Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...g the jury verdict, and so could not be sentenced to a greater term two days later. On February 18, 1976 a jury found Flowers guilty of sending a written threat to kill or injure another — both a circuit judge and a social worker — in violation of Section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...cribed conduct, it is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Wilson, 464 So.2d 667 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We find the statutes offended by Smith's behavior free from constitutional defect; the proscriptions they communicate are not difficult to divine. Section 836.10 makes it a felony to send or procure the sending of any document threatening to kill or injure the recipient or a family member. Section 838.021(3)(b) condemns threats of harm to public servants or persons with whose welfare such servants are entrusted. Section 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected and unwarranted fear of harm; and section 838.021(3)(b) is designed to protect public officials in the discharge of their duties without unlawful intimidation....

...We are persuaded that the trial court fairly considered the relevant criteria and that the decision to depart downward from the guidelines is supported by the record. Tanner v. State, 468 So.2d 505 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). AFFIRMED. RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur. NOTES [1] Respectively, § 836.10, Fla....

...Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. ORFINGER, J. Ahmad Saidi appeals his conviction of sending written threats of death or bodily injury in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The charge arose after Saidi sent various letters and papers to William Roy, the attorney representing Saidi's former wife in a contentious post-judgment family law proceeding, and to the Circuit Court of Seminole County, Florida. While conceding that he authored and sent the letters and papers, Saidi argues that section 836.10 is unconstitutional as it is vague, overbroad, and infringes on his First Amendment rights....

...The jury found Saidi guilty as charged, and he was placed on probation, a special condition of which prohibited him from pro se representation in any civil or family law action. While Saidi acknowledges that the Second District Court of Appeal concluded in Smith v. State, 532 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), that section 836.10, Florida Statutes, is constitutional, he argues that the court failed to consider that the statute lacks a specific intent element....

...Saidi contends that because the statute does not require the specific intent to cause harm, innocent written speech can be criminalized. He also argues that the State should have been required to prove that he had the ability to carry out the threat. At the outset, we note our agreement with Smith, and conclude that section 836.10 is not vague. We also disagree with Saidi's contention that section 836.10 is constitutionally infirm because it is overbroad. Section 836.10 prohibits sending a written communication threatening to kill or injure the recipient, or any member of his/her family....

...elements of the criminal offense'") (quoting Ward v. State, 655 So.2d 1290, 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)); see also Johnson v. State, 632 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). While we agree with that general statement of the law, it has no application here. Section 836.10, Florida Statutes is violated if: (1) a person writes or composes a threat to kill or do bodily injury; (2) the person sends or procures the sending of that communication to another person; and (3) the threat is to the recipient of the communication or a member of his family. State v. Wise, 664 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Smith. Similar to extortion, this crime does not require the actual intent to do harm or the ability to carry out the threat. See § 836.10, Fla....

...1) and the State of Florida, et al., Respondents' Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 38). I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner Michael K. Reilly was charged by information with two counts of making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury pursuant to § 836.10, Florida Statutes (1985); two counts of corruption by threat against a public servant pursuant to § 838.021, Florida Statutes (1985); and one count of carrying a concealed weapon pursuant to § 790.01, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...ncarceration on the first count of corruption under § 838.021 and to five years probation on the second count of corruption. The trial court also sentenced Petitioner to ten years probation on each of the two counts of making a written threat under § 836.10, and to five years probation for the concealed weapon charge under § 790.01....

...ears probation for all five counts. [1] Petitioner brought a direct appeal of his sentence before the Florida *955 Second District Court of Appeal. The issues raised on appeal included: (1) Section 838.021, Florida Statutes was unconstitutional; (2) Section 836.10, Florida Statutes was unconstitutional; (3) Section 790.01 was unconstitutional and has been impliedly repealed by the legislature; (4) the conviction under both §§ 838.021 and 836.10 constituted double jeopardy; (5) Appellant Reilly was justified in using deadly force to defend against the illegal orders of the court; (6) the trial court erred in denying Appellant Reilly's motion to proceed pro se at trial; and (7) the tri...

...or laws or treaties of the United States. Petitioner raises several grounds in his petition including: (1) Sections 838.021, 836.01, and 790.01, Florida Statutes (1985), are unconstitutional; (2) Petitioner's convictions under both §§ 838.021 and 836.10 constitute double jeopardy; (3) Petitioner's convictions under §§ 838.021, 836.10, and 790.01 were against the weight of the evidence and Petitioner was justified in using deadly force to defend against an illegal order of the court; (4) trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to proceed pro se at trial; and (5) tr...

...dies and is "in custody" for purposes of §§ 2241 and 2254, therefore, Petitioner's claims on the remaining counts are properly before this Court. A. Constitutional Challenges to Florida Statutes In Ground one, Petitioner alleges that §§ 838.021, 836.10, and 790.10, Florida Statutes, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad....

...In addition, Petitioner contends that § 838.021 violates his constitutional right of free speech and that it exceeds the power of the state legislature because it imposes an incarcerative sanction that is greater than the sanction possible for comparable federal law; that § 836.10 is in violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment; and that § 790.01 has been impliedly repealed by the state legislature....

...ating § 838.021 and to probation on the second count. In light of the maximum penalty available by the federal court for a similar crime, the sentence proscribed by the statute does not exceed the power of the state legislature. 2. Claims Involving Section 836.10, Florida Statutes Vagueness Petitioner alleges that § 836.10 is vague, overbroad, and in violation of the Eighth *958 Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment....

...mily of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent, the person so writing or composing and so sending or procuring the sending of such letter or communication, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree.... Petitioner asserts that § 836.10 is unconstitutionally vague without argument or citation to case law. In Smith v. State , the Florida Second District Court of Appeal specifically upheld § 836.10 in the face of a vagueness challenge....

...by common understanding and practice, it is not unconstitutionally vague. Smith v. State, 532 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The statute in question is definite enough to apprise persons of common intelligence of the proscribed activities. Therefore, § 836.10 is not unconstitutional due to vagueness....

...Overbreadth As discussed above, threats to kill or do bodily harm are legislatively proscribable and are not constitutionally protected. United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir.1975). Because of the limited objectives of § 836.10 and because threats to injure persons are not constitutionally protected, the statute cannot be considered overbroad. Eighth Amendment Claim Finally, Petitioner argues the sentence under § 836.10 is in violation of the Eighth Amendment which proscribes cruel and unusual punishment....

...2680, 2683, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Probation is presumptively less severe than incarceration. See generally § 948.01, Florida Statutes (1985). Petitioner could have received up to a fifteen year prison term, but only received probation. Therefore, Petitioner's sentence under § 836.10 is not grossly disproportionate or in violation of the Eighth Amendment....

...This partial repeal does not affect Petitioner's conviction. Skinner v. State, 383 So.2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), Art. X, § 9, Fla. Const. B. Claims Involving Double Jeopardy Violations In Ground two, Petitioner alleges that the convictions under §§ 838.021 and 836.10 constitute fundamental error in violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy....

...306 (1932), in support of his argument. In Blockburger, the Supreme Court held that two offenses are the same unless each requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Petitioner argues there is no proof of fact required under § 836.10 which is not already required under § 838.021. The elements of proof for conviction under § 838.021 require that the unlawful threat be made against a public servant in order to induce him or her to perform an act in violation of a public duty. The element of proof for conviction under § 836.10 only requires that a written threat be made to any individual. Section 838.021 requires that the target be a public servant while § 836.10 does not. Section 836.10 requires that the threat be written while § 838.021 does not....

...ion of the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge found that the claims regarding the facial challenge to two of the three Florida statutes and the double jeopardy claim had not yet been presented to the state courts. [3] Petitioner also argues that § 836.10 is invalid because it lacks a "postal nexus." This argument is without merit and will not be addressed by this Court.

...o the person who was actually [hit] [struck] [shot]. Comments See State v. Brady, 745 So.2d 954 (Fla.1999) and Nelson v. State, 853 So.2d 563 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). This instruction was adopted in 2013. 8.22 WRITTEN THREAT TO [KILL] [DO BODILY INJURY] § 836.10, Fla....

...*723 An “inscribed communication” is a communication that is written or printed. To “procure” means to persuade, induce, prevail upon, or cause a person to do something. Lesser Included Offenses APPENDIX — Continued WRITTEN THREAT TO KILL OR DO BODILY INJURY — 836.10 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...Macchione comes to this court with an array of convictions that include sixteen violations of repeat violence injunction and one conviction each for aggravated stalking after an injunction, aggravated stalking with a credible threat, and violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2009), which makes it a crime if a person “writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter or inscribed communication ... to any person, containing a threat to kill or do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent_” § 836.10, Fla....

...s motion to dismiss that charge. The question presented is whether, as Macchione contended in his motion and contends in this appeal, the threatening electronic communications in the form of Twitter postings and YouTube videos were not prohibited by section 836.10 when he composed and transmitted them in 2009....

...These convictions are the result of a plea Macchione entered. 2 He reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss he had previously filed. The court found, and the State agreed, that the motion is dispositive of the charge alleging violation of section 836.10, and hence this appeal....

...Tube videos and Twitter postings and that all of the charged communications were stipulated by the State to be electronic communications composed and transmitted in 2009. The significance of the stipulated facts lies in the historical development of section 836.10....

...inal offense. He cannot be convicted under the 2010 amendment, he argues, because that would constitute a violation of the constitutional protection against ex post facto laws. The State takes the opposite view, contending that the 2010 amendment to section 836.10 clarified that electronic communications were intended all along by the Legislature to fall within the meaning of the statutory provisions enacted in the 1913 era and therefore no ex post facto violation occurred....

...Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 825 (Fla.1981) (“The title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent.” (citation omitted)). The title to the bill enacting the amendment to the statute at issue here provides: An act relating to threats; amending s. 836.10, F.S.; revising provisions relating to the sending of or procuring the sending of letters or inscribed communications containing certain threats of death or bodily injury; including electronic communications in provisions; providing an effective date....

...Ch.2010-51, § 1, at 381, Laws of Fla. Now the amended statute lists three alternative prohibitions, “letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication” that may form the basis of a criminal prosecution, whereas before there were only two. Compare § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2009), with § 836.10, Fla....

...Therefore, if the statute is reasonably susceptible to either interpretation, it must be strictly construed in Macchione’s favor. We conclude that the particular threats Macchione electronically composed and communicated do not fall within the provisions of the 2009 version of section 836.10....

...tutes a substantive change meant to be applied prospectively, and to sustain Macchione’s conviction under that amendment would violate the constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws. We, therefore, reverse his conviction for violating section 836.10 and vacate the sentence imposed for that offense....

...community control for each offense. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. He was sentenced to one year of probation for each of the counts charging violation of an injunction to be served concurrently. For the offense of violating section 836.10, Macchione was sentenced to two years of community control to be followed by thirteen years of probation....

...However, the issue in Duan was whether a threat of mental injuries is prohibited under the statute. Id. Similarly, in Dudley , the Second District affirmatively resolved the issue of whether convictions on both the extortion statute, section 836.05, and the statute criminalizing a threat of bodily harm, section 836.10, constitute a violation of double jeopardy. Dudley, 634 So.2d at 1094 . Section 836.10 provides, as follows: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or communication be signed or anonymous, to any per...

...ke the stand, and further contends the weight of authority supports the ruling by the trial court. The appellant Parker was convicted of the instant offense of sending a letter containing "written threats to kill or do bodily injury" in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Carter appeals from an order finding him in continuing civil contempt of the trial court for failure to furnish handwriting samples as ordered and challenges the legality of the sentence upon the contempt. We affirm. Carter was charged with making written threats to kill or do bodily injury to another, in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1979)....

VAN NORTWICK, J. We have for review the trial court’s denial of Timothy Ryan O’Leary’s motion to dismiss the two counts of sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...Appellant argues that, because the threats at issue were simply posted on his personal Facebook 1 page, the threats were *875 not “sent” to the alleged victims as required by the statute. Thus, he asserts, he did not violate the statute. Because we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, appellant violated section 836.10 by posting the threats on his Facebook page, we affirm....

...Michael, on his own initiative, showed appellant’s threatening post to his uncle. The uncle, on his own accord, informed the victims about appellant’s Facebook posting. Appellant was charged with two counts of making written threats to kill or do great bodily harm in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes....

...e contended that appellant’s Facebook post constituted a “sending” under Florida law. The trial court heard argument from both parties on the motion to dismiss. The trial court found that appellant’s posting constituted a “sending” under section 836.10....

...State will rely on to prove its case, establish a prima facie case, as a matter of law, so as to permit a jury to determine the defendant guilty of the crime charged.’ ” Bonge v. State, 53 So.3d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (citation omitted). Section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or communication be signed or anonymo...

...letter or communication is sent, or a threat to kill or do bodily injury to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent commits a felony of the second degree. The Second District Court of Appeal has held that section 836.10 is violated when: “(1) a person writes or composes a threat to kill or do bodily injury; (2) the person sends or procures the sending of that communication to another person; and (3) the threat is to the recipient of the communication or a member of his family.” State v. Wise, 664 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). At least two other district courts of appeal have adopted the Wise court’s three-element framework for analyzing section 836.10 violations. See Saidi v. State, 845 So.2d 1022, 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Suggs v. State, 72 So.3d 145, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Although Wise, Sai-di and Suggs each involved a letter or letters as the form of communication, in 2010 the legislature amended section 836.10 to include “electronic communication.” Ch....

...also fulfill the second prong of Wise’s two-part definition of “sending.” Our research has failed to uncover any Florida case discussing whether posting a message on one’s personal Facebook page can constitute a “sending” for purposes of section 836.10....

...e threatened individual, or a family member of the threatened individual, views and receives the thoughts made available by the composer, the second step in the Wise definition is completed. At that point, the statement is “sent” for purposes of section 836.10....

...n his own personal page, appellant “sent” the threatening statements to all of his Fa-cebook friends, including Michael. Michael received the composition by viewing it. As the trial court correctly ruled, at that point appellant’s violation of section 836.10 was complete, because the target of the threatening composition was a relative of the recipient....

...After sentencing, appellant filed a motion to correct sentence. The trial court granted the motion and lowered the length of the community control portion of the sentence from five years to two years. .Other jurisdictions have applied statutes similar to section 836.10 to electronic communications posted on a social networking website....

KHOUZAM, Judge. J.A.W., a juvenile, appeals his disposition for sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...He was found to have committed this delinquent act after he posted on Twitter that he was going to *143 “shoot up” his school. Because J.A.W.’s threats were not sent directly to the alleged victims or their families as prohibited under the plain language of section 836.10, we are constrained to reverse....

...at his home, which was located only several hundred feet away from the school, and took him into custody. We must determine whether this evidence was sufficient to support J.A.W.’s disposition for sending written threats to Idll or do bodily injury under section 836.10, which provides as follows: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or communication be signed or anonymous, to a...

...And because this statute is clear and unambiguous, we cannot look behind its plain language or resort to the rules of statutory construction in order to ascertain the legislature’s intent. See Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005). The plain language of section 836.10 makes clear that it only applies where a threat is sent directly to a specific victim or a member of that person’s family. The statute specifies that it covers communications “to any person, containing a threat to kill or to do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent.” § 836.10 (emphasis added)....

...The only intermediary third parties encompassed in the language of the statute are family members of the potential victim because ■ the statute specifically includes threats “to kill or do bodily injury to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent.” § 836.10 (emphasis added); cf....

...person” because the plain language of the statute requires “intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will.” (emphasis added)). This court has explained that section 836.10 does not criminalize written threats that have not been “sent” to the person being threatened or a member of that person’s family. See State v. Wise, 664 So.2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The act of sending under section 836.10 requires both “the depositing of the communication in the mail or through some other form of delivery” and “the receipt of the communication by the person being threatened.” Id, Twitter cannot be considered a “form of deliver...

...State, 109 So.3d 874, 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the Fust District applied Wise in the context of threats publicly made on social media and determined that threats posted on Facebook had been “sent” to all of the defendant’s Facebook friends for purposes of section 836.10....

...appellant wished to communicate that information to all of his Face-book friends.” Id. And because O’Leary’s posts threatened a “member of the family of the person to whom” it was “sent,” his post fell within the ambit of the statute. § 836.10; O’Leary, 109 So.3d at 877-78 ....

...ts were sent directly to any of the potential victims or their family members—rather, the threat was publicly posted on social media and relayed by nonfamily third parties to the potential victims. We hold that the plain and unambiguous meaning of section 836.10 requires a showing that the threat was sent directly to the potential victims or their family members....

...is popularity comes the unfortunate but inevitable problem that social media posts, like any other form of communication, can be used to make threats of violence. 6 But many threats made on so *146 cial media will fall outside the narrow language of section 836.10, which was originally written with pen-and-paper letters in mind....

...State, 123 So.3d 114, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). It is true that the statute was amended in 2010 to include “electronic communication,” but the language requiring the communication to be sent directly remained intact. See id. at 116 . The narrow language of section 836.10 will not encompass many threats made via social media because, as acknowledged by the First District in O’Leary , social media is often used to post communications publicly, for the whole world to see, instead of sending those communications directly to any specific person....

...ross the internet.” 8 In this context, a threat of violence made publicly on social media is likely to reach its target and cause fear of bodily harm just like a traditional letter might. See Smith v. State, 532 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (“Section 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected and unwarranted fear of harm.”). The facts of the instant case exemplify this phenomenon. Accordingly, the legislature may wish to revisit section 836.10 to address the modern problem of threats issued and shared publicly on social media....

...Hope is the defendant's ex-wife and the mother of four of the defendant's sons. Hope lives part-time with Karen. Both letters contained statements which could be interpreted as threats to kill or do bodily injury to Karen and Hope. Based on the letters, the state charged the defendant with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2004), entitled "Written threats to kill or do bodily injury; punishment." That statute provides, in pertinent part: If any person writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter or inscribed...

...to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent, the person so writing or composing and so sending or procuring the sending of such letter or communication, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree.... § 836.10, Fla....

...of that communication to another person; and (3) the threat is to the recipient of the communication or a member of his family." (citation omitted). Although the defendant sent only two letters, the state charged the defendant's alleged violation of section 836.10 in four counts: sending the first letter to Karen; sending the first letter to Hope; sending the second letter to Karen; and sending the second letter to Hope....

...("`Determining whether double jeopardy is violated based on undisputed facts is a purely legal determination, so the standard of review is de novo.'") (citation omitted). The defendant argues that his convictions violate the double jeopardy clause because, in his view, the allowable unit of prosecution for a violation of section 836.10 should be the number of letters or communications sent, and not the number of people to whom each letter or communication is sent....

..." is "ambiguous with respect to the unit of prosecution and ... must be treated as a single offense." Id. (emphasis added). The defendant, applying Grappin to this case, argues that the legislature's use of the terms "any letter" and "any person" in section 836.10 indicates the legislature's intent that the allowable unit of prosecution for a violation of section 836.10 should be the number of letters or communications sent, and not the number of people to whom each letter or communication is sent....

...Here, the actual language of the statute proscribes communications "containing a threat to kill or do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent, or a threat to kill or do bodily injury to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent." § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis added). In our view, the statute's plain focus is on "the person" to whom such letter or communication is sent. Accord Smith v. State, 532 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (the proscription which section 836.10 communicates is "not difficult to divine.... Section 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected and unwarranted fear of harm"). Thus, we hold that, under section 836.10, the unit of allowable prosecution is determined by the number of persons to whom a letter or communication is sent, and not the number of letters or communications sent....

...The federal statute, however, contains only two elements: "(1) a threatening communication (2) sent through the mails." United States v. Geisler, 143 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (7th Cir.1998). Neither of those elements refers to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent. Section 836.10, on the other hand, contains three elements, the second and third of which refer to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent. See Wise, 664 So.2d at 1030. Those references support our conclusion that section 836.10 punishes based on the number of persons to whom the letter or communication is sent and not the number of letters sent. The dissent also focuses on the fact that, with regard to the two letters involved in this case, the defendant addressed one letter to Karen and the other letter to Hope. According to the dissent, that fact is significant because section 836.10 does not punish the defendant for sending a letter to Karen threatening Hope and vice versa....

...The statute punishes the sending of the letter, not the number of persons threatened in the letter. Therefore, two of the four convictions violate double jeopardy. For purposes of this dissent, I have edited the statute to include only the operative portions of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2004), applicable to this case: If a person writes ......

...In a footnote, however, the court noted: "This is not to say that prosecution would not be appropriate in a case in which a threatening letter was mailed but not received by the intended recipient." In other words, the court did not decide that receipt of the letter was an essential element of the offense. Section 836.10, Florida Statutes is similar to 18 U.S.C....

...However, it noted that federal courts had construed the prohibition of the theft of "any firearm" as being ambiguous to the unit of prosecution, thus requiring the application of the rule of lenity, precluding multiple charges for the theft of multiple firearms in a single theft. In the same way, section 836.10 prohibits the sending of any letter....

...Relying on the principle of lenity, Wallace concluded that the Grappin analysis should apply. In this case, the majority cannot cite any legislative history or clear intent to justify its result. There is none. The majority concludes that the focus of section 836.10 is the threat to the person to whom a communication is sent....

...person that violence is imminent.") (emphasis added). An essential element of the offense is the victim's well-founded fear of violence. See Johnson v. State, 888 So.2d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Therefore, the statute focuses on the effect of the perpetrator's acts on the victim. In contrast, section 836.10 does not require any effect on the victim as an essential element of the crime....

...Karen and Hope are not related, so they are not a "member of the family" of the other. Therefore, even if the letter to Hope did threaten Karen, it is not a violation of the statute. For all of these reasons, I would reverse, remand, and instruct the trial court to vacate two of the four convictions for violating section 836.10....

...[2] The "allowable unit of prosecution" is "the aspect of criminal activity that the Legislature intended to punish." Mauldin v. State, 9 So.3d 25, 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted). "Double jeopardy is not violated if the legislature intended separate punishments." Id. [3] In 2010, the legislature amended section 836.10 as follows: If a Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, or inscribed communication, so written or composed or electronic communication, whether such letter or communication be signed or...

...n lack of venue. We reverse because venue is appropriate in either Pinel-las County or Polk County. Appellee Percell Wise was charged by information filed in Pinellas County, Florida, with forty-three counts of making written threats in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...e received. Section 910.05, Florida Statutes (1991), allows prosecution of a crime in the county where any of the acts constituting the offense took place. Appellee was charged with sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1991). Section 836.10 provides: 836.10....

...McGre-gor, 503 F.2d 1167 (8th Cir.1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 926 , 95 S.Ct. 1122 , 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975) (use of mails to defraud may be prosecuted in district where communication sent or received). As we stated in Smith v. State, 532 So.2d at 52 , “[s]ection 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected and unwarranted fear of harm; .... ” Since the act of “sending” under section 836.10 continues from deposit to receipt, venue is proper in either the sending or the receiving county....

...m and/or his family unless he released certain prisoners from the Highlands County Jail. When a police investigation revealed that Dudley had written the letter, he was charged with making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1991), count one; and extortion in violation of section 836.05, count two....

...written threat to do such, that such threat — i.e., letter or inscribed communication — was actually sent, and that the threat of injury or death was either against the person actually threatened or a member of the threatened person’s family. Section 836.10....

...Smith v. State (wherein this court noted that the crime of making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury is an offense which involves or resembles extortion). For that reason, we must conclude that the elements of making a written threat under section 836.10 are subsumed within the offense of extortion....

threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2014). He was found to have

...By statute, a person commits a second-degree felony if he “sends or procures the sending of . . . an electronic communication,” written by him, “containing a threat to kill or to do bodily injury to the person to whom such [] communication is sent.” § 836.10, Fla....

...conclude with ease that there simply is no purchase in either of Khayrallah’s arguments for acquittal: that he did not “send” this message to the chief judge, and that his message was not a threat of physical violence. His offense of conviction is defined in section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2017), which in its entirety states as follows: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether s...

...General, for appellee. Before EMAS, C.J., and HENDON and GORDO, JJ. HENDON, J.  N.D. appeals from a withhold of adjudication and order of probation following a plea of no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial of a motion to declare section 836.10(1), Florida Statutes (2018), unconstitutional....

...f**kin lock me up! Ima blow da PD up f**k all yal bitches. The State did not investigate the threat but took N.D. back into custody and filed a petition for delinquency charging her with one count of making a written threat in violation of section 836.10(1), Florida Statutes....

...of its discriminatory effects. Miles v. City of Edgewater Police Dep’t/Preferred Governmental Claims Sols., 190 So. 3d 171, 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). 3  Discussion Section 836.10(1), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 2018, provides, Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such lette...

...4th DCA 2020) (noting that the current version of the statute now punishes “the mere act of posting the threat on social media, regardless of whether it is directed to an individual.”). The statute has been held not to be overbroad. Saidi v. State, 845 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding section 836.10 is not constitutionally infirm for overbreadth); Reilly v. State, Dep’t of Corrections, 847 F. Supp. 951 (M.D. Fla. 4 1994) (applying Florida law, and holding that because of the limited objectives of section 836.10 and because threats to injure persons are not constitutionally protected, the statute cannot be considered overbroad)....

...Further, “courts must exercise caution in distinguishing true threats from crude hyperbole—a judgment derived from examining the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 53; see also 16A Fla. Jur 2d Criminal Law—Substantive Principles/Offenses § 1053. N.D. argues that section 836.10(1) lacks any subjective intent element, and thus fails to distinguish between those acts that are merely venting anger and those that are viable threats to intimidate and do violence....

...843.085(1) is constitutionally infirm because it makes no distinction between the innocent wearing or display of law enforcement indicia from that designed to deceive the reasonable public into believing that such display is official.” Although the text of section 836.10 does not explicitly include a mens rea element, Florida courts have long held that “criminal statutes are generally read to include a mens rea element, even when not expressly included in the statute.” Siplin v....

...Further, criminal statutes that fail to include a mens rea element usually raise due process concerns, and courts are “obligated to construe 6 statutes in a manner that avoids a holding that a statute may be unconstitutional.” Id. at 518. Section 836.10(1) does not contain any statement making it clear that the legislature intended to dispense with a mens rea requirement....

...ful effects. In order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.”). As section 836.10(1) does not contain any statement making it clear that the legislature intended to dispense with a mens rea requirement, and because we are obligated to construe the statute in a manner that avoids holding that the statute may be un...

...14, 2020), published a snapchat photo of an AR-15 rifle with the caption indicating a “show and tell” at his school. The defendant was 7 arrested and charged with sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury pursuant to section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018). Although the trial court in Cowart did not address the defendant’s constitutional challenge to section 836.10, the appellate court did conclude that the reasonableness of the recipient’s perception of the posted threat is a matter for the finder of fact to determine....

...language reflected an intent to punish on a per-victim basis. See Suggs v. State, 72 So. 3d 145, 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[T]he statute’s plain focus is on ‘the person’ to whom such letter or communication is sent. Thus, we hold that, under section 836.10, the unit of allowable prosecution is determined by the number of persons to whom a letter or communication is sent, and not the number of letters or communications sent.”) (internal citation omitted); Mauldin, 9 So....

...Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessenia J. Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. MAY, J. A juvenile appeals the trial court’s finding of guilt and disposition for written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2021)....

...State, . . . the threat itself is measured on whether or not a reasonable person would see the threat itself as true, excuse me, whether the threat itself was sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons. Defense counsel also argued section 836.10 was overbroad and criminalized free speech. The State responded by arguing “threats” are unprotected speech, and the juvenile sent a “threat” when he sent the image....

...Thus, the State had proven, at trial, a reasonable person would be alarmed by the image. Finally, the State argued the statute was constitutional. The trial court found the image constituted a “threat.” Citing to Puy, the trial court found that whether “a written communication constitutes a threat under section 836.10 depends on whether the message was ‘sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons.’” Regarding the image the juvenile sent, the trial court found “[the juvenile’s] face was covered, his identity couldn’t be seen from the 3 photograph....

...y was unequivocally no. So, even if the test is a subjective one, as to the recipient, I find that in this case there is more than sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of this element, as well. The trial court then found section 836.10 constitutional in line with other cases....

...t’s application of a “reasonable persons” standard was error because it lessened the mens rea requirement. 4  The State responds the trial court correctly followed our binding precedent interpreting section 836.10 in Puy....

...World Cont. S.R.L., 314 So. 3d 309, 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (citing Haas Automation, Inc. v. Fox, 243 So. 3d 1017, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)). Because we are asked to review a legal issue, we have de novo review. The State charged the juvenile under section 836.10—which deals with “threats” to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism....

...other record, including an electronic record, in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person, when in such writing or record the person makes a threat to: .... (b) Conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism. § 836.10(2), (2)(b), Fla....

...(2) had a notebook containing a white supremacist speech, Columbine references, and “a manifesto on how to carry out a school shooting.” Relying on Puy, as requested by the juvenile, the trial court found the defendant guilty. The trial court also found section 836.10 did not require “the actual intent to do harm or the ability to carry out the threat.” See Saidi v....

...But Puy was confined to determining whether the trial court, at the motion to dismiss stage, could find a posting was a threat. We held it could not. Subsequently, in T.R.W. v. State, 363 So. 3d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), we determined the State’s burden was to prove a “threat” under section 836.10 at the adjudication stage....

...United States, 575 U.S. 723, 734 (2015) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952)): the “‘mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent’ should not be read ‘as dispensing with it.’” We [held] that section 836.10 does contain a mens rea component. To prove the commission of a violation of section 836.10, the trier of fact must find that the defendant transmitted a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. 4 We relied on the Fifth District’s decision in State v....

...evil, injury or damage,” thereby finding the requisite mens rea. One thing is certain, regardless of the test employed, the evidence in this case was sufficient to satisfy the tests of Puy, T.R.W., and Counterman. We therefore affirm the trial court’s finding of guilt. B. Section 836.10’s Constitutionality “The constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law subject to de novo review.” N.D....

...“threats.” 575 U.S. at 740. “Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant's mental state.” Id. 6 The Colorado statute at issue in Counterman used different language than employed in section 836.10....

...distress and does cause that person . . . to suffer serious emotional distress.’” 600 U.S. at 70 (alterations in original) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18–3–602(1)(c) (2022)). 7  The juvenile argues section 836.10 is unconstitutionally overbroad and infringes on the juvenile’s First Amendment rights....

...at 69. Therefore, “a defendant’s First Amendment rights are not violated by laws prohibiting such threats.” N.D., 315 So. 3d at 104. But “courts must [still] exercise caution in distinguishing true threats from crude hyperbole.” Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)). We hold section 836.10 is not overbroad. This is because section 836.10 has a limited objective—to punish “threats” of violence sent through electronic social media. See N.D., 315 So. 3d at 104. Because section 836.10 deals only with “threats” to commit a violent act, it does not violate the juvenile’s First Amendment rights. Affirmed. WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur. * * * Not final until di...

...Cassandra L. Denmark, Judge. May 31, 2024 BROWNLEE, J. In this appeal, the defendant, I.R., challenges his conviction for sending written or electronic threats to kill or do bodily injury, in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2022). 1 He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence because the trial court erroneously determined that a violation of section 836.10 is a general, rather than specific, intent crime. 1 This case was transferred from the Second District Court of Appeal to this Court on January 1, 2023.  The State concedes error, but not for the reason posited by I.R....

...arately, that the gun emoji did not constitute a “threat.” The record shows the trial court considered both arguments. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined the State met its burden of proof and found I.R. guilty of violating section 836.10....

...” This is the opposite of what I.R. argued below. Although defense counsel informed the trial court that “it does matter what the intent is,” counsel argued “[i]t’s not specific intent.” Thus, I.R.’s argument that violation of section 836.10 is a specific intent crime is not preserved for our review, and we do not consider it on the merits....

...State, 295 So. 3d 327, 330 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (Eisnaugle, J., concurring in part) (citing Powell v. State, 223 So. 3d 412, 413 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)). Furthermore, despite its apparent concession, the State disagrees with I.R.’s argument that section 836.10 is a specific intent crime....

...kill others, including N.H.’s family members and the Teacher. N.H.’s journal listed weapons that would be used, including a knife, gun, rope, and pocketknife, along with times, such as “12:50 school” and “3:01 school.” Based on these facts, N.H. was arrested for violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2022), which is entitled: “Written or electronic threats to kill, do bodily injury, or conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.” At the ensuing detention hearing, N.H.’s counsel argued that there was no probable cause to believe an offense had been committed because the State could not prove N.H.’s written note was “sent, posted, or transmitted” within the meaning of section 836.10. The State responded by arguing that section 836.10 was applicable because the Teacher saw the written threat to kill on N.H.’s desk while N.H....

...subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which she again argues that the State did not establish probable cause to 3 support her detention for the act of “sending, posting, or transmitting” a written threat to kill in violation of section 836.10. N.H. argues that section 836.10 requires a showing of some affirmative act on behalf of the defendant evidencing an intent to communicate the writing’s contents....

... As N.H. did not contest that she prepared the kill list, the dispositive question is whether there was probable cause to find that N.H.’s act of placing it on her desk constituted the “posting” of a written threat to kill in violation of section 836.10(2). The current operative version of section 836.10(2) provides: (2) It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or transmission of, a writing or other record, including an electronic record...

...And we typically look to dictionaries for the best evidence of that ordinary meaning.”). 8  As the State has argued that the writing in question was “publicly displayed,” it is thus important to focus on the word “post” as used in section 836.10(2)(a)....

...publicly,” Announcement, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2011), which conforms with the provided definitions. 9  Given these definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of “post,” as used in section 836.10(2)(a), can be understood as making it unlawful to cause a writing, which threatens to kill or do bodily harm to another person, to be seen in public. Significantly, regarding causing a writing to be seen in public, section 836.10(2)(a) explicitly states that this can be accomplished “in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person.” Therefore, the mode or means whereby the written threat to kill is made public does not matter as long as it can be viewed by another person. Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient probable cause for the trial court to find that N.H. violated section 836.10 when she placed a written threat to kill her teacher, on her desk, out in the open in a public school classroom....

...kill another person in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person. N.H.’s argument that she did not intend to communicate the writing to anyone in public is unavailing. We acknowledge that Florida courts, when interpreting previous versions of section 836.10, have concluded that there 10 is a “mens rea” element present in the statute....

...5th DCA 1994) (finding that “[i]ntent is generally a question for the trier of fact because a defendant's mental intent is hardly ever subject to direct proof and must be established by 4 Florida courts when reviewing different versions of section 836.10 have focused on whether the written communication was intended to be an actual threat and not whether intent to actually communicate or post the threat is necessary....

...Conclusion Accordingly, we deny the petition as the trial court properly found probable cause. It is important to note that we are merely affirming the trial court’s finding that there was probable cause to believe N.H. violated section 836.10, which requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity and not an actual showing of such activity....

...the underlying concern the State has with this written threat that was observed by the teacher. THE COURT: Okay. I think it's enough PC … Petitioner is detained based upon a finding of probable cause that she violated section 836.10(2), Florida Statutes (2022), which provides: (2) It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or transmission of, a writing or other record, including...

...or “transmitting” a written threat. The dispute turns entirely upon the statutory interpretation of the term “post”; specifically, what activity reasonably may be found to fall within the term “post.” Petitioner argues that the plain language of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2022), as outlined in the jury instruction, makes clear that such a threat must be, in some manner, relayed or 14 dispatched....

...individual.”). If the Legislature had included language in section 784.046 that applied to felonies involving the “threat” of violence, then Appellant’s Facebook message to Appellee’s daughter would have qualified as a second offense under section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...felony, punishable by up to fifteen years in state prison. See O’Leary v. State, 109 So.3d 874 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (holding that written threats posted on Facebook page constituted sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of § 836.10, Fla....

sensibly be a valid defense to the convicted crime. § 836.10(2), Fla. Stat. (2021). Furthermore, with no records

...Article I, section 14 of the Florida Constitution.2 Upon consideration of the petition and response, as well as the relevant allegations and circumstances established in this record, we grant the petition. 1 Aglio is charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or commun...

...warrants an extension of Petitioner’s secure detention, and because the trial court made that finding in writing, we deny the petition. Petitioner is being prosecuted in the juvenile division of the circuit court on one count of written threats in violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2021), a second-degree felony....

...Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Picard, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm the defendant’s conviction for violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2021)....

of the letters he was charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1997). Appellant’s trial

...hassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. GERBER, J. The state originally charged the defendant by information with one count of writing threats to kill or to do bodily injury, in violation of section 836.10(2), Florida Statutes (2022). Section 836.10(2) pertinently provides: It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or transmission of, a writing or other record, including an electronic record, in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person, when in such writing or record the person makes a threat to: … [k]ill or to do bodily harm to another person[.] § 836.10(2), Fla. Stat. (2022). The charge arose out of several texts which the defendant had sent to the victim over the course of a day. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing section 836.10 is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to the defendant’s conduct as charged....

...After the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion, the state and the defendant agreed upon the defendant entering a no contest plea to a reduced charge of misdemeanor assault, while reserving her right to appeal the denial of her dispositive motion to dismiss the section 836.10(2) charge. That reservation led to this appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See B.W.B. v. State, 374 So. 3d 40, 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (“We hold section 836.10 is not overbroad. This is because section 836.10 has a limited objective—to punish [written or electronic] ‘threats’ of violence sent[, e.g.,] through electronic social media. Because section 836.10 deals only with ‘threats’ to commit a violent act, it does not violate … First Amendment rights.”) (internal citation omitted); Puy v....

...4th DCA 2020) (“Because there was a question of material fact to be decided by the factfinder—whether the posting was a threat under the statute—the trial court correctly denied appellant’s motion to dismiss.”); Saidi v. State, 845 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“[S]ection 836.10 is not vague.”). The defendant’s appeal raises a secondary argument that the circuit court erred in partially denying the defendant’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing errors relating to the imposition of costs....

...13, 2020)); see also Threat, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) (defining “threat” as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage”). There, the Fourth District Court of Appeal expounded upon the meaning to preserve the constitutionality of section 836.10, Florida Statutes. 17 The court found that “whether a written communication constitutes a threat under section 836.10 depends on whether the message was ‘sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons.’” Puy, 294 So....

...Tatman, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Anthony Doyle appeals his convictions and sentences for extortion under section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2015), and written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2015), arguing that the dual convictions violate double jeopardy. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for resentencing.  The evidence adduced at trial was that Doyle sent a handwritten letter to his pa...

...ain from doing any act against his or her will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 836.05, Fla. Stat. (2015). Section 836.10, “Written threats to kill or do bodily injury; punishment,” provides: 1 The handwriting also matched writing samples Doyle provided in the instant case. 2 ...

...or do bodily injury to any member of the family of the person to whom such letter or communication is sent commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2015). Doyle argues that the elements of the two offenses are inseparable and that a conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not include any additional elements not included for an extortion conviction under section 836.05. Alternatively, he suggests that even if the crimes contain different elements, a conviction for written threats under section 836.10 is necessarily subsumed by an extortion conviction under section 836.05....

...2011) (quoting Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Fla. 2006)). “The prevailing standard for 2 The State also argues that Roughton v. State, 185 So. 3d 1207 (Fla. 2016), controls in this case and that dual convictions under sections 836.05 and 836.10 do not violate double jeopardy based on the alternative conduct proscribed by each statute....

...In Roughton, the court explicitly found that both lewd or lascivious molestation and sexual battery contain a different element that the other does not, based on the alternative conduct proscribed by each statute. 185 So. 3d at 1210. As explained below, however, section 836.10 does not contain any element not found in section 836.05. 3  Written Threats to Kill or Do Extortion—Section 836.05 Bodily Injury—Section 836.10 (1) a person writes or composes a (1) the defendant made a written, printed, or verbal communication containing a threat, communication of a threat to another...

...(b) compel a person to do any act or refrain from doing an act against his/her will. Thus, extortion under section 836.05 may be committed by issuing a written threat to commit bodily harm on another, which encompasses all of the required elements of section 836.10—a written threat to kill or do bodily injury on the person threatened or a family member....

...an intent to extort money or compel a person into action or inaction. But a conviction for written threats to kill or do bodily injury contains no further requirements. The State’s contention that the elements are different because the written threat under section 836.10 may be directed toward a family member is unpersuasive....

...threatening to injure another person. See § 836.05, Fla. Stat. This is broad enough to encompass the third element required for written threats to kill or do bodily injury that the threat of injury is to the person receiving the threat or a member of his or her family. See id. § 836.10. A conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not have any 5  Written Threats to Kill or Do Extortion—Section 836.05 Bodily Injury—Section 836.10 (1) a person writes or composes a (1) the defendant made a written, printed, or verbal communication containing a threat, communication of a threat to another...

...(b) compel a person to do any act or refrain from doing an act against his/her will. Thus, extortion under section 836.05 may be committed by issuing a written threat to commit bodily harm on another, which encompasses all of the required elements of section 836.10—a written threat to kill or do bodily injury on the person threatened or a family member....

...an intent to extort money or compel a person into action or inaction. But a conviction for written threats to kill or do bodily injury contains no further requirements. The State’s contention that the elements are different because the written threat under section 836.10 may be directed toward a family member is unpersuasive....

...threatening to injure another person. See § 836.05, Fla. Stat. This is broad enough to encompass the third element required for written threats to kill or do bodily injury that the threat of injury is to the person receiving the threat or a member of his or her family. See id. § 836.10. A conviction for written threats under section 836.10 does not have any 5 additional elements not contained in section 836.05....

...Egber, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. WARNER, J. T.R.W. appeals the judgment of delinquency and disposition in three cases. In one, case no. 4D21-2399, the trial court adjudicated T.R.W. delinquent based upon a violation of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2020), for communicating a written threat to do bodily harm or commit a mass shooting. In the other two, case nos. 4D21-2396 and 4D21-2398, the court determined that by committing the violation of section 836.10, T.R.W....

...As part of the conditions of probation, he was ordered to obey all laws, perform twenty-five hours of community service at the rate of five hours per month, and provide written proof of the service hours performed each month. While T.R.W. was on probation, the State charged him with violating section 836.10. The State also charged T.R.W. with violating both of his probation orders for failing to obey the law in communicating the threats in violation of section 836.10. In addition, the State alleged that appellant had violated the probation orders by failing to perform his required community service hours. The charges for violation of section 836.10 arose out of texts sent by T.R.W....

...case and again at the close of all the evidence. The trial court denied both motions. The trial court entered a single amended order as to all three cases. Based on the testimony at the trial, the court found that the State proved the elements of section 836.10, Florida Statutes, beyond a reasonable doubt and that T.R.W. violated the terms of his probation by committing the offense. The court ruled that section 836.10(1), did not require “the actual intent to do harm or the ability to carry out the threat,” citing Saidi v....

...is probation by failing to provide written proof of completion of his hours of service. On the violations of probation, the court adjudicated T.R.W. delinquent of the underlying offenses and imposed probation. As to the main charge of violating section 836.10, the court withheld adjudication and imposed probation....

...that he violated his probation by failing to provide written documentation of his community service hours. We address these issues and conclude that both require reversal. Failure to Consider Mens Rea in Finding a Violation of Florida Statute Section 836.10 In finding T.R.W. violated section 836.10, the trial court rejected any consideration of T.R.W.’s intent in sending the texts....

...as a threat, relying on Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). T.R.W. contends that his intent that the words be taken as a threat is essential, without which the element of mens rea is absent. Smith considered an earlier version of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1987), which made it a felony to send a communication threatening to kill or injure the recipient or a member of the recipient’s family....

...5th DCA 2020), the Fifth District applied this proposition to a perceived threat sent over Snapchat. Id. at 335 (finding “the State made a prima facie showing that the [communication] was a threat because it was ‘sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons’”) (quoting Smith, 532 So. 2d at 53). Section 836.10(1), Florida Statutes (2020), provided: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or co...

...to conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism, in any manner that would allow another person to view the threat, commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. § 836.10(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). 3 As we noted in Puy v. State, 294 So. 3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), section 836.10 does not define “threat.” In Puy, we considered whether section 836.10 was vague and ambiguous as to what constituted a threat. The appellant was charged under the statute after he posted a picture of himself on social media with 3 Section 836.10 was amended in 2021, making primarily format changes to the statute. Section 836.10(2) currently reads: It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or transmission of, a writing or other record, including an electronic record, in any manner in which...

...inflict evil, injury, or damage.” Id. at 933 (quoting Threat, Merriam- Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/threat (last visited Jan. 25, 2023)). We then relied on Smith to hold that “whether a written communication constitutes a threat under section 836.10 depends on whether the message was ‘sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons.’” Puy, 294 So. 3d at 933 (quoting Smith, 532 So. 2d at 53). Puy did not discuss mens rea as a necessary element of violating section 836.10, other than to conclude the word “threat” required an objective assessment of the communication’s effect on a reasonable person. The mens rea element of section 836.10 was addressed in part by N.D. v. State, 315 So. 3d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). There, the appellant argued that section 836.10 lacked any subjective intent element and as a result the statute failed to distinguish between acts of merely venting anger and actual threats to intimidate and do violence. Id. at 104–05. The N.D. court noted that section 836.10 did not specifically include a mens rea element but determined the statute must be construed to include mens rea. Id. at 105 (citing State v. Giorgetti, 868 So. 2d 512, 515–16 (Fla. 2004)). After recognizing that mens rea must be included as an element of section 836.10, the court then applied the reasonableness test of Smith and Cowart to conclude that the juvenile’s threatening language was sufficient to warrant the trial court placing him in a probation program....

...As noted above, this requirement is little more than a reflection that society ordinarily reserves criminal sanctions for acts of intentional misconduct. Id. at 520. Following the reasoning of Elonis, a mens rea element must be read into section 836.10....

...the defendant’s claim that the communications were a hoax. 532 So. 2d 10 at 53. Thus, Smith does not comport with the necessity of finding some level of mens rea in order to sustain the conviction. We hold that section 836.10 does contain a mens rea component. To prove the commission of a violation of section 836.10, the trier of fact must find that the defendant transmitted a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat....

...And we reverse the court’s order revoking T.R.W.’s probation based upon the uncharged violation of failure to provide documentation of his community service hours. Conclusion The trial court failed to consider the mens rea element of section 836.10, specifically determining that T.R.W.’s intent was irrelevant. Based upon Romero and Elonis, section 836.10 must be construed to have an element of intent. We thus reverse the court’s order finding T.R.W. guilty on the main charge of violating section 836.10 and revoking his probation on that basis in the two other cases....

...the failure to document community service hours, as the State had not charged T.R.W. with a violation of probation on that ground. We certify conflict with Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) on the issue of the mens rea required in section 836.10, Florida Statutes. As this issue has arisen in multiple cases due to the posting of messages on social networks, clarity in the correct interpretation of the statute is needed. Reversed and remanded; conflict certified. DAMOORGIAN...

...*1310 APPENDIX Rule 3.988(d) Category 4: Violent Personal Crimes [[Image here]] *1311 Rule 3.988(d) Category 4: Violent Personal Crimes Section 231.06 — Assault or Battery Upon District School Board Employee Chapter 784 — Assault, Battery Section 836.05 — Threats, Extortion Section 836.10 — Written Threats to Kill or Do Bodily Injury Section 843.01 — Resisting Officer with Violence Subsection 381.411(4)(b) — Battery on HRS Employee [[Image here]] Note — Any person sentenced for a felony offense committed after O...

...Jury Instr. (Civ.) 700. Next, instruction 8.22 is amended to add “conduct a mass shooting” and “conduct an act of terrorism” to the title of the instruction and name of the crime in response to amendments made by the Legislature to section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018). See Ch. 2018-3, § 17, at 26, Laws of Fla. Additionally, italicized notes are added that explain there are two ways to violate section 836.10....

...2d 1272], 2010 [52 So. 3d 595], 2012 [141 So. 3d 132], 2014 [152 So. 3d 529], and 2016 [202 So. 3d 830], and 2018. 8.22 WRITTEN THREAT TO [KILL] [DO BODILY INJURY] [CONDUCT A MASS SHOOTING] [CONDUCT AN ACT OF TERRORISM] § 836.10, Fla....

...Stat. To prove the crime of Written Threat to [Kill] [Do Bodily Injury] [Conduct a Mass Shooting] [Conduct an Act of Terrorism], the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: *There are two ways to violate § 836.10, Fla....

...Definitions. Give if applicable. An “inscribed communication” is a communication that is written or printed. To “procure” means to persuade, induce, prevail upon, or cause a person to do something. *The second way to violate § 836.10, Fla....

...threat. A “record” includes an electronic record. Lesser Included Offenses WRITTEN THREAT TO [KILL] OR [DO BODILY INJURY] [CONDUCT A MASS SHOOTING] [CONDUCT AN ACT OF TERRORISM] – 836.10 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....

...definition of the word inscribed. The definition of procure comes from the manslaughter standard instruction. *The act of posting a message on social media that threatened to “shoot up” a school did not constitute a violation of law under the clause of § 836.10, Fla. Stat., that prohibits the sending of threats to a specific victim because it was not sent directly to the victims....

...It is a second degree felony to maliciously threaten an injury to a person, property or reputation of another person by means of written or printed communication. Where individuals have received hate mail or had their public property vandalized by means of graffiti spelling out threatening messages the statute may be useful. Section 836.10 — Written threats to kill or do bodily injury; punishment....

...School shooter.” A student at appellant’s former high school saw that Snapchat posted on appellant’s Snapchat account and subsequently showed it to a teacher. Law enforcement was brought in to investigate. Appellant was charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018), which states the following: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such let...

...disputes that are properly to be resolved by the jury.” Hunwick, 446 So. 2d at 215. The version of the statute appellant was charged under resulted from an amendment following the decision in J.A.W. v. State, 210 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Prior to March 2018, section 836.10 stated: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the sending of any letter, inscribed communication, or electronic communication, whether such letter or communication be signed or anonymo...

...up my school” and “school getting shot up on a Tuesday.” 210 So. 3d at 143. The court reversed the conviction because all the threats “were not sent directly to the alleged victims or their families as prohibited under the plain language of section 836.10.” Id. After J.A.W., section 836.10 was amended. Now the plain language of section 836.10 does not require that the individual send the threat “directly” to any particular person, as was required in the prior iteration of this statute....

...in the record in the light most favorable to the state, with all inferences resolved against appellant, a prima facie case exists where a jury could determine that appellant’s posting did in fact constitute a threat to conduct a mass shooting at school. Section 836.10 does not define “threat.” However, in In Interest of P.J., 579 So....

...See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2382 (2002) (defining “threat” as “an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage”). The Second District has stated that whether a written communication constitutes a threat under section 836.10 depends on whether the message was “sufficient to cause alarm in reasonable persons.” See Smith v....

...2d 289, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (“Whether a particular communication constitutes a true threat which has the probable consequence of causing reasonable apprehension in the hearer is a question of fact for the jury.”). In a recent case involving section 836.10, State v....

threat to kill or do bodily harm in violation of section 836.10(1), Florida Statutes (2019). Appellant raises