Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...to economic damages. Therefore, $106,047 must be set off against the $202,853 award of economic damages. Because the collateral source of social security benefits relates to economic damages, TMRMC should receive an additional setoff of $17,000. See § 768.76, Fla....

...s verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source. (Emphasis supplied.) This statute has since been repealed, see ch. 93-245, § 3 at 2439, Laws of Fla., and the general collateral source statute is now found in section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...introduction of collateral sources of payment at trial. See Sheffield, 741 So.2d at 536. Upon proper objection, the collateral source rule prohibits the introduction of any evidence of payments from collateral sources. See Gormley, 587 So.2d at 457; § 768.76, Fla....

...[3] The common-law rule prohibited both the introduction of evidence of collateral benefits received and the setoff of any collateral source benefits from the damage award. See Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 300 (Fla. 2000). The common-law rule has been altered in this State by statute. See § 768.76, Fla....

...Although collateral source evidence may not be introduced before the jury, after entry of the verdict the trial court is required to reduce the amount of damages by the amount of all collateral sources for which no right of subrogation exists. See § 768.76(1), Fla....

...This same reasoning has been applied to Medicare benefits. Wildermuth v. Staton, No. CIV.A.01-2418-CM, 2002 WL 922137 (D.Kan. Apr.29, 2002); Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So.2d 422 (La.App.2000). This limitation on compensatory damages is also in accord with the policy expressed by the legislature in section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 768.76 abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it with a statutory provision that allows certain payments from collateral sources to be set off from a plaintiff's recovery. § 768.76(1)....

...Our holding in this case likewise allows an injured party to receive compensation for medical expenses for which they have become liable, but does not permit the plaintiff to receive a windfall by recovering "phantom damages." Cf. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999), a tortfeasor was entitled to a setoff for medical bills that were written off by medical providers pursuant to their contracts with a health maintenance organization to protect the insurer from having to pay "phantom damages"), review granted, 865 So.2d 480 (Fla.2004). We reject Johnson's characterization of the issue as whether the amount "written off by Medicare providers can be set off from the amount of past medical expenses a plaintiff recovers. Johnson contends that sections 768.76(1) and 768.76(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), preclude the trial court from reducing her recovery by the amount of benefits she has received from Medicare....

...from any medical services program administered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shall not be considered a collateral source. Johnson correctly contends that "benefits received" under Medicare are not a collateral source under section 768.76(2)(b) and therefore cannot be set off from her recovery under section 768.76(1)....

...Where we differ with Johnson is in how to properly construe "benefits received." She argues that "benefits received" includes not only the amount paid to her medical providers, but also the amount "written off" by her medical providers. We cannot agree with Johnson's interpretation of the statute. Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because the federal government has a right to reimbursement from Johnson's recovery for payments it has made on her behalf....

...the full amount of her medical bills, including the amount for which she never became liable and for which the federal government has no right to reimbursement. This would result in a windfall that is contrary to the legislative policy evidenced by section 768.76. Consequently, the amount that was written off by her medical providers cannot be considered "benefits received" under section 768.76(2)(b)....

...accordance with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. SALCINES and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] On the contrary, under the rationale of this court's decision in Goble it would constitute an "amount ... paid for the benefit of the claimant" under section 768.76(1), and therefore could properly be set off from her recovery. See 848 So.2d at 409 (holding that the difference between the amount paid to medical providers under an HMO contract and the amount billed by those providers constituted a "payment[ ] made to the claimant, or made on the claimant's behalf" under section 768.76(2)(a) and it could therefore be set off from the plaintiff's recovery).

...Petersburg, FL on behalf of the Allstate Insurance Company, for Amici Curiae. PER CURIAM. We have for review Goble v. Frohman, 848 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), in which the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: UNDER SECTION 768.76, FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), IS IT APPROPRIATE TO SETOFF AGAINST THE DAMAGES PORTION OF AN AWARD THE AMOUNTS OF REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEDICAL BILLS THAT WERE WRITTEN OFF BY MEDICAL PROVIDERS PURSUANT TO THEIR CONTRACTS WITH A HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION? Id....

...We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. We approve the district court's decision affirming the trial court's setoff under section 768.76 of contractual discounts negotiated by the plaintiff's HMO and written off by the plaintiff's medical providers....

...Goble sued Frohman, and the jury awarded Goble $574,554.31 for past medical expenses, reflecting the amount Goble's medical providers had billed. Frohman filed a posttrial motion to reduce this award by the amount of the contractual discounts. The trial court granted Frohman's motion for setoff under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of setoff. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So.2d 406, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). The district court held that contractual discounts off medical bills are "collateral sources" subject to setoff under section 768.76....

...arges a debt or obligation. Goble, 848 So.2d at 409. In this case, the contractual discounts discharged Goble's obligation to his medical providers; therefore, the discounts are "payments made" on Goble's behalf and so are "collateral sources" under section 768.76....

...The allowance of a windfall would undermine the legislative purpose of controlling liability insurance rates because "insurers will be sure to pass the cost for these phantom damages on to Floridians." Id. DISCUSSION We agree with the conclusion reached by the Second District Court of Appeal. Section 768.76 provides in relevant part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court sh...

..., or made on the claimant's behalf, by or pursuant to: .... 3. Any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services. § 768.76, Fla....

...If a statutory term is not defined, its plain and ordinary meaning generally can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001). We conclude, as the Second District did, that the contractual discounts fit within the statutory definition of collateral sources. Section 768.76 defines collateral sources as "payments made" on a claimant's behalf....

...ining charges on Goble's medical bills. The contractual discounts, therefore, constitute "amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the claimant, from [a] collateral source[]." Therefore, under section 768.76, the amount of the contractual discount, for which no right of reimbursement or subrogation exists, is an amount that should be set off against an award of compensatory damages....

...CONCLUSION We agree with the conclusion reached by the Second District Court of Appeal that contractual discounts negotiated by an HMO fall within the statutory definition of collateral sources subject to setoff. The trial court, therefore, properly applied section 768.76 to reduce Goble's damages by the amount of the discounts....

...BELL, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority's reasoning and conclusion. The contractual discounts negotiated by Goble's HMO fall under the statutory definition of "collateral sources" that are to be set off against an award of compensatory damages under section 768.76....

...s court even recognized the collection of such legal authority in an annotation which it characterized as a "nearly overwhelming modern authority." Id. The reasonable value of even gratuitous services have been recoverable under common law concepts. Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it with a statutory provision that allows certain payments from collateral sources to be set off from a plaintiff's recovery. See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So.2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Therefore, today an injured party pursuant to section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes may recover only that portion of his medical bills that he is actually obligated to pay....

...test. We disagree. The legislature has not required the admission of any collateral source into evidence in the liability trial. It has rather required that some collateral sources shall reduce damages. See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla....

...[3] This document was the basis for the Gormleys' lawsuit against Old Republic Insurance Company. See supra note 2. [4] Compensation from a source wholly independent of the defendant tortfeasor. See Black's Law Dictionary 262 (6th ed. 1990). [5] See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla....

...ence claim. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order deducting twenty-five percent from the jury award, reflecting the fact that the jury found Cronin twenty-five percent comparatively negligent. G. The Issue of Collateral Sources Fla.Stat. § 768.76 requires that a damage award be reduced to account for certain collateral sources of recovery....

...to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state. . Because we hold that there is personal jurisdiction over the contract claim, we need not decide whether there was personal jurisdiction over the negligence claims. . Fla.Stat. § 768.76 provides in pertinent part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability ......

...this testimony. COLLATERAL SOURCE SETOFF Finally, appellant challenges the trial court's refusal to award a setoff for future disability (collateral source) benefits against the jury's verdict. He claims he was entitled to such a setoff pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987). Appellees respond in the alternative that: (1) section 627.7372, Florida Statutes, not section 768.76, governs the admissibility of collateral sources in automobile accident cases; and (2) even if section 768.76 is the proper section, that section does not provide for a setoff for future collateral source benefits. Section 768.76(1) provides: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the amo...

...e court shall admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources paid to the claimant, and the court shall instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source. [e.s.] Section 768.76 is contained in Part III of Chapter 768, which governs damages in negligence actions. Section 768.71, states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this part applies to any action for damages, whether in tort or in contract." (emphasis added). Section 768.76, titled "Collateral sources of indemnity," provides that it applies to any action "to which this part applies." Section 627.7372, on the other hand, is also entitled "Collateral sources of indemnity," and it specifies that, "[i]n any a...

...This conclusion is supported by Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Civil) 6.13 and *1153 the committee notes contained therein. Under 6.13, separate jury instructions are established for tort actions generally (6.13), and for actions involving motor vehicles in particular (6.13b), both of which are modeled after sections 768.76 and 627.7372, respectively....

...The committee notes that follow explain that "6.13b not 6.13a should be given in all cases involving actions for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle.... In all other cases, reduction for collateral source payments should be made ... pursuant to § 768.76, ... and 6.13a." (emphasis added). Thus, if the jury is to be given instruction 6.13b in automobile accident cases, which is patterned after section 627.7372 (not section 768.76), it follows that the former section, not the latter, applies here....

...4th DCA 1988) (finding error in the trial court's setoff for future benefits, and citing section 627.7372 for the proposition that only past benefits can be set off against an award in that case). Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to deduct future benefits from the jury's award. Even assuming section 768.76 applied, as noted, that section provides that "the court shall reduce the amount of any award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to him, from all collateral sources." (emphasis added). Appellant interprets the language of the underscored portion to mean that this section applies to "those benefits not yet paid but payable in the future." However, the portion of section 768.76 quoted above indicates that, in order to have collateral source benefits set off against an award, those benefits must either be already paid ("amounts which have been paid ") or presently earned and currently due and owing ("otherwise available to him")....

...Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Florida courts interpreting this section, as well as its predecessor [section 768.50], have implicitly, if not expressly, held that future earned disability benefits cannot be set off from an award as a collateral source under section 768.76....

...Hodges, 583 So.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Fla. 1st DCA) (affirming trial court's refusal to set off future social security benefits), rev. denied, 593 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 1991); Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So.2d 123 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (interpreting § 768.76 to bar setoff of collateral source benefits by reasoning that "[c]ollateral source benefits are not `otherwise available' ......

...ntion in the instruction of the particular element of damage to which the collateral source instruction is properly applicable. See Greyhound Corp. v. Ford, 157 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). See F.S. 768.76, 1986 supplement, concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court....

...Carlson, on the other hand, contended that any setoff in addition to her deductible against past medical expenses and lost wages should be limited to the amount of PIP benefits actually paid and not the amount payable at 80% or 60%, respectively. Carlson also argued that under subsection 768.76(1), the setoff for PIP benefits should be reduced by the amount of the automobile insurance premium which she had paid. McKenna argued subsection 768.76(1) did not apply to PIP benefits....

...The court denied McKenna's motion for attorney fees and her motion to tax costs. In considering the setoff issue the initial question is whether section 627.736(3), [2] Florida Statutes (dealing with setoff of PIP benefits which are "paid or payable") or section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the collateral source rule, applies to the setoff of PIP benefits....

...The trial court erred in setting off $4,750 in PIP benefits which may be payable in the future. We find that the trial court also erred in reducing the PIP setoff by the amount of the premium paid by the plaintiff for PIP and collision coverage. This reduction was predicated upon section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes, the general collateral source statute which provides: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate th...

...Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury. [Emphasis supplied]. McKenna argues that subsection 768.76(1) does not apply and that section 627.736, which is the applicable statute, does not provide for a reduction from any setoff for automobile insurance premiums. Subsection 768.76(1) does not govern PIP setoffs but rather controls other collateral source payments received by an injured party. See, e.g., Rudnick (medpay benefits are a collateral source governed by section 768.76). However, we deal in this case with the issue of the entitlement, vel non, to attorney fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes. Subsection 768.76(1) is therefore implicated to the extent it would allow a reduction from the setoffs for the plaintiffs cost of obtaining PIP coverage in determining the amount of the "judgment obtained." This cost, however, is limited to the cost of...

...However, the Legislature has abrogated the common law damages rule. Today, trial courts must reduce awards “by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources . . . .” § 768.76(1), Fla....

...2005); Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). There are certain exceptions to this rule. For example, there are no reductions “for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76(1), Fla....

...the Medicaid Program of Title XIX of the Social Security Act or from any medical services program administered by the Department of Health shall not be considered a collateral source. -2- §768.76(2)(b), Fla....

...This exception does not result in a windfall to plaintiffs because Medicare and similar collateral sources retain a right of subrogation or reimbursement. See Pollo Ops., Inc. v. Tripp, 906 So. 2d 1101, 1104 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); Coop. Leasing, 872 So. 2d at 960. Additionally, this Court has determined that section 768.76 does not allow reductions for future medical expenses....

...The Second District affirmed the trial court’s rulings on all evidentiary issues without explanation, with the exception of the admissibility of Luke’s future Medicare benefits. Joerg, 38 Fla. L. Weekly at D1378. The district court noted that section 768.76, Florida Statutes, which statutorily amended the damages -9- aspect of the common law collateral source rule two years after the decision in Stanley, left the viability of Stanley in question....

...Pollo Ops., Inc., 906 So. 2d at 1104 n.3 (explaining that the exclusion of Medicare benefits from the definition of statutory collateral sources exists because of the right of reimbursement retained by the federal government); Coop. Leasing, 872 So. 2d at 960 (“Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because the federal government has a right to reimbursement from Johnson’s recovery for payments it has made on her behalf.”); cf....

...2d at 203, any potential windfalls to the plaintiff that might occur through - 14 - the exclusion of such evidence are minimized by judicial reductions to the damage award by any collateral source, which occurs outside of the jury’s presence. § 768.76, Fla....

...federal statute outweighed the probative value of the evidence to demonstrate malingering by the plaintiff); Sheffield, 800 So. 2d at 203-04 (citing Gormley, 587 4. We also reject the cramped interpretation of the Second District regarding future setoffs under section 768.76. Section 768.76 requires a judge to set off the value of most collateral source benefits from a damages award; however, the statute excludes benefits received under Medicare or programs with a right of reimbursement from the definition of collateral sources for the purpose of the setoff statute. § 768.76, Fla. Stat. The district court below concluded that section 768.76(2)(b) creates an exception only for previously earned Medicare benefits, not for future unearned benefits....

...2d at 292-93; see also White v. Westlund, 624 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (“Florida courts . . . have implicitly, if not expressly, held that future earned disability benefits cannot be set off from an award as a collateral source under section 768.76.” (citations omitted)); Swamy v. Hodges, 583 So....

...1st DCA 1991) (affirming the refusal of a trial court to grant a setoff for future Social Security benefits); Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (reversing a setoff for future medical expenses under section 768.76(1)). - 15 - So....

...See Rudnick, 706 So.2d at 391. This portion of the district court's opinion conflicts with the opinion of the First District in King v. Burch, 724 So.2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), over the interpretation given to the term "otherwise available" in section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993), the general collateral source statute. Specifically, the district courts are in conflict on the question of whether under section 768.76(1) remaining *291 medpay benefits must be set off from the jury's verdict for future medical expenses....

...Rather, medpay benefits are a collateral source to which the general collateral source statute is applicable. See Klinglesmith, 717 So.2d at 570. [3] Allstate alternatively argues that the remaining medpay benefits must be set off from the verdict because they were available within the meaning of section 768.76(1), the general collateral source *292 statute. Section 768.76(1) [4] requires the court to reduce the amount of the plaintiff's award by the total of all amounts "which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to him, from all collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists." In King, the First District Court interpreted the "otherwise available" language of section 768.76(1) to mean that those medpay benefits remaining at the time of judgment should be set off against a verdict for future medical damages. King, 724 So.2d at 1238. In contrast, the Fourth District in White, interpreted the phrase "otherwise available" in section 768.76(1) to include only those benefits that have already been paid or that are presently due and owing and not those benefits potentially payable in the future: [This language] indicates that, in order to have collateral source benefits set...

...se benefits that have already been paid or that are presently due and owing. Although the term "available" is not defined by statute, the Legislature did define "collateral sources" in the very next subsection as "any payments made to the claimant." § 768.76(2)(a) (emphasis supplied)....

...As an alteration of the common law, the statutory provisions that allow the introduction into evidence and setoff of collateral insurance benefits must be narrowly construed. Rollins, 761 So.2d at 300. Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Fourth District's interpretation that the term "available" within the meaning of section 768.76(1) includes only those benefits that have already been paid or that are presently due and owing, rather than those benefits potentially payable in the future....

...We conclude that the trial court was correct in refusing to set off the remaining medpay benefits against the verdict. Accordingly, we approve the Fourth District's decision in Rudnick based on its interpretation of "payable" as found in section 627.736(3) and its interpretation of "available" within the meaning of section 768.76(1)....

...5th DCA 1998), the Fifth District held that medpay benefits were a collateral source within the meaning of 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991). Although section 627.7372 has been repealed and does not apply in this case, see ch. 93-245, § 3 at 2439, Laws of Fla., the reasoning in Klinglesmith also applies to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), the general collateral source statute applicable in this case. [4] Section 768.76 provides in relevant part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court sh...

...its and the damages sustained, up to the maximum amount of such coverage provided under this section. In the present case, the Fourth District concluded that the term "available" within section 627.727(1) should be interpreted no differently than in section 768.76(1)....

..."the contractual discount"), was written off by the medical providers, who have no right to seek reimbursement from Goble or any third parties. [1] See § 641.315(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Posttrial, the court granted Frohman's motion for setoff under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999). In pertinent part, this statute provides: 768.76 Collateral sources of indemnity.— (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court sh...

...Under the common-law rule, both the introduction of evidence of collateral benefits and the setoff of any collateral source benefits were prohibited. Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So.2d 197, 200 n. 3 (Fla.2001). The common-law rule has been altered in this state by section 768.76. Id. The Florida Supreme Court has held that section 768.76 must be narrowly construed as an alteration of the common law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla.2000). While we recognize we are bound by this precedent, we suggest that section 768.76 should be liberally construed because the statute is also remedial in nature....

...See Irven v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 790 So.2d 403, 406 (Fla.2001) (holding that statutes that are both alterations of the common law and remedial in nature should be liberally construed to give effect to the legislature's express intent). Section 768.76 was enacted in 1986 as part of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act....

...nce at reasonable rates, to ensure a stable market for liability insurers, to ensure that injured persons recover reasonable damages and to encourage *409 the settlement of civil actions prior to trial. Ch. 86-160, § 2 (emphasis added). Thus, while section 768.76 constitutes an alteration of the common law, it is clearly remedial in nature, and it should be liberally construed to give effect to the legislature's express intent. We question the supreme court's reliance on Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 300 (Fla.2000), to apply a narrow construction of section 768.76 in Rudnick....

...Rollins involved the construction of section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), which precluded the recovery of damages "for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable" from collateral sources and required the jury to be so instructed. The Rollins court did not construe section 768.76. Because it does not appear that section 627.736(3) is also remedial in nature, it was proper to narrowly construe that section. However, the remedial nature of section 768.76 requires a liberal construction under Irven. Regardless, even a narrow construction of section 768.76 requires a holding that the trial court properly set off the contractual discount. In section 768.76, the legislature defined a certain category of collateral source benefits that are subject to setoff. The statute defines the collateral sources subject to setoff as "payments made to the claimant, or made on the claimant's behalf." § 768.76(2)(a)....

...May 15, 2003), as relied upon by Goble, is inapposite. In that case, prior to trial, the plaintiff settled with a defendant hospital for the forgiveness of an outstanding hospital bill and cash. Id. at 136. The court rejected the defendant's request for a setoff of the settlement amounts under section 768.76. [2] Id. at 136 n. 2. Goble argues that the forgiveness of a hospital bill is analogous to the contractual discount in this case. However, under section 768.76(2)(a), a settlement agreement with a codefendant hospital is not a "collateral source" of indemnity. Thus, section 768.76 would not apply in D'Angelo....

...See ch. 86-160, § 2. The injured party is fully compensated by an award that equals the amounts the injured party paid to the medical provider plus the amounts paid by his insurer, which will ultimately be subrogated by the insurer. See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla....

...Fernandez, 664 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Therefore, we affirm the exclusion of evidence at trial regarding collateral source benefits. Because this case presents an issue of great public importance, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question: UNDER SECTION 768.76, FLORIDA STATUTES (1999), IS IT APPROPRIATE TO SETOFF AGAINST THE DAMAGES PORTION OF AN AWARD THE AMOUNTS OF REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEDICAL BILLS THAT WERE WRITTEN OFF BY MEDICAL PROVIDERS PURSUANT TO THEIR CONTRACTS WITH A HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION? Affirmed; question certified....

...NORTHCUTT, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., SENIOR JUDGE, Concur. NOTES [1] Aetna, however, has a subrogation or reimbursement right for the amounts paid on Goble's behalf minus a pro rata share of Goble's costs and attorney's fees. See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] Although section 768.76 is not cited in the opinion, it was cited in briefs the appellant filed with this court.

...Subsection (2) then provides for what is called the "threshold requirement" of permanent injury or death. Here, the jury found the plaintiff met the threshold permanency requirement. Therefore, she was entitled to bring suit. [4] A similar statute is section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which addresses collateral sources of indemnity and provides in pertinent part that in any negligence action the court shall reduce the amount of damages awarded "by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant......

...Further, even if the workers' compensation carrier does not file a notice of payment in any subsequent civil action which would operate as a lien on any judgment in favor of the injured employee, Florida's collateral source statute would at least prevent a double recovery on the part of the injured employee. See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes states that "the court shall reduce the amount of [damage] award[s] by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant." Id....

...Petsmart removed the case to federal court on grounds of diversity jurisdiction after receiving documentation showing plaintiffs medical bills totaled $104,351.92. Id. Plaintiff moved to remand, explaining she could only recover $22,446.95 in damages under Florida Statute § 768.76’s set off provision because her health insurance company had paid $85,904.97 toward the medical bills....

...lating jurisdiction amount at time of removal). Although attractive at first blush, Stramiello and Henry are distinguishable from the case at hand. The cornerstone of the courts’ jurisdictional decisions in Stramiello and Henry was Florida Statute § 768.76. This section prohibits a plaintiff in a tort action from recovering damages *1347 for expenses that have already been paid through a collateral source. Fla. Stat. § 768.76 . But, the instant case does present a situation in which a future set off is at issue under § 768.76....

...ts and expenses (totalling $472,000.00) incurred for their daughter, Loraine, who nearly drowned in *1040 the Larsens' pool at their residence, and later died. The issue in this case, which is one of first impression in this state, is whether or not section 768.76 (part of the 1986 Tort Reform Act) is applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case....

...the $472,000.00 in medical expenses and costs paid by Boston Mutual. The parties agreed that the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the Magsipocs totalled $66,600.00, leaving a net recovery of $84,500.00. Based on these findings the court applied section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and prorated a share of the settlement for Boston Mutual....

...It then multiplied the net recovery ($84,500.00) by .31 and determined that Boston Mutual's prorata share of the net recovery was $26,588.77. But, it made no express findings that any part of the $150,000.00 settlement represented recovery of medical costs and expenses. Section 768.76 provides: Collateral Sources of Indemnity (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, ......

...to the medical costs and expenses. In this case, that sum would be $1,500,000.00 less $472,000.00, or $1,028,000.00. Their position in this case is that until they recover $1,028,000.00, Boston Mutual has no subrogation rights. Boston Mutual argues section 768.76 entitled them to prorata subrogation even though the Magsipocs did not recover the total amount of their non-economic damages. [1] This is a case of first impression in this state, and a difficult one. The issue, as we see it, is whether the Florida Legislature, by promulgating section 768.76, intended to create a right of prorata subrogation for collateral source providers when the injured party has not received the full amount of other kinds of damages required to make it whole and whether, under the circumstances of this...

...payments made for such injury," allowable under Florida law. Thus recovery of any medical costs or expenses by the Magsipocs would trigger Boston Mutual's subrogation rights under the contract, since Boston Mutual paid all of those expenses in full. Section 768.76(4) expressly contemplates a prorate recovery for the collateral source provider where the tortfeasor pays only part of the injured party's medical costs and expenses, and the insurer's payment under its contract, plus the recovery from...

...Where there is a general verdict, however, and the injured party has not been fully compensated for all of its damages, in addition to medical costs and expenses, the right of a collateral source provider to prorate some part of the net undifferentiated recovery pursuant to *1043 section 768.76(4) is not clear....

...ng. See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Martinez, 7 Ohio App.3d 178, 454 N.E.2d 1338 (1982). The parties in this case stipulated that the trial judge could make all necessary fact findings in order to enter an order of equitable distribution pursuant to section 768.76(4)....

...United States, 748 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.Fla. 1990), reversed in part, vacated in part, 953 F.2d 650 (11th Cir.1992). The trial judge valued the Magsipocs' non-economic damages at $1,000,000.00. The trial judge assumed these findings required proration, pursuant to section 768.76. However, proration and allocation to the collateral source provider is not required by section 768.76, when an injured party receives an undifferentiated recovery....

..."As a rule of evidence, the collateral source rule prohibits the introduction of any evidence of payments from collateral sources, upon proper objection." Id. (citing Damages in Tort Actions ). In Florida, the damages portion of the rule has been superseded by legislative action. See § 768.76(1), Fla....

...Frohman, 901 So.2d 830, 833 (Fla.2005), our supreme court held that "discounts" negotiated by a plaintiff's private health insurer with health-care providers constitute a collateral source which must be set off against an award of compensatory damages following trial pursuant to section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes, unless a right of reimbursement or subrogation exists....

...injury protection benefits paid or payable. (Emphasis supplied). This court previously reviewed section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1991), in White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In that case, the court was asked to decide whether section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987), the general statute governing damages in negligence actions, or section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1987), the statute specifically directed at tort actions involving motor vehicles, governed collateral source offset in automobile accident cases. There, appellant, who believed section 768.76 controlled, challenged the trial court's refusal to award a set-off for future disability benefits against the jury's verdict....

...4th DCA 1988) (finding error in the trial court's setoff for future benefits, and citing section 627.7372 for the proposition that only past benefits can be set off against an award in that case). Id. at 1153. We went even further to find that even if section 768.76 was applicable, its language that "the court shall reduce the amount of any award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to him from all collateral sources" does not mean "those benefits not yet paid but payable in the future"....

...fs of future benefits. We find that the Kokotis court was correct to apply section 627.736(3) to the PIP collateral source issue. It relates more specifically to PIP set-offs. While this court was correct in White, when it held that between sections 768.76 and 627.7372, the latter was more applicable, a comparison of section 627.7372 and section 627.736(3) now leads us to the conclusion that section 627.736(3) is the more specific applicable statute....

...Bangert v. Beeler, 470 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) and Walker v. Hilliard, 329 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), also relied on by Carner-Mason are equally unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subrogation as set out in section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989), dealing with use of the collateral source rule in negligence cases....

...Welfare benefits clearly fit this definition. In addition, statutes dealing with collateral sources have listed as collateral sources any payments by "public programs providing medical expenses, disability payments, or other similar benefits." See, e.g., § 768.76(2)(a)1, Fla....

...ably entitling the insurer to subrogation against the insured's recovery. (citation omitted). This same rule applies generally to all damages, not just medical expenses. See Magsipoc v. Larsen, 639 So.2d 1038, 1041-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (addressing section 768.76, Florida Statutes [collateral sources], recognizing general "made whole" rule where insured failed to recover $1 million of his losses from "judgment-proof" tortfeasor)....

...3 (Fla.2001); Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 297 (Fla.2000); McKenna v. Carlson, 771 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). The Florida Statutes contain at least two provisions governing the presentation of collateral sources available to the plaintiff. Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2001), entitled "Collateral sources of indemnity," provides: *544 (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded...

...Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of the claimant's immediate family to secure her or his right to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury. Thus, under section 768.76(1), the court reduces the jury award by the amount of collateral source benefits....

...In all cases in which a jury is required to fix damages, the court shall instruct the jury that the plaintiff shall not recover such special damages for personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. (Emphasis added.) Thus, in contrast to the procedure under section 768.76(1), in which the court offsets the collateral source amount, under section 627.736(3), the trier of fact—whether judge or jury—is to offset the amount. As noted, section 768.71(3) provides that any conflicting statute governs over section 768.76. Therefore, in lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, section 627.736(3), not section 768.76(1), applies....

...APPLICATION OF LAW TO THIS CASE Although we have answered the questions above, we note that this case presents unusual circumstances. Here, both parties waived the presentation of evidence of PIP benefits to the jury. The parties apparently operated under the assumption that section 768.76(1) applied and that the judge would determine the setoff issue. (In fact, after trial, the plaintiffs specifically argued that section 768.76(1) applied.) Neither party even mentioned section 627.736(1)....

...[4] In addition the Committee should consider changes to Paragraph 2 of this jury instruction's "Notes on Use." Currently, as pointed out by the majority, there are two applicable collateral source statutes: section 627.736, which governs setoffs for PIP benefits in automobile accident cases, and section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which governs setoffs in all other negligence cases....

...A third collateral source statute, section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1987), was repealed in 1993 for causes of action accruing on or after October 1, 1993. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 6.13 (Notes on Use) (citing Ch. 93.245, § 3, Laws of Fla.). Standard Jury Instruction 6.13(a) is the jury instruction that is derived from section 768.76(1), which is applicable to tort actions in general....

...JURY TRIAL TO THE JUDGE FOR A FACT FINDING OF AMOUNTS INVOLVED, AND FOR PURPOSES OF REDUCING THE PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY? Caruso, 835 So.2d at 281. [2] In Garcia v. Arraga, 872 So.2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), the Fourth District recently found that both section 768.76(1) and section 627.736(3) apply simultaneously "regardless if [ sic ] the case is a personal injury case or a general tort case." 872 So.2d at 269....

...Co., 425 So.2d 608, reversed on other grounds, 452 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1984), this court stated that future benefits were excluded from collateral source setoff requirements pursuant to section 768.50, Florida Statutes. While this statutory section has been amended and transferred to *1097 section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986), the pertinent statutory language remains unchanged....

...CONCLUSION The district court’s ruling granting the motion in limine is AFFIRMED. We REVERSE the final judgment for the plaintiffs and REMAND for a new trial on all issues. 1 . In 1986, the Florida legislature passed the following law: Florida Statute 768.76 Collateral Sources of Indemnity — Subsection 1 — In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the cou...

...Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his injury. Fla.Stat. § 768.76(1) (emphasis added)....

...Kirkland's claim for past and future loss of consortium. The court denied the Kirklands' motion for new trial on Mr. Kirkland's claim for future noneconomic damages and Mrs. Kirkland's claim for past and future loss of consortium. The court granted Allstate's post-trial motion pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), and reduced the damage award for past medical expenses to $0 based on collateral source payments made to the Kirklands by Allstate under the PIP and medical pay coverages of their policy....

...Our review of the record fails to reveal sufficient evidence of the probable nature and cost of future medical expenses to warrant submitting that issue to the jury. Finally, we agree with Mr. Kirkland's contention that the trial court erred in granting Allstate's post-trial motion, made pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes, and reducing the jury's damage award in the amount of $14,859.10 collateral source payments made by Allstate for medical bills under the Kirklands' PIP and Med pay coverages. Section 768.76 is found in part II of *109 chapter 768 and is a general provision that authorizes the court to reduce the jury's damage award by the total amounts of collateral source payments for benefit of the claimant....

...4th DCA 1993), rev. dismissed, 640 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1994). Allstate neither pleaded an entitlement to an offset under section 627.7372 nor made any attempt to submit required evidence at trial for the jury to consider on this issue. Because section 627.7372, not section 768.76, governs in this case, we must reverse the trial court's ruling that allowed the offset. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the directed verdict on Mr. Kirkland's claim for future medical expenses; reverse the offset for collateral source payments allowed under section 768.76; and reverse the judgment award for Mr....

...Kirkland's claims for past and future loss of consortium. We remand this cause for a new trial on only the issues of Mr. Kirkland's noneconomic damages and Mrs. Kirkland's loss of consortium. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. KAHN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993) states: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the cou...

...rust" for appellant. See 16 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 61:29 (2d ed. 1983). While this action is controlled by Section 627.7372, Florida Statutes (1985), the statute as amended effective July 1, 1986 [3] would require the same result. Section 768.76(1) would permit the injured party to receive the damages from the tortfeasor and Section 768.76(4) would permit reimbursement to the paying health care provider from the injured party....

...t of their damages. Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, Inc., 403 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1981). [2] See 16 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, § 61.203 2d ed. (1983); see also National Surety Corporation v. Bimonte, 143 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). [3] § 768.76, Fla....

...paid on behalf of decedent, and therefore, constituted damages as provided by section 768.21(6)(b), despite fact that plaintiff and estate had no obligation to repay providers). Further, such damages are not subject to reduction when subrogation or reimbursement right exists. § 768.76(1), Fla....

...Allstate raised as an affirmative defense its entitlement to a collateral source setoff for PIP benefits paid to Scott by her PIP carrier. The trial court should have conducted a post-trial collateral source hearing to address the issue of a PIP setoff from the damage award contained in the verdict. See § 768.76(1), Fla.Stat....

...stances. Chambers v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 511 So.2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Rosabal v. Arza, 495 So.2d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). [2] In 1986 the legislature repealed section 768.50, see Ch. 86-160, § 68, Laws of Florida, and replaced it with section 768.76(4), which provides: A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation shall have a right of reimbursement from a claimant to whom it has provided collateral sources if such claimant has recovered all or part of such collateral sources from a tortfeasor. Ch. 86-160, § 55, Laws of Fla., codified at § 768.76, Fla....

...d duplication of benefits when there are collateral sources in motor vehicle accident cases and, to avoid such duplication, a trial court must reduce a damage award by an amount "which encompasses benefits relating to future damages, ... pursuant to section 768.76(1), Fla....

...Additionally, because the payments Olson has received from her personal injury protection and medical payments carrier relate to economic damages, the amounts of these collateral sources ($14,000) should be set off against the amount of economic damages for which Hughes/Cole is liable. § 768.76(2)(a)2., Fla....

...It was agreed prior to trial that any setoff because of the collateral source doctrine would be determined by the court after the jury verdict. The jury returned a verdict of $2,000 for past medical expenses and $8,000 for future medical expenses. The trial court then reduced both awards by 70%. Measom appeals claiming that Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989) does not authorize the court to setoff unearned collateral source benefits from future medical expenses....

...such benefits are dependent upon future employment. The statute does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting collateral sources to which the insured may be entitled in the future. In addition, the statute expressly precludes such setoff. Section 768.76(1) provides that "there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a right of subrogation exists." The Florida Supreme Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc....

...1986) held that Florida has long recognized the subrogation rights of an insurer to recover payments made to an insured for injuries which were caused by a tortfeasor. While it is true that Measom's insurance carrier did not have a contractual right of subrogation, Section 768.76(1) does not require a contractual right....

...contrary precedent. The Third District found these cases were distinguishable, explaining: Bangert and Walker , also relied on by [appellee] are equally unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subrogation as set out in section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989), *655 dealing with use of the collateral source rule in negligence cases....

...Brutton v. State, 632 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). We turn to the damages issue. Defendant seeks a reduction in the award of medical expenses equal to the amount by which a provider's charges were reduced upon acceptance of payment from Medicare. Section 768.76(1) provides: "In any action to which this part applies......

...the court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant ... from all collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists." § 768.76(1), Fla....

...difference between the amount charged by the provider and the amount the provider accepted from Medicare. The result, defendant argues, is that this difference is either inadmissible as "damages" suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 because this is an unwarranted surplus damage awarded to plaintiff....

...Our opinion contributed to this misapprehension about our precise holding, so we find it necessary to make our thinking clear. The pertinent part of our opinion said: "The result, defendant argues, is that this difference is either inadmissible as `damages' suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 because this is an unwarranted surplus *551 damage awarded to plaintiff....

...We agree." We should have taken care to make clear that our agreement applied only to the evidentiary issue, not to any setoff argument. If this were only an issue of setoff, we might agree with plaintiff's motion for rehearing that some cases interpreting section 768.76(1) appear not to allow a setoff for this kind of Medicare benefits....

...llateral source rule, and indeed has done so, albeit in an incremental manner. See, e.g., § 627.736(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) (precluding insured motorist from recovering “damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable”); § 768.76(1), Fla....

...company involved. What we need to do now is take some — get into some evidentiary matters and try to see precisely what the — determine the existence of coverage and the amount of coverage involved ... [T.A. 52-53]. [3] We also agree with PJC that section 768.76, the collateral source rule, does not apply in the instant case. The funds paid by PJC directly to Montgomery for her medical care under its liability reserves does not fall within the statutory definition of a "collateral source." Moreover, section 768.76 was created under chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida, which, in sections 49 and 50, provided that the entirety of part III of chapter 768 — which includes section 768.76 — applies only to causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1986....

...From her own policy, Rudnick had $10,000 in PIP coverage and $5,000 in medpay coverage remaining at the time of trial. Allstate argues that the trial court erred by refusing to set these amounts off against the verdict. In support of its argument, Allstate cites to sections 627.727(1), 627.736(3), and 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The plaintiff may prove all of his special damages notwithstanding this limitation, but if special damages are introduced in evidence, the trier of facts, whether judge or jury, shall not award damages for personal injury protection benefits paid or payable. (Emphasis supplied). Finally, section 768.76(1), pertaining to collateral sources of indemnity, contains the following In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the...

...The issue presented is whether, at the time of trial, the $15,000 coverage for future PIP and medpay claims was "available" or "paid or payable" within the meaning of these statutes. Previous decisions of this court construing sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1), compel the conclusion that Allstate was not entitled to a set-off in this case. In White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), this court concluded that benefits "otherwise available" under section 768.76(1), did not include benefits potentially payable in the future....

...source payments to be submitted during trial for a jury's determination in automobile tort actions. The appellant appeals the court's decision denying the post-trial motion for collateral source set-off. In support of the appeal, the appellant cites Section 768.76(1) of the Florida Statutes, which the appellant contends requires the trial court, after trial, to reduce the amount of the damage award by the total amount of the collateral source benefits which have been paid or which will be paid to the appellee....

...This court finds that the trial court did err. The trial court misconstrued the governing authority regarding collateral source evidence, and misinterpreted the facts. *268 A review of the governing authority and the record supports this finding. Governing Statutory Provisions Section 768.76(1) and Section 627.736(3) of the Florida Statutes are two separate statutory provisions governing collateral sources. Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes, governs collateral sources of indemnity in general. It is set forth in Part II of the Florida Statutes entitled Negligence Actions. The provision applies to any action for damages whether in tort or contract. [1] Pursuant to Section 768.76(1), the court is authorized to reduce the claimant's damage award by the total amount of collateral source payments made for the benefit of the claimant after the trier of fact has made an initial award of damages....

...y is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded ... the court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant... from all collateral sources. § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Subsection (2) of Section 768.76 defines the term "collateral sources." The subsection provides, in pertinent part: For purposes of this section: (a)"Collateral sources" means any payments made to the claimant, or made on the claimant's behalf, by or pursuant to: (2) any health, sickness, or income disability insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage.... § 768.76(2)(a), Fla....

...Thus, under Section 627.736(3), the judge or the jury, as the trier of fact in an automobile case, is authorized to off-set an award of damages by the amount of personal injury protection benefits paid or payable if evidence of the benefits is presented at trial. A cursory comparison of Section 627.736(3) with Section 768.76(1) initially reveals that the set-off provisions differ as to whether the judge, post-trial, or the jury, during trial, shall ultimately reduce the damage award....

...2003), the trial court granted the defendant's request to conduct post-trial discovery and present post-trial evidence of personal injury protection benefits. On appeal, the appellate court reluctantly upheld the trial court's ruling. The court applied Section *269 768.76(1) in lieu of Section 627.736(3)....

...ded that it was bound by an earlier decision rendered by that court announced in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Scott, 773 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) [2] . That decision held that collateral source evidence should be presented after trial pursuant to Section 768.76(1)....

...angeably. See e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 706 So.2d 389 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scott, 773 So.2d at 1290. This court agrees with those decisions which cite both statutory provisions interchangeably. [4] This court finds Section 768.76(1) merely enlarges the scope of collateral sources from "personal injury protection benefits" (as set forth in Section 627.736(3)) to "all collateral sources" and defines the latter term specifically to include certain enumerated insurance benefits among which is "health or income disability insurance benefits" provided under automobile insurance (as set forth in Section 768.76(2)). Therefore, Section 768.76(1) applies to cases involving automobile accidents....

...paid or to be paid. The purpose of the collateral source set-off could be achieved under the provisions of either law. Arguably, the preclusive language set forth in Section 768.71(3) of the Florida Statutes would seem to preclude the application of Section 768.76(1) to automobile tort cases. Section 768.71(3) provides: "if a provision of this part is in conflict with any other provision of the Florida Statutes, such other provision shall apply." This court finds that Section 627.736(3) does not conflict with or supplant Section 768.76(1)....

...Such a construction would render meaningless subsection (2) of Section 68.76 that expressly provides that benefits provided under auto insurance are collateral sources which are deductible. Furthermore, it is implausible to conclude that the collateral source law, set forth in Section 627.736(3), supersedes Section 768.76(1) by operation of Section 768.71(3). Although the role of the jury was delineated under Section 627.736(3), the rights and obligations of the court were not extinguished. Thus, Section 768.71(3) does not preclude the authority accorded trial courts by Section 768.76(1) in cases involving automobile torts. This interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of Section 768.76. In 1984, the Florida Bar Tort Litigation Review Commission recommended that the legislature synthesize all case law and then-existing statutes into a general collateral source statute for all personal injury cases. Thus, in 1986, Section 768.76 was enacted under the Tort Reform Act of 1986. [5] Section 627.7372, enacted in 1977, operated in conjunction with Section 768.76 until Section 627.7372 was repealed in 1993....

...[6] Section 627.7372 governed collateral source deductions in motor vehicle tort actions, and required the judge to admit into evidence the total amount of collateral source deductions, and to instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of the collateral source benefits received. Section 768.76 did not repeal or supplant Section 627.7372....

...While Section 627.7372 stood for the premise that collateral source payments arising from automobile cases must be presented during trial and not post-trial, Section 627.736 eliminated the distinction between mandatory and elective procedural practices. Therefore, Section 627.736 should be read in tandem with Section 768.76, similar *271 to Section 627.7372 and Section 768.76. Section 768.76 was enacted to harmonize, not nullify, existing laws. It is logical to conclude that Section 627.736 should be construed harmoniously with Section 768.76....

...ODUCE THAT EVIDENCE AFTER A JURY TRIAL TO THE JUDGE FOR A FACT FINDING OF AMOUNTS INVOLVED, AND FOR PURPOSES OF REDUCING THE PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY? [3] Other examples of court decisions which have not applied Section 627.736(3) contemporaneously with Section 768.76(1) include Kirkland v. Allstate Insurance Co., 655 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). [4] In a previous decision, this court reviewed Section 627.7372 (now repealed) and Section 768.76. See White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In that case, this court addressed whether Section 768.76, as the general statute governing damages in negligence cases, or Section 627.7372, as the statute specifically directed at tort actions involving motor vehicles, governed collateral source setoff in automobile accident cases....

...ies, [1] *361 Roger Despointes and Francois Despointes, as personal representatives of the estate of Jacqueline Hoyt, challenge the partial final summary judgment entered in favor of Intermatic, Inc., on the issue of collateral source payments under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...As noted, the policy issued to Hoyt by CIGNA contained a right of subrogation, and CIGNA assigned that right of subrogation to Hoyt. Thus, as Intermatic acknowledged in its motion for summary judgment, Hoyt stepped into the shoes of CIGNA to recover $224,567.66. Section 768.76(1) provides that "there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists." This provision of the statute is not ambiguous, and it does not contain an exception for situations such as th...

...23 - taxable __________ $ 5,422.23 costs $366.50 = $592.73 $13,682.46 divided by $25,000.00 (amount of verdict) = 55% 55% × $592.73 = $324.40 $17,500.00 - 5,422.23 __________ $12,077.77 We conclude this calculation was correct. Three subsections of § 768.76 are arguably relevant to this issue: 768.76 Collateral sources of indemnity.— (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court sh...

...section shall satisfy such collateral sources provider's right of subrogation or reimbursement. The provider shall have no right of subrogation or reimbursement for collateral sources payments made after the date of waiver, settlement, or judgment. § 768.76, Fla.Stat....

...e for the correct verb to describe what has occurred) from the provider, subsection (1), which requires a dollar for dollar setoff, becomes the controlling provision. Sutton argues that his position is reinforced by the language of subsection (8) of section 768.76, but we question whether this provision is applicable....

...The statute contemplates that collateral sources which are of the sort that give rise to a right of reimbursement or subrogation should not be charged against the plaintiff except to the extent they are recovered by him. The answer to this problem may be found by examining the setoff provision in section 768.76(1). That subsection provides that "there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. "§ 768.76(1), Fla....

...ose sums from the tortfeasor *304 and by the obligation to pay an allocation of fees for obtaining the judgment. As to the collateral source reduction for the med pay, it appears this is not within the definition of a collateral source as defined in 768.76(2)(a)....

...Fite of Barron, Redding, Hughes, Fite, Bassett & Fensom, P.A., Panama City, for appellees. ALLEN, Judge. The appellants raise several issues in this civil case, each of which we find to be without merit. The appellee Caterpillar cross-appeals, contesting the court's denial of a collateral source offset under section 768.76, Florida Statutes....

...had no interest in the workers' compensation action. Its liability as a defendant in the appellants' separate civil action is unaffected by the private allocation of rights in the workers' compensation action. A collateral source offset pursuant to section 768.76(1) is not allowed due to the statutory subrogation right which pertains under section 440.39(2), as section 768.76 does not imbue a wrongful tortfeasor with the benefit of a plaintiff's settlement of a third party claim with a negotiated subrogation waiver....

...s affirmed. BARFIELD, J., concurs. BOOTH, J., concurs with written opinion. BOOTH, Judge, specially concurring. I fully concur in the majority's disposition of the issues raised by appellants and in the holding that appellee has no entitlement under section 768.76, Florida Statutes, to a collateral source offset for workers' compensation benefits received by Michael Bruner. I write separately to more fully explain what I believe to be the basis for the majority's holding. Section 768.76(1) permits a tortfeasor an offset in the amount of any collateral source of indemnity unless the source of indemnity has a right of subrogation....

...insurer was handling two other claims on the same policy (in effect from July 23, 1993 through July 23, 1994) that were more egregious and, therefore, could have consumed the entire $1,000,000.00 in coverage. [1] Prior to settlement and pursuant to Section 768.76, Florida Statutes, Defendant, via its counsel, gave notice to Plaintiff of Plaintiff's potential lien on December 6, 1994. On December 30, 1994, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's notice letter, stating: In accordance with the requirements of Florida Statutes 768.76, you are hereby notified that the above health plan is a collateral source payor on behalf of the above patient and hereby asserts its rights of subrogation and/or reimbursement....

...Id. The Court may not decide a factual dispute. Fernandez v. Bankers National Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d at 559, 564 (11th Cir.1990). If a factual issue is present, the Court must deny summary judgment and proceed to trial. Id. II. LAW AND DISCUSSION a. Section 768.76 Plaintiff alleges federal question jurisdiction in this declaratory action on the ground that federal laws governing Medicare insurance entitle it to more favorable terms than those set out in Section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the state law governing insurance collateral sources and subrogation rights. Contending that federal pre-emption is not present, Defendant argues that neither 42 U.S.C. 1395mm (e)(4), nor C.F.R. Section 417.528, conflict with Section 768.76. However, a review of Section 768.76 shows that a federal pre-emption analysis is unnecessary because Florida law expressly defers to federal Medicare laws that pertain to collateral sources. Section 768.76 defines "collateral sources" as payments made pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, "except Title XVIII and Title XIX." Further, Section 768.76 expressly states in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of this section benefits received under Medicare, or any other federal program providing for a Federal Government lien on or right of reimbursement from the plaintiff's recovery... shall not be considered a collateral source. Id., at Subsection (2)(b). In other words, Medicare payments are not collateral sources under Florida's Section 768.76 and, therefore, Defendant cannot rely on the Section in determining Plaintiff's Medicare lien rights....

...sively governed by federal law, Defendant's affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel must be examined. Defendant argues that Plaintiff waived its right to pursue recoupment under federal law because Plaintiff sought subrogation under Florida law, Section 768.76, and Defendant *1350 reasonably relied on Plaintiff's representations regarding same....

...Specifically, on December 30, 1994, Plaintiff responded to Defendant's letter notifying Plaintiff of a possible settlement in the wrongful death case, by sending two (2) letters. The first December 30, 1994 letter states: Collateral Source Provider Response... In accordance with the requirements of Florida Statutes 768.76, you are hereby notified that the above health plan is a collateral source payor on behalf of the above patient and hereby asserts its rights of subrogation and/or reimbursement....

...This second letter from Plaintiff does not mention any state or federal statutory or regulatory law, but clearly asserts its rights under the policy to be subrogated and/or reimbursed for medical expenditures. According to Defendant, it relied on Plaintiff's representation that Section 768.76 was applicable in determining to settle the underlying claim....

...." See 22 Fla. Jur 2nd Estoppel and Waiver, Section 4. On the other hand, the doctrine of waiver requires the knowing, intentional relinquishment of a known right, privilege, advantage, or benefit. Id., at Section 89. As indicated above, pursuant to Section 768.76, Defendant notified Plaintiff of the potential settlement and reimbursement. In turn, on December 30, 1994, Plaintiff sent Defendant's counsel two (2) letters that gave notice of Plaintiff's intent to enforce its reimbursement rights. Although one letter refers to Section 768.76, the other letter simply referenced Plaintiff's rights under the subject policy and did not mention any statute or regulation....

...No evidence has been presented that Plaintiff represented it would seek subrogation via Florida law only, and neither Defendant nor his counsel dispute that they were aware federally mandated Medicare coverage was involved in that potential lien. Thus, it was not reasonable for Defendant to assume Section 768.76 was Plaintiff's only vehicle for subrogation....

...Moreover, Defendant could and should have known that Medicare was expressly excluded from state law concerning equitable subrogation of collateral sources, as explained above. Further, the evidence at bar is unequivocal that any detrimental reliance by Defendant that Section 768.76 would govern reimbursement was upon the insurer and attorney of the nursing home and/or Defendant's counsel, and not Plaintiff....

...t before a Judge to determine the amount of that lien, that M. Valdez agreed to settle the case. 10. At no time prior to the settlement of the Valdez Case did plaintiff Humana ever indicate that it was seeking subrogation upon any other grounds than Section 768.76 FL Statute....

...rd, under Florida law, and that his client relied on the possibility of equitable subrogation in deciding to settle the wrongful death matter for $170,000.00. [3] As discussed above, however, Plaintiff never promised to seek subrogation solely under Section 768.76, rather Plaintiff merely complied with Florida's notice requirements as well as sending Defendant additional notice.

...by a source other than this Plan. This may include payments made as a result of claims against a third party of negligence, wrongful acts or omissions. The first statute under which the Boyles argue that Travelers is not entitled to reimbursement is section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides in part: A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation or reimbursement that has complied with this section shall have a right of reimbursement from a claimant to whom it h...

...Travelers responds that it is not seeking reimbursement under the statute, but rather under its policy. The statute begins with language limiting its applicability to actions in which "liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded." § 768.76(1)....

...Deangelo, 448 So.2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Therefore, the amount paid by the insurance providers does constitute damages as provided by section 768.21(6)(b). We also determine that appellants are not entitled to a collateral source reduction for these amounts under section 768.76, Florida Statutes....

provision in the contract. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 768.76(4) (“A provider of collateral sources that has

, 163 So.3d 565, 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).. Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in pertinent

...nt of the Medicaid lien for past payments is recoverable against Defendant United States of America. That amount is $99,024.98. No set-off for future payments is permitted under Florida law. Allstate v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289 (Fla.2000)(interpreting § 768.76, Fla....

Matthews, 498 So.2d 421 (Fla.1986). Similarly, section 768.76(2)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1989), defines collateral

...§ 627.736(3) ("No insurer shall have a lien on any recovery in tort by judgment, settlement, or otherwise for personal injury protection benefits...."). Although the Florida PIP statute does not apply, Hastings is a collateral source provider as defined in section 768.76(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). See also Olson v. N. Cole Constr. Inc., 681 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Because the policy contains a right of reimbursement, section *68 768.76(4) controls....

...the percentage of the judgment or settlement which is for costs and attorney's fees. The trial court treated Hastings as a collateral source provider but nevertheless erred when setting off Hastings's payments to Collins. Instead of proceeding under section 768.76(4), quoted above, the court apparently applied section 768.76(1). But that subsection does not pertain where, as here, the collateral source provider has a right of reimbursement. § 768.76(1) ("[T]here shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists."). The difference between section 768.76(1) and 768.76(4) is that the former adjusts the claimant's damages award, whereas the latter adjusts the amount of the collateral source provider's reimbursement. Compare § 768.71(1) (providing that "the court shall reduce the amount of [the claimant's] award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant... from all collateral sources"), with § 768.76(4) (stating a collateral source provider's "right of reimbursement shall be limited to the actual amount of collateral sources recovered"). Here, the circuit court reduced the verdict by Collins's percentage of negligence, then subtracted the collateral source payment and entered judgment for that amount. That is the procedure for reduction of the award under section 768.76(1), but it was not the correct calculation in this case. Under section 768.76(4), which applies here, Osler was entitled to her full judgment, against which Hastings could claim reimbursement calculated in the following way....

...ately resulted in his death. After settling with the medical providers in a medical malpractice lawsuit, Ham's estate (the Estate) contended that it was only required to reimburse UnitedHealthcare a reduced amount according to the formula set out in section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes (2008). We must decide whether section 768.76(4) applies to limit UnitedHealthcare's reimbursement out of the Estate's settlement with the tortfeasors when language in the insurance policy provides for full reimbursement to UnitedHealthcare in the case of such a settlement. We hold that section 768.76(4) controls, and we affirm the final order of the trial court limiting UnitedHealthcare's reimbursement under section 768.76(4)....

...in Ham's care during and after the procedure and, through two settlements, recovered a total amount of $1,150,000. The Estate filed a motion for equitable distribution, seeking a determination from the trial court that under the formula set forth in section 768.76(4), the Estate owed UnitedHealthcare only $81,660 of the $154,075.46 after taking into account UnitedHealthcare's pro rata share of costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Estate in obtaining the settlements....

...Ingenix, UnitedHealthcare's recovery agent, argued in response that UnitedHealthcare is entitled to full reimbursement based on a provision in the insurance policy that provides for reimbursement in full from any settlement recovery. The trial court ruled in favor of the Estate on this issue, and Ingenix appealed. Section 768.76(4) provides that a collateral source provider that has a right of reimbursement, such as UnitedHealthcare, "shall have a right of reimbursement from a claimant to whom it has provided collateral sources if such claimant has recovered a...

...UnitedHealthcare's reimbursement claim of $154,075.46 was thus subject to reduction by 47%, resulting in UnitedHealthcare's being entitled to only $81,660 in reimbursement. Counsel for the Estate later reduced his fees by 16%, thereby decreasing the reduction percentage under section 768.76(4) and increasing the total reimbursement amount to $86,282.25. Ingenix relies on Travelers v. Boyles, 679 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), for the proposition that section 768.76 only applies to claims arising out of reimbursement rights not founded on a contract....

...In Travelers, 679 So.2d at 1189, a health insurer paid medical expenses on behalf of its insured and sought full reimbursement from a settlement the insured received *951 from his uninsured motorist carrier. The insured argued that the health insurer's claim was barred by section 768.76(4) because the uninsured motorist carrier is not a tortfeasor under section 768.76(4)....

...suant to a policy provision." Id. [1] According to the holding in Travelers, where the statute is not implicated, a policy provision may allow for full reimbursement. Travelers does not stand for the proposition that a policy provision controls when section 768.76(4) is otherwise applicable. The statute is clearly implicated here. This case presents the exact scenario section 768.76(4) was designed to address. In Osler v. Collins, 870 So.2d 65, 67-68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court held that where an insurance policy contains a right of reimbursement, as here, section 768.76(4) applies and requires a reduction of the amount of the insurer's reimbursement by its pro rata share of costs and attorney's fees. The trial court in this case properly applied section 768.76(4) to determine the amount of reimbursement owed to Ingenix on behalf of UnitedHealthcare. We therefore affirm the final order on appeal. Affirmed. WALLACE and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] We question the apparent conclusion in Travelers, also relied upon by Ingenix, that section 768.76(4)'s application is limited—by the language in section 768.76(1)—"to actions in which `liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded.'" 679 So.2d at 1189....

...1 Accordingly, we reverse the por *899 tion of the verdict awarding future economic damages, and remand for a new trial as to future economic damages only. See, e.g., Milton, 22 So.3d at 625 . We find no error in the trial court’s decision to allow testimony of the full amount of Dar-ragh’s past medical bills pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2009) and Goble v....

...Future medical expenses $25,000 Past lost earnings $50,000 Future lost earnings $0 After trial, Defendants filed a motion for final judgment asking the trial court to set off certain collateral source payments pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2010), and to reduce the jury award of $125,000 to a $25,000 net verdict....

... Defendants contend the trial court erred in failing to apply a collateral source setoff to the judgment for the Social Security disability benefits received by Smith in the five years between the accident date and the trial. Specifically, they argue that section 768.76 does not require a party to present evidence matching the “period covered by the disability benefits” with the “period covered by the jury’s award of past lost wages.” We agree. Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2010), provides: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to...

...§ 1396 et seq. 3Smith has not asserted any exceptions, such as Title XVIII and Title XIX of the United States Social Security Act, or any other exception as “prohibited by federal law” or 3 According to the plain language of the statute, section 768.76 only requires evidence of a plaintiff’s receipt of benefits from a collateral source for losses sustained....

...the statute, but would also require a party to request an itemized verdict form in every case, potentially as detailed as each individual item of care or benefit received. Notwithstanding, Smith argues that there should be no setoff because the legislative purpose behind section 768.76 is to avoid a “duplication of benefits.” It is the statutory language that controls, however, not a purported legislative purpose. Here, the Legislature chose to accomplish its purpose by requiring a trial court to “reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant.” § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). We have no authority to require a line by line itemization in every verdict before giving effect to section 768.76(1) where the Legislature has declined to do so. AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur. otherwise “expressly excluded by law as collateral sources.” § 768.76(2)(a)1., Fla....

...However, the rule cited by Novartis applies to inconsistent verdicts; in this case, the problem is that an award of future medical expenses lacks evidentiary support, not that it is inconsistent with the remainder of the verdict. There was no waiver. Florida Statute 768.76, titled “Collateral Sources of Indemnity,” provides in pertinent part In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant...

...In support of its request, Novartis provides billing records and insurance reimbursement records showing collateral source payments and reductions. Guenther does not dispute the figures provided by Novartis. Instead, Guenther argues that to obtain a setoff under Fla. Stat. § 768.76 , Novartis was required to show that the entity providing these benefits to her had no right of subrogation or reimbursement....

...Therefore, the Court finds that it was incumbent upon Guenther to prove that the entity from which she received these benefits had some right of subrogation or reimbursement. Guenther has not provided any such evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is obligated by Fla. Stat. § 768.76 to reduce Guenther’s award of *1307 actual medical expenses by $93,430.74....

...However, the undersigned finds that the credibility of the plaintiff on this *1305 point is properly decided by the jury rather than the court. . The Florida Supreme Court has held that contractual "write-offs” by medical providers are collateral sources for purposes of Fla. Stat. § 768.76 and should therefore be set off against damages awards....

...esented to the lower tribunal); see also Pedroni v. Pedroni, 788 So.2d 1138 , 1139 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (stating that where documents not part of the record are attached to an appellate brief, they will not be considered by the appellate court). Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2000), requires the trial court to reduce an award for damages by the amount the plaintiff has collected from collateral sources....

...2 To prevent double recovery by the claimant, the statutes further direct that the trial court shall reduce the amount of any award by the total amount which have been paid or are otherwise “available” for the benefit of the injured claimant from all collateral sources. § 768.76, Fla....

...Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76, Fla....

...Arraga, 872 So.2d 266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). However, subsequent to our per curiam affirmance, the supreme court held in Caruso v. Baumle, 880 So.2d 540 (Fla.2004), that in lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, PIP setoffs are governed by section 627.736(3), not section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2002), effectively overruling Scott and Garcia....

...Because section 768.041(2) does not authorize a setoff based on uninsured motorist coverage, Kay is not applicable. See Int'l Sales-Rentals Leasing Co. v. Nearhoof, 263 So.2d 569 (Fla.1972); Respess v. Carter, 585 So.2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). II. We also reject Van Winkle's argument that the setoff is required under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Without addressing the issue of whether a set-off *1067 under section 768.76 is appropriate in a legal malpractice action, we conclude that the record does not support considering the insurance proceeds from AMEX as a collateral source. Section 768.76(2)(a)2....

...e that provides health benefits or income disability coverage." The record does not specify whether any of the non-PIP proceeds is for health benefits or loss of earnings, therefore Van Winkle has not demonstrated entitlement to a setoff pursuant to section 768.76....

...Although I agree with the majority's decision to affirm, I am unable to join in part II of its opinion, in which it concludes that the record is insufficient to support an inference that the insurance proceeds paid to the Johnstons can be considered a collateral source for the purpose of a setoff under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...As the majority points out, the $42,500 paid to the Johnstons were uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. The majority, however, is of the view that the record is inconclusive as to whether these benefits meet the definition of a collateral source provided in section 768.76(2)(a)(2), [1] because there is no showing that they were furnished either as health benefits or for loss of earnings....

...and was not required to produce any additional evidence for such purpose. I nevertheless agree to affirm, because, as I later explain, the payment was from a collateral source for which AMEX had a reimbursement right that precluded any setoff under section 768.76(1)....

...Having so concluded, I would then address Van Winkle's alternative argument that she is entitled to a setoff on the theory that neither the Johnstons nor their insurer, AMEX, have any subrogation rights which would qualify as an exception to the setoff requirement under section 768.76(1), [2] because the statute of limitations in Georgia had expired as to the Johnstons' personal injury claim, thereby barring any such claim against the tortfeasor....

...AMEX assigned this right to the Johnstons after settling a bad-faith insurance claim with the Johnstons, and there has been no contention that its right to same had lapsed or expired due to any applicable statute of limitations. In my judgment, the clear language of section 768.76(1) precludes a setoff. See Bruner v. Caterpillar, Inc., 627 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (denying collateral source offset under section 768.76(1) to workers' compensation benefits based on statutory subrogation right under the Workers' Compensation Law)....

...id. [1] A collateral source includes "[a]ny health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits." (Emphasis added.) [2] Section 768.76(1) authorizes a setoff against any award of damages for all collateral sources paid the injured party or parties, with the exception that no reduction shall be allowed "for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement ri...

...Moreover, they argue that the benefits were relevant in a wrongful death case to establish damages for lost support. We are concerned that the admission of evidence describing the amounts of these benefits may have shifted to the jury a function that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1991), allocates to the judge....

...United States, 780 F.2d 902, 908 (11th Cir.1986). . Because neither party contests the magistrate judge’s finding that CHAMPUS payments are not a collateral source, and thus are not immune from offset under Florida’s collateral source rule, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.76 (West Supp.1994), we leave review of that issue, one of first impression in this circuit, for another day....

...4th DCA 2000) (declining to speculate as to how much of an undifferentiated damages award represented economic versus noneconomic damages). We therefore turn to the legal basis for the trial court's decision. In reducing Buchman's award to zero, the court cited without further elaboration section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2024), Woudhuizen v. Smith, 241 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), and State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pettigrew, 884 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). We start, as always, with the plain language of the pertinent statute. Section 768.76(1) provides: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court...

...automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76(2)(a)2. Although section 768.76(1) thus requires that the damages award be reduced by the "total of all amounts" from PIP or health insurers, see § 768.76(1), 2(a)2, we do not read that directive as untethered from the earlier, highlighted portion of the sentence....

...e, the jury necessarily determined that McDonald's negligence did not cause Buchman to "sustain" any losses for the Massachusetts expenses or for the MRI, and it did not award damages for them. We note that our reading of the plain language of section 768.76 is consistent with the history of that section and the caselaw discussing it. Enacted as part of Florida's Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, section 768.76 abrogated the common law collateral source damages rule, which effectively permitted double recovery....

...Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So. 3d 294, 304 (Fla. 2017), as "[t]he presumption is that no change in the common law is intended unless the statute is explicit and clear in that regard," see Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. 1990). Section 768.76 "evinces the legislature's intent to 6 prevent plaintiffs from receiving a windfall by being compensated twice for the same medical bills by both their insurance company and by the tortfeasor." Coop....

...The court denied the offset, reasoning that the jury's award was likely for a period that predated the disability payments and noting that it was the defendant's burden to prove the offset. Id. The Fifth District reversed, explaining that nothing in section 768.76 requires a defendant to obtain an itemized verdict to obtain an offset and that there is no statutory requirement that there be a "dollar for dollar" match between the jury's verdict and any subsequent offset. Id. at 218 ("We have no authority to require a line by line itemization in every verdict before giving effect to section 768.76(1) where 2 Indeed, were we to do so, we would perversely be giving defendants an unearned windfall at plaintiffs' expense: any time the jury awarded something less than all the plaintiff's claimed damages, the defendant could n...

...2004) ("[S]ection 627.736(3) dictates that an insured plaintiff has 'no right to recover' 8 damages paid or payable by PIP benefits."). But here, Buchman did not recover the $2,440 as "damages," regardless of whether they were paid. 3 And as with section 768.76, the purpose of offsetting PIP benefits under section 627.736(3) is to prevent double recovery....

...o they say that that assumption would hold when we know, as we do here, that a particular PIP expense was excluded from the award. 9 MOE, Judge, Dissenting. Respectfully, I would affirm. According to section 768.76(1), if damages are awarded in "any action" governed by the statute and in which liability is either admitted or determined by the trier of fact, then "the court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources . . . ." § 768.76(1) (emphasis added). Here, liability was admitted in an action governed by the statute and the jury awarded Ms. Buchman damages. Both the PIP benefits Ms. Buchman received, and the health insurance payments and adjustments made on her behalf meet the statutory definition of "collateral sources." § 768.76(2)(a)2 (defining "collateral sources" as "Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life...

...t it had discretion to deny the setoff. Courts are not at liberty to carve out discretion that the 10 legislature precluded in the text. I agree with the Fifth District's assessment that the plain language of section 768.76 requires evidence of a plaintiff's receipt of benefits from a collateral source for losses sustained but it "does not require a claimant to further prove that each dollar of a collateral source was actually awarded by the jury." Wouldhuizen v....

v. Ford, 157 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). See § 768.76 F.S. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral

...following mention in the charge of the particular element of damage to which the collateral source charge is properly applicable. See Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Greyhound Corp. v. Ford, 157 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). See § 768.76, F.S....

...Tfae-That statute specifiesspeci-fied which benefits are defined as collateral *379 sources and which are specifically excluded from the definition. In all other casesactions accruing on or after October 1, 1993, reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76, F.S....

...DeRycke, payable to the beneficiary of his choice, were also paid to the estate. Id. at *1. At trial, PCA sought to offset the additional funds that Mrs. DeRycke received from the Buckeye insurance policies against the economic damages awarded by the jury for loss of income stemming from the premature sale of the stock. See § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2009) (providing for reduction in damages award for amounts already paid to claimant from collateral sources). Section 768.76 provides, in part, as follows: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in *294 which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the...

...Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. The trial court denied the motion for setoff because it found that the additional monies were life insurance policy proceeds excluded from setoff under section 768.76(2)....

...Under the common law, collateral source evidence was per se inadmissible and the payments from such sources were not used to offset the tortfeasor’s liability. Goble v. Frohman, 848 So.2d 406, 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). However, the Florida Legislature modified the portion of the rule related to damages by enacting section 768.76, Florida Statutes. By this provision, the payments made to or on behalf of an injured party by a collateral source are to be offset against the damage awarded to an injured party by verdict or settlement. § 768.76(1), Fla....

...does not allow for a set-off of unemployment compensation benefits.1 The defendants respond that unemployment benefits fall within the purview of the collateral source statute. The issue is whether unemployment compensation is a collateral source subject to a set-off under section 768.76, Florida Statutes. We have de novo review. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). Common law prohibited a set-off of collateral source benefits. Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 200 n.3 (Fla. 2001). “Section 768.76 abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it with a statutory provision that allows certain payments from collateral sources to be set off from a plaintiff’s recovery.” Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing § 768.76, Fla....

...e services. 3  4. Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. .... § 768.76(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). Both parties focus on section 768.76(2)(a)1....

...interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). Using the plain meaning of the statute, unemployment benefits do not fall within sections 768.76(2)(a)1.–4. Under section (2)(a)1., unemployment compensation is not provided pursuant to “[t]he United States Social Security Act, except Title XVIII and Title XIX.” § 768.76(2)(a)1., Fla....

...3.091(1)(d), .036(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection 2. refers to “health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits.” § 768.76(2)(a)2., Fla....

...This section therefore cannot cover unemployment compensation benefits. Subsection 3. refers to a “contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services.” § 768.76(2)(a)3., Fla....

...expressed above, unemployment compensation does not fall within its purview. And last, unemployment compensation is not a “contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.” § 768.76(2)(a)4., Fla....

...Unemployment compensation would not fall under this section as it does not involve sickness or injury. See § 443.091(1)(d), Fla. Stat. In fact, the person seeking unemployment compensation must be physically able to work. See § 443.036(1), Fla. Stat. The purpose of section 768.76 is “[t]o prevent double recovery by the claimant.” Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Castellano, 764 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing § 768.76, Fla....

...ed by a payment the plaintiff received to settle a bad faith claim against his uninsured motorist insurance carrier. 1 Ellison v. Willoughby, 326 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Two of Florida’s setoff laws are at issue, sections 768.041(2) and 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2012)....

...It also certified this two-part question as one of great public importance: Is a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim subject to setoff under section 768.041(2) or a collateral source within the meaning of section 768.76? Ellison, 326 So....

...state more precisely the issue presented to the trial court and passed on by the district court: Is a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim a collateral source within the meaning of section 768.76(2)(a)2.? We agree with the Second District that the answer to the rephrased certified question is no....

...Appellate courts’ faithful enforcement of this preservation rule promotes accuracy, efficiency, and fairness in adjudication. The record below shows that, in the trial court, Ellison did not seek a setoff under section 768.041(2); instead, she relied entirely on section 768.76. Ellison filed a pretrial “Motion to Determine Collateral Source Set Off” “[p]ursuant to Florida Statutes Section 768.76.” Her posttrial legal memorandum supporting that motion invoked only section 768.76. And, at the posttrial hearing on the setoff motion, Ellison told the court that the insurance settlement “fits within the collateral source statute [i.e., section 768.76]”— again making no argument about section 768.041(2)....

...-5- court understood itself to be ruling on a section 768.041(2)-based claim. Whether a setoff is available under section 768.041(2) presents an issue distinct from the issue whether a setoff is available under section 768.76....

...st other tort-feasors.” See also Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Boone, 85 -6- So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1956) (showing the legal background against which the Legislature enacted chapter 57-395). Compare that with section 768.76(1), which appears in a statutory section titled “Collateral sources of indemnity.” Section 768.76(1) says, in relevant part: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses susta...

...paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. The next provision, section 768.76(2)(a), defines “collateral sources” in detail. Those definitions show that, broadly speaking, the “collateral sources” referred to in the statute are government benefits and insurance and insurance-like payments. Adopted in 1986, see chapter 86-160, section 55, Laws of Florida, section 768.76 embodies the Legislature’s decision to cut back on the common law “collateral source rule.” See Paradis v....

...The district court waved off Willoughby’s preservation- based argument: “this issue was thoroughly litigated in the trial court, and both the parties and the trial court relied on case law analyzing setoff of [uninsured motorist] settlements under both sections 768.041(2) and 768.76(1).” Id....

...that Florida law does not allow Willoughby to be compensated twice for the same damages. We cannot agree that Ellison preserved the section 768.041(2) setoff issue for appellate review. A trial court called upon to apply sections 768.041(2) and 768.76 would quickly see that each statute presents distinct issues of interpretation. If Ellison wanted the trial court to consider a setoff under both statutes, she had the -8- obligation to present both issues to the trial court. Ellison did not do that—she relied entirely on section 768.76....

...at 217 (“How can a trial court apply a statute meant to prevent plaintiff windfalls when higher court precedent authorizes double recovery in all but the ‘perfect’ case?”). -9-  II. We now consider the availability of a setoff under section 768.76....

...th for the $10,000 limit allowed under his policy and for bad faith damages, his $4 million insurance settlement was undifferentiated (as to claims and categories of damages). Like the parties’ briefing, our analysis here will focus on whether section 768.76 required setoff of any bad faith damages portion of the settlement, i.e., at least $3.99 million.5 Recall that, subject to certain exceptions, section 768.76(1) mandates damage award reductions for sums that the plaintiff has received from “collateral sources.” Recall further that section 768.76(2)(a) defines “collateral sources” in detail. In her setoff request to the trial court, Ellison relied on the collateral source definition in section 768.76(2)(a)2. She maintained that 5. The Second District held that any portion of the settlement attributable to Willoughby’s policy benefits is subject to subrogation and therefore excluded from setoff under the text of section 768.76(1)....

...automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76(2)(a)2. The trial court denied setoff. The Second District affirmed that decision, concluding that the bad faith damages portion of the settlement agreement did not meet the definition of “collateral source” in section 768.76(2)(a)2....

...settlement meets the “collateral source” definitions in sections - 11 - the term “benefits” because they would not be available absent an underlying insurance contract. Ellison also maintains that this Court should interpret the text of section 768.76 in a way that furthers the (asserted) statutory purpose of preventing plaintiffs from receiving windfalls consisting of a double recovery of (assertedly) the same damages. We agree with the Second District that bad faith damages are not “benefits” for purposes of the collateral source definition in section 768.76(2)(a)2....

...627.727(10): “the total amount of the claimant’s damages, including the amount in excess of the policy limits, any interest on unpaid benefits, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any damages caused by a violation of a law of this state.” 768.76(2)(a)3....

...Our answer to the second part of the certified question, as rephrased at the beginning of this opinion, is no: a settlement payment made by an uninsured motorist insurer to settle a first-party bad faith claim is not a - 14 - collateral source under section 768.76(2)(a)2....

...The jury awarded the plaintiff $15,868.16 in past medical expenses, $0 in future medical expenses, and found the plaintiff did not sustain a permanent injury. The total verdict was $15,868.16. Post-trial, the driver moved to reduce the verdict by a $10,000 PIP setoff and a $7,039.52 Medicaid discount setoff, pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2022)....

...The Plaintiff has settled the common law equitable subrogation lien with the disability carrier and received a negotiated release of the aforesaid hen in exchange for a payment of $1,000.00 from the Plaintiff, George Herrera. Based upon these findings of fact the Court determines that: 1. Pursuant to F.S. § 768.76 1 , there existed a common law right of equitable subrogation for the disability insurance payments made to the Plaintiff for his loss of income....

...t to a negotiated settlement, does not destroy the character of the disability payments and they were collateral source payments for which a common law right of equitable subrogation existed. Sutton v. Ashcraft, 671 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). 3. Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes does not imbue a wrongful tortfea-sor with the benefit of a plaintiffs settlement of a third party claim with a negotiated subrogation waiver. Bruner v. Caterpillar, 627 So.2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). AFFIRMED. WARNER and HAZOURI, JJ, concur. . See § 768.76 Fla....

...ues that the trial court erroneously set off amounts from the jury verdict for which a right of subrogation exists. Under Florida law, there “shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76(1), Fla....

Ch. 86-160, Laws of Fla. The Act—codified at section 768.76, Florida Statutes—requires a court to setoff

...rom a verdict in an automobile negligence action for future PIP benefits that are payable to reimburse future lost income or future medical expenses. See *1118 Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294 (Fla.2000). The court reached a similar result under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993), for future payments under voluntary medical payments coverage....

...overage. Rudnick, 761 So.2d at 293 n. 5. It is noteworthy that section 627.736(3) addresses future benefits that are “payable,” whereas section 627.727(1) addresses future benefits that are “available.” Moreover, both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) are statutes altering rights of parties in a typical negligence action....

Proposed SJI 6.13a implements the provisions of Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). Proposed SJI

reduced the award, however, by a setoff under section 768.76(1) for sums paid under an insurance policy

...2 To prevent double recovery by the claimant, the statutes further direct that the trial court shall reduce the amount of any award by the total amount which have been paid or are otherwise “available” for the benefit of the injured claimant from all collateral sources. § 768.76, Fla....

...Any health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76, Fla....

...f future damages.” Id. It concluded that “[sjuch evidence violates neither the statutory nor the common-law collateral source rule and does not, therefore, require a new trial.” Id. The supreme court noted that the then-existing predecessor to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2007), section 768.50, Florida Statutes (1981), applied only to collateral source payments already paid; it did not apply to future damages....

...of insurance, and part of the 1986 Act’s emphasis was on avoiding double recovery by plaintiffs. See Coop. Leasing, 872 So.2d at 959-60 (noting legislative policy of preventing undue windfalls to plaintiffs in tort cases under the Act) (citing § -768.76); see also Goble v....

...e medical payments benefits.” Id. at 290 . The supreme court held that the future medical insurance payments at issue were not to be set off against a verdict for future medical damages. The court’s analysis focused on the emphasized language of section 768.76(1), which states: In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court shall reduce th...

...Indeed, portions of the 1986 Act upon which Joerg relies in this case focus on setoffs against award for past damages; in contrast, Stanley and this case focus upon awards of future damages and the admission in evidence of the availability of unearned benefits. We have not overlooked the Medicare exclusion in section 768.76(2)(b), which- provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, benefits received under Medicare, or any other federal program providing for a Federal Government lien on or right of reimbursement from the plaintiffs recovery ... shall not be considered a collateral source.” § 768.76(2)(b) (emphasis added). Under this limited exclusion, Medicare “benefits received” are not a collateral source “for purposes of [section 768.76]” and therefore cannot be used to reduce past damages....

...Had the exclusion been written to apply to “benefits received or to be received under Medicare” the result would be symmetric and quite different: no reduction would be permitted against past or future damage awards. The’absence of symmetry means section 768.76(2)(b) has no application in the present case, which involves future *858 damages only....

...Gordon & Justin Linn, Goble, Thyssenkrupp, and the Collateral Source Rule: Resolving The Ongoing Conflict, 84 Fla. B.J. 18 (Dec.2010); Benjamin J. Steinberg, Collateral Damage: Discounted Medical Bills and Conflicting Applications Of Florida Statiites § 768.76 as a Rule of Evidence, 62 Fla....

...13 (S.D.Fla.2005) ("No set-off for future [Medicaid] payments is permitted under Florida law.”); Measom v. Rainbow Connection Preschool, Inc., 568 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (disallowing set off of unearned non-Medicare collateral source benefits against future medical expenses because section 768.76 “does not purport to benefit the tortfeasor by deducting collateral sources to which the. insured may be entitled in the future.”); White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (even if section 768.76 is applicable, "future earned disability benefits cannot be set off from an award as a collateral source under [that statute]”) (emphasis added); Swamy v....

...� into account and that the award was not “supported by the evidence.” § 768.74(5), Fla. Stat. As such, the court properly used its discretion in granting Garrison’s motion for remittitur as to those amounts. See Adams, 65 So. 3d at 1188. Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2017), provides another avenue besides remittitur for trial courts to reduce certain awards....

...n paid for the benefit of the claimant . . . from all collateral sources; however, 3  there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. § 768.76(1), Fla Stat. (2017). Post-trial reductions to a jury award made pursuant to section 768.76(1) are termed setoffs....

...Because contractual discounts off medical bills also “fit within the statutory definition of collateral sources,” they too may be setoff from a verdict. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 833. However, “benefits received under Medicare . . . shall not be considered a collateral source” and they are not subject to a setoff. See § 768.76(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017); see also Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“[C]ases interpreting section 768.76(1) appear not to allow a setoff for this kind of Medicare benefits.”). We agree with Garrison that the trial court did not err in granting a setoff of the PIP benefits....

...premiums she paid on the PIP coverage before doing so. In its order, the trial court simply stated that Matrisciani was not entitled to a credit for the past premium payments she made without further explanation. This was error. As Matrisciani rightly contends, “section 768.76(1) ‘allow[s] a reduction from the setoffs for the plaintiff’s cost of obtaining PIP coverage[.]’” Forest v....

...y issue for trial, and that post-trial setoffs for Medicare benefits were not authorized. See Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 551 (“If this were only an issue of setoff, we might agree with plaintiff's motion for rehearing that some cases interpreting section 768.76(1) appear not to allow a setoff for this kind of Medicare benefits.”)....

...� into account and that the award was not “supported by the evidence.” § 768.74(5), Fla. Stat. As such, the court properly used its discretion in granting Garrison’s motion for remittitur as to those amounts. See Adams, 65 So. 3d at 1188. Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2017), provides another avenue besides remittitur for trial courts to reduce certain awards....

...n paid for the benefit of the claimant . . . from all collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. 3 § 768.76(1), Fla Stat. (2017). Post-trial reductions to a jury award made pursuant to section 768.76(1) are termed setoffs....

...Because contractual discounts off medical bills also “fit within the statutory definition of collateral sources,” they too may be setoff from a verdict. Goble, 901 So. 2d at 833. However, “benefits received under Medicare . . . shall not be considered a collateral source” and they are not subject to a setoff. See § 768.76(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017); see also Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“[C]ases interpreting section 768.76(1) appear not to allow a setoff for this kind of Medicare benefits.”). We agree with Garrison that the trial court did not err in granting a setoff of the PIP benefits....

...premiums she paid on the PIP coverage before doing so. In its order, the trial court simply stated that Matrisciani was not entitled to a credit for the past premium payments she made without further explanation. This was error. As Matrisciani rightly contends, “section 768.76(1) ‘allow[s] a reduction from the setoffs for the plaintiff’s cost of obtaining PIP coverage[.]’” Forest v....

...y issue for trial, and that post-trial setoffs for Medicare benefits were not authorized. See Thyssenkrupp, 868 So. 2d at 551 (“If this were only an issue of setoff, we might agree with plaintiff's motion for rehearing that some cases interpreting section 768.76(1) appear not to allow a setoff for this kind of Medicare benefits.”)....

...The accident took place on April 21, 2000. On or about April 27, 2000, Murphy entered into a contingency fee agreement with attorney Hersh to represent the child’s interests following the accident. On December 20, 2000, Hersh served a notice of intent to claim damages pursuant *601 to section 768.76(6), Florida Statutes, upon health providers, Health Options, Inc....

...A plain reading of the statute offers no support for the distinction the Gulledges argue. In *632 deed, they cite no case law supporting their argument. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. WOLF, C.J., ERVIN and BENTON, JJ., concur. . Section 768.76(2)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1997) provides in part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losse...

cannot be reduced by the amount of these proceeds. § 768.76(1) Fla.Stat. (1993); Calloway v. Dania Jai Alai

...See Sheffield v. Superior Insurance Co., 800 So.2d 197 (Fla.2001); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289 (Fla.2000). Unfortunately, these statutes have been inconsistent in their treatment of collateral sources. For example, sections 627.7372 and 768.76 are both entitled "Collateral Sources of Indemnity." Section 627.7372(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1992) provided: (1) In any action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor ve...

...all admit into evidence the total amount of all collateral sources paid to the claimant, and the court shall instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source. (emphasis added) Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2001) provides: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, t...

...claimant's immediate family to secure her or his right to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury. (emphasis added) These two statutes clearly conflict in their treatment of collateral sources. Section 768.76 requires the court to reduce the damage award by the collateral source payments. Section 627.7372 requires that evidence of collateral source payments be *279 presented to the jury during trial and the jury deduct those payments from its verdict. Section 768.76 is contained in Part II of chapter 768, which governs damages in negligence actions....

...Gonzalez, 706 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Kirkland; White v. Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). See also Rudnick. In 1993, section 627.7372 was repealed. Ch. 93-245, § 3, Laws of Fla. [1] Thus presumably the general collateral source statute (section 768.76) will control, even in automobile cases unless another more specific statute applies....

...This principle should also apply to cases involving section 627.736(3). Logically, if the defendant neglects to present evidence of the plaintiff's PIP benefits, the jury cannot be faulted for failing to consider those payments in its award. Citing to both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) in Allstate Insurance Co....

...tion GRANTED; Questions CERTIFIED. SHARP, W., SAWAYA, JJ., and HARRIS, C., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] In Rollins, the Florida Supreme Court noted that section 627.7372 had been repealed and "the general collateral source statute is now found in section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999)." (emphasis added) Rollins, 761 So.2d at 296, n. 2. This suggests that section 768.76 replaced the repealed section 627.7372. This is incorrect as section 768.76 existed prior to the repeal of section 627.7372. There was merely a minor amendment to section 768.76(1) in 1993....

...PIP benefits paid or payable. See Ch.76-266, § 4, Laws of Fla.; Rollins, 761 So.2d at 299. As part of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, the legislature repealed section 768.50 (the medical malpractice collateral source statute) and created section 768.76. Ch.86-160, §§ 55, 68, Laws of Fla. Both the repealed section 768.50 and the newly created section 768.76 provided for the court to reduce the award by the amount of collateral source payments....

...future medical expenses and future pain and suffering and as to Miguel Barberena’s past and future loss of consortium. In turn, the defendants filed a motion seeking a set-off for the amount of personal injury protection benefits paid, pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Accordingly, the trial court entered a final judgment awarding Carla Barberena $10,146 and Miguel Barberena $2,000. The Barberenas’ appeal follows. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by granting the defendants’ motion for set-off, pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993). 1 Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that section 768.76 is inapplicable to this cause of action because this cause arose out of the ownership, operation, use or maintenance of a motor vehicle and accrued before October 1,1993....

...teral source payments to the jury. In response, the defendants contend that section 627.7372 was repealed and that therefore, they were not required to present evidence of collateral source payments to the jury. Instead, the defendants maintain that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), controls and provides that the court shall reduce the award of damages by the total amount of all collateral source payments. Based on the facts of the instant case, we agree with the plaintiffs. In Kirkland v. Allstate Insurance Co., 656 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the First District addressed the conflict between section 768.76 and section 627.7372. The First District explained that section 768.76....

...ted to the jury during trial and that the jury be instructed to deduct from its verdict the value of all benefits received by the claimant from any collateral source. Kirkland, 655 So.2d at 109. The First District concluded that in automobile cases, section 768.76 must yield to the more specific section 627.7372....

...ude that the trial court was acting within its discretion when it denied that portion of the plaintiffs’ motion for addi-tur and/or new trial. Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. . 768.76 Collateral sources of indemnity.— (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for losses sustained, the court s...

...torney’s fees and costs, and by factors such as comparative negligence or the difficult liability issue. When he and the County could not reach an agreement, he filed a motion in his Pinellas County suit, seeking equitable distribution pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999)....

future damages, was properly made pursuant to section 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. The appellant obtained a jury

receive an additional set-off of $17,000. See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. *901(1991). Wells is entitled to recover

...after October 1, 1993. (2) deletion of the last sentence of Note on Use 2, which presently reads: “In all actions accruing on or after October 1, 1993, reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76, F.S....

...following mention in the charge of the particular element of damage to which the collateral source charge is properly applicable. See Paradis v. Thomas, 150 So.2d 457 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); Greyhound Corp. v. Ford, 157 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). See § 768.76, Fla....

...int in state court requesting a declaratory judgment prohibiting appellee from seeking subrogation against the settlement proceeds. Specifically, appellant asserted appellee had not met the pre-subrogation notice requirements outlined in subsections 768.76(7) and (9), Florida Statutes (2009) (the collateral sources statute), and thus, had waived its right to subrogation pursuant to the provisions of that statute....

...state to regulate insurance practices but to reserve regulatory jurisdiction over self-insurance plans. A Related to an Employee Benefit Plan First, both parties concede the first prong has been met because the underlying state statute, subsections 768.76(7) and .(9), Florida Statutes (2009), creates subro-gation notice requirements that relate to ERISA benefit plans....

...nsurance industry. The Florida statute meets this interpretation. Florida’s collateral sources statute has the practical effect of regulating the insurance industry’s right to subrogation through its procedural notice requirements. Specifically, section 768.76(2)(a) defines “collateral sources” as: ......

...pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services. 4. Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. § 768.76(2)(a)(l)-(4), Fla....

...In addition to the foregoing, the statute requires collateral source providers respond within 30 days of notification from a claimant of his or her intent to file suit against a tortfeasor, and failure to promptly comply waives the right of subrogation. § 768.76(6)-(7), Fla....

...The regulation at issue is directly related to insurance practices and procedures. The fact that it relates to notice provisions rather than constituting a total bar to subrogation does not change its character as an insurance regulation. Accordingly, the savings clause of ERISA exempts section 768.76, Florida Statutes, from express preemption....

...cussion on preemption *1060 dicta. Id. at 834 . Second, die court in Matthews considered the preexisting subrogation statute which defined "collateral source” as "any health, sickness or income disability insurance,” whereas the definition under section 768.76 includes "any contract by any corporation to pay for medical services.” Thus, the current version of the statute expressly imposes limitations on self-funded employee benefit plans rather than "insurance.” Accordingly, the current...

ERVIN, Judge. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for directed verdict and reverse the court’s denial of appellant’s motion for offset. Pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the trial court must hold a post-trial hearing on the issue of collateral source benefits....

... Humana Medical Plan, Inc., a Medicare Advantage organization, appeals a final judgment determining its right to reimbursement of conditional Medicare payments under Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Reale brought this action in the circuit court below for a declaration of Humana’s right to reimbursement, asserting that Humana’s payments constituted a collateral source of indemnity and that Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), and not Medicare’s Secondary Payer Act, 1 42 U.S.C....

...Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2003). The court also found that Florida subrogation law, including the collateral sources statute, was applicable in determining Humana’s right to reimbursement. Pursuant to the formula in section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes, for calculating the amount of 5 recovery for “[a] provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation or reimbursement[,]” the court calculated Humana�...

...§ 1395w-22(g)(5).18 II. THE STATE LAW SUBROGATION CLAIM The Reales argue that their action for a declaration of Humana’s reimbursement rights is governed by Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012). The circuit court agreed....

...reinforces the Court’s conclusion that [the Reales’] claims concerning [Humana’s] reimbursement rights necessarily arise under the Medicare Act.” See Potts, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 195. a. The Plain Language of Section 768.76 18Although Humana does not take the place of the Secretary and may not waive the exhaustion requirement, its conduct has not necessarily been aboveboard....

...there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Humana will reissue another determination letter, which will restart the time period for pursuing the administrative appeals process. 23  The court below found section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), applicable in determining Humana’s right to reimbursement. Section 768.76(4) provides a formula for calculating the amount to be reimbursed when a collateral source payment is made under a right of subrogation or reimbursement: (4) A provider of collateral sources that has a right of...

...disability act; or any other public programs providing medical expenses, disability payments, or other similar benefits, except those prohibited by federal law and those expressly excluded by law as collateral sources. § 768.76(2)(a)(1), Fla....

...Workers' Compensation Law, the Medicaid program of Title XIX of the Social Security Act or from any medical services program administered by the Department of Health shall not be considered a collateral source. § 768.76(2)(b), Fla. Stat., (emphasis added). The Reales completely ignore section 768.76(2)(a)(1) and argue that section 768.76(2)(b) does not apply because Humana did not provide “Medicare conditional benefits,” and “Humana is not Medicare.” These arguments cannot be harmonized with the plain language of the statute....

...As explained above, Humana is a Medicare Advantage organization that provides Medicare benefits to enrollees in its Medicare Advantage plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). The benefits paid on behalf of the Reales are indisputably “benefits received under Medicare[.]” The plain language of § 768.76(2)(b) makes clear that such benefits “shall not be 25 considered a collateral source.” Further, Humana’s payments are expressly excluded under section 768.76(2)(a)(1) because they are payments made pursuant to Part C of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. The circuit court erred in finding section 768.76 applicable to determine the extent of Humana’s reimbursement rights. b. Express Preemption The court below found that “Florida Subrogation Law, including the provisions of Florida Statute § 768.76, is applicable to determine the extent of Defendant Humana’s right to reimbursement from the Reale settlement proceeds.” To the extent that “Florida Subrogation Law” apart from section 768.76 may be applicable to determine Humana’s right to reimbursement, it is preempted by the broad, express preemption clause in Part C of the Medicare Act: (3) Relation to State laws The standards established u...

...3D12-2883 29 SALTER, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I. Concurrence Regarding the Collateral Source Statute I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the Florida collateral source statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), expressly excludes the claim raised by Mr. and Mrs. Reale. Section 768.76(2)(b) defines “collateral sources,” those subject to the provisions of the statute, as excluding “benefits received under Medicare, or any other federal program providing for a Federal Government lien on or right of reimbursement from the plaintiff’s recovery ....

...an, Is Medicare Advantage Entitled to Bring a Private Cause of Action Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act?, 41 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1408, 1409 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 30  The exclusion in section 768.76(2) applies to the MAO-paid benefits at issue in the present case, and that conclusion requires a reversal of the final judgment and remand to the trial court. However, Humana’s status as a non-governmental, for-profit enti...

...1. 35  In the State Settlement Proceeds Suit, the Reales sought a declaratory judgment regarding the respective interests of Mrs. Reale, her husband, her attorney, and Humana in the escrowed settlement funds. The Reales asserted that Florida’s collateral sources statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), applied, providing apportionment of the settlement proceeds based on pro rata reductions for the legal fees incurred in obtaining those proceeds and for the ratio of the actual recovery to the total value o...

...o compel reimbursement. The state trial court granted the Reales’ motion for a final declaratory judgment, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that “Florida Subrogation Law, including the provisions of Florida Statute § 768.76, is applicable to determine the extent of Defendant Humana’s right to reimbursement from the Reale settlement proceeds.” The final declaratory judgment determined 27W....

...permitted for MAOs in seeking reimbursement for their own account rather than for reimbursement to the Medicare Trust Account, and on the unusual record presented to us. III. Conclusion I concur with the majority’s determination that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), is inapplicable to Humana’s claim for reimbursement against the Reales, and that the final judgment must be reversed and remanded.30 I respectfully dissent, however, with regard to the actions to be taken on remand....

... Humana Medical Plan, Inc., a Medicare Advantage organization, appeals a final judgment determining its right to reimbursement of conditional Medicare payments under Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...Reale brought this action in the circuit court below for a declaration of Humana’s right to reimbursement, asserting that Humana’s payments constituted a collateral source of indemnity and that Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), and not Medicare’s Secondary Payer Act, provided 1 42 U.S.C....

...hoices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2003). The court also found that Florida subrogation law, including the collateral sources statute, was applicable in determining Humana’s right to reimbursement. Pursuant to the formula in section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes, for calculating the amount of recovery for “[a] provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation or reimbursement[,]” the court 5 calculated Humana...

...§ 1395w-22(g)(5).18 II. THE STATE LAW SUBROGATION CLAIM The Reales argue that their action for a declaration of Humana’s reimbursement rights is governed by Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...s process. 23 that [the Reales’] claims concerning [Humana’s] reimbursement rights necessarily arise under the Medicare Act.” See Potts, 897 F. Supp. 2d at 195. a. The Plain Language of Section 768.76 The court below found section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), applicable in determining Humana’s right to reimbursement. Section 768.76(4) provides a formula for calculating the amount to be reimbursed when a collateral source payment is made under a right of subrogation or reimbursement: (4) A provider of collateral sources that has a right of...

...disability act; or any other public programs providing medical expenses, disability payments, or other similar benefits, except those prohibited by federal law and those expressly excluded by law as collateral sources. § 768.76(2)(a)(1), Fla....

...Workers' Compensation Law, the Medicaid program of Title XIX of the Social Security Act or from any medical services program administered by the Department of Health shall not be considered a collateral source. § 768.76(2)(b), Fla. Stat., (emphasis added). The Reales completely ignore section 768.76(2)(a)(1) and argue that section 768.76(2)(b) does not apply because Humana did not provide “Medicare conditional benefits,” and “Humana is not Medicare.” These arguments cannot be harmonized with the plain language of the statute....

...to enrollees in its Medicare 25 Advantage plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a). The benefits paid on behalf of the Reales are indisputably “benefits received under Medicare[.]” The plain language of § 768.76(2)(b) makes clear that such benefits “shall not be considered a collateral source.” Further, Humana’s payments are expressly excluded under section 768.76(2)(a)(1) because they are payments made pursuant to Part C of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. The circuit court erred in finding section 768.76 applicable to determine the extent of Humana’s reimbursement rights. b. Express Preemption The court below found that “Florida Subrogation Law, including the provisions of Florida Statute § 768.76, is applicable to determine the extent of Defendant Humana’s right to reimbursement from the Reale settlement proceeds.” To the extent that “Florida Subrogation Law” apart from section 768.76 may be applicable to determine Humana’s right to reimbursement, it is preempted by the broad, express preemption clause in Part C of the Medicare Act: (3) Relation to State laws The standards established...

...Reale Case No. 3D12-2883 SALTER, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I. Concurrence Regarding the Collateral Source Statute I concur with that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the Florida collateral source statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), expressly excludes the claim raised by Mr. and Mrs. Reale. Section 768.76(2)(b) defines “collateral sources,” those subject to the provisions of the statute, as excluding “benefits received under Medicare, or any other federal program providing for a Federal Government lien on or right of reimbursement from the plaintiff’s recovery ....

...Medicare Trust Fund.” Jennifer Jordan, Is Medicare Advantage Entitled to Bring a Private Cause of Action Under the Medicare Secondary Payer Act?, 41 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1408, 1409 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 30  The exclusion in section 768.76(2) applies to the MAO-paid benefits at issue in the present case, and that conclusion requires a reversal of the final judgment and remand to the trial court. However, Humana’s status as a non-governmental, for-profit enti...

...Reale, her husband, her attorney, and Humana in the escrowed settlement funds. The Reales asserted that Florida’s 25 Complaint at 6, Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Reale, No. 10-21493-Civ-MGC (S.D. Fla. filed May 7, 2010), ECF No. 1. 35 collateral sources statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), applied, providing apportionment of the settlement proceeds based on pro rata reductions for the legal fees incurred in obtaining those proceeds and for the ratio of the actual recovery to the total value o...

...o compel reimbursement. The state trial court granted the Reales’ motion for a final declaratory judgment, concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that “Florida Subrogation Law, including the provisions of Florida Statute § 768.76, is applicable to determine the extent of Defendant Humana’s right to reimbursement from the Reale settlement proceeds.” The final declaratory judgment determined that (1) Mrs. Reale had recovered 33.75% of the full value of her clai...

...claim against the enrollee in favor of a double recovery in a separate MSP Act lawsuit against a primary payer, leaving escrowed funds in a resulting limbo. 43  I concur with the majority’s determination that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), is inapplicable to Humana’s claim for reimbursement against the Reales, and that the final judgment must be reversed and remanded....

...As the Florida Supreme Court concluded in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289, 291 (Fla.2000), MedPay benefits “are not the equivalent of *250 PIP benefits for purposes of section 627.736(3),” but are instead “a collateral source to which the general collateral source statute [section 768.76(1) of the Florida Statutes] is applicable.” Thus, the trial court, rather than the jury, is to offset a UM damage award by the amount of paid MedPay benefits. This makes testimony regarding MedPay benefits irrelevant. Id. at 292-93 ; see also Caruso, 880 So.2d at 544 (stating that, “under section 768.76(1), the court reduces the jury award by the amount of collateral source benefits”)....

Fla. Jan. 24, 2006) (noting that “Fla. Stat. § 768.76 . . . abrogates the common law collateral source

...The plaintiffs insisted the benefit was not a pension, but was a death benefit akin to life insurance and there was no risk of double recovery. The trial court refused to permit the defendants to put evidence of the wife’s receipt of the City benefit before the jury. Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2009), requires that the damages awarded to compensate a claimant for losses sustained be reduced by the total amounts paid for the benefit of the claimant, or otherwise available to the claimant, from all “collate...

...lable to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. [[Image here]] 4. Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. § 768.76(2)(a)1.-2., 4., Fla....

...At the hearing on the motion to vacate, the plaintiff admitted that “PIP paid out $10,000.” The plaintiff also argued that the set-off should be reduced by the amount of premiums paid by the plaintiff to obtain PIP coverage. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion to vacate, and this appeal followed. *526 Section 768.76(1) provides that any collateral source reduction of damages shall be offset to the extent of any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of the claimant’s immediate family to secure her or his right to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury. § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). When an award of damages is reduced according to the amount of PIP benefits paid to the plaintiff, section 768.76(1) “allow[s] a reduction from the setoffs for the plaintiffs cost of obtaining PIP coverage....” McKenna v....

...5th DCA 2000). We remand this case to the lower court because the court failed to consider reducing the collateral source set-off by the amount paid by the plaintiff in obtaining those collateral source benefits. On remand, and in accordance with McKenna and section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the lower court shall determine the amount paid by the plaintiff in obtaining PIP coverage....

...2008). In Goble, the majority concluded that “[t]he contractual discounts negotiated by Goble’s HMO fall under the statutory definition of ‘collateral sources’ that are to be set off against an award of compensatory damages under [section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999)].” 901 So....

...she became eligible for Medicare. The parties and amici argue that Medicare and private insurance should be treated equally, and I agree that there is no principled reason to distinguish between them. In the context of post-trial setoffs, section 768.76 creates a distinction by excluding Medicare as a collateral source. See § 768.76(2)(b), Fla....

...s which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources; however, there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists. § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. In short, the collateral source statute "mandate[es] post-trial setoff for money received from collateral sources." (Doc. 122 at 2). Collateral sources include payments made pursuant to a health insurance policy, § 768.76(2)(a) l, and pursuant to any contract to pay for hospital or healthcare services, § 768.76(2)(a) 3....

...does not allow for a set-off of unemployment compensation benefits.3 The defendant responds that unemployment benefits fall within the purview of the collateral source statute. The issue is whether unemployment compensation is a collateral source subject to a set-off under section 768.76, Florida Statutes. We have de novo review. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 2007). Common law prohibited a set-off of collateral source benefits. Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197, 200 n.3 (Fla. 2001). “Section 768.76 abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it with a statutory provision that allows certain payments from collateral sources to be set off from a plaintiff’s recovery.” Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing § 768.76, Fla....

...the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services. 4. Any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. .... 7 § 768.76(1)–(2), Fla. Stat. (2012). Both parties focus on section 768.76(2)(a)1....

...interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984)). Using the plain meaning of the statute, unemployment benefits do not fall within sections 768.76(2)(a)1.–4. Under subsection (2)(a)1., unemployment compensation is not provided pursuant to “[t]he United States Social Security Act, except Title XVIII and Title XIX.” § 768.76(2)(a)1., Fla....

...1)(d), .036(1), Fla. Stat. Subsection (2)(a)2. refers to “health, sickness, or income disability insurance; automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; and any other similar insurance benefits.” § 768.76(2)(a)2., Fla....

...This subsection therefore cannot cover unemployment compensation benefits. Subsection (2)(a)3. refers to a “contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services.” § 768.76(2)(a)3., Fla....

...And last, unemployment compensation is not a “contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or by any other 8 system intended to provide wages during a period of disability.” § 768.76(2)(a)4., Fla....

...Unemployment compensation would not fall under this section as it does not involve sickness or injury. See § 443.091(1)(d), Fla. Stat. In fact, the person seeking unemployment compensation must be physically able to work. See § 443.036(1), Fla. Stat. The purpose of section 768.76 is “[t]o prevent double recovery by the claimant.” Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Castellano, 764 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing § 768.76, Fla....

...greater. The settlement authorized payment of attorney’s fees in the amount of $900,000 and costs in the amount of $19,493.78. After our decision allowed Provident to intervene in the action, Provident filed a motion for reimbursement, pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987) (amended 1993), contending that it was entitled to a pro rata reimbursement amount from the settlement *589 proceeds....

...It provided one method of calculating its share and the appellees provided another. The trial court figured the amount differently, which both sides agree was in error. Rather than explaining the errors in the various methods, we will explain the proper way to calculate what is due to Provident. Section 768.76(4) provides in pertinent part: A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation shall have a right of reimbursement from a claimant to whom it has provided collateral sources if such claimant has recovered all or part of such collateral sources from a tortfeasor....

...The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and thereafter, the defendant sought a set-off equal to the disability benefits which the plaintiff might receive in the future. On appeal, in affirming the denial of the requested set-off, this court noted that section 768.76 indicated that a party seeking a set-off can rely only on amounts already paid or already available to the claimant from collateral sources....