CopyCited 7 times | Published | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 1994 WL 501296
...ursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We reverse and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The state charged Jones with three counts of retaliating against a witness in violation of section 914.23, Florida Statutes (1991)....
...At no time did Jones indicate that he wanted to retract his statements or that he was merely jesting or blowing off steam. Jones also made his death threats known to Dr. Falcone, a psychologist, who, in turn, informed the officers of the threats. [1] As pertinent, section 914.23 provides: Retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant....
...eeding; ... * * * * * * or attempts to do so, is guilty of a criminal offense. If the conduct results in bodily injury, such person is guilty of a felony of the second degree... . Otherwise, such person is guilty of a felony of the third degree... . § 914.23, Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added). Section 914.23 is virtually identical to the federal statute which prohibits retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1513 (1984). In granting Jones' motion to dismiss, the trial court interpreted the provisions of section 914.23 as requiring the state to show that Jones either intended to communicate the threats to the officers, or intended that the probation officer or psychologist communicate the threats to the officers. [2] We respectfully disagree with this interpretation of the statute. By its express terms, section 914.23 requires the state to demonstrate that a defendant has knowingly engaged in conduct threatening to cause bodily injury to another person with the intent to retaliate against the person for his testimony as a witness in an official proceeding....
...1125,
127 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994); United States v. Brown,
937 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
112 S.Ct. 323,
116 L.Ed.2d 264 (1991). The only intent requirement contained in the statute is that the defendant make the threats with the intent to retaliate against the witness; section
914.23 does not require that the defendant have the intent to communicate his threats to the witness or, even, that the defendant have the intent to carry out his threats. United *806 States v. Maggitt,
784 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1986). In this regard, section
914.23 is aimed at deterring both retaliatory bodily injury to a witness and retaliatory threats against a witness before the threats become reality....
...ver subject to direct proof and must be established by surrounding circumstances. See Brewer v. State,
413 So.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), rev. denied,
426 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1983). See also United States v. Brown,
937 F.2d at 36. In construing section
914.23's federal counterpart, courts have concluded that determining whether a defendant's statements and acts constitute threatening conduct is a question of fact generally reserved for the jury....
...Thus, the issue of Jones' intent or state of mind in the present case presented a jury question and was not a matter which could be decided on a "(c)(4)" motion. See State v. Evans,
394 So.2d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In our view, the state presented a prima facie case under section
914.23 because the state demonstrated that Jones verbally made detailed threats to kill the three officers in retaliation for their deposition testimony....
...reats as merely letting off steam or made in jest. In a subsequent telephone call to his probation officer, Jones stated that he realized the threats in fact had been communicated to the officers. Because the state presented a prima facie case under section 914.23, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the charges against Jones....
...Pentecost,
397 So.2d 711, 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Cramer,
383 So.2d 254, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied,
388 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 1980); State v. Savarino,
381 So.2d 734, 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). [3] We agree with the state's observation that section
914.23 does not address the evil of tampering with a witness as does section
914.22, Florida Statutes (1991)....
...This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the legislature separately addressed the problems of tampering and retaliation when it enacted these statutes. See Ch. 84-363, §§ 14, 15, Laws of Fla. Prior to the enactment of sections
914.22 and
914.23, section 918.14, Florida Statutes (1983), which dealt primarily with tampering with a witness, also contained some provisions protecting a witness from retaliation....
...l the President. [5] Because they were not raised in this appeal, we need not address two other issues raised in the trial court regarding whether a deposition in a civil trial is an "official proceeding" as defined in section
914.21(4), and whether section
914.23 is unconstitutionally vague. [6] The information in this case describes the three charged offenses as second-degree felonies. The charged offenses, however, are clearly third-degree felonies under section
914.23 because the charging document does not allege any resulting injury....
CopyPublished | Florida 5th District Court of Appeal | 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3835, 2004 WL 587673
THOMPSON, J. C.S., a minor, appeals an order adjudicating him delinquent. We affirm. C.S. contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal to the charge of retaliating against a witness in violation of section
914.23, Florida Statutes. A trial court must not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal unless there is no view of the evidence which a jury might consider to be favorable to the state that can be sustained under law. Holland v. State,
773 So.2d 1065 (Fla.2000). Section
914.23, Florida Statutes, provides in part: A person who knowingly engages in any conduct that causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with the intent to retaliate agai...
...and the victim because C.S. stormed towards the victim. We conclude *639 there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal. Next, C.S. argues that the evidence does not support an adjudication of delinquency under section 914.23(1), Florida Statutes, which was cited in the information....
CopyPublished | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1089, 2009 WL 331006
...A person is guilty of retaliating against a witness where he or she "knowingly engages in any conduct that causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any person....." § 914.23 Fla....
...attery on a law enforcement officer and battery on firefighter, but was correctly sentenced according to PRR statute for resisting arrest with violence because that crime required use or threat of physical force or violence). Because the elements of section
914.23, Florida Statutes, do not necessarily require the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual, the retaliating against a witness conviction does not fall within section
775.082(9)(a)1....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 5270
...ing R.T.’s motion for judgment of dismissal, and remand with instructions to enter an order granting R.T.’s motion for judgment of dismissal. The pertinent facts are as follows. R.T. was charged with retaliating against a witness in violation of section 914.23(1), Florida Statutes (2008). 1 To prove a violation of section 914.23(1), the State was required to demonstrate that R.T....
...aliation of the witness’ testimony at an official proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying R.T.’s motion for judgment of dismissal at the close of the State’s case. 2 Reversed and remanded with instructions. . Section 914.23(1) provides in pertinent part: A person who knowingly engages in any conduct that causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any pe...
...iven or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding ... [[Image here]] or attempts to do so, is guilty of a criminal offense.... . The State contends that R.T. was not charged under the correct subsection of section 914.23, and that the evidence supports a violation of section 914.23(2). Thus, the State requests that if we reverse the orders under review, that we do so without prejudice to allow the State to file an amended charging document charging R.T. under section 914.23(2). The State argues that because R.T. was not tried under section 914.23(2), and our reversal is not based on the sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy does not bar a successive prosecution....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2010 WL 1565504
...denying R.T.'s motion for judgment of dismissal, and remand with instructions to enter an order granting R.T.'s motion for judgment of dismissal. The pertinent facts are as follows. R.T. was charged with retaliating against a witness in violation of section 914.23(1), Florida Statutes (2008). [1] To prove a violation of section 914.23(1), the State was required to demonstrate that R.T....
...tion of the witness' testimony at an official proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying R.T.'s motion for judgment of dismissal at the close of the State's case. [2] Reversed and remanded with instructions. NOTES [1] Section 914.23(1) provides in pertinent part: A person who knowingly engages in any conduct that causes bodily injury to another person or damages the tangible property of another person, or threatens to do so, with intent to retaliate against any pe...
...mony given or any record, document, or other object produced by a witness in an official proceeding . . . .... or attempts to do so, is guilty of a criminal offense.... [2] The State contends that R.T. was not charged under the correct subsection of section 914.23, and that the evidence supports a violation of section 914.23(2). Thus, the State requests that if we reverse the orders under review, that we do so without prejudice to allow the State to file an amended charging document charging R.T. under section 914.23(2). The State argues that because R.T. was not tried under section 914.23(2), and our reversal is not based on the sufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy does not bar a successive prosecution....
