Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Marjorie Gadarian Graham of Jones & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Florida Defense Lawyers Ass'n, amicus curiae. EHRLICH, Justice. We have for our review Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), wherein the district court certified the following question of great public importance: DOES SECTION 768.125, FLORIDA STATUTES, CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, AGAINST A SOCIAL HOST, AND IN FAVOR OF A PERSON INJURED BY AN INTOXICATED MINOR WHO WAS SERVED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES BY THE SOCIAL HOST? Id....

...Bankston; his wife, Mary Bankston, was a passenger in Eddie's car, as was Eddie and Mary's daughter, Lori. The Bankstons received personal injuries as a result of the collision. The Bankstons brought suit against the Ladikas alleging a violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...use of action exists against a social host under the circumstances of this case. The district court affirmed the dismissal and certified the question now before us. Our disposition of the certified question turns solely on the meaning to be given to section 768.125....

...which evidences the fact that the legislature clearly intended this act to be included within chapter 562, Beverage Law: Enforcement. Without any legislative direction, 80-37 was subsequently codified by the Joint Legislative Management Committee as section 768.125 in the chapter dealing with Negligence. Our first occasion to address this statute was in Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1984). The issue presented was whether, prior to the effective date of section 768.125, a vendor who sold intoxicating beverages to a minor was liable to third persons injured by the minor's operation of a motor vehicle....

...2d DCA 1967), had broadened a vendor's liability for injuries to minors or third parties which resulted from illegal sales to minors. 448 So.2d at 980. We therefore held in Migliore that prior to the statute's effective date, such a cause of action did exist. We also held that section 768.125 represented a limitation on a vendor's liability, reasoning: When the legislature enacted this statute it was presumed to be acquainted with the judicial decisions on this subject, including Davis and Prevatt. Moreover, the legislative intent that this statute limit the existing liability of liquor vendors is clear from its enacting title which reads: "An act relating to the Beverage Law; creating s. 562.51, Florida Statutes [codified as s. 768.125], providing that a person selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to another person is not thereby liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such other person; providing exceptions; providing an effective date." Chapter 80-37, Laws of Florida (1980). Id. at 981. Armstrong v. Munford, Inc., 451 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984), involved an accident which occurred after the effective date of 768.125....

...e already existing liability of vendors. Id. at 481. This same view of the statute's provisions was again reaffirmed in Forlaw v. Fitzer, 456 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1984). The petitioners advance two basic arguments in support of their contention that 768.125 does create a cause of action against a social host under these circumstances....

...80-37, would in effect allow the Joint Legislative Management Committee, authorized by section 11.242(5)(e) to transfer acts, to alter the substance of a statute. This we refuse to do. Petitioners' final argument is that if this Court concludes that section 768.125 does not apply to social hosts, we should recognize a common law cause of action in favor of similarly situated plaintiffs....

...capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal consensus." Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc. v. Smith, 497 So.2d 644, 646 (Fla. 1986). The legislature has evidenced, through chapter 562 and section 768.125 for example, a desire to make decisions concerning the scope of civil liability in this area....

...elow. It is so ordered. McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion. ADKINS, J. (Ret.), dissents with an opinion. BARKETT, Justice, specially concurring. I agree with the majority's analysis that section 768.125, Florida Statutes, was not intended to create a cause of action against a social host....

...538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984), that common law principles of negligence are applicable to establish such liability. Since the legislature has acted to limit the liability of vendors, however, we cannot find social hosts more liable than the legislature has determined vendors should be. ADKINS, Justice (Ret.) dissenting. Section 768.125 provides in pertinent part: [A] person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age ......

...[Emphasis supplied.] When the language of a statute is plain, clear and free of ambiguity this Court is obligated to follow the plain meaning of the statute. Citizens v. Public Service Commission, 425 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979). The plain meaning of section 768.125 requires us to hold that a social host who willfully and unlawfully serves alcoholic beverages to a minor may be liable to any person injured by the actions of the intoxicated minor....

...create a statutory cause of action against a social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to minors. See, e.g., Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis.2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985). Defendants assert that section 768.125 is ambiguous in light of the construction placed on a similar statute, section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1973), by the First District Court of Appeal in Bryant v....

...Despite the use of the broad term such as "person" and "give," the courts in both Bryant and Butler held that section 562.11 only applies to licensed vendors of alcoholic beverages. Nevertheless, Bryant and Butler are entirely consistent with my views today that liability under section 768.125 extends to social hosts as well as vendors of alcoholic beverages. The holding in Butler was premised on the fact that section 562.11 makes specific reference to "licensed premises." 359 So.2d at 500. Section 768.125 makes no such reference....

...Further, the finding that section 562.11 applies only to vendors is quite logical considering its placement in chapter 562 which pertains to beverage law enforcement. In sharp contrast, chapter 768 concerns negligence law. The majority opinion asserts that our prior pronouncements concerning the effect of section 768.125 in Migliore v....

...2d DCA 1967), and found that a vendor who sells alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11 may be liable to third persons injured by the minor's operation of a motor vehicle. In so holding, we acknowledged: Moreover, contrary to the Fourth District's holding in the present case that *1389 section 768.125 creates a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries by intoxicated minors, we find that section 768.125 is a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages. 448 So.2d at 980. The quotation above does not mean that liability under section 768.125 is limited to vendors of intoxicating beverages. The portion of the statement rejecting the district court's finding that section 768.125 creates a cause of action for third parties against dispensers of intoxicants was made while assessing vendor liability and is therefore inapplicable in determining social host liability....

...In fact, the statement was made to rebut the district court's finding, contrary to Prevatt, that a third party injured by an intoxicated minor may not sue the tavern owner who dispensed the alcoholic beverages. The above quoted language finding that section 768.125 is a limitation of liability of vendors of intoxicating liquors is a correct statement of the law and a statement that one might expect to find in a case analyzing vendor liability. Clearly, one of the purposes behind the enactment of section 768.125 was to limit such liability....

...As we explained in Migliore, the legislature was presumed to be acquainted with judicial decisions such as Davis and Prevatt which held that a vendor who negligently served alcoholic beverages to a minor may be liable for injuries resulting therefrom, and sought to limit the liability of vendors by enacting section 768.125 which requires a party to provide alcoholic beverages to a minor willfully before liability may attach. 448 So.2d at 981. The requirement that the selling or furnishing of alcoholic beverages under section 768.125 must be done willfully before liability may attach was emphasized in Armstrong, in which we affirmed an order of summary judgment in favor of a tavern owner because the complaint in question failed to allege that the tavern owner willfully sold alcoholic beverages to a minor. In so holding, we cited Migliore for the proposition that section 768.125 constitutes a limitation on the liability of vendors and does not create a cause of action for third persons against the dispenser of intoxicants. Like Migliore, the defendant in Armstrong was a tavern owner and therefore any statement in Armstrong to the effect that section 768.125 does not acknowledge liability for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants is constricted to actions against vendors. According to the terms of section 768.125, a person who furnishes alcoholic beverages to a minor may not be liable to third persons for the resulting damages unless the furnishing is unlawful. Defendants contend that section 768.125 does not create liability for a social host because it is not unlawful to provide alcoholic beverages to minors within the confines of the home....

...448 So.2d at 980. We also reemphasized our finding in Davis that the proximate cause of the injury was the sale rather than the consumption of the alcohol. Id. With the exception of the requirement that a person furnishing alcoholic beverages under section 768.125 do so willfully before liability attaches, all of the general principles of law found applicable to a cause of action against a tavern owner under section 562.11 apply to social hosts under section 768.125. I find no valid basis, nor did the legislature, to distinguish between tavern owners and social hosts when it comes to furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors. In my opinion, a violation of section 768.125 constitutes negligence per se....

...lined in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973), could limit recovery for the injured party. As acknowledged in Armstrong, the party furnishing alcoholic beverages to a minor must do so "willfully" before liability may attach. I do not say that section 768.125 establishes a cause of action for the negligent furnishing of alcoholic beverages; more than mere furnishing of alcohol to a minor is required....

...shing of the alcoholic beverages was done unlawfully; and, it was reasonably foreseeable that the minor might cause injury to himself or others, and the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. In summary, I believe that section 768.125 creates a cause of action in favor of a minor or third person and against a social host who willfully and unlawfully furnishes alcoholic beverages to the minor....

...n 390 in Florida. BANKSTON In Bankston, a social host served alcohol to a minor, who, while intoxicated, drove away and collided with a vehicle driven by the plaintiffs. 507 So.2d at 1386. The plaintiffs sued the social host, alleging a violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 768.125 states: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who...

...ors," we concluded that "prior to the statute's effective date, such a cause of action did exist." [3] 507 So.2d at 1386. We explained, however, that in response to this judicial recognition of a vendor's civil liability, the legislature had enacted section 768.125, and that such enactment represented "a limitation on the already existing liability of vendors." Id....

...Simply put, we chose not to expand liability in a field in which the legislature had so expressly chosen to restrict liability. In this case, the Fourth District refused to recognize Kitchen's cause of action for common *1204 law negligence because it found that, similar to the effect of section 768.125 in Bankston, the Florida legislature had abrogated any form of common law liability when it enacted the criminal statutes consisting of section 790.17 and section 790.151, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ohol vendors. Id. at 1386. Conversely, as noted above, the Florida statutes upon which the Fourth District relied are purely criminal statutes imposing criminal sanctions. The language contained in sections 790.17 and 790.151, unlike the language in section 768.125, does not limit a commercial gun retailer's civil liability....

...We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 425 So.2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), which directly and expressly conflicts with Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So.2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). The issue before us is whether, prior to the effective date of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), [*] a vendor who sells intoxicating beverages to a minor contrary to section 562.11, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...oxicating beverages to minors for the sole purpose of protecting minors who might become injured as a result of the purchase and consumption of intoxicants. This finding, the Fourth District continued, is buttressed by the legislature's enactment of section 768.125 which the district court characterizes as creating a cause of action for third parties against vendors....

...tion. 401 So.2d at 924. The present case is analogous to Prevatt. Here, the purchasing minor was the consuming minor who is alleged to have caused the injuries to Migliore. Moreover, contrary to the Fourth District's holding in the present case that section 768.125 creates a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries by intoxicated minors, we find that section 768.125 is a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for *981 injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such...

...avis and Prevatt. Moreover, the legislative intent that this statute limit the existing liability of liquor vendors is clear from its enacting title which reads: "An act relating to the Beverage Law; creating s. 562.51, Florida Statutes [codified as s. 768.125], providing that a person selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to another person is not thereby liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such other person; providing exceptions; providing an effective date." Chapter 80-37, Laws of Florida (1980)....

...Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District Court, adopt the Second District's holding in Prevatt v. McClennan , and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so ordered. BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] Section 768.125, enacted as ch....

...e where a jury could assess the comparative fault of the two defendants, Austin and Publix. Austin and Publix were not alleged to be joint tortfeasors in pari delicto. Austin was charged with a negligent tort; Publix was charged with a willful tort. Section 768.125 indicates that the culpable vendor becomes vicariously liable for the damages caused by the intoxicated tortfeasor....

...[2] Under analogous circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court in Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, 586 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 1991), and Peoples Restaurant v. Sabo, 591 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1991), considered the liability of liquor vendors who sold alcoholic beverages in contravention of section 768.125, Florida Statutes....

...and Nissen seeks compensatory and punitive damages on the grounds that N.G.N. and Nissen served Gilbert Ellis "knowing that [he] was a person addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages." The complaint also alleged that the provisions of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized this cause of action. N.G.N. and Nissen moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: (1) section 768.125 does not provide a first-party cause of action for a one-car accident involving an injured adult drinker/driver; and (2) even if there was a cause of action, the complaint did not allege that the bar had received written notice from the habitual drunkard's family as required by section 562.50, Florida Statutes (1987). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding under the first grounds that there is no cause of action against a vendor of intoxicants under section 768.125. The district court of appeal, while agreeing that the cause of action must be dismissed, made that determination on different grounds. The district court explained that a class of persons to be protected under section 768.125 includes the habitual drunkard himself, as well as those he consequently injures....

...However, the court concluded that the complaint was properly dismissed because prior written notice of Ellis's alcohol addiction had not been provided, as required by section 562.50. In reaching this conclusion, the district court of appeal determined that sections 562.50 and 768.125 must be read in pari materia because they deal with the same subject matter, i.e., the unlawful dispensing of alcohol and the consequences thereof, and because the legislative history of section 768.125 reflects that the legislature intended that *1044 the two statutes be read together....

...ales were made to persons who lacked the ability to make a responsible decision in the consumption of alcohol. As a result of this judicial trend to extend liability towards vendors of alcoholic beverages, the legislature enacted section 562.51, now section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989). That statute was enacted as chapter 80-37, Laws of Florida, and its title read as follows: "An act relating to the Beverage Law; creating s. 562.51, Florida Statutes [codified as s. 768.125], providing that a person selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to another person is not thereby liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such other person; providing exceptions; providing an effective date." (Emphasis added.) The substantive provision, now section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989), reads as follows: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of su...

...ded exceptions for sales to those who were not of a lawful drinking age or to a person habitually addicted to alcoholic beverage use. In 1984, in Migliore v. Crown Liquors, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1984), we addressed the effect of the enactment of section 768.125....

...We expressly agreed with "the holding and rationale" of the Prevatt decision, and stated that "[p]roviding alcoholic beverages to minors involves the obvious foreseeable risk of the minor's intoxication and injury to himself or a third person." 448 So.2d at 980. However, this Court expressly rejected the claim that section 768.125 created a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicating beverages for injuries caused by minors. We held that "section 768.125 is a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages," and that "the legislative intent that this statute limit the existing liability of liquor vendors is clear from its enacting title." Id....

...1987), we considered a social host's liability for injuries to a third person caused by an intoxicated minor who had been served alcoholic beverages by the host. We rejected liability for the social host. In answering a certified question, we expressly found that section 768.125 does not create a cause of action against a social host....

...ty of vendors ... we cannot find social hosts more liable than the legislature has determined vendors should be." 507 So.2d at 1388 (Barkett, J., concurring). In summary, the above case law has established that, although limited by the provisions of section 768.125, there is a cause of action against a vendor for the negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor that results in the injury to or death of the minor or a third party....

...vendor's liability, and (2) it is also a sale of alcohol to a class of persons who lack the ability to make a responsible decision in the consumption of alcohol. The remaining question is how the cause of action may proceed under the restrictions of section 768.125. II. First, in order to understand its purpose, it is necessary to examine section 768.125 in its entirety....

...The first, the minor exception, provides that one who " willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age ... may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor." § 768.125, Fla....

...s may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such ... person." Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note the distinction in the operative language of these two provisions. In applying the exceptions in section 768.125, a court must consider its terms as well as the provisions of the criminal statute dealing with the sale of alcohol. There are two separate criminal offenses for a sale to a minor and a sale to an alcoholic. Regarding sales to a minor, section 768.125 uses the terms willfully and unlawfully....

...048 any person to sell, give, serve, or permit to be served alcoholic beverages to a person under 21 years of age or to permit a person under 21 years of age to consume such beverages on the licensed premises." We find that the legislature's use, in section 768.125, of the term unlawfully requires that the plaintiff must establish each of the elements of the criminal offense in section 562.11(1)(a) to prevail in a civil action....

...sing said liquors, or to the person giving said written notice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree... . However, with regard to the liability arising from the sale to a habitual drunkard, the legislature used the word knowingly in section 768.125 and did not repeat the phrase willfully and unlawfully used in the exception for the sale to a minor. We therefore conclude that, under the habitual drunkard exception to section 768.125, a plaintiff need show only that the vendor knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a person who is a habitual drunkard. The next question we must resolve is what constitutes "knowledge" in order for a vendor's conduct to be found negligent. The respondents argue that section 768.125 must be read in pari materia with the criminal statute, section 562.50, to require written notification of the vendor before recovery under section 768.125 is permissible. We recognize that section 768.125 was initially enacted by chapter 80-37, Laws of Florida, as section 562.51, immediately following the criminal provision pertaining to habitual drunkards in section 562.50....

...We find, however, that the distinction between the utilization of the words "willful and unlawful" for minors and the word "knowingly" for habitual drunkards is critical to this issue and was purposefully done by the legislature. As originally introduced, section 768.125 required establishment of the elements of the criminal offense in section 562.50 in order for there to be liability in a civil action....

...However, the bill was amended on the floor of the House to delete the language requiring proof of all elements of the criminal offense and to specify only that the vendor knowingly serve a habitual drunkard. Fla. H.R.Jour. 216, 224-25 (Reg.Sess. 1980). Given the legislative history of section 768.125, and the use of the term knowingly rather than unlawfully in the statute, we hold that written notice as required to establish the criminal offense in section 562.50 is not a requisite to proving knowingly as a predicate to a negligen...

...598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So.2d 328 (1966); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964). [2] § 768.125, Fla....

...See Barnes v. B.K. Credit Serv., Inc., 461 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for rev. denied, 467 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1985); Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc., 165 So.2d 787 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), cert. denied, 172 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1965); see also § 768.125, Fla....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. August 4, 1983. Rehearing Denied September 6, 1983. *1012 Anderson E. Hatfield, Gainesville, for appellants. John F. Bennett of Fishback, Davis, Dominick & Bennett, Orlando, for appellee. COWART, Judge. This case involves an interpretation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in part: [A] person who willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age ......

...Theoretically, Disney could be held to some percentage of fault, if a jury found that the security guard's conduct caused Bardy's injuries. REVERSED and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, J., concurs. DIAMANTIS, J., dissents, with opinion. DIAMANTIS, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because, in my view, this case is controlled by section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...he allegedly negligent act of Disney's security guard as one of misfeasance rather than nonfeasance. In my view, regardless of how the security guard's act is characterized, the result reached by the majority impermissibly circumvents the effects of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989), which was enacted to limit vendor liability for injuries caused by the intoxication of other persons. As it did at the time of Bardy's accident, section 768.125 provides: Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. § 768.125, Fla. Stat. (1993). In Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1987), our supreme court concluded that *49 the provisions of section 768.125 did not apply to a social host who served alcoholic beverages to a minor....

...recently observed, "of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public input and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal consensus." The legislature has evidenced, through chapter 562 and section 768.125 for example, a desire to make decisions concerning the scope of civil liability in this area....

...I submit that, if liability is to be imposed in the situation involved in this case, it must be imposed by the legislature, which has the authority to set forth the exact duty which social hosts, restaurants, and bars owe to intoxicated guests. If section 768.125 is to be amended, it must be done legislatively, not judicially....

..., has allowed himself to be exposed to the danger. Id. at 1137-38 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965)). We note that the Fisherman's Pier decision predates Bankston. Further, the Fisherman's Pier decision does not make clear whether section 768.125 was in effect at the time of the invitee's death. Section 768.125 (formerly section 562.51) became effective on May 23, 1980....

...Despite criticism that it avoids statutory immunities, the holding of Harris apparently remains viable. See Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc., 190 Cal. App.3d 792, 235 Cal. Rptr. 641, 649 (1987). The Carroll Air decision similarly has been criticized as an "attempt to eviscerate [section] 768.125." Douglas R....

...5th DCA 1999), in which a minor was sold alcohol in violation of a statute, and became intoxicated and involved in an altercation in which he was fatally shot. The court reversed a summary judgment for the alcohol vendor; however, liability was based on a specific statute, section 768.125, which makes a seller of alcohol liable where there is a willful sale of alcohol to a minor....

...hird party have a cause of action against the dispenser of alcoholic beverages for injuries caused by a minor when the alcoholic beverages were furnished in violation of section 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), notwithstanding the enactment of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981)? The district court held that section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), in effect at the time of the accident involved in this case, requires that the selling or furnishing of the alcoholic beverage to a minor must be done willfully....

...We approve the result reached by the district court. Unlike the situation in either Migliore v. Crown Liquors, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1984), or Barber v. Jensen, 450 So.2d 830, No. 63,598 (Fla. Mar. 8, 1984), the present accident occurred after the effective date of section 768.125. In our recent decisions of Migliore and Barber, we held that prior to the effective date of section 768.125, a third party who could establish proximate causation for his injuries did have a cause of action against the person who furnished alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11. We also stated, however, that although section 768.125 did not create a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries caused by intoxicated minors, it does constitute a limitation on the already existing liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages. The district court correctly held that section 768.125 requires that the selling or furnishing of the alcoholic beverage must be done willfully. Section 768.125 controls in those cases arising after its effective date....

...dent occurred. The trial court entered summary judgment for Gracewood on the authority of Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385 (Fla. 1987). The district court of appeal affirmed. *218 The disposition of this case turns on the construction to be given section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989), which reads: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such pe...

...On its face, the statutory language lends some support to Dowell's contention that the legislature created a cause of action against a social host who knowingly serves alcoholic beverages to an alcoholic. However, in Bankston, this Court reviewed the circumstances under which section 768.125 had been enacted and held that the statute did not create a cause of action against a social host for serving alcoholic beverages to a minor....

...he legislature is presumably aware. 507 So.2d at 1387 (citation omitted). While Dowell attempts to characterize Bankston as only deciding the liability for serving alcoholic beverages to a minor, the opinion unmistakably rejected the contention that section 768.125 created a cause of action against a social host....

...Consistent with the vast majority of other courts which have considered the issue, we believe that the imposition of social host liability is a matter best left to the legislature. Several legislative sessions have passed since our decision in Bankston, but no amendments to section 768.125 have been forthcoming....

...imilar context. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Austin, 658 So.2d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), involved two defendants, a negligent driver who caused an accident and Publix, which committed the willful tort of selling alcohol to a person under twenty-one. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991) provided that a "culpable vendor becomes vicariously liable for the damages caused by the intoxicated tortfeasor." Austin, 658 So.2d at 1068....

...1978), may be liable to third persons injured by the minor's operation of a vehicle. We found that Florida common law recognized the cause of action, based on a line of district court cases. The defendant argued that no cause of action existed until passage of chapter 80-37, section 1, Laws of Florida (codified at section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983)), which occurred after the accident in Migliore....

...(2007) (utilizing the language, "not liable for any action or omission"); § 768.075(1), Fla. Stat. (2007) (employing the phrase, "shall not be held liable for any civil damages"); § 768.12, Fla. Stat. (2007) (using the terminology, "shall have no cause of action"); § 768.125, Fla....

...ing of a Carroll Air employee. It claims that the employee was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the fatal accident and that, in any event, the employer cannot be liable for the furnishing of liquor to its employee, citing section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...conduct by the employee, there is some independent fault or negligence on the part of the employer. Id. at 549. Appellant argues that, despite the rule of Mercury Motors, where the fault of the employer is serving alcoholic beverages to an employee, section 768.125, Florida Statutes precludes liability of the employer....

...We find no reversible error in the remaining points on appeal and cross-appeal and affirm as to those issues. Affirmed. GLICKSTEIN and FARMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] While Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Company, 559 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1990), discusses an employer's liability under section 768.125 when it was a social host at a company picnic, the drunken tortfeasor in that case was not a company employee at the time of the party and was therefore merely a social guest, a fact which we were able to glean from the briefs on appeal in Dowell v....

...We think the record creates material issues of fact as to whether Peoples knowingly served Hoag sufficient alcoholic drinks to render him intoxicated, with the knowledge that Hoag was habitually addicted to the use of alcoholic beverages, as required by section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983). Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment entered in Peoples' favor. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983) provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful *268 drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such p...

...tually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. (emphasis supplied) The issue in this case is whether the knowledge required by section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983), to establish liability on the part of a bar establishment can be proved by circumstantial evidence, and whether the record in this case establishes a jury question as to whether Hoag was habitually addicted to alcohol at the time of the accident. This is a case of first impression with regard to the application of section 768.125 to establish liability on the part of a seller of alcoholic beverages for damages caused by an intoxicated adult....

...This interpretation does not appear to us as warranted by the language of the statute. See Pritchard v. Jax Liquors, Inc., 499 So.2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 511 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1987). Further, such an interpretation would lead to so restricted an application as to make that portion of section 768.125 dealing with liability for adult customers virtually meaningless....

...denied, 446 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1984); Gorman v. Albertson's, Inc., 519 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); French v. City of West Palm Beach, 513 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). We can conceive of no policy reason for treating the proof of knowledge required by section 768.125 for sales to adults differently than for sales to minors....

...Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment for Peoples and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED. LEE, R.E., Jr., Associate Judge, concurs. COBB, J., concurs specially with opinion. COBB, Judge, concurring specially. The constitutionality of that part of section 768.125 relating to liability for "knowingly" serving alcoholic beverages to "a person habitually addicted" to their use is not raised as an issue on this appeal....

...Count I was directed at Steven Austin and Anthony Brewer, the driver and owner of the truck, respectively; Count II alleged that Publix willfully and unlawfully sold alcohol to Austin on the date of the collision in violation of sections 562.11 and 768.125, Florida Statutes, [1] resulting in Wurtz's injuries; and Count III alleged that Publix was negligent in the training, instructing and supervising of its employees, said negligence leading to Wurtz's injuries....

...ose commingled in the allegations of Count II. Publix asserts in its brief: Florida law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent sale of alcohol ... the only cause of action available to Wurtz was a cause of action based on Florida Statute section 768.125 which required Wurtz to prove a willful and unlawful sale of alcohol to Austin, a minor, which resulted in Wurtz's injuries....

...ohol to minors ( see section 562.11) could give rise to civil liability. As a judicial trend developed extending liability towards vendors of alcoholic beverages, the Florida Legislature intervened in 1980 and enacted section 562.51, now codified as section 768.125, effectively reviving the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability for sales....

...gligence against the vendor continues to exist in Florida. He bases this contention on the following sentence which appears at page 1047 of the Ellis opinion: In summary, the above case law has established that, although limited by the provisions of section 768.125, there is a cause of action against a vendor for the negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor that results in the injury to or death of the minor or third party....

...to a minor, to a "willful and unlawful" sale and not merely a negligent one. Nevertheless, counsel for the plaintiff herein has seized on the erroneous Ellis dictum as a basis to claim that a negligence cause of action still exists in Florida under section 768.125. This misreading of Ellis resulted in the injection of error into the trial below, both in the admission of evidence and in jury instructions. Based on the provisions of 768.125, we agree with Publix that Count III, which is merely a negligence claim, should have been dismissed by the trial court. On the other hand, Count II, although improperly commingling negligence allegations with its claim pursuant to section 768.125 — and properly subject to a motion to strike surplusage therein — was not subject to dismissal with prejudice as urged by Publix....

...As in the instant case, the vendor failed to check identification of the minor's age prior to sale. The trial court, on the basis of affidavits and depositions, entered summary judgment for ABC. We reversed. In doing so, we acknowledged that a "willful" sale under section 768.125 requires knowledge that the recipient of the sale is not of lawful drinking age....

...support a jury verdict for Tuttle. Therefore, the seller was entitled to a directed verdict. We find Tuttle directly in point and persuasive. Just as in Tuttle, there was no evidence in the instant case to establish a willful sale as required under section 768.125....

...e where a jury could assess the comparative fault of the two defendants, Austin and Publix. Austin and Publix were not alleged to be joint tortfeasors in pari delicto. Austin was charged with a negligent tort; Publix was charged with a willful tort. Section 768.125 indicates that the culpable vendor becomes vicariously liable for the damages caused by the intoxicated tortfeasor....

...to permit a person under 21 years of age to consume such beverages on the licensed premises. Anyone convicted of violation of the provisions hereof is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: 768.125 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...Gorman filed an action against Albertson's seeking damages for injuries he sustained as a result of an automobile accident which occurred while he was a passenger in an automobile being driven by seventeen year old Kenneth J. Kimbrell. Gorman's amended complaint alleged that Albertson's was liable to him pursuant to section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1979), because one of its employees had willfully sold or furnished alcoholic beverages to Kimbrell, a minor, and that Gorman's injuries resulted from Kimbrell's subsequent intoxication....

...Jax moved to dismiss the complaint, contending it did not state a cause of action in that it failed to assert that Jax had been provided with written notice that Hinnant was an habitual drunkard as required by § 562.50, Fla. Stat. The motion also asserted that § 768.125, Fla....

...es were "impaired or further impaired" and that Jax knew or should have known the danger inherent in serving him. Jax again filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint was deficient as it contained no allegation of written notice, and that § 768.125 was unconstitutional. On October 16, 1985 the court granted Jax's motion to dismiss. It found that § 562.50, which requires written notice as a *928 prerequisite to imposition of any criminal liability on a seller of alcohol, must be read in pari materia with § 768.125. Section 768.125 provides a civil remedy against providers of alcoholic beverages to a person who is "habitually addicted" to their use and who injures an innocent third party. The trial court concluded that unless the two statutes are read in pari materia, the "habitually addicted to the use" of alcohol language of § 768.125 would be unconstitutionally vague....

...Pritchard was given ten days to amend but failed or refused to do so and filed a notice of appeal. This court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction and an appealable final judgment was entered January 1, 1986. Pritchard contends that it is not necessary that § 562.50 and § 768.125 be read and construed in pari materia and that the court erred in requiring an action filed pursuant to § 768.125 to allege that a server of alcohol has received written notice as required by § 562.50....

...t the use of intoxicating drink or drinks is working any injury to the person using said liquors, or to the person giving said written notice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Section 768.125 is a negligence statute which provides for a cause of action against a person who serves alcoholic beverages to minors, or to persons who are known to the server to be habitually addicted to the use of alcohol....

...atutes from being read and construed in pari materia. Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1981). However, there is no basis in the instant case for reading and construing the two statutes in pari materia and imposing upon the plaintiff in a § 768.125 action a requirement that he allege and prove that the server of alcoholic beverages has received written notice that the recipient was habitually addicted to intoxicating liquors....

...al liability for serving alcohol to a "habitually addicted" person if the person's family has previously provided written notice that the person has a drinking problem. The statute's purpose is the protection of the habitual drunkard and his family. Section 768.125, on the other hand, was enacted in 1980 in the midst of a period of growing awareness and concern with the harm inflicted by intoxicated persons, particularly when they attempt to operate automobiles on a public highway....

...g problem. Instead it merely requires that service to such a person be provided "knowingly" without any specification of how such knowledge must be obtained. Although it appears the legislature may have obtained the "habitually addicted" language of § 768.125 from § 562.50, it specifically did not also utilize the provision concerning written notice....

...He has since been declared incompetent and the appellant is his legal guardian. The appellant filed suit in the circuit court seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint sets forth the relevant facts and also states, tracking the language of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1987), that the appellees served Gilbert "knowing that [he] was a person addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages." The appellees moved to have the complaint dismissed claiming that section 768.125 does not provide a first party cause of action for a one-car accident involving an injured adult drinker/driver and because the complaint did not allege that the bar had received written notice from the habitual drunkard's family required as a predicate to liability in section 562.50, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...t the bar had in fact received written notice. The appellees moved to dismiss on the same grounds. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that there is no cause of action against the vendor of intoxicants under section 768.125 for injuries received by an intoxicated [adult] driver as the result of a one car accident, citing Puglia v....

...1st DCA 1986), review denied, 511 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1987). We affirm the dismissal of the suit but not for the reason given by the trial court. Our decision turns on our analysis of the relationship between section 562.50, found in the chapter titled "Beverage Law: Enforcement," and section 768.125, found in the chapter titled "Negligence." [1] The two sections read as follows: 562.50 Habitual drunkards; furnishing intoxicants to, after notice....

...at the use of intoxicating drink or drinks is working an injury to the person using said liquors, or to the person giving said written notice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 768.125 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...Section 562.50 is primarily a criminal statute since it specifies that if a liquor vendor provides an intoxicant to a person who is habitually addicted to the intoxicant, after *1211 receiving written notice from the addict's family that the person is so addicted, such vendor shall be guilty of a second degree misdemeanor. Section 768.125, on the other hand, addresses only the civil remedy and omits any mention of a "written notice," although the serving of the alcohol to the habitually addicted person must be done "knowingly." The appellant argues that the difference in focus of the two sections, i.e., criminal versus civil liability, and the fact that section 768.125 omits the phrase "written notice," provide compelling reasons not to read the two sections in pari materia....

...Therefore, she claims, the allegation in her civil complaint for damages that the bar served Gilbert knowing that he was a habitual drunkard, without mentioning written notice as the source of that knowledge, was sufficient. She also contends that section 768.125 itself provides a separate cause of action so that a habitual drunkard injured in a one-car accident as a result of being served alcohol may sue for damages against the liquor vendor. The appellees contend, on the other hand, that the statutory sections must be read in pari materia so that the written notice prerequisite of section 562.50 be maintained in the application of section 768.125 before civil liability can attach; and, further, that section 768.125 does not, itself, provide a cause of action....

...There are cases discussing a parallel situation where an underage drinker's first party complaint for damages results from unlawful service to the minor. Florida has allowed first party complaints on behalf of an injured minor for a number of years, long before section 768.125 was enacted....

...The case which comes closest to the factual situation in the instant case is Pritchard v. Jax Liquors, Inc . There, the court reversed the dismissal of a complaint by a third party who was injured by a habitual addict. The complaint, although alleging a violation of section 768.125, did not additionally allege that written notice had been received by the liquor vendor as required in section 562.50....

...Pritchard found no occasion to read the two statutory sections in pari materia *1212 primarily because one provides for criminal liability and the other for civil and, further, because the statutes were enacted at different times and for entirely different purposes. Id. at 928-29. In its construction of section 768.125, the court concluded that this section: provides two narrow exceptions to the common law rule of nonliability for servers of alcohol to persons who subsequently inflict damages on a third person....

...new right in members of the general public. It does not contain any requirement that the alcohol provider have written notice of a person's drinking problem. Id. at 929. We do not share this view because our supreme court has specifically held that section 768.125 does not create any new cause of action but is merely a limitation on existing liability....

...1990); Bankston, 507 So.2d at 1387; Migliore, 448 So.2d at 980. In the related context of illegal service to minors we have applied this dichotomy of cause-of-action/no-cause-of-action which characterizes the relationship between sections 562.11 and 768.125....

...2d DCA 1984). Puglia was a case of a one-car accident which caused injuries to the minor driver who had been illegally served alcohol. The injured minor's first party complaint contained two counts: Count I was based on section 562.11 and count II on section 768.125....

...The trial court entered a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant on count II. We reversed the dismissal of count I (since 18 was below the legal drinking age), thus reinstating that part of the complaint, but affirmed the judgment on count II. The reason we did not allow the count based on section 768.125 to stand was that there was no separate cause of action which could be stated under that section, citing Migliore and Armstrong....

...The creation of any new cause of action, nonexistent at common law, thus occurred in the enactment of sections 562.11 and 562.50. This broadened liability, recognized by Migliore only for the exceptional cases of minors and habitual drunkards, was subsequently limited by the enactment of section 768.125....

...[2] As the evolution of the law of liquor vendor liability presently stands in Florida, the liability and causes of action founded on sections 562.11 and 562.50 (initially only criminal liability expanded by case law also *1213 to mean civil liability) is now constricted by section 768.125. Keeping in mind, then, the legislatively limited nature of liquor vendor liability in Florida, we are, contrary to our sister court in Pritchard, constrained to read sections 562.50 and 768.125 in pari materia because they deal with the same subject matter — unlawful dispensing of alcohol and the consequences thereof, whether civil or criminal. Our view that the two sections are closely interrelated is supported by the fact that when section 768.125 was enacted, the legislature numbered it section 562.51, placing it directly after section 562.50....

...hat section to the Negligence chapter instead of placing it as it was enacted in the Beverage Law Enforcement chapter. See Bankston, 507 So.2d at 1387. To bolster their arguments, both parties have provided this court with the legislative history of section 768.125....

...562.50 may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such drunkard. An amendment was introduced to remove the italicized language and substitute the following language which was adopted and now, renumbered, appears as section 768.125: age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person....

...at the necessary conviction could be obtained is further evidence that we reach the correct conclusion in interpreting this legislative concern. Regarding notice as a prerequisite to civil liability, the legislature retained in section 562.51 (i.e., 768.125) the other integral component of section 562.50 (besides the conviction) by requiring that the server of liquor must knowingly serve the habitual drunkard. The legislature was, of course, cognizant of the manner necessary to impart the requisite knowledge in order to impose liability under section 562.50, i.e., written notice. In 1980, it merely added the next following provision, section 768.125 (ne 562.51), as a limitation to the existing liability which already had a written notice prerequisite....

...We reach this conclusion by complying with Ferguson v. State, 377 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1979), which mandates that we construe together and compare statutes which relate to the same or to a closely related subject or object and that we view the entire statutory scheme to determine legislative intent. Since section 768.125 is a limiting provision and does not create any cause of action, it could not broaden, or make easier, the way in which the existing liability under section 562.50 would attach....

...Be that as it may, we believe that the intent of the legislature in this statutory scheme is to limit the criminal and civil liability of the liquor server who has not received the required written notice. Affirmed. CAMPBELL, C.J., and DANAHY and FRANK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The present section 768.125 was originally enacted as section 562.51....

...mage ...; providing exceptions." Ch. 80-37, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). [3] To avoid confusion, we reiterate that this is the bill which was to be section 562.51 when it was enacted as chapter 80-37 of the session laws but which ultimately became section 768.125 in our statutes....

...5th DCA 1983). Appellant's complaint contains the conclusory allegations that appellee willfully and unlawfully sold the alcoholic beverages to the plaintiff. These allegations, standing alone, would not support a cause of action under sections 562.11 and 768.125, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...322.051, or the person's passport, and acted in good faith and in reliance upon the representation and appearance of the person in the belief that he was of legal age to purchase or consume the alcoholic beverage. Nothing herein shall negate any cause of action which arose prior to June 2, 1978. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1985) provides: *1358 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...2 *1153 The appellants subsequently moved to amend the complaint to include a claim for punitive damages against the vendor defendants. The vendor defendants opposed this motion and moved for summary judgment in turn, arguing the appellants could not make out a prima facie case of any violation of section 768.125. 3 Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2010), provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such perso...

...5th DCA 1995) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a cause of action for negligence against a vendor for sale of alcohol to a minor continues to exist in Florida and noting that the statement in Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042, 1047-48 (Fla.1991) — “that, although limited *1153 by the provisions of section 768.125, there is a cause of action against a vendor for the negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor” [and once the elements of the criminal offense in section 562.1 l(l)(a), Florida Statutes "have been proven, the plaintiff has es...

...He further alleged that as a result of appellee's actions he became intoxicated, and this intoxication caused him, while attempting to drive home in a motor vehicle, to become involved in an accident that resulted in personal injuries. In count II of his second amended complaint, the appellant alleged that appellee violated section 768.125, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Carson City Nugget, Inc., supra; Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969), supra. It appears to us that the legislature felt the need to create a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries by intoxicated minors when it passed Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981). They fashioned a statute which does afford a cause of action for third persons if they are able to prove the furnishing of intoxicants was willful and unlawful. The statute provides: 768.125 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. In conclusion, we note that the passage of Section 768.125 would have been totally unnecessary to provide third persons a cause of action against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries by intoxicated minors if such a cause of action was already available to them pursuant to Section 562.11. Certainly, no injured third person would proceed under Section 768.125 and assume its more onerous burden of proof if he could sue under Section 562.11....

...Gate Petroleum Co., 401 So.2d 922 *771 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So.2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Finally, pursuant to Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), Fla.R.App.P., we certify the following question to be of great public importance: Prior to May 24, 1980, the effective date of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), did a third party who could establish proximate causation for his injuries, have a cause of action against a person who furnished alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11, Florida Statute...

...statute. See Kitchen, 697 So.2d at 1203 (noting that the court would not expand liability when the legislature has acted to restrict it). But that legislative limitation of liability applies only to those who sell or furnish alcoholic beverages. See § 768.125, Fla....

...when the actor took charge of him. In Union Park Memorial Chapel v. Hutt, 670 So.2d 64, 66-67 (Fla.1996), the supreme court characterized similar provisions in section 324A as explaining a "well accepted rule of law" in Florida. Granzow argues that section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2003), acts as a "complete limitation on liability" in this case. Granzow further argues that, because section 768.125 renders social hosts "immune under common law and Florida law for serving alcohol to their guests," she could not be found liable, even if the conditions contained in section 324 occurred....

...[2] Despite that common law rule, however, Florida courts previously recognized a cause of action against vendors where illegal alcohol sales were involved. E.g., Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla.1963). In 1980, as alcohol vendors' civil liability continued to increase, the legislature enacted section 768.125 to limit the expansion of vendors' exposure....

...Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385, 1386-87 (Fla.1987); Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 448 So.2d 978, 981 (Fla.1984). Although Florida courts continued to provide social hosts with protection from suit under common law principles during this period, the legislative history relating to section 768.125 indicates that it was "the intent of the legislature to apply the provisions of [this] bill to private party hosts as well as licensees under Chapter 562, Florida Statutes." S. CS/SB 233 by Commerce Comm. with Senator Winn, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement (June 11, 1980). Thus, social hosts are protected from liability for dispensing or furnishing alcohol both by the common law and by section 768.125. The supreme court has viewed section 768.125 as "a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages," Migliore, 448 So.2d at 980 (emphasis added), which "codified the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability for sales but provided exceptions for...

...ose who were not of a lawful drinking age or to a person habitually addicted to alcoholic beverage use." Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042, 1046 (Fla.1991) (emphasis added). When the supreme court has written on the relationship between section 768.125 and social hosts, it has indicated that the statute did not create any new causes of action against social hosts and reaffirmed their pre-existing common law protection. Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 559 So.2d 217 (Fla.1990) (social host who served alcohol to known alcoholic could not be held liable for injuries caused by his intoxication); Bankston, 507 So.2d at 1386-87 (section 768.125 did not create cause of action against social host for serving alcoholic beverages to minor)....

...4th DCA 1993), the defendant employer furnished drinks to one of its employees who later caused a car crash killing the decedent. Id. at 915-16. Plaintiff brought suit for wrongful death and the defendant argued (among other things) that it was immune from liability under section 768.125....

...Appellant filed a wrongful death suit against the country club (Appellee) on the ground that Appellee had served the *435 alcoholic beverages to the killer, Wright, resulting in his intoxication, despite knowing him to be "habitually addicted to the use of ... alcoholic beverages" under section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1997). [1] The trial court granted final summary judgment to Appellee on the grounds that as a private, members-only, not-for profit corporation, Appellee is immune from liability under section 768.125; that Appellee had no legal duty to protect the decedent from Wright's conduct; and even assuming such a duty existed, "it was not foreseeable" that, as a result of intoxication, Wright would shoot the decedent with a personal firearm....

...The occasion of the "golf mixer," where Appellee sold and served large quantities of alcohol to Wright during the several hours immediately before Wright shot and killed the decedent, was not a "private social function" and, thus, does not fall within the ambit of Florida decisions holding that section 768.125 did not create a cause of action against a "social host." Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 559 So.2d 217 (Fla.1990) (social host who served alcohol to known alcoholic could not be held liable for injuries caused by his intoxication); Bankston v. Brennan, 507 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1987) (§ 768.125 did not create cause of action against social host for serving alcoholic beverages to minor); *436 Kirkland v. Johnson, 499 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (no cause of action accrued against social host for third-party injuries resulting from intoxication of minor to whom alcohol was furnished at "private function"). Although section 768.125 generally protects from liability for injury or damage "[a] person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age," the statute expressly provides that "a person who ......

...from which a jury could find that, by knowingly serving Wright too much alcohol, Appellee created a "zone of danger" that some injury could be anticipated. A plaintiff is not required to prove the exact manner of the injury to support a claim under section 768.125. See McCain, 593 So.2d at 504; Kirkman Road Sports Pub & Restaurant, Inc. v. Dempsey, 723 So.2d 384 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Coker, 642 So.2d at 774. In summary, Appellee is not immune from liability under section 768.125; and the selling and serving of liquor to Wright by Appellee, as a corporate beverage licensee, distinguishes the instant facts from the "social host" situations....

...Given the disputed issues of material fact, these are not proper matters for the trial court to resolve by summary judgment. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150. The trial court having erred by granting summary judgment, we REVERSE the summary final judgment and REMAND for further proceedings. WEBSTER and POLSTON, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "768.125 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication.—A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person who ......

...le under the influence and cause injury to innocent third parties. Indeed, even the statute immunizing tavern owners from liability to third persons has an exception in the event the alcohol is knowingly served "to a person habitually addicted... ." Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Gallardo were injured when their vehicle was hit by a drunk driver (“Driver”). Appellants filed a complaint against Appellee Flanigan’s Enterprises, which owns and operates the restaurant at which Driver had been drinking. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2011), insulated businesses from liability for damages caused by intoxicated patrons and therefore precluded the action. Appellants now appeal this dismissal, arguing Appellee’s actions on the night of the accident constituted the assumption of a voluntary duty, which removed the case from the protections of section 768.125....

...Appellants filed a suit against Appellee, alleging that it undertook a voluntary duty to prevent the Driver from driving while intoxicated, but was negligent in performing this duty. Appellee moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the suit was precluded by section 768.125, Florida Statutes....

...as true and consider them in the light most favorable to the Appellants; all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the Appellants favor. Estate of Massad ex rel. Wilson v. Granzow, 886 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). The common law rule, codified by section 768.125, absolves sellers from blame for the drunken acts of another. Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So. 2d 1042, 1044-47 (Fla. 1991). Specifically, section 768.125 states: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person,...

...medication not prescribed for the guest that worsened the guest’s condition. Id. The host then left the guest next to a pool. Id. The guest fell into the pool and drowned. Id. The guest’s estate brought an action against the host, who claimed liability was precluded by section 768.125. Id....

...In that case, a business bought drinks for one of its employees while he was entertaining clients. Id. at 915. The employee later drove while intoxicated and hit a third party. Id. The injured party brought an action against the employer. This Court held that the employer was not protected by section 768.125, as “the ‘fault’ of the employer was not in the furnishing of the drinks but in its knowledge, actual or constructive, that [the employee] was intoxicated and was not in a condition to drive....

...The employee proceeded to attempt to drive away and promptly ran into a light pole. Id. The employee brought an action against Disney. Id. The Fifth DCA held that Disney may be liable for damages to the employee, while a dissent from Judge Diamantis argued the suit was precluded by section 768.125....

...In contrast, there is no allegation Appellee requested or demanded the Driver to leave the premises, much less drive herself. In addition to the Appellants’ failure to show that the undertaker’s doctrine should apply to this case, the legislative intent behind section 768.125 was to limit liability for the actions of others and an expansion of liability would be contrary to these goals. As we noted in Massad: The supreme court has viewed section 768.125 as “a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages,” Migliore [v....

...The injured party, like Appellants, also alleged liability for, inter alia, failure to “ensure that an intoxicated patron left the premises with a safe ride home in accordance with its own policies and procedure . . . .” Id. at 330-31. The Second District held that the suit was precluded by section 768.125....

...We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Barber v. Jensen, 428 So.2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), wherein the district court certified the following question to be of great public importance: [*] Prior to May 24, 1980, the effective date of section 768.125, Florida Statutes *831 (1981), did a third party who could establish proximate causation for his injuries, have a cause of action against a person who furnished alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11, Florida St...

...We today have quashed the Fourth District's holding in Migliore. Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1984). We likewise quash the present decision of the Fourth District on the authority of our decision in Migliore and hold that prior to the effective date of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), a third party who could establish proximate causation for his injuries did have a cause of action against the person who furnished alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11....

...Furry’s father, John Furry, filed an eight-count complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1161 and Florida’s dram shop act, codified at 4 Fla. Stat. § 768.125,4 as well as various state law negligence claims....

...Paraplegic, Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1128 (11th Cir. 1999). Tribal sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue. See Sanderlin, 243 F.3d at 1285; Seminole Tribe, 181 F.3d at 1241. 4 Fla. Stat. § 768.125 provides in full: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such per...

...Marin, 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1993), receded from on other grounds, Wells v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 659 So.2d 249, 254 (Fla.1995). . We acknowledge that there are certain factual scenarios under which a duty may be created by the negligent furnishing of alcoholic beverages. E.g., § 768.125, Fla....

...The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant below, Kirkman Road Sports Pub and Restaurant, Inc., d/b/a JB's Sports Bar and Grill, in regard to its liability to the plaintiffs pursuant to section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1995), which provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such...

...5th DCA 1994), two restaurants served beer to a twenty year old, Nieves, without checking his age. He subsequently became a passenger in a vehicle operated by a drunken friend. The car crashed, injuring Nieves, and he sued the restaurants pursuant to section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...home from a party hosted by the appellee (who was the defendant in the trial court). The appellee had served alcoholic beverages to the minor at the party. The appellant sued the appellee for his injuries, specifically basing his cause of action on section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983), which was in effect at all times material hereto. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it failed to state a cause of action. The motion to dismiss was granted, with the complaint being dismissed with prejudice. The specific question presented to this court is: Does Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983) create a cause of action in favor of a person injured by an intoxicated minor driver who was served alcoholic beverages by a private party host? The trial court answered this question in the negative, primarily relying on two decisions of the Florida Supreme Court....

...lic beverages. The common law did not provide a cause of action against a private social host, under the circumstances of this case, and no court decision in this state has specifically changed that principle of law. In 1980, the legislature enacted Section 768.125, Florida Statutes, which provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person...

...ge caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. It is this new statutory language that the appellant herein sought to use as a basis for the lawsuit filed in the trial court. Specifically, appellant contends that by enacting section 768.125, the legislature created a cause of action that had not previously existed in the state, to-wit: the right of a third party to sue a private social host who serves alcoholic beverages to a minor who thereafter causes injury or damage to the third party. In support of this argument, appellant cites Barnes v. B.K. Credit Service, Inc., 461 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), as standing for the proposition that section 768.125 created a cause of action. Appellant's reliance on Barnes is, however, misplaced. First, the "right created" by section 768.125, according to Barnes, pertains to the right of recovery against a person for injuries caused by an intoxicated minor, as opposed to adult, driver....

...decisions relied upon by the trial court in the instant case. Specifically, in Migliore v. Crown Liquors, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1984), the Florida Supreme Court stated: Moreover, contrary to the Fourth District's holding in the present case that section 768.125 creates a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries by intoxicated minors, we find that section 768.125 is a limitation on the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages. 448 So.2d at 980. In addition to this language which reflects the supreme court's view that section 768.125 limits already existing liability of vendors, and does not create a cause of action, the supreme court went on, in the same opinion, to recognize that this was the apparent intent of the legislature, as reflected by the following lang...

...avis and Prevatt. Moreover, the legislative intent that this statute limit the existing liability of liquor vendors is clear from its enacting title which reads: "An act relating to the Beverage Law; creating s. 562.51, Florida Statutes [codified as s. 768.125] providing that a person selling or furnishing alcoholic beverages to another person is not thereby liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such other person; providing exceptions; providing an effective date." 448 So.2d at 981. The supreme court did not stop there, however. In Armstrong v. Munford, Inc., *248 451 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984), the court, discussing the Migliore case, noted: We also stated, however, that although section 768.125 did not create a cause of action for third persons against dispensers of intoxicants for injuries caused by intoxicated minors, it does constitute a limitation on the already existing liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages. 451 So.2d at 481. This proposition was again repeated in the case of Forlaw v. Fitzer, 456 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1984), wherein the Florida Supreme Court, again discussing the Migliore case as it related to section 768.125, stated: We held that the statute limited the cause of action previously recognized by the courts....

...e trial court's dismissal of appellant's complaint. Because we feel the question involved herein is of great public importance, and is one which has not been specifically addressed before, we certify the following question to the supreme court: DOES SECTION 768.125, FLORIDA STATUTES, CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION, AGAINST A SOCIAL HOST, AND IN FAVOR OF A PERSON INJURED BY AN INTOXICATED MINOR WHO WAS SERVED ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES BY THE SOCIAL HOST? AFFIRMED....

...Russo brought a wrongful death action alleging that the Moose Lodge served alcohol to Gayle Haynes, a habitual drinker. After consuming alcohol at the Moose Lodge, Haynes struck and killed her husband, Pasquale Russo, with his vehicle. She argues that under section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991) 1 , the Moose Lodge is liable for the death....

...In affirming the final summary judgment, we agree with the trial court that Russo’s proof failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to Haynes’ habitual addiction to the use of alcohol and as to the Moose Lodge serving Haynes alcohol with knowledge of his addiction. Such proof is necessary under section 768.125....

...abitual addiction to the use of alcoholic beverages and as to the Moose Lodge’s knowledge of that addiction when serving Haynes. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court. Affirmed. FRANK, C.J., and LAZZARA, J., concur. . Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991) provides in relevant part: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that such person ......

...intoxicated as a result of consuming numerous alcoholic beverages at Nick's Bar and, while operating his automobile, struck appellant while he rode his bicycle, rendering appellant a quadriplegic. The complaint also alleged that Nick's Bar violated section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1988), when it served alcohol to Moulton with knowledge that Moulton was habitually addicted to alcohol. Nick's Bar answered the complaint with a general denial and filed a motion for summary judgment on two grounds: It was not liable under section 768.125 because there was no evidence that it knew Moulton was habitually addicted to alcohol, and it had not received prior written notice of Moulton's alcohol addiction, which they asserted was required under section 562.50, Florida Statutes (1988). [1] The court granted summary judgment on the former. Appellant argues that section 768.125 requires a strict construction, because it purports to limit a pre-existing common law cause of action against a vendor for negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a habitual drunkard....

..., the customer is an alcoholic and is habitually given to maintaining an alcohol level in his system. ... I was taught and it is general practice, despite the lack of extreme symptoms, to cut the customer off for his safety and the safety of others. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes, provides A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person, except that a person ......

...cause of action exists against a bar owner for dispensing alcoholic beverages to a drunk patron who later drunkenly and negligently injures another. There is no question that the present Florida law on this subject is that no cause of action exists. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), provides as follows: 768.125 Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...lcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. This statute was passed in 1980 and was not in effect at the time of the accident in question. We conclude, however, that Section 768.125, as stated above, is declarative of the existing law on the subject, rather than a change in the law as applicable to this case....

...pa brewery employees. Count II — State Law Negligence Claim Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant was negligent in providing him with free beer on a monthly basis, because Defendant was aware of his alcoholism. Plaintiff claims that Florida Statute section 768.125 gave rise to a duty on the part of Defendant to refrain from providing a known alcoholic with alcoholic beverages....

...This is clearly over the six-month limitation set by DelCostello. As to the additional two (2) cases of free beer provided by Defendant to employees with good safety records for the month, Plaintiff attempts to establish a duty under Florida Statutes section 768.125....

...Johnston, of Taylor, Day, Rio & Mercier, Jacksonville, for appellees Oliver Cummings Pickett, Jr. and Donna Pickett. WENTWORTH, Judge. Appellant seeks review of an order by which his complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Appellant contends that the court erred in its construction of section 768.125, Florida Statutes....

...In dismissing appellant's complaint the court below relied upon the Fourth District's decision in Bankston v. Brennan, 480 So.2d 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), pending on certification, Fla. Supreme Court Case No. 68,281. In Bankston the Fourth District held that section 768.125, Florida Statutes, does not create a cause of action against a social host for third party injuries resulting from the intoxication of a minor to whom alcoholic beverages have been furnished at a private function....

an exception in Florida’s Dram Shop Act, section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2014), permitting a claim

...(“the Eagles”). Felt was heavily inebriated, at least partially as a result of drinks purchased from the Eagles. Rodney and his wife, Charlotte (“the Appel-lees”), sued the Eagles for damages, alleging they were negligent and in violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes, for serving alcohol to “a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages.” After a lengthy trial, a jury found in favor of the Appellees and awarded them approximately $11 million in damages....

...The Eagles, joined by their insurance company as a co-defendant, appeal, raising five issues (though not challenging the jury’s determination that Felt was known to be “a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages,” per section 768.125)....

...Discussion of this issue, however, first requires clarification of the exact cause of action brought by the Appellees. That issue is one of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Brown v. City of Vero Beach, 64 So.3d 172, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The Eagles suggest that the only cause of action here is under section 768.125, Florida Statutes. The Appellees argue that there were two causes of action presented to the jury, the first under section 768.125 and the second under general negligence. Neither party is correct. Section 768.125 says, in relevant part: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to....

...ication of such person, except that a person ... who knowingly serves -a person habitually addicted to the use of any or alb alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from- the intoxication of such ... person. § 768.125, Fla. Stat. From its clear language, section '768.125 does not create a cause of action....

...xist, except in certain circumstances. This interpretation was made clear by the Florida Supreme Court in Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042 (Fla.1991). There, the court described its prior case law “expressly rejecting] the claim that section 768.125 created a cause of action,” while simultaneously recognizing that “although limited by the provisions of section 768.125, there is a cause of action against a vendor for the negligent sale of alcoholic beverages.” Id . at 1046-47. That cause of action, when the habitual-alcoholic exception to the statute applies, “is ordinary negligence.” Id. at 1049 . At oral argument, counsel for the Appellees argued that, once the habitual-alcoholic exception from section 768.125 was proven, all that remained to be proven was causation and damages....

...to protect the public from a habitual alcoholic whom it has knowingly served may be sufficient to show that there has been no breach of a legal duty. *338 The Eagles are thus incorrect in their assertion that the only cause of action here was under section 768.125 and that evidence of negligence was irrelevant. The cause of action was negligence; however, it simply was negligence that was alleged to not be limited by section 768.125....

...Similarly, the Appellees are incorrect in asserting in their answer brief that there were two causés of action. The presence on the verdict form of two questions does not indicate that there are two causes of action being brought; it indicates that there is a single cause of action, negligence, with a threshold question, section 768.125 noncompliance....

...Here, the jury found, and the Eagles concede for the purposes of appeal, that the Appellees proved the threshold question. The issue before us is therefore whether evidence of and the instructions on the RVA were appropriate in the negligence action brought by the Appellees (which was unencumbered by the protections of section 768.125)....

...Therefore, to the extent that evidence of the RVA was relevant, it should have been excluded in order to prevent the jury from improperly viewing the Eagles’ decision not to participate in the voluntary program as evidence of their negligence. To summarize this issue, we hold that there is no cause of action under section 768.125; that the cause of action actually alleged in this case was negligence; that the jury verdict contained two questions in order to answer both the predicate requirement of section 768.125 and the substantive issue of negligence; that “noncompliance” with a statute that imposes no legal duty or responsibility on organizations cannot be used as evidence of negligence; that, despite the limiting instruction, this is h...

...Morrison, Apportioning Responsibility in Cases Involving Claims of Vicarious, Derivative, or Statutory Liability for Harm Directly Caused by the Conduct of Another, 55 Baylor L.Rev. 617, 642 (2003)). The question is therefore whether the Eagles’ liability here .was derivative. Examining section 768.125, Florida Statutes, we see that the legislature explicitly intended to protect providers from liability except in cases where the provider serves an underage person or a known habitual alcoholic and “the intoxication of such ... person” “cause[s] or result[s]” in “injury or damage.” § 768.125, Fla....

...not establish that (1) Decedent was a habitual drunkard or (2) McCabe served Decedent with knowledge of Decedent’s condition, which are both necessary elements to establish a claim under Florida’s reverse dram shop liability statute, codified at section 768.125, Florida Statutes. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2009), provides in full: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of su...

...a person who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become hable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. § 768.125, Fla....

...on April 21, 2000, James Centlivre drove his car onto the sidewalk and injured plaintiff. Two blood samples showed blood alcohol levels of .31 and .30, more than three times the legal limit for intoxication. Plaintiff sued the bar where Centlivre had started drinking at 9:00 a.m. that morning, alleging a violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2000), which provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury ..., except that a person who willfully ......

...of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042 (Fla.1991), our supreme court stated that proof that a bar served an individual a substantial amount of alcohol on multiple occasions would be evidence from which a jury could determine that the vendor had sufficient knowledge to have violated section 768.125....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s orders dismissing the action against James Burgin. The complaint fails to state a cause of action against Burgin, individually, for violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1989)....

. cation of such minor or person. Fla. Stat. § 768.125. Cook has not alleged that either of the exceptions

...be served alcoholic beverages to a person under 19 years of age. .. . Anyone convicted of violation of the provisions hereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree punishable as provided in S. 775.082 or S. 775.083, and provisions of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981), which read: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting *1010 from the intoxication of su...

...on who is not of lawful drinking age ... may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. The appellants’ complaint alleged a cause of action under only section 562.11(l)(a) and not under section 768.125, although the latter statute was in effect at the time of the accident....

...ed minor’s operation of a motor vehicle. See also Barber v. Jensen, 428 So.2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), cert. granted (No. 63,598, 1983), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the question of whether, prior to the effective date of section 768.125, a third party had a cause of action against a person who furnished alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of section 562.11. We affirm. By enacting section 768.125, the legislature established the requisites of a cause of action by an injured third person arising out of circumstances which are vio-lative of section 562.11(l)(a)....

...hird party have a cause of action against the dispenser of alcoholic beverages for injuries caused by a minor when the alcoholic beverages were furnished in violation of section 562.11(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), notwithstanding the enactment of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...the car after being served the alcohol. Appellant finally alleges that as a result of appellee having unlawfully sold the alcoholic beverages to the minor that the minor injured appellant when he ran a red light and collided with appellant’s car. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981) was in effect at the time the injury occurred and that statute says a person who furnishes alcohol to a minor may be liable to anyone suffering injuries as a result of the intoxication of the minor....

...Jensen, 428 So.2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 425 So.2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Burson v. Gate Petroleum Co., 401 So.2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. . Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981) provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person...

...Augustine and overturned, causing serious and permanent injuries to Nieves when he was ejected from the vehicle. Nieves sued Camacho Clothes, Inc., d/b/a Café Camacho, and O.C. White’s, Inc., alleging that the two corporations violated sections 562.11(l)(a) and 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991), when their agents served alcoholic beverages to him, an underage person, without requesting any identification indicating his age....

...Section 562.11(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), provides: It is unlawful for any person to sell, give, serve, or permit to be served, alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, or to permit a person under twenty-one years of age to consume such beverages on licensed premises. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication....

...The supreme court, in approving the Prevatt rationale, stated: “[p]ro-viding alcoholic beverages to minors involves the obvious foreseeable risk of the minor’s intoxication and injury to himself or a third person.” Migliore at 980 . The court then construed the later enacted section 768.125 to be a statute limiting the liability of vendors of intoxicating beverages rather than a statute creating, for the first time, a cause of action by third persons against the dispensers....

...fendants for unlawfully furnishing beer to minors. The defendants are service station employee Ed Murdock, the service station owner Haruth, Inc., Shell Oil Company, and two other individuals. 2 The question before us is the proper interpretation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...at the seller was furnishing the alcoholic beverages not just to Last, but also to his underage friends. With such notice, the sale to Last would accomplish selling or furnishing alcohol to the other minor occupants of the ear, within the meaning of section 768.125....

...that Last was buying beer for delivery to other minors, and not for his own consumption. The decided cases are to the contrary. The statute applies to a person who ‘‘willfully and unlawfully sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages” to a minor. § 768.125, Fla.Stat....

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint against defendants for personal injuries incurred in an automobile accident involving a drunken driver to whom defendants allegedly sold alcoholic beverages. We affirm. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1980), imposing liability on one who knowingly sells intoxicating beverages to a person who is “habitually addicted” to such beverages, was not in effect at the time of the sale alleged in the complaint here....

William D. Bailey violated any duty under section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1993) regarding the serving

Appellee urges that the case is controlled by Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1981). These questions have

...This Court dismissed Cook’s negligent manufacture claim with prejudice because *1348 she failed to establish a duty and because “voluntary drinking of alcohol is the proximate cause of an injury, rather than the manufacture or sale of those intoxicating beverages to that person.” Id. at 1361 . Furthermore, § 768.125 of the Florida Statutes limits liability for the sale of alcoholic beverages with express exceptions for two specific classes of persons — minors and alcoholics....

...Under Florida law, “voluntary drinking of alcohol is the proximate cause of an injury, rather than the manufacture or sale of those intoxicating beverages to that person.” Bruner, 153 F.Supp.2d at 1361 ; accord Reed v. Black Caesar’s Forge Gourmet Rest., Inc., 165 So.2d 787, 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Section 768.125, Florida Statutes, absolves purveyors of alcohol from liability, with exceptions for sales to minors and alcoholics, based upon the common law theory that the sale of the beverage is not the proximate cause of any harm related to its consumption. Cook argues that § 768.125 does not apply because it “does not address the liability of the manufacturers of alcoholic products” and “was not intended to provide immunity to a manufacturer of an unlawful alcoholic drink.” 2 (Doc. # 50 at 7). Section 768.125 states that “a person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such person.” Nothing in that language explicitly excludes manufacturers of alcoholic beverages, unlawful or otherwise. But in any event, the applicability of § 768.125 is strictly an academic question. The Florida Supreme Court has explained that § 768.125 “effectively codified the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability” for the sale of alcohol....

...The Florida Supreme Court explained that it modified the common law rule in its 1963 decision in Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla.1963). This launched a judicial trend extending liability to vendors of alcoholic beverages. In response, the Florida Legislature enacted § 768.125 in 1980, effectively reviving and codifying the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability. Ellis, 586 So.2d at 1045-46 . Whether this Court applies § 768.125 or the common law, the result is the same: the proximate cause of an alcohol-related injury is the consumption of the intoxicating beverage not the sale of the beverage....

...893 S.W.2d at 646-48 . . Cook's allegations as to the “unlawfulness” of Sparks are discussed below. . Once again, Cook appears to misconstrue Ellis , taking out of context a quote from the Florida Supreme Court's historical discussion. Cook argues that § 768.125 (and, by extension, Ellis) abrogated the common law, and that Davis is still good law “in situations not governed by section 768.125.” (Doc....

certified to be of great public importance: DOES SECTION 768.125, FLORIDA STATUTES, WHICH IMPOSES LIABILITY

...There the district court passed on and certified the following question as one of great public importance: Whether the comparative fault statute, section 768.81, Florida Statutes, applies to tort actions involving the dram-shop exception contained in section 768.125, Florida Statutes, against a vendor who willfully and unlawfully sold alcohol to an underage patron, resulting in the patron’s intoxication and related injury? Id. at 249.  To unpack the certified question, we note that section 768.81 1 says that percentage-of-fault-based liability, rather than joint and several liability, governs a “negligence action.” § 768.81, Fla. Stat. In turn, section 768.125 permits liability when a person “willfully and unlawfully” provides alcohol to an underage patron and intoxication and injury ensue. § 768.125, Fla. Stat. The issue is whether the action permitted by section 768.125 is a “negligence action,” even though the statute requires willful misconduct. Without approving all the district court’s reasoning, we agree that the answer to the certified question is yes: the action permitted by the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 is a negligence action for purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81. I Late one night in November 2014, a speeding pickup truck struck 18-year-old Jacquelyn Faircloth as she crossed a street on foot....

...and Faircloth were intoxicated at the time of the collision. Tragically, Faircloth suffered catastrophic and permanent injuries. Faircloth’s guardianship later sued Potbelly’s and Cantina 101, two Tallahassee bars, seeking money damages. Without explicitly invoking section 768.125, the complaint alleged that Potbelly’s and Cantina 101 had “willfully and unlawfully” served alcoholic beverages to Dwyer and Faircloth, respectively....

...Dwyer’s oncoming truck. Potbelly’s responded with a comparative fault defense, arguing that any fault attributable to Faircloth should reduce the bar’s liability. But the trial court rejected that defense before trial. The court decided that, since section 768.125 requires willful misconduct, the guardianship’s lawsuit was not a “negligence action” for purposes of the comparative fault statute....

...Cantina 101 had defaulted and did not appear at trial. Over a dissent, the First District reversed the judgment on appeal. The district court held that the trial court should have allowed Potbelly’s to assert a comparative fault defense under section 768.81. After reviewing the background of section 768.125 and this Court’s precedents, the district court concluded: “Following the statute’s enactment, selling or furnishing alcohol to a minor must be done willfully for the vendor to be liable, but the vendor is liable in negligence, not an intentional tort.” Main St....

...The court reasoned that, as “derivatively liable” entities, each bar was responsible for all the fault attributable to the underage drinker it had served. Id. at 236- 37. We agree with the First District that the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 permits a negligence action....

...becomes intoxicated and injures himself or others. The latter issues are outside the scope of the certified question, and we will not address them further. II Everyone agrees that the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 includes a willfulness requirement. The -5- guardianship insists this means that the action permitted by section 768.125 is not a negligence action....

...2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1959) (illegal gun sale to “an obvious minor” was negligence per se). -8-  B Such was the state of the common law in 1980, when the Legislature enacted section 768.125....

...f lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. § 768.125, Fla. Stat. We explained in Ellis that section 768.125 “effectively codified the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability for sales,” subject to the two “exceptions” specified in the statute. 586 So. 2d at 1046. As to cases involving the illegal sale of alcohol to underage patrons, section 768.125 left the preexisting common law largely intact. The statute did not create a new cause of action to address injuries flowing from such sales. Migliore, 448 So. 2d at 980. Instead, with one qualification, section 768.125 assumed that the common law would continue to govern in this area....

...qualified permission for continued application of the existing common-law framework. See id. at 981 (“When the legislature enacted this statute it was presumed to be acquainted with the judicial decisions on this subject, including Davis and Prevatt.”). To be sure, section 768.125 did modify the common law by limiting liability to situations where the sale to an underage patron is done both “willfully” and “unlawfully.” The “unlawfully” requirement brought nothing new—the negligence per se-based cases already required proof that the alcohol provider had violated section 562.11. The term “willfully,” as used in section 768.125, simply means that the alcohol provider knew that the recipient was under age 21....

...5th DCA 1983) (“Circumstantial evidence of such knowledge may consist of facts relating to the apparent age of a person.”). C This brings us to the guardianship’s argument that, by including a willfulness requirement, section 768.125 eliminated the preexisting negligence cause of action and replaced it with something other than a negligence action....

...conduct is an intentional tort is the intent to bring about harm (more precisely, to bring about the type of harm to an interest that the particular tort seeks to protect).” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 1, cmt. b (2010). Now consider section 768.125....

...hort of the standard of diligence to which those who live in organized society are under a duty to conform.” (emphasis added)). - 13 -  Viewed against the common law baseline, the willfulness requirement in section 768.125 does not change the basic relationship between the seller-defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. Instead, section 768.125 merely limits liability to a subset of the actors who could have been found liable under the preexisting negligence per se doctrine. As we have explained, liability in those cases partly depended on proof that the defendant knew or should have known that the purchaser of alcohol was underage. Section 768.125 retains negligence-based liability, but only for defendants who know that the purchaser is underage. Here, the guardianship did not allege that Potbelly’s intended harm to someone in Faircloth’s position or that the bar knew such harm was substantially certain to occur....

...nowingly creating an unreasonable risk of harm. That is negligence, not an intentional tort. III Our answer to the certified question is yes: the action permitted by the underage drinker exception in section 768.125 is a negligence action for purposes of the comparative fault statute, section 768.81....

...cally allows civil tort actions against vendors who—like Potbelly’s in this case—“willfully - 15 - and unlawfully sell[] or furnish[] alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age.” § 768.125, Fla....

...We deny the petition for certiorari as there is an adequate remedy at law by plenary appeal. There is nothing in the record to establish that the defendant/petitioner knowingly served a person habitually addicted to the use of any alcoholic beverages, which is necessary to establish liability. See Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1983); Lonestar Florida, Inc....

697 So.2d 1200 (Fla.1997) does not render section 768.125 unconstitutional. AFFIRMED. DELL, STONE and

...limit to Lavelle. Id., ¶ 10. Subsequently, on February 16, 2010, the Tome Estate filed a wrongful death action against NBSI alleging liability based upon the service of alcohol to Weston Tome at The Arena Sports Bar in violation of Florida Statute section 768.125....

...(Doc. 33-3). On March 12, 2010, the Tome Estate amended its complaint, renaming the Defendant as “176 N. Beach Street, Inc., d/b/a The Arena Sports Bar & Grill and d/b/a The Coliseum Center for Performing Arts,” alleging liability pursuant to section 768.125 based upon the service of alcohol to Tome at the Arena Sports Bar and The Coliseum Performing Arts Center....

...which the courts or the legislature have found it necessary to protect a minor from his or her own unwise acts, the act of stealing an unattended car, and being compensated when subsequently injured while using it, is not one of those areas. Compare § 768.125, Fla....

...Notably there is no exception for Dram Shop Act claims in the 1987 immunity legislation. [4] At the same time, we note that still another statute prohibits voluntary intoxication as a defense to any crime. [5] If being deliberately drunk is not a defense to a crime, on what basis should Judges read into section 768.125 an implied civil law avoidance of the forcible felony defense? We have been given none....

...The injuries to the twins were unquestionably inflicted while they were occupied in aggravatedly battering a man in his bedroom. Nothing in the Dram Shop Act conveys any intent to protect impaired minors while they burgle a house and beat a tenant with a deadly weapon. Affirmed. STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 768.125, Fla....

...g hours, with knowledge that she was an alcoholic, and then failed to provide supervision for her when the employer ejected her from the premises and she was hit by a train while walking home. Appellant attempts to state a cause of action based upon section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2013), but that statute does not create a cause of action nor is it applicable to these circumstances....

...It claimed that it was foreseeable that she would walk and be struck by a train. The Estate demanded damages for her wrongful death. The employers moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on grounds that no cause of action could be stated because section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2013), provides only a cause of action against alcohol “vendors,” not a social host or business that gratuitously serves alcohol. Section 768.125 provides: Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage...

...caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action, agreeing with the employers that section 768.125 did not create a cause of action and a business does not otherwise owe a duty to an inebriated person, except in the limited circumstance that the intoxicated person is inert, citing Preferred National Insurance v. Fat Investors, Inc., 842 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The Estate now appeals. The Estate first argues that section 768.125 does not shield the employers from liability....

...After the young people left Gator Lanes, they participated in a pass and chase driving game during which the driver of the car Melissa was in turned up the wrong road into oncoming traffic. The tragic accident followed. The appellants sued the bowling alley seeking to recover damages for their daughter’s death under section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...their drinking. This appeal ensued. Initially we note that the trial court entered summary judgment because it determined that there was nó material issue as to willfulness, an element which must be established before liability can be imposed under section 768.125....

...g to come under the “sell or furnish” language of the statute by attempting to show that Gator Lanes willfully allowed the minors to drink alcohol on its premises. They contended below, as they argue now on appeal, that the term “furnish” in section 768.125 includes the willful tolerance of underage drinking on licensed premises, regardless of the origin of the alcohol....

...nor to consume alcohol on licensed premises. Thus, it is clear that when the legislature intends to reach the evil of tolerating underage drinking on licensed premises, it can be specific. As the supreme court pointed out in Migliore , the fact that section 768.125 was amended after judicial decisions construing section 562.11(l)(a) evinces the legislature’s intent to limit the liability of alcoholic beverage vendors....

...in the death of the Decedent. At the time of the crash, Hartman had a blood alcohol content of .302. Gonzalez sought damages for the wrongful death of the Decedent against Stoneybrook pursuant to Florida’s reverse dram shop liability statute, codified at section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...rohibited. — (1)(a) It is unlawful for any person to sell, give, serve, or permit to be served alcoholic beverages to a person under 19 years of age or to permit a person under 19 years of age to consume said beverages on the licensed premises... . Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...icted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. [3] In Armstrong v. Munford, Inc., 451 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1984), the supreme court held that section 768.125 requires that the selling or furnishing of the alcoholic beverage to a minor must be done "willfully." A "willful" sale requires knowledge that the recipient is not of lawful drinking age....

...We reverse and remand pursuant to the agreement of the parties, and the authority of Migliore v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc., 448 So.2d 978 (Fla.1984), where the Supreme Court held that a vendor who sells intoxicating beverages to a minor contrary to § 562.11, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978) prior to the effective date of § 768.125, Fla.Stat....

...2d at 48, compelled Shephard's to prevent Mr. West from driving. The trial court rejected Mr. Hall's argument, concluding that "the undisputed facts . . . do not rise to the level that would create a duty as found in Bardy." We agree. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2008), is at play in this case: Liability for injury or damage resulting from intoxication A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinki...

...Disney had a duty to refrain from ordering its employee to leave its premises unless it reasonably believed that the employee could drive away safely. Id. In dissent, Judge Diamantis cogently explained that the majority impermissibly circumvented section 768.125. Id. at 48 (Diamantis, J., dissenting). -4- Recognizing the legislature's constitutional prerogative to set social policy, as it did in section 768.125, Judge Diamantis explained that if liability was to be imposed, the legislature, not the courts, must define the duty of care. Id. at 49-50; see also Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 1997) (noting that where the legislature has acted to restrict liability under section 768.125, a court would not expand liability). We must resist the temptation that Mr. Hall presents us; we leave it to the legislature to decide the proper scope of its statute. In addition to the restrictions imposed by section 768.125, we also must observe that the facts in Bardy are meaningfully different than those before us....

...2d at 398 (citations omitted). Unfortunately, even if Mr. West should not have driven, Shephard's could not restrain him, take away his keys, or impound his car. See Weber, 100 So. 3d at 731. -5-  Because section 768.125 bars Mr....

evil of drunk driving, it is amazing that Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.) was ever adopted

...1st DCA 2022), approved in part, 392 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 2024), we stated that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a defendant to assert an alcohol defense in a negligence action brought by an underage drinker’s guardian under the dram-shop exception statute. See § 768.125, Fla....

...Starita claimed that the defendants “knew, or had reason to know, that [Conrad] was habitually addicted to the use of alcoholic beverages” and that at the time in question knew or had reason to know he was “drunk or intoxicated in direct violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes (1991).” On June 13,1995, Post 10164 filed a motion to transfer venue from Putnam to Marion County pursuant to section 47.122, Florida Statutes....

...As part of the discovery in that suit, the Luques were deposed in March of 2004. Later, on December 12, 2005, the Luques filed this separate action against Ale House. The Luques' suit against Ale House claims that Ale House breached its duty to Luque under section 768.125, Florida Statutes, when it knowingly sold him a substantial amount of alcohol on January 31, 2003....

...another driver; that section 768.36, Florida Statutes relieved it of any liability; and that the Luques were attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the court. It reiterated these points at the hearing. Additionally, Defendant argued at the hearing that section 768.125 was enacted for the protection of the public, not the drunkard, and, thus, the drunkard could not bring an action under the statute. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court entered the summary judgment based on the conclusion that section 768.125 did not create a cause of action....

...Additionally, they objected to the trial court's decision to rest its holding on a ground not argued by the Ale House. The trial court denied the Luques' motion for rehearing. The first count of the Luques' complaint against Ale House was titled "VIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATUTE § 768.125 BY [DEFENDANT]." In support of this count, the Luques alleged that Ale House's owners, managers, and employees knew that Luque was habitually addicted to the use of alcohol. They asserted that, by knowingly serving Luque a substantial amount of alcohol on January 31, 2003, Ale House breached its duty under section 768.125, Florida Statutes to not sell or furnish alcohol to persons known to be habitually addicted to that substance. Ale House did not argue, either in its written motion or at the hearing below, that section 768.125 failed to provide any cause of action against those serving alcohol. Nonetheless, in granting Ale House's motion for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that "the sole basis alleged for [Ale House's] liability in this case is section 768.125. As section 768.125 does not provide a cause of action, Mr....

...Publix Supermarkets, 658 So.2d at 1066; see also Ellis v. N.G.N. of Tampa, Inc., 586 So.2d 1042, 1045 (Fla.1991). "As a judicial trend developed extending liability towards vendors of alcoholic beverages, the Florida Legislature intervened in 1980 and enacted section 562.51," which is now codified in section 768.125. Publix Supermarkets, 658 So.2d at 1066. The statute limited the expanded liability of those who provide alcohol. Id. at 1046-1047. Section 768.125, Florida Statutes (2003), provides: A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such perso...

...on who is not of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. Thus, section 768.125 "effectively codified the original common law rule absolving vendors from liability for sales but provided exceptions for sales to those who were not of a lawful drinking age or to a person habitually addicted to alcoholic beverage use." Ellis, 586 So.2d at 1046. In Ellis, Florida's supreme court outlined the legal developments in liability just discussed, and then went on to discuss what causes of action remained against the seller of alcohol under section 768.125. The Ellis court said: In summary, the above case law has established that, although limited by the provisions of section 768.125, there is a *1065 cause of action against a vendor for the negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor that results in the injury to or death of the minor or a third party....

...and (2) it is also a sale of alcohol to a class of persons who lack the ability to make a responsible decision in the consumption of alcohol. Id. at 1047 (emphasis added). The problem with the trial court's reasoning is that it ignores the fact that section 768.125 presupposes the existence of a cause of action against sellers of alcohol. In "limiting" or modifying the underlying action, section 768.125 now delineates the elements that a party must establish in bringing a civil action against sellers of alcohol. It was error to conclude that because the section does not create a cause of action, it does not define one either. The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment on the ground that an action brought under section 768.125 cannot state a cause of action....

...[2] It may well be that lack of causation will prove to be the basis for a judgment in favor of Ale House in this case, either by summary disposition or after trial, but the record is not well enough developed for this purpose. Discovery is not complete and the testimony of Luque is not necessarily dispositive of the section 768.125 claim....

...gal blood alcohol limit and crashed into the back of the vehicle Serge Myrtil was driving, which was stopped at a red light. Myrtil sued Garcia and Casanola. Myrtil also brought claims against the Nightclub pursuant to Florida’s Dram Shop Law, § 768.125, Florida Statutes, based on allegations that the Nightclub served 1 Casanola is the owner of the vehicle Garcia was driving. 2 alcohol to Garcia, who was under the legal drinking age....

...knowingly serves a person habitually addicted to the use of any or all alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. § 768.125, Fla....

...Appellants, however, have not set forth a basis for imposing a duty on the Nightclub to defend and indemnify them. The allegations in the operative third-party Complaint simply assert that the Nightclub has a duty to defend and indemnify the Appellants pursuant to § 768.125....

...5  alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person. Id. Appellants have not cited any cases involving § 768.125. Neither have they cited any authority for the proposition that § 768.125 gives rise to a duty to indemnify....

automobile accident and 7-11’s alleged violation of section 768.125, Florida Statutes. We affirm. Plaintiffs’ complaint

...We recognize that subsequent to Bryant and other cases, the legislature, in 1980, absolved vendors of civil liability for all situations except those involving a willful sale to a minor or those involving a vendor knowingly serving a habitual drunkard. Ch. 80-37, § 1, Laws of Fla.; § 768.125(Fla.Stat.l997)....

...Prevatt involved the liability of a tavern owner to a patron of the bar who was shot by a minor to whom the tavern had illegally sold alcohol. While the legislature, as noted, subsequent to Prevatt , has absolved vendors of liability for non-willful sales to minors, it has kept in place, through its enactment of section 768.125, liability for the willful sale....

...JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED. ANTOON, J., concurs. GOSHORN, J., dissents, with opinion. GOSHORN, J., . The mandate was recalled by this court's order dated January 11, 1999. . Stanage and Bryant both involved facts which predated the legislature’s enactment of section 768.125, (Ch....

...others). With respect to the special risk created by a vendor willfully selling alcohol to a minor, the legislature, as noted above, has specifically indicated that such a vendor may be liable for injuries resulting from the minor’s intoxication. § 768.125....

furnished alcoholic beverages to Richard. Section 768.125, Fla.Stat. (1989). Appellee concedes that there