Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that section 7.2 of the Primary Declaration would not be enforceable

...ipton to support a claim of false designation of origin, "[s]uch a claim may be supported ... by further acts on the part of the infringer falsely representing itself as the owner of the work"); cf. Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 7.02[5], at 7-26 & n....

...1996) (noting that although a copyright notice is insufficient under Lipton to support a claim of false designation of origin, “[s]uch a claim may be supported . . . by further acts on the part of the infringer falsely representing itself as the owner of the work”); cf. Jerome Gilson, Trademark Protection and Practice § 7.02[5], at 7-26 & Montgomery has stated a claim for false designation of origin....

appellant failed to give notice of breach. Ala.Code § 7-2-607(3)(a) provides that the “buyer must within a

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

to a four year statute of limitations, Ala.Code § 7-2-725. What was not clear, prior to the Alabama Supreme

781 F.2d 1569, 1570 (11th Cir.1986). Ala.Code § 7-2-201(1) (1984) states in pertinent part “a contract

arising under the Plan. . . ." (R.15-216 at CC426 § 7.2(b)(2).[1]) The Committee also has the "exclusive

the committee of this discretion fail. Because section 7.2(b) of the plan gives the committee discretion

...mber of billboards and their location. Compare LDC § 7.01.01(A) (restricting new billboards to designated locations, and stating that no increase in the total number of billboards shall be permitted "unless fully compliant with this Code") with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four per location, but placing no limits on the number of building signs such as marquee and canopy signs)....

...It states, "[i]f any of the provisions of this Code, including [provisions] pertaining to permitting new Billboards is found unconstitutional... all provisions pertaining to allowing and permitting new Billboards shall be deemed voided in totality and no new Billboards shall be allowed." 2. ON-PREMISE SIGNS 17 Part 7.02 regulates on-premise signs. On-premise signs are generally limited to 150 square feet. See LDC § 7.02.01(B). Those within 500 feet of the interstate are allowed up to 300 square feet of advertising space. See LDC § 7.02.02(B)....

...1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (noting that "there may be cases in which banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the message"). 12 Additionally, "permit applications for on-premise signs shall be in accordance with Part 7.02.00," which sets forth requirements for on-premise signs. LDC §§ 7.00.01, 7.02.01 13 In Thomas , the Supreme Court upheld a permitting scheme whereby "the object of the permit system ( as plainly indicated by the permissible grounds for permit denial ) is not to exclude communication of a particular content, but to coordinate multiple uses of limited space, to assure preservation of ......

incorporated the findings of the HCCB study. Section 7(2) of the Act contains a statement of legislative

Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 7(2). It is for this reason that the mere physical

Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook § 7:2 (2014) (“For the most part ... the [Federal Trade

later *10 adopted constitutional provision, Art. V, § 7(2), which authorizes an additional County Judge in

Neb.Const. Art. III, § 24; N.J.Const. Art. IV, § 7(2); and, N.Y.Const. Art. I, § 9(2). The New York amendment

2 W. LeFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2 (1978). The Court’s latest decision affecting

Code of Alabama defines express warranty at section 7-2-313: (1) Express warranties by the seller are

govern. State law provides a rate of 7%. O.C.G.A. § 7-2-4. Appellant, however, concedes that admiralty

43 Unless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable

opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 1 U.S.C. § 7 [2] Florida Statutes § 741.212, Marriages between

Farnsorth, Farnsworth on Contracts, § 7.2 at 194 (1990). The rule does not purport to exclude

Article 2 “applies to transactions in goods.” § 7-2-102. The Code defines the term “goods" broadly to

behavior and has been held to be protected under § 7.2 “The right of employees to wear union insignia at

cited in this opinion. See Ala.Code § 7-2-302; Ohio Rev.Code Ann, § 1302.15. Consequently

implied warranty of merchantability, Ala. Code § 7-2-314(2)(c), Cowan must establish that her shoe was

bargain creates an express warranty....” Ala. Code § 7-2-313(l)(a) (1975). The complaint alleges that “Lumber

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

paragraph (1)(b) of Section 7-2-103." Sec. 8-20-3(7), Code of Alabama (1975). Section 7-2-103(1)(b) is the

...... Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." Bowling, 394 So.2d at 174, n. 17 (quoting from 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 7.02 at 413)....

...The district court found that because Trucks’s policy did not require drivers to return the 1% of load revenue directed towards lodging if they chose to sleep in the sleeping berths in the trucks, Trucks failed this third requirement as well. Trucks relies on Rev. Proc. 90-60 § 7.02, which requires accountable per diem allowances to ask that employees return the per diem allowance for “days of travel not substantiated,” as opposed to costs not substantiated....

...The dispute resolution process in the Master Group Service Agreement provides in § 7.01 that a dispute "relating to the performance of this Agreement by PacifiCare and Member" shall first be submitted to an internal dispute resolution process to resolve the dispute in a non-adjudicative setting. § 7.02 provides that any dispute that is not resolved through the dispute resolution process described in § 7.01 "shall have the matter resolved by binding arbitration by a single arbitrator." JAMS/Endispute shall arbitrate, and its rules shall govern....

...Plaintiff's remaining argument, that the dispute is beyond the scope of the arbitration clause, is also rejected. Plaintiff argues, by focusing on the language of § 7.01, that the arbitration clause is limited to the denial of claims relating to the performance of the agreement. § 7.02 only mandates arbitration for disputes "not resolved by the above appeals and dispute resolution processes...." Plaintiff posits that her allegations concerning systemic *1007 violations by PacifiCare (that speak to violations of RICO and ERISA) are not covered by the arbitration clause. PacifiCare counters by highlighting the preamble of § 7.02, "Any claim, controversy, dispute or disagreement...." The difficulty with Plaintiff's argument is two-fold. First, this Court is not persuaded that the arbitration clause at issue is limited only to denial of claims, particularly in view of the broad, all-encompassing preamble of § 7.02....

Guardians of my infant Children.” 5 . Section 7(2) of the Guardianship Act grants a mother the

Article V, Florida Constitution emerged. We quote Section 7(2), Article V, to point out that it is obviously

...hor discusses the question of filling and gasoline stations and garages for some 32 pages showing the holdings of the courts over the nation under various circumstances in zoning businesses of this type. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, Volume 1, Section 7.02 summarizes the reasoning of the various State Courts in this regard as set out in the brief of appellant as follows: "The validity of every Zoning Ordinance is to be tested as applied to a particular piece of property at a particular time....

Cases Under Chapter 15 of the BANKRUPTCY Code, § 7[2], at 70 (2008)). Thus, it was within the bankruptcy

the district court should have applied Ala.Code § 7-2-103(l)(b) (1975). The code imposes and defines a

and Adult Services Program Supervisors. Id. at § 7-2(c). Although the manual does not detail the monitoring

McGovern, Kurtz and Rein, Wills, Trusts and Estates § 7.2 (1988). At another time, when asked why his sister

may stand with the invalid portion excised. Section 7(2) of the act is a severability clause: If any

LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 7.2(c)(1982), quoting, People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529

a 4-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 7-2-725. The dispute is about when the claims arose

...Power & Light Co., 254 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1971). [4] Campo was cited with evident approval by the District Court of Appeal in Royal, 205 So.2d at 310. It has also been roundly criticized. 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, 1542 (1956); 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 7.02 (1975); See also Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 Yale L.J....

contraband, see generally 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 7.2(d) (2d ed. 1987), they are inapposite to this case

54 The relevant statute, Ala.Code Section 7-2-725 (1975), provides in pertinent part that:

needed to be negligible. Disclosure Statement, § 7.2. The Supreme Court has rejected this type of argument:

...to enforce DER's related rules and regulations under section 120.69(1)(a). BACKGROUND On September 27, 1982, appellant filed the above-mentioned alternative actions in the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in Sarasota County. Appellant alleged: (1) section 27.02, Florida Statutes (1981), [3] when read in conjunction with article V, section 17, Florida Constitution (1968), [4] gave him authority to file the civil action for damages and penalties, and section 120.69(1)(a) gave him authority to file the al...

...1), [8] with respect to the administrative action. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the case under advisement and then later issued its final order on December 22, 1982. In that order, the court specifically ruled: (1) section 27.02 is merely enabling legislation for article V, section 17 of the Florida Constitution and simply "authorizes a state attorney to bring criminal and civil actions, but does not give special authority to bring an action [pursuant to section 403.141...

...2(1)(b). It is from this order that the state attorney appeals. ISSUES In this appeal, we have discerned the following two related and important issues which merit our discussion: (1) whether a state attorney has independent authority under section 27.02 (or any other statute) to institute in his judicial circuit and on behalf of the state a civil action for damages and penalties pursuant to section 403.141(1) for alleged violations of section 403.161(1) occurring in his circuit, and (2) whether...

...e conditions creating the violation or other appropriate corrective action. (Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, we must analyze appellant's assertions in light of the relevant statutory provisions. Discussion Appellant essentially argues that section 27.02 when read in conjunction with article V, section 17 [13] grants him the authority to independently initiate a section 403.141(1) civil action on behalf of the state....

...today's burgeoning environmental problems that are inevitable with commercial development, we, nevertheless, reject appellant's novel contention with respect to this issue. We reach this conclusion after examining article V, section 17 and section 27.02 together, as well as determining the legislature's intention with respect to this issue as evidenced by the enactment of various statutes relating to the authority of state attorneys and by the enactment of certain sections of Chapter 403....

...Rather, only a specific general law can grant him the power to file such a suit. Such a construction of article V, section 17 is consistent with the scope of authority traditionally granted to and exercised by a state prosecuting attorney. Furthermore, we hold that section 27.02 contrary to appellant's contention, is not such a specific general law but only broadly sets forth, as its heading indicates, a state attorney's general duties....

...[2] Section 7 states: "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise." [3] Section 27.02 provides: "The state attorney shall appear in the circuit and county courts within his judicial circuit and prosecute or defend on behalf of the state all suits, applications, or motions civil or criminal, in which the state is a party......

...The legislature has also specifically granted a state attorney authority to institute other civil actions on behalf of the state if an action is referred to or delegated to him by a particular state agency or official. See §§ 106.25(4)(a); 161.071; 206.07; 206.22; 207.022; 253.05; 402.17(5); 501.052; 526.10; 542.15; 585.36; 586.09(1), Fla....

its discretionary authority to decide claims. Id. § 7.2(b)(3). Broadspire is the Administrative Services

Disputed Claim becomes an Allowed Claim." (CP 204, § 7.2).[2] C. The Adversary Proceeding to Invalidate the

that the act shall take effect August 1, 1974, Section 7(2) specifically provides: [N]otwithstanding the

violation of written rules and policies including section 7-2.13, F.A.C. and sections 2M and 13F of the Division

ongoing enterprise." Stock Purchase Agreement, § 7.2.1. A perusal of Count II, the breach of third party

therewith. [emphasis added] Sections 7.1.2 and § 7.2.2. state in pertinent part as follows: 7.1.2 Accuracy

agreements between them (as more fully set forth in Section 7.2) outside the scope of this one-year limitation

constitute "special circumstances" under Ala.Code Section 7-2-714(2) (1975),4 so that the rental value of the

some intensity... ." 3 La Fave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(c) (2d ed. 1987). The search of Langer's automobile

...case basis. Moreover, we are unable to reconcile the majority decision in Lingle with the recent holding of the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2425, which was cited merely as "cf." by the Lingle majority. [6] Section 7.02 of the labor agreement provides that the "functions of the arbitrator shall be to interpret and apply the Agreement and he shall have no power to add to or subtract from or to modify any of the terms of the Agreement." [7] Judge Ripple's...

1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 7:2 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted). The doctrine

similarly does not protect NEAPCO. . Ala. Code § 7-2-316(2) (1984). . R. Anderson, 3 Uniform Commercial

subject only to reasonable notice. See Ala.Code § 7-2-309(2), (3) (1984). 15 We

incorporated the findings of the HCCB study. Section 7(2) of the Act contains a statement of legislative

to a four year statute of limitations, Ala.Code § 7-2-725. What was not clear, prior to the Alabama Supreme

to borrow for the limited purposes stated in Section 7.2 of its Certificate and Agreement of Limited Partnership;

Local Admiralty and Maritime Rules state that Section 7.02(a) “codifies- the governing law of this circuit

§ 3(5); Dkt. 119, ¶ 4(1); see also Ch. 2001-299 § 7(2). Having acquired a certificate, a person must then

...From the record it appears that in July, 1994, certain Dade County voters sought a recall election to remove District 7 County Commissioner Maurice Ferre from office. The petition was not certified because it lacked the requisite number of signatures. See § 7.02(2), Art....

...The trial court's reliance on Hardemon v. Leahy, 642 So.2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), is misplaced. Hardemon did not involve a Charter provision founded on specific constitutional grant of power and did not discuss the Charter. The trial court additionally erred in holding that § 7.02(7) of Art....

...s the voters' rejection. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's order decertifying the recall petition with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint seeking declaratory relief. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] Section 7.02(7) of Art....

...ment of the grounds for recall, and limits the grounds for removal to malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform official duties, and conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude. [3] See § 7.02, Art, 7, Dade County Charter (no requirement that petition state grounds for recall)....

...VIII of the 1885 Florida Constitution provides for a home rule charter in Dade County, and specifically grants the Board of County Commissioners the right to "provide a method for the recall of any commissioner." § 11(1)(i), Art. VIII, Fla. Const. (1885). [5] See § 7.02, Art....

its discretionary authority to decide claims. Id. § 7.2(b)(3). Broadspire is the Administrative Services

501 F.Supp.2d at 805; Attorney-Client Privilege § 7.2.1 (“Because of the ease with which e-mail technology

...veral others directly contradict Coalsales' sole source interpretation. [22] Of the thirty-two provisions referenced *1277 by Coalsales, only six seem to support Coalsales' position: Sections 2.05, 5.02, and 9.01; Section 5.08; and Sections 6.02 and 7.02....

...urces. However, the presence in the contract of greater detail regarding particular sources does not preclude other sources, nor does it detract from the plain language obligating Coalsales to supply coal. Finally, Coalsales argues Sections 6.02 and 7.02 indicate that the parties "anticipated" Coalsales would supply a blend of coal from Source A and Source B....

...and unambiguously stating their intentions within the contract. [21] Coalsales identifies these thirty-two provisions as Sections 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, 2.10, 2.12, 2.16, 2.20, 2.22, 2.23, 2.27, 2.28, 2.30, 2.34, 5.02, 5.03, 5.08, 6.02, 6.04, 6.05, 7.01, 7.02, 8.01, 8.02, 9.01, 9.04, 9.06, 9.07, 11.01, 14.02, 14.06, 15.01, and 19.01....

...ion Source A or Source B. Coalsales also refers to Sections 6.04, which describes Source C, and 6.05, which describes "other sources," as support for its sole source interpretation. Finally, Coalsales refers to Sections 2.22, 2.23, 2.30, 6.02, 7.01, 7.02, 9.07 and 15.01, which either mention sources other than Source A and Source B directly or refer to Sections 6.04 and 6.05....

...ther than fixed. [23] Section 6.02 provides, in relevant part: "It is anticipated that the approximate Annual Quality under this Agreement from Source A (Section 6.04) will be 1,000,000 Tons and from Source B (Section 6.04) 900,000 tons." Similarly, Section 7.02 provides, in relevant part: "It is anticipated that the primary source of coal under this Agreement shall be a blend of coals from Source A and Source B." (emphasis added)....

Plan (the "Confirmation Date"). See Plan at p. 30, § 7.2. The Tax Sharing Agreement was not included on Exhibit

...remain at Crandon Park permanently rather than being removed by January 1, 2005, as specified in the Master Plan. On May 4, 2005, the Amendment Committee approved the amendment to allow the lighted ball fields to remain beyond 2005 but 4  Section 7.02, “Restrictions and Exceptions,” of Article 7 of the Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter – “PARKS, AQUATIC PRESERVES, AND PRESERVATION LANDS,” states in pertinent part: In furtherance of this policy parks shall b...

...pleasure, and recreation of the public and they shall be used and maintained in a manner which will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations as a part of the public’s irreplaceable heritage. Article 7.02 provides restrictions for the use of public parks and requires a majority vote of the electorate before certain commercial uses may be made....

...license, renewal, expansion, extension, concession or use shall be approved by a majority vote of the voters in a County-wide referendum. 23  In addition, Article 7.02 creates a special class of public parks (which includes Crandon Park), and imposes the heightened requirement of a two-thirds vote of the electorate before certain commercial uses may be made for this class of parks: To ensur...

...§ 7.00.02. The ordinance set forth regulations governing four categories of signs: (1) signs exempt from the permit requirement; (2) signs expressly prohibited; (3) permitted temporary signs; and (4) permitted permanent signs. See, e.g., §§ 7.01.00, 7.02.00, 7.03.00, 7.04.00....

...These included, among others, flags, except those of any nation, state, political subdivision or corporate flag when not used for a commercial purpose; portable signs; off-site signs; billboard signs ; and signs that bore or contained statements, words or pictures of any obscene, pornographic, [or] immoral character. See § 7.02.02 (emphasis added). Also prohibited was any sign not erected, maintained, compatible with or not in compliance with county, state, or federal law. See § 7.02.01....

...[12] The new regulations address nonconforming signs and still contain categories of permitted, exempt, and prohibited signs, see id. at §§ 7.01.00-7.03.00, but there are notable changes and omissions in each. Off-premises signs still are prohibited, see id. at § 7.02.02(J), but billboards are not listed as such....

...nd that the County neither expressly granted nor denied any of the applications. Maverick therefore, demonstrates their standing to raise as-applied challenges to the provisions of the old sign regulations prohibiting off-site and billboard signs, §§ 7.02.02(P) and (Q)....

...jective standards to determine what content qualifies as holiday, seasonal or commemorative decoration); 7.01.00(R) (which fails to contain objective standards as to what groups fall within public, charitable, educational or religious institutions); 7.02.02(R)(1) (which allows officials discretion to determine whether a sign is obscene); 7.03.02(D) (which fails to *1144 reference what types of signs qualify as "public" or "semi-public" signs); and 7.03.02(F) (which gives officials discretion to determine whether flags and balloon signs "may" be temporarily permitted)....

...regulations place an unconstitutional burden on property holders, such as the individual Plaintiffs, to communicate commercial or non-commercial speech. It appears that Plaintiff here takes umbrage with several sections of the ordinance including §§ 7.02.02(C) (prohibiting banners, pennants, festoons, searchlights, twirling signs, sidewalk or curbside signs, balloons or other gas-filled figures, or other inflatable signs), § 7.02.02(D) (prohibiting flags, except those of any nation, state, political subdivision, or corporate flag when not used for a commercial purpose), and §§ 7.04.03(A), (B)(1)-(3) (setting forth general regulations applying to on-site signs)....

...aintiff succeeds on the merits, its injury would likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Finally, I conclude that Plaintiff fails to establish standing to bring the due process claim asserted in Count Twelve. By that count, Plaintiff challenges § 7.02.02(R)(1) of the old sign regulations, which prohibited any sign that "bears or contains statements, words or pictures of any obscene, pornographic, [or] immoral character." See (Doc....

...In light of the above, the substantive constitutional challenges that remain are those alleged in Counts One, Two, Six, Seven, Eight, and Eleven of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as they relate to the express prohibitions on off-site signs and billboards contained in § 7.02.02(P) and (Q) of the old sign regulations and to the extent implicated, the definitions of both....

...The County counters that the portions of the old sign regulations that Maverick has standing to challenge, those involving off-site signs and billboards, were valid, content-neutral regulations. I agree. Here, the prohibitions on off-site signs and billboards under § 7.02.02(P), (Q) of the old sign regulations did not regulate expression on the basis of content as in Burk, nor did they impermissibly *1152 discriminate between off-site signs or billboards containing non-commercial or political messages and those containing commercial messages as in Café Erotica. When fairly considered, the prohibitions on off-site signs and billboards under § 7.02.02(P), (Q) of the old sign regulations were content-neutral....

...permitted other offsite signs subject to certain restrictions. Under Metromedia, the County could make such value judgments about commercial speech without running afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Consequently, I conclude that sections 7.02.02(P), (Q) of the old sign regulations meet the standards of Central Hudson and did not constitute unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech....

...[11] Inexplicably, the parties appear to ignore this section. [12] A copy of the new sign regulations is appended to the County's supplement to its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 118, Ex. 1). [13] Nonetheless, the new regulations contain a general prohibition. Pursuant to § 7.02.01, "[a]ny sign not permitted by these Sign Regulations is prohibited." [14] The district court dismissed without prejudice Maverick's claims challenging the regulation's permitting procedures (Counts One, Two, and Ten) and its Fifth Amendmen...

...[33] In addition to the prohibition against offsite signs, Plaintiff complains that various other sections of the old regulations are unconstitutional content-based provisions. See (Docs. 93 at 3-5, 97 at 17-20) (citing to, among other sections, §§ 7.01.00(C), 7.01.00(D), 7.01.00(K), 7.01.00(L), 7.01.00(R), 7.02.02(B), 7.02.02(D), 7.02.02(R)(1), 7.03.02(D), 7.05.02(B)(3), 7.05.02(B)(6))....

the charges or fail as being unconstitutional. Section 7.02 fails to provide for notice of the charges and

the study of law as specified in Article V, Section 7 2, the filing fee shall be $60.00 $75.00. Section

580 (Ala.1989). The relevant statute, Ala.Code Section 7-2-725 (1975), provides in pertinent part that:

Thus, W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedures § 7.2(c) (1985), states: What happens if a defendant refuses

Cir.1989). According to Ala.Code § 7-2-601(a), if goods do not conform to a contract, the

...t time"; and (2) the correspondence and Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release between the parties dated August 5, 2004, November 16, 2004, November 29, 2004, and December 9, 2004 constitute the required notices of default. C. Arbitration Provision Section 7.02.(d) of the Agreement exempts from arbitration "[a]ny dispute for which [Campero] is entitled to terminate this Agreement without prior notice under the provisions of section 6.02 of this Agreement." Campero filed this action in this Dist...

...s required to terminate the Agreement without notice under § 6.02. However, STPC does argue that Campero did not properly provide it with notices of its default and therefore this matter does not fall within the exception to arbitration provided by § 7.02.(d)....

...by federal policy but contrary to the intent of the parties.'" Id. (citations omitted). Here, the parties' agreement expressly contemplates a dual dispute resolution system under which some disputes may be litigated while others are arbitrated. See, § 7.02....

...g dispute. At this stage, the only issue for the Court is whether the parties intended to submit Campero's claim regarding its alleged proper termination under § 6.02 to arbitration or litigation. Paladino, 134 F.3d at 1057. The express language in § 7.02 of the Agreement clearly shows the parties' intention to submit this dispute to litigation....

paragraph (l)(b) of Section 7-2-103.” § 8-20-3(7), Code of Alabama (1975). Section 7-2-103(l)(b) is the

“Determination of Clinical Privileges,” and section 7.2-2 is specifically titled “Basis for Privileges

enumerated controlled substance in § 893.135(1), Fla. Stat.)7, 2. The defendant actually [sold] [purchased]

pursuant to the policy of the state in Article II, Section 7. (2) The Everglades Sugar Fee shall expire twenty-five

pursuant to the policy of the state in Article II, Section 7. (2) The Everglades Sugar Fee shall expire twenty-five

2000, D.E. 58-2. D.E. 47-13 at 1. Id. at 13 (§ 7.2.2.4.6.3). Id. at 2. Id. at 3. See Deposition

a 4-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 7-2-725. The dispute is about when the claims arose

requirements of Part I, Ch. 287, F.S. AS TO QUESTION 3: Section 7(2)(b), Ch. 92-277, Laws of Florida,12 provides:

language, “Any other termination” as used in Section 7.2 of the Agreement is plain and unambiguous and

limitations under the UCC is four years. See Ala. Code § 7- 2-725(1); O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725. Starting with

calling for an election in Dade County pursuant to section 7.02 of the Charter of Metropolitan Dade County,

protecting the state’s natural resources, article II, section 7,2 and we also *1076acknowledge the efforts of the

DCA 2008)). The association argues that Section 7.2 of the Declaration, which obligates the association

E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, § 7.2 at 194 (1990). The rule does not purport to exclude

with respect to goods of that kind.” Ala. Code § 7-2-314 (1975). “Merchantability” refers to a product’s

benefits under the Plan is determined under section 7.2 of the Plan. This is dependant upon the employee's

DCA 1984); 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d Ed.), § 7.2(d), p. 56.

Maureen A. Sullivan, Limited Liability Companies § 7:2 (2024) (“The LLC statutes do not mandate distributions

responsibilities of such Unit Owners. (Ex. 16 at § 7.2.) A similar provision is in the Bylaws of the Association

of the trial court. Initially, Chapter 59-1658, § 7(2) (g), is at best vague as to the interest acquired

subject only to reasonable notice. See Ala.Code § 7-2-309(2), (3) (1984). We review the grant or denial

buildings have certain parking available. Moreover, Section 7-2 D. of the ordinance provides that "no existing

the use of the property.” Uniform Partnership Act § 7(2). Therefore, the fact that Ms. Simmons “shared”

Redish, Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice § 7.2 (2023). But the 10-day rule was superseded

...regard to the number of billboards and their location. Compare LDC § 7.01.01(A) (restricting new billboards to designated locations, and stating that no increase in the total number of billboards shall be permitted “unless fully compliant with this Code”) with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four per location, but placing no limits on the number of building signs such as marquee and canopy signs). Section 7.01.01(C) concerns severability of the billboard provisions....

...permitting new Billboards is found unconstitutional . . . all provisions pertaining to allowing and permitting new Billboards shall be deemed voided in totality and no new Billboards shall be allowed.” 2. ON-PREMISE SIGNS Part 7.02 regulates on-premise signs. On-premise signs are generally limited to 150 square feet. See LDC § 7.02.01(B). Those within 500 feet of the interstate are allowed up to 300 square feet of advertising space. See LDC § 7.02.02(B)....

...at 322 (upholding an ordinance listing thirteen specific grounds under which a permit application may be denied, none of which “has anything to 12 Additionally, “permit applications for on-premise signs shall be in accordance with Part 7.02.00,” which sets forth requirements for on-premise signs. LDC §§ 7.00.01, 7.02.01. 19 do with what a speaker might say”).13 VI....

” 1 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 7:2 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted). The doctrine

constitute “special circumstances” under Ala.Code Section 7-2-714(2) (1975),4 so that the rental value of the

reversion. See, Chapter 59-1658 of Laws of Florida, Section 7(2)(g). The Court also takes judicial notice of

ordinance in the City of Sunrise Charter, Article VII, § 7.02, which reads in part: “Any police officer of the

...at § 1.62-2(f)(2). The district court found that because Trucks's policy did not require drivers to return the 1% of load revenue directed towards lodging if they chose to sleep in the sleeping berths in the trucks, Trucks failed this third requirement as well. Trucks relies on Rev. Proc. 90-60 § 7.02, which requires accountable per diem allowances to ask that employees return the per diem allowance for "days of travel not substantiated," as opposed to costs not substantiated....

period of time as said Trustee as in office. Section 7.2(8) details the trustees’ powers as follows: Specific

challenge the validity on constitutional grounds of § 7.02 of the Dade County Home Rule Charter which provides

1943). . 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 7.02. . See City of Miami v. Walker, Fla.App. 1964

addition to the causes for dissolution set forth in Section 7.2(c)[[2]], the Partnership shall be dissolved in