Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The clerk then filled out another form himself, and had Knapp initial each of the "yes/no" answers and sign his name at the bottom of the form. Id. Kitchen's action against K-Mart was in three (3) counts, alleging common law negligence, violations of section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1987) (prohibiting sale to minors or persons of unsound mind), and violations of the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C....

...In this case, the Fourth District refused to recognize Kitchen's cause of action for common *1204 law negligence because it found that, similar to the effect of section 768.125 in Bankston, the Florida legislature had abrogated any form of common law liability when it enacted the criminal statutes consisting of section 790.17 and section 790.151, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...pressly limiting the civil liability of alcohol vendors. Id. at 1386. Conversely, as noted above, the Florida statutes upon which the Fourth District relied are purely criminal statutes imposing criminal sanctions. The language contained in sections 790.17 and 790.151, unlike the language in section 768.125, does not limit a commercial gun retailer's civil liability. The legislature simply has not "entered into the field" of regulating the civil liability of vendors for the sale of firearms with the crimes and penalties set forth in sections 790.17 and 790.151....

...rearm transactions, are indicative of broad public policy concerns about the dangers of firearms. Indeed, the legislature has even chosen to impose criminal liability on parents and guardians who negligently allow children access to deadly firearms. § 790.174, Fla....

...at 262. [3] See Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Prevatt v. McClennan, 201 So.2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). [4] (Citing Armstrong v. Munford, Inc., 451 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla.1984), and Forlaw v. Fitzer, 456 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla.1984)). [5] Section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1987), which was in effect at the time of the incident, states: Whoever sells, hires, barters, lends, or gives any minor under 18 years of age any pistol, dirk, electric weapon or device, or other arm or weapon, othe...

...Cummins Angell, as administratrix of the estate of Robert A. Cummins, Sr., deceased, appeals the dismissal of her second amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The complaint contained two counts: 1) common law negligence, and 2) negligence based upon appellees' breach of Section 790.17, Florida Statutes, which forbids the sale of weapons to minors and persons of unsound mind....

...We therefore hold that appellees' liability to appellant's decedent was not cut off by the intervening act of a third party and thus appellant has stated a cause of action in her complaint. We affirm dismissal of Count II as the facts alleged were insufficient to state a cause of action under Section 790.17....

...§ 569.101. [60] See Fla. Stat. § 732.501 ("Any person who is of sound mind and who is either 18 or more years of age or an emancipated minor may make a will") [61] See Fla. Stat. § 733.303(1)(c). [62] See Fla. Stat. § 539.001. [63] See Fla. Stat. § 790.17 ("A person who sells ......

...n, a mentally retarded man, who used the gun days later in a robbery attempt, killing appellant's husband, Sonny Jones. As the Personal Representative of her husband's estate, appellant sued the pawn shop for wrongful death as well as a violation of section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1997), which makes it a crime to sell a weapon to a person of unsound mind....

...Williams Pawn & Gun moved for final summary judgment alleging that there was no evidence that the pawn shop had actual or constructive knowledge of Lofton's alleged unsound mind or mental condition at the time of the handgun sale. Thus, there was no evidence that the pawn shop failed to comply with section 790.17, Florida Statutes....

...Appellant moved for partial summary judgment alleging that the deposition testimony of Lofton's mother established that Lofton was of "unsound mind" when the pawn shop sold him the gun. Lofton was determined to be mentally and emotionally retarded since he was a young boy. Appellant claimed that under section 790.17(1), it was a crime to sell a gun to a person of unsound mind, even in the absence of any showing that the seller did so knowingly and willingly....

...wn shop's motion for summary judgment, but granted appellant's motion for partial summary judgment on the negligence per se issue. Prior to the issuance of the court's order, the pawn shop moved for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of section 790.17....

...As a result of said motion, the court thereafter requested memoranda of law on the ability of mentally retarded persons to obtain driver's licenses. *270 Prior to ruling on the issue, the parties advised the court that all issues in the case had been resolved, except as to whether section 790.17 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case. Further, the parties agreed that a trial was unnecessary. The parties stipulated to damages and agreed that whichever party prevailed on the pawn shop's motion for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of section 790.17 as it applied to the term "unsound mind," would be entitled to judgment....

...he firearm to Lofton which Lofton used to kill Sonny Jones; (2) that the evidence in the record indicated that Lofton was mildly retarded at the time of sale; and (3) that the parties settled all claims except that of alleging strict liability under section 790.17, and that the total damages attributable to the incident were $275,000, against which the pawn shop was entitled to a set-off of $75,000 for monies previously paid to appellant. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the pawn shop, holding that "[s]ection 790.17, Florida Statutes, does not define the term `person of unsound mind' and as applied to this case, the statute is therefore unconstitutionally vague." We reverse....

...Thus, the instant vagueness claim must be examined in light of the facts pertinent to *271 this case before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. See Barnes, 686 So.2d at 637; Sieniarecki, 756 So.2d at 74-75. In this case, we hold that section 790.17 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1997), provides as follows in relevant part: (1) A person who sells, hires, barters, lends, transfers, or gives any minor under 18 years of age any dirk, electric weapon or device, or other weapon, other than an ordi...

...775.082 or s. 775.083. (emphasis supplied). In the absence of a statutory definition, words of common usage are construed in their plain and ordinary meaning which can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. See Sieniarecki, 756 So.2d at 75. Since section 790.17 does not define the term "of unsound mind," Black's Law Dictionary 1539-40 (6th ed.1990), defines "unsound mind" as follows: Non-legal term referring to one who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his affairs....

...While the trial court adopted the pawn shop's expert's opinion that Lofton was only mildly retarded, the testimony of Mrs. Lofton and Dr. Landrum demonstrates otherwise. Even if mildly retarded, Lofton is incapable of caring for himself or his affairs. Under its plain and ordinary meaning, section 790.17 gives a person of ordinary intelligence a definite warning of what conduct is required or prohibited....

...4th DCA 1999)(if the statute is not vague when considered under the facts at hand, then, by definition, it cannot be vague in all of its applications). In accordance with the parties' stipulation that whichever party prevailed on the strict liability claim under section 790.17 would be entitled to judgment, we reverse and remand with directions that judgment be entered in favor of appellant....

...Before BARKDULL, C.J., and CARROLL and HORTON, JJ. HORTON, Judge. The appellants were plaintiffs below and have appealed a final order dismissing their complaint with prejudice. The appellants alleged in the alternative that the appellee had violated §§ 790.17, 790.18, Fla....

...He accompanied his order of dismissal with a well reasoned opinion setting out the basis upon which he concluded that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. Basically the appellants contend that a sling shot is an "other arm or weapon" within the meaning of § 790.17, supra, or in the alternative, that the appellee is a "dealer in arms" within the contemplation of § 790.18, supra; or, alternatively, that a sling shot is *682 a "deadly weapon" as described in City of Miami Code #67-3. There is no question that under the provisions of § 790.17, supra, if the appellee had sold one of the prohibited weapons to the 13-year-old minor which resulted in injury to him, the appellee would be liable....

...l kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition; Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754, 192 So. 324. In this instance, applying the rule we conclude that a sling shot is not "other arm or weapon" within the meaning of § 790.17, supra. We do not decide, nor do we think it necessary to decide, whether a sling shot is a weapon under the provisions of § 790.17, but we conclude that if the legislature had so intended that sling shots be included, they would have said so....

...osed under the circumstances existing here. Concluding as we have that the order of the trial judge dismissing the complaint with prejudice is without error, it follows that the same should be and is hereby affirmed. CARROLL, J., dissents. NOTES [1] § 790.17 — Furnishing weapons to minors, etc....

...Plaintiff presented experts who testified that if Knapp had consumed as much alcohol during the day as Knapp had indicated, it would have been apparent to the clerk that Knapp was intoxicated. Plaintiff's complaint alleged both common law negligence and violations of section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1987) (prohibiting sale to minors or persons of unsound mind), and the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C....

...ore prudent course is for this Court to defer to the legislative branch. (Footnote omitted.) We cannot distinguish the present case from Bankston. As it has with alcohol, our legislature has also entered the field of regulating the sale of firearms. Section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1987), which was in effect when this incident occurred, provides: Whoever sells, hires, barters, lends, or gives any minor under 18 years of age any pistol, dirk, electric weapon or device, or other arm or weapon, ot...

...Hadaway of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal and Banker, P.A., Clearwater, for appellee. LEHAN, Judge. We affirm the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's third amended complaint which purported to allege causes of action for negligent entrustment of a loaded firearm, negligence per se in violation of section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1985), which forbids the entrustment of weapons to persons of unsound mind, and negligence....

...See § 782.07, Fla. Stat. (2007); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7. To prove the crime of furnishing a firearm to a minor the state must prove that the defendant: (1) knowingly or willfully sold or transferred a firearm to, (2) a minor under 18 years of age. See § 790.17(2)(a), Fla....

...tes, which is inapplicable for several reasons, including that Kyle was not a “disabled adult” as defined in Section 825.101(4) and that no defendant is a “caregiver” as defined in Section 825.101(2). In a similar effort, the plaintiff tries Section 790.17, Florida Statutes, which creates a misdemeanor (and, presumably, negligence per se as a consequence) if a person “sells, hires, barters, lends, transfers, or gives to any person of unsound mind ... any dangerous weapon.” Kyle was not of “unsound mind.” More decidedly, the record contains no evidence of sale, hire, etc. Section 790.17 is inapplicable....

engaged in criminal offense with a weapon), and section 790.17 (furnishing weapons to minors). Violations

...cision. Based upon our record, we conclude that the order on appeal is not fact-driven. Cf. Jones, 800 So. 2d at 270 ("Prior to ruling on the issue, the parties advised the court that all issues in the case had been resolved, except as to whether section 790.17 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the case.")....

dismissal, arguing that he did not violate section 790.17(1) because the switchblade is an “ordinary

...It was a switchblade and has a push-button on it that once you push the button, it releases the blade, which swings open." The State entered into evidence the switchblade that Officer Gordon had recovered from the minor. After the State rested, K.H. moved for a judgment of dismissal, arguing that he did not violate section 790.17(1) because the switchblade is an "ordinary pocketknife," which is excluded under the statutory language....

...characteristic of a knife designed to be a weapon. [2] As such, the trial court did not err by denying K.H.'s motion for judgment of dismissal. See Bunkley v. State, 882 So.2d 890 (Fla.2004). AFFIRMED. MONACO, C.J. and EVANDER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 790.17(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides: A person who sells, hires, barters, lends, transfers, or gives any minor under 18 years of age any dirk, electric weapon or device, or other weapon, other than an ordinary pocketknife, without per...

...[2] K.H. asserts that switchblades are not illegal under section 790.225, Florida Statutes (2008), but the fact that a switchblade in question is not prohibited under Florida law does not speak to the issue of whether it is a weapon for purposes of section 790.17(1).

...This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial after a jury verdict had been rendered against the plaintiff. The case arose in Duval County, Florida. The issue on appeal has been narrowed down by the parties to this question: Was it prejudicial error for the trial court to instruct the jury with respect to section 790.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and the consequences thereof? The facts are: the appellant, Randy Green, age IS at the time of the alleged accident, spent the night with two school boy friends at the home of the latter, the Evans home....

...fired, striking Robert Evans in the leg. According to appellee Robert Evans, Randy was holding the gun pointed downward when he last noticed it. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, to the effect that F.S. 790.17, F.S.A., was applicable and that if the jury so found, and *426 that the plaintiff had violated said statute that the minor plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a result of so violating said statute....

...There was an objection to this instruction by the plaintiff, which was denied. After the jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, one of the grounds therefor being the error of instructing the jury on the firearms statute (F.S. 790.17, F.S.A.). The trial court found the other grounds of said motion to be without merit, but granted the motion on the ground that he had erred in charging the jury on said statute and that he had concluded that said statute (F.S. 790.17, F.S.A.) had no applicability to the facts of this case, based upon Bass v. Flowers, 177 So.2d 239 (Fla.App. 1st, 1965). It is from this order that this appeal is taken. F.S. 790.17, F.S.A., is as follows: “Whoever sells, hires, barters, lends or gives any minor under eighteen years of age any pistol, dirk, or other arm or weapon, other than an ordinary pocketknife, without permission of the parent of such minor or t...

...This conclusion was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So.2d 421 . The facts in this latter case, however, are distinguishable from the case sub judice. In the case of Bass v. Flowers, 177 So.2d 239 (Fla.App. 1st, 1965) the First District Court was again dealing with F.S. 790.17, F.S.A....

...A jury verdict was rendered in favor of both defendants. The appellant concedes there was no error in the judgment in favor of the defendant minor, Newberry, but complains that as to Mrs. Flowers, the court erred in not charging the jury concerning Section 790.17, F.S., F.S.A., and in not granting plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict against Mrs. Flowers. The District Court in its decision on appeal, affirmed the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict for the plaintiff and affirmed the trial court’s refusal to in *427 struct the jury concerning Section 790.17, F.S., F.S.A....

...The only act of appellee Margie Flowers urged on appeal as constituting negligence is said to consist of “giving a pistol to Dennis Newberry, age 14 years, without permission of the parent of said minor, or the person having charge of said minor, all in violation of Section 790.17 of the Florida Statutes of 1961.” Defendants’ answers denied the allegations of negligence and affirmatively pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the decedent....

...He sat down on a sofa beside the decedent and loaded the pistol. Shortly thereafter decedent asked Newberry to let him see it and grabbed it, at which time Dennis jerked back and it discharged a bullet into decedent’s heart, effecting his death. With the above facts in evidence the trial court ruled that Section 790.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., 1 was inapplicable and at the close of the evidence denied plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict. The court also ruled that plaintiff could not go to the jury with instructions concerning said statute. The points for determination are (1) whether by virtue of Section 790.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the trial court should have granted plaintiff-appellant’s motion for a directed verdict against the defendant-appellee, and (2) whether the court should have charged the jury concerning Section 790.17, Florida Statutes, F.S.A....

...having come into the hands of the minor, was used. It is elemental, of course, that the injury complained of must be the proximate result of such negligence.” The principles there stated apply with equal force to the case on appeal involving F.S. § 790.17, F.S.A....

...butorily negligent in the premises. The verdict of the jury, which is not assailed on these appeals, has set those factual questions at rest and the judgments appealed are Affirmed. WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concur. . F.S. § 790.17, F.S.A., provides: “Furnishing weapons to minors, etc....

...circumstances ends there. The complaint insufficiently explicates its conclusory allegations that the circumstances put the gun dealer on notice that both Bullard and Fitzpatrick were persons of “unsound mind” to whom a gun sale is prohibited by section 790.17, Florida Statutes (1979), or that they were otherwise dangerous....

SCHWARTZ, Judge. We agree with the trial court that the sale to a minor of an ordinary BB gun is *29 not forbidden by either Section 790.17 or 790.18, Florida Statutes (1975). A BB gun, which operates through the release of compressed air, is not an unspecified “other arm or weapon” under Sec. 790.17, see Smith v....

...This conclusion is made clear by the fact that the legislature specifically treated BB guns in Sec. 790.22, Fla.Stat. (1975); see Wyatt v. McMullen, 350 So.2d 1115, 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), but just as specifically did not include them within the terms of Secs. 790.17-.18....

...Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. GERBER, J. Following the defendant’s no contest plea to the third-degree felony of furnishing a firearm to a minor, as prohibited under section 790.17(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), the circuit court sentenced the defendant to one year in the county jail, to be followed by two years’ community control under state supervision, to be followed by two years’ probation under state supervision....

...ot ripe for our consideration, as we will briefly mention at the end of this opinion.  Procedural History The defendant pled no contest to the third-degree felony of furnishing a firearm to a minor, as prohibited under section 790.17(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018)....