Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 806.01
CopyCited 130 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 34 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 116, 2009 Fla. LEXIS 148, 2009 WL 217976
...eft. See §
812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§
782.04,
782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. See id. §
806.01....
CopyCited 75 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 17 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 400, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 1220, 1992 WL 148230
...3d DCA 1983); Chapter 84-86, Laws of Florida. [Page A-49] *1227 Explanation of proposed revision: The instruction begins on page 122 of the manual. The revision is based on F.S.
800.04 as amended in 1990. [Page A-50] *1228 ARSON FIRST DEGREE (Amended) F.S.
806.01(1) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Arson, the State must prove the following [three] [four] elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....
...re] [explosion]. Give 2a or 2. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfully. 2b b. The damage was caused while defendant was engaged in the commission of (felony alleged). 3. The (structure alleged) was Give 3a if a. [a dwelling.] charged under F.S. 806.01(1)(a) Give 3b if b. [an institution in which the damage occurred during charged normal hours of occupancy.] under F.S. 806.01(1)(b) [an institution where persons are normally present.] Give 3c if c. [a structure.] charged under F.S. 806.01(1)(c) Give only if 4. The defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe charged the (structure alleged) was occupied by a human being. under F.S. 806.01(1)(c) [Page A-51] *1229 Definition; "Structure" means: give if applicable 1. Any building of any kind. F.S. 2. Any enclosed area with a roof over it. 806.01(3) 3....
...Give only if Define the crime alleged. If burglary, also define crime 2b is alleged that was the object of burglary. Explanation of amendments: The instruction begins on page 127 of the manual. The new language is added based on 1990 amendments to F.S. 806.01(1). [Page A-52] *1230 ARSON SECOND DEGREE (Amended) F.S. 806.01(2) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Arson Second Degree, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Elements 1....
...plosion] [fire]. Give 2a or 2. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfully. 2b b. The damage was caused while defendant was engaged in the commission of (felony alleged). 3. The (structure alleged) is a structure. Definition "Structure" means: F.S. 806.01(3) 1....
...Give only if Define the crime alleged. If burglary, also define crime 2b is alleged that was the object of burglary. Explanation of amendments: The instruction begins on page 128 of the manual. The new language is added based on 1990 amendments to F.S. 806.01(2)....
...sexual organs None Unnatural and
800.03 lascivious act
800.02 Lewd, lascivious, or indecent None Attempt assault or act upon or in Assault
784.011 presence of child
800.04 Battery
784.03 Unnatural and lascivious act
800.02 Arson
806.01(1) None Arson
806.01(2) Arson
806.01(2) [*f] Criminal mischief Attempt
806.13(1)(b)1 Criminal mischief
806.13(1)(b)2 Criminal mischief
806.13(1)(b)3 Criminal mischief
806.13(2) Criminal mischief None Attempt
806.13(1)(b)1 [Page A-79] *1257 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY...
CopyCited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 439
...Whether a jury instruction on second degree (depraved mind) murder is necessary, if supported by the evidence, when defendant is charged with first degree (felony) murder.
442 So.2d at 256. The facts of this case are as follows. Petitioner was indicted for arson under section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and first-degree felony murder under section
782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...The jury found petitioner guilty as charged and, at sentencing, the trial court merged the two offenses and sentenced petitioner to a life term with a minimum mandatory 25-year sentence. On appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's denial of the voluntary intoxication instruction and held that (1) arson under section 806.01 is a general intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is not a defense and (2) voluntary intoxication is not a defense to first-degree felony murder when it would not be a defense to the underlying felony....
...430,
70 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981), where the evidence shows the use of intoxicants but does not show intoxication, the instruction is not required. We reiterate that the intoxication defense applies only to specific intent crimes. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with arson under section
806.01 and felony murder, with arson being the underlying felony. Section
806.01 reads, in part: "Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged ......
...We find that the present statutory definition of arson does not materially vary from the common law definition with regard to the requisite intent. There is no indication that the legislature intended to change the common law intent requirement. Accordingly, we hold that arson under section 806.01 is a general intent crime and, therefore, voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense to arson....
CopyCited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2006 WL 1699524
...See §
812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§
782.04,
782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. *1178 See id. §
806.01....
CopyCited 41 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 67 A.L.R. 4th 917
...idence, and that consideration of the arson conviction after it was kept from the jury as a sanction for the state's discovery violation was improper and obviated the effect of the sanction. Appellant says that arson of an unoccupied structure under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977), is not a violent crime and that under Mann v....
CopyCited 36 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 257
...The district court certified that its decision directly conflicts with State v. W.A.M.,
412 So.2d 49 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied,
419 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1982). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Respondent was charged in a two-count information with first-degree arson in violation *736 of section
806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), [1] and failure to put out or control a fire or give a prompt fire alarm in violation of section
877.15(1), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court of appeal, dismissing the state's appeal from a judgment of acquittal, is approved. It is so ordered. OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., concurs in result only. NOTES [1] Section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged; (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or contents there...
CopyCited 32 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...We endeavor to add a measure of predictability to the law within the bounds of stare decisis. The voluntary intoxication defense potentially exists for numerous criminal offenses and therefore merits serious consideration. Defendant was indicted for arson under section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), and for first degree (felony) murder under section
782.04(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...Defendant argues, and we agree, that voluntary intoxication is a defense to a "specific intent" crime, as contrasted with a "general intent" crime. See Cirack v. State,
201 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1967); Fouts v. State,
374 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). However, we find that arson under section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), is a general intent crime to which voluntary intoxication is not a defense. Section
806.01 provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) any dwelling whether occupied or not, or its contents......
...nt to injure or defraud the insuror sets fire to ... any building." (emphasis added) See also Myers v. State, 422 N.E.2d at 750, where the Indiana appellate court drew the same distinction under similar Indiana arson statutes as we do under sections
806.01(1) and
817.233....
...ondition like "willfully" or "intentionally" should include language encompassing a subjective intent, for example, intent to cause a result in addition to that which is substantially certain to result from a statutorily prohibited act. Accordingly, section 806.01(1) of the Florida arson statute, which says that a person who "willfully ......
...ause the damage. See Rozier v. State,
402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which construed "willfully" to mean general intent under the trespass statute, section 801.08(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Admittedly, our foregoing conclusion that arson under section
806.01(1) is a general intent crime cannot be drawn readily and easily from the bare wording of section
806.01....
...Yet, with seeming paradoxicalness, the Stasio court in dicta said that under the New Jersey arson statute, arson is a crime to which voluntary intoxication is a defense. However, that Stasio dicta is distinguishable from the instant case because the New Jersey arson statute, N.J. Stat. Ann., section 2C:17-1, in contrast to section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the crime of arson must be "purposely" done....
...various arson statutes denote "general" or "specific" intent is that the law has been at best unsettled and inconsistent. But, regardless of the ambiguous background of the general law as described above, we construe statutes which are phrased like section 806.01(1) and contain the words "willfully" or "intentionally" to describe general intent crimes....
CopyCited 31 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 10529, 2010 WL 2813567
...eft. See §
812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). Another is the homicide statute, which expressly identifies three degrees of murder, as well as multiple forms of manslaughter. See id. §§
782.04,
782.07. Yet another is arson, which has two degrees. See id. §
806.01....
CopyCited 30 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10233, 2009 WL 604890
...;
see also Vuksanovic,
439 F.3d at 1311 (concluding that second-degree arson under
Florida law, which required only that a person “‘damages or causes to be damaged
any structure,’” was a crime involving moral turpitude (quoting Fla. Stat. §
806.01(2))).6
Considering the totality of these required elements, we conclude that
criminal reckless conduct under Georgia law inherently involves “‘an act of
baseness ....
...al and unjustifiable risk” that his
6
The Florida statute also required that the offense be committed “‘willfully and
unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony.’” Vuksanovic,
439 F.3d at 1311 (quoting
Fla. Stat. §
806.01(2)).
12
actions or omissions will cause harm or endanger the safety of others and his
actions or omissions actually cause bodily harm to or endanger the bodily safety of
others, he has ex...
CopyCited 29 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3808
...302, 310, § 106(a) (2005)).1 Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), we lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an
alien removable by reason of having committed a crime involving moral turpitude.
After review, we conclude Vuksanovic’s second-degree arson conviction in
violation of § 806.01(2), Florida Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude and
thus dismiss his petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Vuksanovic, a native and citizen of the former Yugoslavia...
...any structure, whether the property of himself or herself or another,
under any circumstances [not falling under the crime of first-degree
arson], is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a
felony of the second degree . . . .
§ 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). The statutory definition of “structure” includes
vehicles. See id. § 806.01(3).
To support his argument, Vuksanovic discusses the circumstances
surrounding his conviction....
CopyCited 27 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 4647, 2004 WL 442688
...ure, or contents
thereof, where persons are normally present, such as: jails, prisons, or
detention centers . . . is guilty of arson in the first degree, which
constitutes a felony of the first degree . . . .
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 806.01(1) (1987). Section 806.01(2) provided that
[a]ny person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion,
damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property
of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in
subsection (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree, which
constitutes a felony of the second degree . . . .
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 806.01(2) (1987)....
CopyCited 16 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5046, 1999 WL 162461
...And the Canales court does not use words like "plain meaning" or
"unambiguous" in its opinion construing the pivotal statute.
Also, section
775.084(1)(b) designates specific offenses that will trigger an enhancement. Each of
these offenses is defined by Florida law. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §
806.01 (defining arson); Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23221, 1991 WL 182553
...sufficient to allow the application of the arson guideline.”
917 F.2d at 1181 . 7 In this case, the facts contained in the Agreement establish arson as defined by Florida law. Under Florida law arson is defined as willfully and unlawfully damaging by fire or exploding any structure. Fla.Stat. §
806.01(2). Florida law defines a *1311 structure for purposes of Section
806.01 to include "any vessel [or] watereraft." Fla. Stat. §
806.01 (3)....
CopyCited 11 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 428524
...rwise might have done. More importantly, to convict Pacheco of first degree arson under the circumstances of this case, it was necessary to prove that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the premises were occupied by a human being. See § 806.01(1)(c), Fla....
CopyCited 10 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1686603
...The fire marshal opined the fire originated on the patio near a stuffed chair. The fire did not appear to have been caused by electrical wiring or by a sloppy smoker. He classified the fire as arson without the use of an accelerant. The State charged the defendant with first degree arson in violation of section 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003)....
...State,
893 So.2d 683, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). The State "charge[d] that David Moore on the 6th day of July, A.D.2003,. . ., did willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a dwelling, located at . . ., contrary to F.S.
806.01(1)(a)." The evidence consistently established the mobile home was used as a residence and that the fire was a completed act....
...Here, the evidence established, and no one disputed, the mobile home was used as a dwelling. While a structure is not always a dwelling, a dwelling is always a structure within the broad definition of the term "structure" found in the arson statute, section 806.01(3), Fla....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2005 WL 3406328
...Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Charlie Crist, Attorney General; and Sherri Tolar Rollison, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. The appellant, a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent of one count of first-degree arson, a violation of section
806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2004); and one count of burglary to a dwelling or structure, with the intent to commit the offense of arson and/or criminal mischief and with damage over $1,000.00, a violation of section
810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2004)....
...The amended petition alleged that Appellant "did willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of a felony, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a structure, or the contents thereof, where persons are normally present, to-wit: RIBAULT MIDDLE SCHOOL, contrary to the provisions of Section 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes." This statutory subsection defines first-degree arson to include a person's damaging, or causing to be damaged, "willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion," "[a]ny structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, such as ......
...occupancy; and 2) that the State had not shown that Appellant was a "principal" with a conscious intent to commit a criminal act. The "structure" in question is the school building that includes the band/chorus room in which the fire originated. See § 806.01(3) (defining "structure" to include "any building of any kind"). The testimony that the middle school normally got out at 2:25 p.m. and the fire was started sometime later that afternoon does not dispose of the issue of whether the evidence satisfied the requirements of section 806.01(1)(b)....
..."; in "[a]ny structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, ... during normal hours of occupancy"; or in "[a]ny other structure that [the perpetrator] knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being." See § 806.01(1)(a)-(c). In contrast, the Legislature designated as arson in the second degree (a second-degree felony) an act of arson "under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1)." See § 806.01(2)....
...The State proved that Appellant was a "principal" in the commission of a felony and willfully, unlawfully damaged or caused to be damaged by fire a structure (and its contents) "where persons are normally present" and "during normal hours of occupancy." Given both the nature of the danger described in section 806.01(1) damages "by fire or explosion"and the evidence that persons were on the campus in the immediate vicinity of the damaged structure on the afternoon when the fire was set, Appellant construed the statute too narrowly by asserting...
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...The second degree arson statute provides in part: Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred in subsection *109 (1), is guilty of arson in the second degree... . § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1979). A vehicle is expressly included in the statutory definition of "structure." § 806.01(3), Fla....
...r intent to inflict such damage. Such an act is not contrary to any statute or common law of this State. Therefore we agree the trial court properly granted Mayle's (c)(4) motion. AFFIRMED. COBB and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 806.01(2), Fla....
...re, was not sufficient to counter Mayle's (c)(4) motion, and the facts set forth in the motion must be accepted by us as true. State v. Kemp,
305 So.2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d). [5] Ch. 79-108, § 1, Laws of Fla. [6] Fla. Stat. §
806.01: Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 1990 WL 98553
...Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent. McDONALD, Justice. We review Higgins v. State,
553 So.2d 177, 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), because the court certified the following question: IS SECTION
806.01(2), FLA. STAT., SECOND DEGREE ARSON, A NECESSARILY INCLUDED OFFENSE OF §
806.01(1), FLA....
...swer the question in the negative. By information the state charged that Higgins "unlawfully and willfully, by fire or explosion, damage[d] or cause[d] to be damaged a structure or contents thereof where persons are normally present," contrary to subsection 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....
...e arson; (3) guilty of criminal mischief; and (4) not guilty. The jury convicted Higgins of first-degree arson. Higgins claims reversible error because of the failure to charge on second-degree arson. In addressing whether the crime proscribed by subsection 806.01(2) is a necessarily lesser included offense of the crime defined in subsection 806.01(1), the district court opined: The term "necessarily lesser included offense" is self-defining....
...The lesser included offenses have no element that are not also necessarily a part of the proof of the greater offense. Therefore, if all essential elements of a lesser offense are included within the elements of the greater offense, the lesser offense is a necessarily included lesser offense. Section 806.01(1) first degree arson, does not include all of the elements of § 806.01(2) second degree arson, and the proof of first degree arson does not and cannot constitute proof of second degree arson....
...There was no error in failing to instruct on second-degree arson in this case. Therefore, we approve the district court's affirmance of Higgin's conviction. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1987), reads as follows: 806.01 Arson....
...(3) As used in this chapter, "structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. (Emphasis added.) [2] § 806.01(2) arson is listed as a necessarily lesser included offense of § 806.01(1) arson in the Schedule of Lesser Included Offenses to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal). We hereby amend that schedule by moving § 806.01(2) arson from the first category to the second, i.e., permissive lesser included offenses.
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...ge to said property, in violation of 77[7].04 and
790.161(2), Florida Statutes ..." and on count three, which charged an "... attempt to commit a crime, to-wit: ARSON IN THE SECOND DEGREE ..." on the same structure, "... in violation of 77[7].04 and
806.01(2), Florida Statutes ..." If we were to reach these issues, we would hold that ownership of the premises described in the allegations of these statutory crimes is not an element of the respective crimes because the statute eliminates the element....
...in contravention of Sections
777.04 and
790.161, Florida Statutes (1975). III. "... did unlawfully, willfully and 5 years 5 years maliciously attempt to commit a crime, to-wit: ARSON IN THE SECOND DEGREE ..." in contravention of Sections
777.04 and
806.01, Florida Statutes (1975)....
...ged are identical. It will be noted from the above tabulation that count two charged the attempted placing of a destructive device in violation of Section
790.161, Florida Statutes (1975), and that count three charged attempted arson in violation of Section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1975)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1990 WL 105517
...On the other hand, in P.P.M. v. State,
447 So.2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), we held that a vacant house was not a dwelling for purposes of the arson statute. Nowhere in Chapter 806 is there a definition of "dwelling" except the phrase "whether occupied or not" contained in section
806.01(1)(a)....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 877, 2013 WL 6305393, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2640
...Lesser Included Offenses LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS EXHIBITION BY A DETAINEE IN THE PRESENCE OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A FACILITY —
800.09 CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. INS. NO. STAT, None Attempt_777.04(1) 51 Unnatural and
800.02 11.8 lascivious act Comment This instruction was adopted in 2013. 12,1 ARSON — FIRST DEGREE §
806.01(1), Fla....
...(Defendant) [damaged] [caused to be damaged] (structure or contents alleged) by [fire] [explosion]. Give 2a or 2b. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfully. b. The damage was caused while defendant was engaged in the commission of (felony alleged). 2. The (structure alleged) was Give 3a if charged, under § 806.01(1) (a), Fla. Stat. a. [a dwelling]. Give 3b if charged under § 806.01(1) (b), Fla. Stat. b. [an institution in which the damage occurred during normal hours of occupancy]. [an institution where persons normally are present]. Give Sc if charged under § 806.01(1) (c), Fla. Stat. c.[a structure]. Give only if charged under § 806.01(l)(c), Fla. Stat. 3.The defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the (structure alleged) was occupied by a human being. Definition. Give if applicable. § 806.01(3), Fla....
...*731 Define the crime alleged. If burglary, also define the crime that was the object of the burglai'y. Lesser Included Offenses ARSON — 806,01(1) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. Arson — second, de- 806=01(2) 4242 greeNone Arson — second
806.01(2) 12.2 degree Attempt_777.04(1)5.1 Criminal mischief
806.13 12.4 Comment This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1992 [
603 So.2d 1175 ] and 2013....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ertently but erroneously instructed the jury that criminal mischief, committed in violation of section
806.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is a lesser included offense of second degree arson. The second degree arson charged in this case, in violation of section
806.01(2), involved appellant's destruction of his own property whereas, pursuant to section
806.13(1)(a): A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1988 WL 96449
...Fred Partin, Louisville, and Fred Haddad, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. COBB, Judge. Ricky Coleman Erwin was convicted of, inter alia, arson of an occupied structure pursuant to section 806.01(1)(c), Florida *725 Statutes (1985). [1] The charge arose from the burning of a barn which contained living quarters at one end. Section 806.01(1)(c) provides as follows: 806.01 Arson....
...Additionally, there was no evidence at all that the actual torchman knew that the barn was occupied. Because of this lack of evidence, the trial court erred in denying Erwin's motion for judgment of acquittal on this charge. However, the evidence does support a conviction under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985) on the second degree felony of arson of an unoccupied structure....
...SHARP, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion. SHARP, Chief Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. While I agree with the majority opinion that there was insufficient evidence to sustain *727 the conviction for first degree arson (§ 806.01(1)(c)), I would reverse all of the arson convictions as well as the solicitation and conspiracy counts, and remand for a new trial because of improper comments by the prosecution in closing argument which compounded the error and resulted in an unfair trial....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. SMITH, THOMPSON and MINER, JJ., concur. ON REHEARING THOMPSON, Judge. Higgins appealed the trial court's denial of his request to have the jury instructed on second degree arson, § 806.01(2), Fla. Stat., as a necessarily lesser included offense of the offense charged, first degree arson, § 806.01(1)....
...The lesser included offenses have no element that are not also necessarily a part of the proof of the greater offense. Therefore, if all essential elements of a lesser offense are included within the elements of the greater offense, the lesser offense is a necessarily included lesser offense. Section 806.01(1) first degree arson, does not include all of the elements of § 806.01(2) second degree arson, and the proof of first degree arson does not and cannot constitute proof of second degree arson....
...hedule of lesser included offenses as approved by the Florida Supreme Court, and to resolve the conflict created by its inclusion in the schedule of lesser offenses and this opinion, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question: IS SECTION 806.01(2), FLA. STAT., SECOND DEGREE ARSON, A NECESSARILY LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF § 806.01(1), FLA....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 2012 WL 4665829, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1922
...State,
972 So.2d 839, 850 (Fla.2007)), cert. denied; — U.S.-,
131 S.Ct. 935 ,
178 L.Ed.2d 776 (2011); Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(6). Arson Kaczmar asserts that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of arson. We disagree. Section
806.01, Florida Statutes (2007), governs arson: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its co...
...of the first degree.... “Structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, *1005 any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. § 806.01(3), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1991 WL 29490
...Charles Andrew Walsingham challenges his conviction and sentence for arson. He raises several points but the only meritorious issue we find concerns his sentencing. The state charged the defendant with committing arson on November 5, 1988, a first-degree felony proscribed by *366 section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Welch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. P.P.M., a juvenile, appeals an order of the lower court adjudicating him delinquent. We reverse and remand. Appellant was charged by petition with first degree arson pursuant to section 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...On appeal, appellant raises two points, only one of which merits discussion. Appellant argues that the state failed to establish a prima facie case of first degree arson because the burned structure was not a dwelling within the meaning of section *447 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes....
...building. See Smith v. State ; Johnson v. State,
188 So.2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Applying these legal principles to the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the subject house was a dwelling inside the meaning of section
806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...However, because we find that the evidence supports appellant's delinquency adjudication for second degree arson, a lesser included offense of first degree arson, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the lesser *448 included offense [section
806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981)] [2] and to pass sentence accordingly. See Tukes v. State,
346 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Johnson v. State . REVERSED and REMANDED. SCHEB and LEHAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section
806.01(1)(a), Fla....
...es or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; .... is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.
775.082, s.
775.083, or s.
775.084. [2] Section
806.01(2), Fla....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 412443
...The fire occurred at 11:00 p.m. on a Sunday, a time when the flea market was closed to the public. The State presented overwhelming evidence, including statements by Neilson, to support an arson charge. However, in order to support a conviction of first-degree arson under section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1991), the State was required to prove that Neilson knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the structure was occupied by a human being....
...n of the arson. [2] The security guard was not called as a witness and there is no record evidence that any of the structures were occupied on the night of the arson. Because the State failed to prove an essential element of first-degree arson under section 806.01(1)(c), we reverse. The evidence, however, supports a conviction of second-degree *1112 arson under section 806.01(2), and judgment shall be entered for this lesser charge on remand....
...The only issue presented to us in this appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Neilson knew or had reasonable grounds to believe that the flea market was occupied by a human being so as to support a conviction for arson in the first degree in violation of section 806.01(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1991)....
...The majority concludes, however, that "there was no testimony or other evidence to connect the presence of a security guard in a vehicle with a conclusion that any of the buildings were occupied" (emphasis supplied). Neilson was charged pursuant to section 806.01(1)(c). Section 806.01(1) provides as follows: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any s...
...(Emphasis supplied.) The information charging Neilson charged that he "willfully and unlawfully by fire or explosion did damage or cause to be damaged a certain structure located at
11721 U.S. 19, Hudson, that he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being; contrary to Chapter
806.01(1)(c), Florida Statutes...." Section
806.01(3) defines "structure" as follows: (3) As used in this chapter, "structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, under the precise wording of the information and the definition of "structure" in section
806.01(3), the "structure" Neilson was charged with burning was the flea market itself and not some separate building within the confines of the flea market....
...e occupied." The fact that Neilson knew that a security guard was on the premises of the flea market is sufficient. We are not presented in this appeal with a challenge, constitutionally or otherwise, to the definition of "structure" as contained in section 806.01(3)....
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...Bill Gunter, State Fire Marshal, Tallahassee, as amicus curiae. HOBSON, Acting Chief Judge. The state appeals an order granting Joseph Daniel Wall's amended motion to dismiss an amended information accusing him of second degree arson in violation of section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....
...*648 The state then presented a sworn traverse under Rule 3.190(d), stating in pertinent part therein that "[t]he State specifically denies Paragraphs 2 and 4" of Wall's affidavit and, as to Paragraph 3, Wall had "admitted his wrongful motives and intent to law enforcement [authorities]." The second degree arson statute, section 806.01(2), reads in relevant part: Any person who willfully and unlawfully, [1] by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), [2] is guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree... . Subsection (3) of section 806.01 provides that, as used in chapter 806, the definition of "structure" includes "any vehicle." A hearing was held on Wall's amended motion to dismiss, at which Wall cited the case of State v....
...nflict any such injury or damage, and without posing any danger of inflicting any such injury or damage. In other words, although the defendant "willfully" damaged his van by the fire, he did not do so "unlawfully." Although the word "unlawfully" in section 806.01 has yet to be clearly defined, we believe that where one willfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged a structure which is his own property, the word "unlawfully" in subsection (2) of section 806.01 means, at the very least, that an injury result to any person or damage ensue to any other property, or that there be an intent that such injury or damage occur, or that a danger of such injury or damage be present....
...Accordingly, we reverse the order granting Wall's amended motion to dismiss and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. DANAHY and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Effective June 1, 1979, the state legislature substituted the word "unlawfully" in section
806.01 for the word "maliciously." See Ch. 79-108, § 1, Laws of Fla. The legislature did so because of the difficulty of proving malice in arson cases. See Fla. Stat. §
806.01: Florida Arson Law The Evolution of the 1979 Amendments, Lawrence W. Smith, 8 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 81, 88-89 (1980). Cf. Love v. State,
107 Fla. 376,
144 So. 843 (1932); Gould v. State,
312 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). [2] Subsection (1) of section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), states: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents: (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, w...
...tes a felony of the first degree... . [3] Of course, as the state has noted, it was irrelevant whether the state specifically denied Wall's allegation in paragraph 1 of the affidavit that he is the owner of the damaged vehicle, given the language of section 806.01(2).
CopyCited 3 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...52.22, Fla. Stat., punishable up to five years' imprisonment. Count 21 : attempted first degree murder in violation of Sections
782.04 and
777.04, Fla. Stat., punishable up to thirty years' imprisonment. Count 26 : first degree arson in violation of Section
806.01(1), and
775.087(2), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 3040274
...son and burglary convictions and remand for resentencing. I. THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT The State charged Mr. Freudenberger with committing three offenses against the Apostles Lutheran Church located in Brandon: arson in the second degree, section
806.01(2), a second-degree felony (count one); criminal mischief to a place of worship resulting in damage greater than $200, section
806.13(2), a third-degree felony (count two); and burglary of a structure, section
810.02(4)(a), a third-degree felony (count three)....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 153 Fla. 663, 1943 Fla. LEXIS 730
that points to an intent or purpose to repeal Section
806.01. Neither are the two acts so inconsistent or
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 6171262, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 18793
...After the jury found him guilty, the trial court sentenced the defendant to forty-five years in prison. Id. The Second District reversed, noting that the trial court’s comments created a presumption of judicial vindictiveness because the trial court advocated for a certain outcome. Id. at 581 . . Section 806.01(l)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: "(1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: ......
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 WL 1559747
...Vinson,
713 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Attwood v. Eighth Circuit Court, Union County,
667 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A.,
436 So.2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). AFFIRMED. PLEUS, C.J. and MONACO, J., concur. NOTES [1] §
806.01(1)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal
...While we adhere to our decision generally, we have modified our opinion to eliminate the aforesaid statement. Accordingly, appellant's petition for rehearing is granted, our opinion is modified, and as so modified it is republished. These consolidated cases involve the constitutionality of Section 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), commonly known as the Arson Statute....
...State, Case No. 81-444, have agreed that the decision in Lofton v. State, Case No. 80-1691, should control in both cases. Accordingly, we shall deal specifically with the Lofton case. The State charged appellant, Joseph Lofton, with arson pursuant to Section 806.01(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...rniture in his fireplace on a cold night. In our judgment the obvious answer is no because the act described is not unlawful. In any event, we hold the term is not vague. After consideration of Lofton's contentions regarding the constitutionality of Section 806.01, we are convinced the trial judge properly concluded the statute is constitutional. Accordingly we affirm the conviction in both of these consoliated cases. AFFIRMED. ANSTEAD, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired), Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or conten...
...(3) As used in this chapter, "structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. [2] Fla. Stat. § 806.01: Florida Arson Law Evolution of the 1979 Amendments, 8 F.S.U.L.Rev....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
deny or explain it. C. Erhardt, Florida Evidence § 806.1 (2d ed. 1984) explains this provision as follows:
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 397454
...unty jail on the other felony count. In the present case, unlike Fleming, the trial court imposed county jail time solely for a misdemeanor conviction. There was no violation of section
922.051. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
806.01 Arson....
...by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself, or herself, or another, . . . is guilty of arson in the second degree. . . . (3) As used in this chapter, `structure' means any building of any kind . . . any vehicle. . . . § 806.01, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant. James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Ronald K. Zimmet, Chief Asst. Appellate Division, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee. ORFINGER, Judge. Appellant was charged with first degree arson under section 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)....
...to the evil intended to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title and the history of its enactment and the state of the law already in existence bearing on the subject. [4] A review of the legislative history of Florida's arson law, section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1979), shows that the statute is a significant and deliberate departure from common law and from its predecessor statutes....
...The order of dismissal is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C.J., concurs. COWART, J., dissents with opinion. COWART, Judge, dissenting: The question presented is the meaning of the word "contents" in section 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) (set forth in footnote 1 of the majority opinion), which makes it illegal to willfully cause damage by fire to "any structure, or contents thereof......
..., while still requiring them to bear some reasonable relationship to a structure, such as to mean furniture, furnishings, fixtures and equipment in or appurtenant to a structure. I would so construe it and hold that it does not apply here. NOTES [1] 806.01(1) (1979): Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present,...
...cupied by a human being, is guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree ... [2] Fla.R.App.P. 9.140(c)(1)(A) allows the State to appeal an order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof. [3] Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1977), in its entirety, read: (1) Any person who willfully and maliciously, by fire or explosive, damages any structure, whether the property of himself or another, knowing, or with reasonable grounds to believe, tha...
...h have made conviction of suspected arsonists difficult in the past. The new law appears to be a reflection of the Legislature's concern over the dramatic increase of arson in recent years and the resultant loss of life and property. Fla. Stat. Sec. 806.01: Florida Arson Law the Evolution of the 1979 Amendments, 8 F.S.U.L.Rev....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 9617, 2011 WL 2462662
...The state alleged that the defendant hired two men to set fire to his restaurant so he could collect money from his insurance company. The men suffered permanent disfigurement when they set the fire. The state charged the defendant with second-degree arson under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides: Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or her...
...Offenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense. Second-degree arson is a lesser offense of arson resulting in injury to another because the statutory elements of second-degree arson as provided in section
806.01(2) are subsumed by the greater offense of arson resulting in injury to anoth *889 er as provided in section
806.031(2)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1995 WL 39859
...1st DCA 1990), review denied,
576 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1991); Callahan v. State,
504 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Therefore, Bell was properly convicted of both second degree arson and burning to defraud an insurance company. REVERSED and REMANDED. W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] §
806.01(2), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 13382
...This is an appeal from an order withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing the appellant juvenile on community control. The twelve-year-old appellant was charged by petition with a single count of arson of an unoccupied structure in violation of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995)....
...lant said had ignited. Deputy Santiago also testified that he did not believe the appellant intended to set fire to the shack. Based on the testimony of the two witnesses, the trial court found that the State had proven all of the elements of arson. Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; [[Image here]] is guilty of arson in the first degree.... As a general intent statute, section 806.01 “prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act.” Linehan v....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1997 WL 742020
...This is an appeal from an order withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing the appellant juvenile on community control. The twelve-year-old appellant was charged by petition with a single count of arson of an unoccupied structure in violation of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995)....
...lant said had ignited. Deputy Santiago also testified that he did not believe the appellant intended to set fire to the shack. Based on the testimony of the two witnesses, the trial court found that the State had proven all of the elements of arson. Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; .... is guilty of arson in the first degree.... As a general intent statute, section 806.01 "prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act." Linehan v....
CopyPublished | United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1254
...igated in the prior proceeding; and (c) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that earlier decision. In re Halpern,
810 F.2d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir.1987). Florida Statute
806.01 states that “any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents ......
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21176
522, 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (new arson statute §
806.01(l)(a) does not require showing of civil intent
CopyAgo (Fla. Att'y Gen. 1979).
Published | Florida Attorney General Reports
and enforce the criminal laws of the state. Section
806.01, F. S., makes arson a felony of the first or
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 807, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 1856, 2017 WL 4054164
...The State sought the death penalty.
Where relevant, the indictment alleged that Stevens “did unlawfully and willfully,
or while in the commission of a felony, to-wit: robbery, by fire or explosion,
damage or cause to be damaged, a structure, to-wit: a dwelling, . . . or its contents,
contrary to Florida Statute 806.01(1)(a).”
These charges arose from a savage murder in October 2007....
...included
offense of first-degree arson. Higgins v. State,
565 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 1990); Fla.
Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 12.1. Based on the plain language of the statute, first- and
second-degree arson generally cannot be committed simultaneously. See §
806.01,
Fla....
...educational institutions during normal hours of occupancy; or other
similar structures; or
(c) Any other structure that he or she knew or had reasonable
grounds to believe was occupied by a human being.
-5-
§ 806.01(1), Fla....
...commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to
be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or herself
or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1),
is guilty of arson in the second degree.
§ 806.01(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The statute defines “structure” broadly,
ranging from “any building of any kind,” to “any enclosed area with a roof over
it,” to “any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.” § 806.01(3), Fla. Stat.
Therefore, structures covered under section 806.01(1), first-degree arson, fit within
the definition of structures under section 806.01(2), second-degree arson.
However, the statute plainly delineates a distinction between structures under first-
and second-degree arson—the primary difference is human occupancy. See §
806.01, Fla....
...In Higgins, a prisoner was charged with first-degree
arson based on the burning of a mattress in his cell, which did not damage the
prison structure in any way. Id. at 699. This Court quoted reasoning from the
lower court to produce our holding on these unique facts. Id. at 699-700. That
language stated, in part:
Section 806.01(1) first degree arson, does not include all of the
elements of § 806.01(2) second degree arson, and the proof of first
degree arson does not and cannot constitute proof of second degree
arson....
...ructure, which “is a
necessary ingredient of second-degree arson,” so this Court reasoned that the trial
court did not err in refusing to give the second-degree instruction. Id. However,
Higgins clearly committed only first-degree arson under section 806.01(1)(b),
regardless of whether the fire he ignited singed the prison structure....
...Id.
Despite the uncontroverted evidence that the trailer was Moore’s dwelling and was
being utilized as his living quarters, the Fourth District reversed. Id. at 528. It
reasoned that, although “a structure is not always a dwelling, a dwelling is always
a structure within the broad definition” of section 806.01(3)....
...Therefore, Moore
concluded that the indictment and evidence supporting first-degree arson
necessarily supported a charge on second-degree arson as well. Id.
Below, in Stevens, the Second District came to the opposite conclusion.
195
So. 3d at 405. Stevens focused on the plain language of section
806.01 to conclude
that “acts constituting the offense of first-degree arson are expressly excluded from
the scope of the offense of second-degree arson”; thus, “first-degree arson cannot
simultaneously constitute second-degree arson.” Id....
...The jury reached an impasse and submitted a guilty verdict with a request
that the trial court grant leniency because nobody was injured by the fire. Moore,
932 So. 2d at 526.
-9-
agreed that a dwelling is a structure under section
806.01(3), the Second District
rejected Moore’s conclusion that this fact controls whether a second-degree arson
instruction was proper when it is undisputed that the structure burned is a dwelling.
Id. at 408. Instead, it held that the charging document and evidence adduced at
trial are determinative. Id. Therefore, in light of the “total absence of evidence
that the trailer was anything other than a dwelling, combined with the fact that
section
806.01(2) excludes arson of any structure that is covered by the first-degree
arson statute,” Stevens naturally concluded that the trial court properly rejected the
requested instruction....
...structure at issue is, without dispute, totally and solely within the province of first-
degree arson. See id. Under the plain language of the arson statute, first-degree
arson is the only appropriate charge when it is undisputed that a dwelling was
burned.3 See § 806.01, Fla....
...3.490 (“The judge shall not instruct on any degree as to which
there is no evidence.”)). Therefore, the court in Stevens was correct in holding that
it is improper to give a second-degree arson instruction when it is undisputed that
the structure burned is a dwelling.
Moore presented a “crabbed reading” of section
806.01(2) that read the
definitional limitation of second-degree arson out of the statute. Stevens,
195 So.
3d at 409. By holding that a dwelling is necessarily a structure within the meaning
of section
806.01(2), Moore ignored the plain language of the statute that removed
certain structures—such as dwellings—from that provision’s protection.
§
806.01(1)-(2), Fla. Stat.; see Moore,
932 So. 2d at 528. Indeed, the broad
statutory definition of structure encompasses dwellings, see §
806.01(3), Fla. Stat.;
thus, Moore was correct that “a structure is not always a dwelling, [but] a dwelling
is always a structure.”
932 So. 2d at 528. However, this fact is not dispositive
because it fails to consider that section
806.01(2) defines second-degree arson as
beyond and outside the scope of section
806.01(1). Although a dwelling is a
structure, it is flatly not a type of structure protected by the second-degree arson
statute. §
806.01(2), Fla....
...11 -
construction that significance and effect must be given to every word [and] phrase,
. . . and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hechtman
v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y.,
840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). Omitting section
806.01(2)’s express limitation from the statute skewed the analysis and “effectively
[made] second-degree arson a necessary lesser included offense of first-degree
arson,” except for limited factual scenarios such as Higgins....
...2d at 528 (“Here, the evidence
established, and no one disputed, the mobile home was used as a dwelling.”), with
id. (“[B]oth the charging document and the evidence supported a finding that the
mobile home was a non-residential, unoccupied structure.”). Regardless of what
caused the misinterpretation of section 806.01, we must clarify the statute going
forward....
...the evidence did not
support it).
At trial, Stevens did not dispute that the trailer was Beltran’s dwelling.
Because it was undisputed that the structure was a dwelling, the conduct at issue
only could have been first-degree arson under section 806.01(1)(a), which
specifically protects dwellings. Again, section 806.01(2) only applies to structures
- 13 -
not referred to in section 806.01(1); therefore, Stevens’ failure to place the nature
of Beltran’s trailer at issue or present evidence on that issue amounted to a legal
concession that second-degree arson was inapplicable....
...To be sure, under certain facts, a defendant charged with first-degree arson
could be entitled to an instruction on second-degree arson. Higgins,
565 So. 2d at
700; see generally P.P.M. v. State,
447 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). For
instance, a defendant charged under section
806.01(1)(c) could dispute that he or
she “knew or had reasonable grounds to believe [a structure] was occupied by a
human being.” See §
806.01(1)(c), Fla....
...evidence was produced to support the assertion that the defendant did not know
that a structure was occupied. In the past, courts have held that insufficient
evidence on knowledge of occupancy can be the basis for reducing a conviction of
first-degree arson under section 806.01(1)(c) to second-degree arson....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 8228, 1990 WL 162388
PER CURIAM. John Henry Knighten appeals his conviction and sentence for arson, a violation of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1987)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 16937, 2014 WL 5285002
...We affirm the convictions and sentences; however, we remand to correct two scrivener’s *849 errors in the judgment. The statutory citation for the manslaughter conviction should be section
782.07(1), Florida Statutes (2011), and the statutory citation for the second-degree arson conviction should be section
806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2011)....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2628, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 17074
arson in the second degree, a violation of section 806.-01(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant entered
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...Liaison, Office of the State Courts Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
-5-
APPENDIX
12.1 ARSON — FIRST DEGREE
§ 806.01(1), Fla....
...Stat.
To prove the crime of Arson, the State must prove the following two
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Defendant) [willfully and unlawfully] [while engaged in the
commission of [a felony] [(felony alleged)]]]] caused a[n] [fire]
[explosion].
Give 2a if § 806.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. is charged.
2. a. A dwelling, whether occupied or not, [or the contents of the
dwelling,] was damaged by the [fire] [explosion].
Give 2b if § 806.01(1)(b), Fla....
...the time of the [fire] [explosion], [or the contents of a
structure where persons would normally be present at the
time of the [fire] [explosion]], was damaged by the [fire]
[explosion].
Give 2c if § 806.01(1)(c), Fla....
...e of ground and outbuildings
immediately surrounding it. [The enclosure need not be continuous as it may
have an ungated opening for entering and exiting.] For purposes of arson, a
“dwelling” includes an attached porch or attached garage.
§ 806.01(3), Fla....
...If the defendant is charged with causing a fire or explosion while committing
a felony, define the felony that the defendant was allegedly committing.
Lesser Included Offenses
ARSON —
806.01(1)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
None
Arson – second degree
806.01(2) 12.2
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Criminal mischief
806.13 12.4
Comments
A special instruction is n...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 18211
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge. S. W., a juvenile, was found guilty of having committed first-degree arson in violation of Section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1979)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2366, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 10566
COBB, Judge. This case presents a question of first impression: Is an unenclosed motorcycle a “structure” contemplated by the statutory provisions of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1985), relating to the crime of arson in the second degree? The applicable statute provides: 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a)Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present,...
...(3) As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. Jones was charged with violation of section 806.01(2) by willfully damaging, by fire or explosion, the victim’s motorcycle....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 15040
BOYER, Judge. Walter Gould was charged by information with the crime of arson in the first degree “contrary to the provisions of Section 806.01 of the Florida Statutes”, the information alleging that the accused “did then and there wilfully and maliciously cause the burning of a dwelling house by counseling or procuring another towit: Danny Crain, to burn a one-story wood-...
...The facts of this case cannot be reasonably distinguished from those in Love v. State, Sup.Ct.Fla.1932,
107 Fla. 376 ,
144 So. 843 . As pointed out in that case, and in King v. State, Sup.Ct.Fla.1940,
145 Fla. 286 ,
199 So. 38 , the crime of arson in the first degree prohibited by Florida Statute
806.01 is distinct, separate and different from the crime of burning with intent to injure or defraud an insurer demonstrated by Florida Statute 806.06....
...Walter Gould was found guilty by a jury of his peers and was sentenced to 25 years hard labor. He now appeals that conviction and sentence. In Love v. State, supra, the Supreme Court of Florida, after discussing the distinction between the two crimes prohibited by the predecessors to F.S. 806.01 and F.S....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...the Florida legislature intended “vehicle” in terms of insurance coverage to include aircraft. Other Florida statutes, however, support the position that an aircraft is not ordinarily encompassed within the meaning of “vehicle.” At Fla.Stat. §
806.01(3), “structure” is defined as “any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, and any vehicle, vessel or aircraft.” Florida Statute §
932.702(3) states that it is unlawful “[t]o use any vessel, motor vehicle or aircraft to facilitate the transportation ......
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 3769, 1990 WL 68713
...st property to violent crimes against persons.” This reason is valid. Keys v. State,
500 So.2d 134 (Fla.1986). While defendant contends that his record fails to support this reason, his record includes prior crimes against property and arson under section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1985), may properly be considered as a crime of violence against persons as well as property....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 2436, 2001 WL 220030
...The evidence at trial reflected that the bottle Moore threw toward the house was stuffed with cloth rags. But it bore no signs of having been ignited, and the forensic chemist who tested it for the State was unable to detect any flammable substance. Turning first to the attempted arson of a dwelling charge, section 806.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that any person who “willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged [ ] any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents” is guilty of arson in the first degree, a first degree felony. Arsons of any structure where persons are normally present or of any other structure that the perpetrator knows or has reasonable grounds to believe is occupied by a human being also are classified as first degree arsons. § 806.01(l)(b) and (c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Arson of any other structure is second degree arson, a second degree felony. § 806.01(2), Fla....
...(1997). The statute defines “structure” as “any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft.” § 806.01(8), Fla....
...An attempt to commit a first degree felony is a second degree felony. §
777.04(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). The information against Moore charged him specifically with attempting to commit an arson of “a certain dwelling house, or its contents ... contrary to Chapter
806.01(l)(a)/777.04, Florida Statutes.” Thus, to prove the charge the State was required to show that Moore was interrupted while intentionally trying to burn Woods’s house....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 4061, 2001 WL 303626
...Bell and her clothing on fire. Ms. Bell subsequently died from her burn injuries. The only damage from the fire to Harrington’s apartment was soot damage to the ceiling that would require repainting to correct. A person is guilty of arson as defined in section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1999), when they willfully and unlawfully, by fire, damage or cause to be damaged any dwelling or its contents....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
...And the Canales court does not
use words like “plain meaning” or “unambiguous” in its opinion
construing the pivotal statute.
Also, section
775.084(1)(b) designates specific offenses
that will trigger an enhancement. Each of these offenses is
defined by Florida law. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §
806.01 (defining
arson); Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 788, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 1175, 1988 WL 24172
...Shinhol-ser now alleges that the trial court erred in the imposition of concurrent sentences under counts IV through XVII, for the reason that these sentences exceed the statutory maximum for each offense. We agree. Under counts IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, Shinholser was convicted of arson pursuant to section
806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1985), and burglary of a dwelling under counts XI and XII, violative of section
810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1985)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 12372
petition with first degree arson pursuant to section 806.-01(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1981).1 At trial,
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 12374
enter judgment on the lesser included offense [section
806.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981)] and to pass sentence
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 12272
LEHAN, Judge. Defendant was convicted under section
806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1981), of arson in the
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2006 Fla. App. LEXIS 9097
...Vinson,
713 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Attwood v. Eighth Circuit Court, Union County,
667 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A,
436 So.2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). AFFIRMED. PLEUS, C.J. and MONACO, J., concur. . §
806.01(l)(a), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...For example, the theft statute identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of petit theft. See §
812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). The homicide statute identifies three degrees of murder, see id. §
782.04, and the arson statute has two separate degrees. See id. §
806.01; see also Valdes ,
3 So.3d at 1076 (quoting State v....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...For example, the theft statute identifies three degrees of grand theft and two degrees of
petit theft. See §
812.014, Fla. Stat. (2005). The homicide statute identifies three degrees
of murder, see id. §
782.04, and the arson statute has two separate degrees. See id. §
806.01; see also Valdes, 3 So....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 9691, 2016 WL 3450405
...obbery with a deadly weapon. Finding no
error, we affirm his convictions and sentences in all respects. We write solely to explain
why we reject his contention that he was entitled to a jury instruction on second-degree
arson of a structure under section 806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2007)....
...Stevens was charged alleged that during
the commission of the robbery of Mr. Beltran, Mr. Stevens, "by fire or explosion,"
damaged "a structure, to wit: a dwelling . . . or its contents," thereby committing first-
degree arson of a dwelling under section 806.01(1)(a)....
...Stevens did not dispute that
the trailer home was a dwelling within the meaning of the statute; in fact, he conceded
that it was the Beltrans' home. At trial, however, he requested that the jury be instructed
on second-degree arson of a structure under section 806.01(2). His reason was that a
dwelling under section 806.01(1)(a) is also a structure under sections 806.01(2) and
-2-
that the jury should have the opportunity to consider both the charged and the lesser
included arson offenses....
...2d at 361 (alteration in original) (quoting
Williams,
957 So. 2d at 599).
Determining whether a jury instruction on second-degree arson was
required in this case thus requires understanding the relationship between first- and
second-degree arson under section
806.01....
...5th DCA 1989) ("As can be seen, the difference between first degree arson and
second degree arson concerns primarily human occupancy."). First-degree arson
involves the burning of a building, and sometimes the contents of a building, that is or is
likely to be occupied. Under section 806.01(1), it is committed when "[a]ny person ....
...her occupied or not, or its
contents," (b) "[a]ny structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present,"
or (c) "[a]ny other structure that he or she knew or had reasonable grounds to believe
was occupied." Second-degree arson under section 806.01(2) involves the burning of
other structures that are not expressly listed in the first-degree arson statute: it hinges
on whether the fire or explosion "damage[d] or cause[d] to be damaged any structure."
The term "structure" is defined to include, among other things, "any building of any kind"
and "any . . . portable building." § 806.01(3)....
...The statutory definition of the term
"structure" applies to both first- and second-degree arson.
Consistent with the arson statute's focus on treating the burning of
buildings that are or are likely to be occupied more seriously than the burning of
unoccupied ones, section 806.01(2) also provides that second-degree arson can be
committed only "under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1)"—i.e., only
-4-
under circumstances that do not constitute first-degree arson....
...is
that second-degree arson cannot be a necessary lesser included offense of first-degree
arson. The supreme court held as much in Higgins v. State,
565 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla.
1990). There, a prison inmate was convicted of first-degree arson under section
806.01(1)(b), which applies to "a structure or contents thereof where persons are
normally present," where there was evidence that the inmate burned his mattress but
not the prison building itself....
...the Fourth District's affirmance of the conviction. Id. at 698-99. Explaining that "the
district court reached the correct conclusion," the supreme court quoted at length from
the Fourth District's opinion in the case, including the following passage:
Section 806.01 first degree arson, does not include all of the
elements of § 806.01(2) second degree arson, and the proof
of first degree arson does not and cannot constitute proof of
second degree arson....
...ee arson should be given
upon request even where there is no dispute that the structure involved was solely a
dwelling within the meaning of the first-degree arson statute. Id.
We agree with Moore that the definition of structure in section 806.01(3)
includes both dwellings covered by the first-degree arson statute and various other
structures covered by the second-degree arson statute. That definitional fact does not
suggest anything, however, about section 806.01(2)'s separate and explicit requirement
that the circumstances constituting second-degree arson cannot simultaneously be
circumstances constituting first-degree arson....
...Recognizing that a dwelling is a type of
structure says nothing about whether and under what circumstances a second-degree
arson instruction must be given in a case involving the burning of a dwelling. In order to
give effect to all the required elements of section 806.01(2), we hold that such an
instruction need not be given when the charging documents and the evidence at trial fail
to include all of the second-degree arson elements—including the element that the
structure involved not be a dwelli...
...Accepting that the Beltrans' dwelling falls within the statutory definition
of structure does not negate the fact that evidence of at least one necessary statutory
element of second-degree arson was not present in this case—the requirement of
section 806.01(2) that the structure involved not be a structure covered exclusively by
the first-degree arson statute.
Here, there was no evidence that the Beltrans' trailer home was some type
of structure other than a dwelling. On the contrary, the defense conceded that it was
the Beltrans' home. The total absence of evidence that the trailer was anything other
-8-
than a dwelling, combined with the fact that section 806.01(2) excludes arson of any
structure that is covered by the first-degree arson statute, means that the trial court was
not required to give a second-degree arson instruction when Mr. Stevens requested it
based solely on the definition of "structure" in section 806.01(3)....
...State,
447 So. 2d 445, 447-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
(remanding for the entry of a judgment on a lesser included offense of arson of an
unoccupied structure where the evidence at trial failed to established that the structure
burned was a dwelling under section
806.01(1)(a)).
In our view, Moore improperly ignores the fact that the second-degree
arson statute defines first-degree arson out of its scope.1 The opinion does not mention
or address the "under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1)" language
included in section
806.01(2)'s definition of second-degree arson....
...the second-degree arson statute. That approach is
to us mistaken because we are required to give each word and phrase in a statute
meaning and effect. See Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co.,
118 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla.
1st DCA 1960). With respect to section
806.01(2), Moore fails to do so.
1
The uncontroverted facts of this case demonstrate that the Beltrans'
trailer was occupied when it was burned and that Mr. Stevens knew it, meaning that the
evidence showed both arson of a dwelling under section
806.01(1)(b) and arson of an
occupied structure under section
806.01(1)(c)....
...only that the defendant burned an occupied dwelling covered exclusively by the first-
degree arson statute, there is by definition no evidence that could support the giving of
a second-degree arson instruction for arson of an unoccupied structure. Moore's
reliance on section 806.01(3) and the jury's pardon power does not override the
language of section 806.01(2) and the actual facts presented at trial when a trial court is
faced with determining whether a defendant charged under section 806.01(1) is entitled
to an instruction under section 806.01(2)....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 7777, 1999 WL 376872
...lative intent behind a particular statute.... ” Frey,
708 So.2d at 921 . Turning to the legislative acts at issue here, neither the attempt statute nor the arson statute mention the judicially created distinction regarding intent. See §§
777.04,
806.01, Fla. Stat. (1997). In order to establish the crime of arson, the State must prove that a defendant willfully and unlawfully caused damages to a dwelling by use of fire or explosion. See §
806.01, Fla....
CopyPublished | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Argued: Nov 18, 2022
...one of the other men told him not to put water on the fire. Young
understood this to mean that the fire was from cooking “dope.”
As a result, Florida prosecutors charged Tucker, Miles, and
Young with arson under Florida Statutes § 806.01....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 1978 Fla. App. LEXIS 16273
*807crime proscribed by F.S.
806.01. “Structure” is specifically defined by F.S. 806.-01(3) as meaning “any
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 80, 1991 WL 695
LETTS, Judge. This is an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency for arson. The applicable statute, section 806.01(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides: (1) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: [[Image here]] (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present ......
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 99, 2000 WL 6126
...hall be excluded in the computation.... Mr. McFarland was arrested in connection with a house fire in Orange County on October 4, 1998. He was later charged by information with committing various crimes, including arson of a dwelling in violation of section 806.01(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1997)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...Grimes’s arson conviction should be
reversed on that ground, too.
As the jury instruction makes clear, the first element of second-degree arson
requires proof that the defendant “caused” the fire. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.)
12.2. Under the rule of lenity, the 1990 amendment to section 806.01, Florida
Statutes, merely relieves the state of the burden of proving that a person who
causes a fire “while in the commission of any felony” did so intentionally. §
806.01(2), Fla....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 442, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 6717
COBB, Judge. This case presents a question of first impression: Is an unenclosed motorcycle a “structure” as contemplated by the statutory provisions of section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1985), relating to the crime of arson in the second degree? 1 The applicable statute provides: 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present...
...(3) As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. Jones was charged with violation of section 806.01(2) by willfully damaging, by fire or explosion, the victim’s motorcycle....
...not construe an ordinary motorcycle to be a structure. However, the statutory language is present and we are bound to follow it. The dissent does not interpret the statute, rather, it completely rewrites it. The dissent contends that the purpose of section 806.01(2) is to “more severely punish those who burn structures which can be inhabited.” This rationale overlooks section 806.01(1), which in actuality serves that purpose by providing that the burning of a dwelling, or any structure where persons are or believed to be present, will be treated as a first-degree felony, rather than a second-degree felony, as under section 806.01(2)....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 347, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 403, 1988 WL 6436
...The structure, a motor coach vehicle, the property of DONALD E. McBRIDE was located at S.R. 267 and the surrounding vegetation *717 was the property of the United States Department of Agriculture Forestry Service. All in violation of and contrary to Section 806.01, Florida Statutes....
...The trial court was of the view that the rationale of State v. Mayle,
406 So.2d 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), required dismissal. In Mayle , the defendant set fire to his own van and destroyed it. Like the defendant in the instant case, Mayle was charged with second degree arson under Section
806.01, Florida Statutes....
...In its brief, the state recites facts contained in a "summary of offense and probable cause affidavit" executed by a police officer. Such is entirely irrelevant to the issue before this court, to wit: the facial validity of count one of the information. The inclusion of such facts has only served to confuse. .Section 806.01 provides in pertinent part: (2) Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsec...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 692968, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 3163
PER CURIAM. J.H. and C.H. (“appellants”) appeal the Juvenile Disposition Orders adjudicating each of them guilty of first-degree felony arson of a dwelling, contrary to section 806.01(l)(a), Florida Statutes, arguing the trial court erred in denying their motion for a judgment of dismissal of the charged offense....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 656, 1987 Fla. App. LEXIS 7103
insurer, elements not found in the arson statute, section
806.01, Florida Statutes (1985). Therefore, burning
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 13616, 1997 WL 748889
...unduly coercive. 7 As the trial court noted, the whole of the two interrogations were close in time (a maximum of two hours) and were “pretty much of a continuum” as to place and circumstances. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. . § 806.01(1), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 18823, 40 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 2774
the light most favorable to the State. Id. Section
806.01(2), Florida Statutes (2014) provides: ' Any
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2003 Fla. App. LEXIS 19070, 2003 WL 22945700
...IAM. The trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, which was based on the theory that the mattress and bed sheet in his prison cell were not “contents” of the cell within the meaning of the arson statute, section 806.01(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001)....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 19680
PER CURIAM. The appellant, a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent of one count of first-degree arson, a violation of section
806.01(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2004); and one count of burglary to a dwelling or structure, with the intent to commit the offense of arson and/or criminal mischief and with damage over $1,000.00, a violation of section
810.02(2)(c)2., Florida Statutes (2004)....
...The amended petition alleged that Appellant “did willfully and unlawfully, or while in the commission of a felony, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a structure, or the contents thereof, where persons are normally present, to-wit: RI-BAULT MIDDLE SCHOOL, contrary to the provisions of Section 806.01(l)(b), Florida Statutes.” This statutory subsection defines first-degree arson to include a person’s damaging, or causing to be damaged, “willfully and unlawfully, or while in.the commission of any felony, by fire or explosion,...
...y; and 2) that the State had not shown that Appellant was a “principal” with a conscious intent to commit a criminal act. The “structure” in question is the school building that includes the band/chorus room in which the fire originated. See § 806.01(3) (defining “structure” to include “any building of any kind”). The testimony that the middle school normally got out at 2:25 p.m. and the fire was started sometime later that afternoon does not dispose of the issue of whether the evidence satisfied the requirements of section 806.01(l)(b)....
...[a]ny structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present, ... during normal hours of occupancy”; or in “[a]ny other structure that- [the perpetrator] knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was occupied by a human being.” See § 806.01(l)(a)-(c). In contrast, the Legislature designated as arson in the second degree (a second-degree felony) an act of arson “under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1).” See § 806.01(2)....
...The State proved that Appellant was a “principal” in the commission of a felony and willfully, unlawfully damaged or caused to be damaged by fire a structure (and its contents) “where persons are normally present” and “during normal hours of occupancy.” Given both the nature of the danger described in section 806.01(1)— damages “by fire or explosion” — and the evidence that persons were on the campus in the immediate vicinity of the damaged structure on the afternoon when the fire was set, Appellant construed the statute too narrowly by as...
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2896, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6981, 1989 WL 150083
...pport of it. Rule 3.190(c)(4), Fla.R. Crim.P. The facts are not in dispute. Appellant set fire to an unoccupied automobile which was parked in a shopping center parking lot. This was done at the behest of the owner of the car. Arson is proscribed by section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1987). 806.01 Arson.— (1)Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged: (a) Any dwelling, whether occupied or not, or its contents; (b) Any structure, or contents thereof, where persons are normally present...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1979 Fla. App. LEXIS 15427
SHIVERS, Judge. Granville seeks review of his conviction for arson in the first degree, Section 806.-01(1), Florida Statutes (1977), contending the evidence was insufficient to establish damage to a “structure”, as that term is defined in Section 806.01(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida | 39 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 531, 2014 Fla. LEXIS 2582, 2014 WL 4251210
...NO.
None
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Comment
This instruction was adopted in 2014.
- 34 -
12.1 ARSON — FIRST DEGREE
§
806.01(1), Fla....
...(Defendant) [damaged] [caused to be damaged] (structure or
contents alleged) by[willfully and unlawfully] [while engaged in the
commission of [a felony] [(felony alleged)]] caused a[n] [fire]
[explosion].
Give 2a or 2b if § 806.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. is charged.
2. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfullyA dwelling,
whether occupied or not, [or the contents of the dwelling,] was
damaged by the [fire] [explosion].
Give 2b if § 806.01(1)(b), Fla....
...normally be present at the time of the [fire] [explosion], [or the
contents of a structure where persons would normally be present
at the time of the [fire] [explosion]], was damaged by the [fire]
[explosion].
Give 2c if § 806.01(1)(c), Fla....
...A structure, that (defendant) knew or had reasonable grounds to
believe would be occupied by a human being at the time of the
[fire] [explosion], was damaged by the [fire] [explosion].
3.The (structure alleged) was
Give 3a if charged under § 806.01(1)(a), Fla._Stat.
a. [a dwelling].
Give 3b if charged under § 806.01(1)(b), Fla._Stat.
b. [an institution in which the damage occurred during normal hours
of occupancy].
[an institution where persons normally are present].
- 35 -
Give 3c if charged under § 806.01(1)(c), Fla._Stat.
c. [a structure].
Give only if charged under § 806.01(1)(c), Fla._Stat.
4....
...1st DCA 2001).
In order to convict the defendant of Arson, it is not necessary for the State
to prove [he] [she] intended to damage the [dwelling] [structure].
Give if applicable.
The court instructs you that (name of felony) is a felony.
Definitions. Give if as applicable. § 806.01(3), Fla....
...which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging
therein at night, together with the enclosed space of ground and outbuildings
immediately surrounding it. For purposes of arson, a “dwelling” includes an
attached porch or attached garage.
§ 806.01(3), Fla....
...If burglary, also define the crime that was the object
of the burglary.
If the defendant is charged with causing a fire or explosion while committing
a felony, define the felony that the defendant was allegedly committing.
Lesser Included Offenses
ARSON —
806.01(1)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO.
Arson — second
806.01(2) 12.2
degreeNone
Arson – second degree
806.01(2) 12.2
Attempt
777.04(1) 5.1
Criminal mischief
806.13 12.4
Comment
A special instruction...
...State,
734 So. 2d 1067
(Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
This instruction was adopted in 1981 and was amended in 1992 and 2014.
- 37 -
12.2 ARSON — SECOND DEGREE
§
806.01(2), Fla._Stat.
To prove the crime of Arson — Second Degree, the State must prove the
following threetwo elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1....
...State,
568 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) and N.K.D. v. State,
799 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
In order to convict the defendant of Arson, it is not necessary for the State
to prove [he] [she] intended to damage the structure.
Definitions. §
806.01(3), Fla.Stat.
Patterson v. State,
512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
“Willfully”means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.
Berry v. State,
566 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) .
“Unlawfully” means without a legitimate, lawful purpose.
§
806.01(3) Fla....
...committing a felony, define the felony that the defendant was allegedly committing.
Lesser Included Offenses
No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense.
ARSON — 806.01(2)
CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 12528, 2015 WL 4945022
...HOONOVER actually possessed and discharged a “destructive device” as that term is defined in s.
790.001, in violation of Florida Statute
790.161(3),
775.087(2)(a)(l) and
775.087(2)(a)(2); COUNT II ARSON-DWELLING (FI) — POSSESSION AND DISCHARGE
806.01(l)(a),
775.087(2)(a)(l) and
775.087(2)(a)(2) did unlawfully and willfully, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a dwelling or its contents, whether occupied or not, the property of VALERIE MARIE SPINALE or JOEL ALBERT POWERS or...
...0 Hanley Drive in Spring Hill, Florida, and during the course of the commission of the .offense, KRAIG ALAN SCHOONOVER actually possessed and discharged a “destructive device” as that term is defined in s.
790.001 in violation of Florida Statute
806.01(l)(a),
775.087(2)(a)(l) ' and
775.087(2)(a)(2)[.] The jury found Schoonover guilty as charged, making special findings on both counts that he possessed and discharged a destructive device....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1990 Fla. App. LEXIS 6247, 1990 WL 115510
...The state charged appellant with arson in the first count of a three-count information, alleging that appellant “did willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damage or cause to be damaged a dwelling or its contents” which were the property of Charlie Berry, contrary to Section 806.01, Florida Statutes....
...to any property other than his own, or that appellant intended to damage or injure a person or property other than his own. According to appellant, burning one’s own home as charged and proved in this case simply is not arson within the meaning of section 806.01. We disagree. Section 806.01, defines the crime of arson and provides in pertinent part: Any person who willfully and unlawfully, by fire or explosion, damages or causes to be damaged any structure, whether the property of himself or another ......
...The state satisfied this burden by presenting evidence that appellant intentionally burned the home for the purpose of collecting the fire insurance proceeds. 2 Finally, the statute expressly proscribes willful and unlawful burning of one’s own property, as well as the property of another. Thus, we hold that a violation of section 806.01 can be proved by evidence that a defendant willfully and unlawfully burned his own property. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a conviction under section 806.01....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...degree felonies:
felony battery and robbery by sudden snatching. See §§
784.03(2),
812.131(1)(a), Fla. Stat. He received five years of concurrent
probation for the offenses. In 2023, a jury convicted Brantley of
arson—a first-degree felony under section
806.01, Florida
Statutes—a crime he committed while on probation....
CopyPublished | District Court, N.D. Florida | 12 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1268, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9214
...he City of Gainesville, Florida, or of Alachua County, Florida, seeking an injunction restraining the defendants, “their agents, employees, attorneys and all others acting in concert therewith from the enforcement, operation or exe *773 cution of ss.
806.01 and 806.02,
870.01 and
843.01 of the [Statutes of the] State of Floridaand further restraining the defendants, their agents, etc., “from impeding, intimidating, hindering and preventing the individual plaintiffs and the friends, supporter...
...It is, therefore, upon consideration, hereby Ordered: 1. Motions for summary judgment filed by the respective defendants be and they are hereby granted. 2. Prayer for injunctive relief be and it is hereby denied. 3. This cause stands dismissed. . The subject statutes are: (a) F.S. § 806.01, F.S.A....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 4122, 1997 WL 174341
...ructure in violation of the arson statute. In this case of first impression in Florida, the appellant contends that because a large, enclosed covered recycling container does not meet the statutory definition of a “structure,” as contemplated in section 806.01, Florida Statutes (1995) (arson), the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal....
...The definitional portion of the statute states: As used in this chapter, “structure” means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, any real property and appurtenances thereto, any tent or other portable building, and any vehicle, vessel, watercraft, or aircraft. § 806.01(3), Fla.Stat....
... within the meaning of a bribery statute is a question of law subject to de novo review). Subsection (2) of the arson statute, pursuant to which the appellant was charged, is intended to protect property from damage by fire. Smith, L. “Fla.Stat. § 806.01: Florida Arson Law — The Evolution of the 1979 Amendments,” 8 Fla....
...Just as the Nichols court refused to distinguish the container’s “bottom” (which the defense admitted the dumpster had) from a “floor” for purposes of interpreting the arson statute, we conclude there is no meaningful difference between the recycling container’s “cover” and a “roof,” as contemplated in section 806.01(3), Florida Statutes (1995)....
