The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . coverage letters to the iCan plaintiffs, in violation of the Claims Administration Statute ("CAS"), § 627.426 . . .
. . . (quoting § 627.426(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) ). . . .
. . . 62, 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (Rothenberg, C.J., specifically concurring), when she wrote: While section 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2). . . . The Florida Supreme Court has held that noncompliance with the notice requirements in section 627.426 . . . Stated differently, " section 627.426 does not create or extend nonexistent coverage." Doe v. . . .
. . . result articulated in the majority opinion is mandated by the clear and unambiguous language of section 627.426 . . . its-finding that Geico did "not comply with the' expressfy listed methods of compliance with section 627.426 . . . Pursuant to section 627.426, once Geico sent its reservation of rights notice to assert a coverage defense . . . While section 627.426 is clear and unambiguous, and therefore mandates the result identified by the trial . . . It is unlikely that the Legislature intended such a result when it enacted section 627.426. . . . issue of material fact that GEICO failed to comply with the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . . The plain and unambiguous language . of section 627.426 states: (2) A liability insurer shall not be . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426, makes sense to me, but it runs counter to the Fourth District’s decision in Nationwide Mut . . . . § 627.426 (1983). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426. . . .
. . . . § 627.426, and thereby waived its coverage defense. The Kastenholzes and Mr. . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2)(b). . . .
. . . obligation for Progressive to provide .mutually agreeable counsel pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 627.426 . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2).... § 627.4136, Fla. . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2)(a), which, according to the district court, requires thirty days written notice if an . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a) as the basis for denying the motion. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a) was not a proper basis for denying the motion. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a) was error. . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2) (requiring insurers, after providing written notice of their reservation of rights, to . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a), (b)(3). . . . Stat. 627.426, applies only to preclude particular coverage defenses and is therefore not relevant to . . .
. . . . § 627.426. . . . There, the Supreme Court of Florida held as follows: Section 627.426(2), by its express terms, applies . . . Therefore, we hold that the term “coverage defense,” as used in § 627.426(2), means a defense to coverage . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2)(a), Mesa waived the late notice defense because its reservation of rights letter did not . . . The relevant portion of § 627.426(2)(a) reads as follows: (2) A liability insurer shall not be permitted . . . Given the contents of the reservations of rights letter, Mesa complied with the requirements of § 627.426 . . .
. . . with prejudice; and (2) denying the plaintiffs motion for defense cost determination under section 627.426 . . . causes of action for breach of the insurance contract and for defense cost determination under section 627.426 . . . remand for entry of an order granting the plaintiffs motion for defense cost determination under section 627.426 . . .
. . . purported April 2008 ROR constituted a violation of Florida’s Claims Administrations Statute — section 627.426 . . . The trial court determined that Geico violated section 627.426(2)(a), which requires an insurer to assert . . . As the court expressed in AIU: [W]e hold that the term "coverage defense,” as used in section 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Western Heritage was prohibited from asserting a coverage defense because it violated Florida Statutes § 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2) (“FCAS”); and that this failure bars Defendant from relying on coverage defenses. . . . Stat. § 627.426 (“FCAS”), which states in relevant part: A liability insurer shall not be permitted to . . . Ann. § 627.426(2) (West). . . . For example, failure to provide timely notice is a “coverage defense” within the meaning of Section 627.426 . . .
. . . entered or a settlement is reached” occurs where “the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2).” § 627.4136(4), Fla. . . .
. . . they alleged that Essex had failed to comply with Florida’s claims administration statute, section 627.426 . . . Section 627.426 was not specifically addressed, but as will become clear, our decision in this case applies . . .
. . . misrepresentation as a defense because it was untimely under the Florida Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . .
. . . Section 627.426(2) of the Florida Claims Administrative Statute does not apply to a defense of no coverage . . . Section 627.426(2) does not create coverage “where a particular claim is expressly excluded from coverage . . . Max Specialty relies solely on the criminal acts exclusion to the policy to deny coverage, section 627.426 . . .
. . . conclude the plain and unambiguous policy language excludes the leased equipment, and that section 627.426 . . . Turning to whether Auto Owners waived its right to deny coverage, section 627.426, Florida Statutes, . . . registered or certified mail sent to the last known address of the insured or by hand delivery[.] § 627.426 . . . “[T]he term ‘coverage defense,’ as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to coverage that otherwise . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . defense due to National Trust alleged noncompliance with Florida’s Claims Administration Statute, Section 627.426 . . . Section 627.426(2)(a), Florida Statutes, provides: A liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny . . . Section 627.426(2)(a), Florida Statutes. . . . Section 627.401(2) removes the Policy from the requirements of the Claims Administration Statute, Section 627.426 . . .
. . . On October 7, 2009, NHIC sent Scott’s father a “reservation-of-rights letter” under Section 627.426, . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426, from denying coverage on this basis. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). . . . Id. § 627.426(2)(b). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(b). IV. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2). . . .
. . . the settlement by motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of § 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to § 627.426(2). . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2); see also 14 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 202:4 (3d ed. 2005). . . .
. . . Further, Defendants argue that the FCAS, Section 627.426, Fla. . . . As for the case law Mid-Continent does cite, it pertains to Section 627.426, Fla. . . . Because Mid-Continent ultimately complied with Section 627.426 in this case by denying coverage, the . . . citation to the mutually agreeable attorney aspect of Section 627.426 has no relevance here. . . . Stat. § 627.426. . . .
. . . . § 627.426. . . .
. . . Two weeks before trial, AIU refused to provide further defense and, in so doing, violated section 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2). . . .
. . . Section 627.426(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes precludes a liability insurer from denying coverage based . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a) are inapplicable to the instant case. E. . . .
. . . . § 627.426. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Salvia, 472 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla. 5th Dist.Ct. . . .
. . . because it had failed to comply with the requirements of the Claims Administrative Statute, section 627.426 . . .
. . . a comprehensive liability policy, due to its noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 627.426 . . . prohibiting AIU from denying coverage because AIU had failed to notify the insured as required by § 627.426 . . . based on an express coverage exclusion has the effect of rewriting an insurance policy when section 627.426 . . . Therefore, we hold that the term ‘coverage defense’ as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to . . . Defendants also contend that the Block Marina decision is limited to § 627.426 and cite Doe v. . . .
. . . . § 627.426, does not apply to surplus line insurers, like Mt. Hawley. . . . Stat. 627.426(2). In AIU Ins. Co. v. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). Mt. . . . As such, section 627.426(2)(a) of the CAS would not apply to Mt. . . . [therefore, § 627.426(2) is inapplicable to this case.” . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2) (2008), provides that "[a] liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage based . . .
. . . Stat. § 627.426(2) Under Fla. . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2). . . . Stat. 627.426. . . . Stat. § 627.426’s notice requirement. D. . . .
. . . Section 627.426(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that a liability insurer may not deny coverage . . .
. . . Even assuming Defendants’ facts to be true, I conclude, as a matter of law, that Section 627.426 does . . . was not issued for delivery or delivered in Florida, Part II of Chapter 626, which includes Section 627.426 . . . The obligations imposed under Section 627.426 apply strictly to a denial of coverage based on a “coverage . . . and “no action” provisions of the policy, and these arguments are “coverage defenses” under Section 627.426 . . . 2004 breaches (the coverage defense) to argue that Zurich had an obligation to comply with Section 627.426 . . .
. . . coverage defenses at a later date provided that it complies with the requirements of Florida Statute § 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2)(a). . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). . . . The Court in AIU held that “the term ‘coverage defense,’ as used in section 627.426(c), means a defense . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a). . . . We note that Federal also incorrectly states that the bankruptcy court “correctly concluded that § 627.426 . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2)(a) does not have a counterpart in the Illinois statutes, and that a conflict therefore . . . However, § 627.426(2)(a) does not create coverage where none would otherwise exist. . . . International cannot assert this “coverage defense” because the insurer failed to comply with section 627.426 . . . Although we affirm the trial court’s ruling that International failed to comply with section 627.426( . . . Stat. § 627.426(2)(a) does not apply even if Florida law is applicable here. . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2) (2005). . . . Stat. 627.426(2)(a) (2005). . Interestingly, St. . . .
. . . See § 627.426(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . . appropriately provided the insured with a defense under a reservation of rights, pursuant to section 627.426 . . .
. . . defense by registered or certified mail, as required by the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . . coverage on that basis because it did not strictly comply with the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . .
. . . The Beville court also found support in the Claims Administration Statute, § 627.426(2), Florida Statutes . . . Section 627.426(2) provides, in relevant part, that an insurer "shall not be permitted to deny coverage . . .
. . . Royal Oak asserts that § 627.426(2), Florida Statutes, creates a duty on the part of an Insurer to obtain . . . Section 627.426(2) reads in pertinent part: A liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage . . . Accordingly, § 627.426(2) cannot serve as a basis for imposing a duty on Travelers to obtain mutually . . .
. . . We do agree with the insurer, however, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on section 627.426 . . . Hinestrosa, 614 So.2d 633 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)(section 627.426(2)(a) does not apply where there is no . . . See § 627.426(l)(c) (“none of the following acts by or on behalf of an insurer shall be deemed to constitute . . . should prefer "false sense of security” as against clear contractual language to the contrary. . § 627.426 . . . The incident occurred in 1995. . § 627.426(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . .
. . . The court reasoned that General Security had violated section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes, when it hired . . . court held that General Security could not deny coverage, because it had not complied with section 627.426 . . . Barrentine did not assert a claim of estoppel under section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes. . . . The conditions imposed by section 627.426(2) apply only to the immediate parties to an insurance contract . . .
. . . Florida Statute 627.426 The third threshold issue is whether Auto Owners and Northbrook can deny coverage . . . Stat. § 627.426 which provides that a liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage based . . . Stat. § 627.426 does not apply to provide coverage where coverage otherwise does not exist simply because . . . Stat. § 627.426. . . . Stat. § 627.426, this court turns to whether there is coverage under the CGL policies for Reliance’s . . .
. . . Section 627.426(2) bars the carrier from asserting a coverage defense unless the carrier has complied . . . fully with the CAS. § 627.426(2), Fla. . . . See § 627.426(2), Fla. . . .
. . . Section 627.426(2) provides: (2) A liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage based on . . . Although there is no dispute that Hartford did not comply with section 627.426, Hartford’s assertion . . . the antistacking clause does not constitute a coverage defense requiring it to comply with section 627.426 . . . , 999-1000 (Fla.1989): We do not believe that the legislature intended, by the enactment of section 627.426 . . . [T]he term “coverage defense,” as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to coverage that otherwise . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . So.2d 998 (Fla.1989): We do not believe that the legislature intended, by the enactment of section 627.426 . . .
. . . Schultzes first argue that Arni-ca is precluded from raising the statute of limitations defense by section 627.426 . . . There is no dispute that Arnica failed to comply with section 627.426. . . . It makes no sense to read section 627.426(2)(a) to apply to such an affirmative defense, since an insured . . . Having decided this case based on our construction of the term “coverage defense” in section 627.426( . . .
. . . Nor does Section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (1997), somehow give rise to coverage for injuries or losses . . . See § 627.426(2)(b)(3), Fla. Stat. (1997); Steadfast Ins. Co. v. . . . There has been no contention that Colony failed to comply with the requirements of section 627.426(2) . . . Section 627.426(2) provides in pertinent part: A liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage . . . "coverage defense" to mean "a defense to coverage that otherwise exists" and holding that "section 627.426 . . .
. . . The insurer’s actions were in violation of section 627.426(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), which required . . . The supreme court held that the insurer’s failure to comply with the time requirements of section 627.426 . . .
. . . 4th DCA 1999) (refusing to consider, for the first time on appeal, lack of compliance with section 627.426 . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . . excludes joinder of an insurer as a party defendant when the insurer denied coverage pursuant to section 627.426 . . . DeMeo did not raise the issue of lack of compliance with section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes, before . . .
. . . See § 627.426, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . days of its notification of their loses as prescribed by the Claims Administration Statute, Section 627.426 . . . It has been established that “[s]ection 627.426(2), by its express terms, applies only to a denial of . . . defense of no coverage thusly: Therefore, we hold that the term “coverage defense,” as used in section 627.426 . . . excluded by the terms of the policy, the insurer’s failure to adhere to the requirements of section 627.426 . . .
. . . that when the insurer retained counsel to defend it in the personal injury case, it violated section 627.426 . . .
. . . Defendants argue that Progressive has failed to comply with Florida Statute § 627.426(2) which regulates . . .
. . . We hold that section 627.426, Florida Statutes, does not apply to cases in which an insured is making . . . By its terms the statute applies to cases involving liability insurance: 627.426. . . .
. . . Requirements for Denial of Coverage Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Section 627.426 . . . Defendants additionally assert that Plaintiff has also violated Subsection (b) of Florida Statute section 627.426 . . . Therefore, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff’s actions have violated Florida Statute Section 627.426 . . .
. . . See § 627.426(2),(b),2, Fla. . . .
. . . exclusion because it did not notify the appellees it intended to assert that defense as required by section 627.426 . . .
. . . Scottsdale defended Tiffany’s under a reservation of rights pursuant to Section 627.426, Florida Statutes . . .
. . . It cites to § 627.426(2), Fla.Stat. (1994) (Florida’s “Claims Administration Statute”). . . . Section 627.426(2) creates notice requirements as between the company and its named insured. . . . This court addressed the applicability of § 627.426(2) in Lazzara Oil Co. v. Columbia Cas. . . . , this court cited to a Florida case which held that, “[t]he legislature did not intend, by section 627.426 . . . otherwise exist or that coverage which does not otherwise exist, can be created by a violation of § 627.426 . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .
. . . settlement by the motion of any party, unless the insurer denied coverage under the provisions of s. 627.426 . . . (2) or defended under a reservation of rights pursuant to s. 627.426(2). . . .
. . . AIU only addresses whether noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 627.426(2), Florida . . . We concluded that an insurer’s failure to comply with the requirements of section 627.426 will not preclude . . . AIU simply recognizes that section 627.426 does not create or extend nonexistent coverage. . . .
. . . of its failure to comply with the notice requirements of the claims administration statute, section 627.426 . . .
. . . National sent to Barto-lazo a reservation of rights letter required under Section 627.426(2), Florida . . .
. . . defenses, while affording its insured a defense, pursuant to the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . .
. . . authored an opinion which held that timely, actual written notice of a coverage defense under section 627.426 . . .
. . . alleged estoppel and waiver as defenses, arguing that State Farm had failed to comply with sections 627.426 . . . for coverage is that State Farm failed to comply with the “Claims Administration Statute,” section 627.426 . . . a comprehensive liability policy, due to its noncompliance with the notice requirements of section 627.426 . . . The court held: We do not believe that the legislature intended, by the enactment of section 627.426( . . .
. . . . § 627.426. . . .
. . . As to applicability of the provisions of the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426, Florida . . .
. . . Union General, arguing that by denying PIP coverage, Union General had failed to comply with section 627.426 . . . Stat. 627.426, and is thus precluded from denying coverage to the plaintiff under the policy at issue . . . On appeal, Union General asserts that because section 627.426, Florida Statutes (1991), only applies . . . Section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (1991), states: (2) A liability insurer shall not be permitted to . . . Therefore, Union General’s alleged non-compliance with section 627.426(2) has no bearing on the first . . .
. . . not deny her coverage based upon its noncompliance with the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . . to provide mutually agreeable independent counsel under the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . . SCHEB, A.C.J., and HALL, J., concur. .Section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: (2) A liability . . .
. . . . § 627.426; and (3) collateral estoppel. . . . Violation of Fla.Stat. § 627.426 Section 627.426 of the Florida statutes states that an insurer may not . . . Fla.Stat. § 627.426(2)(b)(3). . . . The petitioner, on the other hand, states that § 627.426(2) does not even apply to this situation. . . .
. . . . § 627.426(2) (1982), and that, accordingly, Wausau had the right to assert, as a substantive defense . . . dated May 23, 1988 from Wausau to appellants, of the refusal of the District Court to apply Fla.Stat. § 627.426 . . . In so doing, we find it unnecessary to determine whether, pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 627.426(2), Wausau . . .
. . . However, it is interesting to note that section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that a liability . . .
. . . STERN, M.D. by its failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 627.426(2) Fla.Stat. because . . . Section 627.426(2) provides, in pertinent part: A liability insurer shall not be permitted to deny coverage . . . FPIC’s letter, sent over a month later, failed to meet the requirements of section 627.426. . . . knowledge of a coverage defense and when the court determined PPTF had failed to comply with section 627.426 . . . The Court further finds that PPTF failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 627.426 Fla.Stat . . .
. . . that the insurer had waived the coverage defense pursuant to the Claims Administration Act, section 627.426 . . .
. . . USAU was not required to furnish notice of its denial of liability as specified in section 627.426(2) . . .
. . . damages resulting from the insurer’s failure to comply with the claims administration statute, Section 627.426 . . . coverage, ap-pellee did not send its notice by registered or certified mail as required by Section 627.426 . . . Section 627.426, Florida Statutes (1987), makes no reference to attorney fees, the only express penalty . . . We do not believe that it was the legislature’s intent that section 627.426(2) change this long-standing . . . Therefore, we hold that the term “coverage defense,” as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to . . .
. . . The trial court’s order further determined that section 627.426(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) precluded . . . coverage under the policy because it failed to comply with the Claims Administration Statute, section 627.426 . . . insured, by certified or registered mail, written notice of its right to assert a coverage defense. § 627.426 . . . So.2d 998 (Fla.1989): We do not believe that the legislature intended, by the enactment of section 627.426 . . . Therefore, we hold that the term “coverage defense,” as used in section 627.426(2), means a defense to . . .