Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...272 (1897), they instead sought to create a separate category of appellate review based on evidentiary weight, implementing a de facto corroboration requirement. The Florida Legislature sought to stem this tide of judicial lawmaking by explicitly rejecting a corroboration requirement for a sexual battery conviction. § 794.022(1), Fla....

...Drummond and on Officer's Honholz's representation to Evans and Dr. Brake that Amber had made such a statement to him in evaluating the existence of probable cause. However, even disregarding these additional statements, probable cause existed as a matter of law. 26 We note that under Fla. Stat. 794.022(1) (West Supp.1990), "[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under s....

...Drummond and on Officer’s Honholz’s representation to Evans and Dr. Brake that Amber had made such a statement to him in evaluating the existence of probable cause. However, even disregarding these additional statements, probable cause existed as a matter of law. 26 We note that under Fla. Stat. 794.022(1) (West Supp. 1990), “[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under s....

...Marx was charged with violating Fla.Stat. § 794.011(2) (West 1976), which makes it a felony to commit a sexual battery upon a person less than twelve years old. In addition, “[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under s. 794.011.” Fla.Stat. § 794.022(1) (West Supp.1990). See also Myers, 810 F.2d at 1456 (discussing similar Minnesota statute). We find no *1507 Florida case applying section 794.022(1) to similar facts, but we need not decide whether the uncorroborated statements of a four-year-old rape victim would constitute probable cause: when defendants detained Marx, they had other significant evidence tending to incriminate him....

...Consistent with his prior ruling in limine prohibiting evidence concerning Rimondi's prior sexual conduct, the Court sustained the state's objection to this testimony. Roberts contends that testimony concerning the alleged prostitution does not fall within the parameters of Florida's Rape Shield Law, section 794.022, Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part: (2) Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution [for sexual battery]....

...(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution [for sexual battery]. We disagree and find that any reference to Rimondi's alleged activities as a prostitute was properly excluded under section 794.022. Although as Roberts points out, in a purely technical sense reference to a conversation concerning Rimondi's alleged prostitution is not evidence of a "specific instance of prior consensual sexual activity" with one other than the defendant under section 794.022(2), nor is it reputation evidence under section 794.022(3), we believe this is precisely the type of evidence which Florida's Rape Shield Law was designed to cover. Section 794.022(2) and (3) is a codification of the rule of relevancy as it applies to the prior sexual conduct of a sexual battery victim....

...right of cross-examination); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110-11, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (same). The State, however, took the position that the testimony was inadmissible as evidence of a victim's prior sexual activity under section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1987), Florida's Rape Shield Statute, [2] or *924 alternatively that, even if the statute did not apply, the testimony was inadmissible under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1987), [3] because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice to the victim. The trial court made no ruling on the applicability of section 794.022(2), [4] instead relying on our decision in Marr v....

...used. 494 So.2d at 1142; see also Roberts v. State, 510 So.2d 885, 892 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1123, 99 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). In Marr, evidence of the victim's sexual relationship with her boyfriend was held irrelevant under section 794.022(2), and therefore inadmissible where the defendant had been afforded an adequate and fair opportunity to show the bias and motive of the victim allegedly stemming from the animosity between the victim's boyfriend and the defendant, without delving into the sexual nature of the relationship....

...r further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. [2] Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1987), reads, in pertinent part: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under § 794.011....

...The legislature has since amended the statute to include prosecutions for sexual activity with a child by persons in familial or custodial authority under section 794.041, Florida Statutes (1987). Ch. 90-174, §§ 5, 6, Laws of Fla. [5] Our decision does not directly address section 794.022 and should not be read to cast doubt on the validity of that statute.

...No corroborative evidence is required in a sexual battery case when the victim can testify directly to the crime and can identify her assailant, although it should be carefully scrutinized so as to avoid an unmerited conviction. Thomas v. State, 167 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1964); see § 794.022, Fla....

...If the state introduces evidence that upon physical examination of a victim a physician has determined that a child has engaged in sexual intercourse, then the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence that the child had previously engaged in sexual intercourse with persons other than the defendant. § 794.022(2), Fla....

...the victim's boyfriend, Young, and the petitioner. Petitioner proffered a line of questioning, outside the presence of the jury, relating *1140 to the sexual intimacy of the victim and Young. The trial judge ruled that these questions were barred by section 794.022(2), [1] and held that this section did not unconstitutionally deny petitioner his confrontation rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution....

...wn conclusion about the witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or any part of the evidence or the testimony of any witness. On appeal a panel of the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of section 794.022(2), but reversed the trial court's denial of the requested instruction....

...In order to show the bias of the victim to falsely testify, petitioner proffered a line of questioning, outside the presence of the jury, relating to sexual intimacy between the victim and Young. The trial court held this line of questioning was barred by section 794.022(2). Petitioner claims that this was an unconstitutional abridgment of his right to full and fair cross-examination guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Under section 794.022(2), a victim's prior sexual activity with anyone other than the accused is generally not admissible evidence....

...l nature of their relationship. See Commonwealth v. Elder, 389 Mass. 743, 452 N.E.2d 1104 (1983). Whatever marginal utility or attenuated relevance the proffered questions may have had is clearly overshadowed in this case by the policy enunciated in section 794.022....

...sclose the bias of a key witness serious constitutional problems may be presented. We find no such problem in the case before us. The trial court below carefully protected petitioner's rights while at the same time furthered the policy manifested in section 794.022. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the decision of the district court below. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.022(2), Fla.Stat (1983), provides: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...ed evidence concerning the victim's prior sexual activities and reputation in the community for unchastity. He contends that this evidence tended to establish a pattern of conduct which was legally relevant to the issue of consent in accordance with Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The appellant's proffer actually involves two types of evidence: hearsay/reputation evidence and evidence of specific sexual conduct. At common law the former type of evidence was admissible into evidence. See Thomas v. State, 249 So.2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under S....

...Section 90.404(1)(b)(1) provides: (1) Character evidence generally. — Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: * * * * * * (b) Character of the victim. — (1) Except as provided in s. 794.022, evidence of pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; ... . *748 We therefore conclude that evidence relating to the victim's reputation as to unchaste conduct should have been admitted, and its exclusion constitutes reversible error. Section 794.022 does, however, bar evidence of specific sexual acts unless that evidence establishes a pattern of conduct relevant to the issue of consent. Hodges v. State, 386 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). There, we held that one isolated act of premarital sex did not constitute a "pattern of conduct" within the meaning of Section 794.022(2)....

...She knew two of the men for substantial periods of time before engaging in sexual intercourse. She met the third man in a bar and had sex on their second date. The trial court ruled the foregoing evidence inadmissible because it did not constitute a pattern of similar conduct. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because it was devoid of any logical tendency to prove or disprove the defense of consent. It is important to note that Florida's rape victim shield statute does not exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is merely a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as it applies to the sexual behavior of a sexually battered victim....

...Instead the Florida Legislature has produced a careless codification of some of the case law and judicial custom. Furthermore, the new statute is silent with respect to reputation evidence concerning the victim's chastity, with the result that case law must be followed.[ [3] ] *1389 Not only are there substantive defects in section 794.022(2) of the Florida Statutes, but flaws in form are present as well....

...Two days later they engaged in sexual intercourse. During the second breakup she had sex with two men — one she had known previously for about six months, and the other for a year. This is the testimony that was excluded, I think erroneously, under the provisions of Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...eel that the jury here should have been allowed to consider the banned testimony in the interest of providing Kaplan with a constitutionally fair trial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. NOTES [1] Section 794.011(5), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] Section 794.022(2), Fla....

...eries committed upon two persons under the age of twelve years, violations of section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes. [1] *430 The sole issue Mr. Brown asks us to determine is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury in accordance with section 794.022(1) that the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution for sexual battery....

...In his opening statement and in his cross-examination of the two sisters, defense counsel noted the absence of any evidence corroborating the sisters' testimony. At the charge conference, the prosecutor requested a special jury instruction based on section 794.022(1), which provides: "The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated *431 in a prosecution under s. 794.011." Section 794.011 is the sexual battery statute. The State's requested instruction tracked the language of section 794.022(1) almost verbatim....

...But to suggest, by special instruction, that what these girls say doesn't need to be corroborated is pretty much giving them an invitation to say, okay, fine, then that's good enough. I don't think that we should say one way or the other. Thus defense counsel opposed the requested instruction on the ground that section 794.022(1) was pertinent only to the State's burden of proof to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal and was not a proper subject of comment by the trial court....

...jury instructions on this subject and the practice of reading statutes to the jury. Next, we will make a brief review of Florida's prohibition against judicial comment on the evidence. With this background, we will examine the history and purpose of section 794.022(1), the statute on which the special instruction was based. Our examination of section 794.022(1) leads us to a detailed analysis of the two Florida decisions on which Mr....

...instruction, which was taken directly from the statute, was an accurate statement of the law. [4] C. Reading the Statute Except for the substitution of the name of the crime for the statute number, reading the special instruction amounted to reading section 794.022(1) to the jury....

...State, 452 So.2d 548 (Fla.1984) (finding that instructing the jury that the accused's refusal to submit to fingerprinting was a circumstance from which consciousness of guilt could be inferred was an impermissible comment on the evidence). E. The History and Purpose of Section 794.022(1) The content of section 794.022(1) originated in 1974 as part of the legislation eliminating the crime of rape and replacing it with the new offense of sexual battery....

...statute]; however, the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence." This provision originally appeared in the 1974 Laws as section 794.011(5), but was renumbered in the bound volume of the Florida Statutes as section 794.022(1), its current designation. Ch. 74-121, § 2, at 372, Laws of Fla.; § 794.022(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1974). [5] The purpose of the enactment of section 794.022(1) was to eliminate a judicially created corroboration requirement for a rape or sexual battery conviction based on the lack of evidentiary weight. [6] See Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120, 1129 n. 3 (Fla.1981) (Sundberg, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Anderson v. State, 549 So.2d 807, 814 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (Cowart, J., dissenting). When section 794.022(1) was enacted, the Standard Jury Instructions on Rape (section 794.01, Florida Statutes, now repealed) included the following instruction: If the testimony of the female is not supported by other evidence[,] her testimony should be r...

...Despite the *435 omission of this instruction from the standard instruction, some defense attorneys continued to include it or some version of it in their requested jury instructions in prosecutions for the new offense of sexual battery. See, e.g., id. at 706-07. In 1983, section 794.022(1) was amended to delete the clause authorizing the trial court to "instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence." Ch. 83-258, § 1, at 1315, Laws of Fla. It has been suggested that the deletion of the portion of section 794.022(1) authorizing trial courts to "instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence" was an attempt to bar trial judges from using the portion of the former standard jury instruction requiring a rigid examination...

...1 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting) (referring to "[t]he staff report of the Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives on HB 348, which led to the passage of Chapter 83-258"). Thus it is reasonable to conclude that the 1983 amendment resulting in the current version of section 794.022(1) was intended to prohibit—not to promote—judicial comment on the weight and quality of the victim's testimony in prosecutions for sexual battery....

...Brown In Marr I and Marr II, the First District and the Supreme Court of Florida, respectively, considered a jury instruction analogous to the instruction under review here. Marr I and Marr II were decided after the adoption of section 90.106 and the 1983 amendment to section 794.022(1)....

...her testimony, is plainly erroneous and not the law of this state. Id. at 708-09. In reaching this conclusion, the en banc majority relied on section 90.106. Id. at 711. In addition, the en banc majority specifically noted that the 1983 amendment to section 794.022(1) had deleted the authorization to the trial court to instruct the jury on the weight and quality of the evidence in a prosecution for sexual battery....

...Brown that the special instruction constitutes an improper comment on the evidence. We also conclude that the special instruction is likely to confuse and to mislead the jury. Granted, the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law. However, the history of section 794.022(1) reveals that the statute was directed at the appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in sexual battery cases....

...State ( Marr II ), 494 So.2d 1139 (Fla.1986). [4] Mr. Brown has not argued that the trial judge failed to comply with rule 3.985. Therefore, we need not decide whether the trial judge's remarks on the record were sufficient to comply with the rule. [5] Section 794.022 in the 1974 supplement contains an erroneous reference to section 794.021 (ignorance of victim's age no defense)....

...A trial was held on March 31 through April 2, 1992 on the issues raised in the petition and response thereto, in the United States District Court. III. GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE CLAIMS 1. Application of Florida's Rape Shield Law Petitioner claims that application of Florida's Rape Shield Law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 794.022 [1] , denied him his Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to present a defense, to cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and to testify in his own behalf. Fla.Stat. Ann. § 794.022....

...handling and treatment of mentally disordered sex offenders. See Ch. 77-312 § 31, Laws of Fla. Section 801.161 was not retained in chapter 917, and was not incorporated into chapter 800, relating to lewdness and indecent exposure. [2] We note that section 794.022(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that the testimony of a sexual battery victim need not be corroborated.

...NOTES [1] § 794.011(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). [2] § 794.011(5). [3] Lying in an embrace with each person on his or her side, and one person's chest to the other's back. [4] Kreitzer did not testify during the trial. [1] Florida's Rape Shield statute, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (2005), prohibits introduction into evidence of specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender except in two instances: (1) if the evidence may prove...

...the use of force not likely to cause personal injury, as proscribed by Section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (1978). We find no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's proffer concerning prior consensual sexual activity by the victim, under Section 794.022, Florida Statutes; no reversible error in the allegedly improper comment by the prosecutor in closing argument; and no error on the part of the trial court in failing to instruct the jury on the offense of attempt to commit sexual bat...

...She further denied ever having anything to do with a certain named individual, and denied that she was having sex with four or five other men. The trial court denied defense counsel's request to present the proffered testimony to the jury. The trial judge ruled correctly. Section 794.022(2), provides that specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under Section 794.011, Florida Statutes; however, under the statute (Section 794.022(2)), when consent by the victim is at issue (as it became in this case), such evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court outside the presence of the jury "that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct i...

...To that end, appellant proffered that Dr. Linkous would testify that the victim told him that a year had passed since she last had sexual intercourse. The trial court excluded this testimony pursuant to the Rape *182 Shield Statute. We conclude this was error. The Rape Shield Statute, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (1995), prohibits evidence of specific instances of prior consensual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender in sexual battery cases. Section 794.022 is the codification of the rule of relevancy that a victim's prior sexual activity with one other than the accused is generally irrelevant for determining the guilt of the accused....

...o remove the rule of exclusion required by the rape shield law—"Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011." § 794.022(2), Fla....

..., and the trial judge's ruling on such an issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion." Penalver v. State, 926 So.2d 1118, 1132 (Fla.2006). The record supports the trial court's ruling. Florida's rape shield law, section 794.022(2), further provides that evidence [of prior sexual activity with others] may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the...

...lounge sting operation were not sufficiently factually similar to the incidents here such that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude them. At the pretrial hearing, the defense asserted that "prostitution is prostitution," meaning that pursuant to section 794.022(2), the prior illicit activity was "conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent" and hence admissible....

...Because the prior conduct, individually or collectively, was not sufficiently similar to establish a pattern similar to the victim's conduct relating to the charged offenses, its admission would only go to show "reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual conduct"—which is specifically prohibited by section 794.022(3)....

...istinctively resembled the victim's conduct, under Carlyle's version, that would lead to the conclusion that consent occurred. "It is important to note that Florida's rape victim shield statute does not exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is merely a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as it applies to the sexual behavior of a sexually battered victim." Kaplan, 451 So.2d at 1387....

...cts of that incident do not relate to the consent defense here. "Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011." § 794.022(2)....

...The third point raised concerns the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning the weight to be given to the testimony of the victim of a sexual battery. The trial court decided to use the standard jury instruction rather than the special instruction requested by defendant, pursuant to Section 794.022, Florida Statutes....

...Appellant appeals his convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault raising several issues, only one of which merits extensive discussion. Appellant argues, among other things, that the trial court erred in applying Florida's Rape Shield Law, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (1987), precluding him from presenting reputation evidence that the sexual battery victim was a prostitute....

...He further denied that the red shirt found in the car was his (the victim had identified her attacker as wearing a red shirt), and had no explanation how he received the scratches on his face. After the state rested its case, the state, relying on section 794.022, [1] moved in limine to prohibit appellant from introducing testimony relating to specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and others, or reputation evidence concerning the victim's reputation for prostitution....

...As to the other points and contentions made by appellant, we find any error to be harmless under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). The judgments of conviction and sentences appealed are AFFIRMED. BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 794.022 provides in pertinent part: (2) Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any other person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

..., we are mindful that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to full and fair cross-examination to show a witness's possible bias or motive to be untruthful, Marr v. State, 494 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Fla.1986). We also note that, notwithstanding section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1997), a victim's prior sexual activity with anyone other than the accused may be admissible if, following an in camera proceeding, the evidence tends to show that someone other than the defendant committed the act....

...On Rehearing En Banc June 14, 1985. ERVIN, Chief Judge. Marr appeals from a judgment and sentence imposed for the offense of sexual battery. He raises several issues on appeal, only two require discussion. First, that the trial court erred in holding Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes, constitutional in that it denied appellant his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by a full and fair cross-examination....

...The prosecution introduced no physical evidence, such as laboratory tests or fingerprints which would have established the contrary. In fact, there was no other evidence corroborating the victim's account of the incident. Appellant first contends that the trial judge erred in holding constitutional section 794.022(2), because it denied appellant *705 his constitutional right of a full and fair cross-examination of the prosecutrix, as guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 794.022(2) provides in part that specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender is afforded admissibility: (1) when such evidence may prove that the defendant was not the sourc...

...he victim and her boyfriend. The purpose of the proposed line of questioning was to demonstrate bias on the part of the state's only key witness. Although the trial judge ruled that this line of questioning was inadmissible, because it was barred by section 794.022(2), he permitted appellant to inquire generally about the victim and her loved one's close relationship, barring, however, references to specific sexual acts....

..."Where evidence of bias is available by other means," the exclusion of prior consensual sexual acts relevant to a showing of the prosecutrix's bias does not raise serious constitutional problems. [3] Commonwealth v. Elder, 452 N.E.2d at 1110. Similarly, we find that section 794.022(2) is constitutional as applied to the facts before us....

...The majority's decision relies essentially upon the following judicial and legislative changes: (1) The repeal of Section 794.01, Florida Statutes (rape and forcible carnal knowledge), by Chapter 74-121, Section 1, Laws of Florida (2) the amendment of Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 83-258, Section 1, Laws of Florida, deleting certain language permitting the court to instruct the jury "with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence ..."; (3) the adoption of the Florida Eviden...

...If the effect of the majority's opinion is to interpret the above statutory changes as disallowing any discretionary comment by a trial judge upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim in a sexual battery case, then I strongly dissent. Nothing in Sections 794.01 or 794.022, Florida Statutes, before repeal or after amendment, *713 contained any language similar to that in the requested instruction....

...related to the question of whether or not consent was ever finally given... . This instruction was omitted from Standard jury Instructions in Criminal Cases in 327 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1976), and is not in the present Standard Instructions. Prior to 1983, Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, entitled "Rules of Evidence," provided as follows: (1) The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under s....

...Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.3d 864, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247 (1975). [13] Chapter 76-237, Laws of Florida (1976), effective July 1, 1977, and not retroactive. Mangram v. State, 392 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). [1] In fact, the deletion of the language formerly in Section 794.022(1), by Chapter 83-258, Section 1, Laws of Florida, which had permitted the trial judge to "instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence" in cases in which the testimony of a rape victim is uncorroborated, appears to have been an attempt to bar trial judges from so instructing — although the language presently in section 794.022(1) says nothing to that effect. The staff report of the Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives on HB 348, which led to the passage of Chapter 83-258, states as follows: Section 794.022(1), F.S., provides that the testimony of the victim of a sexual battery need not be corroborated, but the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence. * * * * * * In Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1976) the Supreme Court, in examining s. 794.022(1) stated "if the testimony of the female is not supported by other evidence, her testimony should be rigidly examined, especially as it related to the nature and extent of the force used and as it related to the question of whether or not...

...t it was not reversable [sic] error if specific instructions to the jury to rigidly scrutinize the victim's testimony are not given. Williamson v. State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). B. Probable Effect of Proposed Changes: HB 348 would amend s. 794.022(1) to remove from the court the power to instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence offered by a victim of a sexual assault....

...dges v. State, 386 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and the trial court properly excluded that evidence. We have considered appellant's remaining issues and found them without merit. AFFIRMED. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 794.022(2), Fla....

...I agree with certification to the Florida Supreme Court of the issue of the admissibility in sexual battery cases of the victim's testimony in regard to other uncharged offenses purportedly committed by the defendant against the victim. Accordingly, I dissent. NOTES [1] See § 794.022, Fla....

...unger. [1] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the victim's prior sexual acts with others. We agree and accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial. This issue focuses on the definition of "injury" under section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides as follows: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...inations. These examinations have been historically ordered in other jurisdictions, where one of three situations exists: (a) uncorroborated, testimony of victim; (b) competency of victim is in question; and (c) the victim's credibility is at issue. Section 794.022 specifically provides that testimony of a sexual abuse victim need not be corroborated; therefore, this would be an invalid reason to order such an examination in Florida....

...cy right of a victim). [2] Failure to have psychiatric examination of a witness does not violate the confrontation clause, which is not a constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery. U.S. v. Gates, 10 F.3d 765 (11th Cir.1993). [3] However, section 794.022(1) specifically provides that testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under § 794.011 (the sexual battery statute)....

...He was convicted primarily upon the testimony of the victim. Nevertheless, the court did not err in declining to charge the jury to treat the uncorroborated testimony of the victim with caution. Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Williamson v. State, 338 So.2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 794.022(1), Fla....

...Defense counsel then concluded his opening statement. The following day the prosecutor petitioned the court, outside the presence of the jury, to instruct Mr. Vizzi not to call the victim a prostitute again. The trial court ruled, based on its interpretation of the Rape Victim Shield Statute [§ 794.022, Fla....

...State, 455 So.2d 562, 565 (Fla.1st DCA), cause dismissed, 459 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1984), Mr. Vizzi urges that, where questions of prior sexual conduct of a complainant in a sexual battery case are designed, as here, to demonstrate fabrication, rather than consent or identity, the Rape Victim Shield Statute [§ 794.022, Fla....

...nd, (2) her family's disapproval of her activities, and (3) that the victim had been chastised for writing letters to her boyfriend. The record reflects that respective counsel debated the possible applicability of Florida's rape shield statute, see § 794.022, Fla....

...(1987), to prosecutions for violations of sections 794.041 and 800.04, Florida Statutes, the offenses charged in this case. In determining to exclude the proffered testimony, the trial court decided the issue on relevancy grounds, as do we, and did not rely upon the rape shield statute as such. However, we note that section 794.022(2) and (3) has been held to be an explicit statement of the rule of relevancy as it applies to the prior sexual conduct of a sexual battery victim....

...denied, 485 U.S. 943, 108 S.Ct. 1123, 99 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); Marr v. State, 494 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 1986); Kaplan v. State, 451 So.2d 1386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Therefore, our analysis of this issue necessarily takes into account cases decided under the provisions of section 794.022, the rape shield statute....

...roper evidence of the victim's lack of chastity and, thus, rejected his effort to proffer evidence concerning another source of the victim's injury. The state's attorney suggested to the judge that although he would object to the specific testimony, section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1989), would allow evidence which may prove that the defendant was not the source of the injury....

...inations. These examinations have been historically ordered in other jurisdictions, where one of three situations exists: (a) uncorroborated, testimony of victim; (b) competency of victim is in question; and (c) the victim's credibility is at issue. Section 794.022 specifically provides that testimony of a sexual abuse victim need not be corroborated; therefore, this would be an invalid reason to order such an examination in Florida....

...The prosecution then successfully objected to proffered defense evidence which indicated that the injury (rupture) could have been caused by earlier sexual activity with a person other than the defendant. The exclusion of such rebuttal evidence contravenes both section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985) and substantive due process of law, i.e., fair play....

...mprobability of her being a prostitute, *1351 that they have opened the door to testimony about whether she is or is not a prostitute, which has become directly relevant to this case, given my client's testimony. Indeed, this conceivably fits within 794.022 [the Florida Rape Shield Statute], a pattern of consent that shows the likelihood of consent in this particular case. Consent being, as [the prosecutor] just said, the one and only issue in this case. 794.022, and I'm not sure 794.022 applies in prostitution generally, but even if we were to take the language of that, 794.022 has been held to be a statutory recitation of the rule of relevance and — THE COURT: Excuse me. Florida Statute 790. — [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 794.022, the rape shield statute. THE COURT: Well, let's look at it. 790 point what? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 794.022....

...THE COURT: Not somewhat; it says, "Tend to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent." [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct. THE COURT: Court finds that you have not laid the predicate to invoke 794.022, which specifically says that "specific incidences of prior consensual activity shall not be admitted into evidence except under certain limited circumstances." The Court finds you have not laid the proper predicate to come within the exception....

...and her claimed sole episode of sexual intercourse, the trial court precluded the defense from introducing testimony that the complainant had engaged in prostitution (and procured drugs) before the incident with Johnson. This exclusion was based on Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes, the Florida Rape Shield Law, which states: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under § 794.011....

...The only time the victim's prior sexual activity with a third person is relevant is when such evidence may show the accused was not the perpetrator of the crime or if the defense is consent by the victim."); Kaplan v. State, 451 So.2d 1386, 1387, (Fla 4th DCA 1984) ("Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is merely a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as it applies to the sexual behavior of a sexually battered victim.") Analysis commends the statute's evidentiary proscription as soundly grounded in both reason and experience....

section 316.066 and the rape shield statute in section 794,022 were never within scope of the [C]ommittee’s

...Such testimony, according to Dixon, would make the concept of fabrication less incredible to the jury. The trial court refused to allow Kyle Sexton to testify, however, because of lack of relevance, see Gelabert v. State, 407 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and exclusion under the rape shield statute, section 794.022, Florida Statutes....

...[1] "All relevant evidence is admissible, except *349 as provided by law." § 90.402, Fla. Stat. (2001). "Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact." § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (2001). This rule of relevance as it applies in cases of sexual battery is codified in the rape-shield statute, section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...tablished to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent. § 794.022(2) (emphasis added)....

...urrent allegation is also false. The defense argued that the rape-shield law does not render this evidence inadmissible. The court found T.B.'s allegations that Minus had previously raped her were not relevant. As noted in the statute and in Kaplan, section 794.022 does not make this evidence inadmissible....

...The Rape Shield Law, Chapter 794, Florida Statutes (1987), precludes such testimony unless it tends "to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent." § 794.022(2), Fla....

...The defendant contends that the trial court erred in precluding the defense from introducing the result of the DNA test where the evidence was crucial to his defense of misidentification. The State, on the other hand, argues that the testimony was inadmissible as evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity under Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1991), Florida's Rape Shield Statute....

...Defense counsel urged that the proffered testimony would support defendant's theory that the victim had fabricated the rape to cover up the fact that she was pregnant and to obtain anti-pregnancy medicine. [3] The trial judge refused to allow the proffered testimony on the strength of section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: (2) Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under s....

...ourt outside the presence of the jury that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct involved in the case that it tends to establish *1240 a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is relevant to the issue of consent. Section 794.022(2) forbids the admission into evidence of any specific instances of prior sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender except when consent of the victim is at issue. Appellant contends that the exclusion of the proffered question and answer on the authority of section 794.022(2) has deprived him of his right to confront witnesses against him, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by article I, section 16, of the Florida Constitution....

...asleep in bed with his sister. The boy was nude and the girl was wearing pajamas. At the state's behest, the trial court excluded this testimony and prevented the defense from cross-examining either child on this issue. The court based its ruling on section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1985) — Florida's rape-shield statute — which provides: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...83-1686-CF). Accordingly, the judgments and sentences on appeal are AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. WALDEN, J., and BARKETT, ROSEMARY, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] § 794.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1983); § 794.011(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] § 794.022(2), Fla....

...ACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY. — Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: * * * * * * (b) Character of victim. — 1. Except as provided in s. 794.022, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; or * * * * * * (NOTE: Section 794.022 deals with prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and other persons, not prior acts of violence by the victim.) [6] The dissent's contention that we have reweighed the evidence obviously cannot apply to evidence that the trial court refused to hear, even though we directed that it do so....

...told her mother that she had previously had sexual relations with her boyfriend. The State filed a motion in limine under the rape shield statute, arguing that any evidence of S.D.'s prior sexual activity with her boyfriend should be excluded. See *762 § 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...he source of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease. . . . (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reputation evidence relating to a victim's prior sexual conduct . . . shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011. § 794.022, Fla....

...But Esteban did not attempt to show specific acts of sexual activity with a third person on the evening of the attack, which is what we believe the supreme court meant in Marr. Evidence that the victim was a prostitute is reputation evidence, which under section 794.022(3) is inadmissible....

...Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine, in which the State anticipated that Appellant would attempt to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior sexual relationships “or make some reference thereto,” and argued that such evidence was inadmissible under section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the “Rape Shield.” The court addressed the motion at a pre-trial hearing....

...interpretation of those authorities is subject to de novo review.” Hendricks v. State, 34 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The rape shield law does not exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the Florida Evidence Code; instead, section 794.022 is a codification of Florida's relevance rules as applied to the sexual behavior of victims of sexual crimes.” Teachman v....

...conduct or evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery may not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 787.06, s. 794.011, or s. 800.04. § 794.022(2-3), Fla....

...could mislead the jury into believing it did not need to weigh or evaluate the credibility of the victim’s testimony. Because defense counsel had argued in her opening statement that there was a lack of corroboration of the alleged crime, and because section 794.022(1), Florida Statutes (2012), provided that in a prosecution under section 794.011, the testimony of an alleged sexual battery victim “need not be corroborated,” the trial court gave the instruction as part of the standard instr...

...o corroboration” instruction was indeed error in this case, but was harmless. Id. at 1131. ANALYSIS The trial court in this case agreed to give the “no corroboration” instruction, in part, because section 794.022(1) stated that the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution under section 794.011, Florida Statutes. Section 794.022, titled “Rules of evidence,” addresses the admission and exclusion of certain evidentiary matters in prosecutions for sexual battery. For example, it precludes admission of specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity -5- between the victim and any other person, with certain exceptions. § 794.022(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). The statute also precludes admission of evidence of the victim’s reputation relating to prior sexual conduct or the victim’s manner of dress to show that the victim’s dress incited the sexual battery. § 794.022(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). The statute provides that an offender’s use of a prophylactic device or a victim’s request that the offender use such a device is not, by itself, relevant to the issue of commission of the offense or of consent. § 794.022(5), Fla....

...(2012). It is in this context of certain evidentiary matters in a sexual battery prosecution that the statute also provides that the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated. The Second District in Brown set forth a detailed history of section 794.022(1), and observed that the “no corroboration” provision was enacted in 1974 as part of legislation eliminating the crime of “rape” and replacing it with the offense of “sexual battery.” 11 So....

...Stat., and creating § 794.011, Fla. Stat.). The 1974 enactment also provided that “[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated.” In that same section it stated that “the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and quality of the evidence.” § 794.022(1), Fla....

...es an impermissible comment on the evidence.” Id. at 438-39. The district court also found that the special instruction is likely to confuse and mislead the jury, even though it is a correct statement of law. Id. at 439. The principle of law in section 794.022(1), the “no corroboration” provision, is not intended to be a jury instruction but, the Second District opined, is directed at an appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence in sexual battery cases....

...consensual sexual activity between a victim and any person other than the accused, unless it is established in camera that the evidence is relevant to consent by a similar pattern of conduct, or that the accused is not the source of semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease. § 794.022, Fla. Stat.; Gomez v. State, 245 So. 3d 950, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The rape shield law does not exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the Florida Evidence Code; instead, section 794.022 is a codification of Florida’s relevance rules as applied to the sexual behavior of victims of sexual crimes....

...3d 540, 546 (Fla. 5 2d DCA 2006); Kaplan v. State, 451 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); see also § 90.403, Fla. Stat. A defendant’s “right to full and fair cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, may limit [section 794.022]’s application when evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct is relevant to show bias or motive to lie.” Kaplan, 451 So....

...the victim’s relationship with her boyfriend was critical to the theory of defense, here the probative value of the minor victim’s sexual activity is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and is precluded from admission under section 794.022, Florida Statutes....

...Even assuming that the State withheld evidence that the victim was a prostitute, such evidence would have been wholly irrelevant to the defense's theory that Gilliam murdered the victim during a seizure. Furthermore, the instant evidence would not have been admissible under the Rape Shield Law, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Stillman opined Gilliam endured on the night of the murder. [10] Specifically, both Burroughs and Morris testified that Gilliam did not smell of urine. [11] Dr. Stillman testified that people who suffer seizures typically experience amnesia as to the events shortly before and after the seizure. [12] Section 794.022 provides in pertinent part: (2) Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...tablished to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent. § 794.022(2), Fla....

...ial counsel did make a proffer sufficient to apprise the trial court of the substance of Ware's intended cross-examination. . The common law view has been discredited, and is now displaced by various rules and statutes. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 412; § 794.022, Fla....

...Appellant was convicted of burglary with an assault as well as sexual battery with slight force. He raises two issues on appeal, neither of which has merit but one of which, the trial court's exclusion of evidence upon the defense of consent, we wish to discuss in affirming. Both parties appropriately rely upon section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1981), which provides: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under s....

...Section 90.404(1)(b)(1) provides: (1) Character evidence generally. — Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a particular occasion, except: * * * * * * (b) Character of the victim, — (1) Except as provided in s. 794.022, evidence of pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; ... . We therefore conclude that evidence relating to the victim's reputation as to unchaste conduct should have been admitted, and its exclusion constitutes reversible error. Section 794.022 does, however, bar evidence of specific sexual acts unless that evidence establishes a pattern of conduct relevant to the issue of consent. Hodges v. State, 386 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). There, we held that one isolated act of premarital sex did not constitute a "pattern of conduct" within the meaning of Section 794.022(2)....

...In this respect, the test for admissibility is much like that for admission of "other crime" evidence under Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1959), and its progeny. The proffered conduct simply fails to meet the test required by the statute. Each case to which section 794.022(2) applies is going to involve a judgment call by the trial judge....

...h the victim on this issue. AFFIRMED. MARSTILLER and RAY, JJ., concur. . Florida's Rape Shield Law prohibits "evidence presented for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time of the offense incited the sexual battery...." § 794.022(3), Fla....

Another aspect of this case is that pursuant to section 794.022(3), Florida Statutes (2010), the State was

...ent has appealed that order to this court. The department's first point on appeal is its contention that the testimony regarding the former patients' sexual histories was inadmissible. The first argument in support of this point is founded upon *715 Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, which is more commonly known as the "rape shield statute." The department argues that the statute was applicable to the hearing and therefore prohibited the admission of evidence relating to the former patients' sexual relations with anyone other than the appellee. We disagree. Section 794.022 is expressly limited by its own language to "prosecution[s] under s....

...The other alleged perpetrators, Dante Lee Pigatt (“Pigatt”) and Gerson Juarez (“Juarez”), were also charged with sexually assaulting the victim. Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine pursuant to the Rape Shield Statute, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (2010), to exclude any reference to the alleged fact that the victim had sex with her ex-boyfriend, Brandon Tyler (“Tyler”), prior to arriving at a party at Juarez’s home, where the sexual battery 2 occurred....

...First, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s proper limitation of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim regarding whether she had sex with Tyler prior to arriving at Juarez’s party on the authority of the Rape Shield Statute, section 794.022(2)....

...cross-examination for an abuse of discretion.”). The Rape Shield Statute provides that “[s]pecific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence” in a prosecution for sexual battery. § 794.022(2)....

...im and her boyfriend in order to demonstrate the victim’s bias and motive to lie. Id. at 1143. The trial court denied the request based on the Rape Shield Statute. Upon review by the Florida Supreme Court, the Court noted that “[u]nder section 794.022(2), a victim’s prior sexual activity with anyone other than the accused is generally not admissible evidence,” Marr, 494 So....

...examination of matters which are only marginally relevant”). Additionally, the trial court’s ruling prevented the risk of cross-examination turning into an improper attack on the victim’s character as the kind of person who engages in this type of explicit text messaging. § 794.022(3), Fla....

...5th DCA 2013). “An object” includes a finger. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2008). Consent of (victim) is not a defense to the crime charged. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Stat. “Consent” means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission. Consent does not mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the offender. - 19 -  Give if applicable. § 794.022(4), Fla....

...Stat. “Serious personal injury” means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Give if applicable. § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...position of authority or control does not constitute consent and it is not a defense that (defendant) was not actually in a position of control or authority if the circumstances were such as to lead (victim) to reasonably believe that [he] [she] was in such a position. § 794.022(4), Fla....

...handicapped and substantially limited in his or her ability to resist or flee an act. Give if applicable. § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Stat. - 30 -  “Consent” means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission. Consent does not mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the offender. Give if applicable. § 794.022(4), Fla....

...l battery. § 794.021, Fla. Stat. Ignorance of (victim’s) age, (victim’s) misrepresentation of his or her age, or a defendant’s bona fide belief of (victim’s) age is not a defense to the crime charged. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Stat. To “solicit” means to command, encourage, hire, or request another person to engage in specific conduct. Lakey v. State, 113 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). “An object” includes a finger. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Stat. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Definitions. Give if applicable. Lakey v. State, 113 So. 3d 90 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013). “An object” includes a finger. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Stat. Ignorance of (victim’s) age, (victim’s) misrepresentation of his or her age, or a defendant’s bona fide belief of (victim’s) age is not a defense to the crime charged. § 794.011(8), Fla. Stat. Consent of (victim) is not a defense to the crime charged. § 794.022, Fla....

witnesses would have been admissible under section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes. We affirm this point

...prejudice, see § 90.403, Fla. Stat., or is otherwise excluded by the Florida Evidence Code. Relevant evidence is defined as that tending to prove or disprove a material fact. See § 90.401, Fla. Stat. Chapter 794 governs the crime of sexual battery. Section 794.022, Florida Statutes, sets forth rules of evidence designed to “protect[] a sexual battery victim’s privacy from unwarranted public intrusion by restricting the admissibility of evidence relating to the victim[’s] character and prior consensual sexual activity.” C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.7 (2023 ed.). Section 794.022 is often referred to as the “rape shield” statute. “The rape shield law does not exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the Florida Evidence Code; instead, section 794.022 is a codification of Florida’s relevance rules as applied to the sexual behavior of victims of sexual crimes.” Thorne, 4 271 So....

...camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent. § 794.022(2), Fla....

...nters is not excluded from evidence by the rape shield statute. This testimony concerned alleged consensual sexual activity of the victim with Appellant, not “any person other than” Appellant as expressly contemplated by the rape shield law. See § 794.022(2), Fla....

...ld have legitimately relied, and in addition an even closer examination of the excluded 2 Since Appellant’s testimony concerns alleged prior sexual activity of the victim with Appellant and not another individual, the two exceptions within section 794.022(2) do not apply to this case and need not be considered. 3 Even if the rape shield were to apply, the Florida Supreme Court has considered the reach of the rape shield statute when it hinders a defendant’s constitutional righ...

...The victim testified to the digital penetration of her vagina by the defendant. A victim’s testimony concerning a sexual battery, if clear as to the identity of the perpetrator, is legally sufficient to sustain *90 a conviction and requires no medical or other corroboration. See § 794.022(1), Fla....

defendant’s cross-examination of the victim. § 794.022, Fla.Stat. (1995). Accordingly, we affirm the

...Florida’s rape shield statute, and, alternatively, because the victim had not been convicted of filing a false police report and the previous event was both remote in time and factually dissimilar, it constituted prohibited, unduly prejudicial character evidence. See § 794.022(2), Fla....

...293, 303 (1998). First enacted in 1974, Florida’s rape shield statute provides, in relevant part: “[s]pecific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender may not be admitted into evidence in a [sexual crimes] prosecution.” § 794.022(2), Fla....

...“consensual sexual activity with a person other than the accused.” Thorne v. State, 271 So. 3d 177, 184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (quoting Gomez v. State, 245 So. 3d 950, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)); see McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176, 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“The Rape Shield Statute, section 794.022, Florida Statues, ....

...ol 7 employee. Such evidence was barred from admission, as it constituted a specific instance of prior sexual activity between the victim and another and failed to qualify for any statutory exception. See § 794.022(2), Fla....

...Lastly, we find that the trial court properly excluded evidence concerning the victim’s prior sexual relationship with the defendant’s brother where the defense failed to show that the testimony fell within an exception to the Rape Shield Law. § 794.022(2), Fla....

...We conclude, however, that the appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Evidence of prior consensual sexual activity between a victim and someone other than the defendant would be admissible if the activity might have been the source of the injuries suffered by the victim. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between a victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence, unless it is first established to the court...

...the victim and penetrated her by inserting his penis and finger into her vagina did not make its appearance until Victory filed his amended motion. It is readily apparent, at least to me, that Victory interjects new allegations at every opportunity. Section 794.022, Florida Statutes (The Rape Shield Law), excludes "[s]pecific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender . . . [unless] it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence may prove that the defendant was not the source of the semen, pregnancy, injury, or disease. . . ." § 794.022(2), Fla....

children. This did not meet the requirements of Section 794.-022(2), Florida Statutes (1979). *1048Defendant

PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of section 794.022, Florida Statutes (1987), and Kaplan v....

...The trial judge stayed the trial pending this court’s determination of the petition for writ of certiorari. We grant the petition. The defense sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior consensual sexual activity with three men other than Phillip Pancoast, the defendant. In accordance with section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the judge conducted an in camera proceeding at which he reviewed the affidavits and depositions of the three witnesses and the deposition of the victim....

...-sensual sexual encounter. However, after an objection from the State, the trial court excluded this testimony pursuant to the Rape Shield Statute which precludes evidence of a victim’s prior sexual activity with anyone other than the accused. See § 794.022, Fla....

...expert or otherwise, that made the victim’s history relevant; and there was, therefore, no showing in camera that the evidence tended to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior of the victim so that it was relevant to the issue of consent. See § 794.022(2), Fla....

...al battery. Definition. Give if applicable. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2008). Consent of (victim) is not a defense to the crime charged. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...“Serious personal injury” means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Give if applicable. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...handicapped and substantially limited in his or her ability to resist or flee an act. - 11 -  Give if applicable. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...able of appraising the nature of his or her conduct. Give if applicable. “Union” means contact. Give if applicable. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...Give if applicable. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. - 15 -  Definition. Give if applicable. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

...constitute a sexual battery or consented to engage in such acts. Give if applicable. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. Definition. Give if applicable. “Union” means contact. Give if requested. § 794.022, Fla....

defense to the crime charged. Give if requested. § 794-022, Fla. Stat. (Victim’s) lack of chastity is not

...Unfortunately, the judge did not permit the witness to respond to the question during a defense proffer, so neither we, nor the trial court, can determine whether the answer would include evidence of specific instances of sexual activity by the victim, excluded by Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...In a case of first impression, we are asked to decide whether Florida’s Rape Shield Law serves to shield the defendant from the victim’s testimony. Pedro Portillo appeals his conviction for attempted sexual battery. Portillo argues that the victim’s testimony violated section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2014), a subsection of Florida’s Rape Shield Law....

...the way Por-tillo placed his fingers on her genitals indicated his intent to digitally penetrate her. Portillo raises only one issue on appeal. He argues that his conviction should be reversed because the victim’s testimony in this regard violated section 794.022(2), which provides in part that “[sjpecific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...Third, there is no known Florida case in which a defendant claimed that the Rape Shield Law shields a defendant from a victim’s testimony. Therefore, the trial court had no way to know that Portillo’s objection was not to relevance under section 90.402, but instead based on the prohibition under section 794.022(2)....

...tablished to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent. § 794.022(2)....

...And subsection (5) provides that evidence of use of a prophylactic device or victim’s request for use of a prophylactic device may not be admitted as evidence of consent. These provisions all protect the victim from an abusive defense. They limit the defense, not the victim. In fact, since it was enacted, section 794.022(2) has been applied to limit only the defense; it has never been applied to limit the victim’s testimony....

...blanket prohibition on the victim’s ability to reference a past experience when telling his or her story. *1140 3. Any error that resulted from the victim’s testimony was harmless. Finally, even if Portillo had preserved an objection and even if section 794.022(2) provides a blanket prohibition of the victim mentioning his or her sexual experience to explain an incident, reversal is not warranted because the error here, if any, was harmless....

section 316.066 and the rape shield statute in section 794.022 were never within scope of the [C]ommittee’s

...credibility was sufficient to guide the jury. 1 *1128 The trial judge initially indicated that he was not inclined to give the instruction. However, when the State argued that the requested special instruction used the exact statutory language from section 794.022(1), Florida Statutes (2010), and that Gutierrez opened the door by asserting in opening statement that there would be no corroborating evidence presented in the case, the trial judge opted, instead, to give the instruction....

...The State argues that it was within the trial court’s discretion to include the instruction and that existing case law on this issue is distinguishable from the instant appeal. The permissibility of a special “no corroboration” jury instruction rooted in the language of section 794.022(1) was recently addressed in Brown v. State, 11 So.3d 428, 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Similar to this case, the special instruction reviewed in Brown involved the verbatim use of the statutory language in section 794.022(1)....

...ttery, constituted an improper comment on the evidence and was likely to confuse and mislead the jury. Id. at 439 . The court recognized that the special instruction provided a correct *1129 statement of the law. However, it concluded the history of section 794.022(1) revealed that the statute was directed at the appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence, not the question of whether a jury should accept the uncorroborated testimony of a victim in a sexual battery prosecution....

...Although the testimony of each sister reinforced the testimony of the other, their accounts were not supported by any other evidence, a fact defense counsel noted during opening statement and cross examination. Based on defense counsel’s comments, the State requested the following special jury instruction based on section 794.022(1), Florida Statutes: “The testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in a prosecution for sexual battery.” Id....

...articular issues at trial. . The trial court inserted the requested language as item eight in the list of suggested factors a jury is to consider when weighing the credibility of a witness. . Brown opposed the requested instruction on the basis that section 794.022(1) was only pertinent to the State's burden of proof to survive a judgment of acquittal and thus, was not a proper subject for judicial comment....

...nt. The State’s Motion in Limine After M.R.’s deposition, the State moved in limine to prohibit the defense from bringing out any information relating to the prior rape allegation, arguing that the admission of that evidence was precluded by section 794.022, Florida Statutes, Florida’s rape shield law....

...obtain money from victims by exposing an extra-marital affair). Similarly, for the reasons that evidence of the New York incident was inadmissible as reverse Williams rule evidence, that evidence was also inadmissible because it did not fall within section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2019), for evidence that “tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent.”...

...The defendant appeals from his convictions of five counts of sexual battery of his fifteen-year-old niece, in violation of section 794.041(2)(b). [1] The determinative question concerns the action of the trial judge in excluding, purportedly under the rape shield statute, section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1989), extensive proffered evidence concerning the victim's alleged motivation to fabricate the accusations against the defendant....

defendant’s convictions. The rape shield statute, section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2019), provides:

...The standard instruction also lists additional definitions and points of law that are read to the jury “if applicable.” During trial, the Defendant’s counsel objected to the court giving one of the “if applicable” instructions. The challenged instruction references section 794.022(4), Florida Statutes, and states: “Evidence of (victim’s) mental incapacity or defect, if any, may be considered in determining whether there was an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent.” Id.  The court overruled the D...

...his or her conduct must be due to an act without his or her consent. It does not apply to voluntary intoxication. The State’s response to the Defendant’s argument is simple. The State argues the court correctly read the instruction based on section 794.022(4), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...787.06, s. 2 794.011, or s. 800.04, evidence of the victim’s mental incapacity or defect is admissible to prove that the consent was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary; and the court shall instruct the jury accordingly.” Id. The State argues: “[b]ased on [section 794.022(4)] and the fact that consent was the defense asserted, the instruction at issue must be read. The trial judge correctly read the portion of the standard instruction.” Section 794.022 is an evidentiary statute....

...to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, it is offered to show why the witness is not trustworthy.” (citation omitted)). D Rape Shield statute Subsection (2) of the “rape shield” law, section 794.022, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part: 14  Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender may not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s....

...evidence during cross-examination. * While the court did not indicate that it was excluding the evidence under the Rape Shield statute, it is worth repeating that the Rape Shield statute does not apply to evidence of nonconsensual sexual activity. § 794.022(2), Fla....

...Mielke, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before COPE, FLETCHER and WELLS, JJ. COPE, J. Charles Strong appeals his convictions of sexual battery and kidnapping. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in giving a jury instruction on subsection 794.022(5), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The defendant's statement to the police came in through the police detective, including the defendant's claim that the sexual encounter was consensual. [*] From his convictions, the defendant appeals. II. The trial court granted the State's request to instruct the jury on subsection 794.022, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: (5) An offender's use of a prophylactic device, or a victim's request that an offender use a prophylactic device, is not by itself relevant to either the issue of whether or not the offense was committed or the issue of whether or not the victim consented....

...You know, sounds like it's not against her will. Oh, you finished with that condom, oh, I got one here. Here you go. Doesn't sound like rape to me. TR. 512. On appeal, the defendant argues that the special jury instruction should not have been given. The defense points out that section 794.022, Florida Statutes, is entitled "Rules of Evidence." Subsection (5) speaks in terms of relevancy, an evidentiary concept. The defense argues that in a companion part of section 794.022, subsection (4) addresses consent where the victim suffers mental incapacity or defect. Id. § 794.022(4)....

...twelve years old in violation of section 794.011(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2019). Mr. Lydecker raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting his cross-examination of one of the victims under the rape shield statute. See § 794.022(2)....

...These are the statements that were redacted from the CPT interview to be played in Mr. Lydecker's trial. The State argued that the allegations against the two other people were not relevant and should, therefore, be excluded under the rape shield statute. See § 794.022(2) ("Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the 3 offender may not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 787.06, s....

...As the victim did not attribute this to prior consensual conduct, it does not fit within the rape shield [statute]."). Moreover, "[t]he rape shield [statute] does not exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible under the Florida Evidence Code; instead, section 794.022 is a codification of Florida's relevance rules as applied to the sexual behavior of victims of sexual crimes." Teachman v....

...He now appeals, raising three issues. Robinson’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of third-party DNA found in the young woman’s underwear. Although Florida’s Rape Shield law generally precludes this type of evidence to show consent, § 794.022(2), Fla. Stat....

...rding her prior allegations of rape against her employer, as well as against the appellant. 2 The trial court ruled that the examination of her relationship with her employer would violate the rape shield law, section 794.022, Florida Statutes (2013)....

...would not allow appellant to question her regarding the prior allegation of rape. Although the rape shield law was inapplicable to either allegation of rape by the victim, the court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings because the evidence was not relevant in this case. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (2013), prohibits questioning a victim regarding a sexual relationship with others: Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender sha...

...if she did not comply with his assault. There is no similarity between the allegations of the sexual assault by the appellant and the sexual assault years earlier by the employer. Moreover, even if the conduct were considered consensual, and thus within the ambit of section 794.022(2), it would not satisfy the similarity exception in the statute....

...examination of the victim regarding her prior sexual experiences and her denial of any prior sexual experience to a police officer investigating this case. The court granted the state’s motion in limine to prevent such cross-examination based upon section 794.022, Florida Statutes (2008) (commonly referred to as the “Rape Shield Statute”). The state concedes that the court erred in excluding it on this ground, as the statute does not apply to prosecutions for lewd or lascivious molestation and battery. See § 794.022(2)-(3), Fla....