Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 390.0111
S390.0111 7 - HEALTH-SAFETY - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7917 - M: S
S390.0111 12 - ABORTION - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9108 - M: F
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 42 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 183, 2017 WL 633772, 2017 Fla. LEXIS 340
...The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly applied strict scrutiny when reviewing the Mandatory Delay Law, which imposes an additional twenty-four hour waiting period on women seeking to terminate their pregnancies. See ch. 2015-118 § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 390.0111(3), Fla....
...The Woman’s Right to Know Act requires the physician to inform the patient of “[t]he nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing” the termination of pregnancy procedure, “[t]he probable gestational age of the fetus,” and some other, additional information. See § 390.0111(3)(a), Fla....
...In 2015, the Florida Legislature amended the Woman’s Right to Know Act to require that a woman be given the statutorily re *1248 quired information at least twenty-four hours prior to the termination of pregnancy procedure. Ch. 2015-118 § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 390.0111(3))....
...additional information which the physician deems material to the woman’s informed decision to terminate her pregnancy. Ch. 2015-118, § 1, Laws of Fla. (deletions indicated by strike-through type and additions indicated by underline) (codified at § 390.0111(3)(a), Fla....
...As Justice Pariente’s concurrence, which was joined by Justice Quince and Justice Anstead, made clear, it was because of this Court’s interpretation of the law as a neutral informed consent law, which the State conceded was appropriate, that the law avoided any constitutional infirmity: The majority has construed section 390.0111(3)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (2005), to be a neutral informed consent statute that is comparable to other informed consent statutes and the common law from which they are derived....
...trips to the clinic by the new law because they can receive the information from their referring physician, the law, in fact, requires women to make a second trip to their health care provider at least twenty-four hours after their first visit. See § 390.0111, Fla....
CopyCited 12 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 210, 2006 Fla. LEXIS 555, 2006 WL 870497
...of Florida, and American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive Freedom Project, for Amici Curiae. LEWIS, J. We have on appeal State v. Presidential Women's Center,
884 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared section
390.0111 of the Florida Statutes invalid. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the district court's decision and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND In 1997, the Florida Legislature enacted subsection
390.0111, Florida Statutes, titled the "Woman's Right to Know Act" (hereinafter "the Act")....
...The Act essentially prohibits termination of pregnancy procedures from being performed or induced unless either the referring physician or the physician performing the procedure first obtains informed and voluntary written consent from the patient. See § 390.0111(3), Fla....
...Presidential contends that requiring physicians to inform patients of "[t]he nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure that a reasonable patient would consider material to making a knowing and willful decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy," § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(a), Fla....
...of "[t]he medical risks to the woman and fetus of carrying the pregnancy to term" (emphasis supplied), subsection (3)(a)(1)(a) requires physicians to inform patients of "[t]he nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure." § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)(a),(c), Fla....
...s award of summary judgment. [7] Because we have concluded that the Fourth District erred in holding that the Act is unconstitutional, we vacate the Fourth District's award of attorneys' fees to Presidential at this time. CONCLUSION We conclude that section 390.0111(3)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes is not unconstitutional....
...It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurring. The majority has construed section 390.0111(3)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2005), to be a neutral informed consent statute that is comparable to other informed consent statutes and the common law from which they are derived....
...nowing and willful decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy. b. The probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the termination of pregnancy is to be performed. c. The medical risks to the woman and fetus of carrying the pregnancy to term. § 390.0111(3)(a)(1), Fla....
CopyCited 8 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1998 WL 1070946
...The State also contends that the Act is not unconstitutionally vague because the only way that a physician can be held criminally liable is if he knowingly performs the partial birth abortion. B. Summary of the Act The Act prohibits physicians from "knowingly perform[ing] a partial-birth abortion." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(a)....
...livery." FLA.STAT. §
390.011(5). Violation of the Act carries both criminal and civil penalties. Under the Act "any person who willfully performs, or actively participates in" a partial-birth abortion commits a felony in the third degree. FLA.STAT. §
390.0111(10)(a)....
...The Act excepts from its criminal prohibition only those "partial-birth abortions" that are "necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury, provided that no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(c). Further, the Act creates a civil cause of action for the father of the fetus and for the maternal grandparents of the fetus if the mother is a minor. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(11)(a). The relief that can be obtained in such a civil action includes monetary damages for "all injuries, psychological and physical" and "damages equal to three times the cost of the partial-birth abortion." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(11)(b). Finally, FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(b) of the Act provides that "a woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed" cannot be prosecuted for a conspiracy to violate the partial-birth abortion ban but the Act does not exempt the woman from civil liability. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(11)....
...becomes viable. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Permanent Injunction is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendants are prohibited from enforcing FLA.STAT. §§
390.0111(5),
390.0111(11), and
390.011(5) (as renumbered by the Act)....
...[T]his point may differ with each pregnancy ..." Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 388-89,
99 S.Ct. 675, 682,
58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). [2] Specifically, the Act amends Florida's Statutes governing abortion by renumbering and amending Florida Statutes § 390.001 (as §
390.0111), renumbering Florida Statutes § 390.002 (as §
390.0112), and amending Florida Statutes §
390.011 as renumbered by the Act, §§
390.0111(5),
390.0111(11), and
390.011(5) of the Florida Statutes deal with the prohibition of the performance of "partial-birth" abortions....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2008 WL 53616
...The appellant, a minor, challenges the final order dismissing her petition for judicial waiver of the statutory requirement that her physician notify her parent or guardian prior to terminating her pregnancy. We affirm because the minor has failed to carry her burden of proving the grounds for a waiver under section 390.01114, Florida Statutes (2007), alleged in her petition. Section 390.01114(2)(a) requires a physician to notify a minor's parent or legal guardian at least forty-eight hours before performing an abortion on that minor. A minor may petition a circuit court to waive the notification requirement. § 390.01114(4)(a)....
...parental notification requirement. We agree. In arguing for reversal, the minor asserts that she is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. The statute requires that she establish maturity by clear and convincing evidence. § 390.01114(4)(c)....
...lopment, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor, and all other relevant evidence" and at a minimum, provides a sound starting point in attempting to determine whether a minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion. § 390.01114(4)(e)....
...e circuit court [was] not likely to yield findings sufficient to deny the waiver petition." Id. at 283. Here, a reversal and remand for additional findings, even if it could be accomplished in a manner consistent with the time constraints imposed by section 390.01114(4)(b) and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(n), could not possibly yield findings sufficient to grant the minor's waiver petition....
...My reasoning is more fully explained below. I. Background The appellant, Jane Doe, a minor who will turn eighteen in a few months time, sought to terminate her pregnancy without the requirement of Florida law that her parents be notified of the impending procedure. § 390.01114, Fla....
...anc consideration was necessary because the case is one of exceptional importance because it may "affect large numbers of persons" or "implicates `fundamental legal or constitutional rights.'" [3] I agree with Ms. Doe that the procedures outlined in section 390.01114 may affect large numbers of persons and that a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy implicates a fundamental legal and constitutional right....
...be remembered that facts must first be placed in evidence before the trial judge can make appropriate findings. V. Concluding Observations Presently, there appears to be no bar preventing Ms. Doe from filing a new petition seeking judicial by-pass. Section 390.01114 contains no language that limits a petitioner to but one petition....
...Wade v. Hirschman,
903 So.2d 928, 932-33 (Fla.2005). Ms. Doe's circumstances do not fit the requirements of res judicata because, first of all, there has not been a final judgment on the merits. In accordance with the mandate of the statute, see sections
390.01114(4)(c) and (d), the trial judge dismissed her petition when he found that she had not made the required evidentiary showing....
...2926,
111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 75,
96 S.Ct. 2831,
49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); In re T.W.,
551 So.2d 1186, 1194-95 (Fla.1989). Florida's legislature has imposed a condition on the exercise of this right in section
390.01114(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), which requires a physician to notify a minor's parent or legal guardian at least 48 hours before performing an abortion on the minor. §
390.01114(3)(a). The statute excuses the notice requirement under five circumstances, one of them being that the minor has successfully petitioned a circuit court to waive it. §
390.01114(3)(b)(5)....
...evidence of child abuse or sexual abuse of the petitioner by one or both of her parents or her legal guardian"; or (3) by a preponderance of the evidence, that "the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interest of the petitioner." § 390.01114(4)(c), (d)....
...he petition. Id. The statute further provides that, unless the minor requests an extension, the petition will be deemed granted if the court does not rule on it and issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law within 48 hours of its filing. § 390.01114(4)(b). Importantly, the statute mandates that a court conducting a judicial bypass proceeding must provide for a written transcript and that its order must contain "specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision." § 390.01114(4)(e)....
...Even if the judge had otherwise kept his thoughts to himself, these remarks by themselves warranted a reversal. The judge's decision must also be reversed for his failure to abide by the statutory requirement that the court's written order contain "specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting its decision." § 390.01114(4)(e)....
...The judge employed a form order prescribed by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.991. The form language of the order stated: "The minor has not proven by sufficient evidence any of the criteria that would permit a judicial waiver of the parental notification requirement of Section 390.01114(3), Florida Statutes, for the following reasons:....
...filed, except that the 48-hour limitation may be extended at the request of the minor. If the court fails to rule within the 48-hour period and an extension has not been requested, *568 the petition is granted, and the notice requirement is waived. § 390.01114(b) (emphases supplied)....
...1st DCA 2006) (reversing dismissal of bypass petition because trial court erroneously disqualified the petitioner's counsel, and holding that the case could not be remanded for a new hearing because a remand would violate the time limits specified in section 390.01114)....
...debate on these issues. I would emphasize that I merely vote to reconsider this case en banc, and have not decided how I would actually rule on the merits of the case. The trial court did not make the factual findings mandated by the legislature in section 390.01114(4)(e)....
...he record did not contain competent, substantial evidence from which a trial judge could decide, under the clear and convincing standard, that this seventeen-year-old petitioner was "sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." § 390.01114(4)(c)....
...ly related concepts, a petitioner may prove maturity without necessarily revealing all private aspects of her decision to seek an abortion. I see nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge applied the correct legal standard enunciated in section 390.01114(4)(c) or that he understood that the petitioner's maturity was the critical issue that he needed to decide....
...is little dispute that Ms. Doe failed to carry her burden of proof under subsection 4(d). Therefore, my discussion will be limited to her showing under subsection (4)(c), the "sufficiently mature" basis entitling the minor to a judicial by-pass. [5] Section 390.01114(4)(e) provides, "the trial court shall hear evidence relating to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor, and all other relevant evidence." These are examples of the important factors the legis...
...[9] Section
59.041, Florida Statutes (2007), provides that "[n]o judgment shall be set aside or reversed . . . for error as to any matter of . . . procedure," unless it is apparent "that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice." [10] Section
390.01114(4) requires the trial court to rule and issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law within forty-eight hours after the petition is filed....
...The trial judge, using a form approved by the supreme court, placed his initials in the appropriate place on the form to indicate his finding that the minor had failed to prove by sufficient evidence any of the criteria that permit a judicial waiver of the notification requirements of section 390.01114(3)....
...d of the medical risks associated with terminating their pregnancies. That function is served by another statute that requires this information to be given to every woman, young or old, as part of her informed consent to a termination procedure. See § 390.0111(3), Fla....
CopyCited 6 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 1998 WL 64072
...Gartner, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae-Florida Association of Planned Parenthood Affiliates, Planned Parenthood of Northeast Florida, Inc., and Planned Parenthood of Southwest Florida, Inc. KLEIN, Judge. The Florida Legislature, in 1997, passed legislation known as the "Women's Right to Know Act," section 390.0111, Florida Statutes (1997)....
...an and may not be significantly restricted by the state. Following this point, the state may impose significant restrictions only in the least intrusive manner designed to safeguard the health of the mother. T.W.,
551 So.2d at 1193. We first address section
390.0111(3)(a)1 which provides that a woman's consent is not voluntary or informed unless "the physician who is to perform the procedure, or the referring physician, has, at a minimum, orally, in person, informed the woman [of described infor...
...In this case there is evidence in the record that the regulation would make it more difficult for women to get abortions. The other abortion cases on which the State relies are distinguishable for the same reasons. [4] We next address the new informed consent statute, section 390.0111(3)(a)1.a, which provides that consent is not voluntary or informed unless the information provided by the physician includes: "the nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure that a reasonable patient woul...
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 8133, 2008 WL 2026154
...mers that ancillary products are optional, we reject that interpretation of the informed consent requirement. If the Legislature had intended to require particular means or procedures for obtaining informed consent, it could have done so. See, e.g., § 390.0111(3)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 51896, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 148
...om making an informed decision as to whether they should terminate the pregnancy. Prior to trial, defendants sought to preclude plaintiffs from presenting any evidence or argument that the Level II ultrasound caused any damages. The defendants cited section 390.0111, Florida Statutes, which, in pertinent part, provides: (1) TERMINATION IN THIRD TRIMESTER; WHEN ALLOWED.— No termination of pregnancy shall be performed on any human being in the third trimester of pregnancy unless: (a) Two physici...
...ealth of the pregnant woman; or (b) The physician certifies in writing to the medical necessity for legitimate emergency medical procedures for termination of pregnancy in the third trimester, and another physician is not available for consultation. § 390.0111(1), Fla....
...Plaintiffs, however, represented that using the date of conception, the mother was not in her third trimester when the Level II ultrasound was performed. The trial court ruled that any reference or evidence regarding Florida’s prohibition against third trimester abortions under section 390.0111, as applied to the Level II ultrasound, 2 was irrelevant....
...The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the mother could have obtained a legal abortion in another state. Following the adverse jury verdict and final judgment ultimately rendered against the defendants, this timely appeal was taken. On appeal, defendants assert that the trial court incorrectly ruled section 390.0111 was irrelevant. They maintain that the mother could not have obtained an abortion in Florida as of the date of the Level II ultrasound, arguing that the term “third trimester” as used in section 390.0111, should be calculated using the gestational age....
...2481 ,
76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court in Roe also measured the weeks of pregnancy and trimesters by the fetus’s gestational age. Id. Consequently, we hold that the term “third trimester” as used section
390.0111 must also be interpreted using gestational age in light of Roe’s trimester viability analysis....
...1st DCA 1988), the First District upheld a ruling by the State Board of Medicine revoking a doctor’s license after he miscalculated the gestational age of the fetus and performed an abortion during the last trimester of the patient’s pregnancy. To adopt plaintiffs’ view that “third trimester” as used in section 390.0111 should be determined using the date of conception would hereafter require clinicians to calculate the “weeks of pregnancy” based on indiscernible facts and make estimates of fetal age in a manner contrary to established medical p...
...Even if we were to agree that the statute should be interpreted to measure pregnancy from the alleged time of conception, thereby allowing the mother nearly two weeks after the June 30 Level II ultrasound to obtain a lawful abortion under Florida law, the existence of section 390.0111 would still be relevant to whether the mother could have logistically obtained an abortion in Florida before the statutory deadline....
...issue of causation, those considerations do not constitute valid reasons for excluding evidence that third trimester abortions are generally illegal in Florida. In light of the trial court’s failure to permit the jury to consider the relevance of section 390.0111 to the plaintiffs’ specific situation, leading to the exclusion of other relevant evidence on that factual issue, a new trial on the issue of liability and causation is required....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2000 WL 423471
...[there are] few more personal or private decisions concerning one's body that one can make in the course of a lifetime." Similarly, in State v. Presidential Women's Center,
707 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Court upheld a non-final order temporarily enjoining enforcement of the "Women's Right to Know Act," Section
390.0111, Florida Statutes, which required that a physician performing an abortion inform the patient of what a "reasonable patient would consider material." Id....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 42619
...Wixtrom is concerned that J.D.S.'s guardian could have authorized an abortion of the fetus. Florida law provides safeguards to insure that a guardian does not act capriciously or cavalierly when considering the health of the incapacitated mother and fetus. For example, sections 390.0111(1) and (3), Florida Statutes, state that no abortion can be performed on a ward unless two physicians certify in writing that "to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the termination of pregnancy is necessary to save the life or prese...
...nitely outside the womb. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the woman's life and health shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the concern for the life and health of the fetus when such concerns are in conflict. § 390.0111(4), Fla....
...less certain conditions are met. In recognition of its interests in the life of the unborn child, Florida has chosen to prohibit abortions after the 24th week of pregnancy except where medically necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. § 390.0111, Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2004 WL 2290364
..., M.D., and North Florida Women's Health and Counseling Services, Inc. (collectively Presidential Women's Center), and finding unconstitutional Florida's abortion informed-consent statute, also known as the "Women's Right to Know Act" (the Act). See § 390.0111, Fla....
...ute, or risk penalties including licensure penalties, the Amended Statute violates due process and is otherwise void for vagueness; 30. The vagueness of the Amended Statute is increased by the ambiguity created by its reference to "medical risks" in Section 390.0111(3)(a)1.c, but then making reference simply to "risks" in Section 390.0111(3)(a)1.a....
.... . . 32. To sever the challenged portions of the Amended Statute would be to sever subsections of the informed consent section. To do so would reduce the section to being nonsensical and incomplete. Accordingly, the constitutional *535 defects of Section 390.0111(3) cannot be cured by severing portions of it....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 3529, 2016 WL 886384
...n
underlying neuromuscular disease would not have consented to surgery had he been
advised that he was at "increased risk of pulmonary complications." Cf. Presidential
Women's Ctr.,
937 So. 2d at 119 (discussing the reasonable patient standard of section
390.0111, Florida Statutes (2005), and approving the interpretation that "the doctor
need only consider, address, and inform based on that patient's individualized
circumstances in determining what information is material and to be provided as the
'informed consent' "); Ritz, 436 So....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 8694, 2009 WL 1883893
...s. First, she found that Dr. Pendergraft's conduct violated section
797.03(3), Florida Statutes (2005), which prohibits the performance of such a procedure in a location other than a hospital. [1] Second, the ALJ found that the same conduct violated section
390.0111(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), which prohibits third trimester abortions unless "two physicians certify in writing to the fact that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the termination of the pregnancy is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the pregnant woman." Third, the ALJ found that Dr. Pendergraft failed to comply with section
390.0111(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), because he did not certify in writing "to the medical necessity for legitimate emergency medical procedures *394 for termination of pregnancy in the third trimester, and another physician is not availa...
...clear and convincing evidence that Dr. Pendergraft committed medical malpractice pursuant to section
458.331(1)(t)1., Florida Statutes (2005), by failing to meet the standard of care for performing third trimester abortions as set forth in sections
390.0111 and
797.03....
...The Board approved and accepted the recommended order, including the recommended penalties. On appeal, Dr. Pendergraft argues that the violation of sections
456.072(1)(k) and
458.331(1)(g) cannot serve as the basis for any disciplinary action by the Board because he has not been convicted of violating sections
390.0111 and
797.03....
...LAWSON, J., and PLEUS, JR., R., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Criminal sanctions are available for violation of this subsection as any person who violates this provision is guilty of a second degree misdemeanor. §
797.03(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). [2] A violation of sections
390.0111(1)(a) and (1)(b) is punishable as a third degree felony. §
390.0111(10)(a), Fla....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 2868, 2016 WL 745900
PER CURIAM. The State of Florida appeals a tempor rary injunction against- enforcement of a 24-hour waiting period added to Florida’s abortion statute in 2015. § 390.0111(3)(a), Fla....
...that it applied the proper legal analysis, render this tempo *283 rary injunction invalid and thwart meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we reverse the temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of Chapter 15-118, Laws of Florida (amending section 390.0111(3), Florida .Statutes)....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 11754, 2010 WL 3168124
...705,
35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); In re T.W.,
551 So.2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.1989). The Legislature has defined "viability" as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may *266 with a reasonable degree of medical probability be continued indefinitely outside the womb." §
390.0111(4), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal
...vacate it and remand for a new hearing.
I.
On August 29, 2023, the minor filed her petition in the
Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. That same day, the court set the
petition for a hearing and appointed counsel for her. 1
1 Consistent with section 390.01116, Florida Statutes (2023),
and Rule 9.147(f) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, we
The court held the hearing on August 31, 2023....
...The Florida Parental Notice of and Consent for Abortion Act
generally prohibits the performance or induction of abortions on
pregnant minors unless their parents or legal guardians are
notified of the abortion and have provided written informed
consent to the abortion. See § 390.01114(3), (4)(a), (5)(a), Fla....
...Stat.
(2023). These statutory requirements of parental notice and
consent may be waived upon a minor’s petition if a court “finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently
mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. §
390.01114(6)(c)....
...2 We note that the judicial waiver statute expressly prohibits
a judge from considering “financial best interest or financial
considerations or the potential financial impact on the minor or the
minor’s family if the minor does not terminate the pregnancy.” §
390.01114(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2023).
3
circuit court since the proceeding is a nonadversarial proceeding.”
Id. § 390.01114(6)(b)2.
Here, the circuit court correctly acknowledged that it cannot
waive the requirements of parental notice and consent where the
minor’s planned abortion would take place beyond the allowable
gestational age of the fetus....
...here because it rests on a legal error: a failure to appreciate that
Florida’s prohibition on abortions beyond six weeks of fetal
gestational age has yet to take effect.
Section four of Florida’s recent Heartbeat Protection Act, Ch.
2023-21, Laws of Fla., amends section 390.0111, Florida Statutes,
to generally prohibit physicians from knowingly performing or
inducing abortions where the fetus has reached a gestational age
of more than six weeks....
...23, Article I of the State Constitution
does not include a right to abortion; a
decision by the Florida Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthood v. State, SC2022-
1050, that allows the prohibition on
abortions after 15 weeks in s. 390.0111(1),
Florida Statutes, to remain in effect,
including a decision approving, in whole or
in part, the First District Court of Appeal’s
decision under review or a decision
dischar...
...III.
We now must determine the appropriate appellate remedy.
This appeal arrives in an unusual posture, as the circuit court
expressly declined to hold a full waiver hearing, did not consider
the full list of factors enumerated in section 390.01114(6)(c), and
did not make or decline to make the factual finding described in
that statute....
...on.
Given the under-developed record, we vacate the circuit
court’s order, remand this case for the court to hold a new and full
hearing, and direct the court to rule on the minor’s petition within
three business days after the remand. See § 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla.
Stat....
...(2023). Moreover, based on our review of the record, we direct
the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court to reassign the petition
forthwith to another circuit judge. The new judge’s ruling must be
based on a consideration of all the factors enumerated in section
390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2023), and the ruling must make
the factual finding described in that statute (whether or not, “by
clear and convincing evidence,” the minor is “sufficiently mature
to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy,” § 390.01114(6)(c)).
5
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
LAMBERT and PRATT, JJ., concur.
PRATT, J., concurs with opinion.
HARRIS, J., concurs in part with opinion.
6
Case No....
...best interests—to procure secret abortions that are hidden from
the very adults who superintend all their other life decisions. We
do not review these judicial waivers. The statute provides for
appellate review only of decisions not to grant waiver petitions, see
§ 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2023), and it expressly states that
“[a]n order authorizing a termination of pregnancy under this
subsection is not subject to appeal,” id. § 390.01114(6)(g)....
...gestational age of the fetus and whether the abortion can occur.
As the majority correctly notes, in order to grant the judicial
waiver of the statutory notice and consent requirements, the trial
court is required to consider the eight factors set forth in section
390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes. None of these factors includes
the gestational age of the fetus. In fact, this issue is not mentioned
one time in the “Procedure for Judicial Waiver” subsection. Section
390.0111, Florida Statutes, specifically deals with fetal gestational
age....
CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2012 WL 5898058
...By the opinion attached, the Second District Court of Appeal has reversed the order entered by the Honorable Harvey A. Kornstein, Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, Florida, in Case Number 2012-DP-000536-0000-00, dismissing a petition for a judicial waiver of parental notice under section 390.01114(4)(c), (d), Florida Statutes (2012)....
...The minor may consent to the performance or inducement of a termination of pregnancy without notice to a parent or guardian. WALLACE, Judge. Jane Doe, 1 a minor, challenges the final order dismissing her petition for judicial waiver of parental notification under section 390.01114(4)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (2012). We find no error in the circuit court’s determination that Doe failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it would not be in her best interest to notify a parent under section 390.01114(4)(d). However, we reverse the order of dismissal because the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Doe is not sufficiently mature to terminate her pregnancy under section 390.01114(4)(c)....
...After the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court promptly entered an order dismissing Doe’s petition, finding that she failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either of the grounds alleged. This appeal followed. II. THE APPLICABLE LAW Under section 390.01114(3)(a), a physician is required to notify a minor’s parent or legal guardian at least forty-eight hours in advance of performing an abortion on that minor....
...The statute excuses the notice requirement under five circumstances, but the pertinent provision applicable to this case provides for judicial waiver of the notice requirement in the event the minor successfully petitions a circuit court to waive that requirement. See § 390.01114(3)(b)(5)....
...s the victim of child abuse or sexual abuse inflicted by one or both of her *885 parents or her guardian”; or (3) “by clear and convincing evidence!,] that the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interest of the [minor].” §§ 390.01114(4)(c), (d)....
...*886 The numerous criteria considered by various courts in assessing whether a minor is sufficiently mature to determine whether to terminate her pregnancy, while perhaps a starting point, did not provide for consistent application of the bypass provision of section
390.01114. See, e.g., Doe,
973 So.2d at 552 . It is against this backdrop that the Florida legislature amended section
390.01114 in 2011 to provide a list of factors a trial court must consider when determining whether a minor is sufficiently mature....
...Ability to accept responsibility. f. Ability to assess both the immediate and long-range consequences of the minor’s choices. g. Ability to understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision. § 390.01114(4)(c)(l). In addition, the trial court must consider “[wjhether there may be any undue influence by another on the minor’s decision to have an abortion.” § 390.01114(4)(c)(2)....
...ress. Moreover, not only must the trial court consider these factors in its determination of maturity, its final order must include “factual findings and legal conclusions relating to the maturity of the minor” in view of these specific factors. § 390.01114(4)(e)(2)....
...EXAMINATION OF THE STATUTORY FACTORS The circuit court’s order contains findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact generally summarize Doe’s testimony at the hearing. Although the circuit court’s order contains a recital that it has considered each of the factors outlined in section 390.01114(4)(c), the order actually only addresses some of the statutory factors while ignoring others. In the following discussion, we will use the statutory factors as a framework to address the circuit court’s findings and conclusions in the light of the record. Section 390.01114-(4-)(c)(1)(a): The minor’s age....
...A fair reading of the record supports the conclusion that Doe’s emotional development and stability are appropriate to her age and circumstances. Nothing in the record suggests that she has any emotional problems or instability. The circuit court’s order fails to address this factor. Section 390.0111JfU)(c)(l)(d): The minor’s credibility and demeanor as a witness....
...The circuit court accurately summarized the substantial responsibilities assumed by Doe at home but did not otherwise consider this factor. The circuit court failed to note or otherwise consider Doe’s testimony about the steps she normally took to avoid the consumption of alcohol and participation in sexual relationships. Section 390.0111h.(k)(c)(l)(f): The minor’s ability to assess both the immediate and long-range consequences of the minor’s choices....
...ether to terminate her pregnancy). In assessing Doe’s judgment and decision-making, the circuit court simply failed to consider the substantial evidence of the maturity she displayed in understanding and addressing the consequences of her actions. Section 390.0111k(U)(o)(l)(g): The minor’s ability to understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision....
...However, the circuit court did not ask Doe for any details about her understanding of the risks of the available procedures and gave no hint that it considered Doe’s response inadequate. Thus neither Doe nor her counsel had an opportunity to address the issue further. Section 390.01111p(U)(c)(2): Whether there may be any undue influence by another on the minor’s decision to have an abortion....
...The circuit court’s failure to follow this court’s controlling precedent also constitutes an abuse of discretion. V. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s order, and Doe’s petition for judicial waiver of the parental notification required by section 390.01114 is deemed granted....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 161
...Wixtrom is concerned that J.D.S.’s guardian could have authorized an abortion of the fetus. Florida law provides safeguards to insure that a guardian does not act capriciously or cavalierly when considering the health of the incapacitated mother and fetus. For example, sections 390.0111(1) and (3), Florida Statutes, state that no abortion can be performed on a ward unless two physicians certify in writing that “to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the termination of pregnancy is necessary to save the life or pre...
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...,
have challenged an amendment to Florida’s abortion law requiring
24 hours to pass between the time a patient is informed of the
nature and risks of having an abortion and a physician’s
completion of the procedure. Ch. 2015–118, Laws of Fla.;
§ 390.0111(3), Fla....
...2
must be resolved in the State’s favor for purposes of deciding
Appellees’ summary judgment motion, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
The Woman’s Right to Know Act, § 390.0111(3), Fla....
...Stat.,
generally prohibits abortions unless the physician obtains
informed consent from a patient. In 2015, the Legislature amended
the Act to require a 24-hour period between the time a pregnant
woman receives the statutorily required informed consent
information and completion of the procedure. § 390.0111(3)(a)1,
Fla....
...2017) (describing and quoting the 24-hour
Law). The 24-hour Law has some exceptions. For example, a
physician can forego the 24-hour period if there is a medical
emergency, or if the patient is a victim of rape, incest, domestic
violence, or human trafficking. § 390.0111(3)(a)1.c....
...restrictive measures to be utilized to advance the interest.”
Uniquely treating abortions differently from other medical
procedures and failing to present evidence that the statute is the
least restrictive means to accomplish the purported goals of section
390.0111(3) renders the law unconstitutional....
...the abortion
procedure; “[t]he probable gestational age of the fetus, verified by
an ultrasound,” which is relevant to the nature and risks of the
procedure; and “[t]he medical risks to the woman and fetus of
carrying the pregnancy to term.” § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)a.-c., Fla....
...Stat.
The Act amends this pre-existing, abortion-specific informed
consent law to require that a patient make a separate, medically
necessary visit to her physician to receive exactly the same
information described above, and then delay her abortion by at
least 24 hours. § 390.0111(3)(a)1., Fla....
...Stat.; see also Gainesville
12
Woman Care,
210 So. 3d 1243, 1261 (Fla. 2017). Florida law
subjects no other medical procedure to a mandatory delay. 1
ANALYSIS
In Gainesville Woman Care, the court held that section
390.0111(3), Florida Statutes (2015), “implicates the Florida
Constitution’s express right of privacy” and, therefore, was subject
to strict scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional....
...The first is for a
woman who “presents to the physician a copy of a restraining
order, police report, medical record, or other court order or
documentation evidencing that she is obtaining the abortion
because she is a victim of rape, incest, domestic violence, or human
trafficking.” § 390.0111(3)(a)(1)c., Fla. Stat. This exception does
not apply to a woman who lacks documentation of these assaults.
The second exception is for a woman experiencing a “medical
emergency.” § 390.0111(3)(a), Fla. Stat. The term “medical
emergency” is undefined, but the statute specifies that a woman
may obtain care without delay only if “continuation of the
pregnancy would threaten [her] life.” § 390.0111(3)(b), Fla....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2017 WL 1242696, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 4535
ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT PER CURIAM. The 2015 amendment to Florida’s informed consent law for termination of pregnancies, section 390.0111(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, created a 24-hour wait *1142 ing period....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal
...ive Rights, New
York, New York, pro hac vice, for Appellee Medical Students for Choice.
ON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
PER CURIAM.
The 2015 amendment to Florida’s informed consent law for termination of
pregnancies, section 390.0111(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, created a 24-hour
waiting period....
CopyPublished | District Court, M.D. Florida | 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47102, 126 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1613, 2015 WL 1608827
...Hellwege asserts that this refusal violates federal and state law. (Id. at ¶¶32, 46-49). In particular, the Amended Complaint lists the following claims for relief: (I) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7; (II) Violation of Fla. Stat. §
381.0051 (5); 2 (III) Violation of Fla. Stat. §
390.0111 (8); 3 (IV) Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C....
...ghts Act to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, TFHC’s Motion is denied as to Counts IV and V. V. Counts II and III In Counts II and III of her Amended Complaint, Hellwege alleges violations of Fla. Stat. §
381.0051 (5) and Fla. Stat. *1314 §
390.0111 (8)....
...physician or other person from refusing to furnish any contraceptive or family planning service, supplies, or information for medical or religious reasons; and the physician or other person shall not be held liable for such refusal.” . Fla. Stat. § 390.0111 (8) states: "Nothing in this section shall require any hospital or any person to participate in the termination of a pregnancy, nor shall any hospital or any person be liable for such refusal....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
2022-69, § 4, Laws of Fla. (codified at section
390.0111(1), Florida Statutes (2022)). The parties
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Florida
...regulations on both pre and
postviability abortions. This includes current laws defining viability
and drawing the line at a certain number of weeks, §§
390.011(15),
.0111(1), Fla. Stat. (2023); those requiring a sonogram and
informed consent, §
390.0111(3), Fla. Stat. (2023); and those
prohibiting abortions postviability with limited exceptions. §§
390.0111(1)(a)-(c), .0112, Fla....
