Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...iled to defend the insured. After the judgment is set aside, FIGA is then permitted to defend the claim on the merits. The constitutionality of this aspect of the statute is not before us. [4] FIGA also alleged that such a stay was appropriate under section 631.041....

...If a stay had been entered in an applicable federal bankruptcy proceeding in Arizona, there is no question that it would control the actions in a Florida state court. [3] Just as the state of Florida would expect Arizona to honor a stay pursuant to section 631.041, Florida Statutes (1995), if Florida were the domiciliary state, Florida should do the same as a matter of comity when it is a reciprocal state under Arizona law....

...hatsoever and wherever located in this State," commence and maintain legal actions necessary to administer the receivership, and collect all debts owing to Central which it is economically feasible to collect. The order also gives notice pursuant to section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes, that the department's petition operates as an automatic stay, applicable to all persons other than the receiver, which prohibits the "commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative or other action or pr...

...ets, we affirm this portion of the court's order. Finally, Nova argues that the trial court erred when it refused to lift the stay imposed upon Nova's Dade County suit against Central. The department insists that the stay was appropriate pursuant to section 631.041(1)(a) which prohibits "the commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the insurer or against its assets or any part thereof." Because Nova's suit against Central is undoubtedly a su...

..., it was properly affected by this automatic stay provision. We reject Nova's argument that its suit is an act to create, perfect or enforce a secured claim as defined in section 631.011(15), and therefore, it should not have been stayed pursuant to section 631.041(1)(d). A good example of the application of the secured claim exemption may be found in Manuel A. Sierra, M.D. v. International Medical Centers, Inc., 538 So.2d 102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Section 631.041(2) describes the procedure by which a person affected by the automatic stay may seek relief from the stay....

...The Receiver may, in its discretion, contract with the guaranty association to provide services as are necessary to carry out the purposes of Chapter 631. The order also imposed a stay of judicial and administrative proceedings against the insurer or its assets in accordance with section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Further, appellee contends that if this action is stayed as to the carrier, the employer must prosecute the appeal. [1] Our examination of these issues led us to the preliminary conclusion that only the insurer *335 is protected by the provisions of section 631.041(1)(a), Florida Statutes: (1) An application or petition under s....

...mmunity, resulting in building damage in excess of $8.4 million. Olympus made a claim to Southern Family for insurance benefits under the policy. On April 25, 2006, Southern Family was placed in receivership for liquidation purposes, and pursuant to section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes, all actions against the company were stayed....

...eiver or the circuit court in Tallahassee. [2] There is no need to address the other issues raised. The order of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] We note that subsequently section 631.041, Florida Statutes, has been amended to provide for an automatic stay in proceedings under section 631.031, Florida Statutes....

...Thereafter, the Leon County Circuit Court appointed the Florida Department of Insurance, now the Department of Financial Services (DFS), as receiver for Aries. Title to all property, real or personal, wherever located, was vested in the receiver. The receivership court entered a notice of automatic stay under section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides that the initiation of a delinquency petition operates as a matter of law as an automatic stay applicable to all persons and entities, except that a secured claim as defined in section 631.0...

...irst time, the stay order. At that point defendant's counsel renewed the motion for stay. There is no procedural bar. The plaintiff makes the mistaken argument that a stay should not be issued because the stay in this case is not within the scope of section 631.041, Florida Statutes (2001). For present purposes, we assume that is so. Regardless of whether section 631.041 applies, the New York court in its Order of Rehabilitation has entered a stay in order to allow the superintendent to proceed with rehabilitation of Frontier in an orderly manner....

...appellants, who filed the motion which was denied in the order appealed, have standing to appeal. [1] As to the merits, we conclude that the receivership court should have granted appellants' motion and should have vacated its prior order. Sections 631.041(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, provide that a petition for an order of rehabilitation of an insurer "operates as a matter of law as an automatic stay applicable to all persons and entities, other than the receiver, which shall be permanent ......

...commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the insurer or against its assets or any part thereof... [and] ... enforcement of a judgment against the insurer or an affiliate obtained either before or after the commencement of the delinquency proceeding ..." Section 631.041(2) authorizes the receivership court to grant relief from "the stay against obtaining or enforcing a judgment," with notice to the Department of Insurance and after a hearing, "provided the movant, who has the burden of proof, establi...

...the extent of allowing the Receiver to be named as a nominal party in the suit against appellants by Seapine, nor was it statutorily empowered to prohibit service of any discovery on the Receiver without its express authorization. To the extent that section 631.041(4) may be read to authorize the issuance of an injunction "to prevent interference with the department or the proceeding," we agree with appellants that Seapine did not establish the requisite justifications for issuance of such an injunction....

...ior order vacated. We recognize that this will nullify the prohibition on service of any discovery on the Receiver and will ultimately result in the Receiver being removed as a nominal party in Seapine's action against appellants, but we do not read section 631.041(1) as prohibiting discovery properly sought from the Receiver as a nonparty to the damages action....

...use it "declined to join this action as a plaintiff." The Department then filed a "Notice of Filing, Injunction and Statutory Stay," reciting the receivership court's August 1991 and December 1992 orders and noting that under sections 631.031(4) and 631.041(1), Florida Statutes (1991), Seapine was enjoined from the commencement or prosecution of any action against the Department as GSLIC's receiver and the Department was prohibited from defending legal actions brought against it without express authorization of the receivership court....

...hat "successful prosecution of the Seapine action is in the best interests of the receivership and that the Seapine action is likely to proceed more expeditiously if the Receiver remains as a nominal party." The court ordered: 1. The Florida Statute 631.041 automatic stay and injunctions contained in the August 12, 1991 Order of Rehabilitation remains in full force and effect except as modified herein....

...assets, without the express authorization of this court. The appellants filed a motion requesting the receivership court to vacate this order and leave the automatic stay in place, asserting that the court had exceeded its statutory authority under section 631.041, which authorizes it to grant relief from an automatic stay only where the movant seeks to enforce a "judgment against the insurer or an affiliate obtained either before or after the commencement of the delinquency proceeding." They a...

...t denied the motion, the action challenged in this appeal. In its opinion on appeal, this court concluded that the receivership court should have granted the appellants' motion and should have vacated its prior injunctive order. Noting that sections 631.041(1)(a) and (b) provide that a petition for an order of rehabilitation of an insurer operates as an automatic stay prohibiting obtaining or enforcing a judgment against the insolvent insurer and that § 631.041(2) authorizes relief from the automatic stay under certain circumstances, this court concluded that Seapine's foreclosure action against the appellants "was not seeking either to obtain or enforce a judgment against the insolvent insurer o...

...xtent of allowing the Receiver to be named as a nominal party in the suit against appellants by Seapine, nor was it statutorily empowered to prohibit service of any discovery on the Receiver *833 without its express authorization. To the extent that section 631.041(4) may be read to authorize the issuance of an injunction "to prevent interference with the department or the proceeding," we agree with appellants that Seapine did not establish the requisite justifications for issuance of such an injunction....

...ior order vacated. We recognize that this will nullify the prohibition on service of any discovery on the Receiver and will ultimately result in the Receiver being removed as a nominal party in Seapine's action against appellants, but we do not read section 631.041(1) as prohibiting discovery properly sought from the Receiver as a non-party to the damages action....

...SEAPINE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING Seapine contends that the receivership court's order did not partially lift the automatic statutory stay, as stated in this court's opinion, but rather that it simply modified that portion of its "discretionary injunction," issued under the authority of section 631.041(4), barring suits against the Receiver without prior authorization of the receivership court....

...owever, the explicit language of the August 1991 order, quoted in the first footnote of this opinion, as well as the holding in this court's opinion that Seapine did not establish the requisite justification for issuance of an injunction pursuant to section 631.041(4), seriously undercuts these arguments....

...Seapine seeks deletion of dicta in the last paragraph of this court's opinion "to the effect that it will ultimately result in the Department being removed as nominal party in Seapine's action against appellants" (the foreclosure action which is the subject of the appeal in case no. 94-3641). It argues that section 631.041(4) "does not prohibit actions against the Department of Insurance as receiver so long as they don't seek relief against the receivership assets," that it therefore "does not necessarily follow that the Department will have to be remov...

...tator. The order further provided for a six-month stay in all cases in which Frontier was obligated to defend a party pursuant to an insurance contract and for an indefinite stay in all proceedings in which Frontier was a defendant in an action. Cf. § 631.041(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...vent. A consent order was entered appointing the Department of Financial Services as receiver for Homewise for purposes of rehabilitation and issuing an automatic mandatory 2 stay under section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes (2011), of all legal proceedings against Homewise....

...defined in section 631.54(3) of the Florida Statutes. On December 6, 2011, First Home filed a copy of the Consent Order in the instant case, along with a Notice of Mandatory Stay of Proceedings, whereby the trial court and the parties were informed that, pursuant to section 631.041 of the Florida Statutes, all proceedings against First Home were permanently stayed due to the November 18, 2011 Consent Order that declared First Home insolvent. 2In June of 2011, the trial court denied First Home’s summary jud...

...own insurance company prior to the insurer being declared insolvent, upon DFS’s filing a delinquency petition against the insurer pursuant to Chapter 631, the lawsuit automatically and permanently is stayed with regard to the insolvent insurer. § 631.041(1), Fla....

...8  The statutory stay that prohibited proceedings against First Home went into effect when DFS filed its petition against First Home, and that stay is permanent because of the Consent Order requiring the liquidation of First Home. § 631.041(1), Fla....

...Additionally, if FIGA had to be separately sued and served in pending cases, it is unclear exactly what proceedings would need to be stayed for six months under section 631.67. The plaintiff’s action against the insolvent insurer is permanently stayed by virtue of section 631.041(1)....

...Thus, it argues, once the Department has commenced the delinquency proceeding, all parties including the insurer are enjoined from transferring or encumbering any of the insurer's assets, an act Cypress clearly accomplished by its settlement agreement in violation of section 631.041 and the circuit court's show cause order....

...ts!.]” The court expressly found that “[t]here is clearly no artifice, scheme or anything improper at this point in time.... ” The court stayed its order to allow Devonshire to appeal, which it has done; it also granted an automatic stay under section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes with specified conditions....

...appellants, who filed the motion which was denied in the order appealed, have standing to appeal. 1 As to the merits, we conclude that the receivership court should have granted appellants’ motion and should have vacated its prior order. Sections 631.041(l)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, provide that a petition for an order of rehabilitation of an insurer “operates as a matter of law as an automatic stay applicable to all persons and entities, other than the receiver, which shall be permanent ......

...commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the insurer or against its assets or any part thereof ... [and] ... enforcement of a judgment against the insurer or an affiliate obtained either before or after the commencement of the delinquency proceeding ...” Section 631.041(2) authorizes the receivership court to grant relief from “the stay against obtaining or enforcing a judgment,” with notice to the Department of Insurance and after a hearing, “provided the movant, who has the burden of proof, e...

...he extent of allowing the Receiver to be named as a nominal party in the suit against appellants by Sea-pine, nor was it statutorily empowered to prohibit service of any discovery on the Receiver without its express authorization. To the extent that section 631.041(4) may be read to authorize the issuance of an injunction “to prevent interference with the department or the proceeding,” we agree with appellants that Seapine did not establish the requisite justifications for issuance of such an injunction....

...r order vacated. We recognize that this will nullify the prohibition on service of any discovery on the Receiver and will ultimately result in the Receiver being removed as a nominal party in Seapine’s action against appellants, but we do not read section 631.041(1) as prohibiting discovery properly sought from the Receiver as a nonparty to the damages action....

...dation and Injunction for the Estate of International Medical Centers (“IMC”), which order was entered by the Leon County circuit court on June 25, 1987, ... stays all proceedings in this case as to IMC.” *103 The question presented is whether section 631.041, Florida Statutes, provides an automatic stay of an action to foreclose a mortgage where the collateral is in the custody of a receiver in a liquidation proceeding. We hold that it does not and reverse. While this appeal was pending, the legislature amended section 631.041, effective August 5, 1988, which previously was entitled “Injunctions” and now is termed “Automatic stay, relief from stay, injunctions”....

...e, trust deed, pledge, deposit as security, escrow, or otherwise but does not include a special deposit claim or a claim against general assets.... (emphasis added) We hold, in response to the question presented, that the automatic stay provision of section 631.041(l)(d) does not prevent a foreclosure action on a secured claim....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a stay pursuant to section 631.041, Florida Statutes (1995), in' a rule nisi proceeding....

...On May 16, 1995, USEC was deemed insolvent and an order liquidating USEC was entered pursuant to chapter 681 of the Florida Statutes by the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida. That order included appointment of the Department of Insurance as the receiver and a stay provision, pursuant to 631.041, which stayed all proceedings against the insurer or its assets....

...When Staffing failed to make any payments to Paul or provide continuing medical care, Paul filed her petition for rule nisi pursuant to section 440.24(1), Florida Statutes (1995), in the court below to enforce the supplemental order. Staffing moved for a stay of the proceedings pursuant to section 631.041, as it had done previously in the workers’ compensation proceeding....

...Petition denied. . Staffing’s argument in favor of a stay has similarly been rejected by the First District in its recent decision in Payroll Transfers Interstate, Inc. v. Forshey, 694 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). In Forshey , the court held, inter alia, that section 631.041 stays proceedings only against the insolvent insurer or its assets and not the insured employer....

...Jones v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 908 So. 2d 435, 454 (Fla. 2005); see also, § 631.57, Fla. Stat. (2010). Although there is a permanent stay on any action against DFS as receiver, FIGA is amenable to suit in connection with any unpaid claims. Compare § 631.041, Fla....

any judgment against the Plan, pursuant to Section 631.041(1), Florida Statutes. The Amended Order of

...paid past benefits, future benefits, attorney's fees, and penalties and costs on his workers' compensation claim. PTI argued below and before this court that the workers' compensation proceedings should have been stayed pursuant to the provisions of section 631.041, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...red by that stay provision in such a manner as to exclude from the operation of that provision all claims resulting from dates of accidents before January 1, 1994. The only stay provision in chapter 631 which was asserted to bar these proceedings is section 631.041, Florida Statutes (1995), which provides, in pertinent part, that the commencement of delinquency proceedings under section 631.031 operates as an automatic stay which prohibits "[t]he commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the insurer or against its assets ..." PTI argues that it should have been protected under section 631.041 because the receiver has the power to make assessments against PTI, along with other members of the fund, to pay claims and receivership expenses....

...Forshey to proceed directly against the employer would potentially waste receivership assets, or create an unlawful preference to receivership assets. We reject that argument. USEC was the insurer, and PTI was the insured. PTI's assets are not receivership assets. Section 631.041 only stays proceedings against the insurer or its assets. See Jimmy *82 Lang's Auto Service v. Proctor, 667 So.2d 334, 334-35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) ("only the insurer is protected by the provisions of section 631.041(1)(a)")....

...Under the facts of this case we find no merit to the contention that the workers' compensation proceedings should have been stayed because of the receivership. The employer, who was the insured under the policy of workers' compensation insurance, is not entitled to the protection of the stay provision contained in section 631.041....