Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Here, we address the issue of collateral legal consequences flowing from an involuntary commitment. Section 394.457(8), *213 Florida Statutes (1989), states that "[f]ees and fee collections for patients in treatment facilities shall be according to s. 402.33." In turn, section 402.33(8), Florida Statutes (1989), reads as follows: (8)(a) Unpaid fees for services provided by the department to a client constitute a lien on any property owned by the client or the client's responsible party which property is not exempt by s....

...(c) Upon the death of a person against whom the department has a claim, the department shall file such caveats as are in the best interest of the State. If the department effects recovery, the fund from which the filing fee for the caveat was paid shall be reimbursed. The imposition of a lien under section 402.33(8) on the property of an involuntarily committed person is a collateral legal consequence....

...In all probability, a lien will be filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) long after the expiration of the time for filing an appeal from an order of commitment. In fact, the discretion as to whether and when to file the lien rests solely with HRS. Because section 402.33(8) affects a person involuntarily committed beyond the person's initial release, the statute has collateral legal consequences. The State argues that even if section 402.33(8) does provide a collateral legal consequence, Godwin failed to show that the consequences applied to her case. The State notes that section 402.33(2)(g) reads in part: "[f]ees, other than third-party benefits and benefit payments, may not be charged for services provided to indigents whose only sources of income are from state and federal aid." Further, section 402.33(1)(g) defines "state and federal aid" as "cash assistance of cash equivalent benefits based on an individual's proof of financial need, including, but not limited to, aid to families with dependent children and food stamps." The statut...

...ersons whose sole income is from "[s]tate and federal aid." Even if Godwin does not receive state or federal aid she nevertheless may be indigent, and subject to imposition of a lien in the future despite her indigency. The State further argues that section 402.33(6)(a) keeps HRS from collecting fees against Godwin. Section 402.33(6)(a) provides: "[t]he department may not require a client or responsible party to pay fees it may assess that exceed the client's or responsible party's ability to pay." While section 402.33(6)(a) may restrict HRS's ability to collect fees from Godwin, the statute does not rule out the possibility that HRS may attach a lien to Godwin's property in the future....

...involuntary commitment moot. However, in Kinner, the parties did not raise the issue of collateral legal consequences, and the Court did not address the issue which is presented here. Thus, we distinguish Kinner. Godwin's appeal is not moot because section 402.33(8) allows for the imposition of a lien for unpaid fees flowing from an involuntary commitment, and HRS has not indicated a waiver of its right to impose a lien....

...nt expires or otherwise ends, but others outlined below clearly cannot. For example, as the majority recognizes, any unpaid costs of an incompetent person's treatment constitute a continuing lien against that person's property in favor of the state. § 402.33(8)(a), Fla....

...Michael Lehrke challenges the trial court's order involuntarily placing him in a public facility for a period not to exceed two months. We reverse. Initially we note that although Lehrke's commitment ended in November 2007, this issue is not moot as his rights may still be affected by the trial court's order pursuant to section 402.33(8)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), which allows the State to seek a lien against an involuntarily committed person's property for the costs associated with the commitment long after completion of the commitment. See Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211, 213 (Fla. 1992) (concluding that "[t]he imposition of a lien under section 402.33(8) on the property of an involuntarily committed person is a collateral legal consequence" rendering the issue not moot)....

...Without specificity, the evidence is not clear and convincing that there is a substantial likelihood that in the near future [a]ppellant will inflict serious bodily harm on herself or another person."). Reversed. SILBERMAN and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] We also note that the exception to subsection 402.33(8) found in subsection 402.33(2) does not apply to Lehrke because the record does not reflect that his "only sources of income are from state and federal aid" and does indicate that he owns real property.

...en the defendant is released from commitment. [3] In Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1992), our supreme court held that an appeal from a civil commitment order under chapter 394 did not become moot by virtue of release from confinement, because section 402.33(8), Florida Statutes (1993), allowed imposition of a lien for the costs of involuntary commitment, [4] even after discharge. Godwin's appeal is not moot because section 402.33(8) allows for the imposition of a lien for unpaid fees flowing from an involuntary commitment, and HRS has not indicated a waiver of its right to impose a lien. Godwin, 593 So.2d at 214. Our supreme court explained at some length why the matter was not moot even when no lien had in fact been filed and despite the appellant's poverty: The imposition of a lien under section 402.33(8) on the property of an involuntarily committed person is a collateral legal consequence....

...In all probability, a lien will *798 be filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) long after the expiration of the time for filing an appeal from an order of commitment. In fact, the discretion as to whether and when to file the lien rests solely with HRS. Because section 402.33(8) affects a person involuntarily committed beyond the person's initial release, the statute has collateral legal consequences. Godwin, 593 So.2d at 213. The court made clear that it was concerned with the legal possibility and not the factual probability of a lien: The State argues that even if section 402.33(8) does provide a collateral legal consequence, Godwin failed to show that the consequences applied to her case. The State notes that section 402.33(2)(g) reads in part: "[f]ees, other than third-party benefits and benefit payments, may not be charged for services provided to indigents whose only sources of income are from state and federal aid." Further, section 402.33(1)(g) defines "state and federal aid" as "cash assistance o[r] cash equivalent benefits based on an individual's proof of financial need, including, but not limited to, aid to families with dependent children and food stamps." The stat...

...ersons whose sole income is from "[s]tate and federal aid." Even if Godwin does not receive state or federal aid she nevertheless may be indigent, and subject to imposition of a lien in the future despite her indigency. The State further argues that section 402.33(6)(a) keeps HRS from collecting fees against Godwin. Section 402.33(6)(a) provides: "[t]he department may not require a client or responsible party to pay fees it may assess that exceed the client's or responsible party's ability to pay." While section 402.33(6)(a) may restrict HRS's ability to collect fees from Godwin, the statute does not rule out the possibility that HRS may attach a lien to Godwin's property in the future....

...In this case, HRS has been silent as to whether it will file a lien in the future, and, therefore, Godwin still is subject to the possibility of a collateral legal consequence. Godwin, 593 So.2d at 213-14. Appellant here is equally "subject to the possibility of collateral legal consequence." Section 402.33, Florida Statutes (1993), applies to "forensic clients" as well as to other committed persons....

...rom the issue to be determined." Id. In Godwin v. State, 593 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1992), our supreme court held that an appeal from a civil commitment order under chapter 394 did not become moot by virtue of release from confinement, because section *298 402.33(8), Florida Statutes (1993), allowed imposition of a lien for the costs of involuntary commitment, even after discharge. Godwin's appeal is not moot because section 402.33(8) allows for the imposition of a lien for unpaid fees flowing from an involuntary commitment, and HRS has not indicated a waiver of its right to impose a lien. Godwin, 593 So.2d at 214. Our supreme court explained at some length why the matter was not moot even when no lien had in fact been filed and despite the appellant's poverty: The imposition of a lien under section 402.33(8) on the property of an involuntarily committed person is a collateral legal consequence....

...In all probability, a lien will be filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) long after the expiration of the time for filing an appeal from an order of commitment. In fact, the discretion as to whether and when to file the lien rests solely with HRS. Because section 402.33(8) affects a person involuntarily committed beyond the person's initial release, the statute has collateral legal consequences. Godwin, 593 So.2d at 213. The court made clear that it was concerned with the legal possibility and not the factual probability of a lien: The State argues that even if section 402.33(8) does provide a collateral legal consequence, Godwin failed to show that the consequences applied to her case. The State notes that section 402.33(2)(g) reads in part: "[f]ees, other than third-party benefits and benefit payments, may not be charged for services provided to indigents whose only sources of income are from state and federal aid." Further, section 402.33(1)(g) defines "state and federal aid" as "cash assistance o[r] cash equivalent benefits based on an individual's proof of financial need, including, but not limited to, aid to families with dependent children and food stamps." The stat...

...ersons whose sole income is from "[s]tate and federal aid." Even if Godwin does not receive state or federal aid she nevertheless may be indigent, and subject to imposition of a lien in the future despite her indigency. The State further argues that section 402.33(6)(a) keeps HRS from collecting fees against Godwin. Section 402.33(6)(a) provides: "[t]he department may not require a client or responsible party to pay fees it may assess that exceed the client's or responsible party's ability to pay." While section 402.33(6)(a) may restrict HRS's ability to collect fees from Godwin, the statute does not rule out the possibility that HRS may attach a lien to Godwin's property in the future....

...authorized by Florida law. Indeed, DCF is authorized both to act as representative payee of SSI benefits and to charge clients fees for services, collecting the fees from sources including funds for which DCF is designated the payee. See Fla. Stat. § 402.33 (2)-(3) (2011)....

...Notably, the same statutes that authorize DCF to become a representative payee clearly state that fees are to be charged for services provided to clients, and that “[flees shall be reasonably related to the cost of providing the service[s].” Fla. Stat. § 402.33 (3)....

...$2,002.60 for the cost of maintaining their minor child while incarcerated as a juvenile delinquent. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. The issues, as framed by appellants, would have this court determine: the constitutional validity of section 402.33, Florida Statutes (1985); the validity of the rule establishing the fee collection system employed by HRS (Rule 10-6.010, et seq., Florida Administrative Code); and whether section 39.11, Florida Statutes, containing special provisions dealing with support and maintenance fees for juveniles, preempts the more general provisions for support and maintenance found in section 402.33. We find that the statute, section 402.33, is facially constitutional and that its operation and effect is not preempted by section 39.11. We agree with appellants, however, that section 402.33 may have been unconstitutionally applied by the department in its assessment of fees against appellants....

...ville, Florida, on July 30, 1986. After receiving financial information from appellants, pursuant to provisions of its applicable rule, HRS sought reimbursement for the cost of maintaining appellants' son at the Dozier School under the provisions of section 402.33....

...evidence was submitted and arguments presented and without the benefit of an agency order containing findings and conclusions on the multiple issues of fact and law generated by this appeal. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of the statute, section 402.33, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.), on due process and equal protection grounds, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Article I, Section[s] 2, 9, Florida Constitution. Section 402.33(2) provides, in part: (2) The Department, in accordance with rules established by it, shall either charge, assess, or collect, or cause to be charged, assessed, or collected, fees for any service it may provide its clients either directly or through its agencies or contractors......

...ibility and need for services provided by HRS, and educational services provided in lieu of public education. None of these excepted services are shown to have been included in the charges made by HRS in this case. Another subsection of the statute, 402.33(3), provides that the "client" or the client's "responsible party," shall be liable *314 for any fee assessed by HRS as the cost of providing a service....

...The term "client" is defined as "any natural person receiving services, provided by the department, including supervision, care and maintenance, ...," and the "responsible party" means "any person legally responsible for the financial support of the client... ." Sections 402.33(1)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.)....

...ion reasonably appears from references in the statute to collection of fees established pursuant to Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, which controls both delinquency and dependency proceedings. [1] We find appellant's challenge to the facial validity of section 402.33 to be without merit....

...d Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Spencer, 430 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (parents of dependent child could be required to pay fees to HRS for services received by their child while in foster care). Therefore, to the extent that section 402.33 is a codification of the preexisting duty of parents to support their children, there can be no violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal or state constitutions. However, section 402.33 does not by its express terms limit HRS to obtaining reimbursement for basic support costs; and as we interpret the position of HRS, it assumes that it has the authority under this statute to also assess and collect fees against the pa...

...tion or correction of delinquent behavior, infringes upon appellants' equal protection rights. We turn next to appellants' preemption argument. Appellants assert that the assessment of maintenance fees in juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to section 402.33 is preempted by the more specific provisions of section 39.11, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.)....

...1, 1986, after the order of adjudication and commitment of appellants' child, and after at least a portion of the "services" for which charges are made were provided by HRS. Nevertheless, whether we consider the prior versions of sections 39.11 and 402.33, or the statutes as amended in 1986, our view on this issue remains the same....

...nquent child to the "person or institution" having custody of the child reasonable sums for the "care, support, maintenance, training, and education" of the child (section 39.11, Florida Statutes (1985)), the specific authority conferred upon HRS by section 402.33 to collect fees for services rendered to the child is not rendered inapplicable....

...As pointed out by HRS, although both statutes have frequently undergone amendment since their enactment, there has been little substantive change since their inception. Thus, section 39.11(2) has been in existence in some form since at least 1955 (Laws of Florida, 1955, Ch. 29900, § 5), and section 402.33 since 1975 (Chapter 75-190, Laws of Florida (1975))....

...In fact, our prior decision in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Spencer, supra , would indicate just the opposite, since that case reflects an independent action by HRS for collection of support costs for two minor children in *316 foster care under section 402.33....

...order by the court at the time of adjudication of delinquency, we are not faced with the issue here and do not decide whether the amended statute presents an impediment to the authority of HRS to proceed for collection of fees for its services under section 402.33 without an order from the juvenile court....

...involved essentially a matter of law, Nord v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 417 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), it would be inappropriate to do so in this case. Although it is apparent that HRS has attempted to comply with the mandates of section 402.33 in the establishment of charges for services provided, and in the adoption of uniform criteria and rules for determining a responsible party's ability to pay, whether the methodology selected here meets the requirements of law requires...

...Section 39.01 was amended by adding the definition of "child support" which is defined as "a court ordered obligation enforced pursuant to ss. 409.2551-409.2597, for monetary support for the care, maintenance, training and education of a child." Section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). In addition, section 402.33(2) was amended to authorize HRS to charge fees for emergency shelter or emergency detention, care and custody after the holding of a detention hearing....

...e dismissed as moot in that the term of treatment authorized by the trial court's order had now, in fact, expired. Having considered appellant's response, we conclude that in light of collateral legal consequences arising from the lien provisions of section 402.33(8), Florida Statutes, the appeal is not moot, and we therefore discharge the order to show cause....

...The parents were not accorded due process and the language in the order is hereby stricken. Our holding should not be read to imply that under the circumstances of this case, the parents are, or are not, legally responsible for payment for the support of their child under section 39.-11(2), Florida Statutes, 1 section 402.33(2), Florida Statutes; or some other statute or authority....

...nces surrounding said recipients, including income and resources.” HRS is required to charge clients for services, with the fee charged reasonably related to the cost of providing the service and the client’s ability to pay. Sections 393.071 and 402.33, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...egate living facility or for adult foster care, family placement, or other specialized living arrangement; and (2) Is receiving a Supplemental Security Income check or is determined to be eligible for optional supplementation by the department.” . Section 402.33(1) states, “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that whenever practical the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services shall require: (a) The client; (b) Parents, if the client is a minor; or (c) Spouse of the client, and thi...

...appeals an order of involuntary placement in a state mental health treatment facility. We dismiss the appeal as moot. M.B. is no longer committed under this order. From the record, it appears without dispute that M.B. is an indigent “whose only sources of income are from state and federal aid.” § 402.33(2)(g), Fla....

...cost of providing mental health services to persons able to pay, including from insurance or third-party payments. Generally, fees and fee collections by HRS for the care of patients receiving mental health services is governed by the provisions in s. 402.33 , F.S....

...Butterworth Attorney General RAB/tls 1 Section 394.453 (1)(a), F.S. 2 Id. 3 Section 394.457 (2), F.S. 4 See, s. 394.457 (3), F.S. 5 See, ss. 394.463 (1) and (2), F.S. (1992 Supp.). 6 Section 394.455 (8), F.S. (1992 Supp.). 7 Section 394.459 (2), F.S. 8 See, s. 394.457 (8), F.S. 9 See, s. 402.33 (2), F.S. 10 Id. 11 Section 402.33 (3), F.S....

...Temporary custody was awarded to HRS which placed the two children in foster care. HRS provided for the care, subsistence and maintenance of the children for almost two years until January 26, 1981, when the children were returned to the custody of the Spenc-ers. Pursuant to Section 402.33, Florida Statutes, HRS billed the Spencers monthly for costs incurred by the State in maintaining the children in foster care. That section provides for parents of minors receiving services by HRS to pay fees for such services. Section 402.33(4) further provides in pertinent part: The department shall only collect ... from ... parents ... fees consistent with the ... parents' ... ability to pay. Parents of minors receiving services in a program for which fees have been established shall pay fees consistent with their ability to pay .... Section 402.33(3) also requires HRS to determine annually the cost of providing such services and uniform criteria for determining ability to pay....

...HRS billed them $123 per month per child as and for a reasonable contribution towards the State’s cost of maintaining the children in foster care taking into account the Spencers’ ability to pay at the time of such billings and the criteria set forth in Chapter 10-6, Fla.Admin.Code, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 402.33(3)....

...pay then. We agree with counsel for HRS that the trial court erroneously assumed that HRS was precluded from recovering judgment for the unpaid maintenance fees by reason of indigency of the Spencers at the time of the trial. *511 We hold that under Section 402.33, Florida Statutes, HRS is authorized to charge parents of minors receiving services in a foster care program fees which have been properly established pursuant to that section and which represent the actual cost of such services, but n...

...HRS also contends that the trial court erred when it refused to take judicial notice of Chapter 10-6, Fla.Admin.Code. That chapter contains the guidelines and procedure by which HRS determines maintenance fees based upon ability to pay as required by Section 402.33, Florida Statutes....