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Florida Statute 390.011 - Full Text and Legal Analysis
Florida Statute 390.011 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
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The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XXIX
PUBLIC HEALTH
Chapter 390
TERMINATION OF PREGNANCIES
View Entire Chapter
390.011 Definitions.As used in this chapter, the term:
(1) “Abortion” means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus.
(2) “Abortion clinic” or “clinic” means any facility in which abortions are performed. The term does not include:
(a) A hospital; or
(b) A physician’s office, provided that the office is not used primarily for the performance of abortions.
(3) “Agency” means the Agency for Health Care Administration.
(4) “Born alive” means the complete expulsion or extraction from the mother of a human infant, at any stage of development, who, after such expulsion or extraction, breathes or has a beating heart, or definite and voluntary movement of muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, induced abortion, or other method.
(5) “Department” means the Department of Health.
(6) “Fatal fetal abnormality” means a terminal condition that, in reasonable medical judgment, regardless of the provision of life-saving medical treatment, is incompatible with life outside the womb and will result in death upon birth or imminently thereafter.
(7) “Gestation” means the development of a human embryo or fetus as calculated from the first day of the pregnant woman’s last menstrual period.
(8) “Hospital” means a facility as defined in s. 395.002(12) and licensed under chapter 395 and part II of chapter 408.
(9) “Medical abortion” means the administration or use of an abortion-inducing drug to induce an abortion.
(10) “Partial-birth abortion” means a termination of pregnancy in which the physician performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.
(11) “Physician” means a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 or a physician practicing medicine or osteopathic medicine in the employment of the United States.
1(12) “Reasonable medical judgment” means a medical judgment that would be made by a reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved.
1(13) “Standard medical measure” means the medical care that a physician would provide based on the particular facts of the pregnancy, the information available to the physician, and the technology reasonably available in a hospital, as defined in s. 395.002, with an obstetrical department, to preserve the life and health of the fetus, with or without temporary artificial life-sustaining support, if the fetus were born at the same stage of fetal development.
(14) “Trimester” means one of the following three distinct periods of time in the duration of a pregnancy:
(a) “First trimester,” which is the period of time from fertilization through the end of the 11th week of gestation.
(b) “Second trimester,” which is the period of time from the beginning of the 12th week of gestation through the end of the 23rd week of gestation.
(c) “Third trimester,” which is the period of time from the beginning of the 24th week of gestation through birth.
1(15) “Viable” or “viability” means the stage of fetal development when the life of a fetus is sustainable outside the womb through standard medical measures.
History.s. 1, ch. 78-382; s. 1, ch. 86-286; ss. 4, 5, ch. 88-97; s. 4, ch. 91-429; s. 4, ch. 97-151; s. 37, ch. 97-264; s. 3, ch. 98-1; s. 14, ch. 2007-230; s. 1, ch. 2013-121; s. 1, ch. 2014-137; s. 1, ch. 2016-150; s. 6, ch. 2021-112; s. 37, ch. 2022-4; s. 3, ch. 2022-69.
1Note.

A. Section 5, ch. 2014-137, provides:

“Severability and reversion.

“(1) If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.

“(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), if s. 390.01112, Florida Statutes, is held unconstitutional and severed by a court having jurisdiction, the amendments made by this act to s. 390.011, Florida Statutes, and subsections (4), (10), and (13) of s. 390.0111, Florida Statutes, will be repealed and will revert to the law as it existed on January 1, 2014.”

B. Section 9, ch. 2023-21, provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in this act and except for this section, which shall take effect upon this act becoming a law, this act shall take effect 30 days after any of the following occurs: a decision by the Florida Supreme Court holding that the right to privacy enshrined in s. 23, Article I of the State Constitution does not include a right to abortion; a decision by the Florida Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. State, SC2022-1050, that allows the prohibition on abortions after 15 weeks in s. 390.0111(1), Florida Statutes, to remain in effect, including a decision approving, in whole or in part, the First District Court of Appeal’s decision under review or a decision discharging jurisdiction; an amendment to the State Constitution clarifying that s. 23, Article I of the State Constitution does not include a right to abortion; or a decision from the Florida Supreme Court after March 7, 2023, receding, in whole or in part, from In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989), North Fla. Women’s Health v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003), or Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017).”

C. The contingency in s. 9, ch. 2023-21, which occurred pursuant to the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida vs. State of Florida, Florida Supreme Court, SC2002-1050 (Fla. 2024), repeals s. 390.01112, effective 30 days after April 1, 2024, the date of the decision. The decision was not final until the 15-day period for filing a motion for rehearing passed per Rule 9.330, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Division of Law Revision confirmed with the office of the Florida Supreme Court on April 17, 2024, that no motion for rehearing had been filed. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida vs. State of Florida, became effective May 1, 2024. Section 390.011 was not affected by s. 9, ch. 2023-21. Subsections (12), (13), and (15) are repealed by s. 5, ch. 2014-137, contingent upon s. 390.01112 being held unconstitutional, but not technically upon that section being repealed.

F.S. 390.011 on Google Scholar

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Amendments to 390.011


Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 390.011

Total Results: 8  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

Cited 8 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1998 WL 1070946

...The State also contends that the Act is not unconstitutionally vague because the only way that a physician can be held criminally liable is if he knowingly performs the partial birth abortion. B. Summary of the Act The Act prohibits physicians from "knowingly perform[ing] a partial-birth abortion." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(a). A "partial-birth abortion" is defined as the "termination of a pregnancy in which the physician performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5). Violation of the Act carries both criminal and civil penalties. Under the Act "any person who willfully performs, or actively participates in" a partial-birth abortion commits a felony in the third degree. FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(10)(a)....
...The Act excepts from its criminal prohibition only those "partial-birth abortions" that are "necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury, provided that no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(c). Further, the Act creates a civil cause of action for the father of the fetus and for the maternal grandparents of the fetus if the mother is a minor. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(11)(a). The relief that can be obtained in such a civil action includes monetary damages for "all injuries, psychological and physical" and "damages equal to three times the cost of the partial-birth abortion." FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(11)(b). Finally, FLA.STAT. § 390.0111(5)(b) of the Act provides that "a woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed" cannot be prosecuted for a conspiracy to violate the partial-birth abortion ban but the Act does not exempt the woman from civil liability. FLA. STAT. § 390.0111(11)....
...g its legitimate ends. 505 U.S., at 876, 112 S.Ct., at 2820. Defendants contend that the Act does not place an undue burden on women seeking an abortion because it is narrowly tailored to proscribe only the intact D & X procedure. However, FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5)(a) of the Act is not narrowly tailored. It bans "partial-birth abortions" at all stages of pregnancy except where it is "necessary to save the life of the mother." FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5). The Act proscribes procedures in which "the physician performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5)....
...Here, the only medical exception to the Act is where a "partial-birth abortion ... is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, illness, or injury, provided that no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose." FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5)(c)....
...Subsection 4 states that "the woman's life and health shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the concern for the life *1157 and health of the fetus." Defendants' contention is incorrect because subsection 4 would conflict with subsection 5. [4] Under FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5)(c), the life exception allows a "partial-birth abortion" only where "no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose." During the post-viability stage, the Act constitutes an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain a safe ab...
...Act. HB 1227 defines a "partial-birth abortion" as a termination of pregnancy in which the physician performing the termination of pregnancy partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery. FLA.STAT. § 390.011(5)....
...becomes viable. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for a Permanent Injunction is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendants are prohibited from enforcing FLA.STAT. §§ 390.0111(5), 390.0111(11), and 390.011(5) (as renumbered by the Act)....
...[T]his point may differ with each pregnancy ..." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388-89, 99 S.Ct. 675, 682, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). [2] Specifically, the Act amends Florida's Statutes governing abortion by renumbering and amending Florida Statutes § 390.001 (as § 390.0111), renumbering Florida Statutes § 390.002 (as § 390.0112), and amending Florida Statutes § 390.011 as renumbered by the Act, §§ 390.0111(5), 390.0111(11), and 390.011(5) of the Florida Statutes deal with the prohibition of the performance of "partial-birth" abortions....
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Florida Women's Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 478 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Fla. 1979).

Cited 6 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10065

...men of childbearing age who are or may become pregnant and who desire to terminate their pregnancies. The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief permanently enjoining the enforcement of the Florida Abortion Clinic Law, Chapter 78-382, Laws of Florida, F.S. 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.), and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Florida Administration Code, Chapter 10D-72....
...mester pregnancy terminations in the state of Florida, and (3) all pregnant females who *235 desire a first trimester pregnancy termination in the state of Florida. The sole issue presently before the Court for resolution is whether Florida Statutes 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.) and the rules promulgated thereunder by the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 100-72, constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon the plaintiff's right of privacy....
...Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); and Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 476, 50 L.Ed.2d 579 (1976). The Abortion Clinics Law, F.S. 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.) requires all facilities in which pregnancy terminations are performed (other than hospitals and doctors' offices not primarily used for pregnancy terminations) to apply for and to be licensed by the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services....
...State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. . . . Id. at 162-164, 93 S.Ct. at 731-732. This Court concludes, as did the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, supra , that the rules implementing Florida Statutes 390.011-390.021 "sweep too broadly." The rules may be constitutionally permissible as applied to facilities performing second and third trimester pregnancy terminations based upon either (a) the state's compelling interest in the health and welfare o...
...termination. Thus, the Court holds that Chapter 10D-72 of the Florida Administrative Code is unconstitutional and the defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing them. The Florida Abortion Clinic Law, Chapter 78-382, Laws of Florida, F.S. 390.011-390.021 (1978 Supp.) does not, however, attempt to regulate first trimester pregnancy terminations with the exception of requiring facilities performing such procedures to be licensed....
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Florida Women's Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Smith, 536 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1982).

Cited 4 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13148

...the statute and the regulations in their amended form. The statute precludes abortion clinics ["any facility in which abortions are performed, other than a hospital or physician's office which is not used primarily for the performance of abortions," section 390.011(2)] from operating without a license issued by HRS....
...tatute will be upheld and will remain in full force and effect. b) Rule 10D-72.11; c) Rule 10D-72.12(2)(3); d) Rule 10D-72.14; e) Rule 10D-72.15; f) Rule 10D-72.16 5) That costs will be taxed in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. APPENDIX A 390.011 Definitions As used in this act: (1) "Abortion" means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus....
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OB/GYN Specialists of the Palm Beaches, P.A. v. Mejia, 134 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).

Cited 4 times | Published | Florida 4th District Court of Appeal | 2014 WL 51896, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 148

...om making an informed decision as to whether they should terminate the pregnancy. Prior to trial, defendants sought to preclude plaintiffs from presenting any evidence or argument that the Level II ultrasound caused any damages. The defendants cited section 390.0111, Florida Statutes, which, in pertinent part, provides: (1) TERMINATION IN THIRD TRIMESTER; WHEN ALLOWED.— No termination of pregnancy shall be performed on any human being in the third trimester of pregnancy unless: (a) Two physici...
...ealth of the pregnant woman; or (b) The physician certifies in writing to the medical necessity for legitimate emergency medical procedures for termination of pregnancy in the third trimester, and another physician is not available for consultation. § 390.0111(1), Fla....
...Plaintiffs, however, represented that using the date of conception, the mother was not in her third trimester when the Level II ultrasound was performed. The trial court ruled that any reference or evidence regarding Florida’s prohibition against third trimester abortions under section 390.0111, as applied to the Level II ultrasound, 2 was irrelevant....
...The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the mother could have obtained a legal abortion in another state. Following the adverse jury verdict and final judgment ultimately rendered against the defendants, this timely appeal was taken. On appeal, defendants assert that the trial court incorrectly ruled section 390.0111 was irrelevant. They maintain that the mother could not have obtained an abortion in Florida as of the date of the Level II ultrasound, arguing that the term “third trimester” as used in section 390.0111, should be calculated using the gestational age....
...Accordingly, whether the mother could have lawfully obtained an abortion at the *1088 time the Level II ultrasound was performed was certainly relevant to establish causation, or lack thereof. Chapter 390’s definition section defines “third trimester” as “the weeks of pregnancy after the 24th week of pregnancy.” § 390.011(8), Fla....
...2481 , 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the Supreme Court in Roe also measured the weeks of pregnancy and trimesters by the fetus’s gestational age. Id. Consequently, we hold that the term “third trimester” as used section 390.0111 must also be interpreted using gestational age in light of Roe’s trimester viability analysis. Although plaintiffs suggest that this court calculate “weeks of pregnancy” as used in section 390.011(8)’s definition of “third trimester” from the date of conception, in doing so they also concede that the fetus’s date of conception in this case is unknown, and, in most cases, cannot be reliably ascertained....
...1st DCA 1988), the First District upheld a ruling by the State Board of Medicine revoking a doctor’s license after he miscalculated the gestational age of the fetus and performed an abortion during the last trimester of the patient’s pregnancy. To adopt plaintiffs’ view that “third trimester” as used in section 390.0111 should be determined using the date of conception would hereafter require clinicians to calculate the “weeks of pregnancy” based on indiscernible facts and make estimates of fetal age in a manner contrary to established medical p...
...Even if we were to agree that the statute should be interpreted to measure pregnancy from the alleged time of conception, thereby allowing the mother nearly two weeks after the June 30 Level II ultrasound to obtain a lawful abortion under Florida law, the existence of section 390.0111 would still be relevant to whether the mother could have logistically obtained an abortion in Florida before the statutory deadline....
...issue of causation, those considerations do not constitute valid reasons for excluding evidence that third trimester abortions are generally illegal in Florida. In light of the trial court’s failure to permit the jury to consider the relevance of section 390.0111 to the plaintiffs’ specific situation, leading to the exclusion of other relevant evidence on that factual issue, a new trial on the issue of liability and causation is required....
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Jacksonville Clergy Consultation Serv., Inc. v. Martinez, 696 F. Supp. 1445 (M.D. Fla. 1988).

Cited 2 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11088, 1988 WL 103484

...iders necessary relating to the confidentiality of proceedings, anonymity of petitioners and expeditiousness of judicial proceedings, AND until further order of this Court. *1450 Ch. 88-97 1988 REGULAR SESSION APPENDIX 1 Section 5. Subsection (2) of section 390.011, Florida Statutes, and sections 390.012, 390.013, 390.014, 390.015, 390.016, 390.017, 390.018, 390.019, and 390.021, Florida Statutes, are repealed on October 1, 1998, and shall be reviewed by the Legislature pursuant to s....
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State v. Ashley, 670 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Cited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1996 WL 124657

...S DURING THE THIRD TRIMESTER OF PREGNANCY? 2. IF SO, MAY SHE BE CHARGED WITH MANSLAUGHTER OR THIRD-DEGREE MURDER, THE UNDERLYING PREDICATE FELONY BEING ABORTION OR ATTEMPTED ABORTION? Affirmed. THREADGILL, C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 390.011(6), Florida Statutes (1993), defines the "third trimester" as the weeks after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy....
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In Re: Jane Doe Vs (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal

...vacate it and remand for a new hearing. I. On August 29, 2023, the minor filed her petition in the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. That same day, the court set the petition for a hearing and appointed counsel for her. 1 1 Consistent with section 390.01116, Florida Statutes (2023), and Rule 9.147(f) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, we The court held the hearing on August 31, 2023....
...make her pregnancy high-risk. At this point, the court paused its questioning of the minor, stating, “I have a real problem. And this is nothing about you. . . . There is a new state law that went into effect July 1st. . . . [I]t was enacted under Florida Statute 390.011 [sic], and it prevents me from allowing you to obtain ....
...The Florida Parental Notice of and Consent for Abortion Act generally prohibits the performance or induction of abortions on pregnant minors unless their parents or legal guardians are notified of the abortion and have provided written informed consent to the abortion. See § 390.01114(3), (4)(a), (5)(a), Fla....
...Stat. (2023). These statutory requirements of parental notice and consent may be waived upon a minor’s petition if a court “finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. § 390.01114(6)(c)....
...2 We note that the judicial waiver statute expressly prohibits a judge from considering “financial best interest or financial considerations or the potential financial impact on the minor or the minor’s family if the minor does not terminate the pregnancy.” § 390.01114(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2023). 3 circuit court since the proceeding is a nonadversarial proceeding.” Id. § 390.01114(6)(b)2. Here, the circuit court correctly acknowledged that it cannot waive the requirements of parental notice and consent where the minor’s planned abortion would take place beyond the allowable gestational age of the fetus....
...here because it rests on a legal error: a failure to appreciate that Florida’s prohibition on abortions beyond six weeks of fetal gestational age has yet to take effect. Section four of Florida’s recent Heartbeat Protection Act, Ch. 2023-21, Laws of Fla., amends section 390.0111, Florida Statutes, to generally prohibit physicians from knowingly performing or inducing abortions where the fetus has reached a gestational age of more than six weeks....
...23, Article I of the State Constitution does not include a right to abortion; a decision by the Florida Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. State, SC2022- 1050, that allows the prohibition on abortions after 15 weeks in s. 390.0111(1), Florida Statutes, to remain in effect, including a decision approving, in whole or in part, the First District Court of Appeal’s decision under review or a decision dischar...
...III. We now must determine the appropriate appellate remedy. This appeal arrives in an unusual posture, as the circuit court expressly declined to hold a full waiver hearing, did not consider the full list of factors enumerated in section 390.01114(6)(c), and did not make or decline to make the factual finding described in that statute....
...on. Given the under-developed record, we vacate the circuit court’s order, remand this case for the court to hold a new and full hearing, and direct the court to rule on the minor’s petition within three business days after the remand. See § 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat....
...(2023). Moreover, based on our review of the record, we direct the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court to reassign the petition forthwith to another circuit judge. The new judge’s ruling must be based on a consideration of all the factors enumerated in section 390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2023), and the ruling must make the factual finding described in that statute (whether or not, “by clear and convincing evidence,” the minor is “sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy,” § 390.01114(6)(c)). 5 VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. LAMBERT and PRATT, JJ., concur. PRATT, J., concurs with opinion. HARRIS, J., concurs in part with opinion. 6 Case No....
...best interests—to procure secret abortions that are hidden from the very adults who superintend all their other life decisions. We do not review these judicial waivers. The statute provides for appellate review only of decisions not to grant waiver petitions, see § 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2023), and it expressly states that “[a]n order authorizing a termination of pregnancy under this subsection is not subject to appeal,” id. § 390.01114(6)(g)....
...gestational age of the fetus and whether the abortion can occur. As the majority correctly notes, in order to grant the judicial waiver of the statutory notice and consent requirements, the trial court is required to consider the eight factors set forth in section 390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes. None of these factors includes the gestational age of the fetus. In fact, this issue is not mentioned one time in the “Procedure for Judicial Waiver” subsection. Section 390.0111, Florida Statutes, specifically deals with fetal gestational age....
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Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Florida v. Philip, 194 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (N.D. Fla. 2016).

Published | District Court, N.D. Florida | 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86251

“trimester definition” — is Florida Statutes § 390.011(12)(a). It defines the trimesters of a pregnancy

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