Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...2d DCA 1996), which declared section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1995), unconstitutionally vague. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse. FACTS Petitioner, a minor, was charged with and convicted of possessing a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife. The trial court found that petitioner's knife was too large to be considered a "common pocketknife," and was therefore a "weapon" within the meaning of sections 790.001(13) and 790.115(2)....

...e ordered to be discharged. KOGAN, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] The statute reads: "A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop...." § 790.115(2), Fla....

...rt in Florida constitutes a "decision of the highest state court empowered to hear the cause." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So.2d 286, 287 (Fla.1988). [3] The juvenile in L.B. was charged with possession of a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...e, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife. The trial court found that petitioner's knife was too large to be considered a *742 "common pocketknife," and was therefore a "weapon" within the meaning of sections 790.001(13) and 790.115(2)....

...[15] It should be noted that in reported opinions issued in the almost five years since L.B., the Second District opinion in this case is the sole reported appellate decision discussing the retroactivity of L.B. [16] Subsequent to L.B., the Legislature amended section 790.115, Florida Statutes, to specifically prohibit any "knife" from being exhibited on school grounds....

...Beavin of Sparkman & Quinn, Naples, for Appellee. FULMER, Judge. The State appeals from the trial court's order dismissing a delinquency petition that charged A.M. with exhibition of a weapon on school grounds. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. Section 790.115(1), Florida Statutes (1997), prohibits the exhibition of "any sword, sword cane, firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon, including a razor blade, box cutter, or knife ......

...The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because the statutory definition of weapon found in section 790.001(13) is not applicable in this case. It asserts that the reference to pocketknives found in that section, and discussed in L.B., no longer applies to exempt pocketknives from section 790.115(1) because the legislature amended section 790.115 effective October 1, 1997, to expand the definition of prohibited items, and to specifically prohibit any "knife" from being exhibited on school grounds. We agree with the State that pursuant to the October 1997 amendment to section 790.115, [1] any "knife," which we read to include even a "common pocketknife," is prohibited on school grounds....

...Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Susan D. Dunlevy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *1180 FRANK, Judge. L.B., a juvenile, challenges her conviction for possessing a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...2d DCA 1996), which declared section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1995), unconstitutionally vague. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we reverse. FACTS Petitioner, a minor, was charged with and convicted of possessing a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife. The trial court found that petitioner’s knife was too large to be considered a “common pocketknife,” and was therefore a “weapon” within the meaning of sections 790.001(13) and 790.115(2)....

...ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion in which KOGAN, C.J., concurs. . The statute reads: "A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop....” § 790.115(2), Fla....

...Under this analysis, we agree that J.D.L.R.'s knife was not a "common pocketknife". Although the facts in the instant case were similar to those in L.B., the knife in question was not. J.D.L.R., like L.B., was arrested for carrying a weapon—a knife—on school grounds in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which prohibits a person from possessing a "weapon" on school property....

...DAUKSCH, J., concurs, with opinion. DAUKSCH, J., concurring specially. The question in this appeal is whether a person may lawfully possess a common pocketknife on school property, or at a school bus stop. The answer is no, unless "as authorized in school sanctioned activities." § 790.115(2)(a)....

...was found guilty of possessing a BB gun on school property and adjudicated delinquent. On appeal, K.C. argues that the evidence failed to establish that his BB gun was a deadly weapon so as to bring it within the statute charged in the petition for delinquency. We agree and reverse. K.C. was charged with violating section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2009), which provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

...ar gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon.” Since a BB gun is not one of the items enumerated in section 790.001(13), it must be a “deadly weapon” to fall within the scope of section 790.001(13) and thus within the scope of section 790.115(2)....

...eapon or firearm in a vehicle and- to prevent the punishment of any student for the same. The appellees moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that UNF was authorized to regulate firearms possession and storage on school property in accordance with section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2011). UNF maintained that the regulation was authorized under section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that firearms may not be possessed on school property except when securely encased in a vehicle, but that “school districts” may adopt policies to waive the secure encasement exception....

...After hearings on the motions, the trial court denied the appellants’ motion for temporary injunction and granted the ap-pellees’ motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that applying the appellants’ definition of “school district” to section 790.115 would permit only public schools to regulate firearms on their property and frustrate the clearly expressed intent of the legislature to cover all schools as the term “school” was broadly defined in section 790.115(2)(a)....

...etermined it is lawful to carry a weapon or firearm securely encased in a vehicle and that right should be liberally construed; and (3) that the legislature has not granted any affirmative authority to UNF to waive the secure encasement provision in section 790.115(2)(a)3....

...Haridopolos, 108 So.3d 597 (Fla.2013),] and NAACP, Inc. v. Florida Board of Regents, 876 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), to adopt a noncriminal policy or regulation concerning the possession of firearms on campus, irrespective of any right it may have under section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes, to waive the exception that would allow a student to possess a firearm in a vehicle? *970 2....

...Does the provision of the student handbook at issue in this case qualify as an “ordinance,” “rule,” or “administrative regulation” within the meaning of section 790.33, Florida Statutes? The panel then requested supplemental briefing from the parties on the questions above. Analysis I. Section 790.115, Florida Statutes We first emphasize that the only legal question presented, argued, and decided by the trial court was whether section 790.115 allowed UNF to prohibit a student, who was otherwise lawfully able to possess a firearm, from keeping said firearm securely encased in her vehicle in a campus parking lot. In its answer brief before this court, UNF advanced only its views regarding the interpretation of section 790.115. The legislature has provided that a person shall not possess a firearm on school property unless part of a school-sponsored event. See § 790.115(2)(a), Fla....

...This section defines “school” broadly to encompass preschool and elementary through secondary schools as well as career centers and post-secondary schools, whether public or private. See id. Importantly, the legislature also provided exceptions to this general prohibition. See § 790.115(2)(a)l.-3., Fla....

...l be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.” § 790.25(4), Fla. Stat. (2011). While it provides an exception to the general prohibition, section 790.115(2)(a)3. also contains a waiver provision providing that “school districts may adopt written and published policies that waive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges.” § 790.115(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2011). The statute clearly grants school districts the power to waive the exception — not colleges or universities. UNF attempted to exercise this waiver in adopting the operative regulation; however, UNF is not a “school district.” Section 790.115 only uses the term “school district” once; outside of subsection 790.115(2)(a)3., the statute uses the word “school” alone. UNF, as a public post-secondary school, falls within the definition of a “school” in section 790.115(2)(a), but that does not mean that it also falls within the definition of “school district,” a term that is not defined in section 790.115....

...7(e)-(d), Fla. Const.; Ch. 1001, Part IV, Fla. Stat. (2011). Thus, by law, “school districts” are distinct legal entities that do not operate and control state universities. Also significant here, the term “school district” is only used in subsection 790.115(2)(a)3. while the rest of section 790.115 simply uses the term “school.” Where the legislature includes wording in one section of a statute and not in another, it is presumed to have been intentionally excluded....

...Thus here, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to grant the power to issue waivers solely to “school districts” not individual “schools.” This court is almost in full agreement that UNF does not qualify as a “school district” under section 790.115; therefore, UNF does not have the authority to waive itself out of the requirements of section 790.25, which gives Lainez the right to carry a securely encased firearm in her vehicle. Where we differ is in our consid *972 eration of the constitutional issue raised by the original panel. II. The Dissent The dissent implicitly concedes that statutory interpretation of section 790.115 would require reversal. However, the dissent bypasses any error in the trial court’s legal analysis of section 790.115(2)(a)3....

...The dissent maintains that the regulation at issue is a condition on the exercise of a “privilege” rather than a restriction on a fundamental constitutional right. Its analysis thus characterizes the regulation at issue as noncriminal. However, by waiving the secure encasement exception under section 790.115, the regulation here purports to subject a person with a firearm securely encased in his or her vehicle to a potential third-degree felony charge for a violation. See § 790.115(2)(c)l., Fla....

...We recognize that section 1001.706(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), gives the board of gov *976 ernors the authority to restrict the use of firearms, food, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages, among other things. However, this provision must be read in pari matea-ría with section 790.115....

...and securely keep firearms and ammunition locked within his or her motor vehicle by virtue of becoming a customer, employee, or invitee of any employer or business establishment within the state, unless specifically required by state or federal law. Section 790.115 strikes a similar balance when it prohibits firearms from school property except when securely encased within a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5). III. The Concurrences All of the concurring judges agree with the interpretation of section 790.115 above....

...United Auto. Ins. Co., 103 So.3d 866, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing State v. Baez, 894 So.2d 115, 121 (Fla.2004) (Pariente, C.J., dissenting)). IV. Conclusion In conclusion, the trial court incorrectly construed the meaning of “school district” in section 790.115. While school districts may adopt a waiver disallowing securely encased firearms in vehicles parked on campuses under their authority, neither UNF nor the UNF Board of Trustees qualifies as a school district under section 790.115(2)(a)3....

...anner of bearing arms, that UF had passed rules or regulations expressly prohibited by section 790.33, that section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that a person may possess a firearm in his or her home or place of business, and that section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2013), which prohibits firearms on school property with certain exceptions, is in conflict 'with section 790.25(3)(n)....

...n their homes, regardless of ownership by a public entity.” Appellant again sought the repeal of “enjoined rules and regulations.” *141 Appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment. As to Appellant’s housing claim, Appellees relied upon section 790.115, Florida Statutes, and the Legislature’s prohibition of firearms on school grounds....

...lleged a Second Amendment violation under the United States Constitution. While noting that Appellees were not disputing “whether or not campus housing includes a home within the meaning” of section 790.25(3)(n), Appellees’ counsel argued that section 790.115 governed the issue at hand and clearly prohibited firearms anywhere on school property with the limited exceptions set forth in the statute....

...anted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. As for Appellant’s claim that UF’s prohibition of firearms in university housing violated Florida law, the trial court recognized that the issue raised the interplay between sections 790.25(3)(n) and 790.115, Florida Statutes....

...in essence a home for students, and the University is, therefore, not authorized to prohibit students from having firearms in residence hall rooms on university property without violating their right to bear arms at home. Plaintiff acknowledges that § 790.115 prohibits firearms on university property, but contends that the right to have a firearm at home supersedes this prohibition....

...It is difficult to argue with Plaintiffs characterization of a residence hall room as a type of home, and Defendants do not take issue with this characterization in their motion for summary judgment. However, the Court finds Defendants’ arguments persuasive with respect to how the subject statutes should be reconciled. The Section 790.115(2)(a) prohibition against firearms on school property includes university property as recognized by Florida Carry/UNF. But, unlike the right to have a firearm in a vehicle, the legislature’s recognition of a person’s right to possess a firearm in a home does not *142 extend to a residence hall on a university campus. There is no exception in § 790.115(2) for a residence hall like there is for a vehicle....

...(b) The protections of this section do not apply to the following: 1. A person who has been adjudged mentally incompetent, who is addicted to the use of narcotics or any similar drug, or who is a habitual or chronic alcoholic, or a person using weapons or firearms in violation of ss. 790.07-790.115, 790.145-790.19, 790.22-790.24; [[Image here]] (3) LAWFUL USES....

...nterior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use.... (Emphasis added). The statute was enacted in 1965. See Ch. 65-410, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2013), which is entitled “Possessing or discharging weapons or firearms at a school-sponsored event or on school property prohibited; penalties; exceptions,” provides in part as follows: (2)(a) A person shall no...

...school, junior high school, secondary school, career center, or postsecondary school, whether public or nonpublic. (Emphasis added). The statute was enacted in 1992. See 92-130, § 4, Laws of Fla. In attempting to reconcile section 790.25(3)(n) with section 790.115(2)(a), we are guided by the fact that the Legislature, based upon the plain language of section 790.115(2)(a), clearly intended to make it unlawful for individuals to possess firearms and other weapons “on the property of any school,” including “postsecond-ary school[s], whether public or nonpublic.” In enacting section 790.115 twenty-seven years after the enactment of section 790.25, the Legislature chose to include in subsection (2)(a) three exceptions to the prohibition on firearms on campus, thereby permitting the carrying of firearms in a case to a fire...

...case to a career center having a firearms training range, or in a vehicle. It is significant to our conclusion in this case that the Legislature cited and relied upon section 790.25(5), the provision allowing for firearms in private conveyances, in section 790.115(2)(a)3. when it made an exception for vehicles on school property. Had the Legislature viewed section 790.25 as preempting section 790.115 based on the “supersede” language in section 790.25(4), the exception as to vehicles in section 790.115 would have been unnecessary. More significant is the fact that the Legis *145 lature made no such exception for university housing in section 790.115....

...Prior to 2006, the statute listed under “[u]ses not authorized” “a person using weapons or firearms in violation of ss. 790.07-790.12, 790.14-790. 19., 790.22-790.24.” In 2006, the Legislature deleted the reference to sections 790.07-790.12 and 790.14-790.19 and added the reference to sections 790.07-790.115 and sections 790.145-790.19....

...te also now provides that possession of firearms on school property is not authorized. While Appellant is correct that the primary basis for the amendment was to address the prohibition on carrying firearms in national forests, the fact remains that section 790.115 was specifieally included under the section detailing unauthorized uses....

...iversity may not prohibit the carrying of a securely encased firearm within a motor vehicle that is parked in university campus parking. See Fla. Carry, Inc., 133 So.3d at 968 . In reaching this decision, we relied upon the exception provided for in section 790.115(2)(a)3, and we concluded that a college is not a “school district” as that term is used in the exception....

...There are certain places where firearms can be legally prohibited, but the legislature has recognized that a citizen who is going to be in one of these places should be able to keep a firearm securely encased within his or her vehicle. Id. at' 975-76. Here, as stated, the Legislature made no exception in section 790.115 pertaining to university housing....

...UF’s rules and regulations prohibiting firearms in university housing, which are not in conflict with the statutes at issue or the Florida Constitution, also clearly relate to campus safety. Appellant argues that we must reconcile sections 790.25(3)(n) and 790.115(2)(a) by concluding that section 790.25(3)(n) controls the issue of whether individuals in university housing may possess firearms based upon ,the language contained in section 790.25(4) that “[t]his act shall supersede any law, ordinance,...

...older statutes.” Fla. Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So.3d 97, 102 (Fla.2014). “‘The more recently enacted provision may be viewed as the clearest and most recent expression of legislative , intent.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). As we stated, section 790.115(2)(a), the later-enacted statute in this case, clearly prohibits firearms on university property and makes no exception for firearms in university housing....

...housing, our interpretation of the pertinent statutes leads us to the conclusion that it has not yet done so. To read section 790.25(3)(n) to include university housing would, in our opinion, result in an improper ‘judicially-created exception to section 790.115....

...A legislative staff analysis for the companion Senate bill explained that section 2 of the law "[ajmends s. 790.25, F.S. to clarify that the protections provided for lawful ownership, possession and use of firearms and other weapons do not apply for persons violating ss. 790.07-790.115, F.S....

SLEET, Judge. C.W. appeals the disposition order placing him on probation for an indefinite period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday and withholding adjudication for the delinquent act of possession of a weapon on school property. See § 790.115(2)(b), *844 Fla....

...We apply a de novo standard of review for a motion for judgment of dismissal *936 in a juvenile case. See J.P. v. State, 855 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The motion tests the legal sufficiency of the state's evidence. Because the state's evidence was legally sufficient, we affirm. Section 790.115(2) prohibits the possession of a firearm "or other weapon as defined in s....

...rked. He testified that a shot from the gun could put someone's eye out. In T.H. v. State, 859 So.2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), we held that evidence that the gun could damage an eye was sufficient to prove that the BB gun was a weapon for purposes of section 790.115(2)....

...himself admitted to the officer that he had fired the gun. Therefore, this too supported a finding that the BB gun was capable of producing great bodily harm. We distinguish our recent case of J.M.P. v. State, 43 So.3d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). There, the juvenile was also charged with a violation of section 790.115(2) by bringing a BB gun to school....

...it would inflict. [1] In this case, the officer testified both as to how the gun operates and the injury it could inflict. *937 To summarize, we hold that in a prosecution for possession of a BB gun on school premises in violation of Florida Statute 790.115(2), where the state introduces the BB gun into evidence and offers testimony regarding its operation and the extent of harm which can be caused by a BB gun, the state has presented legally sufficient evidence to avoid a judgment of dismissal....

CIKLIN, J. In this juvenile delinquency matter, D.C. was charged by petition for delinquency with possession of a firearm on school property pursuant to section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...1 The court mistakenly believed the crime of carrying a concealed firearm was a lesser included offense of the original charge. See James v. State, 16. So.3d 322, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“[T]he definition of ‘possession’ is different from and broader than the definition of ‘carrying.’ ”); § 790.115(2)(a), Fla....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. KLEIN, J. A.B. was found with a knife at his middle school and charged with possession of a weapon on school campus in violation of section 790.115(2)(a), which provides in part: A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive *1242 device, or other weapon, including a razor blade, box cutter, or knife, except as authorized in support of school-sanc...

...k, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or any other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common pocketknife. He then argues that his knife was merely a "common pocket knife," and he did not therefore violate section 790.115(2)(a). [1] We disagree with appellant that the definition of a weapon means that common pocket knives are not knives within the meaning of section 790.115(2)(a). A weapon is one thing, and a knife is another. If the legislature had intended to exclude common pocket knives from section 790.115(2)(a), which became effective in 1997, it knew how to do so, as exemplified by the previously existing definition of weapon contained in section 790.001(13)....

...State, 732 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999): The question in this appeal is whether a person may lawfully possess a common pocketknife on school property, or at a school bus stop. The answer is no, unless "as authorized in school sanctioned activities." § 790.115(2)(a)....

STEVENSON, J. J.M.P. was charged in a petition for delinquency with violating section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2008) (“[possessing or discharging weapons or firearms at a school-sponsored event or on school property prohibited”), because she brought a BB gun to school. The trial court found J.M.P. guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but we reverse because the State failed to present evidence that the BB gun at issue fit within the parameters of the statute with which J.M.P. was charged. Section 790.115 is directed at preventing visitors, students and other unauthorized persons from bringing weapons or firearms onto school property. The term “weapon” is distinctly defined in the statute. Section 790.115(2)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

...A “weapon” is defined in section 790.001(13) as “any dirk, knife, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical weapon or device, or other deadly weapon.” § 790.001(13), Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). Again, since a BB gun is not enumerated, in order to be prohibited under section 790.115(2), the subsection charged, it must be a deadly weapon....

...TAYLOR and MAY, JJ., concur. . A BB gun is not a firearm. See Petz v. State, 917 So.2d 381, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Wilson v. State, 901 So.2d 885, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). . We emphasize that while a BB gun could be included within the weapons prohibited by section 790.115(2), the State here failed in its burden to show that the BB gun in question met the statutory criteria. Of course, the Legislature may choose to enumerate BB guns as prohibited weapons under the statutory scheme of section 790.115 and, thus, eliminate the State’s burden to prove their harmful propensities....

...indicated that he brought the knife to school and intended to use it for protection against a bully. An investigation resulted in C.R. being charged by petition for juvenile delinquency with possession of a weapon on school property, in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2008), which states, in pertinent part: [a] person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s. 790.001(13), including a razor blade or box cutter, except as authorized in support of school-sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event or on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop.... § 790.115(2)(a), Fla....

...We apply a de novo standard of review for a motion for judgment of dis *936 missal in a juvenile case. See J.P. v. State, 855 So.2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The motion tests the legal sufficiency of the state’s evidence. Because the state’s evidence was legally sufficient, we affirm. Section 790.115(2) prohibits the possession of a firearm “or other weapon as defined in s....

...ed. He testified that a shot from the gun could put someone’s eye out. In T.H. v. State, 859 So.2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), we held that evidence that the gun could damage an eye was sufficient to prove that the BB gun was a weapon for purposes of section 790.115(2)....

...himself admitted to the officer that he had fired the gun. Therefore, this too supported a finding that the BB gun was capable of producing great bodily harm. We distinguish our recent case of J.M.P. v. State, 43 So.3d 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). There, the juvenile was also charged with a violation of section 790.115(2) by bringing a BB gun to school....

...y it would inflict. 1 In this case, the officer testified both as to how the gun operates and the injury it could inflict. *937 To summarize, we hold that in a prosecution for possession of a BB gun on school premises in violation of Florida Statute 790.115(2), where the state introduces the BB gun into evidence and offers testimony regarding its operation and the extent of harm which can be caused by a BB gun, the state has presented legally sufficient evidence to avoid a judgment of dismissal....

...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant. Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Anne C. Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant, J.M., a juvenile, was charged with and found guilty of (I) possession of a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2)(b) or 790.115(2)(c), Florida Statutes; and (II) intentional assault with a knife, a deadly weapon without intent to kill, in violation of section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes....

PER CURIAM. Appellant, J.M., a juvenile, was charged with and found guilty of (I) possession of a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2)(b) or 790.115(2)(c), Florida Statutes; and (II) intentional assault with a knife, a deadly weapon without intent to kill, in violation of section 784.021(l)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Joseph A. Bosco of Joseph A. Bosco, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. CIKLIN, J. In this juvenile delinquency matter, D.C. was charged by petition for delinquency with possession of a firearm on school property pursuant to section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...[1] The court mistakenly believed the crime of carrying a concealed firearm was a lesser included offense of the original charge. See James v. State, 16 So.3d 322, 326 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("[T]he definition of `possession' is different from and broader than the definition of `carrying.'"); § 790.115(2)(a), Fla....

LEVINE, J. The issue presented is whether the appellant violated section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2009), by possessing a common pocketknife on school property....

...The school resource officer measured the pocketknife in the courtroom and confirmed its size as being three-and-a-quarter inches in length. At the end of trial, R.H. moved for judgment of dismissal under Rule 8.110(k), on the basis that possession of a pocketknife, as defined under section 790.001(13), is not a violation of section 790.115(2)....

...“If the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the state does not support a conviction, the motion must be granted. If the state establishes the existence of each element of the crime charged, then the motion must be denied.” T.L.T. v. State, 53 So.3d 1100 , (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). R.H. was charged with violating section 790.115(2), which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s. 790.001(13), including a razor blade or box cutter, except as authorized in support of school-sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event or on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop.... § 790.115(2)(a), Fla. Stat. In other words, section 790.115(2) specifically prohibits the possession of a weapon as defined by section 790.001(13) on school premises....

...he range of a common pocketknife. Id. at 373 . The trial court, in the present case, correctly found the knife with a three-and-a-quarter inch blade was a “common pocketknife.” The key definitional provision of section 790.001(13), referenced in section 790.115(2), exempts a common pocketknife *158 from the ambit of the statute for which R.H....

...We are therefore compelled to reverse R.H.’s adjudication by the plain language of the statutes. If the legislature wanted to prohibit the possession of a common pocketknife on school premises, the legislature could and would have included the “common pocketknife” in the list of prohibited weapons found in section 790.115(2). Further, the legislature could have removed the defining reference to section 790.001(13) in section 790.115(2) and included a special definition of “weapon” for that section....

...a new disposition hearing. The trial court must either follow the DJJ's probationary recommendation or articulate a legally valid basis for departure from the recommendation. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, TORPY, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 790.115, Fla....

...We conclude, however, that F.D.'s reliance on these cases is misplaced. H.M. was a circumstantial evidence case. We have already noted that this case is not. We, therefore, find that H.M. is inapplicable to our analysis in the instant case. F.D. was charged with possession of a weapon on school property, pursuant to section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2005), which is a general intent crime....

...t erred in failing to specify when community control terminated. Because we find that the first issue requires reversal, we do not reach the second issue. *845 The State charged M.C.M. with possession of a firearm on school property, in violation of section 790.115, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...or within 1,000 feet of the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle school, or secondary school, during school hours or during the time of a sanctioned school activity, commits a felony of the third degree...." M.C.M. argues that the State did not prove a prima facie case of a violation of section 790.115(1) because it did not prove that M.C.M....

...However, whether the gun was loaded does not prove or disprove how the gun was handled. While we cannot fathom why any student in these days and times would knowingly drive onto school property in a vehicle containing a firearm, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that M.C.M. violated that portion of section 790.115 which addresses exhibiting a firearm in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner....

...Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to grant a judgment of acquittal. We also note that, if this school district has adopted written and published policies prohibiting carrying a firearm in a vehicle on school property, the State could have charged M.C.M. with violating section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), also a third-degree felony....

...he placement of the child on probation, but remand for the trial court to correct the delinquency disposition order to reflect that the offense, possession of a weapon on school property, is a third degree felony, not a first degree misdemeanor. See § 790.115(2)(b), Fla, Stat....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. GRIFFIN, J. Appellant, Stephen Belcher, entered a no contest plea to the charge of possession of a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (2009), reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge....

...the motion because Appellant was on probation and not permitted to possess any weapons. Appellant then entered a plea of nolo contendere to possession of a weapon on school property, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), makes it a felony to possess a firearm on the grounds of any school, with exceptions. Specifically, section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes provides in part: (2)(a) A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

FRANK, Judge. L.B., a juvenile, challenges her conviction for possessing a weapon on school property in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...apon at a school bus stop. The appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to prove that the unloaded BB gun seen on his person was a “weapon” under Florida law. We agree with the appellant and reverse. The state charged the appellant under section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides that “[a] person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

...a weapon at a school bus stop. The appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to prove that the unloaded BB gun seen on his person was a "weapon" under Florida law. We agree with the appellant and reverse. The state charged the appellant under section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), which provides that "[a] person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

...Under this analysis, we agree that J.D.L.R.’s knife was not a “common pocketknife”. Although the facts in the instant case were similar to those in L.B., the knife in question was not. J.D.L.R., like L.B., was arrested for carrying a weapon — a knife — on school grounds in violation of section 790.115(2), Florida Statutes (1995), which prohibits a person from possessing a “weapon” on school property....

...This instruction was adopted in 2014. 10.21 IMPROPER EXHIBITION OF A [WEAPON] [FIREARM] [AT A SCHOOL-SPONSORED EVENT] [ON SCHOOL PROPERTY] [ON A SCHOOL BUS] [AT A SCHOOL BUS STOP] [WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL] § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Improper Exhibition of a [Weapon] [Firearm] [Sword] [Sword Cane] [Electric Weapon or Device] [Destructive Device] [at] [on] [within] [(insert prohibited place in Fla. Stat. 790.115(1))], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 1....

...] [sword cane] [electric weapon or device] [destructive device] in necessary self- defense, you must find the defendant not guilty. Read instructions 3.6(f) and/or 3.6(g) as applicable. Definitions. Give as applicable. § 790.001(13) and § 790.115(1), Fla....

...- 11 -  See § 790.001(4), Fla. Stat. for the definition of “destructive device.” Lesser Included Offenses IMPROPER EXHIBITION OF A [WEAPON] [FIREARM] AT SCHOOL – 790.115(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Assault 784.011 8.1 Comments The statute has an exception if the exhibition of the weapon or firearm was authorized and in support of school-sanctioned activities. See § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. This crime does not apply if the exhibition of the weapon or firearm was on private real property, within 1,000 feet of a school, by the owner of the property or by a person who had been authorized, licensed, or invited by the owner to be on the property. See § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. This crime does not apply if the defendant was a law enforcement officer as defined in § 943.10(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), or (14), Fla. Stat. See § 790.115(3), Fla....

...Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. SLEET, Judge. C.W. appeals the disposition order placing him on probation for an indefinite period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday and withholding adjudication for the delinquent act of possession of a weapon on school property. See § 790.115(2)(b), Fla....

...State, 438 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Further, here, Officer Ortiz testified that a shot from a BB gun can damage an eye and, if shot at close range, can penetrate the skin. The trial court did not err in finding that the BB gun was a weapon within the meaning of section 790.115(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), which prohibits the possession of such objects on school grounds....

DAUKSCH, W. SHARP, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . § 790.115(2), Fla.Stat. (1993).

...d filed motions for summary final judgment. Chief Perry submitted an affidavit in support of Appellees’ motion where he attested that prior to the UNF decision, “FSU, like other Florida colleges and universities, believed they were authorized by Section 790.115(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, to waive the requirement that persons be permitted to keep guns in motor vehicles on school property.” Chief Perry’s affidavit also stated that since he became FSU’s police chief in 2006, “FSU has not...

...Appellants did not submit any affidavits regarding the summary judgment motions. After a hearing on the competing motions, the trial court issued an order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on all issues. The trial court concluded that the exceptions in section 790.115(2)(a), which permit certain weapons on school property, did not include an exception for electronic weapons or devices....

...We held that public colleges and universities in Florida are not authorized to adopt regulations regarding possession of firearms or ammunition beyond what is provided by statute. Id. at 972. We further held in UNF that a state university is not a “school district” under the exception in section 790.115(2)(a)3., Florida Statutes, which allows school districts to prohibit otherwise lawful possession of firearms in vehicles....

...dministrative agency head under whose jurisdiction the violation occurred” for “knowing and willful” violations. This subsection is discussed below. 7 described by section 790.06(12)(a)13. The court relied on section 790.115(2)(a), which states in part: A person shall not possess any firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon as defined in s....

...790.001(13), including a razor blade or box cutter, except as authorized in support of school- sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event or on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop . . . In relying solely on this section, the trial court did not give effect to section 790.115(2)(e); overlooked section 790.06(12)(a)13.; and did not follow the often-stated requirement, which we mentioned in UF, that statutes should be read in such a way as to harmonize and reconcile them so as to give effect to all provisions of all statutes if possible. See UF, 180 So. 3d at 142. Section 790.115(2)(e), Florida Statutes (2015), states, “[t]he penalties of this subsection shall not apply to persons licensed under s....

...does not fire a dart or projectile . . . Therefore, reading these statutes together, a registered student, employee, or faculty member who possesses a CWL is allowed by Florida law to carry a defined defensive device on campus. The trial court erred in finding that section 790.115(2)(a) applied to Ms....

...Chadbourne, Inc., 810 So. 2d 1028, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). The Code is a regulation per UNF. Id. at 973. The prohibition on the lawful storage of firearms and ammunition in vehicles directly violates UNF. Id. at 977; see also §§ 790.06(12)(b), 790.115(2)(a)3., & 790.25(5), Fla....

...but he could not find that in the record. We likewise cannot find record support to establish a date when FSU prohibited possession of firearms, which would include a prohibition of possession of firearms in vehicles as otherwise allowed by sections 790.115(2)(a) and 790.25(5)....

being in possession of the *1265same weapon. Section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), prohibiting

...Brice possessed or carried a firearm, as applicable, and some additional element: the possession of a firearm on school property count required that the possession be on school property, § 790.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2013); the trespass on school property with a firearm count required a trespass on school property, § 790.115(2)(a); and the carrying of a concealed weapon count required a concealment on or about his person of the weapon carried, § 810.095(1), Fla....

authorized in school sanctioned activities.” § 790.115(2)(a). This statute became effective October 1

...Ragland, a student at Brevard County Community College (“BCC”), was arrested after campus security allegedly discovered in his vehicle a securely encased, unloaded 30.6 Browning Bolt Action Rifle, along with a box of ammunition. The information charged Ragland with a violation of section 790.115(2) (a), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 790.115 provides in part: 790.115....

...rking privileges. (emphasis added). The statute defines “school” as “any preschool, elementary *532 school, middle school, junior high school, secondary school, vocational school, or post-secondary school, whether public or nonpublic.” Thus, section 790.115(2)(a) makes it a felony to possess a firearm on the grounds of any school, with exceptions....

...d. State v. Cohen, 696 So.2d 435, 440 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312-13 (Fla.1991)). The BCC publications do not expressly waive the vehicle exception to the proscription of firearms and other weapons on campuses. Section 790.115 generally proscribes weapons on school grounds, as does the published policy....

...We think that the failure to state expressly that BCC waived the exception means that there was no waiver. AFFIRMED. SAWAYA, J, concurs in result only without opinion. HARRIS, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion. . Because the parties here assume that section 790.115 delegates to the various school authorities the power and responsibility to render criminal that which is generally lawful, we have no occasion to decide whether that was indeed the intent of the legislature, or whether such a delegation is constitutionally permissible. Compare, B.H. v. State, 645 So.2d 987 (Fla.1994). Nor need we decide whether section 790.115 authorizes the waiver at post-secondary schools....

...d for a new disposition hearing. The trial court must either follow the DJJ’s probationary recommendation or articulate a legally valid basis for departure from the recommendation. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON, TORPY, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . § 790.115, Fla....

...We conclude, however, that F.D.’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. H.M. was a circumstantial evidence case. We have already noted that this case is not. We, therefore, find that H.M. is inapplicable to our analysis in the instant case. F.D. was charged with possession of a weapon on school property, pursuant to section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2005), which is a general intent crime....

...matter of law. BACKGROUND With respect to the two counts relevant to this appeal,1 a petition for delinquency alleged that M.D.M had committed one count of possession of a weapon on school property, in violation of section 790.115(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), and one count of trespass on school property with a weapon, in violation of section 810.095, Florida Statutes (2022). At the bench trial, a high school student testified that he knew M.D.M....

...ng a close examination of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied" (emphasis added)). The 2022 versions of both statutes cited in Counts I and II specifically addressed weapons "as defined in s. 790.001(13)." §§ 790.115(2)(b); 810.095(1)....

SHEVIN, Judge. The State of Florida appeals an order dismissing count one of the information against Atrice Coleman, charging Coleman with possession of a firearm or weapon on school property pursuant to section 790.115(2)(b), (c), Florida Statutes (2000). We reverse. Section 790.115(2)(b) prohibits the possession of a knife on school property, and subsection (c) provides that such possession is a third degree felony....

...Coleman moved to dismiss the possession of a weapon count, arguing that the arrest affidavit *423 reflected that the weapon, a three and one-half inch blade pocketknife, was not a “knife” as contemplated by the statute. We disagree. As other courts have found, section 790.115, as amended by the legislature in October 1997, includes a “common pocketknife,” such as the one involved in this case, among the weapons prohibited on school grounds....

...This instruction was adopted in 2014. 10.21 IMPROPER EXHIBITION OF A [WEAPON] [FIREARM] [AT A SCHOOL-SPONSORED EVENT] [ON SCHOOL PROPERTY] [ON A SCHOOL BUS] [AT A SCHOOL BUS STOP] [WITHIN 1,000 FEET OF A SCHOOL] § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Improper Exhibition of a [Weapon] [Firearm] [Sword] [Sword Cane] [Electric Weapon or Device] [Destructive Device] [at] [on] [within] [(insert prohibited place in Fla. Stat. 790.115(1))], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 1....

...] [sword cane] [electric weapon or device] [destructive device] in necessary self- defense, you must find the defendant not guilty. Read instructions 3.6(f) and/or 3.6(g) as applicable. Definitions. Give as applicable. § 790.001(13) and § 790.115(1), Fla....

...- 11 -  See § 790.001(4), Fla. Stat. for the definition of “destructive device.” Lesser Included Offenses IMPROPER EXHIBITION OF A [WEAPON] [FIREARM] AT SCHOOL – 790.115(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Assault 784.011 8.1 Comments The statute has an exception if the exhibition of the weapon or firearm was authorized and in support of school-sanctioned activities. See § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. This crime does not apply if the exhibition of the weapon or firearm was on private real property, within 1,000 feet of a school, by the owner of the property or by a person who had been authorized, licensed, or invited by the owner to be on the property. See § 790.115(1), Fla. Stat. This crime does not apply if the defendant was a law enforcement officer as defined in § 943.10(1), (2), (3), (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), or (14), Fla. Stat. See § 790.115(3), Fla....

FULMER, Judge. The State appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing a delinquency petition that charged A.M. with exhibition of a weapon on school grounds. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings. Section 790.115(1), Florida Statutes (1997), prohibits the exhibition of “any sword, sword cane, firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon, including a razor blade, box cutter, or knife ......

...The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because the statutory definition of weapon found in section 790.001(13) is not applicable in this case. It asserts that the reference to pocketknives found in that section, and discussed in L.B., no longer applies to exempt pocketknives from section 790.115(1) because the legislature amended section 790.115 effective October 1, 1997, to expand the definition of prohibited items, and to specifically prohibit any “knife” from being exhibited on school grounds. Wé agree with the State that pursuant to the October 1997 amendment to section 790.115, 1 any “knife,” which we read to include even a “common pocketknife,” is prohibited on school grounds....

...e granted his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse the trial court’s adjudication and disposition order. In its delinquency petition, the State alleged that A.S.P. committed the acts of possession of a weapon on school grounds, in violation of section 790.115(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and trespass on school property with a firearm or weapon, in violation of section 810.095, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...t erred in failing to specify when community control terminated. Because we find that the first issue requires reversal, we do not reach the second issue. *845 The State charged M.C.M. with possession of a firearm on school property, in violation of section 790.115, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ementary school, middle school, or secondary school, during school hours or during the time of a sanctioned school activity, commits a felony of the third degree.... ” M.C.M. argues that the State did not prove a prima facie case of a violation of section 790.115(1) because it did not prove that M.C.M....

...However, whether the gun was loaded does not prove or disprove how the gun was handled. While we cannot fathom why any student in these days and times would knowingly drive onto school property in a vehicle containing a firearm, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that M.C.M. violated that portion of section 790.115 which addresses exhibiting a firearm in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner....

...Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to grant a judgment of acquittal. We also note that, if this school district has adopted written and published policies prohibiting carrying a firearm in a vehicle on school property, the State could have charged M.C.M. with violating section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), also a third-degree felony....

a weapon on school campus in violation of section 790.115(2)(a), which provides in part: A person shall

weapon on school grounds, in violation of section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). That section