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Florida Statute 106.25 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 106.25 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title IX
ELECTORS AND ELECTIONS
Chapter 106
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 106.25
106.25 Reports of alleged violations to Florida Elections Commission; disposition of findings.
(1) Jurisdiction to investigate and determine violations of this chapter and chapter 104 is vested in the Florida Elections Commission; however, nothing in this section limits the jurisdiction of any other officers or agencies of government empowered by law to investigate, act upon, or dispose of alleged violations of this code.
(2) The commission shall investigate all violations of this chapter and chapter 104, but only after having received either a sworn complaint or information reported to it under this subsection by the Division of Elections. Such sworn complaint must be based upon personal information or information other than hearsay. Any person, other than the division, having information of any violation of this chapter or chapter 104 shall file a sworn complaint with the commission. The commission shall investigate only those alleged violations specifically contained within the sworn complaint. If any complainant fails to allege all violations that arise from the facts or allegations alleged in a complaint, the commission shall be barred from investigating a subsequent complaint from such complainant that is based upon such facts or allegations that were raised or could have been raised in the first complaint. If the complaint includes allegations of violations relating to expense items reimbursed by a candidate, committee, or organization to the campaign account before a sworn complaint is filed, the commission shall be barred from investigating such allegations. Such sworn complaint shall state whether a complaint of the same violation has been made to any state attorney. Within 5 days after receipt of a sworn complaint, the commission shall transmit a copy of the complaint to the alleged violator. The respondent shall have 14 days after receipt of the complaint to file an initial response, and the executive director may not determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint during that time period. If the executive director finds that the complaint is legally sufficient, the respondent shall be notified of such finding by letter, which sets forth the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated and the alleged factual basis that supports the finding. All sworn complaints alleging violations of the Florida Election Code over which the commission has jurisdiction shall be filed with the commission within 2 years after the alleged violations. The period of limitations is tolled on the day a sworn complaint is filed with the commission. The complainant may withdraw the sworn complaint at any time prior to a probable cause hearing if good cause is shown. Withdrawal shall be requested in writing, signed by the complainant, and witnessed by a notary public, stating the facts and circumstances constituting good cause. The executive director shall prepare a written recommendation regarding disposition of the request which shall be given to the commission together with the request. “Good cause” shall be determined based upon the legal sufficiency or insufficiency of the complaint to allege a violation and the reasons given by the complainant for wishing to withdraw the complaint. If withdrawal is permitted, the commission must close the investigation and the case. No further action may be taken. The complaint will become a public record at the time of withdrawal.
(3) For the purposes of commission jurisdiction, a violation shall mean the willful performance of an act prohibited by this chapter or chapter 104 or the willful failure to perform an act required by this chapter or chapter 104. The commission may not by rule determine what constitutes willfulness or further define the term “willful” for purposes of this chapter or chapter 104. Willfulness is a determination of fact; however, at the request of the respondent at any time after probable cause is found, willfulness may be considered and determined in an informal hearing before the commission.
(4) The commission shall undertake a preliminary investigation to determine if the facts alleged in a sworn complaint or a matter initiated by the division constitute probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred.
(a) When the investigator’s report is completed, the executive director shall notify the respondent that the report is completed and shall send to the respondent a copy of the investigator’s report. The investigatory file and main complaint file shall be open for inspection by the respondent and the respondent’s counsel at that time, and copies may be obtained at no more than cost.
(b) The respondent shall be given not less than 14 days from the date of mailing of the investigator’s report to file with the commission a written response to the investigator’s report. This time period may be shortened with the consent of the respondent, or without the consent of the respondent when the passage of time could reasonably be expected to render moot the ultimate disposition of the matter by the commission so long as reasonable notice under the circumstances is given.
(c) Counsel for the commission shall review the investigator’s report and shall make a written recommendation to the commission for the disposition of the complaint. If the counsel for the commission recommends that the commission find probable cause, the recommendation shall include a statement of what charges shall be at issue. A copy of the recommendation shall be furnished to the respondent. The respondent shall be given not less than 14 days from the date of mailing of the recommendation of counsel for the commission to file with the commission a written response to the recommendation. This time period may be shortened with the consent of the respondent, or without the consent of the respondent when the passage of time could reasonably be expected to render moot the ultimate disposition of the matter by the commission, so long as the recommendation is furnished to the respondent within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances.
(d) The respondent and each complainant, their counsel, and the counsel for the commission shall be permitted to attend the hearing at which the probable cause determination is made. Notice of the hearing shall be sent to the respondent, each complainant, and counsel for the commission at least 14 days before the hearing. This time period may be shortened with the consent of the respondent, or without the consent of the respondent when the passage of time could reasonably be expected to render moot the ultimate disposition of the matter by the commission, so long as the notice is furnished within a reasonable period of time under the circumstances.
(e) The probable cause determination is the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. The respondent and the counsel for the commission shall be permitted to make brief oral statements in the nature of oral argument to the commission, based on the investigator’s report, before the probable cause determination. The commission’s determination shall be based upon the investigator’s report, the recommendation of counsel for the commission, the complaint, and staff recommendations, as well as any written statements submitted by the respondent and any oral statements made at the hearing. No testimony or other evidence will be accepted at the hearing.
(f) At its meeting to determine probable cause, the commission may continue its determination to allow further investigation; may order the issuance of a public report of its investigation if it finds no probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this chapter or chapter 104, concluding the matter before it; may order a final, public hearing of the complaint if it finds probable cause to believe that there has been a violation of this chapter or chapter 104; or may take such other action as it deems necessary to resolve the complaint, consistent with due process of law. In making its determination, the commission may consider:
1. The sufficiency of the evidence against the respondent, as contained in the investigator’s report;
2. The admissions and other stipulations of the respondent, if any;
3. The nature and circumstances of the respondent’s actions;
4. The expense of further proceedings; and
5. Such other factors as it deems material to its decision.

If the commission finds probable cause, the commission shall determine what charges shall be at issue.

(g) If no probable cause is found, the commission shall dismiss the case and the case shall become a matter of public record, except as otherwise provided in this section, together with a written statement of the findings of the preliminary investigation and a summary of the facts which the commission shall send to the complainant and the alleged violator. A finding of no probable cause by the commission is a full adjudication of all such matters. The commission may not charge a respondent in a subsequent complaint alleging violations based upon the same actions, nonactions, or circumstances wherein the commission found no probable cause.
(h) If probable cause is found, the commission shall so notify the complainant and the alleged violator in writing. All documents made or received in the disposition of the complaint shall become public records upon a finding by the commission.
(i)1. Upon a commission finding of probable cause, the counsel for the commission shall attempt to reach a consent agreement with the respondent. At any time, the commission may enter into a consent order with a respondent without requiring the respondent to admit to a violation of law within the jurisdiction of the commission.
2. A consent agreement is not binding upon either party unless and until it is signed by the respondent and by counsel for the commission upon approval by the commission.
3. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the commission from entering into a consent agreement with a respondent prior to a commission finding of probable cause if a respondent indicates in writing a desire to enter into negotiations directed towards reaching such a consent agreement. Any consent agreement reached under this subparagraph is subject to the provisions of subparagraph 2. and shall have the same force and effect as a consent agreement reached after the commission finding of probable cause.
(j) If a consent agreement is reached between the commission and the respondent, counsel for the commission shall send a copy of the signed agreement to both complainant and respondent.

In a case where probable cause is found, the commission shall make a preliminary determination to consider the matter or to refer the matter to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, the commission may, at its discretion, dismiss any complaint at any stage of disposition if it determines that the public interest would not be served by proceeding further, in which case the commission shall issue a public report stating with particularity its reasons for the dismissal.

(5) A person alleged by the Elections Commission to have committed a violation of this chapter or chapter 104 may elect, as a matter of right, within 30 days after the date of the filing of the commission’s allegations, to have a formal administrative hearing conducted by an administrative law judge in the Division of Administrative Hearings. The administrative law judge in such proceedings shall enter a final order, which may include the imposition of civil penalties, subject to appeal as provided in s. 120.68. If the person does not elect to have a hearing by an administrative law judge and does not elect to resolve the complaint by a consent order, the person is entitled to a formal or informal hearing conducted before the commission.
(6) It is the duty of a state attorney receiving a complaint referred by the commission to investigate the complaint promptly and thoroughly; to undertake such criminal or civil actions as are justified by law; and to report to the commission the results of such investigation, the action taken, and the disposition thereof. The failure or refusal of a state attorney to prosecute or to initiate action upon a complaint or a referral by the commission shall not bar further action by the commission under this chapter.
(7) Every sworn complaint filed pursuant to this chapter with the commission, every investigation and investigative report or other paper of the commission with respect to a violation of this chapter or chapter 104, and every proceeding of the commission with respect to a violation of this chapter or chapter 104 is confidential, is exempt from the provisions of ss. 119.07(1) and 286.011, and is exempt from publication in the Florida Administrative Register of any notice or agenda with respect to any proceeding relating to such violation, except under the following circumstances:
(a) As provided in subsection (6);
(b) Upon a determination of probable cause or no probable cause by the commission; or
(c) For proceedings conducted with respect to appeals of fines levied by filing officers for the late filing of reports required by this chapter.

However, a complainant is not bound by the confidentiality provisions of this section. In addition, confidentiality may be waived in writing by the person against whom the complaint has been filed or the investigation has been initiated. If a finding of probable cause in a case is entered within 30 days prior to the date of the election with respect to which the alleged violation occurred, such finding and the proceedings and records relating to such case shall not become public until noon of the day following such election. When two or more persons are being investigated by the commission with respect to an alleged violation of this chapter or chapter 104, the commission may not publicly enter a finding of probable cause or no probable cause in the case until a finding of probable cause or no probable cause for the entire case has been determined. However, once the confidentiality of any case has been breached, the person or persons under investigation have the right to waive the confidentiality of the case, thereby opening up the proceedings and records to the public. Any person who discloses any information or matter made confidential by the provisions of this subsection commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(8) Any person who files a complaint pursuant to this section while knowing that the allegations contained in such complaint are false or without merit commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
(9) The commission shall maintain a database of all final orders and agency actions. Such database shall be available to the public and shall be maintained in such a manner as to be searchable, at a minimum, by issue, statutes, individuals, or entities referenced.
History.s. 25, ch. 73-128; s. 11, ch. 74-200; s. 60, ch. 77-175; s. 3, ch. 78-403; s. 1, ch. 82-46; s. 2, ch. 83-265; s. 39, ch. 84-302; s. 20, ch. 89-256; ss. 5, 14, 15, ch. 90-338; s. 21, ch. 90-360; s. 18, ch. 91-107; s. 5, ch. 91-429; s. 26, ch. 96-406; s. 49, ch. 97-13; s. 34, ch. 98-129; s. 21, ch. 2004-252; s. 48, ch. 2007-30; s. 16, ch. 2010-167; s. 70, ch. 2011-40; s. 1, ch. 2013-14.

F.S. 106.25 on Google Scholar

F.S. 106.25 on Casetext

Amendments to 106.25


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 106.25
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S106.25 7 - INVADE PRIVACY - DISCLOSE CONFIDENTIAL ELECTION INFORMATION - M: F
S106.25 8 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - FILE FALSE ALLEGATION CAMPAIGN FINANCE MATTERS - M: F



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

BLOCH, v. DEL REY,, 208 So. 3d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See section 106.25, Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .

TOWBIN s v. ANTONACCI, s, 287 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 106.25(7) and as work product. . . . Defendants contend that they cannot produce the documents Plaintiffs seek because § 106.25(7) mandates . . . Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ attempt to apply the state-created privilege delineated in § 106.25 . . . Defendants, in turn, reiterate their position that § 106.25(7) is analogous to 11 CFR § 111.21, and, . . . Stat. § 106.25(7) would be inappropriate. . . . . § 106.25(7). James Kellogg Green, West Palm Beach, FL, Randall C. . . .

FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, v. L. BLAIR,, 52 So. 3d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The Commission has jurisdiction to investigate and determine violations of chapter 106. § 106.25(1), . . . The Commission is required to investigate alleged violations upon receipt of a sworn complaint. § 106.25 . . . This necessarily requires the Commission to interpret and apply the term “willful” because section 106.25 . . . Here, the law being implemented by rule 2B-1.002 is section 106.25(3), which provides: For the purposes . . . In any event, we see no inconsistency between the language in section 106.25(3) and the adoption of a . . .

FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, v. B. DAVIS,, 44 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . 2007-30, section 48, Laws of Florida, the Florida Elections Commission had the option under section 106.25 . . . The amendment to section 106.25(5) that chapter 2007-30, section 48 enacted changed this procedure without . . . As provided by section 106.25(5), the present case ended up at the Division of Administrative Hearings . . . conducted by an administrative law judge in the Division of Admin- istrative Hearings” take place. § 106.25 . . . odds with the statutory directive that the administrative law judge “shall enter a final order.” § 106.25 . . .

FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION, v. VALLIERE A., 45 So. 3d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Appellees argue for a narrow construction of the term “hearsay” in section 106.25(2), Florida Statutes . . . Appellees contend that, as used in section 106.25(2), the term “hearsay” is defined by the evidence code . . . The administrative law judge rejected appellees’ narrow reading of section 106.25(2). . . . Reading the section 90.801 definition of “hearsay” into section 106.25(2) would lead to an absurd result . . . the technical definition of “hearsay” in the evidence code, the legislature used the term in section 106.25 . . .

S. BROWNING, v. FLORIDA HOMETOWN DEMOCRACY, INC. PAC,, 29 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. 2010)

. . . to investigate and prosecute any criminal offense “involving ... issue petition activities”; section 106.25 . . . Florida Elections Commission with concurrent authority to investigate violations of chapter 104; section 106.25 . . .

Dr. C. SNIPES, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 19 So. 3d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 106.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .

MENTER, v. J. ASTRUE,, 572 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D.N.J. 2008)

. . . Social Security case is “somewhere in the neighborhood of forty hours” but held that a reduction from 106.25 . . . The Gillem Court held that 106.25 attorney and paralegal hours were excessive. See id. at 1-2. . . .

In BRODOWSKI,, 391 B.R. 393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)

. . . The cash price of the 2006 car was $20,450.00, plus sales tax of $106.25. [Ex. A.] 4. . . .

DAY, v. STATE, 977 So. 2d 664 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The first appears in section 106.25(6), where there is a reference to “criminal or civil actions.” . . .

WISE v. W. KELLY,, 620 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . II.A.4(b)) -$ 106.25 (MB) -$ 60.00 (KR) -$ 390.00 (JMS) -$ 300.00 (AM) Travel (See Sec. . . .

JENNINGS, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 932 So. 2d 609 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . the hearing but before the ALJ issued a recommended order, the Florida Legislature amended section 106.25 . . . Jennings contends the 2004 amendment to section 106.25(2) should be applied to bar counts 27 through . . . The 2004 version of section 106.25(2), as amended by chapter 2004-252, section 21, Laws of Florida, reads . . .

J. FUGATE, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 924 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 106.25(3), Fla. . . . because the Commission is charged with enforcing both Chapters 104 and 106 and because it is section 106.25 . . .

DIAZ PORTILLA, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 857 So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See §§ 106.25(3), 106.265(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . Id. §§ 106.19, 106.25(3), 106.265(1). . . . violation must be willful is not explicitly stated in subsection 106.265(1), but derives from subsection 106.25 . . .

J. CONNOR, v. A. ULRICH, a, 153 F. Supp. 2d 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . .: 106.25 hours at $250 per hour = $26,562.50 Felice J. . . .

In J. SHOEN In P. In In In J. M. AMERCO, v. W. M. a k a M. a k a In J. P. W. M. a k a M. a k a v. J. M. AMERCO,, 176 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999)

. . . plan, then the bankruptcy estates (net of exempt assets) are solvent in the approximate amount of $106.25 . . .

In J. SHOEN In P. In In In J. M. AMERCO, v. W. M. a k a M. a k a In J. P. W. M. a k a M. a k a v. J. M. AMERCO,, 176 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999)

. . . plan, then the bankruptcy estates (net of exempt assets) are solvent in the approximate amount of $106.25 . . .

ABOU- KHADRA, v. G. BSEIRANI, AGB G. BSEIRANI, AGB v. T. MAHSHIE,, 971 F. Supp. 710 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)

. . . 8.25 488 496.25 1988 1.25 0 415.25 416.5 1987 41.25 29.75 655.5 726.5 1986 3.75 0 207.25 210.95 1985 106.25 . . . 3 $ 60.00 $ 180.00 Mackey 33 $ 60.00 $ 1,980.00 LAW CLERK: Fitz 0.5 $ 25.00 $ 6.25 3.25 1985 Hours: 106.25 . . .

McMAHAN COMPANY Co. v. WHEREHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, INC. A. A. T. O K. E. D. WEI WEI, 65 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . attempted to tender their Debentures to Wherehouse following the merger, seeking a redemption price of 106.25% . . . contend that determining damages in this case is a simple task — upon a merger, they are entitled to 106.25% . . .

MCMAHAN COMPANY, Co. v. WHEREHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, INC. A. A. T. O K. E. D. THOMPSON, v. WHEREHOUSE ENTERTAINMENT, INC. A. A. T. O K. E. D., 859 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . Where-house and Trustee Bank of America, provides debentureholders with a right to tender their debentures at 106.25% . . . attempted to tender their Debentures to Wherehouse following this merger, seeking a redemption price of 106.25% . . .

M. SPICER, v. CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE, INC., 844 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1993)

. . . Gennelly, who is billed at an hourly rate of $200.00, spent 106.25 hours on this case, for a lodestar . . .

R. CULLEN, v. A. CHEAL F. Jr., 586 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Section 106.25 vests the enforcement power for chapter 106 in the Division of Elections and the Florida . . . government empowered by law to investigate, act upon, or dispose of alleged violations of this code.” § 106.25 . . . (Supp.1990); see id. § 106.25(5) (duty of state attorney, inter alia, “to investigate the complaint [ . . .

C. BEISSWENGER J. v. OMICRON CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., 552 So. 2d 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . been expended by the attorneys for the Counter-Plaintiff was reasonable, and the rates of $125 for 106.25 . . .

SIERRA CLUB, v. L. MARSH, Jr. SIERRA CLUB, v. H. DOLE,, 639 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Me. 1986)

. . . Accordingly, plaintiff requests rates of $106.25 per hour for Messrs. . . .

FORMULA, v. M. HECKLER,, 779 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

. . . In addition, § 106.20 (21 CFR 106.20) requires ingredient composition review, § 106.25 (21 CFR 106.25 . . . Id. § 106.25(a). . . . Id. § 106.25(b)(3), (4). . . . With regard to the six “exempted” ingredients identified in § 21 C.F.R. § 106.25(a)(4) (1984), the FDA . . . In addition, § 106.20 [21 CFR 106.20] requires ingredient composition review, § 106.25 [21 CFR 106.25 . . .

FORMULA, v. M. HECKLER,, 250 U.S. App. D.C. 353 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

. . . In addition, § 106.20 (21 CFR 106.20) requires ingredient composition review, § 106.25 (21 CFR 106.25 . . . Id. § 106.25(a). . . . Id. § 106.25(b)(3), (4). . . . With regard to the six “exempted” ingredients identified in § 21 C.F.R. § 106.25(a)(4) (1984), the FDA . . . In addition, § 106.20 [21 CFR 106.20] requires ingredient composition review, § 106.25 [21 CFR 106.25 . . .

In ENERGY COOPERATIVE, INC., 55 B.R. 957 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985)

. . . allowed an additional $63,096 in fees and $3,207.49 in expenses, and H & H was allowed an additional $10,-106.25 . . .

STATE By STATE ATTORNEY FOR TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, v. GENERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a, 448 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . See §§ 106.25(4)(a); 161.071; 206.07; 206.22; 207.022; 253.05; 402.17(5); 501.052; 526.10; 542.15; 585.36 . . .

TRUSTEES OF TROWEL TRADES EMPLOYEES HEALTH AND WELFARE TRUST FUND, v. E. DeANGELIS AND SON,, 562 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Fla. 1983)

. . . Plaintiffs recover of the Defendant the sum of $7,222.37, with interest as provided by law, and costs of $106.25 . . .

In FINE PAPER ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983)

. . . The total number of hours claimed for these attorneys is 106.25 and would result in a total award of . . .

VULCAN SOCIETY OF WESTCHESTER COUNTY, INC. v. FIRE DEPARTMENT OF CITY OF WHITE PLAINS, 533 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)

. . . The total hours expended were 106.25 (Hiller, 58.75 hours; Teitelbaum, 24.25 hours; Berner, 23.25 hours . . .

THE FLORIDA COMPANIES v. CITY OF TARPON SPRINGS, 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 152 (Pinellas Cty. Cir. Ct. 1981)

. . . Stat. 106.25; Fla. Stat. 905.917(1). . . .

W. ZIMMERMAN, v. FLORIDA ELECTIONS COMMISSION,, 373 So. 2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)

. . . The Commission replies that the hearing authorized by Section 106.25(3), Florida Statutes (1975), was . . . Section 106.25(2), Fla. Stat. (1975). . . . Section 106.25(1), Fla.Stat. (1975). . . . Section 106.25(3), Fla.Stat. (1975). . . . See Sections 106.25(4)(a), (b), 106.26, 106.265, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . . .

B. SCHWARTZ v. NMS INDUSTRIES, INC., 575 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1978)

. . . opinion, the trial court set forth the defendant’s calculations that plaintiffs would have received $57,-106.25 . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, v. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR COMPANY, F. D. H. H. M. O. P. O L. B., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

. . . The price on April 17, 1964, was $119,-106.25, and Darke will be directed to pay the difference of $48,404.58 . . .

M. HODGES, v. J. CELEBREZZE,, 232 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Ark. 1964)

. . . per bale, and I paid him $106.25 for baling hay. . . .

P. ELLIOTT, Jr. v. W. M. CABEEN, d b a W. M., 224 F. Supp. 50 (D. Colo. 1963)

. . . Associates in the capacity of a land secretary for which services she receives the approximate sum of $106.25 . . .

L. STRAWDER, W. R. Jr. A. W. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 277 F.2d 753 (5th Cir. 1960)

. . . The Tax Court found that $78,-106.25 lay-offs were actually made in addition to those allowed as a deduction . . .

EVANS PRODUCTION CORPORATION, v. J. SHAW, J. SHAW, v. EVANS PRODUCTION CORPORATION,, 276 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1960)

. . . subsequent date The price to be paid by Shaw in the original purchase was specified in the agreement at $106.25 . . . Corporation Common Stock (hereinafter referred to as ‘stock’) at its book value March 31, 1953 or $106.25 . . .

EGAN, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956)

. . . ........... 54,549.84 20,538.00 38,000.00 Accounts Payable, Debtor Balance.. 3,360.58 470.94 450.00 106.25 . . .

SQUIRES v. THE IONIAN LEADER, 100 F. Supp. 829 (D.N.J. 1951)

. . . Anderson 106.25 Joe Liverman 76.25 Edwin McDonough 150.00 James H. Stevenson 88.75 William F. . . .

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. CENTRAL- ILLINOIS SECURITIES CORP., 338 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1949)

. . . The fair investment values of the preferred, in view of the redemption privilege, were: $5 series— $106.25 . . . Engineers, in its brief before the Commission, conceded that “these amounts ($106.25, $111.38, $111.50 . . .

CALDWELL v. HAZELTON APARTMENT HOTEL CORPORATION, 88 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1949)

. . . Davidson 106.25 hi Michael A. Drobnek 195.00 IV Mrs. F. C. . . . Greve 106.25 V Harry Hicks 99.37 VI Mrs. lone Killoren 131.74 VII Mata Kotchy 101.29 VIII James Mazzo . . .

FOREIGN TRADE MANAGEMENT CO. v. UNITED STATES, 74 F. Supp. 552 (Ct. Cl. 1947)

. . . Order M-63 did apply to it, both of these companies withdrew their offers and refused to pay more than $106.25 . . . had been in communication with the Commodity Credit Corporation and that this corporation would pay $106.25 . . . This had the effect of limiting the selling price to $106.25. . . . plaintiff was compelled to acquiesce in the sale of its copra to the Commodity Credit Corporation for $106.25 . . .

FOREIGN TRADE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC. v. THE UNITED STATES, 109 Ct. Cl. 587 (Ct. Cl. 1947)

. . . M-63 did apply to it, both of these companies withdrew their offers and refused to. pay more than $106.25 . . . had been in communication with the Commodity Credit Corporation and that this corporation would pay $106.25 . . . This had the effect of limiting the selling price to $106.25. . . . plaintiff was compelled to acquiesce in the sale of its copra to the Commodity Credit Corporation for $106.25 . . .

v., 9 T.C. 195 (T.C. 1947)

. . . 4½%- 225.00 City of Philadelphia 4%_ 600.00 County of Crawford 4½%_ 85.00 County of Allegheny 4⅛%_ 106.25 . . .

WALLING, v. PEAVY- WILSON LUMBER CO., 49 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1943)

. . . The 85-KW unit has an internal capacity of 106.25 KVA, i.e., 25% more than its external capacity of 85 . . .

GENERAL WAYNE INN, v. ROTHENSIES,, 47 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Pa. 1942)

. . . between Roberts and the plaintiff the orchestra was to play five nights a week for the weekly sum of $106.25 . . .

B. v. E., 148 Fla. 264 (Fla. 1941)

. . . payment upon said decree since April 29, 1941, save that he delivered on May 4, 1941, a check for $106.25 . . .

In G. C. H. v. W. J. As G., 128 Fla. 151 (Fla. 1937)

. . . Duffy, attorney, and Helen Morehead Layne 106.25 26 John C. Duffy and Clarence G. . . . Morehead 106.25 29 S. Y. Trimble, Trustee 2500.00 30 R. A- Craft, Circuit Clerk 41.17 31 Mrs. . . .

INGRAHAM v. NATIONAL SALT CO., 130 F. 676 (2d Cir. 1904)

. . . shares of its preferred stock and 1)4 shares of its common stock, and also a money consideration of $106.25 . . . avers as follows: “That, whereas said alleged agreements in writing provided for the cash payment of $106.25 . . . United Salt Company ; that said guaranty extends over a period of five years, and until the sum of $106.25 . . .

NATIONAL SALT CO. v. INGRAHAM, 122 F. 40 (2d Cir. 1903)

. . . thereto the National Company agreed to pay for each share of stock of the United Salt Company the sum of $106.25 . . . The aggregate is $106.25 — the amount of cash the National Company agreed to pay in.semiannual installments . . .

, 45 F. 62 (D. Or. 1891)

. . . Woods, seaman, $100; Elijah Roberts, seaman, $65; James Sample, seaman, $92; Edgar Matthieu, seaman, $106.25 . . .