The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . the instruction and name of the crime in response to amendments made by the Legislature to section 836.10 . . . Additionally, italicized notes are added that explain there are two ways to violate section 836.10. . . . must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: * There are two ways to violate § 836.10 . . . *The second way to violate § 836.10, Fla. Stat. is set forth below. 1. . . . that threatened to "shoot up" a school did not constitute a violation of law under the clause of § 836.10 . . .
. . . Aglio is charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2018), which provides: Any person who . . .
. . . section 836.05, Florida Statutes (2015), and written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10, "Written threats to kill or do bodily injury; punishment," provides: Any person who writes . . . The State's contention that the elements are different because the written threat under section 836.10 . . . See id. § 836.10. . . . As explained below, however, section 836.10 does not contain any element not found in section 836.05. . . .
. . . juvenile, appeals his disposition for sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury under section 836.10 . . . directly to the alleged victims or their families as prohibited under the plain language of section 836.10 . . . The plain language of section 836.10 makes clear that it only applies where a threat is sent directly . . . This court has explained that section 836.10 does not criminalize written threats that have not been . . . The act of sending under section 836.10 requires both “the depositing of the communication in the mail . . .
. . . a. making defamatory and threatening posts on the daughter’s blog in violation of sections 836.05, 836.10 . . .
. . . Appellant’s Facebook message to Appellee’s daughter would have qualified as a second offense under section 836.10 . . . posted on Facebook page constituted sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of § 836.10 . . .
. . . This instruction was adopted in 2013. 8.22 WRITTEN THREAT TO [KILL] [DO BODILY INJURY] § 836.10, Fla. . . . Lesser Included Offenses APPENDIX — Continued WRITTEN THREAT TO KILL OR DO BODILY INJURY — 836.10 CATEGORY . . .
. . . stalking after an injunction, aggravated stalking with a credible threat, and violation of section 836.10 . . . a threat to kill or do bodily injury to the person to whom such letter or communication is sent_” § 836.10 . . . The significance of the stipulated facts lies in the historical development of section 836.10. . . . The State takes the opposite view, contending that the 2010 amendment to section 836.10 clarified that . . . Compare § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2009), with § 836.10, Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . the extortion statute, section 836.05, and the statute criminalizing a threat of bodily harm, section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10 provides, as follows: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or procures the . . .
. . . dismiss the two counts of sending written threats to kill or do bodily harm in violation of section 836.10 . . . Because we hold that, under the circumstances of this case, appellant violated section 836.10 by posting . . . The trial court found that appellant’s posting constituted a “sending” under section 836.10. . . . Section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2011), provides: Any person who writes or composes and also sends or . . . At that point, the statement is “sent” for purposes of section 836.10. . . .
. . . Based on the letters, the state charged the defendant with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes . . . the sending of such letter or communication, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree.... § 836.10 . . . the defendant sent only two letters, the state charged the defendant’s alleged violation of section 836.10 . . . State, 532 So.2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (the proscription which section 836.10 communicates is “not . . . In 2010, the legislature amended section 836.10 as follows: if-aAny person who writes or composes and . . . purposes of this dissent, I have edited the statute to include only the operative portions of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10, Florida Statutes is similar to 18 U.S.C. § 876(b) involving the mailing of threatening . . . In the same way, section 836.10 prohibits the sending of any letter. . . . The majority concludes that the focus of section 836.10 is the threat to the person to whom a communication . . . In contrast, section 836.10 does not require any effect on the victim as an essential element of the . . .
. . . appeals his conviction of sending written threats of death or bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . While conceding that he authored and sent the letters and papers, Saidi argues that section 836.10 is . . . State, 532 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), that section 836.10, Florida Statutes, is constitutional, he . . . At the outset, we note our agreement with Smith, and conclude that section 836.10 is not vague. . . . See § 836.10, Fla. Stat.; Dudley v. State, 634 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Alonso v. . . .
. . . As a result of the letters he was charged with violating section 836.10, Florida Statutes (1997). . . . appellant was charged with threatening to kill or do bodily harm to Judge Horowitz in violation of section 836.10 . . .
. . . Pinellas County, Florida, with forty-three counts of making written threats in violation of section 836.10 . . . Appellee was charged with sending written threats to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10 provides: 836.10. . . . State, 532 So.2d at 52, “[s]ection 836.10 is justified by the right of all persons to live free of unexpected . . . and unwarranted fear of harm; .... ” Since the act of “sending” under section 836.10 continues from . . .
. . . Claims Involving Section 836.10, Florida Statutes Vagueness Petitioner alleges that § 836.10 is vague . . . Therefore, § 836.10 is not unconstitutional due to vagueness. . . . Section 838.021 requires that the target be a public servant while § 836.10 does not. . . . Section 836.10 requires that the threat be written while § 838.021 does not. . . . Petitioner also argues that § 836.10 is invalid because it lacks a “postal nexus.” . . .
. . . letter, he was charged with making a written threat to kill or do bodily injury in violation of section 836.10 . . . Section 836.10. . . . For that reason, we must conclude that the elements of making a written threat under section 836.10 are . . .
. . . District School Board Employee Chapter 784 — Assault, Battery Section 836.05 — Threats, Extortion Section 836.10 . . .
. . . of sending a letter containing “written threats to kill or do bodily injury” in violation of section 836.10 . . .
. . . Section 836.10 makes it a felony to send or procure the sending of any document threatening to kill or . . . Respectively, § 836.10, Fla.Stat. (1987) and § 838.021(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1987). . . . .
. . . MacGuire pled nolo contendere and was found guilty on August 8, 1986 of violating sections 838.021 and 836.10 . . .
. . . charged with making written threats to kill or do bodily injury to another, in violation of section 836.10 . . .
. . . threat to kill or injure another — both a circuit judge and a social worker — in violation of Section 836.10 . . .
. . . Kirk Johnson, Jr., executed a note payable on demand, without interest, in the amount of $278,-836.10 . . .
. . . Collins had functioned as a bankruptcy receiver rather than a trustee in reorganization he would get $36,-836.10 . . .
. . . no attendance is to be allowed, as they are not persons charged with crime. (11) Witness fees paid, $836.10 . . .