Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...petency. But the order also included an inconsistent "conclusion of law" that Gonzalez was "in need of outpatient treatment *39 to restore competency to proceed." In September 2008, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge under section 916.303(1)....

...ek certiorari review of order denying motion to dismiss filed under Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.213); see also Hines v. State, 931 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (granting certiorari review of order denying incompetent defendant's motion to dismiss filed under § 916.303, Fla....

...Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885 (Fla.2003); Justice Admin. Comm'n v. Peterson, 989 So.2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Thus we turn to the requirements of chapter 916, Florida Statutes, and to Gonzalez's claim that the circuit court's failure to dismiss the charge is a violation of the plain language of section 916.303(1)....

...The legislature has provided a substantive right to dismissal of criminal charges for "any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation or autism. . . if the defendant remains incompetent to proceed within a reasonable time after such determination, not to exceed 2 years." § 916.303(1); see also Hines, 931 So.2d 148. The only exception to dismissal under this statute requires the court to specify "its reasons for believing that the defendant will become competent to proceed" within a specified time in the foreseeable future. § 916.303(1)....

...The circuit court agreed to maintain Gonzalez on conditional release and ordered him to complete this training. On appeal as it did *40 below, the State argues that Gonzalez's right to dismissal does not arise until the two-year period referenced in section 916.303(1) has expired....

...The statute establishes a period of two years as the outer limit for jurisdiction over a mentally retarded defendant, but the preceding language cannot be ignored-a defendant is entitled to a dismissal of a criminal charge " within a reasonable time . . ., not to exceed two years." § 916.303(1) (emphasis supplied)....

...rlying purpose is the same. The statute governing dismissal of criminal charges is not limited to defendants who are committed under section 916.302, and it does not exclude defendants who are "only" on conditional release under section 916.304. See § 916.303. When, as here, it is determined that the defendant can never be restored to competency, the criminal process must end and the State must pursue other options if necessary to secure the safety of the defendant or others. See, e.g., § 916.303(2) (providing for post-dismissal determinations of whether involuntary services are necessary); § 393.11, Fla....

...dent. THOMAS, J. Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss his pending criminal charge. In his motion to dismiss, Petitioner alleges that the criminal charge against him must be dismissed pursuant to section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2002). The issue before us is whether section 916.303(1) creates a substantive right requiring dismissal of criminal charges, without prejudice, against a mentally retarded defendant who remains incompetent to proceed for more than two years. Because we hold that the Legislature granted Petitioner a substantive right to dismissal of the criminal charge after two years when it enacted section 916.303(1), we grant Petitioner's writ....

...he trial court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss, relying on Byrd v. State, 834 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (Benton and Lewis, JJ., concur in result only), review dismissed, 880 So.2d 616 (Fla.2004), rather than following the clear language of section 916.303(1). In Byrd, Judge Miner explained that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.213(a) "superseded" section 916.303(1)....

...in the foreseeable future, and that the defendant does not meet the criteria for commitment, it shall dismiss the charges against the defendant without prejudice to the state to refile the charges should the defendant be declared competent to proceed in the future. (Emphasis added.) Section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2002), conflicts with rule 3.213(a), and it states: The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation ......

...We believe that S.R. controls here, as well as the similar logic of L.H. Here, as in S.R. and L.H., the Legislature created a substantive right to dismissal of criminal charges against an incompetent mentally retarded defendant after a certain time period. Because section 916.303(1) confers a substantive right, it takes precedence over rule 3.213(a)....

...The supreme court dismissed review in Byrd because it did not constitute an opinion which the supreme court could review. Byrd, 880 So.2d at 617. Thus, Byrd was not authority for determining whether the issue presented here was substantive or procedural. As noted, section 916.303(1) provides that dismissal of criminal charges is without prejudice to the State to refile, should Petitioner become competent....

...In addition, section 916.14, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "[t]he statute of limitations shall not be applicable to criminal charges dismissed because of the incompetency of the defendant to proceed." Although the substantive right created by section 916.303(1) is conditional because the State may refile charges if Petitioner regains competency, this condition alone does not render section 916.303(1) inferior to rule 3.213(a)....

...See M.F., 583 So.2d at 1386. When charges are dismissed against a mentally retarded defendant such as Petitioner, the State or the defendant's attorney may seek to involuntarily commit the defendant under certain conditions. See § 393.11, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 916.303(1) simply grants a mentally retarded defendant, who is found incompetent to proceed, the right to have the charges against him dismissed after two years. However, nothing in section 916.303(1) prohibits civil commitment of the defendant to protect the defendant and the public from harm. Because we hold that section 916.303(1) is a substantive law within the Legislature's authority to determine, and that it vests Petitioner with a substantive right to have the charge against him dismissed, we do not need to address whether Petitioner is entitled to relea...

...ejudice as a result of his mental retardation. The state requested the appointment of additional experts to examine him, but the court refused, concluding that no further hearing was necessary where mental retardation is involved. The state appeals. Section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes, provides for the dismissal of charges against a *757 defendant found incompetent to proceed due to mental retardation: The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation or au...

...oreseeable future and specifies the time within which the defendant is expected to become competent to proceed. The charges may be refiled by the state if the defendant is declared competent to proceed in the future. The First District has held that section 916.303 creates a substantive right to dismissal....

...l illness, which is often curable, and those whose incompetence is due to mental retardation or autism, for which there is no `cure,' the Florida Supreme Court may find it appropriate to consider amending Rule 3.213 to reflect such a distinction."). Section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "[t]he charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice." The present amendment renders the rule consistent with the statute....

...habilitation, and rehabilitation that the person needs. Fla. Stat. § 393.11(1). Upon petition or motion filed in Florida state circuit court by a petition committee, the APD, the state attorney, or counsel for the person needing services, see id. §§ 393.11(2), 916.303(2), the court appoints a committee to examine the person’s intellectual abilities....

...§ 393.0651(7). As we have said, the Florida circuit court that makes the first involuntary admission decision retains jurisdiction over the order and it cannot be changed 4 Section 393.11 does not specify whether the residential services are “secure” or “non-secure.” However, Florida Statutes § 916.303(3) allows the court to place a person in a secure facility, rather than a community placement, under a different admission standard and subject to more robust annual review. Compare Fla. Stat. § 916.303(3) with id....

...Although the Florida state circuit court must annually review a client’s placement in a secure setting, Florida law does not require the court to perform an adversarial, state-initiated, periodic review of a client who has been involuntarily admitted to services in a non-secure setting. Compare id. § 916.303(3) (review for secure settings) with id. § 393.11 (admission to residential services)....

...We are also aware that the Florida legislature has required periodic judicial review in other contexts. For example, the District Court recognized that an admitting court may choose to admit an intellectually disabled person into secure residential services under Fla. Stat. § 916.303(3). In that context, the secure placement is reviewed annually at a hearing. Id. § 916.303(3)....

...sons who have developmental disabilities.” Fla. Stat. § 393.063(28). 2 Section 393.11 does not specify whether the residential facilities are “secure” or “non- secure.” But a separate statute not relevant here, Fla. Stat. § 916.303(3), contemplates placement in secure facilities under different admission standards....

...ed keeps jurisdiction over the admission order, and the admitted person “may not be released . . . except by order of the court.” § 393.11(11). And the court is never required to review a continuing involuntary admission. Compare Fla. Stat. § 916.303(3) (mandating that admissions to a secure facility, which are not at issue here, “must be reviewed by the court at least annually at a hearing”), with § 393.11 (containing no similar requirement); see also J.R....

...l illness, which is often curable, and those whose incompetence is due to mental retardation or autism, for which there is no `cure,' the Florida Supreme Court may find it appropriate to consider amending Rule 3.213 to reflect such a distinction."). Section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "[t]he charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice." The present amendment renders the rule consistent with the statute....

...In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Everette's criminal case pursuant to section 916.145, Florida Statutes (1996), committed Everette, pursuant to section 393.11, Florida Statutes, to the Department, and retained jurisdiction over Everette. Section 916.145, which has since been renumbered to section 916.303(a), Florida Statutes (2003), required the dismissal of charges against a defendant who is adjudicated incompetent to stand trial two years after such adjudication....

...ement at the secure facility may be continued if so ordered by the committing court following a hearing with the same due process requirements as set out in s. 393.11 for an initial involuntary admission." § 916.13(b), Fla. Stat. (1996). Currently, section 916.303, Florida Statutes (2003), provides that if charges against an incompetent defendant are dismissed, the department, the state attorney, or the defendant's attorney may ask the trial court to involuntarily commit the defendant pursuant to section 393.11, Florida Statutes. § 916.303(2)(a), Fla....

...ends to transfer Everette from Pathways to a licensed Medicaid waiver group home, "Baker Group Home, Inc." located in Miami, Florida. On August 2, 2004, the trial court held a hearing and determined that it needed to schedule an annual hearing under section 916.303(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), to determine whether Everette still met the criteria for secure residential placement....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee; Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent. *873 MINER, J. Petitioner, Lawanda Byrd, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's decision to deny her motion to dismiss without prejudice, which was filed pursuant to section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

PER CURIAM. Kenneth Ray Henry petitions this Court for certiorari review of the denial of his motion to dismiss under section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2013)....

...We grant the petition and remand for dismissal of the charges without prejudice-to the State to refile should Henry become competent in, the future. On May 17, 2013, Henry was found incompetent to proceed due to intellectual *929 disability. On May 18, 2015, he filed for dismissal of the charges without prejudice under section 916.303(1)....

...egarding Henry’s competency. Denial of the motion to dismiss would be permitted only if the court specified its reasons for determining that Henry would become competent in the foreseeable future and provided an expected timeframe- for competency. § 916.303(1), Fla....

...The fundamental issue presented in these petitions was whether, under the Florida Statutes, the sheriff and not DCF was the party responsible for Everette's transport to and from the court-ordered evaluations. DCF asserted that because the trial court ordered Everette's involuntary commitment to a secure facility pursuant to section 916.303(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2004), Everette is therefore a "forensic client" under chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes whose transportation is to be coordinated by the sheriff according to the dictates of section 916.107(10), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...ompetent to proceed due to mental deficiency or illness. See ch. 916, Fla. Stat. (2004). When a mentally retarded individual engages in conduct that results in criminal charges, chapter 916 has direct application. See § 916.3012, Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 916.303 addresses the dismissal of charges against persons deemed incompetent to proceed due to mental retardation. See § 916.303, Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 916.303(1) directs that charges shall be dismissed if a person remains incompetent to proceed for a period of two years after the initial incompetency determination. See § 916.303(1), Fla....

...(2004) ("The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to retardation or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice to the state if the defendant remains incompetent to proceed within a reasonable time after such determination, not to exceed 2 years. . . ."). Section 916.303(2)(a) states: If the charges are dismissed and if the defendant is considered to lack sufficient capacity to give express and informed consent to a voluntary application for services and lacks the basic survival and self-care skills t...

...himself or herself or *276 others if allowed to remain at liberty, the department, the state attorney, or the defendant's attorney may apply to the committing court to involuntarily admit the defendant to residential services pursuant to s. 393.11. § 916.303(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 916.303(2)(b) provides: If the defendant is considered to need involuntary residential services under s....

...on under s. 393.11, the state attorney, the defendant's counsel, the petitioning commission, or the department may also petition the committing court to continue the defendant's placement in a secure facility or program pursuant to this section. See § 916.303(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). [3] The plain language of section 916.303(2)(b) seems to only apply to the continuation of secure placement. Chapter 393 does not even mention secure placement, and, therefore, it appears that section 916.303(2)(b) does not apply to a person originally committed under section 393.11....

...acement of mentally retarded individuals once the criminal charges against the individual have been dismissed. This statutory scheme is far from a picture of clarity in my view. However, because such continued secure placement is clearly governed by section 916.303(2)(b), it is a reasonable conclusion and interpretation that chapter 916 applies to such individuals even after the criminal charges against them are dismissed....

...Contrary to the views of the majority here, chapter 916 contemplates that if a mentally retarded individual engages in conduct which produces criminal charges, that person becomes a defendant, and the label of defendant includes that person even after the criminal charges against him or her are dismissed. See § 916.303(2)(a)-(b), Fla....

...erned by chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes, and chapter 916 continues to govern the treatment of such an individual after the criminal charges against them are dismissed where the individual's placement in a secure facility is extended pursuant to section 916.303(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2004) and ordered by the trial court....

...by chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes, and chapter 916 continues to govern the treatment of such an individual after the criminal charges against him or her are dismissed where the individual's placement in a secure facility is extended pursuant to section 916.303(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2004) and ordered by the trial court....

...d incompetent due to mental illness and increased the time after which charges must be dismissed from two years to five years for such persons. See ch. 98-92, § 18, at 718, Laws of Fla.; § 916.145, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In that same chapter law, section 916.303 was created and subsection (1) addressed the dismissal of charges against persons adjudicated incompetent due to mental retardation or autism and maintained the two-year deadline for the dismissal of charges. See ch. 98-92, § 27, at 724, Laws of Fla.; § 916.303(1), Fla....

...Although this Court recognizes that APD is the real party in interest, for the sake of consistency between this decision and the decision of the Third District below, this opinion will continue to refer to DCF as the State agency involved in this dispute. [3] Sections 916.303(2)(a) and 916.303(2)(b) were amended and renumbered in 2006. See ch. 2006-195, § 21, at 2063, Laws of Fla.; § 916.303(2)-(3), Fla....

dismiss without prejudice, filed pursuant to section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2015). Based upon the

...must either institute civil commitment proceedings or release” him. Mosher v. State, 876 So. 2d 1230, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (footnote omitted). Lastly, we reject the State’s argument that Williams is not entitled to dismissal of his charges because the two-year limit under section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes, has yet to expire. Section 916.303(1) mandates dismissal “within a reasonable time” after a determination of incompetency, “not to exceed 2 years,” unless the trial court specifies reasons indicating that the defendant will soon become competent....

...Catherine L. Combee, Judge. May 31, 2024 PER CURIAM. Antonio Reyes Reina petitions this Court for certiorari relief, seeking to quash two orders: (1) an order denying his motion to dismiss under section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2023); and (2) an order appointing a committee to re-evaluate his competency....

...Reina participated in a competency restoration program and was evaluated several times over two years, during which the incompetency determination remained untouched. In 2023, more than two years after being declared incompetent, Reina filed a motion to dismiss under section 916.303(1), which states: The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to intellectual disability or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice to the state if...

...for when that might be, the trial court entered an order denying Reina’s motion to dismiss and an order requiring re-evaluation of Reina’s competency. Reina takes 2 issue with the trial court’s failure to make findings in accordance section 916.303(1) and its entry of the consequent orders. For certiorari relief, a petitioner must establish: “1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law; 2) resulting material injury for the rest of the trial; 3) that cannot be remedied on post-judgment appeal.” Regala v....

...ircumstances is if “its order specifies its reasons for believing that the defendant will become competent to proceed within the foreseeable future and specifies the time within which the defendant is expected to become competent to proceed.” § 916.303(1), Fla....

...The trial court did not find that Reina will be competent in the foreseeable future, nor did it specify a time when Reina would regain competency; it stated only that Reina has “made improvements” and was “cooperative.” Because the trial court failed to make the necessary findings under section 916.303(1), it departed from the essential requirements of law....

...Id. (discussing §§ 393.11(9)(b), 393.115, Fla. Stat.). The Eleventh Circuit also noted “that the Florida legislature has required periodic judicial review in other contexts,” such as secure detention of intellectually disabled persons under section 916.303(3), Florida Statutes, involuntary commitment of persons with mental illness under sections 394.4655(7) and 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, and involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators under sections 394.918(1), (3), Florida Statutes....

...w specifically address the periodic judicial review of various types of involuntary commitment orders. The Legislature has specifically addressed periodic judicial review in the context of secure detention of intellectually disabled persons under section 916.303(3), involuntary commitments of persons with mental illness under sections 394.4655(7) and 394.467(7), Florida Statutes, and involuntary commitments of sexually violent predators under sections 394.918(1), (3), Florida Statutes. Th...

...The petitioner argues that the trial court departed from the essential elements of law by using section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), to determine that it still had jurisdiction to keep him placed in a secure residential facility based on section 916.303(3), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...The petitioner argued that each of his prior charges had a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison and he had been placed in a secure residential facility for more than fifteen years. The petitioner argued that the trial court only had jurisdiction for fifteen years based on section 916.303(3). The trial court denied the motion finding that it had jurisdiction for thirty years based on the court’s ability to structure sentences consecutively in accordance with section 775.021(4)(a), which prompted the petitioner to fil...

...Certiorari jurisdiction also lies when a petitioner alleges that a trial court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Carmona, 159 So. 3d 165, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). The petitioner’s argument is predicated on the language contained in section 916.303(3)....

...meanings in the same language. Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Clipper Bay Invs., LLC, 160 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2015). When there is an ambiguity, a court may look to the cannons of statutory interpretation and construction. Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774, 777 (Fla. 2012). Section 916.303(3), states in relevant part: A defendant’s placement in a secure facility may not exceed the maximum sentence for the crime for which the defendant was charged. The phrase “maximum sentence” is not defined in chapter 916. The phrase “maximum sentence” also means “maximum sentences” based on section 1.01(1), Florida Statutes (2017). Based on the plain language of the relevant portion of section 916.303(3), one could interpret the phrase “maximum sentence(s)” in two different ways. One interpretation is the maximum sentence a defendant could receive for each individual crime charged, and the other interpretation is the maximum allowable sentence based on a trial court’s sentencing structure. Since the relevant portion of section 916.303(3) is ambiguous, this Court resorts to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction. The legislative intent for chapter 916 is stated in section 916.105, Florida Statutes (2017)....

...The rule of lenity is a canon of last resort that requires any ambiguity in the statute to be resolved in favor of a defendant. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 2008). The rule of lenity applies to statutes that criminalize or penalize criminal behavior. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 342 (1981). Section 916.303 states: (1) The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to intellectual disability or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice to the state if the defendant remains incompetent to proce...

...state attorney and the defendant’s attorney. A defendant’s placement in a secure facility may not exceed the maximum sentence for the crime for which the defendant was charged. 5  Based on the plain language contained in section 916.303, the statute does not criminalize behavior. The petitioner has argued that it punishes him because his liberty has been taken away. Section 916.303(1) specifically allows charges to be reinstated if the petitioner becomes competent. If section 916.303 punishes criminal behavior, then the reinstatement of charges at a later date would be a violation of the principles against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy arguments have been advanced by civilly committed individuals and have been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court....

...at 361-62. Finding no evidence of retribution or deterrence in the Act and that the Act was civil in nature, the United States Supreme Court found that the Act did not violate the principles against double jeopardy. Id. at 369-71. Even though section 916.303 is contained in the criminal procedure and corrections section, that label is not definitive. Upon examining sections 916.303 and 916.105, we find no evidence of retribution or deterrence. Since there is no evidence of an intent to punish a person who has been committed with the aid of section 916.303 and no evidence that section 916.303 criminalizes behavior, section 775.021(1) does not apply. Based on the foregoing, we find that the Legislature intended section 775.021(4)(a) to be applied when determining the maximum sentence referred to in section 916.303(3)....

...n of an occupied dwelling, burglary of a dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and two counts of arson. However, on April 28, 2016, the trial court adjudicated Appellant incompetent to proceed and dismissed his charges without prejudice pursuant to section 916.303, Florida Statutes (2016)....

...solely for the purpose of protecting the public from further criminal activity) for up to two years if mentally retarded or five years if mentally ill upon the commission of a new offense while on pretrial release. See § 916.145, Fla. Stat. (2012); § 916.303(1), Fla....

...or further proceedings. Drayton was charged in 1998 with lewd act on a child and lewd assault in the presence of a child, and in 1999 with burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. The charges were dismissed without prejudice in April 2006 pursuant to section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2005), and Drayton was released from State custody....

...2 In July 2007, the trial court entered an order for Drayton’s temporary commitment to secure placement with APD, stating that commitment was contingent upon the filing and resolution of an involuntary admission petition filed pursuant to sections 916.303 and 393.11, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Geesey, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for respondent. GROSS, J. Kendrick Joseph petitions for a writ of certiorari to quash June 19, 2014 orders denying his motion to dismiss in five pending felony cases. He contends that he is entitled to dismissals pursuant to section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2013), which provides: The charges against any defendant found to be incompetent to proceed due to intellectual disability or autism shall be dismissed without prejudice to the state if the defend...

...Most likely, the reason that the reports don’t use the magic words “intellectual disability” is because these don’t appear in the statute until 2013, when an amendment changed “mental retardation or autism” to “intellectual disability or autism” in section 916.303(1), Florida Statutes (2013). No testing was done of any significance to determine his intellectual capacity until 2014....

...felony mental health court where he was placed on conditional release and ordered to reside in a group home. The trial court later found that Tillman was not restorable to competency, prompting Tillman to request dismissal of his charges pursuant to section 916.303, Florida Statutes (2014), for incompetency due to intellectual disability. He asserted that section 916.303 required the dismissal of the charges because there was no reasonable belief that he could be restored to competency within a specific time frame. The State petitioned to have Tillman involuntarily committed to the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD”), and placed in a group home with 24-hour supervision pursuant to section 916.303(2) and section 916.3025, Florida Statutes (2014). The State also requested the appointment of an examining committee to determine whether Tillman met the criteria for involuntary admission to residential services pursuant to section 393.11, Florida Statutes (2014), and section 916.303(2)....

...ion to residential services. After Tillman’s refusal to cooperate delayed the completion of the evaluation, the attorney representing APD advised the court that it could commit Tillman without an examination by an examining committee, arguing that section 916.303 did not require an examining committee be appointed, and noting a physician appointed by APD, Dr....

...(2014). Involuntary admission to residential services can be *309 initiated by either a petition filed by a petitioning commission under section 393.11(2), or by a motion ñled by APD, the state attorney, or by counsel for the person needing services. § 916.303(2), Fla. Stat. Section 916.303(2) states: (2) If the charges are dismissed and if the defendant is considered to lack sufficient capacity to give express and informed consent to a voluntary application for services and lacks the basic survival and self-care skills...

...njure himself or herself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, the agency, the state attorney, or the defendant’s attorney shall apply to the committing court to involuntarily admit the defendant to residential services pursuant to s. 393.11. § 916.303(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). Section 916.303(3) provides, in pertinent part: (3) If the defendant is considered to need involuntary residential services for reasons described in subsection (2) and, further, there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant will injure another...

...less restrictive alternatives ... have been judged to be inappropriate, the agency, the state attorney, or the defendant’s counsel may request the committing court to continue the defendant’s placement in a secure facility pursuant to this part. § 916.303(3), Fla....

...In Everette , we noted that section 393.11, Florida Statutes, under which Everett as well as Respondent herein were involuntarily committed, did not provide any guidance as to who was responsible for an individual’s transportation. See id. at 120 . However, because Everett concerned a statutorily-mandated evaluation under section 916.303(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), to determine whether Everett continued to meet the criteria for secure residential placement, we found that section 916.107(10), Florida Statutes (2004), governed the issue of who was responsible for providing transportation, namely the Sheriffs Office....