Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...l value in such a draconian penalty. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As his second issue, Johnson argues that his confessions should have been suppressed for a variety of reasons. He states that Officer Castro violated the procedures established under either section 901.16 *659 or section 901.17, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Martin, 232 Neb. 385, 440 N.W.2d 676 (1989). We do note that there is no requirement in Florida that the arresting officer must have the warrant in hand at the time of the arrest, but must only show the warrant upon request as soon as is practicable. § 901.16, Fla. Stat. (1987). [12] Section 901.16, Florida Statutes (1987), states in pertinent part: A peace officer making an arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued, except when the person flees or forcibl...

...purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. Such withdrawal of blood shall be performed only at a hospital, clinic, or other medical facility. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of breath, urine, or saliva specimens." [13] F.S. § 901.16 and § 901.17, F.S.A., require officer making arrest to inform person arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest....

...ly coercive and improper tactics a presumption of compulsion is warranted. In that case, any subsequent statements must be suppressed unless the taint of the improper activity is sufficiently attenuated. In this case Officer Fernandez first violated section 901.16 of the Florida Statutes (1981) by not informing Madruga-Jiminez that a warrant for his arrest had been issued on a charge of murder....

...[4] The simple giving of Miranda warnings, by itself, was not sufficient to remove the taint of the improper tactics utilized to secure the initial statement. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is Affirmed. NOTES [1] Officer Fernandez was required by section 901.16, Florida Statutes (1981) to inform Madruga-Jiminez of the cause of his arrest and that a warrant had been issued....

...Section 901.04, Florida Statutes, provides for the direction and execution of a warrant: Warrants shall be directed to all sheriffs of the state. A warrant shall be executed only by the sheriff of the county in which the arrest is made . . . An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the day or night. Section 901.16, Florida Statutes, provides for the method of making an arrest with a warrant: *1055 A peace officer making an arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued ....

...In this case, the officer actually arrested Trout on the violation of probation arrest warrant when Trout was stopped in his vehicle. The officer filed an arrest affidavit attesting to his arrest. Contrary to the statement by the trial judge, the statute requires no paperwork to effect an arrest pursuant to the warrant. See § 901.16, Fla....

...st would not appear to have been improper. The ensuing search was therefore justifiable as subsequent to the arrest. McCray v. State, 496 So.2d 919 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); cf., Albo v. State, 477 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Appellant also relies upon section 901.16, Florida Statutes (1987), which provides: A peace officer making an arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued, except when the person fleas or forcibly resists...

...fore the officer has an opportunity to inform him, or when giving the information will imperil the arrest, (emphasis supplied) Decisions in Florida and in other jurisdictions indicate a standard of substantial compliance with arrest statutes such as section 901.16....

...ing of evidence incident to the arrest). In this case, appellant was informed that there was a warrant outstanding for his arrest, and the officer did not then know the specific “cause” for the warrant. There was compliance with the provision of section 901.16 which requires the officer to inform the person being arrested that a *936 warrant has been issued....

...he entry exceeded the scope of his cotenant’s consent, and their conduct in failing to advise appellant of the warrant and of their intention to arrest him under it immediately upon seizing him in his bedroom (as required under the arrest statute, Section 901.16, Florida Statutes), so tainted his later confession as to require exclusion under Wong Sun, supra, and its progeny....

...Ultimately, the detectives told Appellant why he was under arrest. Appellant moved to suppress the statements he made in his interview. He claimed that the detectives failed to honor his right to counsel and that the arresting SWAT officer failed to comply with section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...ng a warrant. The trial court held a two-part evidentiary hearing. Afterwards, the court entered a detailed order rejecting both of Appellant’s suppression arguments. The court found that the arresting officer substantially complied with section 901.16 and that Appellant never unequivocally invoked his right to counsel....

...3d 109, 112 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (quoting Ferryman v. State, 919 So. 2d 710, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)). A. First, Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his suppression motion based on section 901.16....

...will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his or her possession at the time of arrest but on request of the person arrested shall show it to the person as soon as practicable. § 901.16, Fla. Stat. (2018). The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 901.16 is subject to a substantial compliance analysis because the statute does not have “a constitutional dimension.” See Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 659 (Fla. 1995) (“Arrest statutes such as [sections 901.16 and 901.17] are subject to 4 a substantial compliance analysis because they direct ministerial acts not of a constitutional dimension.” (internal citations omitted)); cf....

...1991) (noting that penal statutes “must be strictly construed according to their letter” because due process demands that criminal statutes precisely identify prohibited conduct). Under certain circumstances, an officer substantially complies with section 901.16 when he informs the arrestee about the existence of the arrest warrant, even if he fails to identify the charged offense at the time of the arrest. See Conti v. State, 540 So. 2d 934, 935–36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)2 (holding that a substantial compliance standard applies to section 901.16 and affirming the denial of a motion to suppress that was based in part on section 901.16 in a case where the officer informed the appellant that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, but that he did not know the specific cause for the warrant); see also City of Miami v....

...Even if Appellant could show a violation of the statute, he does not identify any authority that provides him with the remedy he seeks—that is, the suppression of his statements. The plain text of the statute includes no such remedy. See § 901.16, Fla....

...Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) (“In interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text.”). Moreover, the absence of suppression as a remedy in section 901.16 is conspicuous because the Legislature has expressly included that remedy in other criminal procedure statutes. For example, the stop and frisk statute, which immediately precedes section 901.16, provides that no evidence obtained in violation of the statute is admissible in any Florida court. See § 901.151(6), Fla. Stat. Such is also true of the statutes governing drone searches and intercepted wire or oral communications. See §§ 934.50(6), .06, Fla. Stat. By not including a similar provision in section 901.16, the Legislature has spoken “loudly and clearly.” See In re Guillen, 972 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir....

...Nor did the trial judge discuss whether or when Robinson was told by FDLE that he was being arrested on the Duval County warrant. Robinson argues that the FDLE agents were required by law to inform him that they were arresting him on the Duval County warrant. He refers to section 901.16, Florida Statutes (2021), which states in pertinent part that “[a] peace officer making an arrest by a warrant shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued.”8 While we need not rely on that argument, neither will we accept the State’s invitation to presume that the FDLE agents ignored section 901.16, especially in light of Robinson’s unrebutted and unchallenged testimony that the agents complied with their 8There are statutory exceptions to this required communication of arrest based on a warrant, but none apply here....

...Even if Robinson’s undisputed testimony was less than credible, it would nonetheless be consistent with the statutory obligation of an arresting officer to “inform the person to be arrested of the cause of arrest and that a warrant has been issued” absent circumstances that are not present in this case. See § 901.16, Fla....

...attempting to reach the trial judge at least five times on the day in question to inquire about this particular order. It was not necessary, of course, for appellant to have a copy of the order actually in his possession in order to execute it. See, Section 901.16, Florida Statutes; and, Cf....