction.” See Fla. Stat. § 27.711(2), (8)....