Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...nterest without disclosing confidential information. Additionally, we recently evaluated a statute similar to amended section 27.703(a) in Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305 (Fla. 2012). In Johnson, we addressed the issue of whether sections 27.5303(1)(a)7 and 27.511(8), 8 Florida Statutes (2008), authorize appellate courts to inquire into the adequacy of the conflict of interest. 78 So. 3d at 1308. In determining that section 27.5303(1)(a) 7. In relevant part, section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: If, at any time during the representation of two or more defendants, a public defender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his or her staff without conflict of interest ....

...regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. . . . § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). 8. In relevant part, section 27.511(8), Florida Statutes, provides: If the public defender certifies to the court that the public defender has a conflict consistent with the criteria prescribed in s. 27.5303 and moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal, unless the regional counsel has a conflict, in which case the court shall appoint private counsel pursuant to s. 27.40. § 27.511(8), Fla....

...determine whether a conflict of interest is present, and that there is no evidence that such statutes have required an attorney to violate his or her ethical duties with respect to confidentiality. Furthermore, while section 27.703(1) does not contain the limiting language of section 27.5303(1)(a), which explicitly protects confidential communications, amended section 27.703(1) can and must be logically interpreted to require an attorney to make only those disclosures that are required to identify to the court that he...

...The trial court found that the suppression did not meet the standard in Brady, and we affirm. [11] Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla. 1994), which would have required the trial court to grant a motion to withdraw upon certification from the public defender that a conflict of interest existed, is no longer good law. Section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), now allows the trial court to inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...blic defender]— without any inquiry by an appellate court. " Id. Under the Fourth District's interpretation of the statute, if the public defender "certifies conflict then RCC shall handle the appeal." Id. The Fourth District further concluded that section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), only authorizes factual inquiries into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding conflict by trial courts, not when the appellate public defender certifies conflict....

...valid for the codefendants' appeals as well. Id. at 1267. Finally, the district court concluded that RCC has no standing to object to a public defender's motion to withdraw. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the fact that section 27.5303(1)(a), which gave the Justice Administrative Commission standing to challenge a public defender's motions, was repealed in 2007 and no other statute gave RCC standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw....

...the appellate level the case will automatically be transferred to RCC without a determination from a district court of appeal. Id. at 1266. ANALYSIS The underlying case involves a judicial interpretation of the application of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a) and whether RCC has standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw....

...cordance with constitutional principles of due process." Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 978 So.2d 134, 148 (Fla.2008). If RCC has a conflict, the court appoints private counsel from the registry. § 27.40(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). [1] Section 27.5303, which addresses conflicts of interest by the public defender and RCC, provides that in determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender and RCC "shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Article V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004." § 27.5303(1)(e), Fla....

...in the state courts system and any authorized appeals to the federal courts required of the official making the request. If the public defender certifies to the court that the public defender has a conflict consistent with the criteria prescribed in s. 27.5303 and moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal, unless the regional counsel has a conflict, in which case the court shall appoint private counsel pursuant to s....

...The Fourth District concluded that this statute specifically governs conflicts relating to the appellate public defender. Because the last sentence of the statute provides *1311 that if the public defender "certifies. . . conflict consistent with the criteria" specified in [section] 27.5303 and "moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal," the Fourth District concluded that appellate courts are not authorized to review such motions or to inquire into the adequacy of the conflict representations (as section 27.5303(1)(a) specifies) and certification of conflict by the appellate public defender must result in appointment of RCC....

...egislative intent for creating RCC, list the qualifications for RCC and how RCC should be appointed, and list the duties of RCC, which include representation on appeals if the public defender has a conflict. Additionally, the language and history of section 27.5303(1)(a) do not support the Fourth District's interpretation of the statutes. Under the Fourth District's interpretation, if the appellate public defender certifies conflict then RCC shall handle the appeal. Section 27.5303 is entitled "Public defenders; criminal conflict and civil regional counsel; conflict of interest. " § 27.5303, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). In fact, the whole subject matter of section 27.5303 is conflicts of interest, the appointment of other counsel when a conflict occurs, and how a conflict is to be determined....

...The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. If the court grants the motion to withdraw, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent the accused, as provided in s. 27.40. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...o withdraw based upon an assertion of conflict. In fact, the court is specifically charged with reviewing the motion and making a determination of whether the asserted conflict is prejudicial to the client. In 2003, this provision was moved to *1313 section 27.5303 [2] as part of a comprehensive bill dealing with the implementation of Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution....

...The analysis also notes that "[c]urrently, there appears to be some difference of opinion concerning the extent to which the court can inquire into the sufficiency of a motion filed by a public defender to withdraw from representation due to an ethical conflict of interest." Id. The plain language of section 27.5303(1)(a) specifies when it applies and what action the public defender and court must take....

...The opening sentence provides that "[i]f, at any time " during the representation of multiple defendants a public defender determines that they cannot all be counseled without a conflict of interest, then the public defender " shall file a motion to withdraw and move the court to appoint other counsel." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...s the second sentence of the statute provides. In fact, appellate courts do review motions for their adequacy and can direct further inquiry on motions through orders to show cause or by scheduling oral argument. Moreover, when section 27.511(8) and section 27.5303(1)(a) are read in pari materia, there is no contradiction in the statutes and one can discern a reconciled legislative intent that courts review all motions to withdraw, at both the trial and appellate level, and make further inquiry if necessary. In light of the plain language, the titles of the statutes, and the legislative history of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a), we disagree with the Fourth District's interpretation of the statutes. Instead, we hold that section 27.5303(1)(a) governs all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict, both at the trial and appellate level, and the court where the motion is filed is required to review such motions for sufficiency....

...LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. CANADY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority's conclusion that section 27.5303(1)(a) governs all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict—both at the trial and appellate levels—and that the court where the motion is filed is required to review such motions for sufficiency....

...nt a private attorney rather than a public defender, the counties did not have a legal basis for challenging the motions to withdraw and there was no reason to conduct a hearing on the matter. In contrast, the statute at issue in the case on review—section 27.5303(1)(a)—does limit the trial court's discretion to grant a public defender's motion to withdraw to only those circumstances when the public defender has a conflict....

...A litigant lacking standing to raise an issue in a lower court also lacks standing to obtain appellate review and a ruling from the appellate court that the lower court erred on that issue. In conclusion, I would quash the Fourth District's decision. The Fourth District erred both in its interpretation of section 27.5303(1)(a) and in its ruling regarding RCC's standing. RCC had a sufficient interest in the public defender's motion to be heard on the subject, and pursuant to section 27.5303(1)(a), the Fourth District should have reviewed the sufficiency of the public defender's motion to withdraw....

...t the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person"). Although the rule was once otherwise, [3] section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2006), now permits a trial court to inquire into the factual basis of a legally sufficient motion for leave to withdraw on conflict of interest grounds that arise from the public defender's representation of multiple defendants....

...without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. *974 § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ion. After all, the statute acknowledges the existence of confidential communications, and does not purport to abolish the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege, both of which limit the trial court's ability to learn all the facts. Section 27.5303(1)(a) requires denial of a legally sufficient motion only if the trial court affirmatively finds that an indigent client or his or her representation has not been and is unlikely to be prejudiced by the public defender's representation of the other client(s), [6] i.e., that "the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...An irreconcilable conflict exists because of the downward departure that the informant received for gathering evidence against Mr. Scott, as well as the Public Defender's current representation of the informant. The trial court did not in terms rule that the stated "grounds for withdrawal are insufficient." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...t." Ch. 99-282, § 1, at 3084, Laws of Fla.; Valle v. State, 763 So.2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (recognizing that the 1999 amendments to section 27.53(3) abrogate Guzman ). Effective July 1, 2004, the legislature renumbered section 27.53(3) to section 27.5303(1)(a) and inserted language directing a trial court to "deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." Ch....

...n order to demonstrate entitlement to leave to withdraw from a case. The court must grant a public defender's motion for leave to withdraw unless it can rule out prejudice in fact and any substantial risk of prejudice to the client(s) going forward. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ed); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16 ("a lawyer shall not represent a client....") (emphasis added). Therefore, under the facts of this case, the determination of whether or not a conflict exists under the RRFB, must be made on an individual basis. C. Section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2007) In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court determined that "[w]hen excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he [or she] represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created." In re Prosecution, 561 So.2d at 1135. In 2004, the legislature promulgated, and in 2007 amended, section 27.5303, which permits assistant public defenders to withdraw from representation based on a conflict of interest. ß 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...The obligation to withdraw, however, is not without exception. "In no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender or criminal conflict and *804 civil regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional counsel." ß 27.5303(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007). Within section 27.5303, the Legislature provided guidance as to what constitutes a conflict of interest....

...In determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender or regional counsel shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Article V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004. ß 27.5303(1)(e), Fla....

...The only conflicts addressed in appendix C are conflicts involving codefendants and certain kinds of witnesses or parties. Conspicuously absent are conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload, or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client. We must assume that when the Legislature drafted section 27.5303, it was aware of the prior state of the law....

...acted") (citing Collins Inv. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 164 So.2d 806 (Fla.1964)). Thus, when the Legislature promulgated a law, which prohibited withdrawal based on excessive caseload and which stated that the "conflict of interest" contemplated by section 27.5303 included only the traditional conflicts arising from the representation of codefendants, we must assume that the Legislature understood the existing law and intended to modify it. Here, PD11 failed to submit to the trial court any evidence that a "conflict of interest," as described by section 27.5303(1)(e), existed. The trial court did not reach the question of whether PD11 had presented evidence sufficient to prove a statutory conflict of interest, determining instead that section 27.5303(1)(d) did not apply because it addressed withdrawal from representation, rather than what PD11 sought, which was to have other counsel appointed in the first instance. We find this distinction unpersuasive for two reasons. First, permitting PD11 to withdraw by merely couching its requests as motions to decline future appointments, would circumvent the plain language of section 27.5303(1)(d). We cannot allow such an exercise in semantics to undo the clear intent of the statute. Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). If we did, section 27.5303(1)(d) would be rendered meaningless....

...s, or will be, prejudiced or harmed by the attorney's ineffective representation. However, such a determination, absent individualized proof of prejudice or conflict other than excessive caseload, is defeated by the plain language of the statute. ß 27.5303(1)(a) and (d), Fla....

..."We believe that within the existing statutory framework there exists a method for resolving the problem of excessive caseload." In re Prosecution, 561 So.2d at 1134. Only after an assistant public defender proves prejudice or conflict, separate from excessive caseload, may that attorney withdraw from a particular case. ß 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...1 We accepted review in Public Defender because the decision directly affects a class of constitutional officers, namely public defenders. In Bowens , the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: Whether section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), which prohibits a trial court from granting a motion for withdrawal by a public defender based on *265 “conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload or the prospective inability to adequate...

...of interest under section 27.5808, Florida Statutes (2007), because the Legislature had not included excessive caseload as part of the its definition of conflicts of interest. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the Third District concluded that section 27.5303 was applicable in this case because there is no distinction between withdrawing from cases and declining new appointments under the clear meaning of the statute and the structure of the Public Defender’s Office....

...In Bowens, 39 So.3d at 480 , assistant public defender Jay Kolsky filed a motion to withdraw from representing defendant Antoine Bowens. The motion alleged that the excessive caseload of the assigned public defender created a conflict of interest. The Public Defender also challenged the constitutionality of section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), 4 the statute that excludes excessive caseload as a ground for withdrawal....

...draw based upon an assertion of conflict. In fact, the court is specifically charged with reviewing the motion and making a determination of whether the asserted conflict is prejudicial to the client. Effective July 2004, this provision was moved to section 27.5303 as part of a comprehensive bill dealing with the implementation of Revision 7 to Article Y of the Florida Constitution....

...Additionally, the new provision contained a subsection providing that “[i]n no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender.” Ch.2003-402, § 19, at 3669, Laws of Fla. This prohibition was originally codified in section 27.5303(l)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), but was subsequently moved to subsection (l)(d) in the 2007 amendment to the statute. See ch.2007-62, § 10, at 446, Laws of Fla. Section 27.5303(l)(d) is the primary provision at issue in this case....

...er aggregate relief can be granted or must be handled on a case-by-case basis, what constitutes sufficient proof under the statute, and whether motions seeking to decline future appointments constitute withdrawals under the statute. Applicability of Section 27.5303(l)(d) The initial issue that we must address is whether section 27.5303(l)(d) is even applicable in this case....

...This subsection of the statute provides that “[i]n no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public *269 defender or criminal conflict and civil regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional counsel.” § 27.5303(l)(d), Fla....

...The Public Defender’s motion in the trial court was styled as “Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Cases Due to Conflict of Interest.” In its memorandum of law in support of the motion, the Public Defender argued that because the plain language of section 27.5303(l)(d) governed motions to withdraw and his office was not moving to withdraw from any case to which it was currently assigned, the statute was not applicable to this situation. The trial court’s order granting in part and denying in part the Public Defender’s motion does not acknowledge section 27.5303 at all....

...The Third District found the withdraw/decline distinction to be unpersuasive for two reasons. First, permitting the Public Defender “to withdraw by merely couching its requests as motions to decline future appointments, would circumvent the plain language of section 27.5303(l)(d).” Public Defender, 12 So.3d at 804 . The Third District stated that such an “exercise in semantics” would “undo the clear intent of the statute” and render section 27.5303(l)(d) meaningless....

...ases. Public Defender, 12 So.3d at 804 n. 6. The statutes governing the public defenders and their duties support the Third District’s conclusion that motions to decline future appointments are in essence motions to withdraw, which are governed by section 27.5303....

...ions to the appropriate committees of The Florida Bar for study. Id. at 22 . However, we clearly labeled the motion to decline future appointments as a motion for “prospective withdrawal,” id., which would subject such motions to the dictates of section 27.5303. However, as discussed in more detail below, section 27.5303 should not be interpreted to proscribe courts from considering or granting motions for “prospective withdrawal” when necessary to safeguard the constitutional rights of indigent defendants to have competent representation....

...n, rather than at some later point in a trial proceeding.”) (emphasis added). Scope of Relief Each of the parties in this case has taken a diametrically opposed position as to the scope of relief that may be addressed in a motion to withdraw under section 27.5303....

...m ... lies with the legislature or the internal administration of [the Eleventh Circuit Public Defender], not with the courts.” Public Defender, 12 So.3d at 806 . Additionally, the Third District noted that the Legislature provided guidance within section 27.5303(l)(e) as to what constitutes a conflict of interest for purposes of withdrawal by the public defender....

...ublic defender or regional counsel shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Article V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004.” § 27.5303(l)(e), Fla....

...Conspicuously absent are conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload, or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client.” Public Defender, 12 So.3d at 804 . Thus, the Third District concluded that the only conflicts of interest contemplated by section 27.5303 are “traditional *271 conflicts arising from the representation of codefendants.” Id....

...This is tantamount to applying a band aid to an open head wound. Thus, we reaffirm that aggregate/systemic motions to withdraw are appropriate in circumstances where there is an office-wide or wide-spread problem as to effective representation. Standard Applicable under Section 27.5303 We next address the standard for reviewing motions to withdraw under section 27.5303....

...ice because the defendant was later convicted or entered a guilty plea on less favorable terms. Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1386 ; Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1406 . Based on the cases and analysis above, we conclude that the prejudice required for withdrawal under section 27.5303 when it is based on an excessive caseload is a showing of “a substantial risk that the representation of [one] or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.” R....

...F09-019364, at 2-5 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Oct. 25, 2009) (findings of fact regarding detrimental effect of attorney Kolsky’s caseload on ability to represent clients). Therefore, we agree that the Public Defender has demonstrated cause for withdrawal pursuant to section 27.5303. However, we remand these cases to the trial court to determine if the same conditions still exist at this time. Constitutionality of Section 27.5303(l)(d) The Third District also certified a question regarding the constitutionality of section 27.5303(l)(d), which provides that “[i]n no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender ......

...Additionally, a determination that a statute is facially unconstitutional means that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. Lewis v. Leon Cnty., 73 So.3d 151, 153 (Fla.2011); City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d at 256 . The language currently contained in section 27.5303(l)(d) was added when this statute was created in 2003 and became effective July 1, 2004....

...This provision states that “[i]n no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender or criminal conflict and civil regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional counsel.” § 27.5303(l)(d), Fla....

...� Public Defender, 12 So.3d at 804 . The Third District concluded that the Legislature’s pro *281 mulgation of this law “which prohibited withdrawal based on excessive caseload and which stated that the ‘conflict of interest’ contemplated by section 27.5303 included only the traditional conflicts arising from the representation of codefendants” prevents the courts from considering other conflicts of interest as a basis for a motion to withdraw....

...1 (Fla.1984) (“It is well settled that mootness does not destroy an appellate court’s jurisdiction ... when the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.”). The trial court concluded that the used of the word “solely” in section 27.5303(l)(d) is not a prohibition on considering excessive caseload as a factor in an attorney’s motion to withdraw, just that other considerations must also be present. State v. Bowens, Case No. F09-019364, at 7 (Fla. 11th Cir.Ct. Oct. 25, 2009) (order denying public defender’s motion to declare section 27.5303(l)(d) unconstitutional and granting public defender’s motion to withdraw)....

...but concluded that they “could be unconstitutional when applied to curtail the [trial] court’s inherent authority to ensure adequate representation of the criminally accused.” Olive, 992 So.2d at 203 . The same applies in the instant case. -If section 27.5303(l)(d) is interpreted as *282 prohibiting any motions to withdraw based on excessive caseloads or underfunding, then it would violate the courts’ inherent authority to ensure adequate representation of indigent defendants....

...party.” . The Eleventh Circuit Public Defender's Office is structured so that a set of attorneys represents clients through arraignment (the Early Representation Unit or ERU). After arraignment, representation shifts to another set of attorneys. . Section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “In no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender or criminal conflict and civil regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional counsel.” ....

...R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.16 (“a lawyer shall not represent a client ....”) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the facts of this case, the determination of whether or not a conflict exists under the RRFB, must be made on an individual basis. C. Section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2007) In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court determined that “[w]hen excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose between the rights of the various indigent criminal defendants he [or she] represents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created.” In re Prosecution, 561 So.2d at 1135 . In 2004, the legislature promulgated, and in 2007 amended, section 27.5303, which permits assistant public defenders to withdraw from representation based on a conflict of interest. § 27.5303(l)(a), Fla....

...The obligation to withdraw, however, is not without exception. “In no case shall the court approve a withdrawal by the public defender or criminal conflict and *804 civil regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of the public defender or regional counsel.” § 27.5303(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007). Within section 27.5303, the Legislature provided guidance as to what constitutes a conflict of interest....

...In determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender or regional counsel shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Article V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004. § 27.5303(l)(e), Fla....

...The only conflicts addressed in appendix C are conflicts involving codefendants and certain kinds of witnesses or parties. Conspicuously absent are conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload, or the prospective inability to adequately represent a client. We must assume that when the Legislature drafted section 27.5303, it was aware of the prior state of the law....

...��) (citing Collins Inv. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 164 So.2d 806 (Fla.1964)). Thus, when the Legislature promulgated a law, which prohibited withdrawal based on excessive caseload and which stated that the “conflict of interest” contemplated by section 27.5303 included only the traditional conflicts arising from the representation of codefendants, we must assume that the Legislature understood the existing law and intended to modify it. Here, PD11 failed to submit to the trial court any evidence that a “conflict of interest,” as described by section 27.5303(l)(e), existed. The trial court did not reach the question of whether PD11 had presented evidence sufficient to prove a statutory conflict of interest, determining instead that section 27.5303(l)(d) did not apply because it addressed withdrawal from representation, rather than what PD11 sought, which was to have other counsel appointed in the first instance. We find this distinction unpersuasive for two reasons. First, permitting PD11 to withdraw by merely couching its requests as motions to decline future appointments, would circumvent the plain language of section 27.5303(l)(d). We cannot allow such an exercise in semantics to undo the clear intent of the statute. Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). If we did, section 27.5303(l)(d) would be rendered meaningless....

...is, or will be, prejudiced or harmed by the attorney’s ineffective representation. However, such a determination, absent individualized proof of prejudice or conflict other than excessive caseload, is defeated by the plain language of the statute. § 27.5303(l)(a) and (d), Fla....

...“We believe that within the existing statutory framework there exists a method for resolving the problem of excessive caseload.” In re Prosecution, 561 So.2d at 1134 . Only after an assistant public defender proves prejudice or conflict, separate from excessive caseload, may that attorney withdraw from a particular case. § 27.5303(l)(a), Fla....

...otion to withdraw based upon a conflict of interest. After careful review, we have determined that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it inquired into the details of privileged information in contravention of section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2015), and denied counsel's motion to withdraw when counsel failed to answer....

...This "constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of the law that would result in an irreparable, material harm to the [certiorari] petitioner that cannot be remedied on final appeal." Id. (citing Ward, 753 So. 2d at 708). Section 27.5303 entitled, "Public defenders; criminal conflict and civil regional counsel; conflict of interest," directs the public defender to file a motion to withdraw and move the trial court to appoint new counsel in circumstances where its o...

...his or her staff because of a conflict of interest, then the public defender shall file a motion to withdraw and move the court to appoint other counsel. -5- § 27.5303(1)(a)....

...The statute then directs that the "court shall review and may inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender’s representations regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications." Id. (emphasis added). Based on the plain language of section 27.5303(1)(a), the purpose of a trial court’s inquiry is to determine the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest involving two or more criminal defendants represented by that Public Defender's Office....

...But the statute's text expressly limits the court from requiring the public defender to divulge "any confidential information," recognizing that there will be circumstances where the public defender will be ethically precluded from sharing the precise facts giving rise to the conflict of interest. § 27.5303(1)(a). Given this statute's express limitation of the scope of the trial court's inquiry, section 27.5303(1)(a) "does not give a trial court free rein to inquire into matters which are privileged by law." Smith, 156 So. 3d at 1125. The language of section 27.5303(1)(a) "does not purport to abolish the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege, both of which limit the trial court's ability to learn all the facts." Smith, 156 So....

...tional right to be represented by conflict-free counsel. Neither is a virtuous choice. In assessing the "the adequacy of the public defender’s representations regarding a conflict of interest," as required by the plain language of section 27.5303(1)(a), the trial court could not require the disclosure of privileged information, even if those facts could have aided the trial court’s assessment. § 27.5303(1)(a); see also Smith, 156 So....

...uninterested regardless of his or her identity. And, more importantly, the trial court's knowledge of the identity of the other client would not have made the assistant public defender's representations more or less adequate, per the language of section 27.5303(1)(a). Simply stated, the identity of the other client would not have changed anything in this case. In situations like this one, there is no promise the State can make to do away with the conflict....

...ct in -9- the first place. The trial court had no way of verifying that assumption without violating attorney-client privilege, which would have been in clear contravention of the plain language of section 27.5303(1)(a), precluding the trial court from requiring the disclosure of "any confidential information." As this court stated in Moorman v. Threadgill, 462 So....

...rts were required "to grant a public defender's motion to withdraw on conflict of interest grounds without conducting any factual inquiry." Scott, 991 So. 2d at 973 n.3 (citing Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1994)). Under current law, section 27.5303(1)(a) allows for a limited inquiry into a withdrawal motion caused by representation of multiple defendants whose interests are adverse. But section 27.5303(1)(a) expressly limits the inquiry to those matters that are not "confidential." The assistant public defender laid out the legal basis of the conflict in the certification, provided proof that he had contacted the Florida Bar's co...

PER CURIAM. Petitioner, Lorenzo Brower, petitions this court for a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of his public defender's motion to withdraw. The motion was filed pursuant to section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2018), and asserted a conflict of interest between Petitioner and his counsel. We grant the petition and quash the trial court's order under review. *525 Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to withdraw in compliance with section 27.5303, certifying a conflict of interest and explaining that any additional explanation would require counsel to reveal privileged and confidential information....

...present the petitioner, the trial court would be denying effective assistance of counsel." Ward v. State , 753 So.2d 705 , 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ; see also Young v. State , 189 So.3d 956 , 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ; Smith , 156 So.3d at 1126 . While section 27.5303 permits the trial court to inquire as to the nature of the conflict, the court is not permitted to inquire into confidential matters. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...may seem at odds with the general intent. RCC omits mentioning the dispositive provision in § 27.511(8), which states: "If the public defender certifies to the court that the public defender has a conflict consistent with the criteria prescribed in s. 27.5303 and moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal, unless the regional counsel has a conflict, in which case the court shall appoint private counsel pursuant to s....

...a trial court must grant separate representation") (citing Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla.1982)); see also § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). A separate statute authorizes but does not require trial courts to conduct an inquiry *1267 into the basis for the PD's assertion that a conflict exists. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...lic defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest..."). RCC says this statute also applies in the appellate courts but has not furnished us with any statutory text supporting his argument that in spite of the clear appellate provision, § 27.5303(1)(a) nevertheless also authorizes factual inquiries when the appellate PD certifies conflict....

...A backlog of such appeals is plainly not the issue here, however; the reason for the PD's motion today is the presence of conflict. But since In re Order of Criminal Appeals, two statutes appear to bear directly on the issue of standing. In 2003, before the later adoption of the RCC statutes, the Legislature had enacted § 27.5303. [12] Subsection 27.5303(1)(a) then contained the following provision: "If, at any time during the representation of two or more defendants, a public defender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be cou...

...The court shall deny the motion to withdraw *1268 if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. If the court grants the motion to withdraw, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent the accused." [e.s.] § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ormerly been given the Justice Administration Commission. [13] Since this 2007 legislation, no statute authorizes the newly created RCC to object to PD motions to withdraw in any court. The omission of any grant of standing in the revised version of § 27.5303 causes us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to grant the RCC statutory standing to object to PD withdrawals....

...ut requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. Fla. Stat. § 27.5303 (1)(a) (2014) (emphasis added)....

...In the instant petitions, the public *1123 defender argues that the circuit court’s finding that the public defender’s office “has not presented evidence sufficiently establishing the existence of an actual conflict” increases the burden on that office beyond what section 27.5303(l)(a) requires, by undermining the portion of that section precluding the trial court from “requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications.” We agree....

...Kolker, 649 So.2d at 251-52 (emphasis in original) (quoting Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). “Viewed prospectively, any substantial risk of harm is deemed prejudicial.” Scott v. State, 991 So.2d 971, 972 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “Section 27.5303(1)(a) requires denial of a legally sufficient motion only if the trial court affirmatively finds that an indigent client or his or her representation has not been and is unlikely to be prejudiced by the public defender’s representation of the other client(s) ... i.e., that ‘the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client.’ ” Id. at 975 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 27.5303 (1)(a) (2006)) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added)....

...State, 559 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990) (citing Turner v. State, 340 So.2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)). As this court noted in Scott , the trial court “is no longer bound to accept the public defender’s factual representations at face value” under section 27.5303, and may conduct an evidentiary hearing into the basis for the public defender’s motion to withdraw. Scott, 991 So.2d at 973 . However, the court in Scott noted that section 27.5303 recognizes that there may be situations in which the trial court is precluded by a public defender’s ethical duty to his or her client from learning all the facts relating to a conflict of interest: Where circumstances preclude the...

...2 “To deny a motion for separate representation, where a risk of conflicting interests exists, is reversible error.” Foster v. State, 387 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla.1980) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). “Although the rule was once otherwise, section 27.5303, Florida Statutes ......

...State, 991 So.2d 971, 973 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (footnote omitted). The amendment of this provision to allow for a factual inquiry into a motion to withdraw, however, does not give a trial court free rein to inquire into matters which are privileged by law. See Fla. Stat. § 27.5303 (1)(a) (2014) (“The court shall review and may inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender’s representations regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications ”) (emphasis added)....

...Once a public defender has certified a conflict, and where it becomes clear that the trial court cannot learn the basis for the conflict “without requiring the disclosure of ... confidential communications,” the trial court must grant the motion under section 27.5303(1)(a). In these cases, the trial judge’s finding that the public defender’s office “has not presented evidence sufficiently establishing the existence of an actual conflict” runs contrary to section 27.5303(1)(a), because for the public defender’s office to present such evidence, it would be forced to reveal confidential and privileged client information....

...We close by noting that the well-regarded and experienced trial judge did everything that she could to achieve a just and fair result given the statutory conundrum she faced and the gravity of the trials at issue. Her efforts were commendable. We recognize the difficulty that section 27.5303(l)(a)’s specific limitation on the disclosure of confidential information creates for trial judges and attorneys, and the potential for the unscrupulous criminal defendant to attempt to exploit this statutory exception by manufacturing a conflict of interest and thus creating a fraud upon the court....

...Perhaps other mechanisms exist for handling situations involving confidential information, ones that provide for more direct means of verifying that an actual conflict exists; but that is a legislative question for another day. In conclusion, the language of section 27.5303(l)(a) requires that the trial court’s inquiry into the nature of a conflict of interest based on confidential information stops where attorney-client privilege begins....

...The trial court had a multi-week murder trial which presented a timing challenge. After the court was able to make adjustments and set Petitioner’s trial within the speedy trial recapture period, the PD moved to withdraw. The trial court then conducted a hearing on the motion to withdraw under section 27.5303, Florida Statutes. That provision governs conflicts of interest for public defenders. Among other things, the provision sets out a process for evaluating potential conflicts and assigns responsibilities to the public defender and the court. § 27.5303(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (“In determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender . . . shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases.”); § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...After the hearing, the trial court entered a thoughtful and detailed order. The trial court found that the motion to withdraw failed to establish a conflict and, even if it had, the PD had failed to take reasonable steps to explore alternatives to withdrawal. § 27.5303(1)(e)1., Fla....

...his, it was a departure from the essential requirements of law for the trial court here to deny the public defender's request to withdraw under the facts set forth in the requests and outlined in the transcripts of the hearings in this case. See § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

withdrawal of an attorney in a criminal case under section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2016), and the Rules Regulating

PER CURIAM. Petitioner, Lorenzo Brower, petitions this court for a writ of certiorari challenging the trial court's denial of his public defender's motion to withdraw. The motion was filed pursuant to section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2018), and asserted a conflict of interest between Petitioner and his counsel. We grant the petition and quash the trial court's order under review. *525 Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to withdraw in compliance with section 27.5303, certifying a conflict of interest and explaining that any additional explanation would require counsel to reveal privileged and confidential information....

...present the petitioner, the trial court would be denying effective assistance of counsel." Ward v. State , 753 So.2d 705 , 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ; see also Young v. State , 189 So.3d 956 , 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ; Smith , 156 So.3d at 1126 . While section 27.5303 permits the trial court to inquire as to the nature of the conflict, the court is not permitted to inquire into confidential matters. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...The State of Florida petitions for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing that part of the trial court’s order granting the Public Defender’s motion to withdraw. The Public Defender has cross-petitioned to challenge that portion of the order denying the Public Defender’s motion to declare section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), unconstitutional. We grant the State’s petition in part and quash that portion of the order allowing the Public Defender to withdraw from Antoine Bowen’s case. We deny the Public Defender’s challenge to the constitutionality of section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ning responsibilities, and his resulting inability to fulfill the standards of representation set forth by the Florida Bar and the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, at least as to out-of-custody defendants. 1 PD11 and Kolsky also moved to declare section 27.5303(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2007) to be unconstitutional....

...is, or will be, prejudiced or harmed by the attorney’s ineffective representation. However, such a determination, absent individualized proof of prejudice or conflict other than excessive caseload, is defeated by the plain language of the statute. § 27.5303(l)(a) and (d), Fla. Stat. (2007). Id. at 805. (emphasis added). The pertinent subsections of section 27.5303(1) provide: (l)(a) If, at any time during the representation of two or more defendants, a public defender determined that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defende...

...3d DCA 2009), review granted, No. SC09-1181, 2010 WL 2025545 (Fla. May 19, 2010), we believe that the Florida Supreme Court should address this matter in the interest of uniformity, and so we certify to that Court the following question as one of great public importance: Whether section 27.5303(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), which prohibits a trial court from granting a motion for withdrawal by a public defender based on “conflicts arising from underfunding, excessive caseload or the prospective inability to adequately re...