CopyPublished | Florida 6th District Court of Appeal
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their legal challenge. They alleged that the Ordinance failed to meet the Exception’s
requirements, and thus Orange County was prohibited from enacting it. In their
complaint, Appellants also sought an award of attorney fees and costs under section
57.112, Florida Statutes (2022) (stating that “the court shall assess and award
reasonable attorney fees and costs ....
...(2023).
Accordingly, Orange County filed a suggestion of mootness, signifying that section
125.0103’s amendment fully resolved the controversy such that a judicial
determination would have no effect. Appellants opposed dismissal because, they
asserted, their right to recover attorney fees and costs under section
57.112, should
they prevail, constituted a collateral legal consequence that precluded dismissal.
The trial court dismissed Appellants’ complaint, ruling that section
57.112
was inapplicable to the underlying action because Appellants did not challenge the
Ordinance as being expressly preempted by section
125.0103, and concluding that
Appellants could not challenge it as being expressly preempted becaus...
...3
no specific statement of preemption in section
125.0103 at the time Orange County
sought to enact the Ordinance.
This Court is called upon to resolve two issues: (1) whether the trial court
erred by determining that section
57.112 was inapplicable to the underlying action;
and (2) whether recovery of attorney fees and costs under section
57.112 is a
collateral legal consequence precluding dismissal.
We turn first to the applicability of section
57.112, 2 which requires the
assessment of attorney fees and costs in favor of the prevailing party when “a civil
action is filed against a local government to challenge the adoption or enforcement
of a local ordinance on the grounds that it is expressly preempted by the State
Constitution or by state law ....
...was based on a claim that the ordinance was expressly preempted by either state law
or the Florida Constitution. Thus, if Appellants’ challenge was based on a claim that
section
125.0103 expressly preempted Orange County’s adoption of the Ordinance,
then section
57.112 is applicable. In concluding that it was, we first consider
2
Our analysis of sections
57.112 and
125.0103 proceeds under the de novo
standard of review....
...Having determined that section
125.0103 contained language expressly
preempting local government from passing rent control ordinances except under one
6
circumstance, our next query is whether Appellants triggered section
57.112 by
challenging the Ordinance as expressly preempted; a claim of express preemption is
required by section
57.112 as a condition to the award of prevailing party fees and
costs thereunder....
...sufficient evidence and met the requirements of the statute.” However, the
consequence of not meeting the Exception’s requirement is that the Ordinance was,
just as Appellants’ complaint alleged, prohibited under general law, i.e., expressly
preempted. Accordingly, section
57.112 was applicable to the underlying action
because Appellants challenged the Ordinance on the grounds that it was expressly
preempted and section
125.0103 does, in fact, contain language of express
exemption.
Having resolved the first issue in favor of Appellants by determining that the
trial court erred in finding that section
57.112 was inapplicable, we turn next to the
second issue presented, which is whether recovery of attorney fees and costs under
section
57.112 is a collateral legal consequence precluding dismissal....
...plaintiff’s right to
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attorney fees fell within a recognized exception to mootness—it was a collateral
legal consequence. Id. 4
Appellants argue that, like Florida’s public records law, section 57.112 also
allows for a mandatory right to attorney fees and costs, and thus the right to fees and
costs is a collateral legal consequence to an otherwise moot action. Appellants are
correct. Section 57.112(2) states:
If a civil action is filed against a local government to
challenge the adoption or enforcement of a local ordinance
on the grounds that it is expressly preempted by the State
Constitution or by state law, the court shall assess and
award reasonable attorney fees and costs and damages to
the prevailing party.
§ 57.112(2), Fla....
