Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. NOTES [1] Recently, in State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982 (Fla.2001), we held, under the youthful offender sentencing scheme, that only a new criminal offense constitutes a substantive violation of probation or community control. Under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1995), the trial court must determine whether the offender has committed a technical or substantive violation....

...motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule 3.800(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 We reverse because the trial court failed to continue Smith’s youthful offender designation. See Yegge v. State, 88 So. 3d 1058, 1059–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also § 958.14 Fla....

...ent placement. Cf. King v. State, 373 So.2d 78 (Fla.3d DCA 1979); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The jurisdictional issue arises from section 958.10, Florida Statutes (1979), and its apparent conflict with sections 958.05(2) and 958.14....

...than six years, not more than four of which are to be served in prison and not more than two years in community control. If the youthful offender violates the terms of his community control, the circuit court has jurisdiction to proceed pursuant to section 958.14, which incorporates section 948.06(1), to revoke the community control and pronounce sentence upon him....

...By authority of section 958.05(2) the circuit court initially ordered each appellant to incarceration and then a period of probation (which we held was meant to be community control). When they violated the terms of the probation/community control, the court had jurisdiction to sentence them pursuant to section 958.14....

...the youthful offender while he is in community control and who may proceed against him in the event he violates the terms of the community control, we believe the jurisdiction of the sentencing circuit court is established by sections 958.05(2) and 958.14....

...)), and as such is punishable by imprisonment for not more than thirty years ( See section 775.082(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1979)). However, the State takes the position that, upon a revocation of community control, the court may, under authority of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1979), which incorporates section 948.06(1), impose whatever sentence it might originally have imposed without regard to the youthful offender act....

...obation Act or the Fifth Amendment safeguard against double punishment. [6] See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 408 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1981). [7] Now section 948.01(8), Florida Statutes (1987). [8] § 958.011, et seq., Fla. Stat. (1987). [9] § 958.14, Fla....

...After Watts and Smith were released from prison, a community control officer in 1988 alleged that they violated community control. Watts and Smith admitted the violations in open court, and the circuit court revoked community control under the authority of Brooks v. State, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 1985). The defense argued that section 958.14 of the Florida Statutes (1987), part of the Youthful Offender Act, imposed a ceiling of six years' imprisonment, thereby limiting the trial court's discretion in resentencing. Section 958.14 provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. The state argued that section 958.14 was not intended to limit the circuit court's discretion, and that the court was free to resentence the defendants under section 948.06(1) to any sentence that the court might have originally imposed before it put the defendants on community control....

...The circuit court's imposition of sentence on Watts and Smith is a clear violation of that holding. However, this disposition does not resolve the certified conflict, and so our analysis cannot end there. Although the district court's decision in Franklin involved primarily double jeopardy considerations, it also interpreted section 958.14 in a manner that conflicts with the instant case and with Cole v....

...2d DCA 1988); Watson v. State, 528 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); and Brown v. State, 492 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). [4] Since the only question argued *997 and addressed in Franklin was the certified question, we did not reach the district court's interpretation of section 958.14....

...Brooks, 478 So.2d at 1053. Although we said in Brooks that a circuit court may treat the youthful offender as though it had never placed the defendant on community control, our opinion was limited to the controlling law at the time, which was the pre-1985 version of section 958.14. That statute provided in its entirety: A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1). § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1983). The controlling law changed effective July 1, 1985, when the legislature amended section 958.14 to add, in pertinent part, a second sentence: However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department [of Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1985). See ch. 85-288, § 24, Laws of Fla. The question is whether the legislature intended this second provision in section 958.14 to limit the application of the sentence preceding it. We believe that it did. The intent of the legislature should be derived from the plain language of the statute in question. The plain and ordinary meaning of section 958.14 is clear....

...ive. Allen v. State, 526 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 1988). See also Reams, 528 So.2d at 559 (Ervin, J., specially concurring). Our conclusion is fortified by the timing of the 1985 amendment. As the district court observed in Watson, the legislature amended section 958.14 after two district court decisions questioned whether a circuit court could resentence a youthful offender as an adult upon revocation of youthful offender status and revocation of community control....

...4th DCA 1984); Brooks v. State, 461 So.2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), approved, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 1985). We agree with Watson, in which the court said: [T]he only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to change the case law interpretation of § 958.14, or in any event to change the law, so that once the circuit court has given a defendant *998 youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resentence the defendant as a youthfu...

...A youthful offender's sentence after revocation of probation or community control is therefore limited to a maximum of six years less credit for time served. To assume that the legislature did not intend a change in the law would be to assume it intended to enact a nullity. The language of § 958.14, as amended, relating specifically to resentencing of youthful offenders after violation of probation or community control, should prevail over the preexisting general provisions of § 948.06(1) relating to any violation of probation or community control by anyone. Watson, 528 So.2d at 102. Although the foregoing analysis resolves the conflict among the district courts, we must determine whether the court below properly applied the 1985 amendment of section 958.14 where the original offenses occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, but the violations of community control occurred after the 1985 effective date....

...As the Second District Court said in Buckle, courts have viewed the 1985 amendment as being "applicable to all violations of probation occurring after its effective date because it is the violation of probation which subjects the youthful offender to the provisions of section 958.14." 528 So.2d at 1286....

...pective laws had changed. Moreover, the statutes that defined the original offense and sentence in the instant case, sections 812.13, 958.10, Florida Statutes (1983), have not been amended. Here, the amendment was to a completely separate provision, section 958.14, Florida Statutes, which had no direct connection to the original conviction or sentence....

...ct of [1891]; the same punishment may be inflicted, and the same form of sentence is to be entered as before the approval of the later act. Ex parte Pells, 28 Fla. at 74, 9 So. at 834-35. The facts in the instant case are analogous. The amendment to section 958.14 in no wise amended or directly affected sections 812.13 and 958.10, under which Watts and Smith were originally convicted and punished....

...nature of the offense created, or even the character or degree of the punishment authorized by the" statutes under which Watts and James originally were convicted and punished. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted section 958.14 to apply to violations of probation or community control that occurred after the effective date of the 1985 amendment, even where the original offenses occurred prior to that date....

...ding in Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla. 1989), did the [C]ourt intend to hold that a trial court could resentence a youthful offender as an adult, upon a violation of community control, despite the 1985 amendment to the youthful offender act, section 958.14, Florida Statutes? Hamilton, 553 So.2d at 389....

...We have for review Meeks v. State, 754 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), wherein the district court of appeal certified the following question as being one of great public importance: CAN A CIRCUIT COURT RE-SENTENCE A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION UNDER SECTION 958.14, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN THE ACTS UPON WHICH THE VIOLATION IS BASED DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE CRIMINAL OFFENSE? Id....

...The judge revoked Meeks' community control and resentenced him to ten years in prison. Meeks appealed his sentence, arguing that it violated the statutory limit for youthful offender sentences because it exceeded the six-year maximum which could be imposed for technical violations pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...It nevertheless certified the previously quoted question as one of great public importance. For purposes of clarifying the scope of our opinion, we rephrase the question to read as follows: WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION" OF PROBATION/COMMUNITY CONTROL AS THE TERMS ARE USED IN SECTION 958.14, FLORIDA STATUTES (1995)? ANALYSIS Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, addresses the sanctions which may be imposed upon a youthful offender who violates probation or community control and provides in pertinent part: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...State, 754 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Inman v. State, 684 So.2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Green v. State, 620 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). By placing reliance on Allen, the State is attempting to equate the term "substantial" with "substantive," as used in section 958.14....

...First, it is consistent with decisions from other Florida district courts, which have only classified new criminal offenses as "substantive violations." Further, concluding that only additional criminal offenses constitute substantive violations for purposes of section 958.14 also provides a clear line of demarcation which may be efficiently and uniformly applied by trial courts considering this issue. More importantly, however, such an interpretation would likely further the Legislature's intent. Particularly, the legislative history of section 958.14 demonstrates that the Legislature has had some struggle with the appropriate sanction for a youthful offender who violates probation. Prior to 1985, section 958.14 did not specifically delineate a permissible sanction that could be imposed on a youthful offender who violated community control, other than to note, by reference to section 948.06(1), that upon revocation of community control, a trial court could impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed....

...m sanction for a youthful offender who violated community control/probation was six years or the maximum term authorized for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever was less. [6] See also State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994 (Fla.1990). Section 958.14 was again amended in 1990, and it was at this time that language was included to provide different sanctions depending on whether the violation was substantive (i.e., youthful offender could be sentenced for a length of time to not exc...

...sentenced for a length of time to not exceed six years or the maximum sentence for which he or she was *989 found guilty, whichever is less). [7] It is this version of the statute which is at issue in this case. Our analysis of the three versions of section 958.14 clearly reveals that the applicable version of section 958.14 is a blending of the pre-1985 version of the statute—which allowed a trial court to sentence the defendant to any sentence which could have been originally imposed—and the pre-1990 version—which imposed a six-year cap irrespective of the violation....

...originally sentenced as a youthful offender becomes subject to being sentenced to the maximum authorized penalty for the offense for which he or she was found guilty. Accordingly, we conclude that a "substantive violation," as the phrase is used in section 958.14, refers exclusively to a violation premised on the commission of a separate criminal act....

...SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissenting. I dissent from the majority's determination that only a new criminal offense qualifies as a substantive violation of probation or community control under section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...However, confinement of the community controllee to his or her residence is the very essence of community control status. Thus, the failure of the community controllee to remain so confined surely cannot be characterized as a "technical" violation even if sentencing were to proceed under chapter 958.14....

...to abide by the curfew. It is that proposition (i.e., that violation of curfew is sufficient to revoke probation), which is not at issue in this case, that Jones stands for. Thus, in our view, it does not truly enhance the State's position. [5] See § 958.14, Fla....

...However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the [D]epartment [of Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1985)(pre-1990 version). [7] Section 958.14 has not undergone serious, substantive amendments since 1990.

...ive violation of probation. Instead, in that instance the court may sentence a youthful offender to a period not "longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated." § 958.14, Fla....

..."[A] motion to correct a sentencing error involves a pure issue of law," so the proper standard of review is de novo. Kittles v. State, 31 So.3d 283, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). Chapter 958 of the Florida Statutes governs youthful offenders. Specifically, section 958.14 discusses a youthful offender's violation of probation....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...After release from prison and while on community control in 1984, Arnette violated the conditions thereof by committing a sexual battery. [2] After sentencing him for this new crime, the court resentenced Arnette to life imprisonment for the 1979 armed burglary. We agree that this new sentence was not legal. In 1984, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), read: "A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...ears. The second ambiguity is whether the incarceration limitation (be it four years or six years) applied when the youthful offender was being resentenced after a violation of straight probation or *484 community control or whether the reference in section 958.14 to section 948.06(1) served to permit the imposition of the maximum statutory punishment for the particular underlying offense without the Youthful Offender Act's four or six year limitation....

...Another ambiguity is whether the answers to the preceding questions differ when the original Youthful Offender sentence is a true split sentence rather than a probationary split sentence. 566 So.2d at 1371 (footnote omitted). In 1985 the legislature amended section 958.14 to limit total prison sentences of a youthful offender to six years....

...It has always been clear that the legislature intended to treat youthful offenders differently than adults. Unless the legislature clearly states otherwise, youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of community control. Section 958.14 did not specifically authorize applying adult sanctions to a youthful offender, and we now perceive the legislature's intent to have been to limit penalties against youthful offenders to six years....

...HARDING, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority that the pre-1985 Youthful Offender Act limited sentencing to a maximum of four years when the youthful offender was being resentenced after a violation of community control. Prior to the 1985 amendment, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), provided that "[a] violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1)." In 1985, the legislature amended section 958.14 to add, in pertinent part, a second sentence: However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department [of Corrections] for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...Stat. (1985). See Ch. 85-288, § 24, Laws of Fla. Try as I might, I cannot reconcile the majority opinion with this Court's previous opinion in State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994 (Fla. 1990). In Watts, this Court explained that under the pre-1985 version of section 958.14 a "circuit court may treat the youthful offender [who violates community control] as though it had never placed the defendant on community control." Id. at 997. We also noted that "the legislature amended section 958.14 after two district *485 court decisions questioned whether a circuit court could resentence a youthful offender as an adult upon revocation of youthful offender status and revocation of community control." Id. In explaining the effect of the 1985 amendment, we stated: "[T]he only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to change the case law interpretation of § 958.14, or in any event to change the law, so that once the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resentence the defendant as a youthful off...

...[4] Our explanation in Watts leads me to the inexorable conclusion that the pre-amendment Youthful Offender Act did not impose a four-year restriction on the resentencing of a youthful offender who violated community control or probation. Prior to the 1985 amendment, section 958.14 was silent as to any time limitation upon resentencing a youthful offender after a violation of community control. See § 958.14, Fla....

...control, and then violated the community control. Upon revocation of the community control, the court imposed a number of consecutive and concurrent two, three and four year sentences totaling 14 years. Watson contended below that the provisions of § 958.14, Fla....

...The state contended that only if the court chose to continue the defendant's youthful offender status was the court constrained *102 by the new statute to limit the sentence imposed to six years. The court accepted the state's argument and imposed the sentences totaling 14 years. The amended version of § 958.14, Fla. Stat., provides: 958.14 Violation of probation or community control program....

...However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than six years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. The prior version of § 958.14, Fla. Stat. provided: 958.14 Violation of community control program. — A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1). Section 948.06, Fla. Stat., the statute referred to in both versions of § 958.14, provides, generally, that upon revocation of probation or community control the court may impose any sentence it might have originally imposed had it not chosen to place the defendant on probation or community control. Watson, unlike the defendants in the cases relied upon by the state, was resentenced after the effective date of the 1985 amendment. Therefore, the amended version of § 958.14 was applicable at his resentencing....

...uthful offender or to reclassify him as an adult upon violation of probation or community control. In a number of cases involving resentencings conducted prior to the enactment of the 1985 amendment the courts held that under the pre-1985 version of § 958.14 the trial courts had the option of continuing the youthful offender status of the defendant or resentencing the defendant as an adult....

...the revocation of his youthful offender's community control program status. In Brooks v. State, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 1985), the court answered this question in the affirmative. Shortly after the decisions in Brooks I and Clem the legislature amended § 958.14 by adding the following sentence: However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than six years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time serve while incarcerated. In view of this action, the only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to change the case law interpretation of § 958.14, or in any event to change the law, so that once the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resentence the defendant as a youthful off...

...A youthful offender's sentence after revocation of probation or community control is therefore limited to a maximum of six years less credit for time served. To assume that the legislature did not intend a change in the law would be to assume it intended to enact a nullity. The language of § 958.14, as amended, relating specifically to resentencing of youthful offenders after violation of probation or community control, should prevail over the preexisting general provisions of § 948.06(1) relating to any violation of probation or community control by anyone....

...State , wherein this court inferred that if the 1985 amendment had been effective at the time of the resentencing in that case, the sentence would have been limited to six years less credit for time served while incarcerated. 486 So.2d at 1373, n. 1. We therefore hold that after the effective date of § 958.14, as amended in 1985, a youthful offender who is resentenced after a violation of probation or community control can be resentenced to a term of incarceration no longer than six years or for a period no longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. Contra, Franklin v. State, 526 So.2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (holding, without discussion or explanation, that the amended version of § 958.14 does not require a court to reclassify a defendant as a youthful offender after a violation of probation or community control)....

...[5] § 948.01(8), Fla. Stat. (1983). [6] The court in Crosby reversed the sentence on other grounds: (1) the written sentence did not conform to the oral pronouncements of the trial court, and (2) the defendant was not given credit for time served. [7] § 958.14, Fla....

...The trial judge gave the defendant 198 days credit for time served, calculated from the date he was arrested on the probation violation. Dixon now appeals. We reverse the sentence upon three grounds. First, defendant claims that it was error to resentence him outside the confines of the Youthful Offender Act because under section 958.14 of that act, his maximum sentence could be no more than six years. Prior to its 1985 amendment, section 958.14 provided that, upon a revocation of probation or community control, the court could disregard the defendant's youthful offender classification and impose any sentence it might have originally imposed had it not chosen to place the defe...

...However, no youthful offender *1196 shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1987) (Italization denotes language added to the statute.). The first sentence of section 958.14 incorporates the procedure stated in section 948.06(1) for revoking the defendant's probation or community control....

...The second sentence serves to limit the application of section 948.06(1) where a youthful offender is involved by substituting that section's permissible sentence, i.e., any sentence which the court might have originally imposed, for the more limited sentence provided by section 958.14....

...Consequently, the maximum sentence a court may impose after a revocation of a youthful offender's probation or community control is the statutorily mandated six years with credit for time served. [1] Nevertheless, the courts are not unanimous in their reading of the amended section 958.14....

...We disagree with this reading of the statute. While prior to the 1985 amendment, a youthful offender could be reclassified or resentenced as an adult offender, the clear language of the amended statute now prohibits that. As the court pointed out in Watson, the legislature amended section 958.14 to limit youthful offenders' sentences upon probation or community control violations as it did shortly after the decisions in Brooks v....

...1985) and Clem v. State, 462 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) which held that upon such violations, a youthful offender could be resentenced as an adult. It could thus be said that by this action, the legislature intended to abrogate the case law interpreting section 958.14 or else change the intent of the statute. See Watson, 528 So.2d at 102. To paraphrase the words of Judge Thompson of the First District in Watson in reference to the amended section 958.14: To assume the legislature did not mean what the law it enacted says is to assume that the legislature intended to enact a nullity. Id. at 102. The state contends, however, that in its decision in Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1988), the Supreme Court of Florida approved the Franklin court's reading of the amended section 958.14. We reject this contention. Section 958.14 is not even discussed in Poore....

...case State v. Wayne, 531 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1988) (which apparently did not involve a defendant originally sentenced as a youthful offender), the supreme court cited a number of cases. All of these cases were either decided before the 1985 amendment to section 958.14 or else relied on cases *1197 decided before that amendment....

...result.); Lynch v. State, 491 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (The court relied on Clem, 462 So.2d 1134, and Brooks, pre-1985 amendment cases.); Crosby v. State, 487 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (The case involved a resentence based on the unamended section 958.14....

...4th DCA 1988) (defendant, not a youthful offender, could be resentenced to term of imprisonment excluding original sentence for probation violation of a probationary split sentence without violating double jeopardy). Nowhere in Poore did the supreme court hold that the amended section 958.14 permits a court to "reclassify" a youthful offender as an adult offender upon a probation or community control violation. [3] We decline to find that the supreme court held thus by implication or inference. While it is true that Poore concerned a youthful offender who was resentenced outside the confines of the amended section 958.14, that fact was never placed at issue in that case as it has been in the case before us. Consequently, we do not view Poore as authority for the state's proposition. In fact, it is inconceivable that the supreme court could fail to hold as we have here today when confronted with the plain and simple language of the amended section 958.14 applied within the context of the facts and issues presented here. Accordingly, we align ourselves with those cases which hold, in accordance with the amended section 958.14, that the maximum sentence which a youthful offender can receive for a probation or community control violation is six years or the statutory maximum for the crime committed, whichever is less, with credit for time served....

...This being so, I believe the majority holding is in error notwithstanding that it finds such to be "inconceivable." I, of course, concur with the majority's view that the result here is in conflict with Franklin. NOTES [1] However, if the state feels confined by the sentencing strictures of section 958.14, it can file new substantive charges against the defendant....

...See State v. Goodson, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1981). We find nothing in the record before us indicating that, upon revocation of his community control, appellant was reclassified or treated by the trial court as a youthful offender. Further, nothing in section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1985) — which was not in existence at the time appellant was resentenced — required the trial court to reclassify appellant as a youthful offender and cap his sentence at six years....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...contains language that allows the court, if it revokes supervision, to “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control.” Nothing in section 948.06 or 958.14 indicates that youthful offender status is revoked upon revocation of probation or community control....

...We held that the trial, court erred in revoking Rogers’s youthful offender status where he had not been convicted of the new substantive offense. Rogers, 972 So.2d at 1019 . We also held that the court erred in imposing a sentence for the third degree felonies in excess of the statutory maximum, which, under section 958.14, was the maximum permissible sentence for a youthful offender who committed a substantive violation....

...ird-degree felony counts. These sentences are illegal as they exceed the five year maximum permissible sentence which may be legally imposed for a substantive violation of a Youthful Offender Act sentence involving a third-degree felony. Pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2000), a violator of youthful offender probation whose violation is substantive must be credited with time served and cannot be sentenced in excess of the maximum permitted for the underlying crime. Section 958.14 states: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...[1] He was sentenced in case number 93-2135 to a 10-year term, which he argues on appeal, is illegal because it exceeds the 6-year cap for youthful offenders. At the time Robinson was convicted of this crime, he was only 16 years old, and he was sentenced as a youthful offender. We affirm. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1993) provides: [N]o youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the Department for a substantive violation [of probation or community *1347 control] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty ......

...The State filed a confession of error based upon the case of State v. Arnette, 604 So.2d 482 (Fla.1992). This Court recognized the confession and entered an opinion which reversed the sentence and ordered that the matter be returned to the trial court for appropriate resentencing pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Subsequent to the issuance of the mandate, the state filed a motion to recall mandate and for rehearing, asserting that its previous confession of error was itself erroneous. It had failed to realize that the holding of Arnette was based upon the pre-1990 version of section 958.14. Under amended section 958.14, a youthful offender can be *935 sentenced in excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive rather than technical. See § 958.14, Fla....

...We recalled the mandate and accepted the motion for rehearing as timely filed and received no response from the defendant. After a careful review of the record, we find the state's contentions to be correct and therefore recall our prior opinion. The defendant was originally sentenced in 1993, when the amended version of section 958.14 was in effect....

...ant argues, the general six-year cap on youthful offender sentences applies under section 958.04(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). The parties appear to agree that resolution of this dispute boils down to the question of whether the amended version of section 958.14, effective October 1, 1990 ( see chapter 90-208, sections 19 and 22, Laws of Florida), applies to defendant. The amended version of section 958.14 operates to subject a youthful offender to the general provisions of section 948.06(1) beyond the normal six-year cap for such an offender when the offender commits a substantive violation of probation or community control. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant's having resisted arrest without violence constituted such a substantive violation. There is also no dispute that section 958.14 as amended was in effect at the time defendant committed the substantive violation in March 1991, a fact upon which the state relies in its argument that the six-year cap may be exceeded. However, as defendant points out, section 958.14 was amended well after defendant had committed the offense of delivery of cocaine in March 1988....

...ration. § 958.04(2)(a)-(d), Fla. Stat. (1987). The sentence imposed shall not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense involved, and the total sentence shall not exceed six years. Id. In regard to a revocation of community control or probation, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1987), provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...Once released from prison, they violated their community control. The court thereafter revoked their community control, declined to continue their status as youthful offenders, and resentenced them to ten years in prison, with credit for time served. The supreme court held that the trial court was limited by section 958.14 to imposing incarceratory sentences of not more than six years, with credit for time served....

...ce for Case No. 88-2874 must be reversed. Determining the legality of the remaining three sentences is more difficult, as none of them was for more than six years, or rather five years, since the remainder of the offenses were third degree felonies. Section 958.14 merely provides that, upon revocation of probation or community control, credit need be given for time served while incarcerated....

...[3] Note that section 948.06(2), Florida Statutes, which provides that "[n]o part of the time that the defendant is on probation or in community control shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve," is not specifically referenced in section 958.14....

...On February 21, 1995, Swilley pleaded guilty to carjacking and aggravated battery. The trial court sentenced him to three years' imprisonment, followed by two years' community control, to be followed by one year of probation, as a youthful offender in accordance with section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...On July 28, 1999, Swilley filed a motion to correct illegal sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). He alleged that his sentence was illegal for two reasons: (1) his sentences exceeded the six-year sentence maximum allowed under the Youthful Offender Act, section 958.14; and (2) the trial court failed to award credit for time Swilley already served....

...tered an *460 order finding that Swilley was not entitled to relief. Initially, the trial court stated that Swilley's motions were filed pursuant to rule 3.850. The trial court then proceeded to hold that Swilley's sentences were not illegal because section 958.14 permitted sentencing in excess of six years when a defendant commits a substantive violation....

...motion). Swilley's main argument for post-conviction relief is that his sentences exceeded the six-year maximum for youthful offenders. We agree and reverse the trial court's denial of postconviction relief on this ground. The Youthful Offender Act, section 958.14, provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...l be committed ... for a substantive violation [of probation] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, ... or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years.” § 958.14, Fla....

...cited above following Robinson , including other cases from the Fourth District, see, e.g., Thompson, 945 So.2d at 628 , and the Third District’s recent Flores decision. More importantly, no such holding could be squared with the plain language of section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...n an argument that Flores conflicts with Rogers . If Flores does conflict with Rogers on this *441 issue, then our precedent also conflicts with Rogers . Seeing no reason to revisit our longstanding precedent, which in our view accurately interprets section 958.14, we elect to certify conflict with Rogers (even though we see no conflict) in light of our Supreme Court’s current review of Flores ....

...The youthful offender sentencing feature most often addressed by the courts is the six-year sentencing limit applicable, under the current version of the statute, to the original sentence on an offense and to any sentence imposed following a technical or non-substantive violation of probation. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2011). It is important to note that prior versions of the statute contained a six-year cap on all youthful offender sentences, with no exceptions. See, e.g., § 958.14, Fla....

...was found guilty. Meeks, however, is inapplicable to the current case because the appellant therein did not complete boot camp whereas the appellant in the instant case did. Upon violation of probation, Meeks was subject to resentencing pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes, which is the general youthful offender law that the supreme court interpreted in Meeks....

...rs after boot camp completion. Well established principles of statutory construction require the specific statute to control over the general statute. See State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 112 (Fla.2002). Therefore, the supreme court's interpretation of section 958.14 in Meeks is inapplicable to the appellant's present sentence....

...ut regard to the youthful offender act. See Johnson v. State, 482 So.2d 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). [1] AFFIRMED. BOOTH, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Inasmuch as the appellant was resentenced in 1984, we do not address the amended version of Section 958.14, as amended by Chapter 85-288, Section 24, Laws of Florida, particularly since this appellant was resentenced to not longer than six years. Section 958.14, as amended in 1985, is reproduced as follows, the underlined portions constituting the language added by Chapter 85-288, supra: 958.14 Violation of probation or community control program....

...State, 528 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Reams v. State, 528 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), in holding that the maximum sentence a court may impose after revocation of a youthful-offender's probation or community control is the six-year limitation period of the statute. § 958.14, Fla....

...period of imprisonment for a youthful offender committed to the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 958.05(2) because the sentence that section authorizes includes a term of service in a community control program." The court concluded that section 958.14, which subjects a youthful offender to probation revocation proceedings, does not apply to youthful offenders serving in a community control program begun pursuant to section 958.10 after a period of imprisonment....

...2d DCA 2003); Eristma v. State, 766 So.2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). And because Mr. Odegaard violated his youthful offender community control with a new substantive offense, he again may be sentenced to up to the maximum sentence for the original offenses. See § 958.14, Fla....

...He contends that because he completed boot camp, upon his violation of probation the court was required to sentence him to no more than 364 days in prison under sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). In the previous order, the trial court had ruled that the five-year sentence was not illegal under section 958.14, which the court ruled controlled appellant's sentence, *467 because appellant committed new law violations....

...osed after he successfully completed boot camp by committing a new law offense could be sentenced to no more than 364 days. This Court ruled that the specific provisions of sections 958.045(5)(c) and 958.04(2)(b) superceded the general provisions of section 958.14....

...nly if he "has not previously been classified as a youthful offender." § 958.04(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1987). A youthful offender who is resentenced after violation of community control or probation is entitled to be resentenced as a youthful offender. § 958.14, Fla....

...4th DCA 2010)). A youthful offender who commits a substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original offense; the six-year limitation applicable to youthful offender sentences no longer applies. See § 958.14, Fla....

...lation of probation for a substantive violation involving a new law offense); Tidwell v. State, 74 So.3d 503, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (affirming that “when a youthful offender commits a violation of probation, even a substantive one as described in section 958.14, his status as a youthful offender cannot be revoked”); Mosley v....

...See Christian v. State, 84 So.3d 437, 441-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (explaining that, though a youthful offender may receive the maximum sentence that could have originally been imposed had he not been sentenced under the youthful offender act pursuant to section 958.14, he still maintains his “youthful offender status”); Hudson v....

...After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that defendant had violated his probation. The court sentenced defendant to serve seven years imprisonment concurrently on both counts, with credit for time served. At sentencing, defendant argued, as he does on appeal, that the court was limited by section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1987), to the imposition of six years imprisonment because defendant had originally been sentenced as a youthful offender. We agree with defendant's argument. In 1985 section 958.14 was amended to provide that upon violation of probation or community control no youthful offender could be imprisoned for longer than six years (or the maximum legal sentence for the offense, whichever is less)....

...er *1286 courts simply imposed any sentence up to the lawful maximum without regard for the Youthful Offender Act. Either of those approaches was considered proper. See Brooks v. State, 478 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 1985). The effect of the 1985 amendment to section 958.14 is to require youthful offender treatment of a defendant upon revocation of his probation if the defendant had originally been sentenced to the probation under the Youthful Offender Act and to eliminate any option of sentencing the youthful offender to the statutory maximum sentence upon revocation of probation. The sentence imposed in this case upon revocation of probation was seven years imprisonment, which exceeds the maximum of six years provided by section 958.14 as amended in 1985....

...to the statutory maximum for DUI manslaughter. We disagree with the state's contention. As this court said in Brown v. State, 492 So.2d 822 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), even though the crime and the original sentencing occurred prior to the 1985 amendment to section 958.14, that amendment is applicable to all violations of probation occurring after its effective date because it is the violation of probation which subjects the youthful offender to the provisions of section 958.14....

...ing error. "[N]o youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the [D]epartment [of Corrections] for a substantive violation [of probation] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty." § 958.14, Fla....

...Arnette, 604 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1992); Young v. State, 654 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Darden v. State, 641 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). A youthful offender can be sentenced in excess of six years after revocation of probation if the violation was substantive. See § 958.14, Fla....

...2d DCA 1984), which in turn relied on the Fourth District's opinion in Clem v. State, No. 81-2243 (Fla. 4th DCA August 31, 1983) [ Clem I]. Subsequent to the filing of this petition, the Fourth District withdrew its opinion as being erroneous and entered a new opinion holding that, pursuant to sections 958.05(2) and 958.14, the circuit court has jurisdiction over offenders in a community control program....

...*944 We think the language of section 958.10, while somewhat unclear, does lend support to the decision we reached in Lollis. However, it now appears to us that a recent amendment to section 948.06 explicitly controls the present case and distinguishes our opinion in Lollis. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983) provides: A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...As a result, the trial court sentenced Hill to seventeen years imprisonment, suspended upon successful completion of three years supervised probation. Hill argues that because he was originally sentenced as a youthful offender, his sentence could not exceed six years. [1] However, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991), permits sentences in excess of the six-year cap for youthful offenders who commit substantive violations of probation....

...[2] Moreover, this provision was in effect in 1992 when Hill committed the underlying offense and thus, is not an impermissible ex post facto law, as Hill suggests. Cf. Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). AFFIRMED. COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 958.04(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in pertinent part: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...sentence. Since the record does not contain appellant's July 1, 1999 negotiated plea agreement nor his July 1, 1999 sentencing documents, the record does not refute appellant's claim that he entered a negotiated plea to youthful offender sentences. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1999), addresses the sanctions which may be imposed upon a youthful offender who violates probation or community control and provides in pertinent part: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a...

...hat the appellant was "adjudicated guilty as a youthful offender." The judgment then set out the sentence on each count, and the sentences imposed were in accord with the applicable provisions of the Florida Youthful Offender Act. §§ 958.04(2)(c); 958.14, Fla....

...der. We see no evidence in this record that the original sentencing judge intended to treat the appellant as a youthful offender on one count and as an adult on the other two counts. Such would be contrary to the intent of the Youthful Offender Act. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that upon violation of probation or community control no youthful offender can be imprisoned for longer than six years or the maximum legal sentence for the offense, whichever is less....

...bation for two counts of sexual battery and imposing concurrent 15-year sentences. Appellant was originally sentenced as a youthful offender; upon resentencing, he was sentenced under the guidelines. Appellant argues on appeal that the provisions of Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, as amended in 1985, were applicable at the time he was resentenced....

...Because this was a substantive and not a technical violation, the court could sentence appellant as a youthful offender up to the statutory maximum for the offenses and was not limited by the six-year cap that applies to technical violations only. § 958.14, Fla....

...Thompson claims the judge violated the principles announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because the judge increased his sentence beyond the six-year limit for violations of youthful offender probation, as described in section 958.14, Florida Statutes, by making findings of fact as to the nature of the violation. We disagree and affirm. Thompson's argument that his sentence is illegal misconstrues both section 958.14 and Apprendi. Section 958.14 restricts a court to a sentence of six years in prison "for a technical or nonsubstantive violation" of the youthful offender probation. However, where the violation is a substantive violation, the punishment cannot be "longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated." § 958.14, Fla....

...State, 789 So.2d 1184, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting a defendant who tested positive for cocaine substantially and willfully violated the conditions of his probation). Because the lower court found a substantive violation, the court was not bound by the six-year cap found in section 958.14....

...Kennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Winokur, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. Shallist Thomas Hudson appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation. He contends that his seven-year sentence exceeds the six-year cap of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2003), because he is a youthful offender and committed technical rather than substantive violations....

...scheduled visit from his probation officer. The court revoked Hudson's probation and youthful-offender status and sentenced him as an adult to two years of community control followed by five years of probation, concluding that the second sentence of section 958.14, below, applies only when a court imposes a sentence of incarceration, because a combined sentence of community control and probation does not commit a defendant to "the custody of the department." Because the trial court exceeded the sentence allowed by the first sentence of the provision, we need not address the second sentence. Section 958.14 provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...Tidwell was designated a youthful offender when he was originally sentenced for the lewd battery crime. His sentence on the violation of probation is permissible under the youthful offender act because he committed a new law offense and his sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the crime. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2009). But when a youthful offender commits a violation of probation, even a substantive one as described in section 958.14, his status as a youthful offender cannot be revoked....

...In accordance with our decision in Miles v. State, 536 So.2d 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), that "the maximum sentence a court may impose after revocation of a youthful-offender's probation or community control is the six-year limitation period of the statute," § 958.14, Fla....

...First, he claims that because he was originally sentenced as a youthful offender, the maximum sentence the trial court could impose at a probation revocation was one of six years in prison. This not correct. In Johnson v. State, 678 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), this Court recognized that "under amended section 958.14, a youthful offender can be sentenced in excess of six years after a revocation of probation if the violation is substantive rather than technical." In the present case it is clear that the trial judge revoked the defendant's probation for both technical violations and the commission of new criminal offenses....

...Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. Appellant, Timothy Meeks (Meeks), appeals a sentence and judgment of 10 years' incarceration for a violation of community control. Meeks contends, as a youthful offender, that his sentence is illegal because under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991) [1] , his violation is "technical," rather than "substantive," and therefore the maximum sentence the trial judge can impose is six years, less time served, or the maximum authorized for his original sentence, with credit for time served, whichever is less. See § 958.14, Fla....

...The trial judge revoked Meeks' community control and re-sentenced him to 10 years in prison, with credit for 55 days for time served. This appeal ensued. The instant case impels us to construe the import of "technical violation" and "substantive violation" under section 958.14, Florida Statutes, and specifically, whether Meeks, as a youthful offender, can be re-sentenced for a substantive violation based upon acts that constitute a willful and substantial violation of community control, but not a separate criminal offense....

...its usual and ordinary meaning, unless an ambiguity exists. Graham v. State, 472 So.2d 464 (1985); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984). A criminal statute is strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Jackson, 526 So.2d 58 (Fla.1988). Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, provides: Violation of probation or community control program.—A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...The legislature has not defined what constitutes a "technical violation" and a "substantive violation" to aid us in discerning its intent, and no appellate court has previously construed the statute in the context of the instant case. Therefore, because the language of section 958.14, Florida Statutes, is clear, we examine the ordinary meaning of the term "substantive" as used in the statute....

...By describing the second offenses as "separate substantive criminal offenses," the court implies that a "substantive violation" is synonymous with a separate criminal offense. We find this language persuasive and adopt this definition of "substantive violation" under section 958.14, Florida Statutes. To attribute any other meaning would do violence to the rules of statutory construction. We conclude that a "substantive violation" under section 958.14, Florida Statutes, requires the commission of a separate criminal offense by a youthful offender. It necessarily follows that under section 958.14, Florida Statutes, a technical violation is one arising from a *104 transgression by a youthful offender of a condition of probation or community control that does not constitute a separate criminal offense....

...ted with the "willful and substantial" standard used in the context of revocation of probation and community control. However, they are not to be construed as synonymous. A "willful and substantial violation" of probation and community control under section 958.14, Florida Statutes, will be only a "technical violation" unless it constitutes a separate criminal offense and, thus, a substantive violation. A willful and substantial violation of probation and community control will always be a "technical violation" under section 958.14, Florida Statutes, not a "substantive violation," unless the acts that form the violation also constitute a separate criminal offense....

...ntive violation that was not based upon a separate criminal offense. This certainly implies that the prosecutors and the trial courts have reached the same conclusion as we regarding the distinction between substantive and technical violations under section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...for not trying to get a GED, determined to be technical violations). For the above reasons, we conclude that Meeks' violation of community control for failure to remain confined to his residence on four dates constitutes a technical violation under section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...chnical violation. Finding that this decision passes upon a question of great public importance, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the following question: CAN A CIRCUIT COURT RE-SENTENCE A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION UNDER SECTION 958.14, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN THE ACTS UPON WHICH THE VIOLATION IS BASED DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SEPARATE CRIMINAL OFFENSE? We also note that the trial court's written judgment incorrectly designates Meeks' offense of attempted armed robbery wit...

...*105 MINER, J., dissenting with opinion. Because I believe the majority opinion misses the mark in at least two dispositive respects, I am obliged to dissent. My colleagues assume, wrongly, I suggest, that Meeks was sentenced under the provisions of section 958.14 first when he admitted violating probation by committing a new criminal offense and thereafter when he was sentenced for violating the pivotal condition of the community control program into which he was placed following his probation violation....

...Arguing that his violation of community control was only "technical," Meeks filed the instant appeal. Primarily he contends that under the circumstances, the trial court was limited on resentence to a term of no more than six years as provided for in section 958.14. In a holding seemingly premised on the proposition that once a youthful offender always a youthful offender, the majority here agrees. For the following reasons, I disagree. Section 958.14 provides in pertinent part as follows: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of section 948.06(1)....

...for a period longer than six years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. Section 948.06(1) (emphasis added), to which section 958.14 refers, provides in pertinent part: Whenever within the period of probation or community control there are reasonable grounds to believe that a probationer or offender in community control has violated his or her probation or community...

...n or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it *106 might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control. In my view, the reference in section 958.14 back to section 948.06(1) was intended to and does authorize the trial court, upon a finding of a violation of probation or community control, to deal with one who was initially afforded youthful offender treatment as it would any other probationer or community controllee....

...bationer or offender guilty of the offense charged" unless such has previously been done. To be noted also is the fact that section 948.06(1) makes no use or mention of "substantive" or "technical" violation of probation or community control as does section 958.14....

...However, confinement of the community controllee to his or her residence is the very essence of community control status. Thus, the failure of the community controllee to remain so confined surely cannot be characterized as a "technical" violation even if sentencing were to proceed under chapter 958.14....

...6(1) both when he violated probation and later when he violated community control, I see no need to further explore the meanings of "substantive" and "technical." I would affirm the judgment and sentence below for the above-stated reasons. NOTES [1] Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991), has not been amended since Meeks was adjudged a youthful offender, and all subsequent references are to the 1991 version of the statute. [2] Use of the word "technical" in section 958.14 is at best confusing to the extent that the statute suggests that violation of such a condition can result in revocation of community control or probation and a prison sentence....

...Accordingly, we reverse the revocation of his youthful offender designation. Mr. Vantine also challenges his sentence. As a youthful offender with a substantive violation for which he was not separately charged and convicted, he could be sentenced to no longer than the maximum sentence for each offense. See § 958.14, Fla....

...hose counts within the five-year maximums. We reverse the revocation of Mr. Vantine's youthful offender status and remand for reinstatement of that status. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. CASANUEVA and BLACK, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Section 958.14, provides as follows: [N]o youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, ....

...term. For this reason we reject the appellant's contention that the judge was without authority to sentence Dimilta upon the violation of probation. However, the 4 1/2 year term imposed following the probation violation was excessive under the YOA. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1989), provides as follows: ......

...iod longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. As was stated in State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994, 997 (Fla. 1990): The plain and ordinary meaning of section 958.14 is clear....

...In his postconviction motion, Jacques claimed that the lower court erred in failing to continue his status as a youthful offender and in imposing a sentence beyond the permissible sentence of no more than six years for a technical or non-substantive violation of probation. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2012). The lower court denied the motion on both points. Jacques appeals the denial of his postcon-viction motion. We find no error in the imposition of a sentence exceeding six years as section 958.14 provides that, for a substantive probation violation, a youthful offender may be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowed for the crime for which he or she was found guilty. See § 958.14, Fla....

...ully violated the conditions of his probation. However, as the State concedes, the trial court erred in sentencing appellant as a youthful offender to six years in prison after he violated his probation. See State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982 (Fla.2001). Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, provides that a youthful offender who has violated probation may not be sentenced to a period of imprisonment for greater than the statutory maximum....

...State, 727 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Kelly v. State, 739 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The statutory maximum for the appellant's current sentence was a total of six years, all of which could be served as incarceration, with credit for time served. See § 958.14, Fla....

...3d DCA 2005) (holding sections 958.04(2)(b) and 958.045(5)(c) do not apply to a defendant who was committed to a boot camp not operated by the Department of Corrections); Lee v. State, 884 So.2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (same). The postconviction court did not agree. Citing section 958.14, it determined that because Cutler's probation was revoked based on a substantive violation, it could sentence Cutler to the maximum sentence authorized for the offenses for which he was on probation. This rationale was rejected in Mims v. State, 871 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), which held that section 958.045(5)(c) rather than section 958.14 controlled when a youthful offender had violated probation following successful completion of boot camp....

...offender sentencing. § 775.084(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (1989). Schneider also argues that upon the revocation of his community control in case number 85-426, he should have been sentenced to no more than six years in prison as a youthful offender under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Whether Schneider received a legal sentence is discernable from the record; therefore, the issue can be raised under rule 3.800(a). Before 1985 and after 1990, a trial court could impose an adult sanction on a youthful offender who violated community control by committing new substantive offenses. See § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (1983 & 1991); Willis v. State, 744 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Because Schneider committed five new substantive offenses while on community control, the trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence. However, the version of section 958.14 in effect at the time Schneider violated his community control permitted a maximum sentence of only six years in prison. See § 958.14, Fla....

...the court is not limited to imposing the usual youthful offender sentence of six years or less in prison if the revocation is based on a substantive violation of probation.” Id. (emphasis in original). In such cases, the court can impose up to the statutory maximum for the underlying offenses. Id. (citing § 958.14, Fla....

...Ollie Bryant appealed the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Bryant claimed he was placed on probation as a youthful offender and, after a determination that he had violated probation, was sentenced in excess of the Youthful Offender Act. § 958.14, Fla....

...On remand, the trial court again denied Bryant's motion attaching portions of the record which demonstrate that Bryant's violation of probation was a substantive violation. Because the violation was substantive, the court could impose a sentence up to the maximum for the offenses. § 958.14, Fla....

...Both grand theft and attempted burglary as charged in these cases are third degree felonies punishable by a maximum of five years in prison. § 775.082(3)(d). The sentences in these cases exceed the maximum provided by law, violating the express provision of section 958.14 of the Youthful Offender Act....

...tance: WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE? Eustache , 199 So.3d at 490 ....

...the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217 , 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey , 102 Fla. 1141 , 137 So. 157 , 159 (1931) ). The sentencing of a youthful offender upon revocation of probation or community control is governed by sections 958.14 and 948.06, Florida Statutes (2005). In section 958.14, part of the Act, the Legislature provides that a youthful offender who violates probation or community control is to be sentenced under section 948.06, a separate provision of general law applicable to adult CPC sentences....

...The Act then distinguishes between substantive violations and technical or nonsubstantive violations. As explained in Christian , Florida courts have consistently treated conduct involving a new criminal offense, such as Eustache's illegal drug possession, as a substantive violation. Christian , 84 So.3d at 439 -41 . Section 958.14 of the Act reads in full: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 958.14 clearly and unambiguously requires sentencing within the six-year cap for youthful offenders who commit technical probationary or community control violations and clearly and unambiguously permits sentencing above the six-year cap upon revocation *1101 of a youthful offender's probation or community control for a substantive violation. Section 958.14 also clearly and unambiguously directs that a violation of probation or community control "shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...ction over the matter in the parole commission. After the denials of their motions, the defendants pled nolo contendere to the violations and appealed the jurisdictional question to this court. We affirm. We find that the more specific provisions of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1983), govern over the more general provisions of section 958.10, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 958.14 provides that alleged violations of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that upon revocation of a defendant's community control program, the trial court may "impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the ... offender into community control." See also § 958.14, Fla....

...Of the several grounds raised in Darden's motion, only one merits discussion. Darden alleges that the consecutive two-year sentences imposed for his violation of community control constituted illegal sentences because they exceeded the six-year limitation placed on youthful offender sentences by section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...the total commitment exceeded the six-year limitation imposed by the Youthful Offender Act, stating "[h]ence, imposition of consecutive sentences resulting in a total commitment of more than six years would thwart the purpose of the Act." Id. at 70. Section 958.14 of the Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Gottlieb, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michelle Crawford, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Before HUBBART, NESBITT and BASKIN, JJ. *430 PER CURIAM. Defendant, originally sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act, § 958.14, Fla....

...State, 528 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Consequently, the sentence must be vacated on this ground. Third, and finally, defendant contends, and the state concedes, that defendant was denied credit for time served in state prison prior to his release on community control. § 958.14 Fla....

...t 5-year sentences for the third-degree felonies. The trial court provided no reason for the departure, believing that a youthful offender could *67 be sentenced to 6 years' incarceration without regard to the sentencing guidelines. We conclude that section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1991), which explains the sentencing options available when a youthful offender violates community control or probation, must be read in conjunction with section 958.04(3), which provides that a sentence greater than permitted under the guidelines must be supported by written reasons....

...ntent. Id.; see ch. 85-288, § 24, at 1821, Laws of Fla. This holding is consistent with the Fourth District’s decision in Brandle . In 1990, the legislature eliminated the six-year limitation for violations that were new substantive offenses. See § 958.14, Fla....

...Thus, at all times since the decision in Amette, it has been clear that the ninety-nine-year sentence imposed on Mr. Shultz was not a legal sentence. At the time of the revocation of Mr. Shultz’s probation, the trial court could only impose a sentence of up to six years’ imprisonment. See § 958.14, Fla....

...(2008), provides that "no youthful offender shall be committed . . . for a substantive violation [of probation] for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, . . . or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years." § 958.14. "[A] `substantive violation,' as the phrase is used in section 958.14, refers exclusively to a violation premised on the commission of a separate criminal act." State v....

...or ... a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2011). It is clear that the trial court’s revocation in this case was based upon a technical violation. See State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982, 989 (Fla.2001) (“[W]e conclude that a ‘substantive violation,’ as the phrase is used in section 958.14, refers exclusively to a violation premised on the commission of a separate criminal act.”)....

...4th DCA 1997); Swilley v. State, 781 So.2d 458 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Schebel v. State, 721 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) rev. dism. 723 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1999). The merit of Bryant's claim may hinge on whether his violation of probation was substantive or technical. § 958.14, Fla....

...The State concedes error, and we agree. [2] Given the fact that Martinez already had served three years of incarceration as a youthful offender, the court's imposition of an additional sixty months of probation violated the six-year cap established by section 958.14....

FERNANDEZ, J. Ulyses West appeals an order denying his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the trial court erred in its application of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2013), we reverse and remand for further proceedings....

...or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Florida Statutes (2013) (emphasis added). “[A] ‘substantive violation,’ as the phrase is used in section 958.14, refers exclusively to a violation premised on the commission of a separate criminal act.” State v....

...*1157 As the State properly concedes, failure to report and leaving the county of residence without permission are technical offenses because they are merely violations of the rules or probation. See Meeks, 789 So.2d at 989 ; Swilley, 781 So.2d at 460 . Under section 958.14, West could not be sentenced for a period of longer than six years for a technical violation....

...his August 28, 2008 charges in Broward County for riding a bike with no/improper light and possession of cannabis. If the record shows that West committed no substantive violation, then the trial court shall correct West’s sentence to comply with section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2018)....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. December 5, 2008. Nicholas L. Drost, Gainesville, Pro Se. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Mary G. Jolley, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 958.14, Fla....

...which allows for a defendant originally sentenced as a youthful offender to be resentenced up to the statutory maximum for the offense involved upon a substantive violation of probation. The resolution of this controversy depends on which version of section 958.14 should apply—the version in effect at the time Windom committed his original offenses, or the amended version, which was in effect *1175 that the time Windom violated his probation. In Reeves v. State, 605 So.2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), the court held that the application of the amended statute would constitute an ex post facto violation: The amended version of section 958.14 operates to subject a youthful offender to the general provisions of section 948.06(1) beyond the normal six-year cap for such an offender when the offender commits a substantive violation of probation or community control. In this case, there is no dispute that defendant's having resisted arrest without violence constituted such a substantive violation. There is also no dispute that section 958.14 as amended was in effect at the time defendant committed the substantive violation in March 1991, a fact upon which the state relies in its argument that the six-year cap may be exceeded....

...State, 588 So.2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Therefore, the sentence may not exceed the foregoing six-year cap. We adopt the holding in Reeves. We find no merit in the other issues raised by Windom. We remand the matter for resentencing consistent with section 958.14, as it was in effect at the time Windom committed his original offenses....

...Minimum mandatory sentences do not apply to an initial youthful offender sentence. Mendez v. State, 835 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Sentencing of a youthful offender upon revocation of probation or community control supervision is governed by sections 948.06 and 958.14, Florida Statutes. Section 958.14 provides that “[a] violation ... of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06.” § 958.14, Fla....

...The Second District rejected that argument, concluding that Amette was not controlling because it decided the issue of a sentencing cap, and did not decide the issue of minimum mandatory sentencing. See id. at 556-57. The Second District interpreted the language of section 958.14, Florida Statutes, incorporating the provisions of section 948.06, Florida Statutes, and concluded: In our view, this unqualified statement of the sanctions to which a youthful offender who commits a substantive violation is exposed re...

...Thus, we certify the following question as matter of great public importance: WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE? Affirmed. *491 CIKLIN, C.J., WARNER, GROSS, TAYLOR, MAY, DAMOORGIAN, GERBER, LEVINE, and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. CONNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion, in which FORST, J., concurs. . The second sentence of section 958.14 continues to limit the period of incarceration for a youthful offender who commits a technical or nonsubstantive violation to no more than six years, or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. § 958.14, Fla....

...However, had the trial court allowed the parties to proceed as they agreed on only the Condition 16 technical violation, Mr. Davis' maximum sentence after revocation of probation for the technical violation would have been a maximum of six years as a youthful offender. See § 958.14, Fla....

...See § 948.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2014) (providing that when a court revokes a defendant’s community control it may “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the ... offender on probation or into community control”); cf. § 958.14, Fla....

...(2011) (providing that if a defendant was placed on community control as a youthful offender, upon revocation the court may not sentence the defendant to more than six years’ imprisonment where the violation is technical or non-substantive); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA *1077 1995) (applying section 958.14 and holding a defendant placed on probation as a youthful offender cannot be sentenced to more than six years’ imprisonment following a revocation of probation based upon a technical violation)....

...This provision is somewhat ambiguous but seems to (1) limit the period that a youthful offender could be committed to imprisonment to either six years or four years and (2) mandates some type of sentence split with no more than four years imprisonment and two years in a community control program. Section 958.14 of the Youthful Offender Act provided that upon a violation of com *1371 munity control the youthful offender will be subject “to the provisions of section 948.06(1).” Section 948.06(1), Florida Statutes, was part of the original s...

...ix years. The second ambiguity is whether the incarceration limitation (be it four years or six years) applied when the youthful offender was being re-sentenced after a violation of straight probation or community control or whether the reference in section 958.14 to section 948.-06(1) served to permit the imposition of the maximum statutory punishment for the particular underlying offense without the Youthful Offender Act’s four or six year limitation....

...State, 526 So.2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), while focusing on other issues, affirmed a youthful offender’s sentence of 15 years upon violation of probation. 8 The second complication resulted from, the fact that effective July 1, 1985, the legislature amended 9 section 958.14 to specifically provide that even after violation of probation or community control, no youthful offender could be imprisoned for a period longer than six years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less. 10 Since the supreme court wrote Brooks, cases have generally focused on the applicability of the 1985 amendment of section 958.14, to the particular case, generally holding, as in Buckle v....

...If, pre-amendment, the youthful offender statute limited punishment to four years, 11 the 1985 amendment authorizing six years confinement enhances prior authorized punishment and cannot be applied ex post facto to existing cases. 12 On the other hand, if pre-amendment, the reference in section 958.14 to section 948.06(1) authorized punishment up to the statutory maximum without limitation and that statutory maximum exceeds the six years confinement (as it does in this case), then the 1985 amendment restricting punishment to six years confinement constitutes a limitation on previously authorized punishment and the amendment can be constitutionally applied retroactively to the benefit of the youthful offender. 13 The second question concerning whether the 1985 amendment of section 958.14 applies has recently been answered by the supreme court in State v....

...The supreme court in Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla.1989) did not directly address the limitations on "resentencing” a youthful offender after a violation of probation. However, the court in State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994 (Fla.1990) addressed the issue and held that section 958.14, Florida Statutes, as amended by Ch....

...seemingly approved in the Supreme Court Brooks case? Several district courts of appeal have held that, post amendment, the maximum sentence a trial court can impose after revocation of a youthful offender’s probation is the six year limitation of section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...the new substantive crimes of obstructing without violence and failing to register as a sex offender, which significantly impacted his sentence given the fact that he was initially sentenced as a youthful offender. See § 2 958.14, Fla....

...d, rather than revoked, to include a prison sentence as a condition of probation. Papinchak’s prison sentence is within the six-year statutory maximum sentence for a youthful offender who technically violated the conditions of his supervision. See § 958.14, Fla....

...§ 958.04(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). Further, if an offender who is placed in a basic training program completes such program satisfactorily, the sentencing court is required to modify the original sentence and place the offender on probation. If probation is revoked, section 958.14, Florida Statutes, provides that a youthful offender cannot be committed to DOC custody “for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is le...

...l offender on charges of a lewd and lascivious act in the presence of a child and leaving the scene of an accident with injury. Upon violating his supervision with technical violations, the trial court sentenced Quiles to six years’ incarceration. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1995), provides that “no youthful offender shall be [incarcerated]......

...the one cell increase permitted by the sentencing guidelines for a sentence following a violation of probation is the exclusive applicable sentencing factor relating to the effect of a prior violation, or violations, of probation ...” (footnote omitted)). We also call the trial court’s attention to section 958.14, Florida Statutes *566 (1989) which limits the sentence of a youthful offender to no more than 6 years’ imprisonment....

...3d DCA 1988) that it is error for the trial court upon revocation of probation or community control to sentence a defendant who, when the offense was committed, was a youthful offender, to a term in excess of the maximum penalty established by chapter 958. We have also held that the alternative provisions of section 958.14 (as amended in 1985) apply to sentences imposed for offenses committed, as was the instant offense, prior to the effective date of the amended statute....

...State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989); Dixon, 546 So.2d at 1198 . Reversed and remanded, with directions. NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ., concur. . Appellant does not challenge by this appeal the trial court’s revocation of his community control. . Section 958.14, Florida Statutes was amended in 1985 to add the underlined language: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...to be addressed. 3 The appellant was originally sentenced as a youthful offender, which carries certain benefits. See Ch. 958, Florida Statutes (2007). The most notable feature of the Youthful Offender Act is the six-year sentencing cap. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2007), provides: 3 We note that the appeal only challenged the sentence imposed in case 2007-4603. We decline to address the propriety of the sentences imposed in case 2008-3830 or 2008-4014....

...1st DCA 2008). The appellant argues that his 2010 violations were all technical violations; therefore, the six-year sentencing cap applies, rendering his concurrent 25-year sentences in 2007-4603 improper. We agree that we must adhere to the plain language of section 958.14, which clearly provides, “[N]o youthful offender shall be 6 committed to the custody of the department ....

...control. Case 1D14-1162 is reversed and remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing. After resolution of case 1D14-1162, if applicable, the appellant should be resentenced as a youthful offender within the six-year sentencing cap in section 958.14, including credit for time served. REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions. BILBREY, J., CONCURS; SWANSON, J., CONCURS with opinion. 8 SWANSON, J., Concurs with opinion. I c...

...d on youthful offenders on a substantive violation rather than risk a subsequent technical violation for which the trial court is precluded from imposing a sentence that would exceed the six year cap. Irrespective of this view, a plain reading of Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2007), compels this court to find the sentence imposed in 1D14-1600 was error in that it exceeded the six year sentencing cap for a youthful offender following a technical violation of community control....

...The state having confessed error in the sentencing of the appellant upon a probation violation, the sentence be and the same is hereby reversed and set aside, and the matter is returned to the trial court for appropriate resentencing as provided in § 958.14, Fla....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s Rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes, following appellant’s substantive violation of youthful offender probation, which he admitted, the court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for robbery with a firearm....

...In case 13-CF-17933, the sentences of six years in prison as a youthful offender on counts II, III, and IV were erroneous, as the State concedes, because the maximum permissible sentence on each of these third-degree felony counts was five years in prison. See § 958.14, Fla....

...When there has been only a technical violation of probation or community control by a youthful offender, he shall not be incarcerated for a period of more than six years or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. See § 958.14, Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 958.14, Fla....

...or the departure. We agree that section 958.04(3), Florida Statutes (1995) requires written reasons for a departure sentence under these circumstances. We reject the state’s argument that this sentence was permissible under section 958.04(2)(d) or section 958.14, Florida Statutes....

...ent. However, the trial court did not continue Mr. Williams’ youthful offender status. Upon finding that a youthful offender committed a substantive violation of probation, a trial court may impose the maximum sentence allowable for the crime, see § 958.14, Florida Statutes (2007); Mistretta v....

...trict: WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 [ 1 ] AND 948.06(2), [ 2 ] FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE *560 A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE? 248 So.3d at 1099 ....

...Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Cooper's motion to correct his illegal sentence. We remand to the trial court to remove the "youthful offender" designation from his sentence. AFFIRMED and REMANDED with instructions. ORFINGER, COHEN, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. § 958.14, Fla....

...trict: WHERE A DEFENDANT IS INITIALLY SENTENCED TO PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 [ 1 ] AND 948.06(2), [ 2 ] FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE *560 A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE? 248 So.3d at 1099 ....

...Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Cooper's motion to correct his illegal sentence. We remand to the trial court to remove the "youthful offender" designation from his sentence. AFFIRMED and REMANDED with instructions. ORFINGER, COHEN, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. § 958.14, Fla....

...r of probation. Although the trial court was clearly attempting to impose a proper youthful offender sentence on violation of probation, it was not authorized to impose a sentence that was longer than the statutory maximum for a charged offense. See § 958.14, Fla....

...ound guilty of violating his community control restrictions. We reverse. Haynes contends the trial court erred in finding him in violation of his community control and in imposing consecutive sentences in excess of the six year maximum prescribed in § 958.14, Fla.Stat....

...There is sufficient competent evidence to support a finding that Haynes violated his community control. However, the trial court did err in sentencing Haynes to serve two consecutive four-year sentences or a total commitment of eight years. Under the provisions of § 958.14, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Appellant’s sentence is not illegal because his total period of incarceration does not exceed the six-year maximum penalty under the youthful offender statute. See § 958.14, Fla....

sentence exceeds the six-year maximum provided by section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1985), we reverse the sentence

PER CURIAM. The order denying the motion to correct illegal sentence is affirmed on authority of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1999); State v....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 958.14, Fla....

...A youthful offender who technically, but not substantively, violates probation may receive a sentence of incarceration up to either (1) the maximum sentence for the underlying crime or (2) six years, whichever is less. Rogers v. State, 972 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); § 958.14, Fla....

...ursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand for an evi-dentiary hearing or for record attachments to refute appellant’s claim that his fifteen-year sentence entered pursuant to his probation violation is illegal. See § 958.14, Fla....

...Procedure 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. He claims that his twenty-year sentence for his violation of his youthful offender probation is illegal because the sentence exceeds the six-year cap for a “technical or nonsubstantive violation” as stated in section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2003). We have reviewed our records for the defendant’s direct appeal in case number 4D07-4303....

...to a prison sentence followed by probation. The violation of probation charge in this case involved the allegation of a domestic battery. As the state concedes, for the violation of probation, the court was required to sentence appellant under youthful offender restrictions. See § 958.14, Fla....

...nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated. 3 § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2017). As mentioned earlier, a “substantive violation,” as the phrase is used in section 958.14, “refers exclusively to a violation premised on the commission of a separate criminal act.” Meeks, 789 So....

...sentence involving prison incarceration is subject to a revocation proceeding held by the trial court for misconduct occurring during the community control portion of the offender's split sentence. Our holding was based on the provisions of sections 958.14 and 948.06(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Those provisions read as follows: 958.14 Violation of community control program....

...outhful *27 offender's release from imprisonment to the community control program is subject to revocation "as if he were on parole." This implies exclusive jurisdiction of the Probation and Parole Commission to revoke or not revoke the release. But section 958.14, which is subsequent in location in the statutes to section 958.10, [2] explicitly states that a youthful offender who violates the terms of his community control release shall be subject to the provisions of section 948.06(1) — which...

...State, 462 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). A contrary view has been taken, however, by the Second District in Lollis v. State, 449 So.2d 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), wherein it was held that there can be no "probation" for a youthful offender following imprisonment, and section 958.14 does not apply to youthful offenders serving in a community control program begun pursuant to section 958.10 after a period of imprisonment. Such an offender, under Lollis, is solely under the supervisory authority of the Parole and Probation Commission, and his release to community control cannot be revoked by the trial court. On their face, sections 958.14 and 948.06(1) make no distinction between those youthful offenders serving in a community control program after imprisonment and those who enter community control directly. Given the explicit and unambiguous language of sections 958.14 and 948.06(1), we adhere to our holding in Spurlock to the effect that a youthful offender released to community control following a sentence of imprisonment is subject to the supervisory authority of the trial court, and the latter has the power to revoke his release....

...tire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances.’” Id. at 1178 (quoting Blakley v. State, 746 So. 2d 1182, 1186‒87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). 2  Section 958.14, Florida Statutes, addresses a youthful offender’s violation of probation or community control: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty .... (Emphasis added). Section 958.14 dictates that violations are subject to the provisions of section 948.06, which provides, in relevant part: If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender g...

...PROBATION OR COMMUNITY CONTROL AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, AND THE TRIAL COURT LATER REVOKES SUPERVISION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATION AND IMPOSES A SENTENCE ABOVE THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER CAP UNDER SECTIONS 958.14 AND 948.06(2), FLORIDA STATUTES, IS THE COURT REQUIRED TO IMPOSE A MINIMUM MANDATORY SENTENCE THAT WOULD HAVE ORIGINALLY APPLIED TO THE OFFENSE? The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, Eustache v....

...heart. The sentencing options for youthful offenders are limited. Section 948.06 does not, on its face, alter the sentence that the court “might have originally imposed” on a youthful offender. When read together, sections 958.04, 948.06, and 958.14 permit the trial court to sentence a youthful 4 offender who substantively violates probation or community control to a prison sentence in excess of 6 years but do not allow the court to impose...

...ear maximum provided by law under section 958.04, Florida Statutes (1989). He further alleged that when the court revoked his probation [1] for new substantive offenses committed in 1991, it again exceeded the six-year statutory maximum set forth in section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1989), by sentencing him to seven-and-a-half years, and particularly so, he urged, in that he had previously completed the earlier four-year imprisonment term....

...On appeal, the state concedes that at the time appellant committed his initial crimes, the statute authorized resentencing of a youthful offender following a violation of probation to no more than six years, with credit for time served while incarcerated. See § 958.14, Fla....

...1st DCA 1995). Although the statute was subsequently amended to allow for a longer sentence for a substantive probation violation, the state recognizes that the amended statute cannot be applied to appellant, because of the ex post facto prohibition. See § 958.14, Fla....

...m on the 1991 and 1995 probation violations, with the result that his youthful offender sentence exceeded the six-year statutory maximum, then appellant's sentence would likewise be illegal and he would be entitled to relief under rule 3.800(a). See § 958.14, Fla....

...holding in Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851 (Fla.1989), did the court intend to hold that a trial court could resentence a youthful offender as an adult, upon a violation of community control, despite the 1985 amendment to the youthful offender act, section 958.14, Florida Statutes? In Brooks v....

...ence a youthful offender as an adult, since the trial court could have done so at the defendant’s original sentencing. The issue was significantly redefined, perhaps in response to Brooks , as of July 1, 1985, the effective date of an amendment to section 958.14, Florida Statutes, as follows: 958.14....

...Since the amendment governed Hamilton’s behavior at the time of his parole violations, the amendment applied to Hamilton when he was resentenced. Buckle v. State, 528 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), was the first of many cases to hold that the amended language of section 958.14, Florida Statutes, was intended to negate the holding of Brooks ....

...3d DCA 1988), juris, accepted, 544 So.2d 201 (Fla.1989); Reams v. State, 528 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Watson v. State, 528 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). [T]he only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to change the case law interpretation of § 958.14, or in any event to change the law, so that once the circuit court has given a defendant youthful offender status and has sentenced him as a youthful offender, it must continue that status and only resen-tence the defendant as a youthful of...

PER CURIAM. Cecil Ray Willis appeals his sentence imposed after violation of probation, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to resentence him as a youthful offender. Under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1997), a trial court may impose a non-youthful offender sentence on a youthful offender who commits violations of probation that involve new substantive offenses....

...No appearance required for appellee. PER CURIAM. With respect to appellant's claim to be entitled to a sentence of not more than six years, only if a violation is technical or non substantive is a sentence on revocation of supervision limited to six years. See § 958.14, Fla....

...resen-tencing for a violation of probation even when the violation was substantive.” ); Tidwell v. State, 74 So.3d 503, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“[W]hen a youthful offender commits a violation of probation, even a substantive one as described in section 958.14, his status as a youthful offender cannot be revoked.” ); Lee v....

...2d DCA 2011) (“ ‘Once a circuit court has imposed a youthful offender sentence, it must continue that status upon resentencing after a violation of probation or community control.’ ” (quoting Blacker v. State, 49 So.3d 785, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010))). We also note that under section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2005), a youthful offender who commits a substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original crime....

...A youthful offender’s sentence after revocation of probation or community control is therefore limited to a maximum of six years less credit for time served.” State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994 , 997-98 (Fla.1990) (quoting Watson v. State, 528 So.2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)); see also § 958.14, Fla....

...fense for *372 which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served.”). Here, Plamondon pleaded to a second-degree felony with a statutory maximum of fifteen years. Because he was sentenced as a youthful offender, under section 958.14, his maximum sentence was limited to six years....

...ory maximum for youthful offenders. Reversed and remanded. KELLY and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. . See generally State v. Meeks, 789 So.2d 982, 989 (Fla.2001) (“[A] ‘substantive violation,' as the phrase is used in [the violation of probation statute,] section 958.14, [Fla....

...See § 948.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2011) (providing that when a court revokes a defendant’s community control it may “impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the ... offender on probation or into community control.”); cf. § 958.14, Fla....

...(2011) (providing that if a defendant was placed on community control as a youthful offender, upon revocation the court may not sentence the defendant to more than six years’ imprisonment where the violation is technical or nonsubstantive); Dunbar v. State, 664 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (applying section 958.14 and holding a defendant placed on probation as a youthful offender cannot be sentenced to more than six years’ imprisonment following a revocation of probation based upon a technical violation).

...We conclude that the first issue, concerning the trial court’s alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction, is without merit and, accordingly, affirm in that regard. We discuss only the second issue which concerns treatment of youthful offenders upon revocation of probation or community control pursuant to section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1987) (part of the Youthful Offender Act)....

...The court sentenced the appellants to departure sentences of ten years incarceration. The court did not sentence either appellant pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act as had been done in 1985. The appellants appeal these sentences, claiming that since they were initially sentenced as youthful offenders, section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1987) as amended in 1985, mandates that upon the revocation of their community control they receive a sentence of not more than six years. We agree with appellants’ position that the 1985 amendment to section 958.14 imposes a six year limitation on the sentence of imprisonment that can be imposed upon revocation of a youthful offender’s probation or community control....

...1st DCA 1988). Contra Franklin v. State, 526 So.2d 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). Franklin cited Crosby v. State, 487 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), as support for a *426 conclusion contrary to our holding in this case. Crosby does contain a statement that section 958.14 as amended did not require the trial court to cap defendant’s sentence in that case at six years. However, as Crosby itself pointed out, the 1985 amendment to section 958.14 was not in effect when the defendant in that case was resentenced after violation of probation....

...He was subsequently found to have violated his probation and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison for each original charge. Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to more than a six year term of incarceration in violation of the Youthful Offender Act. Section 958.14, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...On appeal, Yegge argues that his ten-year mandatory minimum sentence is illegal because sentencing enhancements do not apply to youthful offender sentences. We disagree. Once Yegge violated probation or community control, he was resentenced in accordance with section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2002) (emphasis supplied), which provides: A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...flects the legislature's intent that such offenders lose the benefit of the original sentencing limitations of the Youthful Offender Act. To understand the full import of the first sentence of this statute, some statutory history is helpful. When section 958.14 was enacted in 1978, it provided simply that "[a] violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...me served while incarcerated. Ch. 85-288, § 24, at 1821, Laws of Fla. And again in 1990, the legislature further amended the second sentence to apply the six-year cap only to technical, not substantive, violations of probation. See § 958.14, Fla....

...fender Act. "The intent of the legislature should be derived from the plain language of the statute in question." State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994, 997 (Fla. 1990). A plain -4- reading of section 958.14 leads to the conclusion that the sentencing limitations contained in section 958.04, which preclude sentencing enhancements, do not apply to a sentence imposed after a substantive violation of probation or community control. Section 958.14 states that a violation of probation shall subject the youthful offender to sentencing under the general violation statute, section 948.06, which states that on revocation of probation or community control the court "shall ....

...violations of probation or community control retain the benefit of the six-year sentencing cap, youthful offenders who commit a substantive violation may be sentenced to "the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty." § 958.14....

...After Yegge pleaded guilty to armed burglary, his maximum sentence was controlled by sections 810.02(2)(b) and 775.087(2)(a)(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2002), and the guidelines in effect at the time of his offense. Once a youthful offender violates probation, he is sentenced according to section 958.14, which states that a youthful offender who commits a substantive violation is exposed to the maximum sentence for his original offense....

...ined in section 775.082 for Mendenhall's offense."); Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991) (explaining that the defendant's "maximum guideline sentence" included the section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1985), enhancement). Nothing in section 958.14 suggests that a sentence imposed after a substantive violation is limited by the other qualifiers of section 958.04....

...To support its holding, the Fourth District cited Mendez v. State, 835 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and Jones v. State, 588 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). However, both Mendez and Jones address initial youthful offender sentencing under section 958.04, not postviolation sentencing under section 958.14....

...possibility of enhancing his sentence with a ten-year minimum mandatory." However, because the issue in Wooten was whether the 10/20/Life Statute could be applied to a youthful offender's initial sentence, its reasoning is not relevant to Yegge's appeal from a postviolation sentence. Section 958.14 does not extend the sentencing limitations of -7- section 958.04 to youthful offenders who substantively violate supervision....

...substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original offense" and that "the six-year limitation applicable to youthful offender sentences no longer applies." Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 958.14, Fla....

...The Fifth District vacated the life sentence, concluding that it was illegal. Arnette v. State, 566 So. 2d 1369, 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). On review, the Florida Supreme Court noted that at the time of Arnette's resentencing, - 11 -  section 958.14, Florida Statues (1983), read: "A violation or alleged violation of the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s....

...unity control." Thus, we must determine what sentence the trial judge could have imposed on Arnette originally. 604 So. 2d at 483. In answering that question, the supreme court specifically addressed a 1985 amendment to section 958.14 by which the legislature added the provision that "no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for such violation for a period longer than [six] years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he was found guilty, whichever is less." See 604 So....

...to treat youthful offenders differently than adults. Unless the legislature clearly states otherwise, youthful offenders maintain youthful offender status even when they violate a condition of community control. Section 958.14 did not specifically authorize applying adult sanctions to a youthful offender, and now we perceive the legislature's intent to have been to limit penalties against youthful offenders to six years. Id....

...(emphasis added). Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the Fifth District to vacate Mr. Arnette's life sentence and "authorize[d] a total of six years' imprisonment." Id. As the majority points out, in 1990, the legislature again amended section 958.14, changing the second sentence of the statute to read as follows: - 12 -  However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for...

.... I agree that this amendment establishes the legislature's intent to remove the six-year cap for youthful offender sentences following substantive violations of probation. But the balance of the section was left unchanged. Therefore, both the pre- 1990 version of section 958.14—which was at issue in Arnette—and the post-1990 version of section 958.14—at issue here—state in the first sentence that "[a] violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06(1)." In Arnette, the supreme court concluded that this language in section 958.14 should not be considered as the legislature's statement that every conceivable adult sanction should be available upon resentencing youthful offenders for violations of probation without limitation. 604 So. 2d at 484 ("Section 958.14 did not specifically authorize applying adult sanctions to a youthful offender."). And although subsequent amendments have expanded the range of postviolation youthful offender sentencing options beyond those available under the version of section 958.14 applicable in Arnette, I see nothing in the post-Arnette amendments to section 958.14 that changes this conclusion or authorizes the limitless application of section 948.06(1) to youthful offender sentences following a substantive violation....

...- 13 - seriousness of the violation of supervision. Accordingly, I conclude that Arnette applies and supports a reversal in this case. I also disagree with the majority's assessment that the first line of section 958.14 is an "unqualified" directive that upon a substantive violation of supervision youthful offenders are to be resentenced only pursuant to section 948.06(1)....

...In my opinion, this language most certainly has been qualified—both by case law requiring that a youthful offender designation be retained upon resentencing after a violation of probation, see, e.g., Vantine v. State, 66 So. 3d 350, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), and more pointedly by the second sentence of section 958.14, which requires that "no youthful offender shall be" resentenced "for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty." (Emphasis added.) The first sentence of section 958.14 serves to sever the restraints of the original youthful offender sentencing caps of section 958.04(2), but the second sentence dictates the boundaries for resentencing after substantive violation. It is the interpretat...

...which he or she was found guilty" in the second sentence that brings me to my final disagreement with the majority's opinion. The majority correctly states that the youthful offender who is found to have committed a substantive violation of supervision is subject to this section 958.14 language....

...authorized by law." See Holmes v. State, 638 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (second alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted). When Yegge then committed a substantive violation of his probation, pursuant to the second sentence of section 958.14, Yegge's new sentence could be no "longer than the maximum sentence for" armed burglary....

...and habitual violent felony offenders, the burglary statute contains no additional reference to the availability of a minimum mandatory sentencing enhancement pursuant to section 775.087.3 As such, upon resentencing of Yegge, the trial court exceeded the scope of section 958.14 by imposing the 10/20/Life minimum mandatory enhancement to his ten-year sentence. Furthermore, in my opinion, the holdings in Mendenhall, 48 So....

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 958.14, Fla....

...r than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less"); Flores v. State , 46 So.3d 102 , 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that the six-year prison sentence "cap" under section 958.14 applies only to sentences resulting from a technical violation of youthful offender supervision, not to a substantive violation (i.e., the commission of a new criminal act), and that this is true even if the new criminal charge is nolle prossed) (citing State v....