Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Thus, a conflict may arise when a public defender's office represents clients with adverse interests. When a public defender determines that a conflict of interest exists, the public defender is bound to report the conflict to the court so that independent counsel can be appointed. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 27.53(3) (West 1974)....

...1980), this Court recognized that excessive caseload in the public defender's office creates a problem regarding effective representation. In that decision, we approved the authority of the trial court to appoint private counsel to represent an indigent on appeal under the provisions of subsection 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977). At the time of Behr, subsection 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), read in pertinent part: (2) In addition, any member of the bar in good standing may be appointed by the court to, or may register his or her availability to the public defender of each judicial circuit for a...

...er counsel in lieu of the public defender is "virtually unfettered and not dependent on a showing of a lawful ground or special circumstances." Behr, 384 So.2d at 149. In 1981, following this Court's decision in Behr, the legislature deleted from subsection 27.53(2) the all important words "in addition, [any member] of the bar may be appointed by the court." Ch....

...The relevant part of this subsection now reads: *1135 (2) Any member of The Florida Bar, in good standing, may register his availability to the public defender of any judicial circuit for acceptance of special assignments without salary to represent indigent defendants. § 27.53(2), Fla. Stat. (1989). Subsection 27.53(2) no longer provides an independent mechanism for appointment of counsel in lieu of the public defender. However, in subsection 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1989), the legislature has provided an appropriate mechanism to handle the problem of excessive caseload....

...As the court below stated, "The rights of defendants in criminal proceedings brought by the state cannot be subjected to the fate of choice no matter how rational that choice may be because of the circumstances of the situation." Order, slip op. at 3. Subsection 27.53(3) provides a valid mechanism to handle such situations. The 1981 amendment of the statute also added paragraph (3)(b) of section 27.53, which expressly authorizes the appointment of other public defenders where a public defender is permitted to withdraw because of conflict....

...The state, therefore, should compensate attorneys appointed in cases of conflict, especially as the conflict is created by the underfunding of the public defenders, and any compensation to the conflict attorneys would essentially be a contribution to the public defenders. 2) By the amendment to subsection 27.53(2) in 1981, the state relieved the counties of the burden of compensating conflict attorneys, placing it instead on the state itself....

...unties from contributing funds to the operation of the offices of the public defenders. [5] However, this does not resolve the issue. Court-appointed counsel in conflict situations are not employees of the public defender's office. Indeed, paragraph 27.53(3)(a) specifically provides that court-appointed private counsel should in no way be affiliated with the public defender's office....

...1972). Nor do we agree that by adopting chapter 81-273, Laws of Florida, the state accepted the obligation to fund court-appointed private counsel, which responsibility has been on the counties. Chapter 81-273 deleted the following language from subsection 27.53(2): Fees, costs, and expenses shall be fixed by the trial judge and shall be paid in the same manner and amount as counsel fees are paid in capital cases or as otherwise provided by law....

...The payment of counsel fees in capital cases is governed by section 925.035, Florida Statutes (1989). Subsection 925.035(6) provides an express requirement that attorneys' fees in capital cases be paid by the county. Chapter 81-273 also amended subsection 27.53(2) to read: "Such persons shall be listed and referred to as special assistant public defenders and be paid a fee and costs and expenses as provided in s....

...ded for the most serious offense for which he represented the defendant. This section does *1137 not allow stacking of the fees limits established by this section. Ch. 81-273, § 4, Laws of Fla. The counties argue that by removing the language in subsection 27.53(2) which tied the payment of fees for court-appointed private counsel in noncapital cases to those in capital cases, the legislature also intended to eliminate the requirement that the county pay for court-appointed counsel in noncapital cases....

...The best evidence of the intent of the legislature is generally the plain meaning of the statute. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). However, in this case the plain meaning of the statute is less than clear. First, although the amendment to subsection 27.53(2) deleted the only language that tied the payment of court-appointed attorneys in noncapital cases to the statute that addresses such payment in capital cases, wherein lies the express language placing the burden for such payment on the counties, no language was added to assign that responsibility to the state....

...e fees *1138 from the outset. Most tellingly, subsection (8) of section 925.037 provides: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to be an appropriation. Once the allocation to the county has been expended, any further obligation under s. 27.53(3) shall continue to be the responsibility of the county pursuant to this chapter." (Emphasis added.) This new statute is good evidence that the legislature views the primary responsibility for compensating court-appointed attorneys as being on the counties, that the 1981 amendment to subsection 27.53(2) did not alter that scheme, and that the legislature is only now beginning to address the tremendous financial burden that scheme places on the counties....

...y handle those cases, it is his responsibility to move the court to withdraw. If the court finds that the public defender's caseload is so excessive as to create a conflict, other counsel for the indigent defendant should be appointed pursuant to subsection 27.53(3)....

...s of section 925.036, Florida Statutes, may be stacked and awarding the appellees the requested compensation. Section 925.036, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: Appointed counsel; compensation. — An attorney appointed pursuant to s. 925.035 or s. 27.53 shall, at the conclusion of the representation, be compensated at an hourly rate fixed by the chief judge or senior judge of the circuit in an amount not to exceed the prevailing hourly rate for similar representation rendered in the circuit....

...the requested compensation. The court in Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So.2d 183, 188-89, (Fla.3d DCA 1980), interpreted section 925.036, Florida Statutes (1979), as follows: By its plain terms, this statute provides that an attorney appointed under Section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1979), shall be compensated exclusively at an hourly rate to be fixed by the chief judge or the senior judge of the circuit in an amount not to exceed the prevailing hourly rate for similar representation rendered in the circuit....

...Similarly, we find that public policy reasons exist in the present case which would also justify an exception to face-to-face confrontation. First, the witnesses in this case lived beyond the subpoena power of the court. See, e.g., § 27.04, Fla. Stat. (1995); [3] § 27.53, Fla....

...ed to administer oaths to all witnesses summoned to testify by the process of his or her court or who may voluntarily appear before the state attorney to testify as to any violation or violations of the criminal law. § 27.04, Fla. Stat. (1995). [4] Section 27.53(1) states in relevant part: Each assistant public defender appointed by a public defender under this section shall serve at the pleasure of the public defender....

...Each investigator employed by a public defender shall have full authority to serve any witness subpoena or court order issued, by any court or judge within the judicial circuit served by such public defender, in a criminal case in which such public defender has been appointed to represent the accused. § 27.53(1), Fla....

...o request the submission of three new candidates), and the Senate must confirm each nominee. Id. § 27.511(3). The regional counsel is in charge of hiring assistant regional counsel and other support staff pursuant to the General Appropriations Act. § 27.53(4), Fla....

...without a conflict of interest. Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1982). Moreover, once a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation....

...5. See Roberts v. State, 345 So.2d 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Turner v. State, 340 So.2d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The district court acknowledged this Court's decision in Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1982), in which we held that the language of section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...not represent the two clients without a conflict of interest." Guzman v. State, *1044 644 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994); Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla.1982); Hope v. State, 654 So.2d 639, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In that situation pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), "a trial court must grant separate representation." Guzman, 644 So.2d at 999....

...I would affirm the trial court's denial of both the motion to withdraw by counsel and the motion to withdraw plea. NOTES [1] Defense counsel's appointment in this case was the result of the public defender's certification of a conflict in representing defendant and a co-defendant, pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993).

...In In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990) [hereinafter In re Order ], this Court addressed the latest in a series of efforts by the Second District Court to resolve what has become a crisis situation. We noted that subsection 27.53(2), Florida Statutes, relied upon in Behr, was amended in 1981 to remove it as an independent mechanism for appointment of counsel in lieu of the public defender. Ch. 81-273, Laws of Fla. However, we found that subsection 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1989), provides an appropriate mechanism to handle the problem of excessive caseload. Subsection 27.53(3) provides: (3) If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defende...

...t choice may be because of the circumstances of the situation." Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, slip op. at 3 (Fla. 2d DCA May 12, 1989). This Court found in In re Order that the legislature in section 27.53(3) has provided the appropriate method for handling such situations, and held that where the backlog of cases in the public defender's office is so excessive that there is no possible way he can timely handle those cases, it is his responsibility to move the court to withdraw. If the court finds that the public defender's caseload is so excessive as to create a conflict, other counsel for the indigent defendant should be appointed pursuant to subsection 27.53(3)....

...Tenth Judicial Circuit shall file a motion in the Second District Court of Appeal to withdraw because of conflict created by excessive caseload. [5] The district court may either rule on the motion, and if proper appoint other counsel pursuant to subsection 27.53(3) and our opinion in In re Order, or order the circuit court to handle the motion and if proper appoint such counsel....

...ever received any notice of any hearings on said motion, and never was afforded any opportunity to contest the award. Rather, the order was entered ex parte against a body not party to the suit. The award of attorneys' fees was made pursuant to Sec. 27.53(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows: "In addition, any member of the bar in good standing may be appointed by the court or may register his or her availability to the public defender of each judicial circuit for acceptance of special assignments without salary to represent insolvent defendants....

...of $250 for the cost of investigation and preparation of the case for trial. However, the new Statute 909.21, under Ch. 70-339, effective January 1, 1971, kept the limit on attorneys' fees but removed the $250 limitation as to costs. Florida Statute 27.53, F.S.A. also provides for indigent criminal defense, but only in non-capital cases. It is noted that the said statute says nothing concerning the inevitable "costs for investigation and preparation of the case for trial." However, in sub-section (2) of 27.53, it provides for the appointment of a special assistant public defender and be paid a fee; "such fee shall be fixed by the trial judge and shall be paid in the same manner as counsel fees are paid in capital cases or as otherwise provided by law." Florida Statute 939.15, F.S.A....

...A charge of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery does not appear to be an extraordinary matter. Even if it did involve extraordinary services as in Dade *141 County v. Carr, supra, the result is the same. The only Florida case interpreting said statute 27.53 is Gant v....

...the circuit without conflict of interest, the trial court shall, upon motion of the public defender, appoint other counsel as provided by statute. [1] *861 In two unrelated cases, Babb, the public defender for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...shall appoint assistant public defenders and who shall perform those duties prescribed by general law. In accordance with this provision and to address conflicts of interest arising within a public defender's office, the Florida Legislature enacted section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Additionally, the Fifth District requires the trial court to weigh those same factors before it rules on a motion to withdraw. *862 We do not agree that the legislature intended to place such a burden on either the public defender or the trial court. We find that the language in section 27.53(3) clearly and unambiguously requires the trial court to appoint other counsel not affiliated with the public defender's office upon certification by the public defender that adverse defendants cannot be represented by him or his staff without conflict of interest....

...The statute does not require the consideration and weighing of those factors suggested by the district court and, more importantly, does not permit the appointment of other counsel affiliated with the public defender's office once conflict is certified. The legislature's intent is made even clearer by the 1981 amendments to section 27.53(3)....

...The legislature intended that assistant public defenders within the same circuit, regardless of the location of their offices, not be appointed to represent adverse defendants once the public defender of that circuit has determined conflict and has moved the court to appoint other counsel. Since section 27.53(3) is clear and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is not appropriate to displace its expressed intent. Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Company, 358 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1978). Accordingly, in response to the certified question, we hold that under the provisions of section 27.53(3), two adverse defendants should not be represented by assistant public defenders in the same circuit once the public defender has determined that to do so would be a conflict of interest and on that ground has moved the trial court to appoint other counsel....

...NOTES [1] In this case we have not considered, nor have we decided, whether a trial court's refusal to grant a public defender's motion to withdraw based on conflict of interest will result in the reversal of a conviction without a showing of prejudice by the defendant. [2] Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1981), reads in pertinent part: If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot a...

...The county argued that section 27.51(1), [2] Florida Statutes (1977), imposes a clear duty on the public defender to provide representation to insolvent defendants. The district court denied relief, saying that the cited subsection must be read in pari materia with other relevant statutes and standards. Section 27.53(2) allows the trial court the discretion to appoint as special assistant public defender any member of the Bar to represent insolvent defendants....

...ounty expense on the ground of excessive case load in the public defender's office. The petitioner here reiterates its argument that the public defender has a clear duty, under section 27.51, to represent insolvent defendants. It argues further that section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977), [3] provides that the only circumstance under which the public defender may withdraw is conflict of interest among the clients of the office. The respondent argues that section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), [4] contemplates *149 various kinds of special circumstances and reasons for appointment of private counsel and that these may include excessive case load. The duty of the public defender to provide representation derives not from the statute, respondent contends, but from court appointment. Therefore the appointment of private counsel under section 27.53(2) can be either instead of the public defender in the first instance, or following the granting of a public defender's motion to withdraw....

...atute and that in purporting to relieve the public defender of that duty the court exceeded its authority. The public defender's motion, said the court, did not state a "lawful ground" for the appointment of a special assistant public defender under section 27.53(2)....

...If so appointed, it becomes the public defender's duty to represent such defendant. The court also has the option of appointing a member of the Florida Bar in good standing to represent an insolvent defendant in a criminal proceeding pursuant to either Section 27.53(2) or 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...to represent insolvent defendants in criminal proceedings. Id. at 158 (footnote omitted). The dissenting opinion stated further that there should be no necessity for inquiry into whether the trial court's order is based on a "lawful ground" because section 27.53(2), providing the authority for the appointment in question, does not mention any such prerequisite....

...Thus the two majority opinions and one dissent below provide us with three possible approaches to resolving the problem before us. The third district majority holds that the appointment of private counsel in substitution for the public defender under section 27.53(2) must be based on some "lawful ground," and holds that excessive case load is not such a lawful ground. The dissenter insists that the trial court's discretion to appoint members of the bar as special assistant public defenders under section 27.53(2) is virtually unfettered and not dependent on a showing of a lawful ground or special circumstances. The first district's approach is to hold that appointments of *150 private counsel in lieu of or substitution for the public defender under section 27.53(2) must be based on some special circumstance and that excessive case load is such a special circumstance....

...el should be assigned to serve as a special assistant public defender. Clearly, the counties are the only real parties in interest in such a proceeding, and they should be able to challenge the evidence offered to support a claim of excess caseload. Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that the fees, costs, and expenses for a special assistant public defender are to be paid in the same manner as capital case fees which, pursuant to section 925.035, Florida Statutes (1979), are to be paid by the county....

...ul screening of cases for which indigency representation is requested. OVERTON and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The fees and expenses of private counsel appointed to represent insolvent defendants are paid in the same manner as in capital cases, § 27.53, Fla....

...and refuses to cooperate fully with counsel" and "has become so adverse and hostile that he necessarily cannot be counseled by the Public Defender's office without a conflict of interest." The motion asked the court to appoint substitute counsel per section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes....

...nt adult criminal defendant at the trial level where the public defender has been permitted by the court to withdraw from representing such defendant because of a conflict of interest. For the reasons developed below, we conclude that under Sections 27.53(2), (3), 925.036, Florida Statutes (1979): (a) the trial court may appoint for compensation purposes one, but no more than one, member of the Florida Bar to represent such an insolvent criminal defendant, (b) the trial court may, in its discret...

...he defendant Stewart and other defendants represented by the public defender. Accordingly, the public defender moved the trial court to withdraw from representing the defendant Stewart and to appoint private counsel to represent said defendant under Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...f the circuit or the senior judge thereof, as required by the above statute. Moreover, our review of the record reflects no such order by the chief judge or senior judge of the circuit. This petition for a writ of certiorari follows. II The statute [§ 27.53(3), Fla....

...However, the trial court shall appoint such other counsel upon its own motion when the facts developed upon the face of the record and files in the cause disclose such conflict, and said attorney may, in the discretion of the court, be paid a fee and costs and expenses as is provided in subsection (2)." § 27.53(3), Fla....

...he statute. This subsection, in turn, provides that "[s]uch fee and costs and expenses shall be fixed by the trial judge and *188 shall be paid in the same manner and amount as counsel fees are paid in capital cases or as otherwise provided by law." § 27.53(2), Fla. Stat.(1979). Section 925.036, Florida Statutes (1979), provides the method by which the court may compensate an attorney who is appointed, as here, under Section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1979). The subject statute reads as follows: "An attorney appointed pursuant to s. 925.035 or s. 27.53 shall, at the conclusion of the representation, be compensated at an hourly rate fixed by the chief judge or senior judge of the circuit in an amount not to exceed the prevailing hourly rate for similar representation rendered in the circuit....

...(3) For life felonies represented at the trial level: $2,000. (4) For capital cases represented at the trial level: $2,500. (5) For representation on appeal: $1,000." § 925.036, Fla. Stat.(1979). By its plain terms, this statute provides that an attorney appointed under Section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1979), shall be compensated exclusively at an hourly rate to be fixed by the chief judge or the senior judge of the circuit in an amount not to exceed the prevailing hourly rate for similar representation rendered in the circuit....

...III We turn now to the order under review in the instant case to determine whether the above statutory requirements were met. We conclude that such requirements were not met. A The subject order awards a separate fee to two attorneys for representing one defendant. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1979), however, contemplates the appointment of only one attorney to represent one indigent defendant for which a fee may later be awarded to the said attorney....

...ce and dignity of the State of Florida. /s/ J. Richard Soulliere J. RICHARD SOULLIERE FOREMAN OF THE GRAND JURY" [3] Both Mr. Goldstein and Mr. Sherman were referred to as special assistant public defenders in the court below. This was a misnomer as Section 27.53(3), Fla....

...he public defender to represent the defendant Stewart. It could not thereafter utilize the statute to permit the public defender to withdraw as counsel based on the conflict of interest grounds and appoint private counsel to represent the defendant. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1979), exclusively governs such a procedure, and is, accordingly, the sole statutory authority for the appointments in this cause....

...See English v. McCrary, 348 So.2d 293 (Fla.1977); cf. Schreiber, 561 So.2d at 1241-42. Migdal and the public defender were properly appointed to represent their clients pursuant to sections 27.51(1)(c), and 39.041, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), and section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Despite the trial judge's improvident language in twice referring to his "appointment" of Gentry to represent Puckett on appeal, he had no authority to make such an appointment in the absence of a conflict of interest on the part of the Office of the Public Defender. See § 27.53(3), Fla....

...blic defender]— without any inquiry by an appellate court. " Id. Under the Fourth District's interpretation of the statute, if the public defender "certifies conflict then RCC shall handle the appeal." Id. The Fourth District further concluded that section 27.5303(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), only authorizes factual inquiries into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding conflict by trial courts, not when the appellate public defender certifies conflict....

...valid for the codefendants' appeals as well. Id. at 1267. Finally, the district court concluded that RCC has no standing to object to a public defender's motion to withdraw. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on the fact that section 27.5303(1)(a), which gave the Justice Administrative Commission standing to challenge a public defender's motions, was repealed in 2007 and no other statute gave RCC standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw....

...the appellate level the case will automatically be transferred to RCC without a determination from a district court of appeal. Id. at 1266. ANALYSIS The underlying case involves a judicial interpretation of the application of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a) and whether RCC has standing to challenge a public defender's motion to withdraw....

...cordance with constitutional principles of due process." Crist v. Fla. Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, 978 So.2d 134, 148 (Fla.2008). If RCC has a conflict, the court appoints private counsel from the registry. § 27.40(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). [1] Section 27.5303, which addresses conflicts of interest by the public defender and RCC, provides that in determining whether or not there is a conflict of interest, the public defender and RCC "shall apply the standards contained in the Uniform Standards for Use in Conflict of Interest Cases found in appendix C to the Final Report of the Article V Indigent Services Advisory Board dated January 6, 2004." § 27.5303(1)(e), Fla....

...in the state courts system and any authorized appeals to the federal courts required of the official making the request. If the public defender certifies to the court that the public defender has a conflict consistent with the criteria prescribed in s. 27.5303 and moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal, unless the regional counsel has a conflict, in which case the court shall appoint private counsel pursuant to s....

...The Fourth District concluded that this statute specifically governs conflicts relating to the appellate public defender. Because the last sentence of the statute provides *1311 that if the public defender "certifies. . . conflict consistent with the criteria" specified in [section] 27.5303 and "moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal," the Fourth District concluded that appellate courts are not authorized to review such motions or to inquire into the adequacy of the conflict representations (as section 27.5303(1)(a) specifies) and certification of conflict by the appellate public defender must result in appointment of RCC....

...egislative intent for creating RCC, list the qualifications for RCC and how RCC should be appointed, and list the duties of RCC, which include representation on appeals if the public defender has a conflict. Additionally, the language and history of section 27.5303(1)(a) do not support the Fourth District's interpretation of the statutes. Under the Fourth District's interpretation, if the appellate public defender certifies conflict then RCC shall handle the appeal. Section 27.5303 is entitled "Public defenders; criminal conflict and civil regional counsel; conflict of interest. " § 27.5303, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). In fact, the whole subject matter of section 27.5303 is conflicts of interest, the appointment of other counsel when a conflict occurs, and how a conflict is to be determined....

...The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. If the court grants the motion to withdraw, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent the accused, as provided in s. 27.40. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). This provision was originally contained in section 27.53(3) of the Florida Statutes....

...on conflicts of interest between Guzman and other clients of the public defender's office. Id. at 997. This Court stated that once a public defender moves to withdraw based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between two clients under section 27.53(3), the trial court must grant separate representation....

...At the time, the statute provided that if a public defender determined that the interests of the clients were adverse or hostile, the public defender had a duty to move the court to appoint other counsel and the court could appoint another member of the Florida Bar to represent the accused. § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Following this Court's decision in Guzman, the Legislature amended section 27.53(3) to provide that under such circumstances the public defender shall file a motion to withdraw and the court "shall review and may inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding a conf...

...o withdraw based upon an assertion of conflict. In fact, the court is specifically charged with reviewing the motion and making a determination of whether the asserted conflict is prejudicial to the client. In 2003, this provision was moved to *1313 section 27.5303 [2] as part of a comprehensive bill dealing with the implementation of Revision 7 to Article V of the Florida Constitution....

...The analysis also notes that "[c]urrently, there appears to be some difference of opinion concerning the extent to which the court can inquire into the sufficiency of a motion filed by a public defender to withdraw from representation due to an ethical conflict of interest." Id. The plain language of section 27.5303(1)(a) specifies when it applies and what action the public defender and court must take....

...The opening sentence provides that "[i]f, at any time " during the representation of multiple defendants a public defender determines that they cannot all be counseled without a conflict of interest, then the public defender " shall file a motion to withdraw and move the court to appoint other counsel." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...s the second sentence of the statute provides. In fact, appellate courts do review motions for their adequacy and can direct further inquiry on motions through orders to show cause or by scheduling oral argument. Moreover, when section 27.511(8) and section 27.5303(1)(a) are read in pari materia, there is no contradiction in the statutes and one can discern a reconciled legislative intent that courts review all motions to withdraw, at both the trial and appellate level, and make further inquiry if necessary. In light of the plain language, the titles of the statutes, and the legislative history of sections 27.511(8) and 27.5303(1)(a), we disagree with the Fourth District's interpretation of the statutes. Instead, we hold that section 27.5303(1)(a) governs all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict, both at the trial and appellate level, and the court where the motion is filed is required to review such motions for sufficiency....

...LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result. CANADY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. CANADY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority's conclusion that section 27.5303(1)(a) governs all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict—both at the trial and appellate levels—and that the court where the motion is filed is required to review such motions for sufficiency....

...Behr arose from different procedural circumstances and interpreted a different statutory provision. Moreover, Behr contains no discussion of the legal principles governing standing. In Behr, Escambia and Dade Counties filed petitions for writs of certiorari, asserting that section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1977), imposed a duty on the public defender to represent indigent defendants and permitted withdrawal only in the circumstance of a conflict of interest. On review, this Court explained that section 27.53(2) stated that in addition to the public defenders, "any member of the bar in good standing may be appointed by the court to . . . represent insolvent defendants." *1318 Behr, 384 So.2d at 148 n. 4. Based on this language, this Court concluded that section 27.53 granted trial courts discretion to appoint either private counsel or the public defender without making any "prerequisite findings" and that, as a result, the trial court did "not have to . . . allow the county an opportunity to be heard before appointing private counsel." Id. at 150. In Behr, this Court determined that because section 27.53(2) granted the trial court broad discretion to appoint a private attorney rather than a public defender, the counties did not have a legal basis for challenging the motions to withdraw and there was no reason to conduct a hearing on the matter. In contrast, the statute at issue in the case on review—section 27.5303(1)(a)—does limit the trial court's discretion to grant a public defender's motion to withdraw to only those circumstances when the public defender has a conflict....

...A litigant lacking standing to raise an issue in a lower court also lacks standing to obtain appellate review and a ruling from the appellate court that the lower court erred on that issue. In conclusion, I would quash the Fourth District's decision. The Fourth District erred both in its interpretation of section 27.5303(1)(a) and in its ruling regarding RCC's standing. RCC had a sufficient interest in the public defender's motion to be heard on the subject, and pursuant to section 27.5303(1)(a), the Fourth District should have reviewed the sufficiency of the public defender's motion to withdraw....

...State, 644 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994), courts must allow withdrawal when the public defender certifies "that the interests of one client are so adverse or hostile to those of another client that the public defender cannot represent the two clients without a conflict of interest." In Guzman our supreme court was construing section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), and that opinion left trial courts with no discretion when a public defender filed a motion to withdraw alleging conflict....

...no alternative but to quash the order because of Guzman. We observed that any change in this area of the law would have to come from the legislature. The public defender points out that the comments to the committee notes to House Bill 327, amending section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes, which were issued June 14, 1999, shows that the amendment was a response to Reardon....

...s other witnesses' cases were also closed. After defense counsel volunteered that none of the witnesses were being represented the trial court denied the motion. In his reply brief, Henyard argues that the governing law at the time of trial, notably section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), as interpreted by Guzman v....

...State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla.1994), presumed that a conflict existed upon the filing of the motion to withdraw and that the trial court judge had no discretion other than to grant the motion. In other words, Henyard is arguing that the trial court's questioning surrounding the motion was inappropriate. In relevant part, section 27.53(3) stated: If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his staff without conflict of interest, or that none can be counseled by the public defender or his staff because of conflict of interest, it shall be his duty to move the court to appoint other counsel. § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Notably, trial counsel's motion to withdraw made no reference to section 27.53(3)....

...Rather, the motion stated, as to potential witness Neal, that the public defender's office would be placed "in the untenable position of having to cross-examine a former client." The addendum in which the only witness that actually testified at trial was listed contained no reference to section 27.53(3) or additional legal argument either. Under these specific circumstances, we conclude that the motion did not satisfy the requirements of section 27.53(3), and therefore appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal....

...lient will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client." Fla.Bar Code Prof.Resp., D.R. 5-105(B). When a public defender perceives a conflict of interest, he or she must move the court to appoint separate counsel. § 27.53(3), Fla....

...792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, and Florida *865 decisions of necessity following it, trial judges are required to see that legal counsel to represent indigent defendants charged with felony violations are provided. To implement this constitutional requirement, F.S. Section 27.53(2), F.S.A., provides for the appointment of special assistant public defenders by trial judges....

...r, and the other a public defender. The same compensation rule allowing a reasonable fee applies to each of them as a matter of equality of treatment. No double standard of compensation is warranted by the law. As was Section 32.17 in the Carr case, Section 27.53(2) must be read in connection with Sections 142.10-142.13. Section 27.53(2) provides special assistant public defenders' fees "shall be fixed by the trial judge and shall be paid in the same manner as counsel fees are paid in capital cases or as otherwise provided by law." Section 909.21 provides that court-...

...itted. This is the manner (but not the maximum amount) prescribed whereby a special assistant public defender is compensated, except as otherwise provided by law. There is no limitation of the amount to be paid a special assistant public defender in Section 27.53(2) as there is in Section 909.21(2). Furthermore, Section 27.53(2) adds that defense counsel may be "paid pursuant to any existing or future local act or general act of local application" which further substantiates the view a public defender's compensation is not intended to be limited by Section 909.21(2) in maximum amount....

...In conclusion on this point, it appears to me that the District Court has neither logic nor a statutory basis for applying the fee limitation of F.S. Section 909.21(2), F.S.A., which relates solely to fees fixed for court-appointed counsel in capital cases, to Strauss' fee, which was fixed by the trial judge under F.S. Section 27.53(2), F.S.A. The District Court applied it out of "thin air," as if it were the Legislature, by simply transferring the fee limitation of Section 909.21(2) into Section 27.53(2)....

...o bear the costs necessary for his defense. The record reveals that the appellant is solvent. He is, therefore, not entitled to the benefits of the public defender system or any of the statutes enacted for the protection of insolvent defendants. See Section 27.53(1), Florida Statutes (1975); but cf....

...We treat the petition for writ of mandamus as certiorari and quash the order denying the request for withdrawal. The petitioner, charged with three violent felonies, was appointed an assistant public defender who was allowed to withdraw based on a certification of conflict pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...sentation of the State's witness. In response to a certified question, the supreme court held in Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla. 1982), that once the public defender has determined conflict and has moved the court to appoint other counsel "section 27.53(3) clearly and unambiguously requires the trial court to appoint other counsel not affiliated with the public defender's office." The trial court is not permitted to reweigh those factors considered by the public defender in determining that there is a conflict in representing two adverse defendants....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and Ettie Feistmann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee. PER CURIAM. Appellant was found guilty of strongarmed robbery. Prior to the trial, appellant's counsel, an assistant public defender, filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993). The motion asserted that an irreconcilable conflict of interest existed because the public defender's office had represented the alleged victim, the state's witness in an unrelated case. The trial court denied the motion. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part that: (3) If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that t...

...other counsel. The court may appoint one or more members of The Florida Bar, who are in no way affiliated with the public defender, in his capacity as such, or in his private practice, to represent those accused. The supreme court recently addressed section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and stated that: [O]nce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation......

...[1] Ward contends that the trial court's requiring the Office to assign other assistant public defenders in the Office to represent him, notwithstanding the finding that a general conflict of interest existed as to certain assistant public defenders in an entire branch of the Office, contravenes the express requirements of section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), and constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law....

...See Haines City Comm'ty Devel. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995) (whether the lower tribunal applied the correct law is synonymous with whether it observed the essential requirements of law); Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla.1982) ("We find that the language in section 27.53(3) clearly and unambiguously requires the trial court to appoint other counsel not affiliated with the public defender's office upon certification by the public defender that adverse defendants cannot be represented by him or his staff without conflict of interest.")....

...THE FACTS The State's information charged Ward with the third-degree felony of armed trespassing on land owned by a county judge in Liberty County. The Office was appointed to represent Ward. After an investigation, the Office filed a motion to withdraw from representing Ward and to appoint independent counsel. § 27.53(3), Fla....

...On these grounds, the motion to withdraw was denied. THE LAW Public defenders are duty-bound to move to withdraw when the conflict between two or more clients is such that "they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his or her staff without conflict of interest." § 27.53(3), Fla....

...adsden and Liberty Counties. The petitioner contends that once a conflict of interest was found under the alleged facts of the motion, the law did not permit substituted appointment of any other lawyer affiliated with the same Office. He is correct. § 27.53(3), Fla....

...361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). This constitutional guarantee "includes the right to counsel whose loyalty is not divided between clients with conflicting interests." Turner v. State, 340 So.2d 132, 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Bouie, 559 So.2d at 1115. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), states in pertinent part that "[i]f the court grants the motion to withdraw, it may appoint one or more members of The Florida Bar, who are in no way affiliated with the public defender, in his or her capacity as such, or in his or her private practice, to represent those accused." (Emphasis added). Florida courts have construed section 27.53(3) as affording greater protection than the Sixth-Amendment right to counsel....

...ests." Turner, 340 So.2d at 133 (viewing the Office of the Public Defender of a given circuit as a "firm" for purposes of construing the disciplinary rules governing conflicting interests of clients and imputed disqualification). The requirements of section 27.53(3), which governs public defenders' offices, reflect concerns like those underlying the conduct set forth for private attorneys in the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar: Rule 4-1.7 Conflict of Interest; General Rule (a) Representing Adve...

...ification of All Lawyers in Firm. While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any 1 of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c), 4-1.9. or 4-2.2. The language in section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), is consonant with the Florida Supreme Court's view that "[a]s a general rule, a public defender's office is the functional equivalent of a law firm." Bouie, 559 So.2d at 1115; cf. State v. Fitzpatrick, 464 So.2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 1985) (noting that state attorneys' offices have no statutory counterpart to § 27.53(3))....

...We hold that by requiring an ethically conflicted attorney from the Office to represent the petitioner, the trial court would be denying effective assistance of counsel. Under the given circumstances, the admitted conflict affecting the attorneys in an entire branch of the Office extends to the whole Office under section 27.53(3) and Babb, and the trial court's ruling to the *709 contrary constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law that would result in irreparable, material harm to the petitioner that cannot be remedied on final appeal....

...blic defender's office and therefore it is a single "law firm." The supreme court in Babb v. Edwards did not specifically adopt the language that the public defender's office within a judicial circuit is a single "firm", but based its conclusions on section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...This stipulation by the County is approved by this court and is accepted as in the interests of justice. The stipulation shall be without prejudice to the position of the County on its petition. It is important to recognize that the trial judge has statutory authority to appoint a special assistant public defender. Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: "In addition, any member of the bar in good standing may be appointed by the court to, or may register his or her availability to the public defender of each judicial circuit for acceptance of, special assignments without salary to represent insolvent defendants....

...Especially noted is Section 27.54(2), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: "No county or municipality shall appropriate or contribute funds to the operation of the offices of the various public defenders." The County has appropriated money to pay for special assistant public defenders when appointed pursuant to Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: "If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be co...

...of law in entering the order from which this petition is taken. Briefly stated, the issue presented for review by the petition and response filed herein is whether a showing of a "lawful ground" or "special circumstances" is necessary under Sections 27.53(2), 925.035, Florida Statutes (1977), before a trial court may (1) appoint a member of the Florida Bar in good standing as a special assistant public defender to represent an insolvent defendant on appeal in a felony case, and (2) thereafter fi...

...ent of the special assistant public defender. The trial court in no sense departed from essential requirements of law in appointing the special assistant public defender herein. A The controlling statute upon which the decision in this case rests is Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...ate by the Florida Legislature in 1963 following the United States Supreme Court decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and has been in effect without substantial amendment for over fifteen years. Compare § 27.53(2), Fla....

...Such persons shall be listed and referred to as special assistant public defenders and be paid a fee and costs and expenses. Such fee and costs and expenses shall be fixed by the trial judge and shall be paid in the manner as counsel fees are paid in capital cases or as otherwise provided by law." § 27.53(2), Fla....

...rt in the same manner as counsel fees are paid in capital cases. Section 925.035, Florida Statutes (1977), governs the manner in which counsel fees are paid to court appointed counsel in capital cases, and is, therefore, incorporated by reference in Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...l fees are paid in capital cases. Counsel fees in capital cases, and therefore under this statute, must be reasonable and are payable by the county. The First District Court of Appeal in Gant v. State, 216 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), has held that Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977) means as follows: "A literal interpretation of subsection (2) of the above-quoted statute [§ 27.53, Fla....

...The court has resolved this dispute by holding that an excessive caseload by the public defender is not a "lawful ground" for the appointment of a special assistant public defender and has therefore upset the order under review. I find it unnecessary to reach any of these questions because there is no provision in Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), which can even remotely be interpreted to require a showing of "a lawful ground" or "special circumstances" before a trial court can appoint a special assistant public defender and thereafter fix attorney's fees, costs and expenses to be paid by the county....

...It is therefore irrelevant, in my view, to determine whether an excessive caseload by the public defender constitutes a lawful ground for the appointment of a special assistant public defender and if so, whether such a ground was established in this case. [2] For the court to read into Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), a requirement of a "lawful ground" as a predicate for its holding in this case is, in all due respects, to amend the statute by finding language therein which is not there....

...In this connection, I am in complete agreement with the court that the proper remedy, if any, to the situation posed in this case is a revision of the applicable statutory law, not judicially-approved stopgap measures. Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). In addition to the plain language of Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), the legislative history behind the passage of the Public Defender Act in 1963 supports the conclusion that no showing of a "lawful ground" or "special circumstances" is necessary in order for a trial court to appoint a special assistant public defender under such statute....

...the pressure of other work or other good cause. " B.K. Roberts, "Judicial Council Sponsors Public Defender Legislation," 37 Fla.Bar J. 381, 382 (1963). For whatever reason, the legislature chose not to include the underscored language in any form in Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1963), upon final passage. It is therefore my view that the courts should not read into the current statute [§ 27.53(2), Fla....

...he legislature from the original bill. Based on the above authorities and reasoning, it is not surprising that we are cited to no prior case in this state which has *158 superimposed a requirement of a "lawful ground" or "special circumstances" onto Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Indeed, the existing statutory and decisional law in this state is quite to the contrary as previously indicated. And to the extent that certain administrative orders entered by the Chief Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida purport to repeal, amend, or limit Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), the orders are of no force and effect. See State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960). It is therefore difficult to understand how the trial court could in any sense have departed from essential requirements of law by following the plain meaning of Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes (1977), as previously interpreted by the Florida courts....

...If so appointed, it becomes the public defender's duty to represent such defendant. The court also has the option of appointing a member of the Florida Bar in good standing to represent an insolvent defendant in a criminal proceeding pursuant to either Section 27.53(2) or 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...represent, without additional compensation as provided in S.925.035, any person who is deemed to be insolvent, as provided in this act, who is under arrest for, or is charged with, a felony ...', must be read in pari materia with other relevant statutes and standards. Section 27.53(2) allows the trial court the discretion to appoint as special assistant public defender any member of the Bar to represent insolvent defendants." Id....

...ain minimum level of funding. [6] Also the counties are required to pay for reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses as fixed by trial upon the court's appointment of private counsel for an insolvent defendant in a criminal case under Sections 27.53(2), 27.53(3) and 925.035, Florida Statutes (1977), or for an insolvent respondent in an involuntary hospitalization proceeding (as to reasonable attorney's fees) under Section 394.473, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...cases and has been more than accommodating to the public defender herein as to office space, utilities, telephone service, custodial services and other court costs. The specially appropriate fund is not limited to private counsel appointments under Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977), as the court suggests, but extends as well to private counsel appointments under Sections 27.53(2) and 925.035, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...and all appellate representation of the [d]efendant herein is granted. The [c]ourt hereby appoints Carl Howard Lida as special assistant public defender to represent the indigent [d]efendant in this case in further appellate proceedings pursuant to Section 27.53(2), Florida Statutes." We have no occasion to determine whether the appointment herein was valid under Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1977), as the appointment was not predicated on that statute....

...without a conflict of interest. Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859 (Fla.1982). Moreover, once a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation....

...Under Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla.1994), trial courts had no discretion to inquire into the merits of public defenders' claims of conflict of interest; however, as we explained in Valle, Guzman has been abrogated by the recent amendment to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which authorizes courts to inquire "into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest." Ch....

...Citrus County, Florida, 462 So.2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) precludes it from being held to be legally liable for said attorney's fees and costs. To hold Songer determinative of the law when applied to the facts of this case would cause Florida Statutes 27.53, 925.035 and 925.036 to be unconstitutional as applied and would constitute a denial of Defendant's constitutional entitlement to equal protection of the law under the United States and Florida constitutions....

...We agree with the trial judge that our prior case of Songer v. Citrus County, Florida, 462 So.2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) is not pertinent to the instant issue. Songer was a narrowly limited opinion which upheld a trial court's determination that nothing in section 27.53, 925.035 or 925.036, Florida Statutes (1983) authorized the imposition of attorney fees on a county for the representation of a criminal defendant in post-conviction collateral proceedings....

...resent appellant. Appellant's boyfriend, Angelo Dellobuono, was also charged with two counts of dealing in stolen property. Both appellant and Dellobuono were appointed an assistant public defender. Dellobuono's counsel moved to withdraw pursuant to section 27.53, Florida Statutes, on the grounds that a conflict of interest existed since the Public Defender's Office was also representing appellant and Dellobuono's theory of defense would be adverse to that of his co-defendant....

...4-1.10. [2] *115 This view was adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Bouie v. State, 559 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990), wherein the court held that as a general rule, a public defender's office cannot represent defendants with conflicting interests. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (2000), which governs public defender's offices, is consonant with the Florida Supreme Court's view, that the public defender's office is the functional equivalent of a law firm....

...ch conflict. The court shall advise the appropriate public defender and clerk of court, in writing, when making such appointment and state the conflict prompting the appointment. The appointed attorney shall be compensated as provided in s. 925.036. § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (2000)(emphasis added). While the trial court now has the discretion to inquire into the allegations of conflict when the public defender seeks to withdraw from representation, see Valle v. State, 763 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), section 27.53(3) also enables the court to sua sponte appoint conflict-free counsel when a conflict is apparent and the facts developed on the face of the record and files disclose that a conflict exists....

...represent, without additional compensation as provided in S. 925.035, any person who is deemed to be insolvent, as provided in this act, who is under arrest for, or is charged with, a felony ...", must be read in pari materia with other relevant statutes and standards. Section 27.53(2) allows the trial court the discretion to appoint as special assistant public defender any member of the Bar to represent insolvent defendants....

...this defendant, and upon the issuance of the mandate herein, vacate the previously ordered stay of proceedings. Writ GRANTED; Order QUASHED; Stay VACATED. COWART and DANIEL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See State v. Pettis, 520 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1988). [2] Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1987) states, in pertinent part: (3) If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they can...

...lso represented the alleged victim in this case at his arraignment on a charge of driving under the influence. The trial judge denied leave to withdraw. We grant certiorari, quash the order, and instruct the trial judge to appoint different counsel. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1997), provides: "If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counsele...

...925.036." In Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 1994), the court held that: "once a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separation representation." Moreover, the Guzman court also held that a trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conf...

...osure of the confidential communications of the client." Presumably the Florida Supreme Court was aware of Holloway when it issued its opinions in Guzman and Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859 (Fla.1982), in which the Court stated that: "the language in section 27.53(3) clearly and unambiguously requires the trial court to appoint other counsel ......

...upon certification by the public defender that adverse defendants cannot be represented by him or his staff without conflict of interest. The statute does not require the consideration and weighing of those factors suggested by the district court.... Since section 27.53(3) is clear and unambiguous, judicial interpretation is not appropriate to displace its expressed intent." 412 So.2d at 862....

...t the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own interests or by the lawyer's duties to another current client, a former client, or a third person"). Although the rule was once otherwise, [3] section 27.5303, Florida Statutes (2006), now permits a trial court to inquire into the factual basis of a legally sufficient motion for leave to withdraw on conflict of interest grounds that arise from the public defender's representation of multiple defendants....

...without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. *974 § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ion. After all, the statute acknowledges the existence of confidential communications, and does not purport to abolish the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege, both of which limit the trial court's ability to learn all the facts. Section 27.5303(1)(a) requires denial of a legally sufficient motion only if the trial court affirmatively finds that an indigent client or his or her representation has not been and is unlikely to be prejudiced by the public defender's representation of the other client(s), [6] i.e., that "the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...An irreconcilable conflict exists because of the downward departure that the informant received for gathering evidence against Mr. Scott, as well as the Public Defender's current representation of the informant. The trial court did not in terms rule that the stated "grounds for withdrawal are insufficient." § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ition adverse to another client when the lawyer represents both clients in the same proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record at a hearing. [3] Until 1999, section 27.53, Florida Statutes, required a trial court to grant a public defender's motion to withdraw on conflict of interest grounds without conducting any factual inquiry. See Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994) ("[O]nce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation." (citing Nixon v. Siegel, 626 So.2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993))); Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla. 1982); see also § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). [4] In 1999, the legislature amended section 27.53(3) to permit the trial court to "inquire or conduct a hearing into the adequacy of the public defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest" and to direct the trial courts to grant withdrawal "unless the court determines that the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." Ch. 99-282, § 1, at 3084, Laws of Fla.; Valle v. State, 763 So.2d 1175, 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (recognizing that the 1999 amendments to section 27.53(3) abrogate Guzman ). Effective July 1, 2004, the legislature renumbered section 27.53(3) to section 27.5303(1)(a) and inserted language directing a trial court to "deny the motion to withdraw if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." Ch....

...n order to demonstrate entitlement to leave to withdraw from a case. The court must grant a public defender's motion for leave to withdraw unless it can rule out prejudice in fact and any substantial risk of prejudice to the client(s) going forward. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...r relevant statutes and standards. In particular, the statute must be construed in light of the aforementioned ethical standards as well as the express statutory authorization permitting the trial court to appoint special assistant public defenders. Section 27.53(2); see also In re: Directive to the public defender of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, 6 FLW 324 (Fla....

...ction again for appointment of alternate counsel. We appreciate and sympathize with the trial judge's desire to save the taxpayers of *462 his county the additional expense incurred by the necessity of appointing special public defenders pursuant to section 27.53(2)....

...Phelps, however, had been appointed the public defender on 19 November 1999 for a similar crime. When the public defender realized that it had previously been appointed to represent Phelps, it moved to withdraw from Stoudimire's case. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw finding no prejudice to Stoudimire. Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999) reads: (3) If, at any time during the representation of two or more indigents, the public defender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by...

...ich fact alone would not ethically bar them from representing adverse interests. [5] The trial judge was therefore correct in ruling that the appointment was not barred by considerations of ethics. We must then consider the effect of the language in section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) and (vi), we certify that this decision passes upon a question of great public importance and that said decision is in direct conflict with decisions of other district courts of appeal, as hereinbefore noted. DENIED. COBB, SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 27.53(3), Fla....

...l exist. In view of the public defender's certification of conflict, the trial court had no discretion to do other than grant the motion; it may not reweigh the facts that gave rise to the public defender's determination that a conflict existed. See § 27.53(3), Fla....

originally contained in section 27.53(3). Until its amendment in 1999, section 27.53 required a trial court

...n, the trial court had no discretion and was required to grant the motion. See, e.g., Valle v. State, 763 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see generally, 14 Fla. Jur.2d Criminal Law § 549 (2001). The applicable 1999 legislative amendment codified in section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (2001), now provides: If, at any time during the representation of two or more indigents, the public defender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counsele...

...The trial court entered an order awarding Anderson $2800 on this motion. Anderson seeks review of this award. In February 2001, the Department of Child and Family Services instituted proceedings to terminate the parental rights of E.T., the father. In April 2001, pursuant to sections 27.53 and 925.036 of the Florida Statutes, the trial court appointed the appellant, Gaila Anderson, to represent the father, who was indigent and serving time in prison....

...The standard of review for a writ of certiorari is "whether the trial court ... departed from the essential requirements of law." Sheppard & White, P.A., 827 So.2d at 928 n. 3 (citation omitted). Under section 925.036 of the Florida Statutes, attorneys appointed pursuant to section 27.53 of the Florida Statutes, like Anderson, are compensated at a fixed hourly rate....

...This petition followed. As we noted in Valle v. State, 763 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), the trial court now has discretion to inquire into the allegations of conflict when a public defender seeks to withdraw from representation. This was the result of an amendment to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), and a reaction to the supreme court's decision in Guzman v....

...representations regarding a conflict of interest without requiring the disclosure of any confidential communications. The court shall permit withdrawal unless the court determines that the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. § 27.53(3), Fla....

...nctional equivalent of a law firm. However, in Bouie the court's holding was that to show a constitutional violation of the right to counsel, an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer's performance. See id. This is consistent with section 27.53(3) which permits the trial court to assess not only whether a conflict exists, but also whether the asserted conflict is prejudicial to the indigent client....

...uring that time, is controlling. On October 24, 1989, however, the current Administrative Order of the Chief Judge of the 18th Judicial Circuit [AD 89-69] became effective. AD 89-69, provides: 1. The hourly rate for attorneys appointed pursuant to F.S. 27.53 or F.S....

...The county's other argument is that the portion of Administrative Order 89-69 that sets a range of fees rather than a single specific hourly rate is invalid because section 925.036(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that: (1) An attorney appointed pursuant to s. 925.035 or s. 27.53 shall, at the conclusion of the representation, be compensated at an hourly rate fixed by the chief judge or senior judge of the circuit......

...may seem at odds with the general intent. RCC omits mentioning the dispositive provision in § 27.511(8), which states: "If the public defender certifies to the court that the public defender has a conflict consistent with the criteria prescribed in s. 27.5303 and moves to withdraw, the regional counsel shall handle the appeal, unless the regional counsel has a conflict, in which case the court shall appoint private counsel pursuant to s....

...This statute is not inconsistent with a supreme court holding before the statute was adopted. See Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994) ("[O]nce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3) ... a trial court must grant separate representation") (citing Babb v. Edwards, 412 So.2d 859, 862 (Fla.1982)); see also § 27.53(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). A separate statute authorizes but does not require trial courts to conduct an inquiry *1267 into the basis for the PD's assertion that a conflict exists. § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...lic defender's representations regarding a conflict of interest..."). RCC says this statute also applies in the appellate courts but has not furnished us with any statutory text supporting his argument that in spite of the clear appellate provision, § 27.5303(1)(a) nevertheless also authorizes factual inquiries when the appellate PD certifies conflict....

...A backlog of such appeals is plainly not the issue here, however; the reason for the PD's motion today is the presence of conflict. But since In re Order of Criminal Appeals, two statutes appear to bear directly on the issue of standing. In 2003, before the later adoption of the RCC statutes, the Legislature had enacted § 27.5303. [12] Subsection 27.5303(1)(a) then contained the following provision: "If, at any time during the representation of two or more defendants, a public defender determines that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be cou...

...The court shall deny the motion to withdraw *1268 if the court finds the grounds for withdrawal are insufficient or the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client. If the court grants the motion to withdraw, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent the accused." [e.s.] § 27.5303(1)(a), Fla....

...ormerly been given the Justice Administration Commission. [13] Since this 2007 legislation, no statute authorizes the newly created RCC to object to PD motions to withdraw in any court. The omission of any grant of standing in the revised version of § 27.5303 causes us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to grant the RCC statutory standing to object to PD withdrawals....

...cent representation was a 1998 case. Id. at D260, at ___. In this case, the public defender's office represented the victim in a 1998 prosecution for public assistance fraud, wherein she pled guilty and was sentenced. I believe that the amendment to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1999), was enacted to force closer scrutiny of the public defender's assertion of a conflict of interest....

...The statute vests some discretion in the trial court to deny withdrawal where "the court determines that the asserted conflict is not prejudicial to the indigent client." On this record, absent Valle, I *1286 would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The discretion that section 27.53(3) intended to give a trial court has been limited by our rigid, overbroad application of language in Bouie v. State, 559 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990), which mandates that a "public defender's office is the functional equivalent of a law firm." Our use of Bouie prevents a trial court from evaluating prejudice under section 27.53(3) from the standpoint of the assistant public defender representing a defendant, as opposed to the office as a whole....

with other relevant statutes and standards. Section 27.53(2) allows the trial court the discretion to

Peggy Ready, moved the court, pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1981), for leave to withdraw

EXPENSES OF SPECIAL ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDERS? Section 27.53, F.S., among other things, provides for the

REMANDED. SHARP, W., and PETERSON, JJ„ concur. . Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: (3) If

hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must

later compensated for his services pursuant to section 27.53, Florida Statutes (1979), does not validate

conflict on the part of the public defender. See § 27.53(3), Fla.Stat. (1981). In the course of his representation

where the former client is also a victim. See § 27.53(3), Fla.Stat. (1999) (courts have the discretion

See Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla.1994); § 27.53(3), Fla.Stat. (1993). The court is in no position

provides that each board select a representative. Section 27.53, Florida Statutes, authorizes the public defender

dismissed,300 So.2d 900 (Fla. 1974) to same effect. Section 27.53(1), F.S., authorizes public defenders to employ

First District Court of Appeal relied on Florida Statute 27.53(2) which allows the trial court to appoint

...the other case. We again conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Guzman v. State, 644 So.2d 996 (Fla.1994), leaves the trial court with no discretion to deny a motion to withdraw when the public defender certifies conflict pursuant to section 27.53, Florida Statutes....

...The Court also finds that CFLS is prohibited from using funds to provide legal assistance in a fee-generating case unless other adequate representation is unavailable. 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3. Attorneys appointed to represent insolvent defendants are to be paid a fee, costs and expenses, Fla.Sta. § 27.53(2), and there has been no showing that other adequate representation is unavailable....

hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must

judge properly exercised his discretion under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1997), in appointing a

hostile interests between the two clients under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must

petition. Guzman makes it clear that under section 27.53, Florida Statutes, the trial court had no discretion

Once a public defender moves to withdraw under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes, from the representation

develop a system to convert to the new manual. Section 27.53(1), F.S., provides, in part, that: The

CONFLICT CASES, SUBJECT TO s 286.011, F.S.? Section 27.53(3), F.S., provides that if at any time during

the Public Defender be appointed (pursuant to § 27.53, Florida Statutes) to represent appellant on his

appointed Blackwood independent counsel. Merits Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent

assistant public defender to represent defendant. See § 27.53(3), Fla.Stat. (1987). Soon thereafter the defendant’s

attorney’s fees to Dono-hoe, who, pursuant to Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1979), was appointed to

cer-tiorari seeks to review that order. Fla.Stat. § 27.53, F.S.A., is intended to facilitate legal services