Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ch were stated in the indictment to have occurred in Seminole County, Florida. The trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, which motion alleged that appellant came within the exception contained in Section 790.25(3)(i), (m) and (n), Florida Statutes (1975), since the weapon found on appellant's person was found as a result of a search of his place of residence, and denied appellant's motion to suppress the pistol found on his person....

...his place of residence. He now argues before this Court that the state failed to show probable cause to believe the appellant was armed, and he abandons his argument made in the motion to dismiss the information that he came within the exception of Section 790.25(3)(i), (m) and (n), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...State, 251 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The Second District, on the other hand, held that a revolver out of view under the defendant's front seat but holstered with a leather strap snapped over the hammer, was concealed under section 790.01(2) but was excepted by section 790.25....

...§ 744.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). Incapacitated persons or those committed to a mental institution cannot hold a concealed weapons' permit, § 790.06(10), Florida Statutes (1989), or carry a weapon openly. Compare § 790.053, Fla. Stat. (1989) with § 790.25(2)(b)1., Fla....

...authorizing such prohibition. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 5, Section 15.20. Furthermore, the Legislature in adopting the Revised Statutes of 1969, which includes Chapter 790 dealing with the subject of weapons and firearms, has declared (Section 790.25(1)) it to be the policy of the Legislature not only that it is necessary to promote firearm safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons, but also that the lawful use in defense of life, home and property and for other lawful purposes is not to be prohibited. And in Section 790.25(4) the Legislature has declared that this section shall supersede any law, ordinance or regulation in conflict therewith....

...Lindsey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. BOYD, Justice. This cause is before us on appeal from the Circuit Court, Dade County. The trial court, at trial, denied defendant's motion to dismiss, thereby passing on the validity of Sections 790.01 [1] and 790.25, [2] Florida Statutes, F.S.A., giving this Court jurisdiction of the direct appeal under Article V, Section 3(b)(1) of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A....

...While waiting for the police, he seated himself upon a bench outside the store. The gun was in his holster under his shirt. When the police arrived, the defendant was arrested. According to defense counsel, the charges were subject to dismissal pursuant to Section 790.25. The court denied the motion with leave to submit testimony at the time of trial concerning residency. Defense counsel then moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that Section 790.01 (and 790.25 as it pertains to 790.01) was unconstitutional in that it was vague and *65 did not afford the defendant a proper opportunity to be apprised of the law....

...A renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was tendered to the trial court. After a lengthy argument the court found that the defendant was carrying the gun in a concealed manner in violation of the law. The court withheld ajudication. On appeal, defendant has raised two issues. First, he argues that Sections 790.01 and 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., as applied to a person in possession of a concealed firearm in defense of his home and place of business, are so vague as to be in violation of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, and Amendments V and XIV of the Constitution of the United States. Second, he argues that the trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of violation of Section 790.01, when it was apparent that he was excepted under Section 790.25....

...'s second, and non-constitutional, issue, and, therefore, it would be both unnecessary and improper to consider the constitutional question. We thus hereby reverse defendant's conviction, for reasons which will be set out below. Subsection (3)(n) of Section 790.25 specifically exempts "a person possessing arms at his home or place of business" from the prohibitions of Section 790.01 and the registration requirements of Sections 790.05 and 790.06. This exception is reinforced by the "Declarations of Policy" and "Construction" set forth in Section 790.25(1) and (4)....

...e had caught attempting to commit a felony. This Court, in Rinzler v. Carson, [5] noted that: "[T]he Legislature in adopting the Revised Statutes of 1969, which includes Chapter 790 dealing with the subject of *67 weapons and firearms, has declared (Section 790.25(1)) it to be the policy of the Legislature not only that it is necessary to promote firearm safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons, but also that the lawful use in defen...

...A homeowner would have to either carry his weapon in his hand or outside holster, or leave said weapon where it would be useless (as in a locked drawer and/or in plain sight). The Legislature could not have intended a result so inconsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4)....

...a Statutes, when acting in the performance of duties as provided in said chapter. "(4) Nothing in this section shall relate to persons licensed as set forth in §§ 790.05 and 790.06, Florida Statutes." [2] Said Section provides, in pertinent part: "790.25 Lawful ownership, possession, and use of fireams and other weapons; penalty "(1) Declaration of policy....

...of another person. " § 790.001(3)(a) (emphasis supplied). The concealed weapon statute is inapplicable if the firearm or other weapon carried in a private motor vehicle is "securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use." § 790.25(5), Fla....

...Anderson filed a verified motion to dismiss the information in count one, averring in pertinent part that he never "used" the firearm. He argued that he was entitled to dismissal because he was permitted to possess the firearm at his place of business pursuant to section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1997), which the legislature stated should be liberally construed. He further argued that section 790.25(2)(b)(1), providing that the protections of the section did not apply to a person "using" a firearm in violation of section 790.23, did not apply to the facts of this case because he was not charged with "using" a firearm....

...The State filed a traverse and demurrer, claiming that Anderson was in possession of the firearm and that "use" was not required by section 790.23. The trial court granted Anderson's motion to dismiss the count for violation of section 790.23(1) due to the operation of section 790.25, because Anderson was not "using" a firearm, but merely possessing one. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the motion. Section 790.25 protects the rights of citizens in Florida to lawfully own and possess firearms. However, within this section the Legislature has also made an express declaration of public policy that "it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime...." § 790.25(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). In keeping with this declaration, section 790.25(2) specifies uses not authorized, which include, in pertinent part: (b) The protections of this section do not apply to the following: 1 .... a person using weapons or firearms in violation of ss. 790.07-790.12, 790.14-790.19, 790.22-790.24; § 790.25(2)(b)1., Fla....

...Snyder, 673 So.2d 9, 10 (Fla.1996); Nelson v. State, 195 So.2d 853, 855 n. 8 (Fla.1967). The evil contemplated by section 790.23 is clearly the prevention of the possession and the use of firearms by convicted felons. Anderson argues that, given the legislative intent in section 790.25(4) that the section be construed liberally, and the express permission for a person to possess arms at his or her home or place of business under section 790.25(3)(n), a convicted felon should be allowed to possess a firearm as long as he does not use it, in spite of the clear language in section 790.23(1)(a)....

...One cannot use a firearm without having it in his or her care, custody, possession or control. Anderson's claim that a violation of section 790.23 requires actual "use" is mere semantics, violates all common sense and frustrates the declared public policy to keep weapons out of the hands of criminals expressed in section 790.25(1)....

...The district also held section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), to be constitutional. Alexander v. State, 450 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We hold that section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), as modified by sections 790.25(5) and 790.001(15) & (16), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...s. Petitioner was charged by information with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981). He moved to dismiss the charge, citing an exception to the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon found in section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...otion to dismiss. The trial court withheld adjudication and placed him on probation. On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and that section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), as refined in sections 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...or state military organizations, and as otherwise now authorized by law, including the right to use and own firearms for target practice and markmanship on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes." § 790.25(1), Fla....

...ctives. Next, we must determine if the means chosen in the statutes bear a reasonable relationship to those objectives. Section 790.01, Florida Statutes (1981), proscribes carrying a concealed weapon. An exception to that proscription is provided in section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...e proscribed." Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 1972) (citations and footnote omitted). The proscribed conduct in this statutory scheme is carrying a concealed weapon that is not securely encased or is readily accessible for immediate use. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...It would frustrate the intent of the legislature if we were to hold that the carrying of a firearm in a zippered pouch like petitioner's was proscribed by the statute, since it is no less readily accessible for immediate use. In summary, section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981), as well as sections 790.25(5), 790.001(15), (16), is constitutional....

...o obtain a license from the county commissioners. Section 790.06 sets forth certain requirements which must be satisfied before the county commissioners may issue a license to carry a firearm. Having set the basic statutory framework, we now turn to Section 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the statute under which appellant claims to have proven a defense. Subsection 1 thereof provides as a matter of public policy for the lawful use of firearms in defense of life, home, and property. Subsection 2 thereof sets forth that § 790.25 shall not authorize the carrying of a concealed weapon [5] without a permit, as prohibited by §§ 790.01-790.04....

...Appellant was charged with violation of § 790.01(2), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. A defense to that charge is recognized by the statute, namely, if the person has a license issued by the county commissioners. See also Fla.Att'y Gen.Op. 072-161 (May 2, *319 1972). Under § 790.25(2) and (3) a person is not required to obtain a license in accordance with §§ 790.05 and 790.06, if that person comes within one of the fourteen enumerated exceptions of § 790.25(3). It is undisputed that appellant comes within the statutory exception provided by § 790.25(3)(n)....

...Thus, appellant was not required to obtain a license from the county commissioners. It would certainly be anomalous to determine that a person who is expressly excepted from the licensing requirements of § 790.05 and § 790.06 may be prosecuted and convicted for failing to have said license. Accordingly, to give § 790.25, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the liberal construction expressly provided for, we conclude that that statute (§ 790.25) must be read in pari materia with §§ 790.01, 790.05 and 790.06....

...WHITE, JOSEPH S., (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs. REED, C.J., dissents in part, concurs in part, with opinion. REED, Chief Judge (dissenting in part; concurring in part). I would affirm the conviction under Count 2. I believe the majority opinion, to the extent it holds that § 790.25(3)(n), F.S. 1969, F.S.A., authorizes one to carry a concealed firearm in his home, is erroneous. The most that can be said for § 790.25(3)(n) is that it authorizes the possession of a firearm in one's home or place of business, but not the concealment of a firearm on one's person....

...As a practical matter, the majority's opinion may well make more dangerous the already dangerous situation which confronts arresting officers when they are required to go to a person's home to effect an arrest. I agree with the majority's treatment of Count 1. NOTES [1] See Florida Statutes § 790.25(3) (n) (1969), F.S.A....

...Irwin Operating Co., 90 So.2d 460, 461 (Fla. 1956). [17] Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 318, 866 (1965). [18] This reasonable and proper action creates police reports suggesting criminal activity in the area which, as here, is used as evidence against the innkeeper. [19] See § 790.25(3)(n), Fla....

...Officer Lerman became suspicious of a bulky object in the pouch. 9. Officer Lerman opened the pouch. 10. Officer Lerman arrested the defendant for carrying a concealed firearm. As to paragraph 11, the motion to dismiss quoted newly effective sections 790.25(5) and 790.001(16), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...There are two issues on appeal, the appellant raising here for the first time the second of the two: I. Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss. We conclude that it did not. *1214 II. Whether section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1981) as refined in sections 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ollectively. Sections 776.012 and .031, and 782.02, Florida Statutes, reinforce this view by making it lawful to use firearms in defense of life, home and property, as does the policy declaration in the statute with which we are here most concerned, section 790.25....

...r weapons in crime and by incompetent persons without prohibiting their lawful use in defense of life, home or property, by state and federal military, and in other lawful uses such as target practice, marksmanship, and hunting, as permitted by law. Section 790.25(1). Section 790.01(2) makes it a third degree felony to carry a concealed firearm on or about one's person. Prior to amendment in 1982, section 790.25(3)( l ) made an exception merely for "[a]ny person traveling by private conveyance when the weapon is securely encased." In Ensor v....

...d, in violation of the concealed firearms statute. Moreover, even if a weapon were in a locked glove compartment, Ensor indicated it could be "about the person" and thus a prohibited concealed weapon. Ensor apparently prompted the legislature to add section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...in enhancing Taylor's sentence. We do not address the other issues raised by Taylor on appeal because we find them to be without merit. Conviction AFFIRMED; sentence REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing. DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 790.25, Fla....

...lid is closed does not constitute the carrying of a concealed weapon in violation of Section 790.01(2) Florida Statutes (1981). Carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner comes within the exception to carrying a concealed weapon found in Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...NOTES [1] The validity of the search was not challenged in the trial court nor was it raised on appeal. Nothing contained herein should be construed as a ruling by this court approving the validity of a search under the facts of the instant case. [2] Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

..., as well as buildings and structures situated thereon." The State requested this instruction after defense counsel placed into issue Campbell's possession of a firearm while working at the Preserve. We conclude that this instruction was proper. See § 790.25(3)(n), Fla....

...The sole point on appeal concerns whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss which was predicated on the fact that the defendant is an employee of the business premises on which he was found in possession of the concealed firearm. The defendant argued unsuccessfully below that subsection 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes, permits a person to possess a firearm in certain specific locations, including his or her place of business....

...by law. Weapons and firearms are regulated by Chapter 790, Florida Statutes (2006). Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes, provides that "A person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree...." Section 790.25, Florida Statutes, entitled "Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons" enunciates at subsection (1) the following Declaration of Policy: The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is...

...ividual have a possessory or proprietary interest in the business which he or she is protecting or that the business at the very least be open. In Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court held, despite the language of subsection 790.25(2)(a), that "Subsection (3)(n) of Section 790.25 specifically exempts `a person possessing arms at his home or place of business' from the prohibitions of Section 790.01 and the registration requirements of Section 790.05 and 790.06." 287 So.2d at 66....

...The two perpetrators escaped but when the police arrived the defendant was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm in violation of section 790.01, Florida Statutes. The supreme court reversed the defendant's conviction under the exemption contained in subsection 790.25(3)(n)....

...A homeowner would have to either carry his weapon in his hand or outside holster, or leave said weapon where it would be useless (as in a locked drawer and/or in plain sight). The Legislature could not have intended a result so inconsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4)....

...287 So.2d at 67. Peoples applied the exemption to concealed weapons, thus rejecting the State's initial contention in this appeal. The State argues its claim that the exemption does not apply to concealed weapons is buttressed by a 1982 amendment to section 790.25 creating subsection (5), which specifically provides that it applies notwithstanding subsection (2) and it is not a violation of section 790.01 to possess a concealed weapon in a conveyance within the parameters set forth in that subsection....

...ed the authority to engraft such requirement onto the statute. Id. The State correctly notes that neither the supreme court in Peoples nor the Third District in Commons explicitly addressed by what legislative enactment the exemption set forth in subsection 790.25(3)(n) applied to concealed firearms as governed by section 790.01. Nevertheless, both decisions so hold and in the 35 years since Peoples was decided, the language *1097 of subsection 790.25(3)(n) has remained substantially unchanged....

...sidence when police officers served a search warrant. A handgun was discovered beneath the place on the couch where the defendant had been sitting and an empty gun holster was found on his person. The trial court ruled that the exemption found in subsection 790.25(3)(n) decriminalized such conduct....

...rm in contravention of his employer's express policy or directive. We express no opinion on that hypothetical situation. We are bound by the clear wording of the statute. The defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of the exemption contained in subsection 790.25(3)(n) and accordingly, the motion to dismiss should have been granted....

...f serious bodily harm to the person of the applicant based upon the individual circumstances of the applicant that are different in kind and degree from that of the general public. (3) Availability of personnel subject to the exceptions set forth in Section 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (1975) or other local, state or federal licensing laws, rules or regulations to provide protective services to persons or property referenced herein....

...nstitutional portions of the statute. Section I of this opinion summarizes the law on gun possession in Florida as it existed prior to July 1, 2008—that is, prior to the effective date of the statute at issue. Section II summarizes the new statute, § 790.251, Florida Statutes....

...Second, there are some places, for example, courthouses, where a person may not possess a gun at all. See § 790.06(12). In other public places, a person may not openly carry a gun, see § 790.053, except for specific purposes such as hunting or to take the gun to a repair shop. See § 790.25(3). A person may not carry a concealed gun in public unless he or she has a state-issued permit to do so. See § 790.01. But even without a concealed-carry permit, a person may keep a gun in a motor vehicle, so long as the gun is encased. See § 790.25(3)( l ); Dixon v....

...officer from possessing a gun on the property. Before addressing the statute's specific provisions, a word is in order about the terms used in the statute and in this opinion. The statute specifically defines the terms "employee" and "employer." See § 790.251(2)(c) & (d)....

...Instead, the statute defines an "employee" as a person "who possesses a valid license issued pursuant to s. 790.06"—that is, who has a valid Florida permit to carry a concealed weapon —and who is either an employee (as the term is ordinarily used) or an independent contractor or a volunteer. § 790.251(2)(c). The statute defines "employer" as a business in any form—including, for example, a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation—or public-sector entity "that has employees." § 790.251(2)(d) (emphasis added)....

...Separate and apart from any interest in gun possession, a worker or customer has privacy interests that are implicated by a vehicle search. The state can protect those privacy interests by banning searches, at least as a general matter. And the state has done so. Since long prior to enactment of § 790.251, Florida law has validly prohibited a person from entering someone else's vehicle without consent....

...r expelling a customer: for exercising his or her constitutional right to keep and bear arms or for exercising the right of self-defense as long as a firearm is never exhibited on company property for any reason other than lawful defensive purposes. § 790.251(4)(e)....

...Indeed, that the Bill of Rights and Declaration of Rights restrict only government, not private, action is too well settled for argument. To his credit, the Attorney General conceded the point at oral argument. [7] Second, the entire substantive section of the guns-at-work statute, § 790.251(4), prohibits private businesses only from "violat[ing] the constitutional rights" of workers or customers in the specific respects described in § 790.251(4)(a) through (e)—that is, in the specific respects addressed in this opinion....

...rhetorical flourish. Still, it is a rhetorical flourish that must be given a meaning, because in subsection 4(e)—unlike in other parts of the statute— there is no other delineation of the provision's scope. Most if not all of the rights secured by § 790.251(4) did not exist before the statute was enacted; the only source of the rights is § 790.251 itself. I conclude that when the statute refers to the "constitutional" right to bear arms, it means the right to bear arms created by § 790.251 itself. On this view § 790.251(4)(e) protects only the right under § 790.251 to have a gun secured in a vehicle in the parking lot. This is the reading suggested by the Attorney General, without objection. As so construed, § 790.251(4)(e) simply prohibits a covered business from terminating *1296 or taking other action against a worker with a concealed carry permit, or expelling a customer, because the worker or customer has a gun secured in a vehicle in the parking lot....

...The business may, however, take action against a worker or customer who exhibits a gun other than for lawful defensive purposes. The provision as so construed is constitutional to the same extent—and only to the same extent—as the underlying provisions dealing with the keeping of a gun in a vehicle in a parking lot. Thus § 790.251(4)(e) validly prohibits a business from terminating or otherwise discriminating against a worker with a concealedcarry permit based on the worker's securing of a gun in a vehicle in the parking lot....

...s may be held liable in a common-law negligence action for any reasonably foreseeable damages that result. But the statute explicitly immunizes a business that allows guns on the property only because required to do so by the statute. See Fla. Stat. § 790.251(5)(b)....

...Also, the statute authorizes any aggrieved person or the Attorney General to bring an action for injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees against a business that fails to comply with the statute, and authorizes the Attorney General to recover civil penalties of up to $10,000 for each violation. See Fla. Stat. §§ 790.251(6) & 760.51....

...There is no rational basis for this disparate treatment of such businesses. For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED: 1. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (document 9) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 2. The defendant Attorney General is hereby enjoined from enforcing those portions of § 790.251, Florida Statutes, that address an employer's treatment of customers or invitees. This injunction does not affect the Attorney General's enforcement of those portions of § 790.251 that address an employer's treatment of an "employee" as defined in the statute—that is, a worker who has a valid Florida permit to carry a concealed weapon....

...consolidation, addressing the matters identified in the Initial Scheduling Order entered May 14, 2008 (document 8). SO ORDERED. NOTES [1] Unless otherwise indicated, citations in this opinion to the Florida Statutes—other than to the newly adopted § 790.251—are to the 2007 official compilation of the Florida Statutes. [2] See § 790.251(4)(a). The statute requires the gun to be "lawfully possessed"—the worker cannot be a convicted felon, for example— and "locked inside or locked to" the vehicle. Id. [3] See § 790.251(4)(a). Again, the statute requires the gun to be "lawfully possessed" and "locked inside or locked to" the vehicle. Id. [4] See § 790.251(4)(b). This provision does not, however, prevent a search by an on-duty law enforcement officer "based upon due process" and complying with "constitutional protections." Id. [5] See § 790.251(4)(c). [6] See § 790.251(4)(e)....

...The first is that a pistol in a closed center console is not in close proximity to, or in easy reach of, the driver. See Watson v. Stone, Fla. 1941, 4 So.2d 700. The second ground is that a pistol in a closed center console is securely encased and, therefore, exempt from the concealed firearm category. See Fla. Stat. § 790.25(3), which provides: "The provisions of §§ 790.05 and 790.06 shall not apply in the following instances......

...reason that the same rationale which exempts a person in his home from a charge of carrying a concealed firearm also exempts a person who carries a concealed firearm in his vehicle. We differ upon this basis in that we apply a strict construction to § 790.25(3)( l ), the exemption section....

...An analysis of the majority opinion seems to say that if the defendant's pistol was in a gun case by his side rather than in the closed center console, then he would be exempt from the provisions of §§ 790.05, 790.06, Fla. Stat. I find this reasoning difficult to follow. *57 I agree that the words [1] of § 790.25(3) ( l ), Fla....

...1972) and Section 901.21, Florida Statutes (1975). Defendant for his second and final point on appeal argues that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon because he was within the exception of Section 790.25, Florida Statutes (1975) allowing persons to carry a firearm in their home or apartment [See Section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1975)]....

...h while at the hospital. *902 The issues raised by this appeal revolve around the legality of possessing and carrying weapons. Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993), makes it a crime to carry a concealed firearm on or about the person. However, section 790.25(5) provides an exception to section 790.01(2) and states, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...Thus, Gemmill was wrongfully convicted of a crime that never occurred. As to count two, Gemmill argues that because the stun gun was in his leather waist pouch, the securely encased exception legalizes his possession of the stun gun at the hospital. However, section 790.25 specifically provides that the securely encased exception does not legalize the carrying of a concealed weapon on the person: ......

...purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased... Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...If Gemmill's carrying of the stun gun in his waist pouch were lawful conduct under the securely encased exception, the language prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon on the person would be completely negated. Such an interpretation would be illogical and render section 790.25(5) meaningless....

...HOBSON, A.C.J., and MANN, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 790.23, F.S. 1969, F.S.A. [2] Bryant did not, and does not now, contend or suggest that his civil rights had been restored so as to except him from the provisions of § 790.23, supra. [3] As to weapons, see, e.g., § 790.08 and § 790.25, F.S....

...Gen., Tallahassee, and David Luther Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee. HOBSON, Judge. Appellant Lonnie B. Facion pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of carrying a concealed firearm, preserving his right to appeal the issue of his exception under F.S. § 790.25(3)(n) F.S.A....

...Facion contends that since he was arrested approximately five feet from the door to his rented apartment in an area in common on the leased premises, that he was "at his home" and came within the exception to the statute relating to unlawful carrying of concealed firearms. Sub-section 3 of § 790.25 provides that the licensing requirements and prohibitions of F.S. §§ 790.05 and 790.06 F.S.A. shall not apply to (n) "A person possessing arms at his home or place of business." In French v. State, Fla.App. 1973, 279 So.2d 317, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that F.S. § 790.25 F.S.A....

...Lesser Included Offenses CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPONS OR FIREARM — 790.01(1) and (2) CATEGORY ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA. STAT. INS. NO. None Attempt_777.04(1)5.1 CARRYING CONCEALED FIREARMS — 780,01(2) CATEGORY-ONE CATEGORY TWO FLA.STAT. INS. NO. Attempt 777.04(1) 5A Comments See § 790.25(5), Fla....

...n during the commission of a felony in violation of Section 790.07, Florida Statutes (1977). The dismissal of the charge of carrying a concealed weapon during the commission of a felony was based upon the trial court's interpretation of a portion of Section 790.25, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides in pertinent part: (3) EXCEPTIONS....

...It does not, under any circumstances, permit carrying concealed firearms. Second, there is no such thing as a license to carry a concealed firearm during the commission of a felony. Accordingly, there can be no exception to the requirement of a license. Finally, Section 790.25(2)(a) specifically provides that the protections afforded by Section 790.25 "shall not apply to ......

...person for purposes of the statute. It is in a position where it cannot be readily seen yet it is within the reach of the driver. See Lawson v. State, Fla.App.3d, 1971, 251 So.2d 683. The pivotal point is whether appellee is exonerated by Fla. Stat. § 790.25 which provides in part: "(1) Declaration of policy....

...This act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith." (emphasis added) A literal reading of the statute does not necessarily support appellee's position. In the first place, he was charged with violating § 790.01, but the enumeration of permissible activities under § 790.25(3) are said to be exceptions to §§ 790.05 and 790.06. Moreover, § 790.25(2) specifies that the section does not authorize carrying a concealed weapon without a permit as prohibited by § 790.01. Finally, § 790.25(1) refers to a weapon, and the definition of weapon in § 790.001(13) excludes a firearm....

...e store where he worked. The petitioner also resided at the store. A subsequent search of the petitioner revealed a pistol under his shirt. In reversing petitioner's conviction for carrying a concealed firearm, the Supreme Court held that Fla. Stat. § 790.25(3)(n) exempted him from the prohibitions of § 790.01 as well as the licensing requirements of §§ 790.05 and 790.06....

...A homeowner would have to either carry his weapon in his hand or outside holster, or leave said weapon where it would be useless (as in a locked drawer and/or in plain sight). "The Legislature could not have intended a result so inconsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4)......

...State, Fla.App.1st, 1974, 304 So.2d 481, reversed appellant's conviction. Finally, this court in Facion v. State, Fla.App.2d, 1974, 290 So.2d 75, recognized the statutory exception, but refused to apply it because appellant was first observed on a public sidewalk. Thus, the courts have interpreted § 790.25(3)(n) as providing an exception to § 790.01 even though subsection (3) only refers to §§ 790.05 and 790.06. These decisions do not fully answer the point about § 790.25(1) referring only to weapons. However, when § 790.25 is read in its entirety, it becomes obvious that the legislature was using the terms "weapons" and "firearms" interchangeably....

...n his home from a charge of carrying a concealed firearm also exempts one who carries a concealed firearm in his vehicle, assuming, of course, that the firearm is securely encased. In view of the Declaration and Construction which are made a part of § 790.25, we think it must. There is no logical basis upon which to distinguish paragraphs ( l ) and (n) of § 790.25(3)....

...790.01 to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...after a few seconds of grasping. The weapon in the car was a sheathed knife found in the closed console between the front seats. Sections 790.01(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1985) proscribe the carrying of a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm. Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1985) provides an exception stating: [I]t is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...The trial court may not either weigh the evidence or determine its creditability. See State v. Davis, 243 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1971); and Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.190. In regard to the count of carrying a concealed weapon, under Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1977), the trial court improperly relied upon Section 790.25(3)( 1 ), Florida Statutes (1977), in granting the motion to dismiss....

CIKLIN, J. The state appeals the trial court’s order granting Little’s motion to dismiss the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The trial court found that Little’s union hall fell within the “place of business” exception under section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...hing labor, patrolling the docks, safekeeping union money, and serving as the union’s business agent. 1 In his motion to dismiss, Little argued that he could not be convicted of carrying a concealed weapon because he fell within an exception under section 790.25(3)(n)....

...ons is a question of law subject to de novo review.” Santiago v. State, 77 So.3d 874, 876 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (citing Brook *1265 v. State, 999 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)). This court recently discussed the interplay between section 790.01 and section 790.25 in Santiago , and we repeat the relevant analysis here. Section 790.01 prohibits a person from carrying a concealed firearm, except when licensed. Section 790.25(3)(n), however, permits the lawful possession of a firearm in one’s place of business. Section 790.25 provides: (1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.— The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompete...

...This act is supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights. This act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith. The principal case interpreting the 790.25(3)(n) exception is Peoples v....

...ked and lived. Id. at 65-66 . The Florida Supreme Court noted that allowing a person to carry a weapon at his place of business but prohibiting him from concealing the weapon would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s “Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4).” Id....

...The Fifth District determined that the “place of business” exception applied when the defendant was at the place of business during non-working hours. Brook, 999 So.2d at 1094, 1097 . We turn now to the state’s contention that Little, an elected secretary of a labor union at his union hall, did not fit the 790.25(3)(n) exception....

...The state argues that there is a distinction between a secretary of a labor union and an employee of a business. The state particularly focuses on the fact that Little did not allege that he was paid by the union. The state cites to no authority that suggests a union secretary (whether paid or unpaid) would not meet the 790.25(3)(n) exception, and this appears to be an issue of first impression....

...the Legislature.” Brook, 999 So.2d at 1097 . If legislative intent in criminal statutes is unclear, ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803, 814 (Fla.2008); see § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat (2010). In section 790.25(4), the Legislature directs that we liberally construe the provisions of section 790.25....

...The facts before us establish that Little’s place of business was the union hall. Little was required to report for and perform duties at the union hall, including providing security in the union parking lot. Under the facts of this case we find that Little was encompassed within the “place of business” exception in section 790.25(3)(n)....

...Wainwright, 526 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.1976); U.S. v. Bowdach, 414 F. Supp. 1346 (S.D.Fla. 1976). McNair next argues that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because he was exempted from the crime charged in that he carried the firearm at his own home pursuant to Section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...We have also determined that the Court did not recede from or modify Smith, supra, when it considered the constitutionality vel non of Section 790.05, Florida Statutes, in Davis v. State, 146 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1962). Specifically noted is the addition to Chapter 790 of Section 790.25(4): " Construction....

...e to carry a pistol, Winchester or other repeating rifle, only to such persons as are over the age of 21 years and of good moral character... ." The above statutes says that the commissioners may grant permits but does not say they shall issue same. Section 790.25(4), Florida Statutes, provides: "This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein *338 and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes......

...That the order to `halt' and the ensuing arrest took place a number of feet away from the Defendant's apartment door. 8. That the said area was in such immediate vecinity [sic] to constitute the `curtilage' area surrounding his home. 9. That subsection (3)(n) of Florida Statutes Section 790.25 specifically exempts a `person possessing arms at his home or place of business' from the prohibitions of Section 790.01......

...We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and defendant's sentence of probation in this prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987). Defendant contends that the conduct with which he was charged falls within the exception created by section 790.25(5) that "it is lawful ......

...ontention. We cannot agree with the state's argument that the statutory exception was not applicable because a firearm need not be operable in order to be accessible for immediate use, e.g., for use in pointing it at someone in a threatening manner. Section 790.25(5), we conclude, contemplates an operable firearm....

...f a vehicle is readily accessible for immediate use when ammunition for that firearm is lying in open view on the passenger's seat. The pertinent statutory provisions concerning the issue in this case are sections 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989), 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...about his person a concealed firearm in violation of section 790.01(2). Subsequent to his arrest, Ashley filed a sworn motion to dismiss, claiming that he fell within the exception to the prohibition against carrying a concealed weapon contained in section 790.25(5)....

...ntained in the vehicle. In reaching its decision in Amaya, the Second District Court emphasized that an unloaded firearm was not immediately accessible. According to the Second District, such an interpretation in favor of the accused was required by section 790.25(5)'s language mandating that it be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms....

...Under the circumstances of that case, we determined that it was irrelevant as to whether the gun was loaded or whether ammunition was available. Based on Bentley, the Fourth District concluded that "an unloaded firearm may indeed be `readily accessible *296 for immediate use' as used in section 790.25(5)." Ashley, 601 So.2d at 1232. Judge Dell dissented in Ashley, stating that the majority had ignored the legislative directive that subsection 790.25(5) be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use of firearms....

...ffense proscribed here, the offense for which the defendant was charged in Bentley involved a conviction requiring a minimum mandatory sentence for use of a firearm. In Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1985), we construed the language of section 790.25(5) that reads "or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use." In Alexander, we determined that the legislature's use of the words "or is otherwise" clearly indicated that its primary objective in creating that section was t...

...the conflict presented between Ashley and Amaya, we must determine: (1) whether an unloaded, concealed firearm contained in a motor vehicle where no ammunition is found is not "readily accessible for immediate use" under the exception provided under section 790.25(5); and (2) whether the presence of ammunition in the vehicle removes the firearm from that exception....

...), Florida Statutes (1983), the statute at issue in Bentley, because the latter provides no exception for a firearm not "readily accessible for immediate use." As previously indicated, the legislature has directed that the exception contained within section 790.25(5) for a firearm not readily accessible for immediate use "shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons." Applying this liberal construction to the first issue, we find that a firearm is not readily accessible for immediate use within the meaning of the statutory scheme set forth in sections 790.01(2) and 790.25(5) when no ammunition is found in the vehicle....

...The second question, however, is more difficult and fact specific. In Amaya, the firearm was concealed under the passenger's seat and its clips and bullets were lying separately in open view on the passenger's seat. Under those factual circumstances, even giving section 790.25(5) a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused, we find that the concealed firearm was readily accessible for immediate use....

...the ammunition had not been so easily accessible, we might have reached a different conclusion. Consequently, we disapprove Amaya, and we hold that the issue of whether the presence of ammunition in a vehicle takes a firearm out of the exception in section 790.25(5) must be determined factually on a case-by-case basis....

...The defendant argued before the trial court, and in his brief, that the officers could not lawfully order him out of the car and *102 search for a weapon because they had no probable cause to believe that he was illegally carrying a concealed weapon. He cites section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1993), and cases defining when one may possess, without a license, a properly encased weapon....

...On appeal, appellant recognizes that under the rationale of Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1981), his gun was concealed within the meaning of section 790.01. However, he argues that he could not be convicted because his gun was "securely encased" as contemplated by the exception set forth in section 790.25(3)(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Yet, because there is so much doubt over the circumstances, if any, when a person can lawfully carry a concealed weapon, we feel warranted in making some further observations. It may be, as the court held in State v. Bryant, 373 So.2d 708 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), that the exceptions of section 790.25(3) only eliminate the need for obtaining a license under sections 790.05 and 790.06, Florida Statutes (1979), and that they are inapplicable to prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon under section 790.01....

...Accord, State v. Murray, 382 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). However, if this is so, it overlooks the fact that section 790.06 pertains to licenses for carrying concealed pistols and that the appellate courts of Florida have often recognized that the section 790.25(3) exceptions are applicable to section 790.01....

...The question of why an alarming number of citizens now feel the necessity to arm themselves should be also a factor to be considered by our lawmakers in spurring along quick legislative attention to chapter 790. NOTES [1] Ensor specifically noted that it was not considering the effect of any of the exceptions contained in section 790.25(3)....

...secondary schools, whether public or private. See id. Importantly, the legislature also provided exceptions to this general prohibition. See § 790.115(2)(a)l.-3., Fla. Stat. (2011). Namely, that a person may carry a firearm in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (2011), which provides that a firearm may be kept in a private conveyance as long as it is securely encased. The provisions of section 790.25 authorizing the carrying of securely encased firearms in private conveyances as well as other lawful carrying of firearms “shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.” § 790.25(4), Fla....

...chool districts” not individual “schools.” This court is almost in full agreement that UNF does not qualify as a “school district” under section 790.115; therefore, UNF does not have the authority to waive itself out of the requirements of section 790.25, which gives Lainez the right to carry a securely encased firearm in her vehicle....

...rm securely encased within his or her vehicle. In regulating the manner of bearing arms, the legislature has attempted to balance this fundamental right with the safety of Florida citizens. This balance can be seen in the “guns-at-work” statute, section 790.251, Florida Statutes (2011), 2 which provides, in part, (3) Legislative intent; findings....

...yer or business establishment within the state, unless specifically required by state or federal law. Section 790.115 strikes a similar balance when it prohibits firearms from school property except when securely encased within a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5)....

...egarding the right to keep and bear arms was not argued in this case, and we need not consider it to decide this case. . In Florida Retail Federation v. Attorney General of Florida, 576 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1302 (N.D.Fla.2008), the Northern District held section 790.251 unconstitutional in part because the court found it irrationally compelled some businesses, but not others, to allow a customer to secure a gun in a vehicle....

...” in Florida. Appellant further alleged, that the Florida Constitution reserves to the Legislature the exclusive authority to regulate the manner of bearing arms, that UF had passed rules or regulations expressly prohibited by section 790.33, that section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2013), provides that a person may possess a firearm in his or her home or place of business, and that section 790.115, Florida Statutes (2013), which prohibits firearms on school property with certain exceptions, is in conflict 'with section 790.25(3)(n)....

...opposition to the summary judgment motion, it had not alleged a Second Amendment violation under the United States Constitution. While noting that Appellees were not disputing “whether or not campus housing includes a home within the meaning” of section 790.25(3)(n), Appellees’ counsel argued that section 790.115 governed the issue at hand and clearly prohibited firearms anywhere on school property with the limited exceptions set forth in the statute....

...judication and granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. As for Appellant’s claim that UF’s prohibition of firearms in university housing violated Florida law, the trial court recognized that the issue raised the interplay between sections 790.25(3)(n) and 790.115, Florida Statutes....

...phrase ‘by law’ indicates that the regulation of the state right to keep and bear arms is assigned to the legislature and must be enacted by statute.” Fla. Carry, Inc., 133 So.3d at 972 . This first issue involves the alleged conflict between section 790.25(3)(n) and section 790,115(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 790.25,, Florida Statutes (2013), which is entitled, “Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons,” provides in part as follows: (1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.— The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and...

...ch has been approved in advance by the principal or chief administrative officer of the school as a program or class to which firearms could be carried; 2. In a case to a career center having a firearms training range; or 3. In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt written and'published policies that waive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges....

...For the purposes of this section, “school” means any preschool, elementary school, middle school, junior high school, secondary school, career center, or postsecondary school, whether public or nonpublic. (Emphasis added). The statute was enacted in 1992. See 92-130, § 4, Laws of Fla. In attempting to reconcile section 790.25(3)(n) with section 790.115(2)(a), we are guided by the fact that the Legislature, based upon the plain language of section 790.115(2)(a), clearly intended to make it unlawful for individuals to possess firearms and other weapons “on the property of any school,” including “postsecond-ary school[s], whether public or nonpublic.” In enacting section 790.115 twenty-seven years after the enactment of section 790.25, the Legislature chose to include in subsection (2)(a) three exceptions to the prohibition on firearms on campus, thereby permitting the carrying of firearms in a case to a firearms program, class or function, in a case to a career center having a firearms training range, or in a vehicle. It is significant to our conclusion in this case that the Legislature cited and relied upon section 790.25(5), the provision allowing for firearms in private conveyances, in section 790.115(2)(a)3. when it made an exception for vehicles on school property. Had the Legislature viewed section 790.25 as preempting section 790.115 based on the “supersede” language in section 790.25(4), the exception as to vehicles in section 790.115 would have been unnecessary....

...More significant is the fact that the Legis *145 lature made no such exception for university housing in section 790.115. Had the Legislature wished to do so, it could have included a subparagraph 4 with language such as “in student housing pursuant to section 790.25(3)(n).” The fact that it did not do so supports the trial court’s ruling and Appellees’ position as to this issue....

...any place that might be considered a student’s home while on school property. Reaching that result, however, requires a strained interpretation of the statutes involved. Another important consideration in this case is that the Legislature amended section 790.25 in 2006....

...19., 790.22-790.24.” In 2006, the Legislature deleted the reference to sections 790.07-790.12 and 790.14-790.19 and added the reference to sections 790.07-790.115 and sections 790.145-790.19. See Ch. 06-103, § 2, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Thus, while section 790.25(3)(n) provides that possession of firearms in a home is a lawful use, the statute also now provides that possession of firearms on school property is not authorized....

...at 977. UF’s rules and regulations prohibiting firearms in university housing, which are not in conflict with the statutes at issue or the Florida Constitution, also clearly relate to campus safety. Appellant argues that we must reconcile sections 790.25(3)(n) and 790.115(2)(a) by concluding that section 790.25(3)(n) controls the issue of whether individuals in university housing may possess firearms based upon ,the language contained in section 790.25(4) that “[t]his act shall supersede any law, ordinance, or regulation in conflict herewith.” We reject Appellant’s argument for two reasons. First, section 790.25 was enacted in 1965, and we find no indication in the statute or other authority that the Legislature, at that time, intended to make it lawful for those living in university housing to possess firearms therein....

...the Legislature, not to a court. While the Legislature may choose to one day amend the current law to permit firearms in university housing, our interpretation of the pertinent statutes leads us to the conclusion that it has not yet done so. To read section 790.25(3)(n) to include university housing would, in our opinion, result in an improper ‘judicially-created exception to section 790.115....

...zes special permits for the carrying of firearms in national forests, and providing penalties for violations.” See Fla. H.R. Comm, on Crim. Just., HB 1029 (2006) Staff Analysis (April 4, 2006). It was also noted that section 2 of the law "[a]mends s. 790.25, F.S., correcting cross-references.” Id. A legislative staff analysis for the companion Senate bill explained that section 2 of the law "[ajmends s. 790.25, F.S....

...'s seat cover. The butt ends of the guns were visible when the driver's door was opened. The distance between the seat and the driver's door was eight inches. Boswink claimed that his possession of the firearms in his truck was lawful because, under section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1991), a person can legally carry a concealed firearm in a private conveyance, without a license, if the weapon is "securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use." Section 790.001(15),...

...That doctrine applies to this case. It is true that, as the trial court found, the offenses observed by the officers, possession of an assault-type rifle, and fleeing from an officer were "only" misdemeanors. See § 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (2007); § 790.053(3), Fla....

...In granting the motion to dismiss the trial court found "there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant inasmuch as the Court finds that the weapon in question was `securely encased' within the purview of Florida Statute 790.25(3)( l ) providing for exceptions to the application of Florida Statute 790.01." Appellant contends that the trial court erred in both respects....

...Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Myra J. Fried, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. STEVENSON, J. In this case, we consider whether the private conveyance exception of section 790.25, Florida Statutes, permits the unlicensed carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon in a zippered pack around the waist while riding a motorcycle....

...utes (2006), which provides that "[a] person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree." Doughty moved to dismiss on the ground that his conduct fell within the private conveyance exception in section 790.25(3)( l ), Florida Statutes (2006), which provides that it is lawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm without a license, if that person is "traveling by private conveyance when the weapon is securely encased." The legislature detailed the private conveyance exception in section 790.25(5), which permits the carrying of a concealed weapon "within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use." Section 790.25(5) further provides, "[n]othing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person." (Emphasis added). We acknowledge that pursuant to the supreme court's holding in Alexander v. *1050 State, 477 So.2d 557, 560 (Fla.1985), the handgun was "securely encased" in Doughty's zippered pack. Yet, pursuant to the unambiguous language of section 790.25(5), even a securely encased weapon does not fall under the private conveyance exception if it is carried "on the person." See Gemmill v. State, 657 So.2d 900, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In Gemmill, the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon on his waist in a securely encased zippered pack, inside an automobile. We recognized that "section 790.25 specifically provides that the securely encased exception does not legalize the carrying of a concealed weapon on the person." Id. Our holding in Gemmill is no less applicable where a defendant is riding a motorcycle. In this regard, we further note that the private conveyance exception of section 790.25(5), by its express terms, applies only to the carrying of a concealed weapon "within the interior of a private conveyance." We interpret this language to require a person carrying a concealed weapon without a permit, while riding a mot...

...Whether it is legal for a person to carry a concealed firearm in certain specific locations is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Brook v. State, 999 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Section 790.01(3) prohibits a person from carrying a concealed firearm, except when licensed. However, section 790.25 permits the lawful possession of a firearm in one’s residence. Specifically, the statute states: 790.25 Lawful ownership,, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.— (1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.— The Legislature finds' as a matter of public policy and fact that it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use...

...A homeowner would have to either carry his weapon in his hand or outside holster, or leave said weapon where it would be useless (as in a locked drawer and/or in plain sight). *877 The Legislature could not have intended a result so inconsistent with its Declaration of Policy in Section 790.25(1), the Exceptions to said Section in Section 790.25(3)(n), and the Construction in Section 790.25(4)....

...Appellant was convicted and sentenced for carrying a concealed weapon. He contends that the state failed to prove its case because the weapon, a knife, was found in a closed center console of the vehicle he was driving and was therefore lawfully possessed within the meaning of section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...apon was found in the closed console not readily accessible to appellant. The court denied the motion. Appellant was convicted, resulting in this appeal. Section 790.01(1) makes it a crime to carry a concealed weapon on or about the person. However, section 790.25(5) provides an exception where it states, in pertinent part, Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...2d DCA 1982), which held a pistol was not securely encased, and State v. Butler, 325 So.2d 55, 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), which held that a pistol in a closed but unlocked center console is not securely encased but is concealed on or about the person. However, both cases were decided before section 790.25 was amended to include the private conveyance exception, and before section 790.001 was amended to include the definition of "securely encased", upon which the later cases rely....

...PER CURIAM. The appellee, in its supplemental brief, having admitted [1] that the gun in the instant case was in a container and could not be removed without opening the lid, in effect, concedes that the firearm was encased within the exception of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989). [2] Although the law enforcement officers and apparently the trial court, believe that the container lid must be secured by a zipper, or attached in some way or there will be a violation of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989), we have held that a glove compartment in an automobile does not have to be locked to be a secure container....

...Other courts have held that a man's purse constitutes a secure container. Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1985). The gun in the instant case could not have been put to use by the defendant without opening the lid of the pouch. We therefore hold that it was "securely encased" within the meaning of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989), and the legislative definition of "securely encased" found in Section 790.001(16), Florida Statutes (1989) [3] , which is controlling herein....

...it. Then, following this Court's decision in City of Miami v. Swift, 481 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. den., 491 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1986), the gun in this case was "securely encased" as defined by Section 790.001(16), Florida Statutes (1989)." [2] Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...nse. Mackey v. State, 124 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 2013). The Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases believes Mackey was probably abrogated by the 2015 change to the statute. - 10 -  SeeSee § 790.25(5), Fla....

...able as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." [1] Section 790.001(2) defines "concealed firearm" as a firearm "which is carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal the firearm from the ordinary sight of another person." Section 790.25(5) addresses possession of a concealed firearm in a private conveyance, stating that it is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...to quickly obtain and place into the firearm" and that the firearm could be loaded and fired "pretty quickly" or "in a fairly quick manner." The trial court concluded as a matter of law, based on these facts and the liberal construction mandated in section 790.25(5), that the unloaded gun was not readily accessible for immediate use. We agree. Several cases have applied section 790.25(5) to conclude that it is not a violation of section 790.01(2) for a person to have a firearm inside a vehicle's closed center console because the firearm is securely encased....

...State, 619 So.2d 294, 296 (Fla.1993) (holding that a firearm in the front passenger floorboard area was not readily accessible for immediate use when no ammunition was found in the vehicle but adding "that the issue of whether the presence of ammunition in a vehicle takes a firearm out of the exception in section 790.25(5) must be determined factually on a case-by-case basis")....

...g it. Under these circumstances, he would not have been able to retrieve and use the firearm as easily and quickly as if he carried it on his person. Thus, under the applicable law, including the liberal construction that must be applied pursuant to section 790.25(5), the trial court correctly determined that the firearm was not readily accessible for immediate use....

...[2] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court correctly dismissed the concealed firearm charge. [3] Affirmed. WALLACE, J., Concurs. VILLANTI, J., Dissents with opinion. VILLANTI, Judge, Dissenting. I respectfully dissent. As the majority recognizes, section 790.25(5) does not directly address the situation in which an unloaded firearm is concealed but otherwise readily accessible in the passenger compartment of a vehicle and ammunition for that firearm is concealed within the closed center console of the vehicle....

...because "[t]he location and accessibility of the firearm and ammunition placed the firearm `within such close proximity ... that it [could] be retrieved and used as easily and quickly as if carried on the person.'" Ashley, 619 So.2d at 296 (quoting § 790.25(5))....

...[4] Thus, in my view, the firearm in this case was more "readily accessible for immediate use" than those found "readily accessible for immediate use" by the supreme court in both Ashley and Ridley. While this court is required to liberally construe section 790.25(5) in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms, our discretion to do so is not unbridled, and we may not do so in contravention of supreme court precedent....

...This application results in an unloaded firearm concealed in the passenger compartment of a vehicle with ammunition concealed in an unlocked center console being a "concealed weapon" while a fully loaded firearm concealed in that same unlocked center console is not. Section 790.25(5) specifically provides an exception for "securely encased" concealed firearms. It does not provide an exception for concealed firearms and securely encased concealed ammunition. I would hope that the legislature would take this opportunity to amend section 790.25(5) to address the issue of unloaded but concealed firearms rather than leaving this issue to the courts to decide on an ad hoc basis....

...That doctrine applies to this case. It is true that, as the trial court found, the offenses observed by the officers, possession of an assault-type rifle, and fleeing from an officer were “only” misdemeanors. See § 775.082(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (2007); § 790.053(3), Fla....

...State, 477 So.2d 557 (Fla.1985), and its holdings, for support of his position that his firearm could not have been found to have been “readily accessible” to him while contained in a pouch in his carry-on baggage. We consider Alexander inapposite as it dealt with the meaning and interpretation to be given to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), a specifically enacted legislative exception to the prohibitions of section 790.01(2). Appellant attempts unsuccessfully to extend the Alexander interpretation of the legislative intent behind the section 790.25(5) exception to the basic prohibitions of section 790.01(2) itself. The fallacy of appellant’s reasoning more clearly appears when we consider carefully what the legislature did and did not do by enacting section 790.25(5)....

...of each case, even a person in a private conveyance could be found guilty of carrying a concealed weapon under section 790.01 if it was securely encased but was found by the trier of fact to be readily accessible for immediate use. The exception in section 790.25(5) seems to be directed at the possession of a securely encased and not readily accessible concealed firearm. Section 790.25(5) contains a specific proviso that the exception does not “authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person.” The exception then seems meant not to apply to the carrying of a securely encased but readily accessible concealed firearm in a private conveyance....

...1 Further, pursuant to chapter 790, Florida law provides sixteen exceptions to Florida’s Open Carry Law, including a broad exception that applies to persons “engaged in fishing, camping, or lawful hunting or going to or returning from a fishing, camping, or lawful hunting expedition.” § 790.25(3) (h), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added); see also § 790.25(3), Fla....

...or state military organizations, and as otherwise now authorized by law, including the right to use and own firearms for target practice and marksmanship on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes. § 790.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). Further, section 790.25(4) addresses the construction to be given to chapter 790, and provides in pertinent part: This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. This act is supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights. Id. § 790.25(4)....

...r of public policy[,] ... it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons without prohibiting the lawful use in defense of life, home, and property .... ” § 790.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). 18 As section 790.25(4) states, the provisions of chapter 790 “shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy,” Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the “ ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.” Schall v....

...Chester, 514 Fed.Appx. 393, 395 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “no circuit has accepted an overbreadth challenge in the Second Amendment context.”). Accordingly, we do not address this claim. We also do not discuss Norman's claim that the exemptions under section 790.25(3) are elements of the crime of openly carrying a firearm under section 790.053 because we find this claim is devoid of merit....

...493.6108(1 )(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and 3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the capital collateral regional counsel and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the investigator is headquartered. § 790.25(3), Fla....

...provision may be viewed as the clearest and most recent expression of legislative intent.” Id (quoting Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000)). The Legislature was aware of the Declaration of Policy contained in section 790.25 when section 790.053 was first enacted in 1987....

...car. Count I of the information charged that he unlawfully and knowingly carried on or about his person a concealed firearm, contrary to section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1989). Ashley filed a sworn motion to dismiss, arguing that he fell within section 790.25(5), which states that it is not a violation of section 790.01 to possess a concealed firearm within the interior of a private conveyance if the firearm "is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use." Acc...

...strict." See State v. Hayes, 333 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In Amaya, as in this case, the defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.01(2). Amaya, like the defendant here, contended that he fell within the section 790.25(5) exception because the firearm was not loaded....

...According to the Amaya court: We must agree with that contention. We cannot agree with the state's argument that the statutory exception was not applicable because a firearm need not be operable in order to be accessible for immediate use, e.g., for use in pointing it at someone in a threatening manner. Section 790.25(5), we conclude, contemplates an operable firearm....

...." We also cannot agree with the state's argument that the statutory exception was not applicable because the firearm could have been loaded and become operable. That *1231 exception requires that the firearm be "readily accessible for immediate use." 580 So.2d at 886 (emphasis added). The Amaya court's interpretation of 790.25(5) necessarily means that a firearm can only be "readily accessible for immediate use" when it is both loaded and capable of being fired. For the reasons that follow, we reject the second district's interpretation of the statute. While section 790.25(5) clearly states that "[t]his subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons," Amaya is the first and only case we have found to specifically address this particular language....

...s "used," not "fired". In short, the plain language of the statute does not require that the firearm be loaded in order to be "readily accessible for immediate use." The Amaya court also failed to offer any case law support for its interpretation of section 790.25(5). There are no citations to any of the other cases interpreting the statute. For example, in Alexander v. State, 477 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of section 790.25(5)....

...irearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of firearms and other weapons in crime and by incompetent persons without prohibiting the lawful use in defense of life, home, and property... .'" 477 So.2d at 559. Turning to the particular language of section 790.25(5), the court held: We agree with the state that by using the `or is otherwise' phrase the legislature clearly indicated that the primary requirement is that the firearm not be `readily accessible for immediate use.' The prohibition ag...

...atory minimum sentence of three years' incarceration. Bentley v. State, 501 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1987). There is no logical distinction to be made between that application and its relevance here. Id. 516 So.2d at 111. The decision in Alexander construing section 790.25(5), along with the decisions in Bentley and Hardee defining "firearm" and "dangerous weapon," lead us to conclude that an unloaded firearm may indeed be "readily accessible for immediate use" as used in section 790.25(5)....

...DELL, J., dissents with opinion. DELL, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I agree with the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in Amaya v. State, 580 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). With all due respect, I think that the majority in interpreting section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1989), misplaces its reliance upon cases involving convictions which require mandatory minimum sentences for use of a firearm....

...1987), a conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm; Hardee v. State, 516 So.2d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), approved, 534 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1988), a conviction for burglary of a dwelling with a firearm. In so doing, I believe that the majority has ignored the legislature's directive that "[t]his subsection [790.25(5)] shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms... ." § 790.25(5), Fla....

carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.25, Florida Statutes (1983). The appellant moved

...5th DCA 2003). Under section 790.01(2), it is a crime for any person to carry a concealed firearm on or about his or her person. However, the Legislature has prescribed certain exceptions to this general prohibition. One of those exceptions is contained in section 790.25(5), which provides: [I]t is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...The undisputed evidence at trial established that when the three guns were found, they were enclosed inside zippered duffle bags located behind the driver's seat. A handgun enclosed inside of a zippered duffle bag fits squarely within the statutory definition of "securely encased." Accordingly, the exception contained in section 790.25(5) applies, and Trock's possession of the firearm did not violate section 790.01(2) as a matter *1197 of law....

...definition of that term); Urquiola v. State, 590 So.2d 497, 498 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (where the firearm was in a "plastic pouch with a flap laid over it" and could not be removed without opening the flap, it was "encased" within the exception of section 790.25(5)). [2] We note, on behalf of the trial judge, that neither the controlling statutory provisions nor the controlling cases were brought to the trial court's attention. Indeed, they were not raised on appeal. While the State did cite to section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (2006), in its brief, its assertion that the exception did not apply because the guns were "readily accessible" contravenes the plain language of the statute....

...shlight on it after defendant exited automobile did not preclude finding that firearm was illegally concealed). There was corroboration of the tip from the ticket seller when Deputy Additon saw in open view at least a portion of the subject firearm. Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1993), provides that an adult may possess a concealed firearm inside a private conveyance if it is securely encased and otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use....

...It is not disputed that after defendant was subdued, his .32 caliber pistol lay on the ground. The jury believed officer Smith and found the defendant guilty as charged. It is clear from the record that the state conceded that the “entire incident occurred in the yard and driveway of the defendant’s home.” Under section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1983), it is not unlawful for a person to possess firearms “at his home or place of business.” The state argues that the statute is inapplicable to this case because defendant had the .32 caliber pistol in his yard and driveway, not “at his home.” We cannot agree....

...Att’y Gen. Fla. 074-156 (May 21, 1974) (possessing a concealed firearm while on a sidewalk adjacent to one’s business). Similarly, defendant’s possession of the firearm while in his own yard qualifies for the statutory exception delineated in section 790.25(3)(n), and we therefore reverse his conviction for concealing a firearm....

...790.001(13), including a razor blade or box cutter, except as authorized in support of school-sanctioned activities, at a school-sponsored event or on the property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop; however, a person may carry a firearm: * * * 3. In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt written and published policies that waive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges. Subsection 3. provides an exception where the firearm is carried in a vehicle pursuant to section 790.25(5). The basis of Appellant's motion to dismiss was this exception. Section 790.25 concerns the "lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons." Subsection (5) permits the possession of a securely encased firearm in a vehicle: (5) Possession in private conveyance.— Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. § 790.25(5), Fla....

...wn, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies for lawful purposes: * * * * * * (n) A person possessing arms at his home or place of business. It appears to us that the exemption from 790.053 and 790.06 created by 790.25(3)(n) is specifically limited to that person’s own home or place of business....

possession was lawful pursuant to the provisions of Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1983), which exempt from

...Now, in addition to law enforcement officers, authorized federal employees, military and national guard personnel, civil defense trainees, and guards or messengers transporting valuables are exempted. Also exempted are persons engaged in, or en route to, such activities as target practice, hunting and fishing. Section 790.25(3), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of § 790.01, Fla.Stat. after a non-jury trial. Defendant urges as reversible error the determination by the trial judge that he does not come within the statutory exception to § 790.01, Fla.Stat. as set forth in § 790.25, Fla.Stat., i....

"place of business" exception set forth in section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes. Further, it is irrelevant

...ppered hand purse along with the defendant’s wallet, driver’s license, and other forms of identification, was securely encased in a gun case such that the defen *481 dant’s prosecution for carrying a concealed firearm was precluded pursuant to section 790.25(5)....

...ession of a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm “is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use.” Section 790.25(5) further provides: “Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person.” No conveyance was involved in the incident which led to Dima’s arrest, and it is u...

provided in s. 775.082 or s.775.083, F.S. 3 Section 790.25(3)(d), F.S. And see, s. 790.051, F.S. (law

...ce of business” without the restrictions against the open carrying of weapons or firearms imposed by section 790.053, Florida Statutes (2020), or the requirements of a concealed carry license imposed by section 790.06, Florida Statutes (2020). See § 790.25(3)(n), Fla....

...For a firearm to be useful for self-defense, it must be readily available and loaded, neither of which can be effectively and safely done if the firearm cannot be taken out of concealment or storage and openly displayed while being loaded and held. As section 790.25(3)(n) permits, Burns had the right to openly carry the firearm he displayed and loaded because he was on his home property. Even if Burns had not been on his home property, it would not have been unlawful, as authorized by section 790....

deputies as to the carrying of concealed weapons. Section 790.25, F.S., in pertinent part provides: (1) DECLARATION

...The state demurred to the motion to dismiss asserting that “as a matter of law the facts establish the crime charged.” The statute proscribes the carrying of “a concealed firearm on or about his person.” Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes. There are certain exceptions which are set out in section 790.25(3): (3) EXCEPTIONS....

...Nothing herein limits the authority of the appointing or employing agency or department from establishing policies limiting law enforcement officers or correctional officers from carrying concealed firearms during off-duty hours in their capacity as appointees or employees of the agency or department." (e.s.) Moreover, section 790.25 (3), Florida Statutes, provides that notwithstanding sections 790.053 and 790.06 , Florida Statutes, "it is lawful for the following persons to own, possess, and lawfully use firearms and other weapons, ammunition, and supplies for law...

...ity which would prevent the safe handling of a firearm, absence of a felony conviction, and demonstrated firearm competency. 3 Further, the provisions of ss. 790.053 , F.S., and 790.06 , F.S. (1990 Supp.), do not apply in those instances provided in s. 790.25 (3), F.S....

...5 A person possessing arms at his or her home or place of business is also within the scope of this statute. 6 Thus, the possession of a concealed weapons license does not authorize a person to openly carry a weapon. However, to the extent that a weapon is carried openly for the specified lawful uses set forth in s. 790.25 (3), F.S....

...(1990 Supp.), defines a concealed weapon or concealed firearm as "a handgun, electronic weapon or device, tear gas gun, knife, or billie, but the term does not include a machine gun . . . ." 3 See , s. 790.06 (2), F.S. (1990 Supp.), for a complete list of the qualifications an applicant must meet for licensure. 4 Section 790.25 (3)(h), F.S. (1990 Supp.). 5 Section 790.25 (3)(l), F.S. (1990 Supp.). 6 Section 790.25 (3)(n), F.S....

PER CURIAM. We reverse upon a holding that under the facts presented on this record the trial court should have applied the place of business exception of Section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1979). See also Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla.1973); Section 790.25(4), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Because the clerk had noticed that 1Peterson also raised the issues of the failure of Deputy Proudfit to provide a warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the lack of probable cause to search her or arrest her based on her admission that she had a weapon because section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (2015), was applicable and provided an exception to the prohibition against possession of a concealed firearm without a permit....

requirements for law enforcement officers. Section 790.25(3)(d), F.S., provides in part that the provisions

790.06, FLORIDA STATUTES (1979), GRANTED BY SECTION 790.25(3)(f) ALSO GRANT AN EXEMPTION FROM THE NEED

...he driver’s seat with a firearm next to him. Florida law prohibits the open carry of a firearm. Fla. Stat. § 790.053 (1). A person can legally carry a firearm while traveling in a “private conveyance” only if it is “securely encased.” Id. § 790.25(3)(Z)....

...Those' facts gave Watson reasonable grounds to believe that Presley was violating Florida’s firearms laws. See Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (holding that a suspect’s “admission to carrying a concealed weapon was sufficient to justify briefly stopping him”). 1 Presley asserts that Fla. Stat. § 790.25 (3)(Z) does not apply to him because he was not actually “traveling” in his car at the time Watson saw him....

...had just violated or was about to violate the law. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1186 . He also asserts that he was not engaged in criminal activity because he was openly carrying the handgun while parked at his residence, which is legal. See Fla. Stat. § 790.25 (3)(n)....

...790.001 (8), F.S., and the ability of assistant state attorneys to carry concealed weapons under the law enforcement exemption of s. 790.051 , F.S. Subsequent to the enactment of Ch. 87-24, Laws of Florida, the Legislature in a special session amended s. 790.25 , F.S. 4 Section 790.25 (3), F.S., as amended, now provides: LAWFUL USES....

...icemen, . . . and other peace and law enforcement officers and their deputies and assistants and full-time paid peace officers of other states and of the Federal Government who are carrying out official duties while in this state; . . . (e.s.) Thus, s. 790.25 , F.S., clearly provides that the licensing provisions contained in s. 790.06 , F.S., do not apply to law enforcement officers. As the later enactment, the provisions of s. 790.25 , F.S., as amended, would control over any conflicting provisions in s. 790.06 , F.S. 5 Inasmuch as the term "law enforcement officer" is not defined in s. 790.25 , the general definition of that term in s....

in section790.06, Florida Statutes (1993). Section 790.25(3), Florida Statutes, states that "[t]he provisions

...rrers to the motions, but did not challenge the facts stated in the motions by a traverse. The trial court denied the motions on the ground that neither Black nor Cockin was a person “possessing arms at his home ...” so as to insulate them under Section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1983), from prosecution for carrying concealed weapons. See Facion v. State, 290 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (Section 790.25(3)(n), which makes it lawful for a person to possess firearms at his home and expressly makes the licensing provisions of Sections 790.05 and 790.06 inapplicable to such a person, must be read *191 in pari materia with Section 790.01 and, thus read, makes it lawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm in his own home); French v. State, 279 So.2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (same). But cf. State v. Bryant, 373 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (Section 790.25(3)(l) not defense to carrying a concealed weapon)....

...ng prosecuted for carrying a concealed firearm in the room. On the other hand, Black’s unchallenged statement that he was residing in the motel room in our view makes the motel room the functional equivalent of Black’s home within the meaning of Section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1983). See Brant v. State, 349 So.2d 674 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (implicitly recognizing that motel room is a home within Section 790.25(3)(n))....

...Cf. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 , 84 S.Ct. 889 , 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (motel room is home for Fourth Amendment purposes); Sheff v. State, 301 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), aff'd, 329 So.2d 270 (Fla.1976) (same). The State says, however, that Section 790.25(3)(n) does not apply to a person who carries a concealed firearm even at his home if his purpose be the furthering of some unlawful activity, here said to be a narcotics transaction. While Section 790.-25(2)(b)l expressly provides that the protections of Section 790.25 do not apply, inter alia, to persons who carry concealed firearms in violation of Section 790.07(2), it seems clear that in order for the State to prevail in its contention that persons carrying concealed firearms at their homes lose the protection of Section 790.25(3)(n) by virtue of having violated Section 790.07(2), such persons must first have been found guilty of carrying the concealed firearm “while committing or attempting to commit any felony o'r while under indictment.” See § 790.07(2), Fla.Stat....

...In a case to a firearms program, class or function which has been approved in advance by the principal or chief administrative officer of the school as a program or class to which firearms could be carried; 2. In a case to a vocational school having a firearms training range; or 3. In a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5); except that school districts may adopt turitten and published policies that icaive the exception in this subparagraph for purposes of student and campus parking privileges....

...ol, whether public or nonpublic.” Thus, section 790.115(2)(a) makes it a felony to possess a firearm on the grounds of any school, with exceptions. The basis of Ragland’s motion to dismiss was the exception provided in subpart three, which cites section 790.25(5). Section 790.25 concerns the “lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.” Subsection (1) of the statute provides: (1) DECLARATION OF POLICY.— The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and fact that it is necess...

...776.012. In his motion to dismiss, Ragland asserted that the rifle found in his vehicle had been encased securely in a plastic ease with four metal clasps holding it closed. The motion argued that Ragland’s possession of the firearm was legal under section 790.25. Ragland further alleged that BCC had not adopted written and published policies waiving the provision in section 709.115(2)(a)3., which allows the possession of firearms and weapons “[i]n a vehicle pursuant to s. 790.25(5).” The state filed a traverse, alleging that BCC had indeed adopted written and published policies waiving the exception allowing possession of firearms and weapons pursuant to section 790.25....

otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use.” § 790.25(5), Fla.Stat. (1991). Moreover, the statute is

...ve compartment of his vehicle. Curry-Pennamon was charged with attempted first-degree murder (count 1) and carrying a concealed firearm (count 2). At trial, the defense argued for a judgment of acquittal on count 2 based on an argument that under section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2011), Curry-Pennamon could lawfully possess a firearm at his place of business, and the evidence supported that Curry-Pennamon was at his place of business at the time he possessed the firearm....

...The possession and use of weapons and firearms are regulated by Chapter 790, Florida Statutes. Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes, provides that “A person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree. . . .” However, section 790.25(3)(n) provides an exception for persons “possessing arms at his or 2 her home or place of business.” Curry-Pennamon argues that his possession of the firearm in the Walmart parking lot was authorized by section 790.25(3)(n) because, as a Walmart employee on duty, he lawfully possessed the firearm at his place of business. We agree. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the “place of business” exception under section 790.25(3)(n) applies not only to owners of a business, but also to its employees....

...as well as buildings and structures situated thereon”); see also State v. Little, 104 So. 3d 1263, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that parking lot of defendant’s place of business was “surrounding property” included within exception of section 790.25(3)(n)). Finally, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the statutory exception found in section 790.25(3)(n), under section 790.25(4) courts are directed to liberally construe the provisions of section 790.25 “in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.” Florida Carry, Inc. 3 v....

...He admits that the barrel was under 18 inches in length and met the statutory definition of a short-barreled shotgun in section 790.001(10), but argues that he possessed the weapon at his home and such possession is made lawful by the exception in section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1987), which applies to a person possessing arms at his home or place of business. We find no merit in appellant’s argument and affirm his conviction. Section 790.25(3)(n) applies only to offenses involving the application of section 790.053 (prohibiting persons from openly carrying firearms about their persons) and section 790.-06 (dealing with the right of duly licensed persons to carry concealed weapons)....

...f the people to keep and bear arms, it can determine that certain arms or weapons may not be kept or borne by the citizen.” 262 So.2d at 665 ); see also Robarge v. State, 432 So.2d 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), aff’d 450 So.2d 855 (Fla.1984). Because section 790.25(3) indicates no legislative intent that its exceptions apply to the offense under section 790.221, we find no error in the ruling of the trial court. The cases cited by appellant are distinguishable. Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla.1973), and Collins v. State, 475 So.2d 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 486 So.2d 595 (Fla.1986), involved the application of the exception under 790.25(3)(n) to the concealed weapons prohibition under section 790.06, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...790.01 for a person 18 years of age or older to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased ....Ӥ 790.25(5), Fla....

...790.01 for a person 18 years of age or older to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm or other weapon is ... not readily accessible for immediate use.” § 790.25(5), Fla....

...Michael Isaak of Isaak Law, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellee. KELLY, Judge. In June 2022, Jonathan Valley was arrested for carrying a concealed firearm in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (2022). Valley filed a motion to dismiss arguing that under section 790.25(5), he was permitted to possess the concealed firearm because it had been securely encased within a private conveyance....

...losed. When the officers removed the pack and searched it, they discovered a loaded handgun. They arrested Valley for carrying a concealed firearm. Section 790.01(2) makes it a crime to carry a concealed firearm on or about the person. However, section 790.25(5)1 provides an exception to section 790.01(2) and states, in pertinent part: Possession in private conveyance.--Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s....

...This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court's dismissal was error because it overlooked the sentence in section 790.25(5) that states 1 Pursuant to a 2023 amendment, subsection (5) has been renumbered subsection (4). 2 that nothing in subsection (5) "shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm ....

...the firearm was securely encased, he could lawfully possess it anywhere in the vehicle—even on his person—because the statute does not limit the exception to constructive possession. This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of section 790.25(5), which expressly limits the right to possess a firearm in a vehicle to those that are either securely encased or not otherwise available for immediate use and not carried on the person....

...Further, it ignores the directive in subsection (5) that it should not be construed in the manner suggested by Valley—that is to allow possession on the person. See Doughty v. State, 979 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("[P]ursuant to the unambiguous language of section 790.25(5), even a securely encased weapon does not fall under the private conveyance exception if it is carried 'on the person.' "); Gemmill v. State, 657 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ("[S]ection 790.25 specifically provides that the securely encased exception does not legalize the carrying of a concealed weapon on the person."). Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the information and remand for further proceedings. Reversed an...

vehicle takes a firearm out of the exception in section 790-25(5) must be determined factually on a ease-by-case

...ve compartment of his vehicle. Curry-Pennamon was charged with attempted first-degree murder (count 1) and carrying a concealed firearm (count 2). At trial, the defense argued for a judgment of acquittal on count 2 based on an argument that under section 790.25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (2011), Curry-Pennamon could lawfully possess a firearm at his place of business, and the evidence supported that Curry-Pennamon was at his place of business at the time he possessed the firearm....

...The possession and use of weapons and firearms are regulated by Chapter 790, Florida Statutes. Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes, provides that “A person who carries a concealed firearm on or about his or her person commits a felony of the third degree. . . .” However, section 790.25(3)(n) provides an exception for persons “possessing arms at his or 2 her home or place of business.” Curry-Pennamon argues that his possession of the firearm in the Walmart parking lot was authorized by section 790.25(3)(n) because, as a Walmart employee on duty, he lawfully possessed the firearm at his place of business. We agree. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the “place of business” exception under section 790.25(3)(n) applies not only to owners of a business, but also to its employees....

...as well as buildings and structures situated thereon”); see also State v. Little, 104 So. 3d 1263, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that parking lot of defendant’s place of business was “surrounding property” included within exception of section 790.25(3)(n)). Finally, notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the statutory exception found in section 790.25(3)(n), under section 790.25(4) courts are directed to liberally construe the provisions of section 790.25 “in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes.” Florida Carry, Inc. 3 v....

...e whether a box or other receptacle contains a securely encased firearm or one that is not securely encased. This is so because secure encasement of a firearm is a legal defense for an individual against a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm. § 790.25(3)(1), Fla....

...ither the method or manner that lawful arms may be carried outside the home. In fact, the plain wording of the Florida Constitution provides explicit support for the State’s position that it may regulate the open carry of firearms. In enacting section 790.25(1), Florida Statutes, the Legislature enunciated a “Declaration of Policy” with regard to the “Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons:” The Legislature finds as a matter of public policy and...

...States or state military organizations, and as otherwise now authorized by law, including the right to use and own firearms for target practice and marksmanship on target practice ranges or other lawful places, and lawful hunting and other lawful purposes. § 790.25(1), Fla. Stat. (2012). Section 790.25(4) addresses the construction to be given chapter 790, and provides in part as follows: This act shall be liberally construed to carry out the declaration of policy herein and in favor of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes. This act is supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and decisions of the courts of Florida, and nothing herein shall impair or diminish any of such rights. § 790.25(4), Fla....

...igned solely for defensive purposes. (3) Any person violating this section commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. § 790.053, Fla. Stat. (2012). Additionally, section 790.25(3), Florida Statutes, limits the application of section 790.053 as follows: LAWFUL USES.—The provisions of ss....

...493.6108(1)(a) and 943.13(1)-(4); and 3. Are individually designated by an affidavit of consent signed by the capital collateral regional counsel and filed with the clerk of the circuit court in the county in which the investigator is headquartered. § 790.25(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). It is also a crime to carry a concealed firearm without a license. § 790.01(2)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). Under chapter 790, there is no permit available for deliberate open carry, making it illegal in virtually all circumstances. See § 790.25(3). In accord with the authority granted by the state constitution, Florida adopted its “shall-issue,” permit-based concealed carry provisions in 1987, now codified in section 790.06(2), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...But see Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1176-77 (stating that “when assessing ‘the fit between the asserted interests and the means chosen to advance them,’” a court should apply “no such deference” (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997))).14 Our review of the Declaration of Policy expressed in section 790.25 sufficiently establishes that a reasonable fit exists between the challenged law and the Legislature’s asserted objectives. As a result, this second prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis is satisfied as well. Therefore, we hold that section 790.25 passes the intermediate scrutiny test and survives Defendant’s challenge. 2....

...carry which gives practical effect to its citizens’ exercise of their Second Amendment rights. II. The Exceptions to the Prohibition Against Open Carry Constitute Affirmative Defenses. Defendant asserts that the exceptions under section 790.25(3) are elements the State must prove to support a violation of the open carry statute, not affirmative defenses....

...efense requiring the defendant to put forth some evidence in support thereof. Id. In the instant case, the exceptions are not in the enacting clause of section 790.053, but are contained within a separate statute altogether. See § 790.25(3). The trial court properly read section 790.053 in conjunction with section 790.25(3), which sets forth specific persons, places, and activities where it is legal to “own, possess, and lawfully use” (and in some cases openly display), firearms without first obtaining any permit or license....

...Generally speaking, and with certain exceptions, a person who carries a concealed weapon commits a misdemeanor of the first degree. See § 790.01(1). However, a person may carry a concealed firearm or weapon in or about the immediate vicinity of his or her residence or place of business without violating the law. See § 790.25(3)(n); Peoples v. State, 287 So....

...itions of his probation. Neither of these assumptions was accurate. Mr. McCarron's mere possession of a sword or a knife in the privacy of his own residence was not a violation - 14 - of the law. See § 790.25(3)(n) ("[I]t is lawful for the following persons to own, possess, and lawfully use ....

...0.- *318 25(3)(n), Florida Statutes (1989), 2 which insulates a person “possessing arms at his ... place of business.” We affirm. This result is mandated by our decision in Cockin v. State, 453 So.2d 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which we held that section 790.25(3)(n) must be read in pari materia with section 790.01(2) and, thus read, makes it lawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm in his home. Accord Facion v. State, 290 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); French v. State, 279 So.2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). But cf. State v. Bryant, 373 So.2d 708, 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (§ 790.25(3)(Z) no defense to carrying a concealed weapon). The same holding obviously applies to the other exception in § 790.25(3)(n), which applies to the defendant’s “place of business.” Moreover, this language is not, as the state contends, confined to a place of business owned by the defendant himself....

...3d DCA 1991). Affirmed. . 790.01 Carrying concealed weapons.— ****** (2) Whoever shall carry a concealed firearm on or about his person shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. . 790.25 Lawful ownership, possession, and use of firearms and other weapons.— ****** (3) LAWFUL USES — The provisions of ss....

...m. We agree and reverse. Strikertaylor was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (2006), which makes it a third-degree felony to carry a concealed firearm on or about one's person. Section 790.25(5) provides that it is not a violation of section 790.01(2) to possess a concealed firearm without a license within the interior of a private conveyance "if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily ac...

...Fraud investigators to carry firearms in the performance of their duties as provided in s 626.989 , F.S. These materials suggest that in view of the definition of "law enforcement officer" contained in s 790.001 (8)(a), F.S., and the provisions of s 790.25 (3)(d) and (4), F.S., such legislative authorization is not needed, and further suggest that the cited statutes, all of which antedate the enactment of present s 626.989 (7), F.S., by s 2 of Ch....

...e purposes of Ch. 790 , F.S., and that chapter only, and s 790.051 , F.S., exempts law enforcement officers (as defined in s 790.001 [8][a] from the licensing and penal provisions of Ch. 790 when acting in the line of or performance of their duties. Section 790.25 (3)(d), F.S., provides that the licensing provisions of ss 790.05 and 790.06 , F.S., are not applicable to, and declares it lawful for, inter alia, "other peace and law enforcement officers" to possess and lawfully use firearms and other weapons for lawful purposes. Section 790.25 (4), F.S., provides that Ch. 65-410, Laws of Florida, codified as s 790.25 , F.S., shall be supplemental and additional to existing rights to bear arms now guaranteed by law and court decisions, and that that act (Ch. 65-410) shall supersede any law, ordinance or regulation in conflict therewith. Chapter 65-410, Laws of Florida (s 790.25 , F.S.), was enacted by the 1965 Legislature and took effect July 1, 1965....

...(7), F.S., which withholds such power from such investigators. Nor does this office possess the power to decree by executive edict or effect an implied modification or repeal of s 626.989 (7) due to the provisions of ss 790.001 (8)(a), 790.051 , and 790.25 (3)(d) and (4), F.S....

...790 , F.S., which deals generally with weapons and firearms regulation and in s 790.001 (8)(a), F.S., defines "law enforcement officer" to include all officers or employees of the state or any agency or department thereof who are authorized to make arrests, and the provisions of s 790.25 , F.S., which authorize "peace and law enforcement officers" to use firearms and other weapons in carrying out their official duties and declares that the provisions of s 790.25 shall supersede any law in conflict therewith....

...Only law enforcement and peace officers are exempt from Florida’s firearm- use controls, and then only while acting “within the scope or course of their official duties or when acting at any time in the line of or performance of a duty.” § 790.051, Fla. Stat.; see also § 790.25(2), and holding appear limited to the contours of the special status that a law enforcement officer holds—the officer seemingly being always on duty....

...See Amaya v. State, 580 So.2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We note express conflict with State v. Ashley, 601 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) and agree with Judge Dell that the Ashley majority “has ignored the legislature’s directive that ‘[tjhis subsection [790.25(5)] shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms_’ § 790.25(5), Fla.Stat. (1989).” Id. at 1232. REVERSED and REMANDED. GOSHORN, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion. . § 790.01(2), Fla.Stat. (1991). . § 790.10, Fla.Stat. (1991). . Section 790.25(5), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in pertinent part: [I]t is lawful and is not a violation of s....

the exception fashioned by the legislature in section 790.25(3)(/) for persons who have a firearm securely

...Instead, the agent’s testimony that the defendant left the gun show while carrying a firearm into the parking lot on the way to his car was elicited in response to suggestive questions by the prosecutor after the agent had already articulated his suspicions. Moreover, section 790.25(8), Florida Statutes (2008), provides for lawful uses of a firearm which are exceptions to section 790.053, Florida Statutes’ prohibition on openly carrying one. Specifically, section 790.25(3)(m) provides for the following lawful purpose: “[a] person while carrying a pistol unloaded and in a secure wrapper, concealed or otherwise, from the place of purchase to his or her home or place of business....” At the hearing,...

county commission, as provided in s.790.06, F.S. Section 790.25(3), F.S., provides 14 exceptions to the licensing