Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...In an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, appellees sought to have their property reclassified and taxed agricultural for the years 1973 and 1974. Final judgment was entered in their favor, based on a finding that their land was denied agricultural classification pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) and was assessed without due regard to the dictates of Section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Because the trial court initially and directly ruled on the validity of a state statute we have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1). While we agree with the trial court that appellees' land was not assessed in conformity with Section 193.011, we cannot agree that Section 193.461(3) is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to these appellees, and reverse the trial court's judgment to the extent that it so holds....

...* * * * * * (3)(b) Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural. "Bona fide agricultural purposes" means good faith commercial agricultural use of the land. .. . Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...provided the use is primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In accord see Smith v. Parrish, 262 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) and Smith v. Ring, 250 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). In 1972, Section 193.461 was substantially modified by Chapter 72-181, Laws of Florida (1972)....

...gricultural use is in fact a bona fide "commercial" use. Such a motive would certainly be one of the "other factors as may ... become applicable" within the contemplation of subsection (7) of the aforequoted factors listed under subsection (3)(b) of Section 193.461, supra. For the reasons expressed above, we find Section 193.461(3)(b) constitutionally sound....

...illing, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices; (6) Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and conditions of the lease; and (7) Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1975).

...Martin of Martin & Martin, Lakeland, for appellants. Ernest J. Rice of Lowndes, Peirsol, Drosdick & Doster, Orlando, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Polk County, which entered a final judgment declaring Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional....

...Rhoden reclassified land owned by appellee as non-agricultural by denying appellee's application for an agricultural assessment for the year 1973. This determination by the Tax Assessor resulted in a reassessment of the subject property and a substantial increase in appellee's tax liability. Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: "Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes....

...Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted." It was upon the authority of this rebuttable statutory presumption that the Tax Assessor based his action. "Purchase price paid" is set forth by Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, [1] as one of seven criteria to be considered by tax assessors in making their determination as to whether property qualifies as agricultural for purposes of the lower tax assessment. Presumably evidence tending to confirm the agricultural nature of assessable land, i.e. "special circumstances", should conform to the other six statutory considerations if the presumption established by Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, is to be overcome. In the instant case, the circuit court found Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, to be unconstitutional as (1) an unlawful delegation of legislative authority without adequate standards and guidelines and (2) a contravention of the constitutional requirement that assessment be made solely on the "basis of character or use". The court also concluded that the land in question was on January 1, 1973 — the relevant date for purposes of classification according to use — being used for bona fide agricultural purposes as defined by Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and therefore it qualified for the lower agricultural tax rate. Appellant Rhoden was ordered to make his assessment reflect this determination. We are not persuaded that Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, constitutes an unconstitutional effort to delegate legislative authority without proper guidelines. The phrase "special circumstances", indicating what must be shown in order to overcome the statutory presumption at issue, should be read in pari materia with Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and the seven criteria for determination of taxable status enumerated therein....

...1972), "[T]here is no deprivation of a property right in denying special tax treatment to this property owner since there is no `right' to the special treatment in the first instance." In Rainey , this Court went on to uphold as a valid exercise of the State's police power Section 193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutes, which authorized county agricultural boards to reclassify lands as non-agricultural when such property is bounded by urban or metropolitan development on two or more sides and when such boards find that contin...

...uidity, degree and level of management, etc. The rational presumption imposed by the Legislature is that land purchased for three or more times its assessed agricultural value is not intended to be put to "good faith commercial agricultural use" per Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, supra....

...Tax assessors, and courts which review their work, can scrutinize the then status of property laid before them for evidence of "special circumstances" suggesting that the agricultural use will continue. In this effort, the six other statutory considerations set forth in Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes will be most significant....

...sment placed on the land creates a red flag for *425 the assessor to re-evaluate the classification of such land as agricultural and places the burden upon the taxpayer to come forward with evidence of "special circumstances" within the framework of Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, to establish that the land continues to be used for "bona fide agricultural purposes"....

...a bona fide forestry operation entitling the land to an agricultural classification for tax assessment purposes?" (which would result in a lower tax) The statutes in question are: Fla. Stat. § 193.071 (1969), F.S.A. [formerly § 193.11 (1967)], and § 193.461 (1969) [formerly § 193.201 (1967)] (popularly referred to as *667 the "Green Belt" law, which would seem to encourage and aid agricultural use of lands in an engulfing urban world)....

...or other real estate development. Provided, agricultural purposes shall include only lands being used in a bona fide farming, pasture, grove or forestry operation by the lessee or owner, or some person in their employ." (Emphasis supplied) Sections 193.461(3) and 193.461(5) provide, inter alia, as follows: "(3) * * * All lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be zoned agricultural....

...Blake, 351 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), on the same point of law. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We quash the decision of the district court. This is an agricultural classification case pertaining to the classification under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) [1] of certain lands in Broward County for the years 1974 and 1975....

...The landowners brought actions for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to have their property classified and taxed as agricultural for 1974 and 1975. The trial court denied the relief sought and upheld the nonagricultural classification. The trial court found that the case was primarily controlled by section 193.461(4)(c) because there was a sale of land at a price more than three times the agricultural assessment and because the landowners had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. In addition, the trial court found that the land had been rezoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the owner as per section 193.461(4)(a)3. Finally, the trial court applied the criteria set forth in section 193.461(3)(b) *1125 and found that the landowners had not shown that the land was primarily being used for bona fide agricultural purposes. The district court reversed. It held that section 193.461(4)(c) applied only to completed sales of realty and that the landowners, while having numerous contracts to sell the land, had not in fact sold the land....

...Finally, the district court held that the evidence failed to support the trial court's finding that the land in question was not being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. The petitioners raise three issues on this appeal. First, they contend that the district court erred when it rejected the application of section 193.461(4)(c) to this case....

...ontracts to sell. In the instant case, there was no completed sale. The next point raised by petitioners concerns the issue left undecided by this court in Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1979). There, the constitutionality of section 193.461(4)(a)3 was brought up but because of the particular facts of that case the constitutional question was not addressed....

...hat has been rezoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the owner. The language is mandatory and "is a clear legislative directive to the property appraisers of the state." 366 So.2d at 1175 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Unlike the above-mentioned section 193.461(4)(c) which allows the landowner to present evidence in opposition to the appraiser's reclassification, section 193.461(4)(a)3 is in the form of a mandatory presumption....

...366 So.2d at 1174 (emphasis supplied). Quite clearly, the statute proscribes speculative rezoning and hence is rationally related to the overall greenbelt purpose. Moreover, this reasoning is not inconsistent with the view expressed in Bass where the related section 193.461(4)(a)4 was declared unconstitutional....

...See also Lauderdale v. Blake, 351 So.2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Or, as noted in Harbor Ventures, "If the greenbelt law and the decisions interpreting it have established actual use of land as the general test for entitlement to the agricultural assessment, then clearly section 193.461(4)(a)3 constitutes a legislatively-mandated exception to that test." 366 So.2d at 1175 (Boyd, J., dissenting)....

...Therefore, the instant section is rationally related to the legislative purpose and hence is proper. As to the final prong of the test, the landowner has no right of rebuttal to the mandatory reclassification of the subject property. This is not fatal, however, because the instant statute can be read in pari materia with section 193.461(3)(b)....

...to the legitimate state goal of minimizing and discouraging speculative rezoning. Harbor Ventures, 366 So.2d at 1174. The treatment afforded the instant landowners are not so disparate from others as to be wholly arbitrary. We hold, therefore, that section 193.461(4)(a)3, applying to a situation where land zoned agricultural is changed to a nonagricultural zoning at the request of its owner, is constitutional and was proper as applied to the facts of this case....

...Accordingly, we quash the decision of the district court and instruct it to enter an order affirming the final judgment of the trial court. It is so ordered. ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. BOYD, C.J., dissents. NOTES [1] The trial involved the application of sections 193.461(3)(b), (4)(a)3, and (4)(c). These statutes provide in relevant part as follows: 193.461 Agricultural lands; classification and assessment....

...or the year 1970. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the members of the Agricultural Zoning Board for Orange County, Florida, on 4 December 1970. The complaint alleged that the Board refused to zone as agricultural land under the terms of Sec. 193.461, F.S....

...At the time of the trial the land was being offered for $4,000 per acre. The appellants argue that the plaintiffs' "use" of the land is not for agricultural purposes, but for the realization of a gain on resale and, therefore, such "use" disqualifies the land for agricultural zoning under the terms of Section 193.461, F.S....

...ham or deception. See Sapp v. Conrad, Fla.App. 1970, 240 So.2d 884, 889 (dissent) and Smith v. Ring, supra. In the present case the appellants concede that the use being made of the land by the tenant is an agricultural use as the same is defined by Section 193.461(5), F.S....

...Deitrich, of Dye, Cleary, Scott, Deitrich & Price, Bradenton, for plaintiffs-appellants. Robert E. Knowles and Clifford L. Walters, III of Knowles, Blalock, Coleman & Landers; and E.N. Fay, Jr., of Mann & Fay, Bradenton, for defendants-appellees. HATCHETT, Justice. We are asked to determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), is unconstitutional because it sets up an irrebuttable presumption that land rezoned non-agricultural at the request of its owners will not be used for a bona fide agricultural purpose....

...The sole reason for the denial of agricultural classification and assessment was the rezoning of the land at the request of its owners. Because of the denial of the *1174 agricultural classification and assessment, appellants' land was assessed at a higher value than adjacent land devoted to the same use. Appellants attack section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), alleging that it denies equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. The trial judge upheld the constitutionality of the statute. We must initially determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1973), applies where land is rezoned from one non-agricultural use to another non-agricultural use....

...be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use. [Emphasis added.] In interpreting these provisions, we have held that the policy of the Greenbelt law and its 1972 amendments is to promote agricultural use of land. Section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), provides: The assessor shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural: ......

...We believe this interpretation is in compliance with our duty to construe tax statutes in favor of taxpayers where an ambiguity may exist. Maas Brothers Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1967); Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We hold that section 193.461(4)(a)3....

...action consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion. BOYD, Justice, dissenting. It seems to me that the majority opinion in effect rewrites section 193.461(4)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1973), in order to avoid the constitutional issue....

...The majority is correct in stating that this Court has in the past held that actual use should be the basic test in interpreting the provisions of the greenbelt law. In Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976), the issue was whether the rebuttable presumption established by Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973) was reasonable in view of the policy objectives of the statute....

...It is a clear legislative directive to the property appraisers of the state. If the greenbelt law and the decisions interpreting it have established actual use of land as the general test for entitlement to the agricultural assessment, then clearly section 193.461(4)(a)(3) constitutes a legislatively-mandated exception to that test....

...ith mathematical precision. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 813, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 2499, 49 L.Ed.2d 200, 233 (1976); Hiers v. Mitchell, 95 Fla. 345, 116 So. 81 (1928). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that section 193.461(4)(a)(3) is applicable to this case and is constitutional....

...Wood, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants. Parker D. Thomson and Susan B. Werth of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for appellee. SUNDBERG, Justice. Appellants appeal to this Court following a final judgment of the Circuit Court for St. Lucie County, Florida, declaring Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional....

...zing lease and was exclusively devoted to agricultural activity. In 1971 and 1972, appellee's land was classified as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes. In 1972, the legislature enacted Chapter 72-181, Section 1, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 193.461(4)(a) to read: *480 The assessor shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural......

...nt of this law. The effective date of Chapter 72-181, Laws of Florida, was July 1, 1972, and it applies to ad valorem taxes levied after December 31, 1972. In September, 1972, appellee filed a subdivision plat for a portion of its land. Relying upon Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes, appellant James W....

...platted land for the tax year 1973. In June, 1973, appellee filed subdivision plats on its remaining lands. For the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, the property appraiser denied an agricultural tax classification for appellee's parcels again relying on Section 193.461(4)(a)4....

...In 1974, 1975, and 1976, the Board of Tax Adjustment upheld the denial of an agricultural tax classification. Beginning in 1974, appellee filed four suits challenging the annual denial of an agricultural tax classification and attacking the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(a), as amended....

...of both the Florida and Federal Constitution; and (3) it conflicted with Section 195.062, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellee's cases were consolidated and summary judgment was entered in its favor. In its summary judgment, the trial court found that Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional because it violates due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that land for which the owner has recorded a subdivision plat is nonagricultural....

...rcels, are declared illegal, erroneous, invalid and void. The levy of such taxes is set aside and Defendants are enjoined from any collection thereof. For the reasons hereinafter expressed, we conclude that the circuit judge was correct in declaring Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), to be unconstitutional. The first question for our consideration is whether Section 193.461(4)(a)4, which requires the property appraiser to reclassify as nonagricultural land upon which the owner has recorded a subdivision plat, is repugnant to Article VII, Section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution....

...Classification of land for ad valorem tax purposes is a matter committed to the legislature. It is separate from and precedes the assessment of land on the basis of character or use, which is the domain of the property appraiser based on statutory guidelines. As evidenced by Section 193.461(3)(b) and (6)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), the distinction between classification and assessment is observed in the legislative enactments which implement Article VII, Section 4(a), Florida Constitution....

...the standards used in subsection (3)(b) to determine its classification. In Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976), we elucidated this distinction between classification and assessment. There, we rejected an argument that Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), impermissibly impinges upon the constitutionally authorized assessment under Article VII, Section 4(a), Florida Constitution....

...That statute creates a rebuttable presumption that land which is purchased for more than three times its appraised agricultural value is not used primarily for commercial agricultural purposes, which use is a prerequisite to an agricultural classification. The Circuit Court of Polk County, Florida, declared Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1975), unconstitutional as a violation of the requirement in Article VII, Section 4(a), that assessment be made solely on the basis of character or use....

...d. In Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1972), we sustained a legislative enactment which classifies land as nonagricultural according to criteria completely unrelated to the actual use of the taxpayer's property. The statute at issue in Rainey, Section 193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1973), [2] conferred upon county agricultural zoning boards the authority to deny an agricultural classification if the property was bounded by urban or metropolitan development on two or more sides and the board found that continued use of the property for agricultural purposes would deter orderly community expansion. Section 193.461(4)(b) was sustained due, in part, to our determination that Article VII, Section 4(a), is permissive rather than mandatory; that it empowers the legislature to remove the favored treatment of agricultural property....

...provided the use is primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In accord see Smith v. Parrish, 262 So.2d 237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) and Smith v. Ring, 250 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). In 1972, Section 193.461 was substantially modified by Chapter 72-181, Laws of Florida (1972)....

...However, as evidenced by subsection (3)(b) of the statute, "use" is still the guidepost in classifying land . .. . 354 So.2d at 370. Based upon our examination of these statutes, we concluded that "[a]gricultural use is now and always has been the test [in classifying land]" under Section 193.461(3)....

...However, the above quote from Tuck is somewhat misleading in that we failed to distinguish the single instance considered by this Court prior to Tuck wherein the legislature chose not to base agricultural classification upon the "use" standard. In Rainey v. Nelson, supra, we sustained the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1973), which permits county agricultural zoning boards to deny an agricultural classification if the prescribed statutory criteria are satisfied, irrespective of the taxpayer's continued agricultural use of the subject property. [3] Appellee next contends that Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), deprives it of due process of law in that: (1) the statute is arbitrary, unreasonable and not reasonably related to a valid legislative purpose; and (2) it creates an impermissible irrebuttable presump...

...t the platted land is not presently being used for good faith commercial agricultural purposes). This is purportedly contrary to the opinion of this Court in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., supra. The circuit court based its invalidation of Section 193.461(4)(a)4 on the second ground....

...Appellee argues that the actual (present) use of its land on the assessment date, rather than the use which it intends to make of the property at some future date, is determinative of whether it should have received an agricultural classification. Because Section 193.461(4)(a)4 creates an irrebuttable presumption that property upon which a subdivision plat has been filed is presently being used for nonagricultural purposes, argues appellee, the enactment effects a denial of due process. Appellee points to the stipulation between itself and appellants that the subject property constitutes agricultural land as defined by Section 193.461(3)(b), supra, and that the sole basis for its reclassification is the filing of a subdivision plat....

...d to an agricultural classification. Appellants, on the other hand, argue that the recording of a plat constitutes a clear signal of a change in the present use of the property from agricultural to nonagricultural. Consequently, the fact presumed by Section 193.461(4)(a)4, that lands within its ambit are in fact being utilized for nonagricultural purposes, is rationally related to the fact proved (that platting has occurred). Appellants alternatively point to the decision of the Court in Rainey v. Nelson, supra, wherein, by sustaining the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1973), we implicitly recognized that the legislature may classify property according to criteria which are unrelated to its present physical use. Consequently, argue appellants, the legislature is free to define nonagricultural property in the manner accomplished by Section 193.461(4)(a)4 even if this definition renders the existence of present agricultural use immaterial to the classification. Appellee submits that although a valid legislative purpose exists which justifies the employment of a standard unrelated to present agricultural use in Section 193.461(4)(b), because there is no similar justification for applying a nonuse standard to subdividing property owners, subsection (4)(a)4 effects a denial of equal protection. It is clear that Section 193.461(4)(a)4 constitutes an attempt by the legislature to balance competing State policies with regard to agriculture on the one hand and taxation on the other....

...Schuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1965). The legislature has poised the balance between these interests by generally providing that only property which is primarily devoted to a good faith commercial agricultural use shall be entitled to preferential treatment. See Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Croker, 51 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.1931); Solary v. Hewlett, 18 Fla. 756 (1882). Cf. Anderson Mill & Lumber Company v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931). In the case before us, we are persuaded that the legislature was attempting, through the enactment of Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), to preclude preferential ad valorem tax treatment for property which is not being used primarily for good faith commercial agricultural purposes....

...ified as agricultural based upon its use consistent with that classification has, by virtue of the more filing of a subdivision plat, been converted to a present nonagricultural use. Because this presumption is irrebuttable, the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(a)4 under the Due Process Clause must be measured by determining (1) whether the concern of the legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid; (2) whether there was a reaso...

...2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975); Gallie v. Wainwright, 362 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1978). [4] As we have indicated, the legislative desire to extend preferential tax treatment only to those individuals who are in fact utilizing their property for agricultural purposes is reasonable. However, Section 193.461(4)(a)4 is simply not rationally related to the achievement of that goal....

...e owner of land previously denominated as agricultural has acquired the property for a price which is three or more times its agriculturally assessed value. Yet in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., supra, we sustained the constitutionality of Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973), which creates a presumption of nonagricultural use upon proof that this purchase price criterion has been met....

...Consequently, subsection (4)(c) of *485 Chapter 193 is in fact reasonably related to the legislative goal of granting preferential tax treatment only to property which is in fact being utilized for agricultural purposes as of the date of assessment. The failure of Section 193.461(4)(a)4 to contain a similar curative provision renders its test for eligibility for agricultural classification one of intended future use, rather than actual agricultural use as of the assessment date....

...It is no more arduous a task for the property appraiser to permit the property owner of platted land to submit evidence of continued agricultural use than it is to receive, as he does, similar evidence from the individual who has purchased property for more than three times its agriculturally assessed value. Consequently, Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), fails to satisfy the third prong of the due process test. Appellants suggest that even if Section 193.461(4)(a)4 renders present agricultural use immaterial to the classification we must sustain the enactment because of our decision in Rainey v....

...State, 354 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1978); State v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1958); Kelly v. Blackburn, 95 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1957); and Richey v. Wells, 123 Fla. 284, 166 So. 817 (1936). The requisite valid and substantial reason was present with regard to Section 193.461(4)(b), which we reviewed in Rainey, supra....

...Because, as we have indicated, the act of platting, without more, is indicative only of the use which the taxpayer intends to make of the platted land in the future and those in appellee's class have been unreasonably singled out for classification under this disparate standard, we find that Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), effects a denial of equal protection of the law. Due to our finding that Section 193.461(4)(a)4 is unconstitutional it is unnecessary for us to address the question of its purported conflict with Section 195.062, Florida Statutes (1975). In summary, we hold (1) that classification of agricultural land for special tax treatment by utilization of a use standard is not compelled by Article VII, Section 4(a), Florida Constitution; (2) that, nonetheless, Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), inherently employs a use standard; (3) that it is unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible to presume conclusively from the recording of a subdivision plat *486 that the platted land is not pres...

...of taxpayers from all others who are assessed on a present use criterion is so disparate as to deny them equal protection of the law. Consequently, for the reasons expressed, the judgment of the Circuit Court for St. Lucie County, Florida, declaring Section 193.461(4)(a)4., Florida Statutes (1975), to be unconstitutional is affirmed....

...I would therefore hold that classification as well as assessment must be based on character or use of the land. Accordingly, I would recede from Rainey and reaffirm our more recent holdings that use is the guidepost in classifying agricultural land. See Tuck and Roden. Because section 193.461(4)(a)4. classifies land based on a factor wholly unrelated to use, I concur in the result of the majority opinion ruling the statute unconstitutional. NOTES [1] In each of the four suits filed by appellee the then current version of § 193.461(4)(a)4. was assailed. However, since the subsection in issue has remained unchanged during each of the relevant tax years, for the sake of clarity and convenience we shall refer to the most recent applicable provision, i.e., § 193.461(4)(a)4, Fla....

...[3] Our recent decision in Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1978), wherein we affirmed the above-quoted proposition enunciated in Straughn v. Tuck, supra, is also misleading in this respect. However, Roden involved a consideration of § 193.461(4)(c), Fla....

...The issue in conflict is whether more than just agricultural use is required to establish for purpose of tax assessment that land may be classified agricultural and be entitled, therefore, to preferential tax treatment. In Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1978), we reviewed the constitutionality of Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes. The statute mandates that to gain "agricultural" classification land must be "actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose," Section 193.461(3)(a), which means "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...n classifying land, although other specifically enumerated factors relative to use may also be considered. Agricultural use is now and has always been the test." We adhere to this view. As we intimated in Tuck the factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 193.461(3) are to be considered in making the determination of good faith agricultural use but none is determinative....

...A problem not present in Markham and Tuck is present in this case. Sale of land for a purchase price three or more times greater than its agricultural assessment creates a presumption that the land is not used for good faith agricultural purposes. Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes....

...necessary circumstance for rebuttal. We reject this notion. As we stated in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976), "special circumstances" may be drawn from the factors for consideration in the classification process listed in Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...for six times the agricultural assessment. Twenty-five of the acres were developed into an amusement park, but the remainder of the grove was continued to be used for citrus production. The issue was whether the presumption of nonagricultural use in Section 193.461(4)(c) was overcome as to the acreage continued for citrus production....

...rd contains no evidence to contradict the property appraiser's conclusion that K & K paid a uniform price per acre for all the land it purchased. Assuming then that K & K paid six times the agricultural assessed value for the grove land, I find that section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973), creates a presumption that "such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes." This presumption may be rebutted "[u]pon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture... ." Section 193.461(4)(c). "Bona fide agricultural purposes" means "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...The record is also clear that the agricultural classification was denied for 1973 solely on the basis of the purchase price. Lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes are entitled to an agricultural classification for tax purposes. [2] Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...necessary circumstance for rebuttal. We reject this notion. As we stated in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976), "special circumstances" may be drawn from the factors for consideration in the classification process listed in Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...There being no statutory authority for the allowance of interest on a tax refund, the trial court was correct in its denial of that claim. There being no error demonstrated in the findings of the trial court, the final judgment is AFFIRMED. CROSS and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Sec. 193.461(4)(c), Fla....

...n that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agricultural, this presumption may be rebutted. [2] Sec. 193.461(3)(b), Fla....

...Stewart, County Atty., and Stephen Nall, Asst. County Atty., for appellants. Tomas R. Moore, Clearwater, for appellee. *539 DEKLE, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County declaring Fla. Stat. § 193.461, F.S.A....

...(formerly 193.201) unconstitutional on its face. Fla. Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A. We reverse. In 1969 appellee filed an application with the Agricultural Zoning Board of Pinellas County for agricultural zoning of her property located within the county, under § 193.461....

...After public hearing the application was denied. Appellee's 1970 application was likewise denied, whereupon appellee filed a complaint for injunction and other relief against both denials in the circuit court. The trial court ultimately entered a final judgment declaring subsection 4(b) of § 193.461 unconstitutional on its face and ordering that appellee's property be designated as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes for the years 1969 and 1970. This appeal followed. The sole question before this Court is the constitutionality vel non of § 193.461....

...under the authority provided for such action in our Constitution. [1] The protection afforded is equal under the law and there is a proper legislative classification, thus meeting the requirements for constitutional validity. We therefore hold that § 193.461(4) (b) is a valid exercise of the state's police power and in no way deprives appellee of equal protection or due process of law....

...for the tax year 1974, it was necessary for the plaintiff to file a return, or application therefor in the office of the tax assessor on or before April 1, 1974, and supplement the same with such information as the assessor properly should require. Section 193.461(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1973)....

...104 (1938); Dade County Land Development Corp. v. Dade County, 157 So.2d 142 (Fla.3d DCA 1963). Third. Admittedly the plaintiff did not exhaust its administrative remedies, by timely seeking review of the amount of the assessment, as provided for by statute. See sections 193.461(2), 194.011(3), 194.032, and 194.042 Florida Statutes (1973)....

...ownership of all applications received [for agricultural assessment], showing the acreage, full valuation under § 193.011, the valuation of the land under the provisions of this section, and whether or not the classification requested was granted". Section 193.461(2) Florida Statutes (1973)....

...1147, 132 So. 842 (1931). For the reasons stated, the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff which is appealed from is hereby reversed, and the earlier summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants is reinstated. It is so ordered. NOTES [1] § 193.461 Fla....

...wner ... because of the purchase price paid, the terms of the lease and the other factors testified to by the Defendant Property Appraiser. *499 The evidence conclusively establishes a "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land" pursuant to § 193.461, Fla....

...ral for purposes of the lower tax assessment. Presumably evidence tending to confirm the agricultural nature of assessable land, i.e, "special circumstances", should conform to the other six statutory considerations if the presumption established by Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes, is to be overcome. 326 So.2d at 423. Later, Justice Sundberg stated: The phrase "special circumstances", indicating what must be shown in order to overcome the statutory presumption at issue, should be read in pari materia with Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, and the seven criteria for determination of taxable status enumerated therein....

...e for rebuttal [of the presumption]. We reject this notion. As we stated in Straughn v. K & K Land Management, 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976), "special circumstances" may be drawn from the factors for consideration in the classification process listed in § 193.461(3)(b)....

...se is in fact a bona fide "commercial" agricultural use. Such a motive would certainly be one of the "other factors as may ... become applicable" within the contemplation of subsection (7) of the aforequoted factors listed under subsection (3)(b) of § 193.461, supra....

...NOTES [1] This opinion does not deal with a zoning change from a nonagricultural use to another nonagricultural use. In Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1979, reh. denied March 22, 1979) the supreme court held that "the legislature intended to limit application of [§ 193.461(4)(a)(3)] to those cases where land is rezoned from an agricultural use to a non-agricultural use at the owner's request." The supreme court declined to address the issue whether this statutory section was unconstitutional. Section 193.461(4)(a)(3) provides: (4)(a) The property appraiser shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural: (3) Land that has been zoned to a non-agricultural use at the request of the owner subsequent to the enactment of this law ......

...But we shall discuss this matter more fully hereinafter. Most significantly, it is also uncontroverted that the purchase price of the land ($1,000,250) was much more than three times the agricultural assessment previously placed on it. Accordingly, in reliance on Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973), the appellant Property Appraiser denied the Tutens' application for an agricultural assessment for the year 1974....

...Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted." (Emphasis added.) Most importantly, however, "bona fide agricultural purposes" as used therein is defined by a preceding subsection of Section 193.461, supra, i.e., subsection (3)(b), as "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Additionally, this latter subsection (3)(b) further provides: "......

...Obviously, given the presumption which undisputedly arises because of the high purchase price of the land, the question herein is whether the Tutens rebutted the presumption. Cognizant of Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., [2] in which our Supreme Court determined that the aforequoted seven criteria outlined in Section 193.461(3)(b), supra, were relevant on the question of whether the presumption is rebutted, the trial court herein found: "(1) The land was used by the Tutens for over twenty years as owners, in the same way that they as lessees were using it...

...We have no quarrel, really, with the conclusions of the trial judge insofar as they relate to an agricultural use of the property. In fact, prior to 1972 a bona fide agricultural use was indeed all that was required for entitlement to a "green belt" assessment. [3] But the aforequoted subsection (3)(b) of Section 193.461 was added to the statute by amendment in 1972 [4] and, as quoted, now requires a "good faith commercial agricultural use" of the land in question....

...efore the court, when it commented: [5] "... The rational presumption imposed by the legislature is that land purchased for three or more times its assessed agricultural value is not intended to be put to `good faith commercial agricultural use' per Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, supra....

...se is in fact a bona fide "commercial" agricultural use. Such a motive would certainly be one of the "other factors as may ... become applicable" within the contemplation of subsection (7) of the aforequoted factors listed under subsection (3)(b) of Section 193.461, supra....

...of Panama City. The issue before the trial court was whether on the first day of the taxable years in question the lands owned by respondents were being used in a bona fide forestry operation under Fla. Stat. §§ 193.11 (1965); 193.201 (1967) [now § 193.461], F.S.A....

...ies for other use" in the future; that the "conversion factors will outweigh its use as forestry lands." This is not the test or even a test or criterion to be considered in determining use as agricultural (forestry) lands (unless Subsection 4(b) of § 193.461, Fla....

...n an attempt to come up with findings of fact contrary to those reached by the court in whom this judicial function is exclusively vested. [4] The judgment appealed is affirmed. RAWLS, J., and GOODFRIEND, SAM, Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] F.S. § 193.461(3), F.S.A....

...Its provisions for zoning lands as agricultural or non-agricultural were, however, optional and could be rejected or accepted by the board of county commissioners in its discretion. (Cf. Section 193.201 as amended by Ch. 67-117, Acts of 1967, carried forward as Section 193.461, Fla....

...We have concluded that the legislative classification of agricultural lands for tax purposes was intended to benefit the owner whose lands are dedicated to the named agricultural purposes "exclusively" so used under old Section 193.201 and "primarily" so used under new Section 193.461 whether such use is being made directly by the owner himself or indirectly through an agent or lessee; and that the legislature did not intend to give preferential tax treatment to land such as that in the instant case that was obviou...

...inder of the citrus grove was continued on as before the purchase. The total purchase price of the entire 350 acre tract was approximately six times the previously assessed agricultural assessment, thus bringing into play the following provisions of Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973): "Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes....

...gislatively encouraged agricultural use. Tax assessors and, in turn, the courts are well equipped to separate truth from sham on the issues of bona fides in such agricultural use and the extent thereof, giving due regard to the criteria set forth in Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes....

...GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976); Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 342 So.2d 1107 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). [2] 347 So.2d 129 (Fla.2d DCA 1977), Opinion filed June 8, 1977. [3] Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) as amended in 1972....

...After being denied relief by the tax adjustment board, McKinney brought this suit in the Circuit Court challenging the assessment of his grove lands as illegal, excessive and in violation of the preferential treatment mandated by Florida's "Green Belt" law, Fla. Stat. 193.461(6), F.S.A....

...Fisher, Fla.App.1st, 1973, 277 So.2d 307; Exchange Realty Corp. v. Hillsborough Co., Fla.App.2d, 1972, 272 So.2d 534. While these decisions were based on § 193.011 (formerly § 193.021), dealing with non-agricultural realty, we find no significant differences in the statutory language of § 193.461 which would require a different rule....

...The trial court upheld that determination. The appellants in this case had the burden of proof at trial to show either no reasonable hypothesis supported the property appraiser's determination, or the appraiser did not consider the appropriate statutory factors under § 193.461....

...He was in the process of developing a forestry plan for this part of the property, which would include controlled burns, and fire lanes. The Florida Constitution provides that agricultural land may be classified by general law for ad valorem tax purposes, and assessed solely on the basis of character or use. [4] Section 193.461 implements that provision of the Constitution....

...n on these lands was not, nor could it be, commercially viable for a *892 very long time. We agree that commercial viability of an agricultural use or activity is not determinative. [5] But profit motive may be a factor which can be considered under section 193.461(3)(b)7....

...exempted and permitted by the County, which it had not done. We disagree. The appropriateness of agricultural classification of land for ad valorem tax purposes depends on the general statutory laws of this state, not a county code. As noted above, section 193.461(3)(b) makes this determination turn primarily on the actual, good faith use of the land. If the land is being used for a bona fide agricultural purpose, it is entitled to the agricultural classification. Hausman v. Rudkin . Zoning may be a consideration under the catchall "other factors" provision in section 193.461(3)(b)7, but it is not determinative. Wilkinson v. Kirby, 654 So.2d 194 (Fla. 2d *893 DCA 1995). Nor does section 193.461(4)(a)3 appear applicable because Sugarmill or its predecessor in title did not seek rezoning of the land from an agricultural use to a non-agricultural use....

...(emphasis supplied). It appears forestry and cattle raising activities are excluded from regulation of development pursuant to the statute and the Code. Further, section 163.3194(5) expressly states: The tax exempt status of lands classified as agricultural under s. 193.461 shall not be affected by any comprehensive plan adopted under this act as long as the land meets the criteria set forth in s....

...*894 If this record contained any disputed material facts concerning whether Sugarmill or its lessee was using these lands for a bona fide cattle grazing operation on January 1, 1994, we would remand this cause to the trial court for a factual determination of this issue using the factors test set forth in section 193.461(3)(b)....

...classification for lands used for agricultural purposes. Other cases involving platted but undeveloped lands have held that agricultural classification should not be denied for other reasons. In Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches , the court held that section 193.461(4)(a) did not apply to deny agricultural classification to property rezoned from a non-agricultural use to another non-agricultural use....

...The fact that the land was platted and undeveloped was also an additional factor insufficient to deny it the classification. [11] The acceptance of Schultz' argument on this point also appears to be inconsistent with Bass v. General Dev. Corp. In Bass, the supreme court held that section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975) was unconstitutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption that lands for which an owner had recorded a plat were not entitled to an agricultural classification....

...In 1987, the Property Appraiser denied the taxpayer's application for an agricultural classification on the grounds that the agricultural use was illegal under the zoning code and thus could not be considered a "good faith" use of the property within the meaning of the Greenbelt Law, section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...[1] The Property Appraiser appeals; we reverse. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the actual commercial agricultural use of property in violation of Dade County zoning ordinances can be considered a "good faith" agricultural use entitled to preferential tax treatment under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (the Greenbelt Law). The question is one of appellate first impression. Agricultural classification or "exemption" for property tax purposes is governed by section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use; 5. Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land ...; 6. Whether such land is under lease ...; and 7. Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable. (Emphasis added.) Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...Tuck, 354 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977). The determination as to whether land is being used primarily for bona fide commercial agricultural purposes must be based upon consideration of the physical use of the land, as well as the statutory factors enumerated in section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...denied Markham v. Gianolio, 569 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1990). Therefore, in order for appellants to succeed on appeal, they must demonstrate that proof at trial regarding the physical use to which the land was put, as well as those factors enumerated *161 in section 193.461, excluded every reasonable hypothesis supporting the tax assessor's denial of their application. Analysis of the applicable statute in light of the testimony at trial reveals that appellants have satisfied their burden. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: 193.461 Agricultural lands; classification and assessment....

...nditions of the lease; and 7. Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable. ... . (5) For the purpose of this section, "agricultural purposes" includes horticulture; floriculture; viticulture; forestry; dairy; livestock; poultry.... § 193.461, Fla....

...ich the application was denied. Plaintiffs timely filed the instant petition for certiorari to review the Board's decision. A certified transcript of the Board's proceedings and briefs were filed. On January 5, 1973, the Court heard final argument. "Section 193.461 F.S....

...State Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. Strickland, 262 So.2d 893 (1st D.C.A., Fla., 1972). Accordingly, plaintiffs had a twofold burden of demonstrating to the Agricultural Zoning Board that their land was entitled to be classified as agricultural under Section 193.461....

...There was no evidence presented that the property had a prior history of agricultural use or that it was physically used for agricultural purposes as of the first of the year. The assessor stated no agriculture was found on the property and presented an aerial photograph thereof." The circuit judge found as follows: "Section 193.461(3) F.S....

...Pastel, II, Joan Nesta Burnett, and Alan B. Koslow of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GROSS, J. The narrow issue in this appeal is whether land used for the boarding and training of horses constitutes a "bona fide agricultural purpose" within the meaning of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...." Holl, 191 So.2d at 43. Since the correctness of summary judgment is a question of law, the granting of such by the trial court is reviewed de novo by this court. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000). Section 193.461 states in pertinent part: (1) The property appraiser shall, on an annual basis, classify for assessment purposes all lands within the county as either agricultural or nonagricultural....

...farm products and farm production. (Emphasis added). PPI argues that horses fit within the statutory category of "livestock." The statute does not explicitly define the term. To decide this case we must construe the term "livestock" as it is used in section 193.461(5)....

...the statute. Our decision is also consistent with Aitken v. Markham, 595 So.2d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). There, we held that where the primary use of land is breeding horses for profit, the landowner qualified for an agricultural classification under section 193.461....

...The property owner obtained an agricultural classification of its property to receive favorable tax treatment. The third district affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the property owner, holding that the boarding and training of racing horses was for a bona fide agricultural purpose within the meaning of section 193.461(3)(b). We agree with the third district's conclusion that the phrase "all forms of farm products and farm production" contained in section 193.461(5) "is not meant to be a limiting phrase but rather a catch-all" and that the term "livestock" should be given its plain meaning....

...l classification to other portions of St. Joe's tract situated on small lakes near the Gulf. It is the denial of agricultural classification on the 660-foot deep strip of Gulf frontage and the property on the small lakes that is in controversy here. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that the property appraiser shall, on an annual basis, classify for assessment purposes all lands within the county as either agricultural or nonagricultural....

...The third of the foregoing reasons is *986 not a legitimate consideration for the tax assessor in determining whether or not he will deny agricultural classification to lands or reclassify lands nonagricultural. This consideration may be made only by the board of county commissioners. Subsection (4)(b) of Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1977), provides: The board of county commissioners may also reclassify lands classified as agricultural to nonagricultural when there is contiguous urban or metropolitan development and the board of county commissio...

...BOOTH, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: I would reverse the trial court's ruling denying agricultural classification both as to the interior lake-front areas and the beach perimeter areas. The entire tract is a unit used for bona fide agricultural purposes and should be so classified. Florida Statutes, Section 193.461(3)(b), requires that the lands be used "primarily" for a bona fide agricultural purpose....

...In October 1979, Union entered into a farm lease with John Mitchell, who immediately subleased approximately 120 acres to Frederick Rutzke. Mitchell and Rutzke began clearing the land in late October or early November 1979. All of the lease agreements required that the property be cleared by February 1, 1980. Pursuant to Section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), Union timely applied for an agricultural classification for the property for the year 1980....

...The trial court's conclusion that the Property Appraiser's assessment was not entitled to a presumption of correctness apparently derives from its mistaken view that in determining a property owner's entitlement to agricultural classification, the Appraiser was required to consider each and every statutory factor in Section 193.461(3)(b), and not having done so, no presumption of correctness attached to his classification. It is clear, however, that Section 193.461(3)(b), which provides that "[i]n determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration ..." (emphasis supplied), does not mandate that the Property Appraiser consider all or any of the factors. Unlike Section 193.011 concerning valuation of regular property and Section 193.461(6)(a) concerning valuation of lands classified as agricultural, both of which provide that the Property Appraiser "shall" consider the listed factors, [7] no such mandatory requirement is imposed by Section 193.461(3)(b)....

...on the land on January 1, 1980. Victor stated that clearing the land would not, of itself, constitute bona fide good faith agricultural use unless the property had already been used for agricultural purposes. In his opinion the factors set forth in section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), "don't have much application" without evidence of prior agricultural use and growing crops. This interpretation of the statutory requirements was erroneous. Although the Property Appraiser may determine the weight to afford each element, he must consider all seven factors set forth in section 193.461(3)(b)....

...Case law provides that it is the Property Appraiser's burden to demonstrate his substantial compliance with the law in determining the classification and assessment. Equitable; Muss. The Appraiser's failure to consider all statutory elements enunciated in section 193.461(3)(b) curtailed a shift in the burden of proof....

...The majority opinion under consideration conflicts with the decisions of this court. With regard to the merits, the Property Appraiser failed to comply with the law in classifying the property. The Property Appraiser testified that he believed the statutory factors of section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), were of little application in the absence of evidence of prior agricultural use and growing crops. A reasonable inference to be drawn from the Appraiser's statement is that in considering statutory factors, he relied solely on the lack of prior agricultural use and failed to consider the other elements. Although section 193.461(3)(b) permits consideration of "the length of time the land has been so utilized," prior use of the land is not dispositive of the issue....

...It is the use of the property on January 1 of the year in question that establishes the character of the property for tax purposes. Furthermore, in Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1978), the supreme court stated that "the factors listed in subsection (b) of section 193.461(3) are to be considered in making the determination of good faith agricultural use but none is determinative." (emphasis supplied)....

...parture from prescribed guidelines. It is apparent that the Property Appraiser applied an improper standard in classifying the property by relying on the absence of growing crops and prior use and by failing to consider all the elements set forth in section 193.461(3)(b)....

...y Appraiser's classification of the property as non-agricultural. The Property Appraiser's method of valuing the property is not an issue. Thus, if his classification is correct, his assessment is correct. [2] The classification was made pursuant to Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979): "Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural....

...Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable." [3] Prior to 1972, a bona fide agricultural use was all that was required in order to obtain assessment as agricultural land. However, by amendment in 1972, see Chapter 72.181, Laws of Florida, subsection (3)(b) of Section 193.461 mandated "good faith commercial agricultural use" of the land in question, simply adding the factor of profit or profit motive....

...Appellant seeks review of a final judgment rendered May 13, 1970, in the Circuit Court of Alachua County, holding that Appellees' lands were entitled to agricultural tax treatment under the provisions of Section 193.201, as amended by Chapter 67-117, Acts Florida Statutes, as amended and renumbered Section 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...Appellees' complaint sought a declaration that the assessment was illegal and to have the 1969 taxes declared void, discriminatory and illegal for the reasons that said property was being used for bona fide agricultural purposes, and was entitled to the tax benefits on January 1st, 1969, as provided for under Section 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...her than a farm, and that a farm provides food and fiber for the community. The appellants claim the Circuit Court erred in finding the Plaintiff entitled to an agricultural assessment within the meaning and intent of Section 193.201, now renumbered 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the assessment of defendant as nonagricultural to be unlawful....

...he lands is consistent with the Statute which provides that said land may be reclassified to another use on ceasing to be used for agricultural purposes. Florida Statutes Section 193.201, as amended by Chapter 67-117, Acts of 1967, now renumbered as 193.461, provides in part: (1) * * * (2) The county agricultural zoning board, in order to promote and assist a more orderly growth and expansion of urban and metropolitan areas, shall on an annual basis zone all lands within the county as either agricultural or non-agricultural....

...ultural operation does contribute to the food and fiber of the community or does somehow find its way into the stream of commerce. There was no doubt nor contentions that the appellees used the land in one or more of the uses stated in the Statutes (193.461) as being agricultural, i.e., raising of livestock, raising of vegetable crops and pasture land for their cows. It appears the appellant questions the degree, the productivity and the ability to derive a livelihood therefrom. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that the land must be used primarily for agricultural purposes, and that all lands which are actually used for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be zoned agricultural....

...However, if said lands were used for bona fide agricultural purposes in 1968, in order for said lands to be denied the agricultural status in January 1, 1969, the lands would have to have been diverted to other use or ceased to be used for agricultural purposes, or to have been re-classified as provided in 4(a) and 4(b) of 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...The issue presented by the conflicting decisions is whether zoned use of land is, as a matter of law, determinative of the actual, good faith agricultural use of the land for ad valorem tax assessment purposes under article VII, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution and section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The Fifth District Court of Appeal held below that when determining the actual, good faith use of the land for tax purposes, the zoned use is but one factor that an assessor or reviewing court may consider along with the other specified factors provided in section 193.461(3)(b)1-7, Florida Statutes (1993), and that zoning alone is not determinative as a matter of law. Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 892-893. The Fifth District reasoned that the determination must be based on an evaluation of the various factors surrounding the alleged agricultural use as provided in section 193.461(3)(b), which include the duration and continuity of the use, the purchase price and size of the land, whether the land is cared for in a manner to support the alleged use, whether there is a lease and, if so, its terms, and "[s]uch other factors" as may be apparent. Love PGI Partners, 706 So.2d at 891-92 (quoting § 193.461(3)(b)). Not having been included as a factor by the legislature, the zoned use of the land enters the analysis via the catchall factor that allows the taxing authority to consider any relevant factor not specifically mentioned. § 193.461(3)(b)7, Fla....

...The property owners received an agricultural tax classification on Red Area I from 1974 through 1979, and received similar classifications on Red Area II, and the Green Area, for 1977-1979. Red Area III received a like classification in 1979. Only the Yellow Area has not received such a classification. In 1980, pursuant to section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the property owners filed a return and application for agricultural classification of lands with the Collier County property appraiser....

...The property owners appealed to the Collier County Property Appraisal Adjustment Board, but the board upheld the denial. In 1981, they again filed for an agricultural property classification and were again denied. They then sought relief in the circuit court. In his final judgment, the trial judge found, pursuant to section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), that based on all the evidence presented, "the Glades Nursery is in fact a bona fide commercial agricultural operation." He found specifically that Red Areas I and II and the Green and Yellow Areas had been in good faith continuously so used....

...d faith for agricultural purposes since its reacquisition in 1979, these reasons are insufficient to support a denial of an agricultural tax classification for the Yellow Area. Once the court finds a bona fide good faith agricultural use pursuant to section 193.461(3)(b), the prior or future use of the land is irrelevant. See Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So.2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The purchase price of land is one of the factors listed in section 193.461(3)(b) to be used in determining whether or not that land is being used primarily for a bona fide good faith agricultural purpose....

...ssification which should result in a lower tax rate than non-agricultural land. The Appellee maintains that the land is not entitled to the more beneficial classification because it is not being used for bona fide agricultural purposes as defined in Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1976) which requires more than just agricultural use to entitle the owner to the agricultural classification....

...an interest payment of $600,000 due for the year 1975. There was evidence submitted by affidavit by Appellant that this land had been previously used as a dairy farm and that this land was presently being used for agricultural purposes. When we read Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1976) we find that agricultural use of the land is not in and of itself sufficient to entitle one to fall within the definition of "good faith commercial agricultural use." In this case there is no question that the cows were grazing and the sod was being lifted....

...Robert B. Burandt of Aloia, Dudley, Roosa, Sutton, McIver & Burandt, Cape Coral, for appellee. ALTENBERND, Judge. The Lee County Property Appraiser and the Lee County Tax Collector [1] appeal final judgments granting an agricultural classification under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1991), for approximately 24 acres of property in Cape Coral, Florida, owned by Larry Kirby, as trustee....

...exclusively for agriculture). The trust clearly proved that the land was being used for agricultural purposes in the relevant tax years, and that the agricultural use was neither new nor temporary. Considering the six specific factors delineated in section 193.461(3)(b)1-6, the only factor suggesting the land may not be used for agricultural purposes is its purchase price. [3] There is a presumption that land which sells for a price three or more times the agricultural assessment is not being used for agricultural purposes. § 193.461(3)(c)....

...ent. As in Fisher, the development's failure and the owner's decision to place the land into legitimate agricultural use is a special circumstance that overcomes the presumption. 371 So.2d 496. Under the catch-all "other factors" to be considered in section 193.461(3)(b)7, the Property Appraiser argues that zoning is a factor barring agricultural classification in *197 this case....

...The fact that the trust arranged for this property to be classified as a planned development at an earlier time or that it is currently zoned for residential development is not dispositive. This is not a case in which the land was rezoned from agricultural status to nonagricultural status at the owner's request. § 193.461(4)(a)3, Fla....

...Finally, the Property Appraiser argues that a lack of profitability is an "other factor" precluding the agricultural assessment. As in earlier cases, the Property Appraiser argues that a "bona fide agricultural purpose" requires a "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land," § 193.461(3)(b), and that good faith equates to profitability....

...Kirby also filed an application for agricultural classification in 1993. The trial court granted a summary judgment in his favor based on the earlier case. The Lee County Property Appraiser's appeal of this summary judgment, case number 94-03139, is also consolidated with this appeal. [3] Section 193.461(3)(b), in its entirety, states: 193.461 Agricultural lands; classification and assessment....

...The question raised by this appeal is whether greyhound racing dogs are livestock. We hold that they are not and, consequently, that the land used for the raising and training of greyhound dogs to be used in the parimutuel gambling industry is not land used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Kennel Club timely filed an application to have a ten-acre parcel of land classified as agricultural. This property is improved with twenty-six individual kennel buildings and is used for raising and training greyhound dogs used in the parimutuel industry. Section 193.461 provides that lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes. According to section 193.461(3)(b), land used for agricultural purposes includes land used for "livestock." Kennel Club contends that it is entitled to agricultural classification because greyhound dogs are "livestock." The property appraiser disagrees....

...1984) (only issues available on review of determination of property appraiser are whether appraiser considered all factors mandated by law and whether appraiser's methods and conclusion are supported by any reasonable hypothesis of legal assessment). Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, provides that "only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural." "`Bona fide agricultural purposes' means good faith commercial agricultural use of the...

...ently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, [1] and the "catch-all," "[s]uch other factors as may from time to time become applicable." [2] Zoning regulations must be considered under Section *909 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes....

...The statutory test for classifying lands for assessment purposes as agricultural or nonagricultural is not the same as that for valuation purposes. The former requires a showing that the realty was "actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose," section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), while the latter involves a consideration of the eight factors listed under section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...uses. Present use and immediate future use are strongly influenced by zoning and zoning must, therefore, be considered by the assessor in his determination of just valuation. Tuck, 354 So.2d at 371-72 (citation omitted). Thus, it appears that while section 193.461(3)(b) requires that actual, current use be agricultural to classify land for agriculture assessment purposes and does not require the assessor to take into consideration any applicable local or state land use regulation, the assessor...

...ssential to a reasonable valuation of St. Joe's property. Nevertheless, because of the posture of this case, i.e., the parties' stipulation regarding valuation, the appraiser's failure to so act is now moot, and I am constrained to concur. NOTES [1] § 193.461(3)(b)5., Fla. Stat. [2] § 193.461(3)(b)7., Fla....

...or agricultural classification for 1984 ad valorem tax purposes. We reverse. Ridgewood, a joint venture, owned about 4,812 acres of land in Manatee County, 2,369 of which could be used in mining activity pursuant to a county permit. As authorized by section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), Ridgewood filed a timely application with the county for an agricultural classification for the other 2,443 acres for 1984....

...on that mining was the primary use of the land. Yet, he acknowledged that mining operations could not have been conducted on the leased land in 1984. Land used primarily for bona fide commercial agricultural purposes must be classified agricultural. § 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983); Roden v....

classification for only 2.25 acres, pursuant to section 193.461(1), Florida Statutes (2012). The McLendons

...as a matter of law, by granting summary judgment in favor of Racetrack and classifying the Property as agricultural. They argue that the primary use of the property, horse boarding and training, was not a bona fide agricultural purpose. We disagree. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part: Agricultural lands; classification and assessment.— * * * (3)(b) [O]nly lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural....

...a limiting phrase but rather a catch-all. Further, when the legislature wanted to limit a category, it did so as is exemplified by its limitation on pisciculture to situations "when the land is used principally for the production of tropical fish." § 193.461(5), Fla. Stat. (1997). Therefore, we must look at the plain meaning of the term "livestock." Although not specifically defined in section 193.461 or related sections, the term "livestock" has been defined consistently throughout the Florida Statutes to include "horses." See § 212.02(29), Fla....

...BERANEK, Judge. This case involves the tax status of approximately 270 acres of land in the Town of Miramar, Broward County, Florida. The basic issue is whether the land in question should be classified as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes pursuant to Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...In addition, private owner horses were boarded by the owner plaintiffs on approximately 100 acres which was not leased. Simply put, the property was being used agriculturally while the paper, permit and financial work was being done to turn it into a planned unit development. The trial involved the application of Section 193.461(3)(b), (4)(a)(3) and (4)(c). These statutes provide in relevant part as follows: 193.461 Agricultural lands; classification and assessment....

...Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted. The final judgment discusses these various statutes and concludes the case is primarily governed by Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.)....

...As a result of this statute, the court relied upon the presumption provided therein and concluded the landowners had not shown the special circumstances required under the statute to consider the property as agricultural. The final judgment also holds that a rezoning to a nonagricultural use had occurred. As a result, Section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.), was found applicable, but the judgment is not couched in terms of reliance upon this statute which is mandatory in nature....

...ricultural land and so taxed until the first shovel is actually turned in nonagricultural pursuits. We start by surveying the cases on the subject. In Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Twenty-five acres of highway frontage contained in the 350 acres were developed into an amusement park. The remainder of the grove was used for continued citrus production. The issue before the trial court was whether the taxpayer had overcome the presumption on nonagricultural use established by the sale statute, Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...al assessment for purposes of shopping center development. Before the sale and as a condition thereof, the zoning on the property was changed from "agricultural" to "commercial." The zoning change occurred *948 in 1971 prior to the effective date of Section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.)....

...1979), and Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1979). In Bass the real estate was under a cattle grazing lease and was exclusively devoted to agricultural activity. The landowner filed a subdivision plat for a portion of the land and relying upon Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), the property appraiser reclassified it as nonagricultural. The Supreme Court considered the case and found Section 193.461(4)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1975), to be unconstitutional in that it created an irrebuttable presumption of nonagricultural use based upon the mere recording of a subdivision plat....

...In Bass the platting statute was the sole basis for reclassification of the property as nonagricultural and the statute was held unconstitutional. In Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, supra , the Court declined to decide a constitutional attack on Section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1973), the zoning subsection which requires reclassification as nonagricultural when land "has been zoned to a nonagricultural use at the request of the owner... ." We now apply the above precedents in reviewing the present judgment. With all respect for the trial court, we conclude the sale statute, Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.), was improperly applied....

...General Development Corporation, supra , and Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., supra . Appellees argue that a contract purchaser holds equitable title and that a "sufficient sale" occurred under the facts of this case to invoke the presumption under the sale statute. We disagree and hold that Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.), applies only to a completed sale of realty....

...We believe this limited and more narrow construction of the statute is consistent with the legislative purpose. The trial court thus erred in employing the presumption established by the sale statute before a sale actually took place. We next consider the rezoning statute, Section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1972 Supp.), which the trial court also found applicable....

...nty-one-acre portion of appellee's property for the year 1984 was reversed by the trial court, precipitating this appeal. It is established that the remainder of appellee's parcel was under cattle lease and qualified for agricultural treatment under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...capable of supporting a cattle grazing operation. Further, even assuming the evidence did tend to indicate some use for cattle grazing, that would not be sufficient to establish that there was a "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." § 193.461(3)(b), Fla....

193.201 and ‘primarily’ so used under new Section 193.461 whether such use is being made directly by

Har-dee County, Florida. We affirm. Pursuant to section 193.461(3)(a), appellants filed a request for an agricultural

purposes, their requests were denied pursuant to Section 193.461(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1972). The common

arbitrary and contrary to the standards set in Section 193.461, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. A more precise statement

193.201 and ‘primarily’ so used under new Section 193.461 whether such use is being made directly by

the tax year 1969 within the purview of F.S. Section 193.461, F.S.A. The trial court found from the evidence

lands used for agricultural timberlands under § 193.461, Florida Statutes, known as the green belt law

agricultrual classification on the authority of § 193.461(4) (c), Fla.Stat., which states: “Sale of land

good faith commercial agriculture purpose. See § 193.461(4)(c), Fla.Stat. This section also provides that

amended § 193.201 F.S. (carried forward as F.S. § 193.461 F.S.A.). It provided for the mandatory zoning

the tax assessor for failure to comply with Section 193.461(6), Florida Statutes, the “Green Belt Law.”

to the agricultural classification pursuant to § 193.461, Florida Statutes (2024).2 Because this remains

entitled to the benefits of agricultural zoning. Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A.: “. . . All lands

Dade County property appraiser as required by section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979).1 Prior to the

classification by the statutory March 1 deadline. Under section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), failure to

appraiser’s determination. This appeal followed. Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1989), deals with the agricultural

We agree with the trial court and affirm. Section 193.461(3)(a) provides that the failure to make an

bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined in section 193.461, Florida Statutes, or a service animal, as

bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined in section 193.461, Florida Statutes, or a service animal, as

building on land classified as agriculture under section 193.461, Florida Statutes, if those regulations do

nonagricultural pursuant to subsection (4). § 193.461(3)(e), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). He

...Love PGI Partners, L.P., 731 So.2d 1270 (Fla.1999). Importantly, while the decision of the Value Adjustment Board was admissible at the trial court level, it was not entitled to be given a presumption of correctness. Chrysler Corp. v. Pitsirelos, 721 So.2d 710 (Fla.1998). Section 193.461(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes (2001) sets forth in detail the factors to be considered in the determination of whether a parcel of property is entitled to receive an agricultural classification: 193.461....

...ng, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices; 6. Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and conditions of the lease; and 7. Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable. *1155 § 193.461(3)(b), Fla....

...d by the trial court as supporting a finding that Resorts did not intend a bona fide agricultural use of the land in 2002. Furthermore, the substantial purchase price paid by Resorts strongly supports the trial court's decision. As noted previously, section 193.461(3)(b)3 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that the purchase price paid for a particular property can be considered as a factor in determining whether that property is being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Indeed, section 193.461(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides there is a presumption, albeit rebuttable, that property purchased at a price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment is not being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes....

...NOTES [1] Section 194.036(3) of the Florida Statutes provides, in relevant part: 194.036. Appeals Appeals of the decisions of the board shall be as follows: * * * (3) The circuit court proceeding shall be de novo, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party initiating the action. § 194.036(3), Fla. Stat. (2001). [2] Section 193.461(H)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides, in relevant part: 193.461....

...presumption that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted. § 193.461(4)(c), Fla....

bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined in section 193.461, Florida Statutes, or a service animal, as

agricultural status. We hold that compliance with section 193.461(8)(a), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.) (now section

homesite be reclassified as agricultural. Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that

zoning from agricultural to non-agrieultural. Section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982) requires

-000 acres) classified agricultural under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1981). The applications

[see: Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1974)] and, pursuant to the provisions of Section 193.461(3)(b)

simply because it was less than twenty acres. Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that:

question are classified as agricultural under Section 193.461, Florida Statutes, and were appraised by appellees

SMITH, Judge. The issue is whether Section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), which required applications

classification in subsequent years pursuant to section 193.461(3)(e), Florida Statutes, unless a specified

farm products . . . and farm production." § 193.461(5), Fla. Stat. (2022). " 'Farm product'

its interest in *679the surface of the land. Section 193.-461(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provided,

the trial court erred in its application of section 193.461(3)(e), Florida Statutes (2006), in determining

assessment as agricultural property under Section, 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973). We reach a contrary

Agricultural Classification of Lands" (DR-482) under section 193.461, F.S., meet the criteria? 2 Section 201.022

from ad valorem taxation in accordance with section 193.461, Florida Statutes. In 1982, Beker filed applications

bona fide agricultural purpose, as defined in section 193.461, Florida Statutes, or a service animal, as

and reassessed at just value accordingly. See § 193.461(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). In similar fashion,

assessed as agricultural under the provisions of Section 193.461(6), Florida Statutes F.S.A. At a hearing before