Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Richard L. Polin, Bureau Chief, and Erik M. Figlio, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before GERSTEN, GREEN, and SUAREZ, JJ. GREEN, J. J.L.S. appeals his delinquency adjudication for trespass in a school safety zone in violation of Section 810.0975(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), on the basis that this statute is facially unconstitutional for overbreadth, vagueness, and substantive due process....

...on a school day by a police officer. On two prior separate occasions, J.L.S. had been warned not to return to Central's school safety zone. J.L.S. was arrested and a petition of delinquency was filed charging him with one count of trespass within a school safety zone in violation of Section 810.0975(2), Florida Statutes and one count of resisting arrest without violence in violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2005). J.L.S. moved to dismiss the petition for delinquency on the grounds that Section 810.0975(2)(b) of the statute was unconstitutional on its face....

...then pled no contest to both charges in the petition, but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to dismiss. J.L.S. was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with certain special conditions. On this appeal, J.L.S. seeks our de novo review of his facial constitutional challenges to Section 810.0975(2)(b) of the statute....

...punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. J.L.S. essentially argues that this section is facially unconstitutional because it is impermissibly overbroad, vague, and violates substantive due process. A. OVERBREADTH J.L.S. first argues that Section 810.0975(2)(b), is impermissibly overbroad because: (1) it restricts a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct such as freedom of speech, peaceable assembly with others for political or social purposes, or freedom to move abo...

...dth doctrine is an unusual remedy which is to be used sparingly, particularly where the challenged statute is primarily meant to regulate *645 conduct and not merely pure speech. Id. In the instant case, J.L.S.'s own conduct is clearly proscribed by Section 810.0975(2)(b), and we recognize that he has standing to challenge this statute for facial overbreadth....

...as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward conduct.'") (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Nevertheless, since any application of Section 810.0975(2)(b) which violates the First Amendment can be remedied through as-applied litigation, we decline to use the "strong medicine" of overbreadth to invalidate this entire statute. B. VAGUENESS J.L.S. next argues that Section 810.0975(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague....

...Thus, not only is this statute not unconstitutional as applied in this case, but the appellant also lacks standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge. See Sieniarecki; Dickerson. We therefore do not labor further on this issue and proceed to his final issue on appeal. C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS J.L.S. lastly asserts that Section 810.0975(2)(b) may be used to punish entirely *647 innocent activities and as such is violative of substantive due process....

...In doing so, we do not concern ourselves with the wisdom of the Legislature in choosing the means to be used, or even with whether the means chosen will in fact accomplish the intended goals; our only concern is with the constitutionality of the means chosen. Lasky, 296 So.2d at 15-16. The obvious legislative objective of Section 810.0975(2)(b), as pointed out by the State is the protection of school children from harmful or negative persons such as drug dealers, gang members, or pedophiles....

...ent people may desire to loiter near a public school does not deprive the Legislature of its power to prohibit loitering at such a place if the safety of school children require such legislative action."). Thus, because we find that the enactment of Section 810.0975(2)(b) was a legitimate exercise of the State's police power for the safety of school children, we can find no constitutional violation of substantive due process....

...CONCLUSION Based upon all of the foregoing, we find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged statute. Accordingly, we affirm the order under review. NOTES [1] The statute also is inapplicable to residents or persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business within the school safety zone. See § 810.0975(3).

...BACKGROUND This action arises from Defendants' prohibition of Plaintiff Thomas Gray's ("Gray") distribution of Bibles on a public sidewalk within 500 feet of Key Largo School, a school safety zone pursuant to the Florida School Safety Zone Statute. § 810.0975, Fla....

...all be construed to abridge or infringe upon the right of any person to peaceably assemble and protest. (d) This section does not apply to residents or persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business within the school safety zone. § 810.0975(2), Fla. Stat. Section 810.0975(1) defines a "school safety zone" as being "within 500 feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or private elementary, middle, or high school or school board and used for elementary, middle, or high school education." The following facts are set forth in the Complaint....

...will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). III. ANALYSIS A. Vagueness Gray facially challenges § 810.0975 (the "School Safety Zone Statute") on grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

..."Legitimate business" is not defined in the statute and there is no scienter requirement. The statute exempts residents, persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business, or persons having another authorization, license or invitation to enter or remain in the school safety zone. § 810.0975(2)(b), (3), Fla....

...ly informs individuals of ordinary intelligence of the acts that will render them in violation of the statute. Florida's appellate courts have never had occasion to define, clarify or narrow the meaning of "legitimate business" within the context of § 810.0975....

...[2] Accordingly, the court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it sufficiently described the type of activity that would expose a person to criminal liability. Id.; see also J.H. v. State of Florida, 625 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Here, § 810.0975(2)(b) has no language, such as "on campus," that limits the scope of "legitimate business." Therefore, no inference limiting the scope of "legitimate business" to any purpose connected to the purpose of the school is warranted....

...n refuses an order by a principal or designee to leave the school safety zone. No order to vacate may issue unless the principal or designee has "a reasonable belief that [the person] will commit a crime or is engaged in harassment or intimidation." § 810.0975(2)(c), Fla....

...The findings above dispose of all dispositive substantive issues. Therefore, this Court need make no additional findings. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. # 85) is GRANTED IN PART. Subsections 2(a) and 2(b) of § 810.0975, Florida Statutes, are declared unconstitutionally vague....

GREEN, J. J.L.S. appeals his delinquency adjudication for trespass in a school safety zone in violation of Section 810.0975(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), on the basis that this statute is facially unconstitutional for over-breadth, vagueness, and substantive due process....

...On two prior separate occasions, J.L.S. had been warned not to return to Central’s school safety zone. J.L.S. was arrested and a petition of delinquency was filed charging him with one count of trespass within a school safety zone in violation of Section 810.0975(2), Florida Statutes and one count of resisting arrest without violence in violation of Section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2005). J.L.S. moved to dismiss the petition for delinquency on thé' grounds that Section 810.0975(2)(b) of the statute was unconstitutional on its face....

...then pled no contest to both charges in the petition, but reserved his right to appeal the- denial of his dispositive motion to dismiss. J.L.S. was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with certain special conditions. On this appeal, J.L.S. seeks our de novo review of his facial constitutional challenges to Section 810.0975(2)(b) of the statute....

...punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. J.L.S. essentially argues that this section is facially unconstitutional because it is impermissibly overbroad, vague, and violates substantive due process. A. OVERBREADTH J.L.S. first argues that Section 810.0975(2)(b), is impermissibly overbroad because: (1) it restricts a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct such as freedom of speech, peaceable assembly with others for political or social purposes, or freedom to move abo...

...doctrine is an unusual remedy which is to be used sparingly, particularly where the challenged statute is primarily meant to regu *645 late conduct and not merely pure speech. Id. In the instant case, J.L.S.’s own conduct is clearly proscribed by Section 810.0975(2)(b), and we recognize that he has standing to challenge this statute for facial overbreadth....

...erwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from “pure speech” toward conduct.’ ”) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Nevertheless, since any application of Section 810.0975(2)(b) which violates the First Amendment can be remedied through as-applied litigation, we decline to use the “strong medicine” of overbreadth to invalidate this entire statute. B. VAGUENESS J.L.S. next argues that Section 810.0975(2)(b) is facially unconstitutional because it is impermissibly vague....

...Thus, not only is this statute not unconstitutional as applied in this case, but the appellant also lacks standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge. See Sieniarecki; Dickerson. We therefore do not labor further on this issue and proceed to his final issue on appeal. C. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS J.L.S. lastly asserts that Section 810.0975(2)(b) may be used to punish en *647 tirely innocent activities and as such is violative of substantive due process....

...In doing so, we do not concern ourselves with the wisdom of the Legislature in choosing the means to be used, or even with whether the means chosen will in fact accomplish the intended goals; our only concern is with the constitutionality of the means chosen. Lasky, 296 So.2d at 15-16 . The obvious legislative objective of Section 810.0975(2)(b), as pointed out by the State is the protection of school children from harmful or negative persons such as drug dealers, gang members, or pedophiles....

...t people may desire to loiter near a public school does not deprive the Legislature of its power to prohibit loitering at such a place if the safety of school children require such legislative action.”). Thus, because we find that the enactment of Section 810.0975(2)(b) was a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power for the safety of school children, we can find no constitutional violation of substantive due process....

...CONCLUSION Based upon all of the foregoing, we find no constitutional infirmity to the challenged statute. Accordingly, we affirm the order under review. . The statute also is inapplicable to residents or persons engaged in the operation of a licensed commercial business within the school safety zone. See § 810.0975(3).

or leased to any public or private [school].” § 810.0975(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). Criminal trespass occurs

...Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. LINDSEY, J.  Appellant D.M.T., a juvenile, appeals from a final order withholding adjudication of delinquency and placing him on probation for trespassing in a school safety zone in violation of § 810.0975(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022). D.M.T.’s primary argument on appeal is that the statute is unconstitutionally vague....

...Moreover, the officer had given D.M.T. a written trespass warning four days before. When the officer called D.M.T. over, D.M.T. fled. The officer found D.M.T. in a park near the school and arrested him. D.M.T. was charged by petition for delinquency with violating § 810.0975(2)(b), which prohibits trespass within a school safety zone: (b)1....

...to a school administrator and contacted D.M.T.’s parents to come pick him up. Four days later, the officer saw D.M.T. across the street from the school on his bike during school hours. D.M.T. was arrested and charged with violating the school safety zone statute, § 810.0975(2)(b). At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of dismissal and renewed her pretrial objection that § 810.0975(2)(b) is unconstitutionally vague....

...1st DCA 1999))). 4  come onto the property to attempt to enter the school for a legitimate reason. The trial court found D.M.T. guilty of trespass within a school safety zone in violation of § 810.0975(2)(b), withheld adjudication, and placed D.M.T. on probation. D.M.T. timely appealed. II. ANALYSIS D.M.T.’s primary argument on appeal is that § 810.0975(2)(b) is unconstitutionally vague....

...testimony about D.M.T.’s prior trespass and that the trial court’s Richardson inquiry improperly placed the burden on the defense to establish prejudice. We address each argument in turn. a. Vagueness D.M.T. argues that § 810.0975(2)(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it requires a person to have “legitimate business in the school safety zone” but does not define “legitimate business.” This undefined phrase, D.M.T....

...had been warned not to return to Central’s school safety zone. J.L.S. was arrested and a petition of delinquency was filed charging him with one count of trespass within a school safety zone in violation of Section 810.0975(2), Florida Statutes ....

...Thus, not only is this statute not unconstitutional as applied in this case, but the appellant also lacks standing to raise a facial vagueness challenge. Id. Based on the record before us, we similarly conclude that § 810.0975(2)(b) constitutionally applies to D.M.T.; therefore, he lacks standing to challenge the statute as unconstitutionally vague....

...was arrested, the school resource officer caught D.M.T. trespassing on school property and truant from the off- 2 D.M.T. relies heavily on Gray v. Kohl, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2008). In Gray, members of Gideons International were arrested and charged with violating § 810.0975(2) for passing out Bibles on a public sidewalk near a school....

...remand for further proceedings. Florida’s School Safety Laws. Florida protects its school grounds by creating school safety zones “in, on, or within 500 feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or private [school].” § 810.0975(1), Fla....

...facility.” § 810.097(4), Fla. Stat. (2014). Every school principal is required to notify the appropriate law enforcement agency to prohibit people from loitering in the school safety zone, except for those with legitimate business, authorization, or license. See § 810.0975(2)(a), Fla....