Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...nt (Docket No. 161) and Plaintiffs’ response (Docket No. 162); and 4. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint and supporting memorandum (Docket Nos. 163— 164) and Defendant’s response. BACKGROUND I. Statutory Framework Section 166.041(c), Florida Statutes, creates particular procedural requirements that must be followed for an ordinance rezoning private property or changing permitted use categories to be validly enacted....

...d uses within a zoning category, the advertisement shall contain a geographic location map which clearly indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance. The map shall include major street names as a means of identification of the general area. § 166.041(c)2....

...ces had been exactly the same, the fact remains that splitting a proposed ordinance into two separate pieces of legislation is a substantial change. Defendant argues further that the notice provided was adequate to meet the legislative intent behind Section 166.041(3)(c), because it provided sufficient notice of the proposed changes....

...Defendant 'states that, because the proposed changes affected the same geographic area, if Defendant had begun the notice process anew, it would have published the same advertisement as it had already published. The Defendant makes valid policy arguments that the notice requirements imposed by Section 166.041(3)(c) may not be logical in every circumstance....

...sary. This Court, however, is compelled to apply the law as it now stands. As Florida law now stands, it requires the holding that the 1990 Ordinances were void ab initio because the Defendant failed to comply with the notice requirements imposed by Section 166.041(3)(c)....

..., therefore, not unconstitutional under Article VIII, Section 11 (5), Florida Constitution. "IV. PROPER ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE "The plaintiffs have alleged that the ordinance and its amendments were not enacted in compliance with Florida Statute 166.041. Dade County contends that Section 166.041 provides a minimum standard to be followed by municipalities when enacting ordinances and it is therefore inapplicable....

...procedural requirements. "Regardless of which contention is correct, it is not necessary for the Court to determine exactly which procedural requirements must be followed since the plaintiffs have not established any violation of the requirements of Section 166.041, Florida Statutes....

...Appellees have described only the nature and degree of formality of a resolution. A resolution is "an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body." § 166.041(1)(b), Fla....

...special assessment liens upon real property following nonpayment by the owners of such property for garbage fees. Appellants' third point complains that the titles to ordinances 35 and 50 of the Town of Mexico Beach were not legally sufficient under Section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes (1975), added by Ch....

...Senate Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement, CS/SB 358 (April 11, 1990). [7] In City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 417 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1982), the second district concluded that the city was required to comply with section 166.041 (the statute which governs the enactment of municipal zoning ordinances, not county ordinances which are governed by section 125.66) before it could pass an emergency one year moratorium on building permits....

...taff and the courts have looked to municipal ordinance cases for guidance; and the courts have generally held that municipal ordinances which substantially impair the use of land are invalid if they were not enacted with the formality required under section 166.041(3)(c)....

...[6] The Broward County ordinance contains a severability clause, so the entire Code would not necessarily be rendered invalid even if a portion of it were to be considered a land use regulation. [7] Oddly, chapter 90-152 would not have affected City of Sanibel since it does not amend section 166.041....

...ained from considering a complaint to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance governing the location of nude bars on the ground that Florida law offered no clear guidance about what constitutes a "substantial change" in land use within the meaning of section 166.041(3)....

...tain the invalidation of the Council's actions. See B.M.Z. Corp. v. City of Oakland Park, 415 So.2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). REVERSED. MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The legislature has required such notice for certain subjects. See, e.g., Section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes.

...shall remain in full force and effect as previously enacted. Section 6. The City notified the public of the May 16, 1989 City Commission meeting through an advertisement that was less than one-quarter page. The notice provisions of Florida Statutes Section 166.041 require that these advertisements "be no less than one-quarter page in a standard size or a tabloid size newspaper." [2] Consequently, on June 5, 1989, Boynton Beach's City Attorney, Raymond Rea, presented to the City's Planning & Zon...

...wanted when they conveyed the property. On June 20, 1989, the City Commission repealed Ordinance 89-12 and enacted Ordinance 89-17. As with Ordinance 89-12, the City enacted Ordinance 89-17 in violation of the notice requirements of Florida Statutes Section 166.041....

...Failure to Comply With State Notice Requirements As their final challenge to Ordinance 89-17, Plaintiffs contend that the ordinance is legally defective and void because it was not adopted by the City in accordance with the notice provisions of Florida Statutes Section 166.041(3)(c)2. Plaintiffs claim that at the first public hearing on Ordinance 89-17, the City failed to announce the day, time, and place at which the second public hearing would be held as required by § 166.041(3)(c)2.a. Plaintiffs also claim *1102 that on the maps used in the public hearing advertisements, the City failed to clearly indicate the area covered by the proposed ordinance and failed to include major street names in accordance with § 166.041(3)(c)2.b. The City concedes that it did not comply with the notice provisions of § 166.041....

...y Ordinance 89-17. The Court therefore holds that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the ordinance under Florida law. The City also claims that where a proposed zoning ordinance affects uses in an entire city, Florida law is unclear as to whether § 166.041 requires the advertisement maps to contain street names....

...l issues this case raises. The Court therefore refuses to stay its hand and proceeds to address Plaintiffs' state law claims. Plaintiffs' proof establishes, without contradiction from the City, that Ordinance 89-17 was not adopted in accordance with section 166.041(3)(c)2....

...mstances under which noncompliance with the statute may be excused so as to result in the passage of a valid zoning ordinance. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the Court finds that Ordinance 89-17 was not enacted pursuant to the requirements of Section 166.041. The ordinance is therefore deemed null and void because of the City's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 166.041....

...t declaring that Ordinance 80-30 was unconstitutional and the City would not be enforcing it. Rea was responsible for evaluating the City's ordinances and instructing the City's employees as to the enforcement of the ordinances. [2] Florida Statutes Section 166.041(3)(c)2 provides in pertinent part: 2....

...at ...... (meeting place) ....... The advertisement shall also contain a geographic location map which clearly indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance. The map shall include major street names as a means of identification of the area. .... § 166.041, Fla.Stat. (1989). [3] See Florida Statutes Section 166.041, supra note 1....

...Appellants urge that the City of Jacksonville's Air Installation Compatible Use Zone ordinance ("AICUZ"), Ordinance 78-256-271, should be found invalid for the following three reasons: (1) the City of Jacksonville did not strictly adhere to the special notice and hearing requirements for rezoning of land, as required by Section 166.041, Florida Statutes; (2) the land use restrictions imposed by the AICUZ ordinance are applied only to land surrounding military air installations in the Jacksonville area and not to any land in the vicinity of Jacksonville's municipal a...

...the US Navy, it unconstitutionally takes or restricts property rights that may only be purchased through the government's exercise of the power of eminent domain. We agree with appellants' contention ((1) above) that the procedural prerequisites of Section 166.041 [1] were not followed by the City of Jacksonville and, disposing of the case on this issue, find no need to reach the other constitutional arguments advanced....

...[3] And since this ordinance does, in fact, constitute an amendatory zoning ordinance, see, e.g., City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981), the ACIUZ ordinance must be deemed null and void because of the City's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 166.041. REVERSED. WENTWORTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1978), provides for a notice and hearing procedure before adoption of an ordinance rezoning specific parcels of private real property, and paragraph 2....

...See Local Rule 3.10. (2) Enactment Procedures/Due Process Claim Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' complaint with respect to Plaintiff's allegation that the City did not follow the procedural requirements set forth in Florida Statutes, § 166.041(3)(c), in the enactment of the two Ordinances. It is undisputed that the two Ordinances, 94-190-651 and 95-307-109, were not enacted in strict accordance with the procedures set forth in Fla. Stat. § 166.041(3)(c)2. Ordinance 94-190-651 was advertised 14 days in advance of the public hearing, rather than *1434 the 5 days specified by section 166.041(3)(c)(2). Ordinance 95-307-109 was enacted as an emergency ordinance and did not comply with any of the requirements of § 166.041(3)(c)(2)....

...id enactment of a zoning measure. Ellison v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 183 So.2d 193 (Fla.1966). Ordinances which do not comply with the notice requirements are void. Daytona Leisure Corp. v. Daytona Beach, 539 So.2d 597, 599 (Fla.App.1989). However, § 166.041(3)(c)(2) applies only to ordinances which substantially affect the use of land....

...See e.g., Ordinance 94-190-651, § 656.1103(a)(1)-(4). However, the City argues that the provisions of the Ordinances that clearly affect conduct and interior structural requirements do not have to be in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(2)....

...Nonetheless, the Court finds that the enactment procedures as to Ordinance 94-190-651 were complied with. The only potential defect Plaintiffs point to — advertising the second public hearing 14 days in advance of the hearing, rather than the 5 days specified in section 166.041(3)(c)(2) — does not render the Ordinance void for failure to comply *1435 with the notice provisions of the statute. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the City complied with each of the minimum requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(2). See Exhibit A to the City's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Enactment Procedures (Doc. No. 58). Section 166.041(8) provides that "[t]he notice procedures required by this section are established as minimum notice procedures." Id....

...The five day requirement is a minimum requirement. Plaintiffs have cited to and the Court has found no cases which indicate that extra notice violates the statute. Therefore, the Court finds that the fourteen days notice complies with the requirements of § 166.041(3)(c)(2), and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Enactment Procedures of Ordinance 94-190-651 is GRANTED. The Court also agrees that only the portions of Ordinance 95-307-109 that "substantially affects the use of the land" have to comply with the § 166.041(3)(c)(2) notice and hearing requirements....

...Moreover, section 656.1109, which guarantees the right to operate a facility while awaiting a decision on an application for an exception, is not an ordinance which substantially affects the use of land. Thus, the City did not have to comply with the notice requirements of § 166.041(3)(c)(2)....

...That judgment has been appealed and afforded expeditious consideration. Daytona Leisure contends that the emergency ordinance is legally defective and void because it is a zoning ordinance, and, as such, was enacted without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard as required under section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...permitted. It is sheer sophistry to say this is not a substantial change in a use previously permitted to the owner of property who is actively constructing an entertainment facility thereon to the tune of $800,000.00 or more. The City's reliance on section 166.041(3)(b), which authorizes the adoption of emergency ordinances, is misplaced; that statute expressly provides that "no emergency ordinance shall be enacted which enacts or amends a land use plan or which rezones private real property." See Baywood Construction, Inc....

...Buntrock, 409 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 417 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1982). Florida follows the majority view whereby measures passed in contravention of notice requirements are invalid (null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirement of section 166.041)....

...Clay County Zoning Commission, 225 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). Where an ordinance substantially affects land use (substantially changes permitted use categories) or rezones specific parcels of private real property, it must be enacted under the procedures that govern zoning and rezoning, i.e., section 166.041(3)(c)....

resolution is “enforceable as a local law.” Fla. Stat. § 166.041(l)(a) (West Supp.1985). A resolution is defined

...n the validity of the adoption of Ordinance No. 77-48. Appellants' proof before the trial court established, *306 without objection or contradiction, that neither Ordinance No. 72-25 nor No. 77-48 had been legally adopted in accordance with sections 166.041(3)(c)(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1977) (formerly sections 176.05 and .06, Florida Statutes (1971))....

...77-48, seeks to regulate "all exterior signs, so as to protect health and safety and to promote the public," Dunedin, Fla., Code § 3-13 (1972), the ordinance and its amendment are zoning ordinances which are null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirements of section 166.041 (formerly sections 176.05 and.06)....

...172-F was not read aloud, either by title or in full, on either of the two occasions when it came before the city council. Appellant Moore, in deposition, admitted the sole basis for the City's denial of the Austins' application for a building permit was the purported enactment of Ordinance No. 172-F. Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...172-F was never read aloud at any open council meeting, either in its entirety or by its title; and (2) the sole basis for the denial of the Austins' application for a building permit was the purported passage of the ordinance prior to the Austins' applying for said permit. The court concluded as a matter of law: (1) Section 166.041(3)(a) requires that a proposed ordinance be read aloud at a minimum of two meetings; the word "may" as used in the subsection in conjunction with *488 the words "on at least 2 separate days" makes reading either by title or in full ma...

...sed by the legislature, [1] and article XI imposes a single-subject requirement for constitutional amendments proposed by initiative petition. [2] Section 125.67, Florida Statutes (1991), applies the single-subject rule to county ordinances, [3] and section 166.041(2) places a single-subject requirement on municipal ordinances....

...[3] Section 125.67, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: 125.67 Limitation on subject and matter embraced in ordinances; amendments; enacting clause. — Every ordinance shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith... . [4] Section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes (1991), provides in relevant part: Each ordinance or resolution shall be introduced in writing and shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith.

...See also City of St. Petersburg v. Schweitzer, 297 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 308 So.2d 114 (Fla.1975). *1244 Under Florida law, ordinances which substantially affect the use of land must comply strictly with the notice requirements of § 166.041(3)(c)1., Fla.Stat....

...The second and final reading of the ordinance occurred on April 16, 1979. At that hearing appellees' counsel argued the merits of the zoning question but did not reiterate his objection to the notice. We first address the question of whether timely notice was given. The applicable provision is contained in Section 166.041(3)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (1979): In cases in which the proposed rezoning involves less than 5 percent of the total land area of the municipality, the governing body shall direct the clerk of the governing body to notify by mail each...

...tion of impact fees. Even though the vote was three to zero, the ordinance was ineffective and subject to attack because an emergency ordinance must pass by a two-thirds vote of a municipality's governing body in order to be valid under Florida law. Section 166.041(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...These alleged defects are the only grounds raised by the plaintiff in its motion for summary judgment. The court will address each argument separately. DEFECTIVE TITLE The plaintiff has attacked Ordinance C-84-91 on the ground that this particular ordinance has a "defective title" and is in violation of Florida Statute § 166.041(2). Section 166.041(2) requires: "Each ordinance or resolution shall be introduced in writing and shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith. The subject shall be clearly stated in the title." Fla.Stat.Ann. § 166.041(2) (West Supp.1987)....

...The title of Ordinance C-84-91 was sufficient to lead to inquiry of the contents of the ordinance. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS The plaintiff also contends that both Ordinance C-84-91 and Ordinance C-84-100 are invalid because the City failed to comply with the notice provisions of Florida Statute § 166.041(3)(c). As Amended, section 166.041(3)(c) requires that ordinances "which rezone specific parcels of private real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts shall be enacted pursuant to ..." certain enumerated notice provisions contained within this subsection. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 166.041(3)(c) (West Supp.1987). The City concedes that it failed to comply with the notice provisions contained in section 166.041(3)(c), but argues that the procedure for passage of the two ordinances is governed instead by Florida Statute section 166.041(3)(a). The City maintains that it did comply with section 166.041(3)(a) and the plaintiff has not disputed this contention....

...[3] The enactment of the two ordinances has not changed the zoning of the land on which the plaintiff's business is located, the property remains zoned for business use. Therefore, the enactment of the two ordinances did not constitute a rezoning of "specific parcels of real property" as contemplated by section 166.041(3)(a). The remaining question facing the court is whether the passage of the two ordinances resulted in a substantial change in a permitted use category, as that phrase is used in section 166.041(3)(c). As it existed prior to 1983, section 166.041(3)(c) required municipalities in Florida to meet certain detailed notice provisions for ordinances whose effect was to impose a restriction upon the use of land. See Fountain v. City of Jacksonville, 447 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (amendatory zoning ordinances must comply with the former version of section 166.041(3)(c)). As the statute stands amended, however, Florida municipalities are required to give the more detailed form of notice provided for under section 166.041(3)(c), only if the changes in permitted use categories are "substantial." Proposed ordinances which result in insubstantial changes or changes which do not constitute a rezoning of the property may be advertised and passed in accordance with section 166.041(3)(a) (1987). [4] The phrase "substantially change permitted use category" is not defined in the statute. In 1983, the Legislature of Florida amended subsection (3)(c) of section 166.041 by inserting the above language. The parties have not cited nor has the court found any cases which construe the new version of the statute. The defendant argues that the notice provisions of section 166.041(3)(a) would have been triggered only if the City intended by its ordinance to abolish or disallow nude dancing entirely. Under the defendant's theory, because the ordinances only *492 involved a restriction on the number of potential sites available for nude dancing, the City was not required to comply with section 166.041(3)(c)....

...[5] The Opinion only treats the issue of addition of other uses within a specific zoning category. The Opinion concludes that "addition" of other permitted uses within a particular zoning district does constitute a "substantial" change in permitted uses under section 166.041(3)(c)....

...Florida House of Representatives, Staff Analysis, Committee on Community Affairs, June 23, 1983, at 1 (1983). The plaintiff maintains that the Staff Analysis supports its contention that even the most minor changes in a permitted use category must be noticed in compliance with the provisions of section 166.041(3)(a). There is nothing in the House of Representative Staff Analysis which warrants such a conclusion. As the Staff Analysis notes, the prior version of section 166.041(3)(c) required "more stringent publication and public hearing requirements ......

...be to alter existing uses of land or permissible activities upon land." Id. at 1. As the statute stands amended, however, only "substantial changes in permitted use categories" require the more detailed form of notice and advertisement provisions of section 166.041(3)(c)....

...The court is without guidance from the Florida courts or the statute itself on the question of what action by a municipality constitutes a substantial change in a permitted use category. The question is not merely academic. If the ordinances were passed in contravention of section 166.041(3)(c), under Florida law the ordinances are "null and void." David v....

...Pullman abstention is appropriate when there is an unsettled question of state law, the question is "dispositive of the case and [resolution of the question] would avoid, or substantially modify the constitutional question." Duke, 713 F.2d at 1510. As the foregoing discussion regarding section 166.041(3)(c) demonstrates, the meaning of this particular provision of the Florida Statutes, as amended, is uncertain....

...ed in violation of the City Charter. See Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss at 7. [3] Alcoholic Beverage establishments are permitted in business zones B-1-A; B-1-B; B-1-C; B-1; B-2; B-3; and B-3-C, within the City of Fort Lauderdale. [4] Section 166.041(3)(a) provides: Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...place or places within the municipality where such proposed ordinances may be inspected by the public. The notice shall also advise that interested parties may appear at the meeting and be heard with respect to the proposed ordinance. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 166.041(3)(a) (West Supp.1987). [5] Florida Attorney General Opinion 084-63, issued July 12, 1984, addresses the issue of whether placement of additional uses such as daycare centers, foster homes and adult congregate living facilities requires notice under subsection (c) of section 166.041(3)....

...State, 415 So.2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Finally, and significantly, the neighborhood study once adopted by ordinance is no longer an expression of general policy. The study becomes a permanent law of local government which continues in force until repealed. § 166.041(1)(a), Fla....

...Ultimately the court declared the ordinance invalid and directed the city to process Buntrock's application. The basis for the court's ruling was that the city had not enacted the moratorium ordinance pursuant to the notice and hearing requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1979), [1] that are applicable to ordinances "which rezone private real property." [2] The city concedes that it did not follow the procedure outlined in the statute but argues that it was unnecessary to do so because the moratorium ordinance did not constitute rezoning....

...on land use. Consequently, it is not too much to ask that a municipality follow the same procedures with respect to notice and hearing before it puts such a moratorium into effect. AFFIRMED. SCHEB, C.J., and HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 166.041(3)(c)1. applies to ordinances affecting less than 5% of the total land area of a city which was the case here. [2] In adopting the ordinance in question, the city followed section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), which prescribes the ordinary method for enacting ordinances. However, this section specifically excepts "rezoning" ordinances which must be enacted according to the procedure prescribed in section 166.041(3)(c). Section 166.041(3)(b) authorizes the adoption of emergency ordinances but stipulates that a municipality cannot use an emergency ordinance to amend a land use plan or rezone private real property. [3] At one point in its brief, Sanibel contends that because it accomplishes its land use control through the vehicle of a comprehensive land use plan adopted under the authority of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, section 166.041(3)(c) has no continuing efficacy in the City of Sanibel....

...ision or provisions of law relating to local government." Significantly, however, Sanibel overlooks the fact that the procedure to be followed in amending a land use plan involving less than 5% of the total land area is the same as that set forth in section 166.041(3)(c)1....

...On July 14, 1997, the City Commission held a duly noticed public hearing on the first reading of an ordinance which would authorize the execution of a purchase and sale agreement with Watchtower. After the second hearing, the Commission approved the ordinance by a vote of four to one on July 28, 1997. Pursuant to section 166.041(4), Florida Statutes (1997), a municipal ordinance takes effect ten days after its passage....

...r 2. Approval by vote of the city electors in a referendum election called and held as provided thereby. Code § 2-18(27)(c)(1997)(emphasis added). The adoption of an ordinance requires more notice and public hearings than a resolution requires. See § 166.041(3)(a)....

...Petersburg's narrow holding does not compel us to agree with the trial court that an ordinance authorizing the sale of a major city asset cannot be the subject of a referendum. See also City of Lake Worth v. State, 111 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1959). Appellees also argue that section 166.041(1)(a), Florida Statutes, when read in tandem with section 6.02 of the Charter, permits a referendum only when the action taken is legislative in nature, as distinguished from executive or administrative. Section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law." Section 166.041(1)(b) defines a "resolution" as "an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of...

...ys, which the Town suggests, the Town Commission authorized an act contrary to its own ordinances and, therefore, its approval was ultra vires and void. The trial court opined that the permissive use was on "the same level of an ordinance" but under section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1997), there are certain procedures to follow and requirements to be met in order to adopt an ordinance, none of which were followed here....

...We agree with Coleman and Henshaw and reverse the single final judgment entered in these two cases. As ordinance no. 98-31 was an effort to change the permitted uses within the City's residential zoning category (or categories), the City was required by section 166.041(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1997), to hold two advertised public hearings to consider its enactment. The first public hearing was required to be held at least seven days after the day that the first advertisement was published, while the second public hearing was to be advertised at least five days prior to the date set for that public hearing. § 166.041(3)(c)(2)(a), Fla....

...In an attempt to rectify the situation, the City rescheduled the second hearing for November 10, 1998, with the advertisement therefor being published on November 8. This advertisement two days prior to the second public hearing did not comply with the five-day mandate of section 166.041(3)(c)(2). Nonetheless ordinance no. 98-31 was attempted to be enacted at the hearing on November 10. The courts have consistently held that ordinances which fall within the ambit of section 166.041(3), Florida Statutes (1997) must be strictly enacted pursuant to the statute's notice provisions or they are null and void....

...Indeed, the havoc and confusion such a storm causes make strict compliance even more important, so that the *86 opportunities meant to be provided are not lost in the storm's wake. Ordinance no. 98-31 is null and void for failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...he Act be read twice. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review." BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003). Because section 163.346 incorporates only the public notice requirements of sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66(2), Florida Statutes (2006), we conclude that two readings are not required for municipal resolutions adopted pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Act....

...163.387; creates a community redevelopment agency; approves, adopts, or amends a community redevelopment plan; or issues redevelopment revenue bonds under s. 163.385, the governing body must provide public notice of such proposed action pursuant to s. 125.66(2) or s. 166.041(3)(a) .... (Emphasis added.) And section 166.041(3)(a), which applies to municipalities, provides: *168 Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least two separate days and shall, at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...Section 163.346 specifies that the governing body of a municipality or county must give public notice and mail a timely notice to each relevant taxing authority before adopting resolutions pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Act. This public notice is subject to the standards set forth in section 166.041(3)(a) or 125.66(2). Although sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66(2) include additional procedures for enacting municipal and county ordinances respectively, they contain the identical public notice requirements....

...lace of the meeting; the title or titles of the proposed ordinance; and the place or places where the proposed ordinance may be inspected by the public; and (5) that the notice advise that interested parties may appear and be heard at the meeting. §§ 166.041(3)(a); 125.66(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Because section 163.346 incorporates only the public notice requirements of sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66(2), we find that section 163.346 does not impose a two-reading requirement for resolutions adopted pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Act....

...First, authority supports the proposition that invalidity of the effective date of an ordinance does not render the ordinance void. [4] Second, disregarding the foregoing *737 authority, there is reason to conclude, as we do, that the effective date in the ordinance was valid. Section 166.041(4), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that all ordinances "shall become effective 10 days after passage or as otherwise provided therein " (emphasis supplied). Section 166.041(6) then states in part: The procedure as set forth herein shall constitute a uniform method for the adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions and shall be taken as cumulative to other methods now provided by law for adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions....

...The key word to us in section (6) is "cumulative," which means "additional." [5] By selecting this word, the legislature apparently intended to give the City freedom to choose which procedure it wanted to use in selecting the effective date of its ordinances, either that set forth in its charter or that authorized by section 166.041(4)....

...City of Oakland Park, 396 So.2d 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the electorate overwhelmingly affirmed the ordinance. [4] 5 Municipal Corporations § 15-39 (McQuillin ed. 1981). [5] Black's Law Dictionary 343 (5th ed. 1979). [6] Although we expressly rest our decision on the construction of section 166.041 and although we requested the parties to file additional briefs on questions dealing solely with our review of the order dissolving the temporary injunction, we find it difficult to see the harm occasioned appellant by the delay of th...

...However, the implementing ordinance was not self-executing; it required ratification by referendum. In February 1977, the voters approved the ordinance by referendum, but it was subsequently declared void because it had been improperly advertised, under Florida Statutes, section 166.041....

...notice, public hearings, etc. The court went on to say that these limitations were designed to protect the public from hasty or ill-advised use of that authority. In this case, the City of Gainesville has a specific grant of power concerning zoning, Section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1979), which contains specific limitations (notice, opportunity to be heard, etc.) on the use of that power....

...ace and as applied to all religious groups, the amended ordinance violates the first, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments of the United States Constitution; sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 17, and 23 of Article I of the Florida Constitution; Florida Statutes § 166.041(3)(a); and Clearwater City Charter § 2.09....

...Plaintiffs did not put forth any evidence of ramifications of their emotional distress. See, e.g., Price v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d 1241, 1254-56 (4th Cir.1996). The City was required to hold the public meeting and allow members of the public to speak to the Ordinance. See Fla. Stat. § 166.041....

...(applying the single subject rule to legislative acts); Art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. (applying the single subject rule to amendments by initiative to the Florida Constitution); § 125.67, Fla. Stat. (1991) (applying the single subject rule to county ordinances); § 166.041(2), Fla....

...ance established an impact fee. They argued that impact fee ordinances are, by their nature, intent, substantial effect and practical impact, actually land use and development regulations which must be enacted pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 166.041(3)(c)(2), *769 Florida Statutes (1979). In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found that ordinance 63-80 is not of such a nature as to have required that it be enacted in compliance with section 166.041(3)(c)(2) and entered a judgment for Cape Coral....

...See Contractors and Builders Association v. City of Dunedin, 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1976). They do contend, however, that the ordinance was improperly adopted and that it, therefore, is null and void. The record reflects that in adopting the ordinance under consideration, the city followed section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). This section sets forth the ordinary procedures which must be followed in adopting a municipal ordinance other than one which rezones private real property. A rezoning ordinance must be adopted by following the stricter procedures set forth in section 166.041(3)(c)(2). This court has held that zoning ordinances are null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirements of section 166.041. David v. City of Dunedin, 473 So.2d 304 (Fla.2d DCA 1985). We have also held that if an ordinance substantially affects land use, it must be enacted under the procedures which govern zoning and rezoning, i.e., section 166.041(3)(c)(2). City of Sanibel v. Buntrock, 409 So.2d 1073 (Fla.2d DCA), petition for review denied, 417 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1982). We agree with the trial court's determination that ordinance 63-80 did not have to be enacted pursuant to the requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(2)....

...A valid impact fee ordinance enacted for the purpose of capital expansion is not a zoning ordinance, and the imposition of a fee for this purpose does not substantially restrict the use of one's property. See Buntrock. Such an ordinance, therefore, may be properly adopted by using the procedure set forth in section 166.041(3)(a)....

...cause they did not contain reasonable standards or guidelines and are vague, indefinite and uncertain. *188 In support of the trial court's findings appellees submit that the ordinances in question were invalid because they violate the provisions of Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...Specifically, appellees contend that 1) the titles of the ordinances in question are defective because they do not contain the subject matter of the ordinance, and 2) the amendatory ordinances are deficient because they do not republish at length the section or subsection of the ordinance which is being amended. Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1973), in pertinent part, provides: "166.041....

...The title need not be an index to the contents. It is not necessary that it delineate in detail the substance of the statute. King Kole, Inc., supra . Our review of the ordinances in question satisfies us there was no violation of the statutory requirements of Section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...n and indefinite because the transcript of the hearing demonstrates that he heard no evidence bearing on that question. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the final judgment which held the ordinances in question are invalid because they violate Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1973), and we remand the cause to the trial court to take additional testimony and make specific findings relative to the constitutionality of the Impact Review provisions of Ordinance 993 as amended....

...City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 681, 1 So.2d 642, 645 (1941). Applying well-settled law we conclude that Ordinance 314 is not substantively unconstitutional. On the procedural point the trial court held Ordinance 314 invalid and unconstitutional for failure to comply with section 166.041(3)(c)(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1976), which requires two advertised public hearings on a proposed zoning ordinance prior to its enactment....

...Although the court did not state how the failure occurred, the Town assumes, and appellee Driggs agrees, that the finding is addressed to an allegation that the time and place of a second public hearing was not announced. Significant to our analysis is section 166.041(3)(a) which expresses the fundamental purpose underlying any requirement for notice....

...quate notice and an opportunity to be heard, before a zoning ordinance is enacted, is a procedural right which may be asserted by one who acquires an interest in the affected land several years after the ordinance becomes law. Considered in light of section 166.041(3)(a), and the case law construing similar enabling statutes, the proposition is also without a logical foundation....

...liminated gas stations as a permitted use in B-2 districts. In this case, Amoco attacked the validity of the new ordinances, 1500.191 and 1500.198, because they were not properly enacted since they did not comply with the publication requirements of section 166.041, Florida Statutes, which the trial court held were "mandatory and jurisdictional" requirements....

...City of Coral Gables, 119 So.2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960), cert. discharged, 126 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1961). The City argues that, even though the procedure in enacting the subsequent ordinances did not technically conform to the advertisement requirements of section 166.041, the trial court should not have relied upon the invalidity of the law absent a vested right/equitable estoppel, citing City of Fort Pierce v....

...28 as an emergency city ordinance. The Florida statute was adopted in its entirety, and identically, except for the penalty which added a jail sentence of up to sixty days. An ordinance by its very definition is a legislative action. Florida Statute section 166.041(1)(a) defines "ordinance" as an "official Legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law." Fla.Stat.Ann. section 166.041(1)(a) (West 1987)....

...nsistent with public morals, peace and safety. It is Plaintiffs' contention that the passage of this resolution is not a legislative act, but is rather an administrative act entitling the Defendants, at best, to a qualified immunity. Florida statute section 166.041(1)(b) defines resolution as "an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body." Fla.Stat.Ann. section 166.041(1)(b) (West 1987)....

...It said: The legislative staff and the courts have looked to municipal ordinance cases for guidance; and the courts have generally held that municipal ordinances which substantially impair the use of land are invalid if they were not enacted with the formality required under section 166.041(3)(c) [the statute which governs the enactment of municipal zoning ordinances]....

...nfair to the several counties which have reasonably relied upon that opinion to enact similar taxes to suddenly declare them illegal. Appellant also asserts that Orange County should have enacted Ordinance 91-17 pursuant to procedures established in section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1991), and not pursuant to section 125.66(1), Florida Statutes (1991). We disagree. Section 166.041 enumerates the procedures a municipality must follow when enacting an ordinance....

...The Charter of the City of Winter Springs clearly provides for holding the referendum election in this case. [7] The record shows that in adopting the ordinance by which the zoning was changed on the subject property, the City complied with all procedural requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (1979), pertaining to zoning and rezoning....

...nce or resolution: (title of ordinance or resolution). A public hearing on the ordinance or resolution will be held on (date and time) at (meeting place). . In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, they allege that Monroe violated Florida Statutes section 166.041....

...may not be located within 2,500 feet of the real property that comprises a public or private elementary school, middle school, or secondary *1368 school unless the ... municipality approves the location under proceedings as provided in ... [section] 166.041(3)(c) ...." [10] A violation of Section 847.0134 constitutes a third-degree felony....

...depressed them. In the absence of anything other than speculation as to the validity of this figure, the Court will assume that it accurately represents the number of entities operating or intending to operate adult businesses in Daytona Beach. [10] Section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes, governs notice and other procedural requirements for consideration of municipal ordinances that would change the zoning of particular parcels or change the uses permitted within particular zoning classifications....

...According to plaintiff, before converting the residentially-zoned property to these non-residential uses, the City was "required to engage in a formal rezoning process with notice to public or to affected owners." Document 46 at 21. The City's failure to provide such notice violates both Section 166.041, Florida Statutes and the United States Constitution....

...inance was changed to accommodate the proposed construction. Before converting the Oven Park property to uses not authorized by the residential zoning classification, the city was required to engage in a formal rezoning proceeding in accordance with Section 166.041, Florida Statutes. [8] Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes provides, in pertinent part, that Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance ......

...ate or proprietary function is that in the case of the former, the municipal corporation is executing the legislative mandate with respect to the public duty generally, while in the other, it is exercising its private rights as a corporate body. [8] Section 166.041(3)(a) states the notice requirements for the adoption of a municipal ordinance. Ordinances "which rezone specific parcels of private real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts" are subject to the more rigid requirements of Section 166.041(3)(c). This case involves the rezoning of public real property. Because no notice was given to plaintiff, it is immaterial (and this court need not decide) whether section 166.041(3)(a) or 166.041(3)(c) governs this action....

...LEVY, Judge. This case involves the validity of Ordinance Number 2763 of the City of Coral Gables, which was adopted in January of 1988. We affirm the trial court's finding that the ordinance is invalid because the requisite notice was not provided under Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...The trial court held that the ordinance was invalid, declared the previously issued building permit void, and enjoined the City from issuing any further permits under the authority of the invalid ordinance. The adoption of the ordinance was governed by Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), because the ordinance was not initiated by the City of Coral Gables, but rather was initiated as a result of the application of the property owner, the John T. McDonald Foundation. As the trial court correctly noted: Section [166.041](3)(a) is the applicable section since the purported notice that the City sent out specifically states that the City will consider application no. 325-P submitted by the John T. McDonald Foundation. The ordinance was thus initiated by a private individual, not a city or its designee, and section (3)(a) applies to this situation. Thus, the procedural provisions of Section 166.041(3)(a), rather than Section 166.041(3)(c), applied to the adoption of the subject ordinance, and required that the proposed ordinance be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...In the instant case, there was no newspaper publication of notice of the City Commission meeting at which adoption of the ordinance took place. Accordingly, the ordinance is null and void because the City failed to follow the mandatory notice requirements of Section 166.041(3)(a)....

...Thus, only the City Commission can set policy, and it can do so only through a duly enacted ordinance or resolution. In Florida, an ordinance is the "official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law." § 166.041(1)(a), Fla....

...A resolution may be adopted at a regular or special meeting of the legislative body without published notice. Except in emergency cases, a proposed ordinance is subject to at least two public readings prior to adoption and must be published in a newspaper of general circulation at least ten days prior to adoption. § 166.041, Fla....

...Corp., Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 664 F.Supp. 488 (S.D.Fla. 1987). In A.B.T., the plaintiff challenged the validity of a city ordinance on the ground that the published title was insufficient to provide adequate notice under the requirements of § 166.041, Fla....

...rtions of the proposed ordinance during the enactment process through different drafts. Rather, defendant complied with all notice and hearing requirements of § 125.66. [9] The court notes that the while Hallandale court dealt with Florida Statutes § 166.041, there is an exact correlation to the language of § 125.67, which prohibits "an ordinance from being enacted by reference to its title only." Plaintiffs have relied upon this language in their Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment at p....

...The Court now addresses SFEF's arguments against mootness. *1282 1. Validity of the New Zoning Ordinance SFEF contends that the New Zoning Ordinance is void because the City enacted it without providing notice pursuant to the notice provisions in sections 166.041(3)(a) and (c) of the Florida Statutes and a void ordinance cannot moot a challenge to an ordinance it purports to repeal. Section 166.041(3)(a) provides that a proposed ordinance "shall at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed in the newspaper ..." Fla. Stat. § 166.041(3)(a)....

...The first public shall be held at least 7 days after the day that the first advertisement is published. The second hearing shall be held at least 10 days after the first hearing and shall be advertised at least 5 days prior to a public hearing. Fla. Stat. § 166.041(3)(c)....

...the "permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category" and that challenges to the new ordinance are beyond the scope of this case as framed by the specific allegations in SFEF's Complaint. The Court agrees with the City. Sections 166.041(3)(a) and (c) of the Florida Statutes are inapplicable because the New Zoning Ordinance does not change the prohibited uses in the zoning category....

...Moreover, as the City correctly points out, challenges to the validity of the new ordinance are beyond the scope of the allegations made by SFEF in its Complaint. Accordingly, SFEF has failed to demonstrate that the new zoning ordinance is void due to the City's failure to comply with section 166.041(3) of the Florida Statutes, and thus has failed to persuade the Court that its claims are not moot....

...City is correct that neither charter amendment is a "land development regulation," which is defined as "an ordinance enacted by a local governing body ...." § 163.3213(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). An "ordinance" is legislative action of the governing body. § 166.041(1)(a), Fla....

...163.387 ; creates a community redevelopment agency; approves, adopts, or amends a community redevelopment plan; or issues redevelopment revenue bonds under s. 163.385 , the governing body must provide public notice of such proposed action pursuant to s. 125.66 (2) or s. 166.041 (3)(a) and, at least 15 days before such proposed action, mail by registered mail a notice to each taxing authority which levies ad valorem taxes on taxable real property contained within the geographic boundaries of the redevelopment area...

...to absolve the county or municipality of its obligations under the statute. Where the Legislature has prescribed the manner in which something is to be done, it is, in effect, a prohibition against it being done in a different manner. 7 You refer to section 166.041 (7), Florida Statutes, which provides in part: "Without limitation, the common law doctrines of laches and waiver are valid defenses to any action challenging the validity of an ordinance or resolution based on failure to strictly adhere to the provisions contained in this section....

...Standing to initiate a challenge to the adoption of an ordinance or resolution based on a failure to strictly adhere to the provisions contained in this section shall be limited to a person who was entitled to actual or constructive notice at the time the ordinance or resolution was adopted. " Section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, thus recognizes that the doctrine of waiver may be a defense to an action challenging an ordinance's validity for failing to comply with the requirements of that statute. Pursuant to section 163.346 , Florida Statutes, the governing body of a municipality seeking to create a community redevelopment agency must provide public notice of such action pursuant to section 166.041 (3)(a), Florida Statutes. Section 166.346 also requires that notice be provided by registered mail to each of the taxing authorities levying ad valorem taxes on property within the boundaries of the proposed community redevelopment agency. While section 163.346 refers to section 166.041 when discussing the public notice requirements, no reference is made to section 166.041 when providing for the separate requirement of notice to the taxing authorities. Any challenge to the notice, or lack thereof, to the taxing authorities would not be based on the failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 166.041 , but of section 163.346 ....

...ion by reading such resolution by title only or must such resolution be read in full? SUMMARY: Unless an ordinance or charter provision adopted subsequent to October 1, 1973, provides otherwise, no reading of a resolution is required by the terms of s. 166.041 , F.S., for the valid adoption of a municipal resolution; resolutions may (but are not required to) be read by title only. Section 166.041 , F.S., establishes a uniform procedure for the adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions....

...in a charter do not fall within the several exceptions specified in s. 166.021 (4), and that therefore, the procedural requirements for legislative or ordinance-making action of the governing body of a municipality are governed by the provisions of s. 166.041 , F.S. See AGO 081-32. Further, subsection (6) of s. 166.041 , F.S., provides: The procedure as set forth herein shall constitute a uniform method for the adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions and shall be taken as cumulative to other methods now provided by law for adoption and enactment of municipal ordinance and resolutions....

...in greater detail than contained herein. However, a municipality shall not have the power or authority to lessen or reduce the requirements of this section or other requirements as provided by general law. Thus, the reading requirements contained in s. 166.041 , F.S., constitute the minimum, mandatory procedures for the adoption of resolutions which cannot be lessened or reduced by a municipality. And unless additional or more stringent requirements for the adoption of resolutions are specified by an ordinance or charter amendment adopted subsequent to the effective date of s. 166.041 , F.S., October 1, 1973, the requirements set forth therein are the minimum requirements necessary for the valid adoption of a resolution. A resolution is defined by s. 166.041 (1)(b), F.S., to mean `an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body.' This is consistent with the general statement contained in 62 C.J.S....

...character, nor prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is merely declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation in a given matter, and in the nature of a ministerial or administrative act, and is not a law.' Subsection (2) of s. 166.041 , F.S., sets forth the minimum requirements for the passage of a resolution. `Each . . . resolution shall be introduced in writing and shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith. The subject shall be clearly stated in the title.' These are all the requirements provided by s. 166.041 , F.S., necessary for the valid adoption of a municipal resolution. Subsection (3)(a) of s. 166.041 , F.S., sets forth the reading requirements for an ordinance but no reading is required for the valid adoption of a resolution....

QUESTION: Does that part of Ch. 76-155, Laws of Florida, amending s. 166.041 (3)(a), F....

...Petersburg Beach (effective July 30, 1976), which provides that a proposed ordinance "shall, at least 14 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in that city"? SUMMARY: That part of Ch. 76-155, Laws of Florida, which amends s. 166.041 (3)(a), F....

...ption," does not affect in any way the requirement contained in the recently revised charter of the City of St. Petersburg Beach (effective July 30, 1976) that a proposed ordinance be given the prescribed notice "at least 14 days prior to adoption." Section 166.041 (3)(a), F....

...S., formerly provided in part that a proposed municipal ordinance "shall, at least 14 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality." (Emphasis supplied.) However, Ch. 76-155, Laws of Florida, which took effect upon becoming a law June 16, 1976, amended s. 166.041 (3)(a) so as to, inter alia, reduce the notice requirement for a proposed ordinance from "at least 14" to "at least 7 days prior to adoption." (Emphasis supplied.) You inquire as to how this amendment affects the requirement in the recently revised charter of the City of St. Petersburg Beach, which became effective July 30, 1976, that notice of a proposed ordinance be given "at least 14 days prior to adoption." (Emphasis supplied.) As stated in AGO 074-371, s. 166.041 , F....

...73- 129, Laws of Florida, the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, establishes a uniform procedure for the adoption of municipal ordinances and resolutions which is applicable to, and cannot be lessened or reduced by, any municipality in the state. However, it was also stated that s. 166.041 (6) authorizes a municipality, by future ordinance or charter amendment, to specify additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or resolutions or prescribe procedures in greater detail than contained in s. 166.041 . Thus, it was concluded in AGO 074-371 that the city council of the City of Miramar was authorized by s. 166.041 (6) to adopt by ordinance or charter amendment "additional, more stringent requirements than those established by s. 166.041 ." Cf. AGO 075-173. Likewise, in the instant situation, I am of the opinion that when the revised charter of the City of St. Petersburg Beach became effective on July 30, 1976, that city was authorized by s. 166.041 (6), F. S., to adopt a charter amendment establishing additional, more stringent requirements for the adoption of ordinances than those contained in s. 166.041 (3)(a), F....

...S., as amended by Ch. 76-155, Laws of Florida. And, since the minimum notice requirement for proposed ordinances in the revised charter of the City of St. Petersburg Beach — 14 days — is more stringent than the minimum notice requirement contained in s. 166.041 (3)(a), as amended by Ch....

...The delay in placing the proposed amendment on the ballot was due to a suit between Shulmister and the City of Pompano Beach. The issues in that case were eventually resolved by this court in Shulmister v. City of Pompano Beach, 798 So.2d 799 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review denied, 821 So.2d 293 (Fla.2002). . Section 166.041(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) defines 'ordinance' as "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law." Section 166.041(l)(b) defines 'resolution' as “an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of...

...sibly joining two proposals in one: (a) the restructuring of the City of Miami government, and (b) the early election for mayor. The trial court concluded that the City's proposal is invalid because it fails to meet the single subject requirement of Section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes (1999) which relates to *556 the adoption of municipal ordinances and resolutions, and reads in part: "Each ordinance or resolution shall be introduced in writing and shall embrace but one subject and matters prop...

...Compare , Farnsley v. Henderson, 240 S.W.2d 82 at 84 (Ct.Ap. Ky. 1951) (holding that what constitutes a material or substantial change in an ordinance between first consideration and enactment is dependent upon the circumstances of each case). Subsection (1)(a) of s 166.041 , F.S., defines `ordinance' for the purposes of that section as `an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law.' See also , AGO 075-171. Section 166.041 generally sets forth the procedures for adoption of ordinances, s 166.041 (6) specifically providing that: The procedure as set forth herein shall constitute a uniform method for the adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions and shall be taken as cumulative to other methods now provided by law for adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions....

...al law. (e.s.) See , AGO's 081-32; 075-173; 074-371 (concluding that this statute provides a uniform method for the enactment of municipal ordinances unless a municipality has adopted more stringent requirements subsequent to the effective date of s 166.041 ). Subsection (3)(a) of s 166.041 sets forth this uniform method: Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 7 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...Thus, both the reading and notice provisions of this section should be regarded as mandatory. See also , 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations s 418(a). However, my research has revealed no Florida appellate decisions which are germane to the specific issues raised by your inquiry, nor have I found any cases which interpret s 166.041 (3)(a) in these particular areas....

...of fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. In City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, supra , at 488, the Second District Court of Appeal found correct and affirmed the trial court's conclusion of law stating, inter alia , the legislative intent of s 166.041 (3)(a): `[t]he legislative intent is to give the public notice of the ordinance and to make the council itself aware of the ordinance's effect . . . .' In view of the above authorities, I must conclude that if any substantial or material changes or amendments are made during the adoption process, the enactment process mandated by s 166.041 (3)(a) must start anew, with full compliance with the reading and notice requirements contained therein....

...In sum, unless and until legislatively or judicially determined otherwise, it is my opinion that if any substantial or material changes or amendments are made during the process of enacting a municipal ordinance, the enactment process mandated by s 166.041 (3)(a) must begin anew with full compliance with the reading and notice requirements contained therein....

...Additionally, Anderson asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting his challenge to the City of St. Pete Beach, Florida, Ordinance 2011-19 (June 28, 2011), an amendment to the appellee City's comprehensive plan based on the City's failure to publish notice in accordance with section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011)....

...ion 163.32466, amendments to the City's Charter, and an amendment to the City's comprehensive plan during a series of seven shade meetings. We conclude that Ordinance 2011-19 is void because the City did not comply with the notice requirements of section 166.041 when it passed the ordinance....

...because it was enacted pursuant to section 163.32466, which he contends is unconstitutional. However, we do not reach this constitutional argument because we conclude that the ordinance is invalid because the City did not comply with the notice provisions of section 166.041.1 Section 166.041(3)(c) in pertinent part provides: (c) Ordinances initiated by other than the municipality that change the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land shall be enacted pursuan...

...least 5 days a week unless the only newspaper in the municipality is published less than 5 days a week. This court and others have held that zoning ordinances not strictly enacted pursuant to the notice provisions of section 166.041 are null and void. See, e.g., David v. City of Dunedin, 473 So. 2d 304, 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ("[T]he ordinance and its amendment are zoning ordinances which are null and void if not strictly enacted pursuant to the requirements of section 166.041."); Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (same). The City does not dispute that it did not follow the procedure outlined in section 166.041(3), nor does it offer any argument in defense of its failure to do so....

...dinance -4- was "clearly a legislative enactment," a point which is not in dispute and which is not pertinent to the question of whether the ordinance had to be enacted pursuant to the provisions of section 166.041(c)(3). Accordingly, we conclude that Ordinance 2011-19 is null and void because the City did not comply with the notice provisions of section 166.041(c)(3). Anderson also challenges the entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on his claim that the appellees violated article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution and section 286.011, the Government in the Sunshine Law....

...The primary remedy Anderson has sought in bringing his Sunshine Law claim—having the adoption of the comprehensive plan amendment voided—has already been accomplished by virtue of our determination that the plan amendment was improperly adopted without complying with the notice provision of section 166.041(c)(3)....

not satisfy the requirements of the statute. Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes, requires that, at

...s enactment. Accordingly, we reverse the final summary judgment and remand the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED. PALMER, C.J., and LAWSON, J., concur. . Section 166.041(3)(C), Florida Statutes (2006), requires that proposed ordinances which change the "list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category” must provide for public notice and hearings in the form of “two adver...

...The addition of hundreds of homes would displace students and necessitate busing to neighboring schools. She further testified she had submitted extensive documentation as to adverse environmental impacts, including potential effects on fish and wildlife. 2 Section 166.041(4), Florida Statutes (2021), provides, in pertinent part: “A majority of the members of the governing body shall constitute a quorum....

...1st DCA 2011) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003)). 5  LEGAL ANALYSIS Notice of the Public Hearing Chapter 166, Florida Statutes (2021) Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2021), codifies the procedures for the adoption of ordinances and resolutions....

...escribe procedures in greater detail than contained herein. However, a municipality shall not have the power or authority to lessen or reduce the requirements of this section or other requirements as provided by general law. § 166.041(6), Fla....

...or resolution based on a failure to strictly adhere to the provisions contained in this section shall be limited to a person who was entitled to actual or constructive notice at the time the ordinance or resolution was adopted. § 166.041(7), Fla....

ordinances which rezone private real property. Section 166.041(3)(d) provides in part as follows: (d) Enactment

home rule powers is an ordinance. Accord: Section 166.041 as to municipal action of "a general and permanent

...The Court cannot find in these facts that the City's actions had no foundation in reason or that they were an arbitrary exercise of power having no rational relationship to public health, safety, or welfare. As such, summary judgment should be granted as to Counts I and II. COUNT IV: FLORIDA STATUTES SECTION 166.041 Count IV alleges a violation of Florida Statutes section 166.041, which sets out the requirements that must be followed by a municipality when enacting ordinances....

...ly to the date on which the ordinance itself actually takes effect. Here, the ordinance was adopted on May 14, 2001 and, by its terms, became effective immediately, as permitted by the statute. [8] See doc. 1, att. 1, exh. D at 8:6. Florida Statutes section 166.041 is simply inapplicable to Watson's argument about the zoning-in-progress date. Any argument Watson has about the City's selection of February 12, 2001 as the cutoff date is simply not cognizable under section 166.041....

QUESTION: Is a resolution adopted when two members vote in favor of the resolution, one votes against, and one abstains, when only four members of a five-member town commission are present at a meeting? SUMMARY: Under s. 166.041 (4), F.S., where only four members of a five-member town commission are present at a meeting of such body, the adoption of a resolution requires the affirmative vote of at least three members, irrespective of the fact that one of the members present abstained from voting. The Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, Ch. 73-129, Laws of Florida, enacted a new Ch. 166, F. S., which includes specific provisions respecting the adoption of resolutions by the governing bodies of municipalities. Section 166.041 (1)(b), F.S., now defines a "resolution" as . . . an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body. Section 166.041 (4), F.S., provides: (4) A majority of the members of the governing body shall constitute a quorum....

...On final passage, the vote of each member of the governing body voting shall be entered on the official record of the meeting. All ordinances or resolutions passed by the governing body shall become effective ten days after passage or as otherwise provided therein. Section 166.041 (6), F.S., provides that the foregoing "shall constitute a uniform method for the adoption and enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions" and, although municipalities may specify additional requirements, "a municipality shall not have the power or authority to lessen or reduce the requirements of this section [s. 166.041 , F.S.] ....

a quorum present) to take official action. Section 166.041, F.S., establishes a uniform procedure for

...gs. Based on the foregoing, we grant appellees’ motions to certify a question of great public importance. However, we do not agree with appellees’ proposed certified question. Appellees’ proposed certified question asks: Whether section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), requires a municipality to re-advertise an ordinance proposed for adoption, where the advertised public meeting is held, and the ordinance is considered, but the vote adopting the...

...reflect the record and our holding. To that end, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question of great public importance: Where an ordinance proposed for adoption is initially advertised for a date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), and the proposed ordinance is considered at the advertised public meeting, but the proposed adoption is postponed on the record from the advertised public meeting to a subsequent date certain public meeting, does section 166.041(3)(a) require 2  the municipality to re-advertise the ordinance proposed for adoption for the subsequent date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a)? Motions for certification granted; rephrased question certified. KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and GERBER, J., concur. GERBER, J., concurs specially with an opinion. ARTAU, J., dissents with an opinion. GERBER, J., concurring speci...

...to adopt a proposed ordinance. Second, the issue’s resolution affects parties statewide, because we have held that where an ordinance proposed 3 for adoption is initially advertised for a date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), and the proposed ordinance is considered at the advertised public meeting, but the proposed adoption is postponed on the record from the advertised public meeting to a subsequent date certain public meeting, section 166.041(3)(a) requires the municipality to re-advertise the ordinance proposed for adoption for the subsequent date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a)....

...w issue with very unique facts”). Rather, as the amici cogently articulate, this case presents facts commonly occurring statewide: an ordinance proposed for adoption is initially advertised for a date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), and the proposed ordinance is considered at the advertised public meeting, but the proposed adoption is postponed on the record from the advertised public meeting to a subsequent date certain public meeting. Those commonly occurring facts raise a broad legal question applying statewide: whether section 166.041(3) requires the municipality to re-advertise the ordinance proposed for adoption for the subsequent date certain public meeting in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a). For these reasons, we grant appellees’ motions to certify a question of great public importance. ARTAU, J., dissenting. I dissent from the certification of the question deemed by the majority to be one of great public importance....

...Instead, they seek certification because they do not believe they are statutorily obligated to notify the public whenever the date and time of a meeting to adopt an ordinance is postponed to another date and time that has never been publicly advertised in compliance with section 166.041(3)(a), Fla....

...(2018). Put simply, the issue presented in this appeal does not give rise to a question of great public importance. Merely determining that a municipal government is required to comply at minimal expense with the technical public notice requirements set forth in section 166.041(3)(a) by timely publishing notice containing the date, time, and place of a meeting in a local newspaper of general circulation, is not an issue of great public importance....

comply with the single subject requirement of section 166.041(2), Florida Statutes? In sum, it is my opinion

of the Board meeting, and the public hearing, § 166.041, Fla.Stat. (1989); § 125.001, Fla.Stat. (1989);

restrictive than the provisions of s. 166.041(4). Section 166.041(6) authorizes municipalities to provide for

...section 3.02 that either kind of commission action in the form of an ordinance or resolution can be vetoed by the mayor. [1] There is nothing in state law that inhibits the citizens of West Palm Beach from setting up such a veto power for its mayor. Section 166.041 defines the terms "ordinance" and "resolution," but the definition creates no conflict with the mayor's veto power....

...of the kind involved in this dispute, so the commission may act by resolution. The veto power in section 3.02 gives the mayor the power to veto virtually all resolutions, so long as they do not involve emergency appropriations or borrowing. [2] See § 166.041(1), Fla....

...Plaintiff is utilizing the structure four days per week. It is Plaintiff's contention that it will be unable to stay in business if its use of the structure is limited to two days per week. Plaintiff has apparently invested in excess of $200,000.00 on its bingo hall business venture. II. APPLICATION OF SECTION 166.041(3), F.S....

...However, only one of such grounds was presented for the Court's consideration on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Injunction. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the subject ordinance is invalid because the City did not comply with the procedural notice requirements set forth in Section 166.041(3), Fla. Stat. (1993). Section 166.041(3)(c) sets forth certain procedural requirements for the enactment of ordinances which "rezone specific parcels of private real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts." The City stipulates it did not provide notice of the proposed ordinance pursuant to Subsection (c)....

...It is the City's position that subsection (c) is not applicable because Ordinance 94-47 does not "rezone property or substantially change permitted use categories." Thus, the City argues it was only required to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in subsection (a) of F.S. 166.041(3)....

...CONCLUSION In conclusion, the Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on its claim that Melbourne City Ordinance 94-47 is invalid because of Melbourne's alleged failure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in Section 166.041(3), Fla....

...e or resolution). A public hearing on the ordinance or resolution will be held on (date and time) at (meeting place). 2 In Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, they allege that Monroe violated Florida Statutes section 166.041....

...May a municipal legislative body vacate a street or alley by resolution as well as by ordinance? 2. May such ordinance be adopted as an emergency ordinance, if an ordinance is required? In sum: 1. Within the purview of the definitions of the words "ordinance" and "resolution" contained in section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, it would appear that, at least with respect to the permanent vacating of a street or alley by a municipal legislative body, the more appropriate procedure would be the adoption of an ordinance rather than a resolution. 2. If it reasonably appears to a municipal legislative body that to follow the procedure for adopting nonemergency ordinances pursuant to section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, would result in serious injury or damage to the people, the government, or the community directly concerned, then the emergency procedure may be followed....

...520; 11 McQuillin Municipal Corporations s. 30.196. In this regard, section 167.09, Florida Statutes 1971, did not specifically prescribe the procedure for vacating streets and alleys. Nor does Chapter 166 , Florida Statutes, specifically address this issue. However, section 166.041 (1) defines the word "ordinance" as used therein to mean "an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law"; and the word "resolution" is defined to mean "an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body." Section 166.041 (1)(b)....

...Stat., requiring a board of county commissioners to set a definite time and place for a public hearing to consider the advisability of vacating a road under its control. Question Two As to whether an ordinance providing for the vacating of a street or alley may be adopted as an emergency ordinance pursuant to section 166.041 , Florida Statutes — establishing the minimum procedural requirements for the adoption of municipal ordinances — the initial determination of the existence vel non of an emergency is, of course, a matter for the municipal legislative body....

...oncerned. See , 5 McQuillin Municipal Corporations s. 15.40, p. 124. In answer to your second question, therefore, if it reasonably appears to a municipal legislative body that to follow the procedure for adopting nonemergency ordinances pursuant to section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, would result in serious injury or damage to the people, the government, or the community directly concerned, then the emergency procedure may be followed....

...creased the developable area on the oceanfront. Opposed to the new development, Testa took action. First, Testa filed suit against the Town, alleging that Ordinance 376 was void ab initio because the Town did not follow the notice provisions in section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), prior to enacting the ordinance. Notably, the trial court permitted Dolphin Suite to intervene in Testa’s suit. On appeal, we agreed that the Town did not comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice provisions prior to enacting Ordinance 376. Testa v....

...WOULD AN ORDINANCE PROVIDING FOR THE PLACEMENT OF ADDITIONAL USES WITHIN THE SPECIAL EXCEPTION CATEGORY IN VARIOUS RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS ESTABLISHED BY THE RIVIERA BEACH ZONING CODE BE CONSIDERED AN ORDINANCE WHICH WOULD "SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGE PERMITTED USE CATEGORIES IN ZONING DISTRICTS" WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S.? 2....

...ses within zoning districts established by the Riviera Beach Zoning Code designated "uses permitted by special exception" would constitute a substantial change in a permitted use category in a zoning district such that the provisions for notice of s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., would apply....

...districts including the RS-8 district described herein. The notice of public hearing you have provided also contemplates the inclusion of daycare centers within two-family dwelling districts and multiple family/hotel districts by special exception. Section 166.041 , F.S., establishes a uniform procedure for the adoption of municipal ordinances and resolutions. These procedures are generally applicable to all municipalities throughout the state and the requirements set forth in s 166.041 , F.S., cannot be lessened or reduced by any municipality. See, AGO's 80-104 and 74-371. However, a municipality may specify additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or prescribe procedures in greater detail than as set forth in this section. Section 166.041 (6), F.S. Prior to its amendment by s 1, Ch. 83-301, Laws of Florida, s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., specifically provided minimum procedures to be followed by municipalities rezoning private real property. As amended, s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., now speaks to ordinances "which rezone specific parcels of private real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts ....

...by mail to each of the real property owners whose land the municipality will rezone by the enactment or whose land will be affected by the change in permitted use is required at least thirty days prior to a public hearing on the proposed ordinance. Section 166.041 (3)(c)1., F.S....

...For proposed ordinances rezoning or changing the permitted use of more than five percent of the total land area of the municipality, the statute sets out specific requirements for advertised notice prior to two public hearings on the proposed ordinance. See, s 166.041 (3)(c)2., F.S. In addition to the provisions for advertised notice, s 166.041 (3)(c)2.c., F.S., states that in lieu of publishing the advertisement described in subparagraph 2. of subsection (3)(c) the municipality may mail notice to each person who owns real property within the area the ordinance covers. As stated in s 166.041 (3)(c)2.c., the notice prescribed therein shall clearly explain the proposed ordinance and shall notify the person of the time, place and location of both public hearings on the proposed ordinance. No definition or construction of the term "substantially" is contained within s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., as that term is used in the phrase "which substantially change permitted use categories." However, words in common use in a statute are to be construed in their plain and ordinary sense....

...ion seem to "substantially change," i.e., materially or essentially change, the uses permitted in the affected zoning districts of Riviera Beach. Therefore, it would appear that the City of Riviera Beach must comply with the notice requirements of s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., as the proposed ordinances substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts as contemplated therein. QUESTION TWO As discussed previously herein, a municipality may specify additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or prescribe procedures in greater detail than provided in s 166.041 , F.S. See, s 166.041 (6), F.S. Such additional procedures for rezoning ordinances were established in 1982 by the City of Riviera Beach and require individual notice to property owners within three hundred feet of the property affected by rezoning. The amendment of s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., by Ch....

...f ordinances which rezone real property or (to use the language of the state statutory provision) which substantially change the permitted use categories in zoning districts such procedures must be followed in addition to the basic requirements of s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S. Therefore, in cases in which the proposed rezoning or change in permitted use involves less than five percent of the total land area of the municipality, s 166.041 (3)(c)1., F.S., prescribes notice by mail to each of the real property owners whose land the municipality will rezone or whose land will be affected by the change in permitted use....

...ng or change in permitted use be afforded to property owners within three hundred feet of the affected property. With regard to instances in which the proposed ordinance deals with more than five percent of the total land area of the municipality, s 166.041 (3)(c)2., F.S., sets out specific requirements for advertised notice prior to two public hearings on the proposed ordinance or, in lieu of publishing such notice, a municipality may mail notice to each person who owns real property within the area the ordinance covers pursuant to paragraph 2.c., of subsection (3)(c)....

...In each case the code calls for individual notice to property owners within three hundred feet of the affected property. It does not appear that any duplication of notice is called for under the statute, so that, to the extent that the notice in s 166.041 (3)(c)2.c., F.S., is appropriate, such notice may be utilized in lieu of a newspaper advertisement and this would appear to satisfy, in part, the individual notice requirements of the Riviera Beach Code which call for additional notice to property owners within three hundred feet of the affected property....

...In sum, it is my opinion that an ordinance providing for the placement of additional uses permitted by special exception in various zoning districts established by the Riviera Beach Zoning Code would "substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts" within the purview of s 166.041 (3)(c), F.S. In addition to the notice requirements specified in s 166.041 (3)(c), the City of Riviera Beach is required to comply with any additional notice requirements established by ordinance of the municipality for the enactment of ordinances which apply to the rezoning of specific parcels of real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts....

"ordinance" and "resolution" contained in section 166.041, Florida Statutes, it would appear that, at

...state regarding legislation in this area. 2 Section 171.0413 , Florida Statutes, provides that a municipality may annex contiguous, compact, unincorporated territory by ordi-nance adopted by the governing body pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, for nonemergency ordinances....

...dinances. 2 The governing body of the municipality, therefore, may enact an ordinance amending or repealing the charter provision. Until such time as the council enacts such an ordinance, however, existing ordinances and charter provisions govern. 3 Section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, establishes a uniform procedure for the enactment of municipal ordinances and resolutions which is applicable to, and cannot be lessened or reduced by, a municipality....

...4 However, as provided in subsection (6) of the statute, a municipality may specify by future ordinance or charter amendment additional requirements for the adoption of ordinances or resolutions, or prescribe procedures in greater detail than contained in section 166.041 , Florida Statutes....

...nitiatives and referenda for the adoption of ordinances, have been nullified and repealed or have become ordinances of the city, subject to modification or repeal as are other ordinances. Thus, the governing body of the municipality may, pursuant to section 166.041 , Florida Statutes, alter or amend the procedures for citizens' initiatives or referenda for the adoption of ordinances without an approving referenda by the electorate....

...The use of the term “passage” to qualify the thirty day time period for review in Section 171.081 further supports the construction that the time period runs following passage of the annexation ordinance by the municipal governing body and prior to the referendum. In Section 166.041(4), Fla....

by municipalities in enacting ordinances. Section 166.041(3). Therefore, I also assume that Sanibel has

...Ordinance 376—a town resident (“the plaintiff”) filed suit against the Town, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff’s suit argued that the Town—before adopting Ordinance 376—had failed to comply with certain notice requirements contained in section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2018), entitled “Procedures for adoption of ordinances and resolutions.” More specifically, the plaintiff’s amended complaint argued that the Town had failed to comply with section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), and section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2018). Section 166.041(3)(a) provides: Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...and the place or places within the municipality where such proposed ordinances may be inspected by the public. The notice shall also advise that interested parties may appear at the meeting and be heard with respect to the proposed ordinance. § 166.041(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2018). Section 166.041(3)(c) provides, in pertinent part: Ordinances that change the actual list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category, or ordinances initiated by the municipality that change the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land shall be enacted pursuant to [certain enumerated procedures identified in section 166.041(3)(c)1. and 2., Florida Statutes (2018).] 2 § 166.041(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). On the parties’ competing summary judgment motions, the circuit court found the Town had complied with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements before adopting Ordinance 376. The circuit court also found the Town need not have complied with section 166.041(3)(c)’s procedures before adopting Ordinance 376, because Ordinance 376 did not “change the [Town’s] actual list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning category” or “change the actual zoning map designation of a parcel or parcels of land” within the Town....

...The circuit court entered a final judgment to those effects in the Town’s and the intervenors’ favor. The plaintiff then commenced this appeal from that final judgment. Regarding the circuit court’s finding that the Town need not have complied with section 166.041(3)(c)’s procedures before adopting Ordinance 376, we affirm without further discussion. However, we conclude the Town did not comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements before adopting Ordinance 376....

...Thus, we reverse that portion of the circuit court’s final judgment which had found in the Town’s and the intervenors’ favor on this issue. We remand for a trial on the Town’s and the intervenors’ defenses that, despite the Town’s failure to comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements before adopting Ordinance 376, laches and waiver preclude the plaintiff from challenging Ordinance 376’s validity. See § 166.041(7), Fla....

...The Plaintiff’s Suit Against the Town On June 2, 2021—nearly two years after the Town had adopted Ordinance 376—the plaintiff filed suit against the Town for declaratory and injunctive relief, based on the Town’s alleged failure to comply with the procedures stated in section 166.041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (2018). The plaintiff later filed an amended complaint against the Town, alleging three counts. Count I sought a declaratory judgment to void Ordinance 376 based on the Town’s alleged failure to comply with the notice requirements in section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). Count I specifically alleged: 5  [Section] 166.041(3)(a)[, Florida Statutes (2018)] provides[:] “[Except as provided in paragraph (c),] a proposed ordinance [may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and] shall, at least 10 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality....

...” stating the correct date … May 7, 2019 […] for the public hearing at which the second reading would occur and the Ordinance would be adopted. …. Strict adherence to the notice requirements of [s]ection 166.041(3)(a)[, Florida Statutes (2018)] is required or the ordinance is void....

...The Town’s reason for adopting the Ordinance at a public hearing held on a date other than the date in the published notice (April 15, 2019) is irrelevant. The Town’s adoption of the Ordinance at the May 7, 2019 hearing was in violation of [s]ection 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes [(2018)]; accordingly, the Ordinance is void ab initio. (paragraph numbers deleted). Count II, in the alternative, sought a declaratory judgment that the Town had adopted Ordinance 376 in violation of section 166.041(3)(c). Count III, presupposing Ordinance 376’s invalidity, sought injunctive relief “from the wrongful enforcement of the Town’s Revised [Waterfront] 6 Setback Line and any resulting...

...respective answers and affirmative defenses to the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. Amongst other affirmative defenses, the Town and the intervenors asserted that the common law doctrines of laches and waiver barred the plaintiff’s suit. See § 166.041(7), Fla....

...The Town’s summary judgment motion—accompanied by the intervenors’ similar motion—argued as follows regarding the plaintiff’s Count I: 7  [T]he Town far exceeded all of the minimum notice requirements of [s]ection 166.041(3)(a)[, Florida Statutes (2018)]....

...ditional actual notice provided to him at every point in the process. That decision was his own. No basis exists to void Ordinance 376. The plaintiff’s summary judgment motion summarized his Count I argument as follows: Section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes [(2018)], required that the Town publish a notice of proposed enactment in a newspaper of general circulation, and such notice was required to state the date of proposed enactment....

...judgment motions, the circuit court orally ruled: 9  I’m granting the summary judgment for the Intervenors and the Town. I don’t think the ordinance changed what it needed to change for [section 166.041(3)(c)’s procedures] to be required. I think the notice that was given is sufficient [under section 166.041(3)(a)]....

...things as reliance, who knew what when, so I’m not granting the summary judgment on those points. Later, the circuit court entered its written order which, in accordance with its oral ruling, found: (1) as to Count I, the Town had complied with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements; (2) as to Count II, the Town was not required to have complied with section 166.041(3)(c)’s procedures; and (3) “[b]ecause … Count III requires a finding in Plaintiff’s favor as to Counts I or II, which th[e] Court has not so found, Plaintiff is not entitled to the injunctive relief sought therein.” More specifically as to Count I, the circuit court’s written order found: The Plaintiff’s contention that the Town failed to comply with section 166.041(3)(a) … by failing to publish a second notice of Ordinance 376 and, specifically, to separately publish notice of the continued May 7, 2019 meeting at which Ordinance 376 was adopted, is based on a flawed interpretation of the relevant statute. Section 166.041(3)(a) … merely requires that a proposed ordinance be noticed once, “at least 10 days prior to adoption”; it does not — as Plaintiff argues — require 10-day notice of the hearing at which the ordinance is adopted....

...ed by section 286.011[,] Florida Statutes[,] if unable to reach a proposed ordinance on a busy agenda. The actions of the Town in relation to the adoption of Ordinance 376 complied with the minimum requirements established by section 166.041(3)(a) …. The Court likewise rejects the assertion that the continuation of the April 15 meeting to May 7 deprived Plaintiff of statutory notice of a public hearing on Ordinance 376....

...opportunity to be heard was provided. The law requires nothing further. (paragraph numbers, citations, footnotes, and exhibit references deleted). The circuit court’s written order also addressed the Town’s and the intervenors’ laches and waiver defenses under section 166.041(7): While this Court does not need to reach the defenses … given its conclusion that the Town complied with Florida law in connection with the adoption of Ordinance 376, the Court does find that summary j...

...Because this case was decided under the new Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (2021). “[O]rdinances which fall within the ambit of section 166.041(3) … must be strictly enacted pursuant to the statute’s notice provisions[.]” Coleman v. City of Key West, 807 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Thus, if an ordinance is not strictly enacted pursuant to section 166.041(3)’s notice provisions, the ordinance is “null and void.” Id. Here, the primary issue is whether the Town strictly complied with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements in advance of the Town Commission’s adoption of Ordinance 376 on May 7, 2019, when: 11  1....

...376 — Second Reading, Waterfront Setback Lines (WFSBL);” and 5. the Town had properly noticed the Town Commission’s May 7, 2019, meeting in compliance with the Sunshine Act, section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2018). Given those five facts, we conclude the Town did not strictly comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s notice requirements in advance of the Town Commission’s adoption of Ordinance 376 on May 7, 2019. Our conclusion rests upon the Florida Supreme Court’s pronouncement in American Home Assurance Co....

...and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Id. at 366 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, to give significance and effect “to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of” section 166.041(3)(a), and to avoid rendering any part of section 166.041(3)(a) meaningless, we conclude section 166.041(3)(a) 12 addresses only the meeting at which the proposed ordinance is to be enacted. Section 166.041(3)(a) simply does not address the possibility, as occurred here, of a proposed ordinance’s enactment being postponed from one meeting to another, with notice of the proposed ordinance’s enactment being directed to only the earlier meeting, and not the later meeting. Nor does section 166.041(3)(a) provide that a notice of proposed enactment stating one meeting’s date, time, and place, suffices to provide notice of proposed enactment at another meeting’s date, time, and place. The most significant word within section 166.041(3)(a) is perhaps our vocabulary’s most simple word—“the.” The word “the” modifies several words and phrases within section 166.041(3)(a) to indicate that section 166.041(3)(a) addresses only the meeting at which the proposed ordinance is to be enacted. To demonstrate our point, we emphasize section 166.041(3)(a)’s use of the word “the” as follows: Except as provided in paragraph (c), a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 10 days prior to adoptio...

...and the place or places within the municipality where such proposed ordinances may be inspected by the public. The notice shall also advise that interested parties may appear at the meeting and be heard with respect to the proposed ordinance. § 166.041(3)(a), Fla....

...The notice of proposed enactment is not effective for another meeting date—regardless of the reason why the proposed enactment may have been postponed from the noticed meeting date to another date. We are not convinced, as the circuit court found, that section 166.041(3)(a) should be interpreted as having been satisfied upon a municipality having noticed a proposed enactment once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality “at least 10 days prior to adoption,” 13 whenever that adoption may ultimately occur. Such an interpretation does not give significance and effect to “every word, phrase, sentence, and part of” section 166.041(3)(a)—specifically, “the date, time, and place of the meeting.” Rather, the circuit court’s interpretation transforms that phrase into useless and meaningless surplusage....

...sion’s May 7, 2019, meeting still required the publishing of a notice—in a newspaper of general circulation in the Town, stating the proposed enactment of Ordinance 376 would occur at the Town Commission’s May 7, 2019, meeting—to comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s plain language. In reaching our conclusion, we note that the case upon which the plaintiff primarily relies, Healthsouth Doctors’ Hospital, Inc....

...In Healthsouth, as in the instant case, “there was no newspaper publication of notice of the City Commission meeting at which adoption of the ordinance took place. Accordingly, the ordinance [was] null and void because the City failed to follow the mandatory notice requirements of Section 166.041(3)(a).” Id....

...take place. In the instant case, that additional fact of such prior notice created an issue of first impression for the circuit court—and us—to determine here. 14  We also note that our construction of section 166.041(3)(a) is not dependent upon, and has not been determined by, our construction’s practical ramifications, which both amicus briefs have requested us to consider. However, if we were required to have considered our construction’...

...stated in the First Amendment Foundation’s amicus brief. Although the First Amendment Foundation’s reasoning relies upon the purposes of the Sunshine Act, section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2018), that reasoning equally supports our construction of section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2018)....

...agues”). The Leagues argue, in pertinent part: The [circuit] court’s decision affirms the longstanding practice of local governments throughout Florida, whereby proposed ordinances that are duly advertised pursuant to section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes [(2018)], but which are continued on second reading for consideration at a 15  subsequent public meeting, are not required to be readverti...

...…. In our view, if the longstanding practice of local governments is that proposed ordinances can be advertised for adoption at one date, time, and place, but can be postponed for adoption to another date, time, and place without being re-advertised, then we conclude that practice does not comply with section 166.041(3)(a)’s plain language, as explained above. Further, even if the Legislature could have used express words in section 166.041(3)(a) to more clearly articulate its intent for a proposed ordinance adoption to be re-advertised when postponed to another date, time, and place, such an omission does not conclusively support the Leagues’ converse interpretation that re-advertisement is unnecessary. Rather, the duty has fallen upon us to interpret section 166.041(3)(a), as written, in such a manner as to give significance and effect to “every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute” and “avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Am. Home, 908 So. 2d at 366. By our interpretation here, section 166.041(3)(a) requires re-advertising. Conclusion On the plaintiff’s Count I, we reverse that portion of the circuit court’s final judgment granting the Town’s and the intervenors’ summary judgment motion....

...to determine the merits of these two defenses, we take no position as to either defense’s merits in this case. On the plaintiff’s Count II, we affirm that portion of the circuit court’s final judgment finding the Town need not have complied with section 166.041(3)(c)’s procedures before adopting Ordinance 376. On the plaintiff’s Count III, we reverse that portion of the circuit court’s final judgment in the Town’s and the intervenors’ favor, because the disposition of Count III is dependent upon the ultimate disposition of the plaintiff’s Count I....

Per Curiam. *291 Affirmed. See Malley v. Clay County Zoning Comm'n , 225 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) ; see also § 166.041(7), Fla....

Per Curiam. *291 Affirmed. See Malley v. Clay County Zoning Comm'n , 225 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) ; see also § 166.041(7), Fla....

..._____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Donna M. Keim, Judge. February 8, 2019 PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Malley v. Clay County Zoning Comm'n, 225 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); see also § 166.041(7), Fla....

...City of Gainesville, 195 So.2d 849 (Fla.1967), is cited in Florida Statutes Annotated as construing sufficiency of title. However, the point actually raised in that case is whether the ordinance itself is expressed with such certainty as to give reasonable notice of its scope. But see § 166.041(2), Fla.Stat....

...A MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCE? Your letter indicates that the City of Sweetwater has no charter provision or ordinance regulating the required number of votes to be cast by the members of the city council to enact municipal ordinances or resolutions. Section 166.041 , F.S., of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act (Ch. 166 , F.S.), establishes a uniform procedure for the adoption of municipal ordinances and resolutions. These procedures are generally applicable to all municipalities throughout the state and the requirements set forth in s. 166.041 , F.S., cannot be lessened or reduced by any municipality. See, AGO's 81-32, 80-104 and 75-173. Cf., City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So.2d 486 (2 D.C.A.Fla., 1978). However, a municipality may specify, by ordinance or charter amendment adopted subsequent to the enactment of s. 166.041 , F.S., additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or prescribe procedures in greater detail than as set forth in this section. Section 166.041 (6), F.S. Thus, it was concluded in AGO 74-371 that the City of Miramar was authorized by s. 166.041 (6) to adopt by ordinance or charter amendment "additional, more stringent requirements than those established by s. 166.041 ." And see, AGO 76-197; AGO 84-63 (an ordinance providing for the placement of additional uses permitted by special exception in various zoning districts established by the Riviera Beach Zoning Code would "substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts" within the purview of s. 166.041 [3][c], F.S.; in addition to the notice requirements specified in s. 166.041 [3][c], the city is required to comply with any additional notice requirements established by ordinance of the municipality for the enactment of ordinances which apply to the rezoning of specific parcels of real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts). In the absence of any such subsequent ordinance or charter amendment, the provisions of s. 166.041 , F.S., are the minimum, mandatory requirements necessary for the valid adoption of an ordinance by a municipality. Section 166.041 (4), F.S., states that: A majority of the members of the governing body shall constitute a quorum....

...On final passage, the vote of each member of the governing body voting shall be entered on the official record of the meeting. All ordinances or resolutions passed by the governing body shall become effective 10 days after passage or as otherwise provided therein. (e.s.) See also, s. 166.041 (3)(c), F.S., which sets forth the procedure to be followed in enacting ordinances which rezone specific parcels of private real property or which substantially change permitted use categories in zoning districts....

...n, element or portion thereof shall be by not less than a majority of the total membership of the governing body. See generally, s. 112.3143 , F.S., regarding voting conflicts. In the absence of a charter provision or ordinance enacted subsequent to s. 166.041 , F.S., which imposes additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances other than as set forth in that section, the City Council of Sweetwater may enact ordinances or adopt resolutions only by an affirmative vote of a majority of a quorum present at a meeting....

...In sum, it is my opinion that, in the absence of a charter provision or other ordinance imposing additional requirements, a majority of a quorum present of the City Council of the City of Sweetwater is necessary to enact a special exception to a municipal zoning ordinance pursuant to the provisions of s. 166.041 (4), F.S....

...requirements applicable to public hearings on zoning applications before the Board of County Commissioners. 3 The Code prohibits action on any application “until a public hearing has been held upon notice of the time, 3 Similarly, Section 166.041(6), Florida Statutes (2021), regulating municipalities, provides: [A] municipality may specify additional requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or resolutions or prescribe procedures in greater detail than contained herein. However, a municipality shall not have the power or authority to lessen or reduce the requirements of this section or other requirements as provided by general law. § 166.041(6), Fla....

...or resolution based on a failure to strictly adhere to the provisions contained in this section shall be limited to a person who was entitled to actual or constructive notice at the time the ordinance or resolution was adopted. § 166.041(7), Fla....

special notice provisions of s. 166.041(3)(c). Section 166.041, F. S., establishes a uniform procedure for

failed to comply with the requirements of section 166.-041(3)(c), Florida Statutes (1983). We find that

...Code Enforcement Department. These code changes adversely affected the music provided by the appellees at their restaurant and nightclub. Both the Noise Ordinance and the Permitting Ordinance were adopted pursuant to the *269 procedures set forth in section 166.041(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Section 316.008 , F. S., however, is silent as to whether the action of the governing body of a municipality in regulating traffic should be in the form of an ordinance rather than a resolution, nor does Ch. 166, F. S., specifically address the issue. Section 166.041 (1)(a), F....

...d as ` an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration , an expression of temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative business of the governing body.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 166.041 (1)(b), F....

...c outside of such municipality.' (Emphasis supplied.) See also v. 316.007 , F. S., stating that `no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter covered by this chapter unless expressly authorized.' (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, s. 166.041 (1)(a), F....

...essions' or resolutions are `enforceable as a local law,' or by criminal punishment or by civil penalties as Ch. 316, F. S., is enforced pursuant to its terms and the terms of Ch. 318, F. S. The discriminating language employed by the Legislature in s. 166.041 (1)(a) and (b), F....

...his action challenging the Town’s adoption of Resolution Number R14-05 (R14-05) which prohibits White’s access to a street from his commercial property adjoining *164 that street. We hold that R14-05 constitutes an “ordinance” as defined in section 166.041(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), and, because the Town adopted this ordinance without complying with the ten-day notice requirement in section 166.041(3)(a), we hold the ordinance void....

...On October 31, 2005, the Town enacted R14-05 as a “resolution.” R14-05 makes it unlawful for a person to drive from commercial properties onto Palm Point Drive. A fence has now been constructed along the drive blocking view of White’s property and any access to Palm Point Drive from the property. Section 166.041(l)(a) defines “ordinance” as “an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law.” Section 166.041(l)(b) defines “resolution” to mean “an expression of a governing body concerning matters of administration, an expression of a temporary character, or a provision for the disposition of a particular item of the administrative bu...

...718 , 153 So. 140 (1933); and Carlton v. Jones, 117 Fla. 622 , 158 So. 170 (1934) (“An act which is required to be accomplished by ordinance may not be accomplished by resolution.”)). It is clear that the action by the Town is an ordinance as defined under section 166.041(1)(a)....

...In R14-05, the Town regulates the use of property in a manner that is both general and permanent. Further, it is neither a matter of administration for the Town nor an expression of a temporary character. Because the Town enacted R14-05 without following the requirements of section 166.041(3)(a) (notice in newspaper at least 10 days prior to adoption), the ordinance is void....

proposed ordinance. (Emphasis supplied.) [Section 166.041(3)(a), F.S.] In contrast, s. 171.044, F.S.

general or special law, or county charter.1 Section 166.041, Florida Statutes, sets forth the procedures

Section 163.3181(1), F.S. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Section 166.041(3)(c), F.S. 14 While I am not advised of the

Mr. Frank A. Kreidler City Attorney City of Lake Worth QUESTION: May the City Commission of the City of Lake Worth, without a change in the city's present charter, pass an ordinance pursuant to s. 166.041 (3)(a), F.S., by reading such ordinance by title only on the first and second readings? SUMMARY: The procedures for the adoption of ordinances by the governing body of the City of Lake Worth are controlled by the terms of s. 166.041 , F.S., and absent an ordinance or charter provision enacted subsequent to July 1, 1973, containing more stringent requirements than are contained therein, the provisions of subsection (3)(a) of s. 166.041 are the minimum, mandatory requirements necessary for the adoption of an ordinance....

...Rather, these provisions appear to be a limitation upon the power of the governing body of the city to enact ordinances; therefore, such provisions were nullified and repealed by the terms of s. 166.021 (4), and the legislative or ordinance-making action of the governing body is controlled by the provisions of s. 166.041 . Section 166.041 , F.S., establishes a uniform procedure for the adoption of municipal ordinances and resolutions that cannot be lessened or reduced by any municipality in the state. See AGO's 076-197, 075-173, 074-371; cf . City of St. Petersburg v. Austin, 355 So.2d 486 (2 D.C.A. Fla., 1978). In pertinent part, subsection (3)(a) of s. 166.041 , F.S., provides that `a proposed ordinance may be read by title, or in full, on at least 2 separate days and shall, at least 7 days prior to adoption, be noticed once in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality.' These are the minimum reading requirements contained in s. 166.041 for the adoption of an ordinance which cannot be lessened or reduced by a municipality. A municipality may specify, by an ordinance or charter amendment adopted subsequent to the enactment of s. 166.041 , F.S., additional or more stringent requirements for the adoption or enactment of ordinances or prescribe procedures in greater detail than are contained in s. 166.041 . See s. 166.041 (6), F.S. However, in the absence of such subsequent ordinance or charter amendment, the reading requirements contained in s. 166.041 (3)(a), F.S., are the minimum, mandatory requirements necessary for the valid adoption of an ordinance by a municipality....

to satisfy the publication requirements of section 166.041(3), Florida Statutes.1 The Pompano Ledger is

...The Attorney General reasoned in part that “ordinance” “has been generally defined as a ‘rule established by authority; a permanent rule of action,’ or as ‘an authoritative decree or direction . . . a public enactment, rule, or law.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Indeed, section 166.041, Florida Statutes (2011), which governs municipalities, defines “ordinance” as “an official legislative action of a governing body, which action is a regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as a local law...