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Florida Statute 7.01 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
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The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title II
STATE ORGANIZATION
Chapter 7
COUNTY BOUNDARIES
View Entire Chapter
7.01 Alachua County.—The boundary lines of Alachua County are as follows: Begin where the range line between ranges sixteen and seventeen east intersects the thread of the Santa Fe River; thence run south on said range line to the southwest corner of section seven, township eleven south, range seventeen east; thence run east along the south line of sections seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven and twelve to the northwest corner of section eighteen, township eleven south, range eighteen east; thence run south along the west line of sections eighteen, nineteen, thirty and thirty-one, township eleven south, range eighteen east to southwest corner of said section thirty-one; thence run east along south line of sections thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-three and thirty-four to southeast corner of section thirty-four, township eleven south, range eighteen east outside of Arredonda Grant; thence run north along east line of said section thirty-four to southwest corner of section thirty-four, township eleven south, range eighteen east inside said grant; thence run east along the township line between townships eleven and twelve, south, to its intersection with the west margin of Orange Lake; thence following the western and southern margin of Orange Lake to its intersection with the range line between range twenty-two and twenty-three east; thence run north along said range line to where same is intersected by the north and east margin of Santa Fe Lake; thence run north following the east margin of said Santa Fe Lake to its westernmost intersection with a line which is the prolongation of the north line of McManus Subdivision as per plat book “A”, page 117 of the public records of Alachua County; thence west along the north line of said subdivision to its intersection with the east line of government lot three of section twenty-one, township eight south, range twenty-two east; thence north along said east line to the southeast corner of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of said section twenty-one; thence north along the line between the east half and the west half of the northwest quarter of said section twenty-one to the north line of said section twenty-one; thence west along the north line of said section twenty-one to the southeast corner of section seventeen, township eight south, range twenty-two east; thence west to the southwest corner of the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said section seventeen; thence north to the southeast corner of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section seventeen; thence west to the southwest corner of the east half of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section seventeen; thence north to the northwest corner of the east half of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section seventeen; thence west to the southwest corner of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of said section seventeen; thence north to the half-mile corner of the south line of section eight, township eight south, range twenty-two east; thence west to the southwest corner of the east half of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of said section eight; thence north to the northwest corner of the east half of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of said section eight; thence north to the northeast corner of the west half of the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section five, township eight south, range twenty-two east; thence west to the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of said section five; thence north along the west line of said section five to the northeast corner of the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section six, township eight south, range twenty-two east; thence west to the southwest corner of the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of said section six; thence north to the northwest corner of the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of said section six; thence west along the north line of said section six to the northwest corner of said section six; thence north along the east line of section one, township eight south, range twenty-one east to the southeast corner of section thirty-six, township seven south, range twenty-one east; thence north along the east line of said section thirty-six to the northeast corner of the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of said section thirty-six; thence west to the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of the southwest quarter of said section thirty-six; thence north along the west line of said section thirty-six to its intersection with the thread of the Santa Fe River; thence northerly and westerly along the thread of the Santa Fe River to its intersection with the east line of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section thirty-three, township seven south, range twenty-one east; thence north to the northeast corner of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of said section thirty-three; thence west to the northeast corner of the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section thirty-two, township seven south, range twenty-one east; thence west to the northwest corner of the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of said section thirty-two; thence west to the southwest corner of the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section thirty-one, township seven south, range twenty-one east; thence north to the northwest corner of the northeast quarter of the northeast quarter of said section thirty-one; thence west to the half-mile corner of the south line of section thirty, township seven south, range twenty-one east; thence north on the quarter section line of said section thirty to its intersection with the thread of the Santa Fe River; thence southerly and westerly along the thread of said Santa Fe River to its intersection with the south line of the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section twenty-eight, township seven south, range twenty east; thence west to the southwest corner of the northeast quarter of said section twenty-eight; thence north to the northwest corner of the northeast quarter of said section twenty-eight; thence west to the northwest corner of said section twenty-eight; thence north along the east line of section twenty, township seven south, range twenty east to the southeast corner of the northeast quarter of said section twenty; thence west on the quarter section line of said section twenty to its intersection with the thread of the Santa Fe River; thence northerly and westerly along the thread of the Santa Fe River to its southernmost intersection with the east line of section two, township seven south, range seventeen east; thence run south along the east line of said section two to the northeast corner of section eleven, township seven south, range seventeen east; thence run south along the east line of said section eleven to the northeast corner of government lot four in said section eleven; thence run west to the northwest corner of said government lot four; thence run south along west line of said government lot four to the southwest corner of said government lot four; thence run west along the south line of said section eleven to the northwest corner of section fourteen, township seven south, range seventeen east; thence run south along the west line of said section fourteen to the southwest corner of said section fourteen; thence run east along south line of said section fourteen to its intersection with the thread of the Santa Fe River; thence run southerly and westerly along the thread of said river to the point of beginning.
History.—s. 6, Dec. 29, 1824; s. 3, Nov. 23, 1828; s. 1, Feb. 10, 1835; s. 1, ch. 106, 1846; s. 1, ch. 923, 1859; s. 1, ch. 1765, 1870; RS 38; GS 36; s. 1, ch. 6243, 1911; s. 1, ch. 6509, 1913; RGS 39; s. 1, ch. 11371, 1925 CGL 41; s. 1, ch. 28312, 1953.

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Amendments to 7.01


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 7.01

Total Results: 124  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 193 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Civil Cases, Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7.1 (West, 1990). The ADA instructions were taken with
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Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 51 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 642, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22417, 1999 WL 721832

punitive damages are not recoverable. Alabama Code § 7-1-1Ó6 (1997), titled “Remedies,” states that:
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Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 197 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 43 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 10 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 87, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32407, 1999 WL 1142914

Cases, Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7.1 (West, 1990). The ADA instructions were taken with
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Tidmore Oil Co., Inc. v. Bp Oil Co./gulf Prods. Div., a Div. of Bp Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1991).

Cited 38 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11425, 1991 WL 82903

provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, Ala.Code Ann. § 7-1-203, does not create a cause of action either in
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CafÉ Erotica of Florida, Inc., a Florida Corp., CafÉ Erotica / We Dare to Bare / Adult Toys / Great Food / Exit 94, Inc., a Florida Corp., Plaintiffs-counter-defendant-appellees v. St. Johns Cnty., a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Defendant-counter-claimant-appellant. Cafe erotica/we Dare to bare/adult toys/great food/exit 94, Inc., a Florida Corp. v. St. Johns Cnty., a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).

Cited 38 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3243

...tals, ¶ 7. 13 Ordinance 99-51 regulates different types of signs differently, including the following sign categories: (1) billboards; (2) on-premise signs; and (3) "special use signs," which include "political message signs." 1. BILLBOARDS 14 Part 7.01 regulates billboards. Billboards are limited to thirty-five feet in height, and can be as large as 378 square feet — or 560 square feet if located along the interstate. See LDC § 7.01.03(A)-(B)....
...t also "political copy intended to directly or indirectly promote a candidate or issue." LDC § 12.01.00. 15 Billboards are subject to greater restrictions than on-premise signs with regard to the number of billboards and their location. Compare LDC § 7.01.01(A) (restricting new billboards to designated locations, and stating that no increase in the total number of billboards shall be permitted "unless fully compliant with this Code") with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four per location, but placing no limits on the number of building signs such as marquee and canopy signs). 16 Section 7.01.01(C) concerns severability of the billboard provisions....
...Under this definition, the separate requirements for "political message signs" appear to govern all non-commercial signs. Political message signs are limited by § 7.03.01(L) to between six and thirty-two square feet. Commercial signs and billboards, on the other hand, can be as large as 560 square feet. See LDC §§ 7.01.03(A), 7.05.01(A)....
...Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 , 122 S.Ct. 2045 , 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 , 122 S.Ct. 1043 , 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002)). 46 Third, the County's interpretation cannot be reconciled with LDC § 7.01.03(G), which states, "[a]ll billboards ......
...et, but it can be up to six hundred feet along certain highways. A review of Café Erotica's billboards reveals that this display requirement means that the corporation's complete legal name must prominently appear on the billboard facing. See LDC §§ 7.01.04(A), 7.01.04(E)6....
...ion. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 790 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 . 19 But note that under Ordinance 99-51, "political message signs" can be no larger than thirty-two square feet, while billboards can be as large as 560 square feet See LDC §§ 7.03.01(L), 7.01.03(A)....
...I disagree that the St. John's County ordinance does the former, but agree that it does the latter. 71 On the first point, the plain text of the St. John's ordinance permits both commercial and political messages on billboards, which can be as large as 560 square feet. Section 7.01.03 regulates the size of billboards and contains no reference to the content....
...size much smaller than the 560 square feet permitted for billboards. The most natural reading of the ordinance, however, leads to a different interpretation. Billboards, as large as 560 square feet, may contain political or commercial messages under § 7.01.03....
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Bank of New York v. Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc. (In Re Sunshine-Jr. Stores, Inc.), 456 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2006).

Cited 33 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17990, 46 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 224

...The Trust Moneys were essentially part of the Collateral securing the Notes. 40 accordance therewith,”26 but its obligations were also limited “by the provisions of the TIA,” the federal statute under which the role of Indenture Trustee was created. Similarly, Section 7.01 of the Trust Indenture Agreement placed the responsibility for disbursing the Trust Moneys, including those held in the Escrow Account, on the Indenture Trustee alone.27 With respect to the Collateral and the Trust Moneys, the Indenture Trustee’s obligations were expressly limited to the Agreement and the TIA....
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Boyd v. Homes of Legend, 188 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 31 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

punitive damages are not recoverable. Alabama Code § 7-1-106 (1997), titled “Remedies,” states that:
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Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 29 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 45 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 300, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24281

plus their costs and expenses.” Id., § 7.1, at 54-55. 2 Finally, the stipulation
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Smith v. Coalition to Reduce Class Size, 827 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 2002).

Cited 26 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2002 WL 31051569

...3d DCA 1996), the Third District Court of Appeal considered an analogous case. In Leahy, the appellants argued that an initiative petition violated section 12-12 of the Dade County Code, which provided that "Initiative petitions proposed pursuant to Sections 7.01 or 8.07 of the Dade County Home Rule Charter shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." The intervenor responded that the Home Rule Charter provided the sole procedure and qualifications an initiative petition must m...
...Article VIII, section 11(1)(i) of the 1885 Florida Constitution, carried forward by Article VIII, section 6(e) of the 1968 Florida Constitution, states that the Home Rule Charter "[s]hall provide a method for ... initiative and referendum, including the initiation of and referendum on ordinances...." Section 7.01 of the Charter carries out the constitutional directive and lays out a "procedure" for Dade County electors to initiate passage of or referenda on ordinances....
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United States v. Gunby, 112 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1997).

Cited 23 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1997 WL 228566

1983 Act repealed the 1982 Act, see § 7-1, 1983 Ga. Laws at 928, and therefore left local
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Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Dade Cty. v. Wilson, 386 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1980).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1980 Fla. LEXIS 4321

...Supreme Court of Florida. July 25, 1980. *557 Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., Miami, for petitioner. Dennis M. O'Connor, Coral Gables, and Eugene M. Short, Jr., of Peters, Short, Maxey & Morgan, Coral Gables, for respondent. *558 SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. Section 7.01 of the Dade County Home Rule Charter provides that any county elector may seek the passage of an ordinance by means of initiative and referendum....
...Askew, 348 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1977), and Weinberger v. Board of Public Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253 (1927). [5] We will accept, without deciding, the district court's conclusion that the proposed ordinance is authorized by the Dade County Charter. See § 7.01(6)(a), Home Rule Charter of Metropolitan Dade County....
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Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

Cited 22 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19763, 2009 WL 4874530

interpretation. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(d) (4th ed. 2009) (acknowledging two plausible interpretations
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Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1969).

Cited 21 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida

L.R. 394 (1940): 1 F.L.P., Administrative Law, § 7; 1 Fla.Jur., Administrative Law, § 35. The exact meaning
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Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., Pennzoil Prods. Co., a Div. of Pennzoil Co., Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 877 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1989).

Cited 21 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 454, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 10771, 1989 WL 73724

do not displace the common law principles. See § 7-1-103. Section 7-2-202 contains the Code’s version
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Johnny E. Walker v. S. Co. Servs., 279 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2002).

Cited 21 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 27 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1417, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 886, 2002 WL 86676

implied in every contract under Alabama law. Ala.Code § 7-1-203. As the Supreme Court observed, the effect of
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In Re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).

Cited 21 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1687, 1996 WL 755143

the designated representative (as defined in Section 7.1 of the Settlement Agreement), (e) the Veil Piercing
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In Re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989 (S.D. Fla. 2000).

Cited 15 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19247, 2000 WL 33180826

...dCom, Inc. ("MCI") and PacifiCare-Oklahoma. Plaintiff *1006 Hitsman, as an MCI employee, became bound by the terms of the agreement when she enrolled in PacifiCare HMO. The dispute resolution process in the Master Group Service Agreement provides in § 7.01 that a dispute "relating to the performance of this Agreement by PacifiCare and Member" shall first be submitted to an internal dispute resolution process to resolve the dispute in a non-adjudicative setting. § 7.02 provides that any dispute that is not resolved through the dispute resolution process described in § 7.01 "shall have the matter resolved by binding arbitration by a single arbitrator." JAMS/Endispute shall arbitrate, and its rules shall govern....
...Accordingly, the Oklahoma statute that prevents arbitration of insurance claims is of no assistance to Ms. Hitsman in the instant action. Plaintiff's remaining argument, that the dispute is beyond the scope of the arbitration clause, is also rejected. Plaintiff argues, by focusing on the language of § 7.01, that the arbitration clause is limited to the denial of claims relating to the performance of the agreement....
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Vierling v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 339 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).

Cited 12 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2003 A.M.C. 1966, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 15373, 2003 WL 21757223

...or other consideration for travel on a public carrier under an express or implied contract.” Benedict on Admiralty § 10.04[A] (7th ed. 2002). A seaman, by contrast, is one “engaged or employed in any capacity on board a vessel . . . .” Id. at § 7.01[C][1][d][ii] (citation omitted). 22 Under the general maritime law, shipowners are held to an implied warranty that their vessel is reasonably fit for its intended purpose....
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City of Miami Beach v. Mr. Samuel's, Inc., 351 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1977).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida

but pawn shops are not mentioned. Pursuant to Section 7-1 of the Zoning Ordinance, an application for conditional
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John S. Freund v. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney Gen., 117 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997).

Cited 11 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17918, 1997 WL 397181

...In addition to charges stemming from using and possessing cocaine, each could have been charged with a myriad of crimes for their conduct surrounding Walker's death. For example, all three could have been charged as principals for aiding and abetting Trent’s kidnapping of Walker, a first-degree felony, Fla. Stat. ch. 787.01 (Supp.1984), or Trent's false imprisonment of Walker, a third-degree felony, Fla....
...Trent would not be guaranteed an acquittal on first-degree murder charges. He could still be found guilty of the capital offense as an accessory before the fact if, along with helping Freund kill Walker, he intended that Freund kill Walker. See Fla. Stat. ch. 777.011 (1983)....
...Kidnapping is defined under Florida law as “forcibly,, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting; or imprisoning another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to" commit one of four enumerated acts. Fla. Slat, ch. 787.01(1) (1984 Supp.). The only enumerated act relevant to this case is to "[i]nflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person." Fla. Slat. ch. 787.01(1)(3)....
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Sierra Club v. Flowers, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2006).

Cited 10 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 62 ERC (BNA) 1265, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12579, 2006 WL 760489

included in the compensatory mitigation proposed in Section 7.1 [of the EIS] will attract mammalian wildlife
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Freehling v. Garson (In Re Top Sport Distributors, Inc.), 41 B.R. 235 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).

Cited 10 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 1984 Bankr. LEXIS 5434

...sion to liquidate the Plan. After receiving notification from the IRS permitting the liquidation, GARSON and DAVIS transferred their fully vested shares of the Plan into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's) and the Plan was terminated. Pursuant to § 7.01 of the Plan, upon termination, each participant is fully vested as to his or her share....
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Halifax Area Coun. v. City of Daytona, 385 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Cited 9 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal

and SHARP, J., concur. NOTES [1] Article 21, section 7.1 of the City Zoning Ordinance requires that the
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Rivergate Rest. Corp. v. METRO. DADE CTY., 369 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

Cited 9 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal

...All other portions of the final judgment in conflict with this opinion are disapproved. The final judgment, as so modified, is affirmed. Affirmed. NOTES [1] This procedure was authorized pursuant to the Home Rule Charter for Metropolitan Dade County, art. 7, § 7.01 (1957)....
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Carol Morris, Adm'x of the Est. of Linda Louis Grimes, Deceased v. Sse, Inc., 912 F.2d 1392 (11th Cir. 1990).

Cited 8 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 628, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16911, 1990 WL 129268

relation to this state. 3 Ala.Code § 7-1-105(1) (1975) (emphasis supplied). Although some
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Kobrin v. Leahy, 528 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

Cited 8 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 18574

...1982), and contrary to the requirements of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), that a ballot question set forth "the substance of ... [the] public measure ... in clear and unambiguous language ... [which contains] the chief purpose of the measure" and to Article 7, Section 7.01(4)(b) of the Metropolitan Dade County Home Rule Charter that ballot language provide "a clear understanding of the proposal." See Smathers v....
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LPJ, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co. (In Re LPJ, Inc.), 22 B.R. 556 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).

Cited 8 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Florida. | 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 3694, 9 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 853

The Bottler's Agreement of January 2, 1982, Section 7.1(4) provides: "TERMINATION WITHOUT NOTICE. This
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Aaron v. State, 345 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1977).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida

Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge, Section 7.1 (1974), which prescribes: "Inherent power of
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Waters v. Int'l Precious, 190 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999).

Cited 7 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Settlement Fund plus their costs and expenses.” Id., § 7.1, at 54-55.2 Finally, the stipulation included a
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Miami Heat Ltd. P'ship v. Leahy, 682 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Cited 7 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 607973

...3d DCA 1978), affirmed, 394 So.2d 981 (Fla.1981). Appellants' first argument is that the initiative petition [4] that prompted the ballot *202 question violates section 12-12 of the Dade County Code. That section declares: "Initiative petitions proposed pursuant to Sections 7.01 or 8.07 of the Dade County Home Rule Charter shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected therewith." Intervenor responds that the Home Rule Charter provides the sole procedure and qualifications an initiative petition must meet f...
...Article VIII, section 11(1)(i) of the 1885 Florida Constitution, carried forward by Article VIII, section 6(e) of the 1968 Florida Constitution, states that the Home Rule Charter "[s]hall provide a method for ... initiative and referendum, including the initiation of and referendum on ordinances...." Section 7.01 of the Charter carries out the constitutional directive and lays out a "procedure" for Dade County electors to initiate passage of or referenda on ordinances....
...have the duty and obligation to ensure ballot integrity and a valid election process. Ballot integrity is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the constitutionally provided initiative process. Id. at 566-67 (emphasis added). In the instant case, section 7.01 of the Charter is a self-executing provision....
...enactment of an ordinance attempting to impose such a requirement. Appellants' second, and final, argument is that the language of the ballot question [6] approved by the County Commission for placement on the general election ballot is violative of section 7.01 of the Home Rule Charter and section 101.161, Florida Statutes (1995). See, e.g., Kobrin v. Leahy, 528 So.2d 392 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied , 523 So.2d 577 (Fla.1988); Metropolitan Dade County v. Lehtinen, 528 So.2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 528 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1988). Section 7.01(4) of the Charter provides that a proposal submitted to the electors must be "in such a manner as provides a clear understanding of the proposal." Likewise, section 101.161 requires "that a ballot question set forth the substance of ......
...This ordinance shall take effect on the day after the election approving this ordinance. WE the undersigned electors of Dade County, Florida petition the Board of County Commissioners either to pass the foregoing ordinance or to submit this ordinance to the electors of Dade County, Florida in accordance with Article 7, Section 7.01 of the Charter of Metropolitan Dade County....
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United States v. Pizdrint, 983 F. Supp. 1110 (M.D. Fla. 1997).

Cited 7 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18514, 1997 WL 722048

S.C. § 7(1) and (8) to provide "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction."[1] Section 7(1) defines
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Hunter v. State, 651 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Cited 7 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 104091

69-835, § 7, at 106, Laws of Fla.; Ch. 89-521, § 7(1)(a), at 405, Laws of Fla. Turning next to the question
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Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Fla. 1970).

Cited 7 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida

...Before SIMPSON, Circuit Judge, and McRAE and YOUNG, District Judges. OPINION WILLIAM A. McRAE, Jr., District Judge: Plaintiffs have brought this action seeking injunctive, declaratory, and other relief, and in particular challenging the constitutionality of the Florida obscenity statute, section 847.011....
...ll v. Carson, 309 F.Supp. 326 (M.D.Fla., 1969) (temporary restraining order) because no prior adversary hearing had been obtained. A civil proceeding against the exhibitor Mandell and against the film followed in state court seeking, under section 847.011, a temporary restraining order against the further showing of the film until a final determination of the state proceeding, and seeking to have the film declared obscene and to have it confiscated and destroyed....
...ndoned the suit). [3] The present suit was filed at the same time as the petition for removal, on October 30, 1969. Subsequently, on November 17, 1969, a temporary restraining order was entered against further acts by defendants to enforce section 847.011 against the film "Vixen" pending consideration by this Court....
...the State of Florida has no legitimate interest in the suppression of allegedly obscene movies, shown exclusively to adults who, though not pandered to, are first informed of the content. [8] This Court finds the Florida obscenity statute, section 847.011, unconstitutional in its entirety for the first three contentions made by plaintiffs; the fourth claim we find to be not an unconstitutional defect, but one which it is desirable to correct if a subsequent statute should be enacted; and the Cou...
...declaratory judgment with injunctive relief from future prosecutions. We hold that plaintiffs' standing to bring this action is not diminished by their commercial interest in the film. 1. Provision for Ex Parte Injunction Florida Statutes, Section 847.011 (7) (b) (1967), provides for the issuance of an ex parte injunction, without notice, of a threatened violation of the obscenity statute: (7) (b) After the filing of such a complaint, the judge to whom it is presented may grant an order restraining the person complained of until final hearing or further order of the court....
...e unconstitutional. Moreover, a contrary ruling by this Court to the position the Florida courts have taken would not necessarily be followed by them. [13] *467 3. Failure of the State to Provide for Prompt Appellate Consideration Although section 847.011(7) (b), (c), provides for an expedited trial procedure to minimize incursions on the right of protected expression, the statute makes no provision whatever for an expedited appellate consideration by the District Courts of Appeal, the courts of final jurisdiction in most cases....
...The state has recently taken such appeals from lower court rulings. E. g., State ex rel. Hallowes v. Reeves, 224 So.2d 285 (Fla., 1969); State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732 (Fla., 1969) (reinstating two criminal informations which had been dismissed by the trial judge on the grounds that section 847.011 failed to prescribe a sufficiently ascertainable standard of guilt)....
...Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S.Ct. 975, 16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966), requirement for obscenity that the material be without socially redeeming value. Plaintiffs also contend, with some force, that the recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court, upholding section 847.011, in State v....
...209 (1969); Krislov, From Ginzberg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour In Obscenity Litigation, 1968 Sup.Ct.Rev. 153. In light of the ruling that is made here, it is unnecessary to reach this contention at this time. [16] *470 Not reached by this ruling is Florida Statutes, section 847.012 (1967), prohibiting sale or distribution of obscenity to persons under eighteen years of age....
...GEORGE C. YOUNG, J., dissents by separate opinion. JUDGMENT For reasons assigned in Judge McRae's opinion for the majority of this Court, filed herein this day (Judge Young dissenting by separate opinion), it is Ordered: 1. Florida Statutes, section 847.011 (1967), F.S.A....
...Defendants' motion for new trial or stay is hereby denied. 2. Plaintiffs' motion to amend judgment is granted and in lieu of paragraph 1 of the judgment heretofore entered in this cause on July 22, 1970, the following paragraph shall be substituted: 1. Florida Statutes, section 847.011 (1967), F.S.A....
...YOUNG, District Judge (dissenting): I dissent from both the opinion and decision rendered by the majority in this case and I therefore respectfully declined to approve the judgment. This case arose because of efforts by Florida state officials to enforce Section 847.011 of the Florida Statutes, F....
...69-8106-H (4th Judicial Cir.Ct., Duval Cty., Fla.) to have "Vixen" declared obscene and to have it confiscated and destroyed. Upon the subsequent filing of this case, Judge McRae entered a one-judge temporary restraining order restraining the defendants against further acts to enforce Section 847.011 which was, in effect, an injunction restraining the state suit. The plaintiffs here seek a declaratory judgment holding Section 847.011 to be unconstitutional and for an injunction permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing the civil or criminal provisions of that statute....
...me limit is imposed for completion of Board action." The Maryland statute provided for administrative determination of obscenity without any judicial participation. The Florida statute does not suffer from the infirmity of Freedman because Section 847.011(7) (c) provides: "The person sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within one day after joinder of issue and a decision shall be rendered by the court within two days of the conclusion of the trial." In Freedman the Supreme Court referred to their previous opinion in Kingsley Books, Inc....
...t issue. In addition to believing that the statute is not unconstitutional on the grounds stated by the majority, there is another reason for my declining to join in the judgment enjoining all enforcement of the civil and criminal provisions of § 847.011 Florida Statutes, F.S.A....
...t of restraining the state suit then pending wherein T. Edward Austin as the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, had brought a civil proceeding against the exhibitor Mandell of the film Vixen under the civil provisions of § 847.011....
...The majority opinion expresses concern over the finding that the state proceeding "chilled" the rights of Vixen's promoters. But who can say from the record that such "chilling" was not justified in the state's efforts to suppress obscenity? APPENDIX I FLORIDA STATUTES, 1967 CHAPTER 847 OBSCENE LITERATURE; PROFANITY 847.011 Prohibition of certain acts in connection with obscene, lewd, etc., materials; penalty....
...This Court enjoined the criminal prosecution of Mandell based on the seizure without a prior adversary hearing, and required the defendants to return the film to Mandell. After the film was returned to Mandell, the State Attorney commenced a civil proceeding against him in the State circuit court under Florida Statute 847.011, seeking to have the film declared obscene and to have the film again confiscated and destroyed....
...show the film again. He offered to submit for the State Attorney's inspection and approval any "questionable" films he might desire to exhibit in the future. The State Attorney declined. NOTES [1] The statute challenged, Florida Statutes, section 847.011 (1967) is attached as Appendix I....
...a showing of the film in Gainesville beginning March 6 was stopped by a temporary restraining order issued March 10 in a civil action brought in the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Florida (which includes a portion of the Middle District) under section 847.011 against M & W Theatres, Inc., the exhibitor of a print of "Vixen" owned by the present plaintiffs....
...adversary hearing determines probable cause that a film or book is obscene, or whether, in the alternative, one who sells or exhibits must do so at his own risk. In addition, this Court has not been presented with an attack specifically on section 847.011(1) (b), although it is somewhat similar to section 847.06(2), stricken as unconstitutional in Morrison v....
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City of Sunrise v. DCA Homes, Inc., 421 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

Cited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal

location from where the sign is installed. [3] Section 7.1(e) of the ordinance provides: "One sign shall
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Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, a P'ship v. United States, 802 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir. 1986).

Cited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 32413

statutes, in pertinent parts, provide: Alabama Code § 7-1-201: Subject to additional definitions contained
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Chino Elec., Inc. v. US Fid. & Guar. Co., 578 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Cited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 40069

F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 7.1 (2d ed. 1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525
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Est. of Joseph P. Kosow, Deceased. Eleanor C. Kosow, Pers. Rep. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 45 F.3d 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).

Cited 6 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 75 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1272, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3781, 1995 WL 57198

...An IRS ruling is not the product of notice and comment procedures, but is merely an opinion of an IRS attorney. Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir.1971). While taxpayers may assert their holdings as a shield, Rev.Proc. 89-14, § 7.01(4), (5), 1989- 1 C.B....
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State v. Williams, 516 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

Cited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1987 WL 2902

the arrest. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 7.1(c) n. 69. In Lafayette, cited and quoted in Bertine
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Diaz v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Dade Cnty., 502 F. Supp. 190 (S.D. Fla. 1980).

Cited 5 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14647

...The proposal reached the ballot stage through the efforts of defendant-intervenors, a political committee named "Citizens of Dade United." The organization's members circulated petitions for an initiative election on the proposal, pursuant to the Home Rule Charter for Metropolitan Dade County, § 7.01 (1957)....
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In Re Joe Morgan, Inc., 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993).

Cited 5 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 401, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 5198

his order or to bearer or in blank." Ala.Code § 7-1-201(20). There is no dispute that UCON was a holder
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Dunkin' Donuts Franchised Restaurants LLC v. D & D Donuts, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Fla. 2008).

Cited 5 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56207, 2008 WL 2853259

causing irreparable harm." (Doc. # 34-3 at 11, § 7.1.) . Plaintiffs have established that the franchise
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Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 722 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Fla. 1989).

Cited 4 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11683, 1989 WL 113929

...ice mark infringement. In sum, federal common law does not serve as a basis for service mark protection, and any development of such a body of law was arrested by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Id. at § 7.01[1]....
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Pena v. Vectour of Florida, Inc., 30 So. 3d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Cited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 3867, 2010 WL 1136210

PHILIP J. PADOVANO, FLORIDA APPELLATE PRACTICE, § 7.1 (2008 ed.). AFFIRMED. VAN NORTWICK, CLARK, and MARSTILLER
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Peebles v. Sheridan Healthcare, Inc., 853 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Cited 3 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2003 WL 22047616

...ests in the Company to which the Seller will not be entitled unless he is selected as Manager and are expected to enter into employment agreements on terms that may be substantially different from the terms of the employment agreements referenced in Section 7.01(1) hereof, (v) understands and acknowledges that he has received no guarantee, promise or assurance, and (except for Dr....
...y improve significantly and that he will not participate in any such improvement after the sale of Shares hereunder (unless he is a Manager, in which case the terms of his participation will be as set forth in the Investment Agreement (as defined in Section 7.01(n)) ......
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Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011).

Cited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60666, 2011 WL 2223422

...the formalities for foreign works, including the registration requirement of § 411(a). See, e.g., Football Ass'n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc. 633 F.Supp.2d 159, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y.2009); 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 7.01[A], at 7-8-7-9 (2011) (for non-U.S....
...it is no longer required, registration is still required for foreign authors to gain the procedural benefits of a prima facie presumption of the validity of a copyright, statutory damages, and attorney's fees under the Act. See 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 7.01[B], at 7-11-7-12; 17 U.S.C....
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Bowdoin v. Showell Growers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).

Cited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 1366, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6963

215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709. . See Ala. Code § 7-1-201(10) (1984) (defining the term "conspicuous”
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Nachwalter v. Christie, 611 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1985).

Cited 3 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18962

...has rejected the use of a series of informal letters as constituting a valid modification of an ERISA plan. The purported written agreement is not a modification pursuant to the terms of the Plans. The procedure for amending the Plans is detailed in Section 7.01 of the Plans. Beyond the substantive restrictions as to what can be amended, that provision requires that "[a]ny amendment to the Plan[s] shall first be approved by resolution of the Company's Board of Directors." Moreover, Section 7.01 of the Plans further requires that any amendment "be executed by the Company and the Trustees." The letters purportedly constituting the written agreement between Irwin G....
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Merrill v. Dade Cnty., 272 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

Cited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal

...1972 Supplement, F.S.A. The court stated: "Section 1 of the proposed repealer ordinance which, when read in conjunction with Section 5 thereof, calls for the effective repeal of the utility tax on the date of its adoption by the voters would also conflict with Section 7.01(6)(a) [1] of the Charter if the effective date were prior to October 1, 1972....
...In any event it is clear that the trial court was not presented with all of the factors which we have held to be applicable here. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein. NOTES [1] Section 7.01(6)(a) of the Charter provides: "An ordinance proposed by initiatory petition or the repeal of an ordinance by referendary petition shall be effective on the day after the election, except that: "(a) Any reduction or elimination of existi...
...t provided for by the current budget or existing bond issues shall not take effect until the beginning of the next succeeding fiscal year; ...". [2] Chapter 72-360, Laws of Florida, 1972, now appearing as § 167.4391, Fla. Stat. 1972 Supplement. [3] Section 7.01(7) of the County Charter states: "An ordinance adopted by the electorate through initiatory proceedings shall not be amended or repealed by the Board for a period of one year after the election at which it was adopted, but therafter it m...
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Harrington v. Batchelor, 781 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

Cited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2001 WL 193791

...§ 5913, at 470 (footnote omitted); see Heina v. La Chucua Paso Fino Horse Farm, Inc., 752 So.2d 630, 635-37 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (allowing claim for breach of shareholder agreement, and derivative claim, in same lawsuit); American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance § 7.01 & cmt....
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Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996).

Cited 3 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6245, 1996 WL 233174

claims, the court concludes that HTI breached section 7.1(g) of the Agreement in its merger with Columbia
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R. Wayne Lowe v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 958 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).

Cited 3 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7412

under the banking laws of Georgia, Ga.Code Ann. § 7-1-490(a) (Michie 1989),32 bank directors are required
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Wilson v. Dade Cnty., 369 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

Cited 3 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal

...llage roll back" ordinance which had been proposed by an initiative petition. The purpose of this opinion is to explain the reasons for that order. *1003 The petition, which has secured the requisite number of voter signatures provided by Article 7, § 7.01(2) of the Dade County Charter, proposed the adoption of the following ordinance: "Section 1....
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Walter v. Celotex Corp. (In Re Hillsborough Holdings Corp.), 197 B.R. 366 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).

Cited 3 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 623, 1996 WL 307277

elements required for the § 524(g) injunction: § 7.1(b) The Confirmation Order will provide that the
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Boroski v. Dyncorp Int'l, 662 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2011).

Cited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 7-1, at 533-34 (5th ed.2011). The fact that various
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Martin v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 637 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 4987, 1994 WL 201390

...This is an appeal from a final judgment upholding the validity of Dade County Ordinance No. 93-46, which repealed the so-called "anti-bilingual" ordinance adopted in 1980 by the electorate through the initiative process. The trial judge found that (a) section 7.01(7) of the Dade County Home Rule Charter, which authorizes the commission to repeal, after one year, an ordinance adopted by initiative, was itself valid and constitutional and (b) the repealing ordinance did not violate Article II, secti...
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Optima Tobacco Corp. v. US Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

Cited 2 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2016 WL 1045838, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34030

service liaison between UETA and USFC, see id. § 7.1. Optima’s duties included receiving purchase orders
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Heidkamp v. Galliher (In Re Hunger), 272 B.R. 792 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002).

Cited 2 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 66, 47 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1300, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 88, 2002 WL 180951

State of New York. N.Y. Est. Powers and Trust Law § 7-1.5(a)(1) sets forth when a trust interest is inalienable
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Abreau v. Cobb, 670 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 60838

...ion. The trial court order never refers to the "defeat" requirement. The July petition was not placed on the ballot due to insufficient signatures. The lack of signatures renders the petition insufficient and it failed, but was not "defeated." *1013 § 7.01(3), Art....
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Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc. v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 796 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1986).

Cited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Central Bank sought a § 365 order. . Ala.Code § 7-1-201(37) eliminates two considerations in distinguishing
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Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2007).

Cited 2 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 WL 3715769

seq.; the Georgia Check Cashing Statute, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-700, et seq.; and the Georgia Racketeer Influenced
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Gulf Power Co. v. Coalsales II, L.L.C., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (N.D. Fla. 2009).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95949, 2009 WL 3190459

...e Galatia Mine in Illinois. Gulf Power argues that the CSA explicitly designates three pre-approved sources of coal, and provides procedures for the establishment of other sources of coal. [19] To further bolster its position, Gulf Power argues that Section 7.01, "Coal Specifications," which states: "If during the term of this Agreement, [Coalsales] is required to supply coal from a Source other than A, B and/or C, the minimum rejection limits for Ash and Btu will be as follows ...." is inconsistent with a sole source agreement....
...early and unambiguously stating their intentions within the contract. [21] Coalsales identifies these thirty-two provisions as Sections 2.05, 2.06, 2.07, 2.10, 2.12, 2.16, 2.20, 2.22, 2.23, 2.27, 2.28, 2.30, 2.34, 5.02, 5.03, 5.08, 6.02, 6.04, 6.05, 7.01, 7.02, 8.01, 8.02, 9.01, 9.04, 9.06, 9.07, 11.01, 14.02, 14.06, 15.01, and 19.01....
...t mention Source A or Source B. Coalsales also refers to Sections 6.04, which describes Source C, and 6.05, which describes "other sources," as support for its sole source interpretation. Finally, Coalsales refers to Sections 2.22, 2.23, 2.30, 6.02, 7.01, 7.02, 9.07 and 15.01, which either mention sources other than Source A and Source B directly or refer to Sections 6.04 and 6.05. As noted above, Section 7.01 raises the possibility of Coalsales being "required to supply coal from a Source other than A, B and/ or C." Furthermore, the level of abstraction of the terms of the contract support a finding that the parties intended for the contract...
...y source of coal under this Agreement shall be a blend of coals from Source A and Source B." (emphasis added). [24] Moreover, the court agrees with Gulf Power that it would defy common sense for a sole source agreement to contain provisions, such as Section 7.01, contemplating a party being required to supply coal from other sources....
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Local Access, LLC v. Peerless Network, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (M.D. Fla. 2016).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2016 WL 6984522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164153

Illinois law by a noncompetition agreement). Section 7.1 of the noncompetition agreement is enforceable
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Boroski v. DynCorp Intern., 662 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2011).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2011 WL 5555686

" Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty & Mar. Law § 7-1, at 533-34 (5th ed.2011). The fact that various
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Sanchez v. Lopez, 219 So. 3d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 2017 WL 1713311, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 6171

Clerk to RECALL Mayor Orlando Lopez pursuant to Section 7.01, Article VII of the Sweetwater City Charter
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MAVERICK MEDIA Grp. v. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., 508 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35731, 2007 WL 1455963

...rograms. § 7.00.02. The ordinance set forth regulations governing four categories of signs: (1) signs exempt from the permit requirement; (2) signs expressly prohibited; (3) permitted temporary signs; and (4) permitted permanent signs. See, e.g., §§ 7.01.00, 7.02.00, 7.03.00, 7.04.00....
...gns or tablets; directional signs in nonresidential districts; non-illuminated identification signs in residential districts; non-illuminated real estate signs; non-illuminated construction signs; and political campaign signs (with limitations). See § 7.01.00....
...by preserving the right of free speech and expression in the display of signs. (Doc. 18, Ex. 1 at § 7.00.02). [12] The new regulations address nonconforming signs and still contain categories of permitted, exempt, and prohibited signs, see id. at §§ 7.01.00-7.03.00, but there are notable changes and omissions in each....
...[13] On-premises signs are permitted, but there are maximum sign areas for building signs and maximum height requirements for ground signs. See id. at § 7.03.00(A), (B). Permits for signs must still be obtained from the Administrator. See id. at § 7.07.01(A). Permit application review and time limits are set forth within the new sign regulations. See id. at § 7.07.01(D), (E)....
...The Administrator must grant or deny a permit application within thirty days from the date the completed application was submitted for approval, and any person denied a permit for a sign may submit a written appeal of the denial within thirty days of the denial. See id. at § 7.07.01(D), (G)....
...The allegations would appear directed at provisions such as the following which permit impermissible discretion to County official in determining whether an exemption applies: § 7.04.02(A) (permitting the County Administrator to determine whether an offsite directional sign is exempted from the general off-site ban); § 7.01.00(D) (which fails to include objective standards to determine what content qualifies as holiday, seasonal or commemorative decoration); 7.01.00(R) (which fails to contain objective standards as to what groups fall within public, charitable, educational or religious institutions); 7.02.02(R)(1) (which allows officials discretion to determine whether a sign is obscene); 7.03.02(D) (whi...
...[33] In addition to the prohibition against offsite signs, Plaintiff complains that various other sections of the old regulations are unconstitutional content-based provisions. See (Docs. 93 at 3-5, 97 at 17-20) (citing to, among other sections, §§ 7.01.00(C), 7.01.00(D), 7.01.00(K), 7.01.00(L), 7.01.00(R), 7.02.02(B), 7.02.02(D), 7.02.02(R)(1), 7.03.02(D), 7.05.02(B)(3), 7.05.02(B)(6))....
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Lehtinen, 528 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 612, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 910, 1988 WL 18575

...Firestone, 421 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1982), and, even more clearly, does not satisfy the requirement of section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (1987), that the "substance of ... [the] measure ... be printed in clear and unambiguous language," nor that of Article 7, Section 7.01(4)(b) of the Metropolitan Dade County Home Rule Charter that a proposition be *395 submitted "in such manner as provides a clear understanding of the proposal." We find no merit in the county's argument that the action is barred by laches....
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In Re Celotex Corp., 377 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).

Cited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2006 WL 4847510

and rights provided in the Trust Agreement." Section 7.1 of the Trust Agreement provides as follows: ARTICLE
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VFW John O'Connor Post 4833 v. Santa Rosa Cnty., 506 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Fla. 2007).

Cited 1 times | Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17150, 2007 WL 781356

...o sell liquor in addition to beer and wine. As part of its application to the State the Post is required to submit proof of compliance with the County's zoning requirements, specifically in this case a certificate of zoning compliance or waiver. [3] Section 7.01.13 of the Santa Rosa County Land Development Code ("LDC"), provides for the regulation of vendors selling liquor, beer, or wine for on-premises consumption in Santa Rosa County. [4] Section 7.01.13(A)(1) sets forth *1084 a distance requirement of 2500 feet between vendors who sell liquor, beer, or wine and established churches or schools....
...Subsection (E), Waiver of Distance Requirements, in part provides that the Santa Rosa Board of County Commissioners ("the Board") may waive the distance requirements "upon a proper showing by the applicant that the Board should waive such requirement." § 7.01.13(E), Santa Rosa County LDC....
...f zoning compliance, applicants seeking a waiver of the distance requirements must also submit an extra fee of $25.00 "for the purpose of offsetting the cost of confirming whether any affected churches or schools have consented to the waiver. . . ." § 7.01.13(D), Santa Rosa County LDC....
...ng requirements that would permit it to sell liquor. In January 2006 the application was discussed at a meeting of the Santa Rosa County Public Services Committee as well as a meeting of the Board. Relying upon the distance requirements contained in § 7.01.13, the Board denied the Post's application. [5] In its complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [6] the Post seeks a judicial determination that § 7.01.13 of the Santa Rosa LDC is unconstitutional because it violates rights protected by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Count I of the complaint alleges the violation of the Establishment Clause due to the unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to churches. Count II alleges the violation of the Equal Protection Clause, based on § 7.01.13's lack of an ascertainable standard for obtaining a waiver to the distance requirements and its grant of authority to churches to withhold their consent to such waiver. Counts III, IV, and V are claims for the violation of the Due Process Clause; they assert that § 7.01.13 is facially invalid (Count III), is invalid as applied (Count IV), and offends substantive due process (Count V). These counts, which contain virtually identical assertions, allege that § 7.01.13 fails to provide standards for assessing the denial of waivers by the Board and the refusal to consent by churches and that it vests unbridled discretion in decisionmaking by the Board and/or churches....
...The Post has moved for summary judgment as to Counts 1, 3, and 4 only of its complaint. The County has also moved for partial summary judgment. It does not seek judgment as to specific counts of the Post's complaint but rather requests a declaratory judgment that upholds the validity of § 7.01.13's distance requirements and severs any unconstitutional portions of the ordinance, leaving the distance requirements intact....
...allenged conduct of the County, and that such injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Furthermore, the Post's claims fall within the zone of interests protected by the relevant provisions of § 7.01.13 and implicate individualized injuries to the Post's own legal rights and interests. Thus the court concludes that the Post has satisfactorily established its *1087 standing to challenge § 7.01.13 of the Santa Rosa County LDC. Count I: Establishment Clause The Post primarily relies on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 103 S.Ct. 505, 74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982), for its argument that § 7.01.13 fails to achieve neutrality toward religion and thus violates the Establishment Clause. More specifically, the Post contends that the ordinance unconstitutionally delegates to churches the County's exercise of legislative discretion to deny zoning approval. [7] The County responds that the waiver provision in § 7.01.13 is factually distinguishable from the waiver provision at issue in Larkin and is not constitutionally deficient....
...us matters. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2868, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (internal citations omitted). In the instant case, religious purpose does not predominate in § 7.01.13....
...Rather, the ordinance clearly has a valid secular purpose, i.e., "the secular goal of protecting churches and schools from the disruption associated with liquor serving establishments." [10] Larkin, 459 U.S. at 124 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 505. Thus the court concludes that § 7.01.13 satisfies Lemon's first element. The court also concludes that § 7.01.13 satisfies the second and third factors set out in Lemon....
...s in schools and churches the power effectively to veto applications for liquor licenses within close proximity to them. [11] Contrary to the Post's assertions, however, the statute in Larkin and the ordinance in this case are factually distinct, as § 7.01.13 doe's not vest such authority in schools and churches....
.... located within a radius of five hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic beverages if the governing body of such church or school files written objection thereto." Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117, 103 S.Ct. 505. Section 7.01.13, on the other hand, simply provides for the payment of a $25.00 fee to ascertain whether the applicant's place of business is within 2500 feet of a school or church and, if a distance requirement waiver is sought, a second fee of $25.00 to be used to "off set[] the cost of confirming whether any affected churches or schools have consented to the waiver of the provisions of subpart A above." Section 7.01.13(D), Santa Rosa County LDC....
...Accordingly, while the reasoning and discussion in Larkin are instructive here, because Larkin is factually distinguishable its application of the second and third Lemon factors does not control the result in the instant case. Rather, as to the second prong of the Lemon test, the court concludes that § 7.01.13 does not have the primary effect of advancing religion....
...for explicitly religious goals. . . ." Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125, 103 S.Ct. 505. Nor does the ordinance provide for any exercise of legislative authority by churches in conjunction with the County or give the appearance of such. See id. at 125-26, 103 S.Ct. 505. Section 7.01.13 does not vest authority in schools or churches to veto, either expressly or effectively, an application for a liquor license or to make zoning decisions of any sort....
...quor-serving businesses and schools and churches and for ascertaining whether they have consented to a waiver. [13] Nothing in the ordinance, however, conditions approval of a waiver upon such consent. *1090 Indeed, as the County submits, nothing in § 7.01.13 would preclude the Board from granting a waiver even if an affected school or church objected or refused its consent....
...[14] Thus, contrary to the Post's contention, the ordinance does not give churches veto power over zoning decisions nor does it grant substantial weight to the viewpoint of any affected churches with respect to such zoning decisions. Furthermore, the distance requirements in § 7.01.13 do no more than convey the County's desire to protect or insulate churches and schools from the disruption associated with liquor-serving establishments....
...269, 276, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (reiterating that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion). For essentially the same reasons that apply to the "effect" prong of the Lemon test, the court further concludes that § 7.01.13 does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion....
...The ordinance's distance requirements implicate no financial support or day-to-day involvement with religious groups and thus in these respects also provide no basis for concluding that it creates an excessive entanglement problem. For all of the above reasons, the court is persuaded that § 7.01.13 of the Santa Rosa LDC survives an Establishment Clause challenge under the Lemon test....
...fact that precludes summary judgment." Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. Accordingly, the County is entitled to summary judgment in its favor with respect to Count I. Counts III and IV: Due Process Clause The Post also makes a facial due process challenge to § 7.01.13....
...upon a "proper showing" that a waiver should be granted but fails entirely to define the criteria for that standard. According to the Post, because the decision of whether to grant a distance waiver is left to the unbridled discretion of the Board, § 7.01.13(E) is void for vagueness....
...tertwined" with the "remainder of the ordinance" and "the County structured the ordinance so that the waiver provisions. were essential to the application for a certificate of zoning." (Doc. 31-1 at 3). The County argues that the waiver provision of § 7.01.13 is not unconstitutional but, if this court were to conclude otherwise, that the provision is severable....
..., Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir.1992) (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S.Ct. 1563, 1566, 18 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967)). The ordinance at issue in this case may be said to implicate both types of problems discussed above. Under § 7.01.13(E), the Board may waive the distance requirements "upon a proper showing by the applicant that the Board should waive such requirement." Because this waiver provision lacks any criteria for applying the "proper showing" standard, this subs...
...The waiver provision of the ordinance is not "set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with. . . ." National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880. Furthermore, § 7.01.13(E)'s lack of any identifiable criteria for applying the standard could result in its arbitrary or discriminatory application by those charged with its enforcement....
...at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294. In short, the ordinance's "Proper showing" standard is "really [ ] no rule or standard at all." Seniors Civil Liberties Association, Inc. 965 F.2d at 1036. Accordingly, the court finds that on its face the waiver provision set forth in § 7.01.13(E) is unconstitutional....
...in substance that it can be said that the legislature would have passed the one without the other and, (4) *1093 an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken." Id. at 1348 (quotation omitted). The court concludes that § 7.01.13(E) is severable from the rest of § 7.01.13....
...First, the court notes that both the Santa Rosa County Ordinance Book and Ordinance 89-04, the first iteration of the distance requirements ordinance, contain severability clauses. ( See doc. 26, exhs. 2 and 3). As to the four-part severability test, the court finds that § 7.01.13(E) is a discrete section of the ordinance and can easily be separated from the remaining valid provisions. In addition, although § 7.01.13 contains no express statement of purpose, its legislative purpose of protecting churches and schools from the disruption associated with liquor serving establishments is implicit in the valid provisions and can be accomplished independently of § 7.01.13(E). Section 7.01.13 also remains an act complete in itself absent the invalid § 7.01.13(E) as, pursuant to Larkin, the County is entitled to ban alcoholic beverages entirely within a reasonable distance from schools, and churches....
...liquor, beer, or wine for on-premises consumption to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance' from the County for properties that are not within 2500 feet of a school or church. [18] While a closer question, the court also concludes that excising § 7.01.13(E) from the rest of the distance requirements ordinance does not run afoul of the third prong of the Florida severability test. As the Post contends, at present it is permitted to sell beer and wine, which suggests that in enacting § 7.01.13 it was the Board's intent to provide for waivers of the distance requirements provision. Nevertheless, because § 7.01.13 evinces a clear interest in insulating churches and schools from the disruption associated with the service of alcoholic beverages, the court concludes that the Board would have enacted an ordinance banning such beverages within 2500 feet of schools and churches even had it known that the waiver provision would be declared unconstitutional. The court does not believe that, in light of the basic purpose of § 7.01.13, the Board would have preferred no ordinance at all to an ordinance "standing by itself [which is] capable of functioning on its own [and which] still helps to achieve that basic objective." Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc....
...Because the general ordinance and the waiver are sufficiently separable in substance, the court concludes that "it can be *1094 said that the [the Board] would have passed the one without the other." Coral Springs Street Systems, Inc., 371 F.3d at 1348. The court thus finds that the invalid § 7.01.13(E) is severable from the remainder of § 7.01.13. [19] The court turns next to the Post's as applied challenge to § 7.01.13....
..., based on the broad grant of authority contained in the Twenty-First Amendment, it may differentiate between beer/wine and liquor in regulating alcoholic beverages. Because the court has found that the waiver provision of the ordinance contained in § 7.01.13(E) is facially unconstitutional, it follows that § 7.01.13(E) likewise is unconstitutional as applied to the Post. [20] With the excision of the offensive § 7.01.13(E), however, the Post cannot succeed with an as-applied due process claim as to the remainder of the distance requirements ordinance. Section 7.01.13, after the severance of § 7.01.13(E), forbids the sale and on-premises consumption of any type of alcohol within the prohibited zone, with no exceptions....
...Nor has the Post alleged, or shown, that the County has acted in a clear display of bad faith. [22] Accordingly, the court finds that the Post has no vested right in the sale of liquor for on-premises consumption. [23] *1096 In summary, the court finds that § 7.01.13(E) of the Santa Rosa County Land Development, Waiver of Distance Requirements, is unconstitutional on its face and, perhaps, as applied to the Post but that § 7.01.13(E) is severable from the remainder of § 7.01.13. The court further finds that § 7.01.13, as severed, survives the Post's facial and as-applied due process challenges, as presented in Counts III and IV of the complaint....
...[24] Conclusion As discussed above, the court concludes that the Post has failed to meet its summary judgment burden with respect to Count I of the complaint and that the County therefore is entitled to judgment in its favor. Count I therefore is due to be dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the court finds that § 7.01.13(E) of the Santa Rosa County Land Development, Waiver of Distance Requirements, is unconstitutional on its face and, perhaps, as applied to the Post but that in any event § 7.01.13(E) is severable from the remainder of § 7.01.13. The court further finds that § 7.01.13, as severed, survives the Post's facial (Count III) and as-applied *1097 (Count IV) due process challenges and that the County is entitled to judgment in its favor with respect to those counts, which shall also be dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the parties shall brief the issues presented in Counts II and V of the Post's complaint, filing their memoranda no later than March 26, 2007. Accordingly, it is the ORDER of this court that: 1. Section 7.01.13(E) of the Santa Rosa County Land Development, Waiver of Distance Requirements, is DECLARED unconstitutional and is SEVERED from the remainder of Section 7.01.13, which otherwise shall remain in place as enacted....
...[4] While the evidence reflects some fluctuation in the parties' positions during the course of this litigation, they apparently now do not disagree that the ordinance pursuant to which the Post's application was denied is Santa Rosa County Ordinance 95-21, Chapter 3, § 3-3, now codified at § 7.01.13 of the Santa Rosa LDC. Ordinance 95-21 is the adopting ordinance for the Santa Rosa County, Florida, Code, which includes Ordinance 89-04, otherwise identified as § 3-3. The parties agree that the relevant provisions of Chapter 3, § 3-3, and § 7.01.13 are identical in content. Accordingly, for the purpose of this order, the court accepts that the two provisions are identical, and it refers to § 7.01.13 as the challenged provision pursuant to which the Post's application was denied. Section 7.01.13, Distance Requirements from Churches and Schools for Vendors Selling Alcoholic Beverages for On-Premises Consumption, in its entirety provides: A....
...sa County, Florida, at least fifteen (15) days prior to such regular or special Board meeting or public hearing. The notice shall state the name of the applicant, the nature of his request and the place and time the Board will hear such application. Section 7.01.13, Santa Rosa County Land Development Code....
...l of analysis in Establishment Clause cases). [10] The court finds that the Post has not come forward with direct evidence that "a sectarian or religious purpose was a substantial or motivating factor" in the County's legislative process of enacting § 7.01.13....
...ablishment Clause jurisprudence as "remain[ing] fundamentally unaltered." Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1286. [16] The Post also points to the notice provisions contained in subsection (E), Waiver of Distance Requirements, in support of its contention that § 7.01.13 violates the Establishment Clause....
...rom schools and churches, absent any provision for waivers, would pass constitutional muster. The Post has not made the argument that a distance as great as 2500 feet is unreasonable but even if it had, based on Larkin the court would disagree. [18] Section 7.01.13 remains an act complete in itself after striking § 7.01.13(E), notwithstanding the fee provision in § 7.01.13(D) that applies to applicants seeking waivers. Even with no provision for obtaining a waiver of the distance requirements remaining in the ordinance, the widowed reference to an additional $25.00 fee in § 7.01.13(D) simply becomes extraneous or lacking effect rather than making the entire ordinance fatally defective. [19] Having found that the waiver provision in § 7.01.13(E) is unconstitutional on its face but that the subsection may be severed from the rest of § 7.01.13, the court does not reach the Post's argument that the notice provision of § 7.01.13(E) improperly gives the Board unfettered authority to apply it "in favor of unspecified `appropriate persons.'" (Doc....
...no additional evidence should be required. If either party contends that it should be permitted to submit additional evidence relevant to either count, however, it should immediately so advise the court. In any event, given the court's severance of § 7.01.13(E) from the remainder of the § 7.01.13, it appears that any additional facial claims regarding the invalidity of the ordinance may be moot....
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The Florida Bar v. Martinez-Genova, 959 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2007).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 325, 2007 Fla. LEXIS 1048, 2007 WL 1703457

sanction in the present disciplinary action. Section 7.1 states: Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer
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Jones Ex Rel. Est. of Hill v. Hill Dev. Co. (In Re Hill), 265 B.R. 296 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001).

Cited 1 times | Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 902, 2001 WL 849350

substitution of general partners. Additionally, § 7.1 of HDC's Limited provides "[t]he Partnership shall
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Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. R. Charles Loudermilk, Sr., 930 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2019).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

failed to vote against such action. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-494(b). 7 As the Court explained
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Huntsville Hosp. v. Mortara Instrument, 57 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1995).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

taken within the time agreed. Ala.Code § 7-1-204(3). Here, the parties set the time for rejection
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Federer v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 701 F. App'x 835 (11th Cir. 2017).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

requirements established by the GRMA, see O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1000 et seq., mortgage lenders wishing to do business
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First Maryland Leasecorp. v. M/V Golden Egret, 764 F.2d 749 (11th Cir. 1985).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 600

sufficient to support a simple contract. Ala.Code § 7-1-201(44) (1984) (emphasis added). FML suggests several
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SP Healthcase Holdings, LLC v. Surgery Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 208 So. 3d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Cited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 18212

misrepresentation. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, section 7.1 of the agreement defines “losses” as follows:
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Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Skow, 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2013 WL 6726918, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25490

based on the standard of care set forth in O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490; but the district court went on to say that
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Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins., 758 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1985).

Cited 1 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Railroad. The note was issued pursuant to Ga.Code Ann. § 7-1-419 and was subordinated to the claims of all other
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United States Liab. Ins. v. Kelley Ventures, LLC, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2015).

Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135619, 2015 WL 5827903

“for any purpose or purposes.” See LLC Agreement § 7.1 [DE 1-1]. Accordingly, because Kelley Auto owns
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Uscardio Vascular, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 993 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 4298547

“Service Fee” shall have the meaning given in Section 7.1. Article VII of the Agreement, entitled “Financial
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Aruvision Holding & Exploitation v. Disney/ABC Television Int'l Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21748, 1997 WL 833304

to CCABC and its controlled entities. (Agreement § 7.1(c) (emphasis added).)3 Defendant contends that this
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Orlando Utils. Comm'n v. State, 478 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1985).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 587, 1985 Fla. LEXIS 4027

previously amended, to read in pertinent part: Section 7. (1) In addition to the power and authority to borrow
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White v. I.T.T., 718 F.2d 994 (11th Cir. 1983).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3132

and creates no executory obligations. 34 Ga.Code § 7-1 (1982); Murphine v. Hospital Authority of Floyd
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City of Miami v. Ass'n of Firefighters, 744 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).

Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal

...ed on it. See Miami Heat Ltd. Partnership v. Leahy, 682 So.2d 198 (Fla. 3d DCA), appeal dismissed, 686 So.2d 576 (Fla.1996), wherein an attempt was made (by Dade County ordinance) to impose a single subject requirement on the exclusive provisions of Section 7.01 of the Miami-Dade Home Rule Charter, which relates to the procedure for initiating referenda on ordinances....
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Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Steven M. Skow, 769 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2014).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20461, 2014 WL 5394321

violate the standard of care established by O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 when he acts in good faith but fails to act
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Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (11th Cir. 2020).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.1 (2000) (observing that a property servitude “may
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Pine Mountain Preserve, LLLP v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (11th Cir. 2020).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 7.1 (2000) (observing that a property servitude “may
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Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP v. Ramon E. Colina, M.D., 192 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 16611, 2015 WL 6874913

Colina remains subject to the restrictions of Section 7.1 relating to trade secrets, and that Dr. Coli-na
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Adams v. Bainbridge-Decatur Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 888 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1989).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Policy Handbook, Grievance Procedure, ch. VII, § 7.1. Chapter VIII, concerning termination of employment
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Ranieri v. Paincare Holdings, Inc., 889 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 17811, 2004 WL 2623950

that it meant any other termination for cause (section 7.1) and any other termination without cause, other
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Dekle v. Valrico Sandstone Co., 74 Fla. 346 (Fla. 1917).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 77 So. 95

complaint, others to section 7, and still others to section 7 1-2 of the bill of complaint. These several special
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Christina Anamaria Alexander v. Clifford Garland Harris (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida

cover" (quoting N.Y. Estates Powers & Trusts Law § 7-1.12(a)(5) (McKinney 1998)). Because the special
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City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Consolo, 279 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1973 Fla. App. LEXIS 7929

said property in accordance with the provisions of § 7-1 of the zoning ordinances of the “city”. We have
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Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, 377 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).

Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 4423

and rights provided in the Trust Agreement.” Section 7.1 of the Trust Agreement provides as follows: ARTICLE
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Util. Contractors Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Amsouth Bank N.A. (In re Joe Morgan, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

to his order or to bearer or in blank.” Ala.Code § 7-1-201(20). There is no dispute that UCON was a holder
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Maas Bros., Inc. v. Vincent (In re Vincent), 10 B.R. 549 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).

Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 4657

Bender’s U.C.C. Service, Sales and Bulk Transfers, § 7.01[4]; Lucas v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 458
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Linda Prentice, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Fla. 2022).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida

not being cheated.” Harper, et al., supra p.11, § 7.1, at 378. This interest is different in kind from
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Gustavo Bojorquez, etc. v. State of Florida (Fla. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida

certificate and one or more permits. Ch. 2001-299, § 7(1), Laws of Fla. A “certificate” was defined as “the
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Randy Mcllenan, Kayla Mcllenan, & Charles Williams v. Cypress Chase North Condo. No. 4 Ass'n, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida

the Declaration. The association claims that Section 7.1, which enumerates the unit owners’ repair responsibilities
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Savers Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Amberley Huntsville, Ltd., 934 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir. 1991).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

faith” in the context of loan acceleration. Ala.Code § 7-1-208 (1984) provides that a party possessing the
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Pinellas Cnty., Florida v. Gary Joiner, etc. (Fla. 2024).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida

subdivisions of the state, including counties); § 7.01-.67, Fla. Stat. (2014) (establishing boundaries
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Florida Digestive Health Specialists, LLP v. Ramon E. Colina, M.D., 170 So. 3d 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 11556, 2015 WL 4605677

Colina remains subject to the restrictions of Section 7.1 relating to trade secrets, and that Dr. Coli-
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Godwin v. Solutia, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Fla. 2002).

Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 28 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2449, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16332, 2002 WL 1837851

the date the Participant becomes vested under Section 7.1, the Participant or, in the case of the Participant's
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Ago (Fla. Att'y Gen. 2010).

Published | Florida Attorney General Reports

ad valorem taxes or utility services taxes. Section 7.01, Marco Island City Charter, provides that the
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Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n), 423 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010).

Published | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 297, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 148, 2010 WL 286615

Hotel are made by the General Partner. (Ex. 19 at § 7.1.) The Declaration provides that the Unit Owners
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Winter Park Pines Dev. Co. v. Kohloss, 244 So. 2d 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1971 Fla. App. LEXIS 7020

59-1658 amends § 7 of chapter 59-1646 to read: “Section 7 (1) No plat shall be recorded hereafter unless
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Landcastle Acquisition Corp. v. Renasant Bank (11th Cir. 2023).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7); 1 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1.6. It bears USCA11
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Jensen v. Pinellas Cnty., 198 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 2864, 2016 WL 746442

069, as it may be amended. (Ord. No. 99-6, § 7,1-26-99) Secs. 86-93-86-100. — Reserved.
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Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 160 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2699, 2015 WL 798849

meeting thereafter.” Commission Rules of Procedure, § 7.01 (k). The effect of the Commission’s approval of
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Café Erotica of Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty., 360 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...If the application is not approved or denied within the thirty-day period, the new Ordinance deems the sign permit to be denied. 8 use signs,” which include “political message signs.” 1. BILLBOARDS Part 7.01 regulates billboards. Billboards are limited to thirty-five feet in height, and can be as large as 378 square feet – or 560 square feet if located along the interstate. See LDC § 7.01.03(A)-(B)....
...“political copy intended to directly or indirectly promote a candidate or issue.” LDC § 12.01.00. Billboards are subject to greater restrictions than on-premise signs with regard to the number of billboards and their location. Compare LDC § 7.01.01(A) (restricting new billboards to designated locations, and stating that no increase in the total number of billboards shall be permitted “unless fully compliant with this Code”) with LDC § 7.02.01(A) (limiting on-premise ground signs to four per location, but placing no limits on the number of building signs such as marquee and canopy signs). Section 7.01.01(C) concerns severability of the billboard provisions....
...govern all non-commercial signs. Political message signs are limited by § 10 7.03.01(L) to between six and thirty-two square feet. Commercial signs and billboards, on the other hand, can be as large as 560 square feet. See LDC §§ 7.01.03(A), 7.05.01(A). III....
...containing a commercial message,” 19 But note that under Ordinance 99-51, “political message signs” can be no larger than thirty-two square feet, while billboards can be as large as 560 square feet. See LDC §§ 7.03.01(L), 7.01.03(A). 24 which by its terms encapsulates all signs carrying a non-commercial message, and then restricts such signs to sizes far below that allowed for billboards....
...d group or series excludes another left unmentioned.” See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)). Third, the County’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with LDC § 7.01.03(G), which states, “[a]ll billboards ....
...certain highways. A review of Café Erotica’s billboards reveals that this display requirement means that the corporation’s complete legal name must prominently 26 appear on the billboard facing. See LDC §§ 7.01.04(A), 7.01.04(E)6....
...John’s County ordinance does the former, but agree that it does the latter. On the first point, the plain text of the St. John’s ordinance permits both commercial and political messages on billboards, which can be as large as 560 square feet. Section 7.01.03 regulates the size of billboards and contains no reference to the content....
...ted for 42 billboards. The most natural reading of the ordinance, however, leads to a different interpretation. Billboards, as large as 560 square feet, may contain political or commercial messages under § 7.01.03....
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Atl. Marine Florida, LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co., 775 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2014).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2014 WL 7331580, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24415

...GPA’s negligent design of the bulkhead door. Rather, American Home, for AMI, settled with Beverly prior to trial. argument was meritless. The phrase “liability imposed by law” does not mean “the law of contract.” See Ostrager & Newman § 7.01 (“The phrase ....
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Atl. Marine Florida, LLC v. Evanston Ins. Co. (11th Cir. 2014).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

...GPA’s negligent design of the bulkhead door. Rather, American Home, for AMI, settled with Beverly prior to trial. argument was meritless. The phrase “liability imposed by law” does not mean “the law of contract.” See Ostrager & Newman § 7.01 (“The phrase ....
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In Re: Jud. Circuit Assessment (Fla. 2023).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida

of the Court, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice § 7:1 (2023 ed.). 11 Art. V, §§ 1, 5(a), Fla. Const.
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Cullum v. Packo, 947 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 21349, 2006 WL 3740785

not cured within ten (10) days as required by Section 7.01 of the lease. Further, the trial court found
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Langston ex rel. Langston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380 (11th Cir. 1989).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

F.2d 1361, 1367 n. 5 (11th Cir.1983); Ala.Code § 7-1-203 (1984).9 The registration materials provided
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Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Venequip Mach. Sales Corp. (11th Cir. 2025).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Argued: Jul 25, 2025

the Court 23-14237 A § 7.01(a)–(b), Dkt. No. 1-3. Default would also occur
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Ago (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1974).

Published | Florida Attorney General Reports

executive director of the department; and under section 7(1) of the act [s. 943.09], they have the duty to
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James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Dep't of Bus. Reg., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 530 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 2008, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 3855, 1988 WL 89498

concur. . The relevant Indiana statutes are section 7.1-4-4-1, Indiana Code Annotated, exacting a 27-cent
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& SC14-1056 The Florida Bar v. Robert D. Adams & The Florida Bar v. Adam Robert Filthaut, 198 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2016).

Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2016 WL 4493453

Duties Owed as a Professional Pursuant to section 7.1, disbarment is appropriate when “a lawyer intentionally
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Ago (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1998).

Published | Florida Attorney General Reports

5(1) and (2), Ch. 80-603, Laws of Florida. 3 Section 7(1), Chapter 80-603, Laws of Florida. 4 Section
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Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 485 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2007).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9577, 2007 WL 1225343

seq.; the Georgia Check Cashing Statute, O.C.G.A. § 7-1-700, et seq.; and the Georgia Racketeer Influenced
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City of Miami Beach v. Breitbart, 358 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 15884

Approval of site plan shall be in accordance with Section 7-1, D, as applied to conditional uses.”
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Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. R. Charles Loudermilk, Sr., 887 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2018).

Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

question in the negative, holding that O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490(a) authorizes ordinary negligence claims against
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Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Capri of Palm Beach, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1996).

Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10878, 1996 WL 429001

first class registered mail.” See ’93 Policy, Section 7(1) (emphasis added). The Court thus must look to
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Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners v. Wilson, 382 So. 2d 431 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).

Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 16389

petition needed to activate the provisions of Section 7.01(4) of the Home Rule Charter which required the

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