Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...d approve the result of the Third District decision in Kasischke and disapprove the Second District's decision in Taylor to the extent it interprets section 948.03(5)(a)(7) as not imposing a blanket ban. NOTES [1] This statute has been renumbered as section 948.30(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2007) ("Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stim...

...what "telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services" are "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern." [9] In 2004, the Legislature transferred the language contained in the 1999 version of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) to section 948.30(1)(g), Florida Statutes. See ch. 2004-373, § 18, at 2826-27, Laws of Fla. In 2005, the Legislature amended section 948.30(1)(g) by adding "accessing" to the total prohibition against convicted sexual offenders "viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material." Ch. 2005-67, § 4, at 467, Laws of Fla.; § 948.30(1)(g), Fla....

...See, e.g., Simmons, 343 F.3d at 82 ("When the references to minors are omitted [from 18 U.S.C. § 2256], what remains is the definition of the broader category of pornography[.]"). A similar cabining of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999), and sections 948.30(1)(g), and 947.1405(7)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (2007), is possible through selective reference to the definitions contained in section 847.001, Florida Statutes....

...rrections, be placed on Electronic Monitoring. However, for offenses committed on or after September 1, 2005, if you are placed on community control or probation, you shall be placed on electronic monitoring if you meet the conditions set forth in F.S. 948.30(3)....

...g need for trial court flexibility. We therefore hold that the reasoning of Lawson applies. B. Sex Offender Treatment To decide whether the reasoning of Lawson applies to the context of sex offender treatment, we must review the applicable statutes. Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2007), requires the imposition of mandatory standard conditions of probation for certain sex offenders. The condition at issue here — "[a]ctive participation in and successful completion of a sex offender treatment program" — is one such condition. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla....

...to specify time parameters for completion at the time of sentencing."). We agree. Sex offender treatment, like drug treatment, focuses on "rehabilitation pursuant to an individualized treatment plan." Lawson, 969 So.2d at 232; see §§ 948.001(10), 948.30(1)(c), 948.31, Fla....

...In sentencing appellant for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court treated appellant as a youthful offender, imposing a sentence of 364 days in prison, anger management, and five years of sex offender probation pursuant to sections 948.30 and 948.31, Florida Statutes (2005). This was error, as aggravated assault is not one of the enumerated felonies for which those statutory provisions are imposed. See § 948.30(1), Fla....

...Grosso appealed the modified sentence. "`The legality of a sentence is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.'" Stoute v. State, 915 So.2d 1245, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting Flowers v. State, 899 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the trial court was required to impose electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation because of Grosso's prior convictions for violations of Chapter 794 and Section 800.04, Florida Statutes, and his new offense. See § 948.30(3)....

...o years of probation with a special condition that he continue to register as required. On July 28, 2006, pursuant to a Department of Corrections request, the trial court re-visited the issue of the mandatory-monitoring sentencing requirements under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006). Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), [1] the trial court is required to impose mandatory electronic monitoring *798 as a condition of probation for defendants previously convicted of unlawful sexual activity involving a victim fifteen years of age or younger where the offender is eighteen years of age or older....

...The defendant had previously been convicted of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under the age of twelve, see § 800.04, Fla. Stat. (1990), and sexual battery on a minor under twelve years of age. See § 794.011, Fla. Stat. (1990). On August 18, 2006, pursuant to section 948.30, the trial court imposed G.P.S....

...645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947)(re-sentencing that imposes more severe sentence to correct omitted mandatory penalty does not violate double jeopardy clause)); see also Oce v. State, 795 So.2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)(Cope, J., concurring). Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006) provides in pertinent part: 948.30....

...The Department argues that by issuing this order the court encroached upon the Legislature's authority to appropriate state funds through duly enacted statutes [1] because under current law, sex offenders are required to pay for such treatment and there is no provision authorizing the Department to pay for an interpreter. Section 948.30(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2004) provides as a standard condition of probation for sexual offenders, the "active participation in and successful completion of a sex offender treatment program with therapists specially trained to treat sex offenders, at the probationer's ....

...The parameters of sexual offender probation are statutorily defined as a form of intensive supervision with an individualized treatment plan. See § 948.001(7), Fla. Stat. (2004). The critical component of sexual offender probation is the active participation and completion of a sexual offender treatment program. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla....

...Webster, Longwood, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. The State of Florida appeals an order modifying a condition of Thomas Springer's sex offender probation. The State contends that the trial court was without authority to modify the statutorily mandated condition set forth in section 948.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), requiring the trial court to prohibit any sex offender on probation from living within 1,000 feet of a playground or other place where children congregate....

...Accordingly, we treat this matter as a petition for writ of certiorari and grant the petition. Mr. Springer pled no contest to various sex offenses, was designated a sexual offender, and placed on consecutive terms of sex offender probation. As required by section 948.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), included in the conditions of his probation was a condition prohibiting him "from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate, as prescribed by the court." Unfortunately, Mr....

...Springer's motion, allowing him to live 865 feet from the playground so long as he did not enter any portion of the subdivision and its recreation area. This proceeding followed. The State asserts that the trial court did not have the authority to modify the residence restriction as section 948.30(1)(b) prohibits a sex offender on probation from living within 1,000 feet of a playground or similar facility. We agree. In its order granting the modification, the trial court determined that it had authority to modify Mr. Springer's conditions of probation, reasoning: 11. The State asserts that the Court does not have the authority to modify a F.S. § 948.30 sex offender probation condition in any respect. 12. Florida Statute 948.03(2) provides in pertinent part that "The Court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and condition theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer." That language existed in § 948.03 at the time § 948.30 was promulgated....

...United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2056, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.)[.] The State urges such an interpretation by asserting that the use of the word "must" in § 948.30(1) prohibits the Court from modifying any of the sex offender probation conditions as authorized by § 948.03(2)....

...Based upon standard American English rules of punctuation this phrase, when set off by a comma, applies to all of the preceding listed subordinate clauses. One of the definitions of "prescribed" in Webster's New World Dictionary is "to set down or imposed rules." 15. Thus, § 948.30(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, when read giving meaning to the afore cited clause provides that the Court may impose rules or conditions applicable to any of the proscribed places within the 1,000 ft buffer....

...As a general proposition, a trial court has authority to modify or rescind the terms or conditions of probation imposed by it. § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); [1] see, e.g., Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061 (Fla.1994). However, that discretion is not unlimited. Section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2006), mandates that for probationers who committed certain specified sex-based crimes after October 1, 1995, "the court must impose [certain] conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed." One of the legislative mandates is that the trial court prohibit any probationer from living within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park or playground, or any other place where children regularly congregate. [2] § 948.30(1)(b), *273 Fla. Stat. (2006). As this condition is mandatory for individuals convicted of Mr. Springer's offenses, we conclude that the trial court was not authorized to modify or delete it. § 948.30(1)(b), Fla....

...PETITION GRANTED, ORDER QUASHED. MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This section formerly appeared in section 948.03(6), Florida Statutes (2004). The statute was rewritten, effective July 1, 2004. See Ch. 2004-373, §§ 14-25, Laws of Fla. [2] Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004). The statute was relocated and renumbered effective July 1, 2004. See Ch. 2004-373, § 18, Laws of Fla. This section now provides in pertinent part: 948.30....

...ken belief that it was required to include sex offender probation for the crimes at issue. 980 So.2d at 1109 . As our supreme court has since explained, “[in Sturges ], the sex offender probation conditions had been imposed mandatorily pursuant to section 948.30” in a situation where they were not mandatory....

...In order to satisfy due process and provide adequate notice to the defendant, “the trial court must orally pronounce any special condition at sentencing.” Id. “Sex offender probation” is a term of art describing certain conditions of probation that must be applied pursuant to statute in certain instances. See § 948.30, Fla....

...On July 6, 2006, the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to two years of probation with a special condition that he continue to register as required. On August 18, 2006, the trial court imposed electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of the defendant's probation pursuant to section 948.30....

...Joseph Lewis Blue appeals the imposition of the electronic monitoring resulting from a modification of the terms of his probation sentence from a violation of probation. The issue before us is whether the trial court made the requisite statutory findings under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2008), when it imposed electronic monitoring as a condition of probation....

...Thereafter, the trial court imposed electronic monitoring as a modification to Blue's condition of the reinstated probation. The record is unclear whether the trial court believed that the JLA (section 948.063, Florida Statutes (2008)) applied to Blue's sentence or whether the court relied upon section 948.30(2), Florida Statutes (2008), as a statutory basis to impose electronic monitoring....

...Blue first argues that the trial court erred because in response to the State's suggestion that the JLA applied, the court—believing that electronic monitoring was mandatory—modified Blue's probation to include that condition. Next, while conceding that electronic monitoring could be applied under section 948.30, Florida Statutes, such condition could be applied only when deemed necessary by the "probation officer and his or her supervisor, and ordered by the court at the recommendation of the Department of Corrections." § 948.30(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2008). The State counters that even assuming that Blue is correct that the JLA does not apply, the *360 trial court properly imposed electronic monitoring because the requirements were met under section 948.30(2)(e)....

...State, 68 So.3d 407, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (holding that applying the JLA to crimes committed before the effective date of the Act would constitute an ex post facto violation). While the trial court could have imposed electronic monitoring under section 948.30(2), it did not make the requisite findings that Blue's probation officer and his supervisor deemed electronic monitoring necessary, and that the Department of Corrections made such a recommendation. See § 948.30(2)(e)....

...State, 993 So.2d 998, 999-1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether electronic monitoring should be imposed after having made the requisite statutory determinations pursuant to section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes....

...Before RAMIREZ, CORTIÑAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. CORTIÑAS, J. The State of Florida ("State") seeks review of a trial court order denying its motion to modify appellee's ("defendant") probation to include mandatory electronic monitoring, pursuant to Section 948.30(3), Florida Statutes....

...The trial court suspended defendant's sentence as to count 2 and placed defendant on probation as to count 1. On May 15, 2007, the State filed a motion to modify probation stating that defendant met the statutory criteria for mandatory electronic monitoring, pursuant to § 948.30(3), because defendant had been previously designated a sexual predator on September 9, 1999, following his convictions for lewd and lascivious assault on a child and for sexual battery on a helpless victim. On May 30, 2007, the trial court denied the motion finding that it could not impose electronic monitoring on defendant because § 948.30(3) was limited to sexual offense cases....

...The court incorrectly concluded that mandatory electronic monitoring was limited to sexual offense cases and that, since defendant was convicted for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer, it could thus not impose on defendant mandatory electronic monitoring. Section 948.30(3) provides, in pertinent part: Effective for a probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after September 1, 2005, and who ... (b) Is designated a sexual predator pursuant to s. 775.21 ... the court must order, in addition to any other provision of this section, mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of the probation or community control supervision. Fla. Stat. § 948.30(3)(b) (2007) (emphasis added). Crime, as stated in § 948.30(3), is defined as a felony or misdemeanor....

...e officer, which he committed on September 6, 2005. Fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer is a second-degree felony under Section 316.1935(3), Florida Statutes. Defendant essentially argues that the phrase, "whose crime was committed," in § 948.30(3) only refers to defendants who commit sexual offenses. This argument is without merit, given that § 775.08(4) explicitly provides that "crime," as referenced in Florida law, means a felony or misdemeanor. See Fla. Stat. § 775.08(4). Therefore, defendant meets the initial requirements of § 948.30(3), since he committed a "crime" after September 1, 2005. See Fla. Stat. § 948.30(3)....

...victim, pursuant to Section 794.011, Florida Statutes. As a result of these convictions, defendant was designated a sexual predator, pursuant to Section 775.21, Florida Statutes. Therefore, defendant has met the clear and unambiguous requirements of § 948.30(3)(b), namely his current felony conviction and sexual predator status. By the plain language of § 948.30(3)(b), as applied to defendant, the trial court should have granted the State's motion to modify defendants probation to include mandatory electronic monitoring. See Fla. Stat. § 948.30(3)(b)....

...because, appellant asserts, there was “no evidence from which an association could be made between the underlying offenses ... and the sexually explicit materials in question.” Id. In Kasisehke, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted what is now section 948.30(1) (g), Florida Statutes (2011), 1 *1220 which prohibits sexual offenders serving probation or community control from possessing pornographic material, as applying only to such material that is relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior....

...ued most favorably to the accused.”). Applying the rule of lenity, the Kasischke court held that the limiting phrase “relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern” must be interpreted as qualifying each of the prohibitions in section [948.30(1) (g) ]....

...1st DCA 2011) (ordering remand because record does not indicate whether trial court would have revoked probation based only on the violation affirmed by the reviewing court). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. LEWIS and SWANSON, JJ., concur. . Section 948.30(1) (g), Florida Statutes provides: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually st...

...As part of the JLA, the Florida Legislature added the requirement that a trial court impose mandatory electronic monitoring on certain sex offenders who are placed on probation, but limited the requirement to probationers whose crimes were committed on or after September 1, 2005. See § 948.30(3), Fla....

...DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . Contrarily, in other sections of the JLA, the legislature clearly indicated that those provisions only applied to probationers whose crimes were committed on or after September 1, 2005. See, e.g., §§ 947.1405(10), 948.30(3), Fla....

...Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1004 (6th Cir.2007) (holding in a 2-1 decision that a Tennessee law requiring mandatory electronic monitoring was not an ex post facto law because the electronic monitoring was part of a civil, nonpunitive regime). . Both cases dealt with the section 948.30(3), Florida Statutes, requirement that a trial court imposing an initial sentence which includes probation on certain sex offenders must include mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of the probation....

...y further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. TAYLOR and CIKLIN, JJ., concur. . The Legislature has since renumbered and amended the statute in a manner not relevant here. See § 948.30(l)(g), Fla....

...Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *999 KELLY, Judge. Nicholas Burrell appeals from the trial courts order which modified the conditions of his sex offender probation by requiring electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act (the Act), section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ed that, because the violation of probation occurred after the Act was in effect, Burrell was subject to its mandatory electronic-monitoring provisions. We agree with Burrell that the offense occurred before the effective date of the Act; therefore, section 948.30 does not apply to him....

...it known it was not mandatory, *1000 we remand for resentencing to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether electronic monitoring should be imposed. Reversed and remanded. ALTENBERND and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.30 states: Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses.— Conditions imposed pursuant to this section do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing and shall be considered stand...

...State, 958 So.2d 981, 985 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Hicks v. State, 890 So.2d 459, 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Reversed and remanded. DAVIS, C.J., and WALLACE, J., Concur. . § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1998). The statute has been amended and renumbered, see § 948.30(l)(g), Fla....

...3d DCA 2007), the Third District recognized that a trial court may modify a sentence of probation to include statutorily mandated conditions of probation without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Specifically, the Harroll court recognized that where section 948.30 requires a probationer to be electronically monitored, a trial court does not err in modifying the probationer's sentence to correct *1205 the omission of this required condition of probation....

...when the trial court simply corrects a legally invalid sentence. See id. (citations omitted). The narrow issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Appellant's previous conviction was a qualifying offense under section 948.30(3)(c). Under section 948.30(3)(c), any probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after September 1, 2005, must undergo electronic monitoring as a condition of probation or community control supervision if he or she "[h]as previously been convicted of a violation of chapter 794, s....

...Where a statute enumerates specific terms, it is ordinarily construed as excluding from its operation all those terms not expressly mentioned. Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976). The crime of lewd or lascivious exhibition, as defined in section 800.04(7), is not listed as a qualifying offense in section 948.30(3)(c). Thus, Appellant's previous conviction of lewd or lascivious exhibition did not require the trial court to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under section 948.30(3)(c). Because the additional condition was not statutorily mandated, the trial court placed Appellant in double jeopardy when it modified the terms of Appellant's probation after the close of the sentencing hearing. The State concedes that section 948.30 does not support the trial court's decision to modify Appellant's sentence....

...ppellant's probation. ALLEN, VAN NORTWICK, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The record does not indicate when Appellant committed this offense. However, Appellant has conceded that the offense was presumptively committed after the effective date of section 948.30(3)(c). Additionally, our ruling in this case renders the date of the offense irrelevant. [2] Although it concedes that section 948.30 does not support the trial court's modification of Appellant's sentence, the State emphasizes its position that the judgment and sentence originally imposed against Appellant were proper....

...Judge Leyte-Vidal was recognized by all as a consummate professional who treated everyone with respect. His wisdom and devotion to the law only added to his outstanding reputation. Judge Leyte-Vidal was an exemplary jurist who will be greatly missed. [2] This statute has been renumbered and is now section 948.30(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...ce, was sentenced to six days time served and five years of sex 'offender probation. Condition 17 of Petitioner’s sex offender probation required Petitioner to actively participate in and successfully complete a sex offender treatment program. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2011). Neither “active participation” nor “successful completion” is defined by statute. See §§ 948.30(1)(c), 948.001, Fla....

...ght to free speech. This motion was also denied after a hearing. Senger thereafter tendered an open, nolo contendere plea to both charges. Contemporaneous with his plea, Senger executed a document titled “Special Conditions for Sex Offenders per E.S. 948.30” in which he agreed to specific conditions of sex offender probation....

..., which, in this case, it is not. Thus, Senger was properly designated as a sex offender. Third, Senger argues that the court should not have placed him on sex offender probation. He contends that the imposition of sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.30, Florida Statutes, is improper because his conviction is not for one of the enumerated offenses to which sex offender probation applies. Senger is accurate that his conviction for traveling after solicitation is not one of the enumerated crimes under section 948.30. In Arias v. State, 65 So.3d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), this court reversed the imposition of sex offender conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.30 because the crime committed by Mr....

...Near the end of the hearing, the prosecutor said that appellant is a sexual offender, and the judge did not disagree with that statement, although both parties and the judge acknowledged that appellant is not a sexual predator and that the trial court had been wrong to classify him as one during the original sentencing. Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), a portion of the Jessica Lunsford Act, states: (2) Effective for a probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after October 1, 1997, and who is placed on community control or sex offender probation for a violation of chapter 794, s....

...monitoring as a condition of the probation or community control supervision. We are unable to determine whether the trial court's misapplication of the Act was the sole reason that the trial court sentenced appellant to electronic monitoring. Under section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes, the court was required to impose electronic monitoring only "when deemed necessary by the community control or probation officer and his or her supervisor" *1062 and recommended by the Department of Corrections....

JACOBUS, J. Daniel Arias appeals the sentence imposed after he pled no contest to one count of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery. 1 On appeal, Arias challenges the imposition of sex offender conditions as found in section 948.30, Florida Statutes....

...After retrieving his wallet, Arias entered the daughter’s bedroom, asked her questions, and petted her hair without her permission. Because the girl was frightened by Arias’ conduct, she locked herself in the bathroom. Although the crime to which Arias pled is not one of the crimes enumerated in section 948.30, the trial court felt there was a sexual motive to Arias’ actions and imposed as special conditions of probation the sexual offender conditions set forth in section 948.30. In Sturges v. State, 980 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), our sister court determined that it is improper to impose sex offender conditions of probation unless the defendant is convicted of a crime specified in section 948.30....

...minality.” Id. at 734-35 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7, 9 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). In this case, the trial court did not find that Arias was a sexual offender or a sexual predator. We recognize that the court imposed the conditions found in section 948.30 as special conditions of Arias’ probation. We find that this distinction does not negate the holding set forth in Sturges . Accordingly, we reverse only that portion of Arias’ sentence which imposes the sex offender conditions set forth in 948.30 as special conditions of his probation....

...Also, over the State’s objection, the trial court refused to impose sex offender probation, finding that because Fureman entered an open plea to Count 3 for attempt *405 ed lewd and lascivious battery in violation of section 777.04 and not actual lewd and lascivious battery in violation of section 800.04(4)(a), section 948.30’s provisions of sex offender probation were inapplicable....

...and who are placed under supervision for violation of chapter 794, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, s. 847.0135(5), or s. 847.0145, the court must impose the following conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed [[Image here]] § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). Section 948.30(1) “mandates that for probationers who committed certain specified sex-based crimes after October 1, 1995, ‘the court must impose [certain] conditions in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed.’ ” State v....

...f sex offender probation and that “the statute does not allow for judicial discretion”), rev. dismissed, 889 So.2d 823 (Fla.2004). Accordingly, because attempted sexual battery is an offense under the battery statute, the mandatory provisions in section 948.30 require conditions of sex offender probation....

...e. Appellant filed a motion to correct sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), claiming it was error to impose sex offender probation because unlawful use of a computer service was not an enumerated offense under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Even though a statute includes sex offender treatment as one of a roster of mandatory conditions of probation for certain specified sexual offenses, the statute does not prohibit a judge from selectively requiring sex offender therapy as a special condition of probation for other offenses where appropriate. Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2011), establishes the conditions for “sex offender probation.” It requires that, when granting probation to persons convicted of spe *1002 cific sexual offenses, 2 the court “must impose” certain conditions “in addition to all other standard and special conditions imposed.” § 948.30(1), Fla....

...ent to pay restitution, submission to warrantless searches, submission to polygraph examinations, maintenance of driving logs, electronic monitoring in certain circumstances, and prohibitions on visiting schools and parks without prior approval. See § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 948.30 reflects the clear intent of the Legislature that all of these conditions be imposed when persons convicted of the sexual offenses listed in the statute are granted probation. But it contains no language that prohibits these conditions from being selectively imposed on the probation for other crimes. Courts already have imposed some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 for offenses other than those listed in the statute. 3 In addition, the Legislature itself authorizes some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 to be imposed for offenses other than those listed in the statute....

...probation statute could not be imposed on persons who were convicted of a crime other than those crimes enumerated in the statute. Sturges v. State, 980 So.2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (rejecting imposition of all the conditions “pursuant to section 948.30”) (original emphasis); Arias v....

...ram with qualified practitioners specifically trained to treat sex offenders,” similar to those that defendants who are placed on probation for certain enumerated sexual offenses are required to participate in as part of sexual offender probation. § 948.30(1), Fla....

...We will refer to this condition as "sex offender therapy.” . The statutory scheme specifies certain mandatory probation conditions for those "placed under supervision for violation of chapter 794, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, s. 847.0135(5), ors. 847.0145.” § 948.30(1), Fla....

...ntencing or at any other time, and the plea agreement did not impose electronic monitoring as a condition of probation. He also argued that he did not meet the criteria for the mandatory imposition of electronic monitoring under sections 948.063 and 948.30(3), Florida Statutes (2008) and therefore, the probation office was without authority to impose such a condition....

...Similarly, the issue of statutory construction is a pure question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. See Alvarado v. State, 9 So.3d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.2008)). Both this Court and the Third District have acknowledged that section 948.30(3) compels electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation. Grosso v. State, 2 So.3d 362, 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (noting that “[u]nder section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the trial court was required to impose electronic monitoring as a mandatory condition of probation because of [the defendant’s] prior convictions for violations of Chapter 794 and Section 800.04,” but reversing t...

...ourt’s imposition of electronic monitoring on jurisdictional grounds); Harroll v. State, 960 So.2d 797 -98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that a “trial court is required to impose mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation” under section 948.30 for defendants previously convicted of certain unlawful sexual activity); State v....

...3d DCA 2009) (holding that mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation was required in case where defendant, who had previously been convicted of sex crime, was convicted for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer). By the plain language of section 948.30(3), the trial court was prohibited from granting Floyd’s motion to modify the terms of his probation to delete mandatory electronic monitoring....

...The Florida Department of Corrections ["DOC"] appeals an order of the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court enjoining the DOC from engaging in the "practice of automatically violating the probation of every sex offender who fails to give an address acceptable pursuant to § 948.30(1)(b) Fla....

...Paragraph 15(b) of the sex offender probation order entered by this court reads as follows: The victim being under eighteen (18) years of age, you are prohibited [sic] living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, park, playground or other place where children regularly congregate. Additionally, § 948.30(1)(b), Fla....

...t that it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, the DOC is hereby ordered to: 1. Immediately cease and desist its practice of automatically violating the probation of every sex offender who fails to give an address acceptable pursuant to § 948.30(1)(b), Fla....

...rcumstances of this case and that it was error for the trial court to enter the order under review modifying King's probation. REVERSED and REMANDED. MONACO and TORPY, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 948.03(5)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2001) (currently section 948.30(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2008)), provides that the court must impose the following standard condition of probation for specified sex offenders: If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition on living within 1,000 feet of a schoo...

...home, had not been established until July 2009. He asked the court to clarify its probation order to allow him to remain living in his home. After a hearing, the lower court denied relief. The dispositive issue on appeal turns on the construction of section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2013), which, in pertinent part, provides: 948.30 Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses ......

...if not be forced to relocate he or she is living in a residence that meets the requirements of this paragraph and a school, child care facility, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate is subsequently established within 1,000 feet of his or her residence. § 948.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). Appellant contends that the last sentence of section 948.30(l)(b) authorizes him to remain in his residence or, at the very least, it is ambiguous, necessitating that we employ the rule of lenity in construing the statute....

...probation in 2013. At that time, the child care facility was already in place and within 1000 feet of his residence. Thus, at the time Appellant became a probationer subject to the statute, his residence did not *727 “meet[ ] the requirements of [section 948.30(1) ].” Therefore, the last sentence of section 948.30(l)(b) does not apply to his situation and the trial court did not err in denying his request to remain in his home....

complete a sex offender treatment program. See § 948.30(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2012).4 In the instant case

...3d 1143 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) equally applicable here, in that a probation condition of no contact would not abrogate appellant’s right to obtain a sexual violence injunction under section 784.046, Florida Statutes (2014). Such a condition is standard for sexual offenders such as appellee. See generally § 948.30(1)(d), Fla....

...graphic material at all, regardless of whether it is related to his prior deviant behavior. That is enough to sustain the trial court's revocation order under the facts of this case. A little background is helpful to understand why. Section 948.30, Florida Statutes, has long required that a trial court impose as a condition of sex offender probation a prohibition on possessing or viewing pornographic material unless otherwise provided in a statutorily required treatment plan. See, e.g., § 948.30(1)(g), Fla....

...ing or viewing any pornographic material (unless otherwise provided in the treatment plan) without regard to whether the pornographic material bears a relationship to the defendant's deviant behavior. See ch. 2014-4, § 15, Laws of Fla.; see also § 948.30(5), Fla....

...Thus, an individual -2- placed on sex offender probation for a crime that occurred after October 1, 2014 is subject to a statutorily required condition prohibiting the possession of any pornographic material. See § 948.30(5). The 2014 amendment did not, however, eliminate the earlier provision regarding pornography related to the defendant's deviant behavior. See § 948.30(1)(g). The offenses underlying Mr....

...he statutory change in the probation conditions is reflected in that order. While condition 21 prohibits "viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing" pornographic material that is "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern"—a condition section 948.30 has always required—condition 33, which only applies to "offenders whose crime was committed on or after October 1, 2014," contains the same prohibition without the additional relevance requirement....

...Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion on three grounds, only one of which merits discussion. In his third claim, Appellant argued that the trial court's "ORDER OF SEX OFFENDER PROBATION" was illegal because he was not convicted of any of the enumerated felonies listed in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2012).  The postconviction court agreed with Appellant on the merits, but nevertheless denied relief, concluding that although labeled as an "ORDER OF SEX OFFENDER PROBATION," the actual substance of the ord...

...I'll find that he has not satisfactorily complied with the terms of his probation." Based upon one condition violation, the trial court revoked Griffin's probation. "The results of the polygraph examination shall not be used as evidence in court to prove that a violation of community supervision has occurred." § 948.30(2)(a), Fla....

...State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla.1952)). Here, the lower court used and considered "results of the polygraph examination . . . as evidence in court to prove that a violation of community supervision has occurred," which is expressly contrary to the statutory mandate. See § 948.30(2)(a)....

...of Senger’s right to free speech. This motion was also denied after a hearing. Senger thereafter tendered an open, nolo contendere plea to both charges. Contemporaneous with his plea, Senger executed a document titled “Special Conditions for Sex Offenders per F.S. 948.30” in which he agreed to specific conditions of sex offender probation....

...n this case, it is not. Thus, Senger was properly designated as a sex offender. Third, Senger argues that the court should not have placed him on sex offender probation. He contends that the imposition of sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.30, Florida Statutes, is improper because his conviction is not for one of the enumerated offenses to which sex offender probation applies. Senger is accurate that his conviction for traveling after solicitation is not one of the enumerated crimes under section 948.30. In Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), this court reversed the imposition of sex offender conditions of probation pursuant to section 948.30 because the crime committed by Mr....

...The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years in prison followed by twenty years on sex offender probation on one count, and concurrent terms of twenty and fifteen years on sex offender probation on the remaining counts. One of the conditions of probation, which tracked the language of sub-section 948.30(l)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), prohibited the appellant from accessing the internet “or other computer services” until a “risk assessment [wa]s completed.” The statutory language and sex offender probation condition indicate t...

...Appellant claims that he only discovered this probationary condition after reviewing the state’s response to his motion for post-conviction relief. According to appellant, the police statements given by the complaining witnesses accused appellant of criminal acts that took place prior to July 1, 2005, rendering section 948.30(l)(h) inapplicable to his case....

...s order removing the mandatory probation condition preventing Christopher Walk from having unsupervised contact with a child under the age of eighteen more than sixty days after the sentence was imposed. Because the trial court failed to comply with section 948.30(e), Florida Statutes, it lacked the authority to remove the mandatory condition....

...In January 2017, Walk was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by ten years of supervised sex offender probation. As a mandatory condition of probation, Walk was prohibited from having unsupervised contact with a child under the age of eighteen. See § 948.30(1)(e), Fla....

...lows a trial court to rescind or modify the terms and conditions of probation at any time. But, the trial court was not authorized to remove a mandatory condition of probation. See State v. Springer, 965 So. 2d 270, 272–73 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Section 948.30(1)(e) provides: (e) If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition on contact with a child under the age of 18 except as provided in this paragraph....

...alternative argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify probation more than sixty days after the imposition of the sentence. For the reasons expressed above, we grant the petition and remand the case to the trial court to either comply with the dictates of section 948.30 or reinstate the condition. GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 5 

...correct sentencing error that challenged the imposition of sex offender probation as part of his sentence for traveling to meet a minor to do unlawful acts pursuant to section 847.0135(4)(a), which is not an enumerated offense under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (2013). * Section 948.30 provides that the court “must impose” certain standard conditions of sex offender probation, which do not need to be orally pronounced at the time of sentencing, when granting probation to persons convicted of an offense enumerated by the statute. The Fourth and Fifth Districts have held that it is error to impose sex offender probation for an offense not enumerated by section 948.30....

...of his probation in 2020 at issue here.  On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) his probationary sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; (2) he could not be placed on sex offender probation in the first place as the sexual battery occurred in 1991 and section 948.30, Florida Statutes, the statute which sets forth standard conditions of probation for specified sex offenses, was not enacted until 1995; (3) electronic monitoring as a condition of probation for an offense committed in 1991 was an ex p...

...1st DCA 2015), quashed on other grounds , No. SC15-536, 2016 WL 1696462 (Fla. Apr. 28, 2016), clarified on remand , 193 So.3d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), on the issue of whether a trial court is required to orally pronounce each condition of "sex offender probation" contained in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010), when the defendant is not convicted of one of the section's enumerated offenses....

...n the future until his probation is concluded. The written Order of Sex Offender Probation included the standard conditions of Levandoski's probation, the special conditions orally pronounced during sentencing, and all of the conditions contained in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2010). Levandoski's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Levandoski v. State , 96 So.3d 907 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). In 2015, after serving his prison term, Levandoski moved to strike the section 948.30 conditions of probation on the ground that they constituted an illegal sentence because the conditions were neither mandatory under the statute, nor orally pronounced at sentencing....

...Alternatively, he moved to modify certain conditions of his probation if the court was unwilling to strike them in their entirety. During a hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court acknowledged that it did not review with Levandoski the conditions found in section 948.30 during the plea colloquy....

...It also determined that the Florida Department of Corrections was supervising Levandoski "as if he had been put on sex offender probation for [ section] 847.0135(5)." In other words, Levandoski was being supervised for every condition of sex offender probation contained in section 948.30 that is applicable to violators of section 847.0135(5), even though he was convicted of violations of section 847.0135(3) and (4). The court ultimately denied Levandoski's motion to the extent he requested the section 948.30 conditions be struck....

...the umbrella of sex offender probation conditions." Id. at 219 . The district court concluded "the court's oral pronouncement that Levandoski would be subject to 'sex offender probation' was sufficient to impose each of the components" contained in section 948.30....

...not be imposed at resentencing pursuant to double jeopardy principles. 157 So.3d at 562 . 5 This review follows. ANALYSIS The issue presented is a pure question of law subject to de novo review. See Norvil v. State , 191 So.3d 406 , 408 (Fla. 2016). Section 948.30 delineates the standard conditions of probation for those who commit certain enumerated sex offenses: those convicted of a violation of chapter 794, or sections 800.04, 827.071, 847.0135(5), or 847.0145, Florida Statutes (2010). Pursuant to the specific language of section 948.30, if a defendant is convicted of one of these offenses, the trial court is not required to orally pronounce each standard condition at sentencing. § 948.30, Fla. Stat. (2010). While the conditions within section 948.30 are only mandatory for violations of the enumerated offenses, they can nevertheless be imposed, in whole or in part, on violators of other offenses as special conditions of probation if they reasonably relate to rehabilitation....

...3.800(b) motion, we conclude he was adequately placed on notice of the conditions of his probation during sentencing. Levandoski argues that the trial court was required to orally pronounce each applicable "sex offender probation" condition found in section 948.30 during sentencing....

...imposed." Levandoski's request for sex offender probation is indicative of an understanding of what probationary conditions he would be subjected to if the court granted his request. Moreover, during sentencing, the trial court implicitly referenced section 948.30 by specifically imposing a condition found exclusively within the statute: I will make it a special condition of his probation that he is prohibited from- this is part of the sex offender probation anyway , but just to make the record...

...te in conversations with anyone over the internet by whatever name that may be known here or in the future until his probation is concluded. (Emphasis added.) The prohibition against accessing the internet as a condition of probation appears only in section 948.30(1)(h) (prohibiting a probationer from "accessing the Internet or other computer services")....

...The trial court's pronouncement, when read in context, orally imposed all of the conditions of sex offender probation, including and in particular the prohibition against accessing the internet. Levandoski contends that, because the statutory definition of "sex offender probation" makes no reference to section 948.30, 8 he could not have known that by imposing "sex offender probation," the trial court was referring to the conditions within section 948.30. However, as the district court observed, "sex offender probation" is a term of art commonly used to refer to the conditions found in section 948.30. Levandoski , 217 So.3d at 219 . Numerous cases have used the term this way, 9 and Levandoski does not assert that it has been used to refer to any other statute. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's reference to section 948.30 during sentencing, in conjunction with Levandoski's prior request for sex offender probation, adequately put Levandoski on notice of the conditions of his probation....

...10 CONCLUSION Levandoski has failed to establish that he was not provided with the written sentencing order in time to file a rule 3.800(b) motion and, therefore, is not entitled to relief. Further, because Levandoski specifically requested sex offender probation, and the trial court implicitly referenced section 948.30 by imposing a condition of probation that is only located in that statute, we conclude due process was satisfied here....

...4th DCA 2010) ("[I]n addition to defining sex offender probation as involving 'intensive supervision,' chapter 948 provides that a trial court sentencing a defendant to sex offender probation must impose an extensive list of conditions for those ... convicted of certain enumerated sex crimes. See § 948.30(1) -(3), Fla. Stat. (2010)." (emphasis omitted) ); see also Staples v. State , 202 So.3d 28 , 30 (Fla. 2016) (using the term "sex offender probation" to refer to the conditions in section 948.30 ); Adams v....

BROWNING, J. Jamal Kelly (Appellant) appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his sex-offender probation without making a finding, pursuant to section 948.30(l)(g), Florida Statutes (2006), that the obscene materials, which Appellant was found to have viewed, “are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern.” Appellant’s sole ground for relief is Kasischke v....

...ferent children. The trial court sentenced him to six months in the county jail, to be followed by three years of sex-offender probation. One of the standard conditions of Appellant’s probation (designated as Condition (40)) is taken verbatim from section 948.30(l)(g) and states: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual...

...At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court orally announced that the DVD covers are obscene and that the substantial, willful violation of Condition *129 (40) justified revocation of sex-offender probation. The court never addressed the qualifying language in section 948.30(l)(g) limiting the prohibition of obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating materials to those “that are relevant to the offender’s deviant behavior pattern.” Defense counsel never asked the court to make such a finding, nor...

...ich he described as molesting an underage girl. In Kasischke , the supreme court applied the rule of lenity and held that the qualifying language relating to “relevance” in section 948.03(5)(a)(7), Florida Statutes (1999)— which was renumbered section 948.30(l)(g) — qualifies each of the prohibitions in the statute....

...irmed the revocation in this case had the affidavit charged unsupervised contact. Finally, I believe that this case stands as a cautionary tale for trial courts that may be inclined to permit sex offenders to live with designated minors. I note that section 948.30(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), which was not in effect when Joslin committed his crimes, now sets forth detailed requirements before any contact between convicted sex offenders and minors may occur....

...See id. at 1000 & n. 1. As explained by the Third District, that term is not mentioned or defined in Florida’s statutory probation scheme, but the Third District assumed that the trial court was referring to sex offender therapy imposed pursuant to section 948.30(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...rily-required condition of probation, sex offender therapy can still be imposed as a special condition of probation outside of those statutorily-required circumstances when the facts of the crime so warrant.” Id. at 1003 . The court explained that section 948.30 “contains no language that prohibits these conditions from being selectively imposed on the probation” for crimes other than those enumerated in that section. Id. at 1002 . In fact, the Third District noted instances in which courts and even the Legislature itself have already authorized “some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 to be imposed for offenses other than those listed in the statute.” Id....

...Villanueva now appeals on the basis of conflict jurisdiction. ANALYSIS Villanueva alleges conflict with Arias , in which the defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein. Id. Although that charge was not one enumerated in section 948.30, the trial court imposed — as special conditions of the defendant’s probation — the sex offender conditions found in section 948.30. The Fifth District Court of Appeal relied on Sturges v. State, 980 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), to find that it was improper to impose the sex offender conditions found in section 948.30 unless the defendant was convicted of a crime specified in that section. Arias, 65 So.3d at 104 . In Sturges , the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that application of “sex offender probation 'pursuant to sections 948.30 and 948.31, Florida Statutes (2005)” was inappropriate because Sturges was not convicted of one of the enumerated felonies for which those statutory provisions are imposed. 980 So.2d at 1109 (emphasis added). Thus, in that case, the sex offender probation conditions had been imposed mandatorily pursuant to section 948.30....

...In fact, the Fourth District concluded that a trial court “may impose probation and special conditions of probation which reasonably relate to- the underlying charges.” Id. (citing Biller, 618 So.2d 734 ). That statement implies that while trial courts may not impose sex offender probation as a mandatory condition under section 948.30 for crimes not enumerated in that statute, courts may be able to impose those conditions as special conditions for any crime, as long as the conditions satisfy Biller ....

...der conditions under the statute for non-enumerated offenses, but also the im *51 position of such conditions even as special conditions based on a trial court’s discretion. The Fifth District explicitly found that although the conditions found in section 948.30 were imposed as special conditions in....

...ose statutorily-required circumstances when the facts of the crime so warrant.” Villanueva, 118 So.3d at 1003 . To resolve this conflict, we first determine whether the imposition of this condition is limited to only those crimes enumerated within section 948.30, even if imposed as a special— rather than standard — condition of probation....

...nder Biller . As described above, the trial judge did not indicate the statute under which he was ordering MDSO therapy. The Third District assumed the imposed therapy referred to the sex offender therapy required to be imposed upon sex offenders in section 948.30....

...ditions. See §§ 948.03(2), 948.039, Fla. Stats. (2008). Such a view is particularly persuasive given that the probation order in this case indicates the MDSO therapy was imposed as a special, not standard, condition of Villanueva’s probation and section 948.30 imposes sex offender therapy as a standard condition. See § 948.30, Fla....

...tion or community control for offenders specified in this section” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, due to the conflict issue in this case, we resort to statutory interpretation, starting with the plain language of the statute, to determine whether section 948.30 prohibits this condition from being imposed, even as a special condition, for a non-enumerated offense. Section 948.30 reads, in relevant part: Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses....

...probationer’s or community controllee’s own expense. If a qualified practitioner is not available within a 50-mile radius of the probationer’s or community controllee’s residence, the offender shall participate in other appropriate therapy. § 948.30(l)(c), Fla....

...a court because that would be to make laws”). In other words, a matter that is not covered by a statute is to be treated as intentionally not covered. See C.M., 154 So.3d at 1180 . This rule of statutory construction applies in several ways here. Section 948.30 indicates the circumstances under which sex offender probation conditions must be applied. It does not, however, indicate when those conditions may not be applied. Because this matter is not discussed by section 948.30, we must consider it purposely unaddressed and must not add any words or concepts to the statute to address it....

...committed and appropriate for the offender.”). The statute at issue here modifies that judicial discretion by requiring courts to impose certain mandatory conditions in cases involving an enumerated list of offenses. Reading these two sections and section 948.30 in pari materia reveals the legislative intent to modify the trial court’s discretion with a mandatory rule only under certain circumstances....

...Thus, any circumstance falling outside of that mandatory rule would remain unchanged and instead be governed by the otherwise statutorily broad discretion typically afforded to trial courts. Accordingly, we agree with the Third District’s finding that section 948.30 does not prohibit sex offender therapy from being imposed as a special condition of probation for an offense not enumerated as part of that statute....

...modification of Villa-nueva’s probation conditions. 5 We also disapprove the Fifth District’s decision in Arias based on that court’s blanket holding that the sex offender probation conditions can never be applied to offenses not enumerated in section 948.30....

...See id. at 1000 & n.1. As explained by the Third District, that term is not mentioned or defined in Florida’s statutory probation scheme, but the Third District assumed that the trial court was referring to sex offender therapy imposed pursuant to section 948.30(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...ly-required condition of probation, sex offender therapy can still be imposed as a special condition of probation outside of those statutorily-required circumstances when the facts of the crime so warrant.” Id. at 1003. The court explained that section 948.30 “contains no language that prohibits these conditions from being selectively imposed on the probation” for crimes other than those enumerated in that section. Id. at 1002. In fact, the Third District noted instances in which courts and even the Legislature itself have already authorized “some of the individual conditions listed in section 948.30 to be imposed for offenses other than those listed in the statute.” Id....

...ANALYSIS Villanueva alleges conflict with Arias, in which the defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge of burglary of a dwelling with an assault or battery therein. Id. Although that charge was not one enumerated in section 948.30, the trial court imposed—as special conditions of the defendant’s probation—the sex offender conditions found in section 948.30. The Fifth District Court of Appeal relied on Sturges v. State, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), to find that it was improper to impose the sex offender conditions found in section 948.30 unless the defendant was convicted of a crime specified in that section. Arias, 65 So. 3d at 104. In Sturges, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that application of “sex offender probation pursuant to sections 948.30 and 948.31, Florida Statutes (2005)” was inappropriate because Sturges was not convicted of one of the enumerated felonies for which those statutory provisions are imposed. 980 So. 2d at 1109 (emphasis added). Thus, in that case, the sex offender probation conditions had been imposed mandatorily pursuant to section 948.30....

...probation and special conditions of probation which reasonably relate to the underlying charges.” Id. (citing Biller, 618 So. 2d 734). That statement implies that while trial courts may not impose sex offender probation as a mandatory condition under section 948.30 for crimes not enumerated in that statute, courts may be able to impose those conditions as special conditions for any crime, as long as the conditions satisfy Biller. While the Fifth District in Arias indicated that it was re...

...offender conditions under the statute for non-enumerated offenses, but also the imposition of such conditions even as special conditions based on a trial court’s discretion. The Fifth District explicitly found that although the conditions found in section 948.30 were imposed as special conditions in Arias, “this distinction does not negate the holding set forth in Sturges.” Arias, 65 So....

...-7- circumstances when the facts of the crime so warrant.” Villanueva, 118 So. 3d at 1003. To resolve this conflict, we first determine whether the imposition of this condition is limited to only those crimes enumerated within section 948.30, even if imposed as a special—rather than standard—condition of probation. I....

...rehabilitation under Biller. As described above, the trial judge did not indicate the statute under which he was ordering MDSO therapy. The Third District assumed the imposed therapy referred to the sex offender therapy required to be imposed upon sex offenders in section 948.30....

...(2008). Such a view is particularly persuasive given that the probation order in this case indicates the -8- MDSO therapy was imposed as a special, not standard, condition of Villanueva’s probation and section 948.30 imposes sex offender therapy as a standard condition. See § 948.30, Fla....

...on or community control for offenders specified in this section”(emphasis added)). Nonetheless, due to the conflict issue in this case, we resort to statutory interpretation, starting with the plain language of the statute, to determine whether section 948.30 prohibits this condition from being imposed, even as a special condition, for a non-enumerated offense. Section 948.30 reads, in relevant part: Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses.—Conditions imposed pursuant to this section do not require oral pronouncement at the time...

...If a qualified practitioner is not available within a 50-mile radius of the probationer’s or community controllee’s residence, the offender shall participate in other appropriate therapy. -9- § 948.30(1)(c), Fla....

...because that would be to make laws”). In other words, a matter that is not covered by a statute is to be treated as intentionally not covered. See C.M., 154 So. 3d at 1180. This rule of statutory construction applies in several ways here. Section 948.30 indicates the circumstances under which sex offender probation conditions must be applied. It does not, however, indicate when those conditions may not be applied. Because this matter is not discussed by section 948.30, we must consider it purposely unaddressed and must not add any words or concepts to the statute to address it....

...circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender.”). The statute at issue here modifies that judicial discretion by requiring courts to impose certain mandatory conditions in cases involving an enumerated list of offenses. Reading these two sections and section 948.30 in pari materia reveals the legislative intent to modify the trial court’s discretion with a mandatory rule only under certain circumstances....

...Thus, any circumstance falling outside of that mandatory rule would remain unchanged and instead be governed by the otherwise statutorily broad discretion typically afforded to trial courts. Accordingly, we agree with the Third District’s finding that section 948.30 does not prohibit sex offender therapy from being imposed as a special condition of probation for an offense not enumerated as part of that statute....

...case to the trial court for a modification of Villanueva’s probation conditions.5 We also disapprove the Fifth District’s decision in Arias based on that court’s blanket holding that the sex offender probation conditions can never be applied to offenses not enumerated in section 948.30. It is so ordered. PERRY, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which LABARGA, C.J., concurs. LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion. CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POL...

...1993). I dissent in part, however, because I disagree with the analysis in Part I of the opinion and would also conclude that the trial court does not have the authority to impose the special condition of probation of “sex offender treatment” under section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2008), when the defendant is not convicted of - 16 - one of the specified sex offenses enumerated in that section....

...I would hold, consistent with the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Sturges v. State, 980 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Arias v. State, 65 So. 3d 104, 105 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011), that sex offender treatment is limited under section 948.30(1) as a condition to probation only to the enumerated felonies of section 948.30(1), which are specific sex offenses.6 Because the jury in this case acquitted the defendant of a sex offense outlined in section 948.30(1), the trial court did not have the authority to impose one of the probationary conditions set forth in section 948.30(1) for an offense that is not enumerated in the statute. I thus agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s opinion in Sturges, which construed the statute to provide that the probationary conditions under section 948.30(1) can be imposed only if the defendant is convicted of one of the enumerated felonies. This interpretation of section 948.30(1) follows from the text of the statute and the rules of statutory construction....

...interpretation,” this Court applies “rules of statutory construction”—such as reading each word and part of the statute together—“to determine the legislative intent behind the provision.” Id. at 198-99. I begin with the actual language used in the statute. Section 948.30 is specifically entitled, “Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses.” (Emphasis added)....

... own expense. If a qualified practitioner is not available within a 50-mile radius of the probationer’s or community controllee’s residence, the offender shall participate in other appropriate therapy. § 948.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of the statute, section 948.30(1) does not authorize the conditions of probation it sets forth to be imposed for any offenses other than the statutorily enumerated sex offenses. The majority concludes that section 948.30 mandates sex offender treatment for the enumerated sex offenses of that statute, yet concludes the statute does not preclude the trial court from imposing this sex offender treatment for other crimes as a special condition of probat...

...Not only does “sex offender treatment” as a special condition of probation require “successful completion” of the treatment, but the statute specifies that this - 19 - treatment must occur at the probationer’s “own expense.” § 948.30(1)(c), Fla....

...’s conviction of misdemeanor battery. Accordingly, I concur in part with the result of the majority that sex offender probation was not a valid special condition of probation in this case but dissent to the majority’s interpretation of section 948.30....

...I would construe the statute that governs “additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses” to preclude the imposition of this highly specialized and stigmatized form of probation to offenses other than those sex offenses enumerated in section 948.30....

...The Third District, and presumably all subsequent parties who read the opinion, “assume[d] that MDSO therapy refers to ‘a sex offender treatment program with qualified practitioners specifically trained to treat sex offenders,’ similar to” the required treatment program described in section 948.30(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008), which is titled “Additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses.” Id....

...The terms and conditions should be reasonably related to the - 24 - circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender. . . .” § 948.039, Fla. Stat. (2008).7 Thus, it is not clear whether the trial court imposed the disputed condition under section 948.30, the provision that mandates a lengthy list of conditions for certain sex offenders, or, as I suspect, section 948.039, which grants trial courts wide latitude to impose special conditions of probation. Regardless, I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that section 948.30 is inherently ambiguous. The Third District correctly noted that section 948.30 does not clearly provide an answer to the question posed to this Court: whether any of the enumerated conditions in the statute can be imposed upon a person who has not been convicted of a sex offense specified by the statute. The statute does not expressly prohibit or allow such action, and therefore I agree with the majority in its conclusion that section 948.30 is ambiguous on this point....

...Villanueva to participate in “MDSO therapy.” - 25 - conditions shall not prevent the court from adding thereto such other or others as it may consider proper. This provision supports the conclusion that the provisions required by section 948.30 are not exclusive to the enumerated offenses in that statute....

...determine any special terms and conditions of probation or community control. The terms and conditions should be reasonably related to the circumstances of the offense committed and appropriate for the offender.” (Emphasis added). Only by reading sections 948.03, 948.039, and 948.30 in pari materia can we actually understand the question presented by this case: is the wide discretion statutorily granted to trial courts expansive enough to allow a court to impose a condition that is otherwise mandatorily imposed only up...

...ated to the - 30 - circumstances of the offense and directly related to preventing the defendant from engaging in such illicit touching of children in the future. I would also reject the view that section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2011), which requires the imposition of sex offender therapy for certain enumerated offenses, implicitly precludes the imposition of sex offender therapy in connection with unenumerated offenses. Any such implication is nonsensical in view of the broad authority granted to trial courts by section 948.03. Nothing in section 948.30 suggests that it in any way limits the authority granted by section 948.03. There is nothing ambiguous about section 948.30, and there is no basis for the use of legislative history to rewrite the plain terms of the statute by reading in a limitation on a trial court’s general authority to impose conditions that the trial court “considers proper.”...

...assessment is completed, approves and implements a safety plan for the offender's accessing or using the Internet or other computer services. NO ACCESS TO SOCIAL MEDIA[.] Special condition 27 is authorized by section 948.30(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2016), except that the statute makes no mention of social media and does not provide for an exception for work and shopping. 1Alford filed a motion to declare section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2016), unconstitutional, which the trial court denied. -2-  In Packingham, the United States Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a North Carolina stat...

...merate the special conditions associated with the sex offender probation. This was significant because traveling to seduce/solicit/entice a child to commit a sex act is not an enumerated offense for which sex offender probation is mandatory under section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...to the offense or to future criminality. Villanueva v. State, 200 So. 3d 47, 53 (Fla. 2016). But after Jones -2- was sentenced the First District held that for an offense that is not enumerated under section 948.30(1), the component conditions of sex offender probation must be orally announced at sentencing and that those not orally announced must be stricken....

...The supreme court held that Levandoski was on notice of the conditions of sex offender probation because his request for such exhibited an understanding of said conditions and the trial court's oral pronouncement of the sentence implicitly referenced sex offender probation by imposing a condition found exclusively within section 948.30....

...nditions to those imposed in the June 11, 1996, order. Because the appellant’s crime was committed on August 18, 1995, section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1995), is applicable. See Burrel v. State, 993 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), did not apply where the offense was committed prior to the statute’s effective date); see also Plute v....

...At sentencing, the trial court also orally pronounced that it would impose electronic monitoring. Although electronic monitoring is now mandatory, at the time of the appellant’s offense, the trial court had discretion to impose electronic monitoring as a condition of the appellant’s probation. See § 948.30(3), Fla....

...Casseus now appeals the denial of his motion, arguing that mandatory electronic monitoring is a direct consequence of his plea and failure to advise him of this condition renders the plea involuntary. We affirm.  The pertinent facts are straightforward and undisputed. Section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2014), sets forth a list of additional terms and conditions of probation or community control for certain sex offenses. They are considered standard conditions and do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing. § 948.30, Fla. Stat. Relevant to this case, the trial court is required to order mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation. § 948.30(3), Fla....

...ng stopped by a police officer on the highway and asked to show your driver’s license is punishment, or being placed on a sex offender registry. . . .”). Accordingly, we hold that mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under § 948.30 is not punishment and, therefore, Casseus is not entitled to withdraw his plea. In reaching our decision, we have not overlooked Casseus’s reliance on Witchard v....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. February 24, 2010. Rehearing Denied April 6, 2010. Ronald Allen Hitt, pro se, Appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See State v. Lacayo, 8 So.3d 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (holding that section 948.30(3), Florida Statutes, requiring a probationer who is designated a sexual predator to be subjected to electronic monitoring was not limited to probation imposed for sexual offenses)....

...Condition 26 of the court’s probation order prohibits Kalinow-ski from living within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park or playground, or any other place proscribed by the court where children regularly congregate. This is one of the standard conditions of sex offender probation mandated by section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...i’s sentence by removing the condition. The trial court correctly found that the probationary condition from which Kalinowski seeks relief is a standard condition of sex offender probation that did not require oral pronouncement at sentencing. See § 948.30(l)(b), Fla....

...5th DCA 2004) (noting that the conditions of sex offender probation mandated by statute are not required to be orally pronounced at sentencing); Woodson v. State, 864 So.2d 512, 514 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (same); Taylor v. State, 821 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (same). Additionally, because section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2005), requires the court to impose this condition for any violation of section 827.071, Florida Statutes (2005), the trial court correctly denied Kalinow-ski’s request to delete the condition from his sentence. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ„ concur. . Section 948.30 formerly appeared as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...offender probation on count one and two years' sex offender probation on count three. The court expressly and affirmatively declined, however, to impose most of the conditions of sex offender probation,1 although those conditions were statutorily mandatory for count three. See § 948.30, Fla....

...officer and was instructed regarding the conditions of supervision. One of those conditions precluded Rivera from living within 1000 feet of a school, child care facility, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate. See § 948.30(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2013). Another condition imposed a curfew that required Rivera to remain confined to his approved residence between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. See § 948.30(1)(a)....

...The trial court found that Bell had violated condition seven of his probation. The court entered an order that restored Bell's sex offender probation, instructed Bell to report to the probation office as requested by his probation officer, and imposed electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act, section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...NOTES [1] The trial court was under the mistaken impression that it was required to impose electronic monitoring under the Jessica Lunsford Act (the Act). The State admits that Bell's offense was committed before the effective date of the Act. See § 948.30(3) (stating that electronic monitoring must be imposed on sex offenders whose offenses occurred on or after September 1, 2005)....

...Davis was sentenced to seventeen years in DOC, followed by ten years of probation on Count I and fifteen years of incarceration on the remaining counts to run concurrently with his sentence on Count I. Davis’s probation on Count I included “[standard sex offender conditions 14 through 30” pursuant to section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006)....

PETERSON, J. Mark Melvin appeals the imposition of a condition of his probation that permits the Department of Corrections, (“DOC”), to recommend electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2005). We affirm Melvin’s sentence without prejudice to his ability to challenge that condition when he is about to begin probation after serving his period of incarceration if DOC requests and the trial court requires monitoring. See § 948.30(2)(e), Fla....

...As part of the plea, Morrow agreed to certain conditions of sex offender probation, including that he could not access the internet or other computer services until a qualified practitioner in a sex offender treatment program approved and implemented a safety plan. See § 948.30(1)(h), Fla....

...the intent to promote child pornography. When he pleaded guilty to violating section 827.071(4), and when the trial court sentenced him to sex offender probation, Morrow was subject to certain mandatory conditions of sex offender probation listed in section 948.30(1)(h)....

...Relevant here is the condition that a sex offender on probation whose crime was committed on or after July 1, 2005, may not use the internet or other computer services until a qualified practitioner in the offender’s sex offender treatment program approves and implements a safety plan. § 948.30(1)(h), Fla....

...to access pornography or contact minors. We disagree. Some conditions of probation provided for in the sex offender probation statute make distinctions with regard to the types of content a sex offender may access via the internet and other means. See § 948.30(1)(g), Fla....

...For sex offenders like Morrow—those convicted of a qualifying offense on or after July 1, 2005—the legislature has determined that any use of the internet or other computer services by the offender should be prohibited during probation, unless an approved safety plan is in place. See § 948.30(1)(h), Fla....

...At sentencing, the primary issue was whether Taplin was required to wear an electronic monitor since he was seventeen years old at the time of the underlying qualifying offense. Over Taplin’s objection, the trial court ruled that electronic monitoring was mandatory pursuant to section 948.30(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2017), which reads: (3) Effective for a probationer or community controllee whose crime was committed on or after September 1, 2005, and who: .... (c) Has previously been convicted of a violation of chapter 794, s....

...the court must order, in addition to any other provision of this section, mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of the probation or community control supervision. (Emphasis added); see ch. 2005–28, § 20, Laws of Fla. A plain reading of section 948.30 compels us to conclude that the age restriction language—“the unlawful sexual activity involved a victim 15 years of age or younger and the offender is 18 years of age or older”—applies to all the crimes listed in section 948.30(3)(c), not just section 847.0145 as the trial court determined. Accord Harroll v. State, 960 So. 2d 797, 797–98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“Under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2006), the trial court is required to impose mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of probation for defendants previously convicted of unlawful sexual activity involving a victim fifteen years of age or y...

... For these reasons, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court strike the electronic monitoring from his probation order, as it is not mandatory. However, as the State points out, electronic monitoring could later be applied under section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes, but only when deemed necessary by the “probation officer and his or her supervisor, and ordered by the court at the recommendation of the Department of Corrections.” See Blue v. State, 73 So. 3d 358, 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“While the trial court could have imposed electronic monitoring under section 948.30(2), it did not make the requisite findings that Blue’s probation officer and his supervisor deemed electronic monitoring necessary, and that the Department of Corrections made such a recommendation.”). REVERSED and REMAND...

...3  CASE NO. 5D17-3135 EISNAUGLE, J., concurring. I concur with the majority concerning mandatory electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2017). However, I would not reach the separate issue of electronic monitoring pursuant to section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2017). 4 

...An order of sex offender probation was entered listing special conditions of sex offender probation. In 2016, the State filed a motion to clarify sentence, asserting that the trial court was required to orally pronounce the conditions of sex offender probation pursuant to section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2011). Section 948.30 requires the trial court to impose certain conditions for sex offender probation for specified offenses, but the statute provides that the conditions "do not require oral pronouncement at the time of sentencing." The State seemed to believe that because the offenses in this case are not enumerated in section 948.30 and the conditions are therefore permissive, rather than mandatory, see Villanueva v....

...years in prison followed by four years of sex-offender probation for his guilty pleas to sexual battery with great force and armed burglary. The probation order did not include the factual findings necessary for the court to impose electronic monitoring under the 2006 version of section 948.30(2)(e), Florida Statutes (effective Jan....

...1 The legislature renumbered the statute between the time of the underlying crime and the time of sentencing. See ch. 2004-373, § 18, Laws of Fla. But the text of the relevant subsection did not change. Compare § 948.03(5)(b)5., Fla. Stat. (1999), with § 948.30(2)(e), Fla....

...He testified that a Department of Corrections classification officer made the initial mistake of placing Maldonado on an electronic monitor. The classification officer believed the victim of the sexual offense was a child and, if the victim had been a child, a GPS monitor was required under section 948.30(3)(a), Florida Statutes (effective Jan....

...offender probationer whose crime was committed on or after October 1, 1997, “when deemed necessary by the community control or probation officer and his or her supervisor, and ordered by the court at the recommendation of the Department of Corrections.” § 948.30(2)(e), Fla. Stat.; see also Blue v....

...chapter 794 . . . and the unlawful sexual activity involved a victim 15 years of age or younger and the offender is 18 years of age or older[,]” “the court must order . . . mandatory electronic monitoring as a condition of the probation. . . .” § 948.30(3)(a), Fla....

...n and probation on the sexual battery count for a period of ten years, and five years’ probation for the cocaine charge, both terms to run concurrently. Special conditions of the plea included sex offender probation pursuant to the requirements in section 948.30 of the Florida Statutes, registration as a sexual offender, as well as MDSO evaluation with treatment as required or as necessary, among other minor requirements....

...5th DCA 2015) (“The enhancement of probation conditions, absent proof of a violation, is precluded by double jeopardy principles.”). At Stapler’s initial sentencing, the trial court adjudicated Stapler a sex offender and imposed “sex-offender probation with all the standard conditions” under section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...conditions. Stapler successfully moved under rule 3.800(b) to have the standard sex- offender conditions struck because section 847.0135(3) is not listed among the offenses that require the imposition of all the standard sex-offender conditions under section 948.30(1)....

...that the conditions were related to the crime of which Stapler was convicted. Stapler concedes that this Court has previously held that trial courts are permitted to impose sex-offender conditions as special conditions, even for crimes not listed in section 948.30(1), when the conditions are reasonably related to the convicted offense....

...4th DCA 2014) (“Because a motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue of law, our standard of review is de novo.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We agree with this argument. The defendant was not convicted of any of the sex offenses specified in section 948.30, Florida Statutes (2013), which imposes standard general conditions of probation or community control for those specified sex offenses.3 Therefore, any conditions which the court imposed on the defendant’s community control and proba...

...rial court must orally pronounce any special condition at sentencing. Id. at 227 n.3 (internal citations omitted). 3 We leave it to the Legislature to determine if it should add voyeurism and video voyeurism to the sex offenses specified in section 948.30. 10  Here, at sentencing, the court did not orally pronounce that “sex offender conditions apply” to the defendant’s community control and probation terms....

...etween the sentencing orders and the pronouncement in open court. The court was unambiguous in its oral pronouncement as to the special conditions which it imposed at sentencing, and did not mention any of the other possible conditions identified in section 948.30, such as a prohibition on viewing, accessing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material. See generally § 948.30, Fla....

...Stat. (2000). There is no subsection, however, which expressly authorizes probation officers to conduct warrantless, suspicionless searches. Harrell points to the lack of an express warrantless search condition in section 948.03. He also cites section 948.30(1)(k), Florida Statutes (2005), which authorizes warrantless searches for certain sex offenders, to make a statutory construction argument under the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing excludes all others....

...ef Judge. Raymond William Driscoll seeks review of an order denying his motion to clarify and/or modify the conditions of his probation. Driscoll argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he was subject to probationary conditions set forth in section 948.30(1), Florida Statutes (2010), because his offenses were committed before its effective date....

...In October 2011, Driscoll filed a motion to clarify and/or modify his probation in which he asserted that, in addition to the special conditions of probation imposed at his sentencing hearing, probation officials were requiring him to comply with the standard conditions of probation set forth in section 948.30(1). Driscoll argued that section 948.30(1) did not apply to him because his crimes were committed before the statute’s effective date. The trial court denied his motion and concluded that Driscoll was subject to the conditions of probation set forth in section 948.30(1) due to his continuing status as a sexual predator. Section 948.30(1), which sets forth mandatory conditions of probation for defendants convicted of certain sex offenses, was enacted in 1995....

...The statute expressly states that it applies to “probationers or community eontrollees whose crime was committed on or after October 1, 1995, and who are placed under supervision for violation of chapter 794, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, s. 847.0135(5), or s. 847.0145.” § 948.30(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). Under the plain language of section 948.30(1), the probation conditions set forth therein are not statutorily authorized as standard conditions for offenders who committed their crimes before October 1, 1995....

...Therefore, *947 when these conditions are not orally imposed as special conditions at the time of sentencing for crimes committed before October 1, 1995, they are not applicable. See id. Thus, Driscoll is not subject to the probation conditions under section 948.30(1) that were not orally imposed as special conditions at his original sentencing hearing. We reverse the order denying Driscoll’s motion to clarify and/or modify the conditions of his probation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. DAVIS and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . Section 948.30(1) was originally created as section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (1995)....