Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...is contrary to law turns upon a construction of the following statutes: "F.S. Section 99.011, F.S.A., "`The word "candidate" shall mean any person who has announced to any person, or to the public, that he is a candidate for a certain office.' *468 "Section 99.061(2), as amended by Chapter 29936, Laws of Florida 1955, "`Candidates for nomination of any recognized political party for the office of governor and all other candidates for state offices are required to file their qualification papers...

...Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record of Orange County. The respondent *126 has declined to accept such qualifying statement and fee at this time on the ground that he is prohibited by the provisions of Chapter 29936, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1955, Section 99.061, Fla....

...ar as the qualifying date was concerned, as candidates for certain state-wide offices, named in the Act. Chapter 30233 was enacted into law on May 28, 1955. At that time, the general law relating to the qualifying dates for state and county offices, Section 99.061, Fla....

...uary 1 of the year in which any primary is held." Chapter 29936, supra, was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 1955, and became a law on June 20, 1955. This Act amended the general election law in various respects and, by Section 4 thereof, amended Section 99.061, Fla. Stat. 1953, to change the qualifying dates for candidates to state and county offices. As amended, Section 99.061 establishes a 14-day period within which candidates for nomination to such offices shall qualify: as to state offices, between the 77th and the 63rd days prior to the date of the first primary election, and as to county offices, between the 63rd and 49th days prior to such election....

candidates, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 99.061. Section 99.061 does not reveal a potential injury in fact

...Indeed, Appellant does not allege that he wishes to vote for whomever the nominee of the Democratic Party may turn out to be. 4 Appellant responds that even write-in candidates and third-party candidates must qualify just like other major party candidates, pursuant to FLA. STAT. ch. 99.061. Section 99.061 does not reveal a potential injury in fact, however, because nothing in that section requires a write-in or other candidate to sign or affirm a party loyalty oath like the Florida Democratic Party's oath. The single reference to a "loyalty oath" in § 99.061(7)(a)(3) is to the completely different public employees oath mandated by FLA....

...Therefore, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 106.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. [2] Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes....

..., all qualified electors, regardless of party affiliation, may vote in the primary elections for that office." [29] See Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Elecs., Op. 00-06 (2000). Under Florida law, write-in candidates must qualify in advance. Fla. Stat. § 99.061(3) (2001). There is no fee for doing so. § 99.092(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). If no write-in candidate qualifies for an election, the ballot provides no block for writing in a candidate. See Fla. Stat. § 99.061(3) (2001)....

...Young's qualifying papers meet the requirements of election laws, despite the alleged deficiency identified by the Secretary. Because this is an issue of law, we review the trial court's decision by the de novo standard. We begin with the text of the statute. Section 99.061(5), Florida Statutes provides that "each candidate for a constitutional office shall file a full and public disclosure of financial interests," pursuant to Article II, section 8, of the Florida Constitution. This provision of the Constitution refers to a public disclosure of financial interests as a "sworn statement" but it does not specify a required method of attestation. No further direction is given on this point in the statute. Section 99.061(5) does not expressly require that a candidate's signature on the financial disclosure form must be notarized or that it must be verified in a particular way....

...This form includes the typical notary acknowledgment showing that it was signed and verified in Florida and it has a blank to write in the county in which it was signed. The Legislature could have incorporated a specific verification requirement such as this in section 99.061(5), for the execution of a financial disclosure form but did not. The Secretary argues that the notary requirement need not be set out in the statute because it is an essential part of a form created by the Commission on Ethics at the direction of the Legislature. This argument unfolds in a number of steps. Section 99.061(5) requires a candidate to submit a financial disclosure form in order to qualify for office....

...The final step is one not found in the statutes, but it is not in dispute. The form the Commission prepared at the direction of the Legislature does, in fact, require a notary public acknowledgment in the usual form with a space for the county. We could read this sequence of statutes to mean that section 99.061(5) requires a notary acknowledgment on a financial disclosure form....

between June 4 and June 8, 2012, pursuant to section 99.061, Florida Statutes. . See, e.g., Lightbourne

...He further alleged that on Tuesday, July 23, 1974, he sent to Tallahassee his representative, the Honorable Robert W. Gordon, Municipal Judge of Neptune Beach, Florida, bearing Petitioner's qualification papers to be filed in accordance with Florida Statute 99.061(1); that the said Robert W....

...Therefore, there being no factual issue, we must resolve the question recited in the first paragraph of this opinion. The exact point before us does not appear to have been heretofore considered in Florida, nor are we aware of any case from any other jurisdiction exactly on point. Florida Statute 99.061(1) provides as follows: "Nomination of candidates for state, county and United States offices; sworn statement, receipt and filing fee....

...229, 25 So.2d 492; and State ex rel. Vining v. Gray, 1944, 154 Fla. 255, 17 So.2d 228. However, our examination of those cases reveal that they are not here controlling. As hereinabove recited the Respondent candidly concedes that she has not customarily construed Florida Statute 99.061 (1) to require the actual filing of candidates qualification papers and the payment of the qualification fees and party assessments prior to the noon deadline therein provided, it being her custom and practice to accept for filing such papers,...

...res with the county supervisors of elections. On or about July 9, 1992, the Party decided to run plaintiff Feather in the new seventh congressional district and began collecting petition signatures for him pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 99.09651 and 99.061 which require a minor party candidate for congress, such as plaintiff Feather, to file 5,625 petition signatures by July 6....

...ed to September. Exhibit C to document 6; document 7 at 5. This request was similarly denied by letter dated July 14, 1992. On July 15, 1992, plaintiffs filed this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 103.021(3) and 99.061....

...The supervisor shall check the names and, on or before the date of the first primary, shall certify the number shown as registered electors of the county. [3] Plaintiffs state that the deadline is July 6, 1992, the 57th day before the first primary (document 2 at 8). Fla.Stat. § 99.061(8) provides that Notwithstanding the qualifying period prescribed by this section, in each year in which the legislature apportions the state, the qualifying period for persons seeking to qualify for nomination or election to federal office...

qualifying papers with the Department of State. § 99.061(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). Among the qualifying documents

...Ion Sancho, the Supervisor of Elections for Leon County ("the supervisor"), appeals an order of the circuit court granting mandamus relief to Manny Joanos, a candidate for re-election to the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County. In this order, the circuit court ruled that the supervisor was required by section 99.061(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), to notify Mr. Joanos that he had not timely filed all qualifying papers required by section 99.061(7)(a) within the qualifying period prescribed by section 99.061(2). The circuit court therefore ordered the supervisor to permit Mr. Joanos to file qualifying papers after the close of the statutory qualifying period. The parties' dispute centers on when the duty of notice arises under section 99.061(7)(b)....

...Because this statute does not impose a clear, indisputable legal duty on the supervisor to provide notice to Mr. Joanos under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that mandamus relief was not appropriate, and we reverse the order. Facts and Procedural History Under section 99.061(2), the qualifying period for prospective candidates for county offices in the 1998 elections ran from 12:00 noon on Monday, July 13 through 12:00 noon on Friday, July 17, 1998. Section 99.061(7)(a) states that in order for a candidate to be qualified, he or she must file six separately identified papers with the supervisor of elections "by the end of the qualifying period." Mr....

...but believing that he had satisfied all requirements for qualifying, put it aside. As *384 a consequence, he filed no qualifying papers with the supervisor during the qualifying period, and at the close of that period, four of the items required by section 99.061(7)(a) had not been filed....

...ments out of time, he filed his complaint for writ of mandamus in the circuit court. In his complaint below, Mr. Joanos predicated his claim for mandamus relief on the allegation that the supervisor had failed to perform the duty imposed upon him by section 99.061(7)(b), which provides in relevant part as follows: If the filing officer receives qualifying papers that do not include all items as required by paragraph (a) prior to the last day of qualifying, the filing officer shall make a reasona...

...Joanos within the time allotted by the order. The Parties' Arguments In their arguments to this court, the parties take markedly different positions on what constitutes a "qualifying paper" (a term not defined in the statute) and on the nature and scope of the duty imposed by section 99.061(7)(b). According to the supervisor, "qualifying papers" are only those documents listed in section 99.061(7)(a) and tendered for filing during the statutorily designated qualifying period. Thus, the supervisor argues, Mr. Joanos' reliance on section 99.061(7)(b) is misplaced since the act that triggers the notification requirement—the filing of incomplete papers during the qualifying period— did not occur in this case. In turn, Mr. Joanos argues that qualifying papers are those documents described in section 99.061(7)(a), without regard to whether they are filed during the qualifying period. Under this construction, because Mr. Joanos had filed some of the described documents, albeit not during the qualifying period, the supervisor was clearly obligated under section 99.061(7)(b) to inform him that all of the required items had not been filed....

...us relief in this case was not warranted unless the interpretation Mr. Joanos advocates is the only reasonable construction of the statute. Analysis Having carefully considered the statutory interpretations advocated by the parties, we conclude that section 99.061(7)(b) is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction....

...Further, we find that the interpretation placed on the statute by the supervisor is a reasonable one. Where a candidate presents himself before a filing officer for qualifying during the first four days of the qualifying period and submits incomplete qualifying documents, the filing officer clearly has a duty under section 99.061(7)(b) to make a reasonable effort to notify the candidate of any missing or incomplete documents and of the deadline for submission of those items....

...This factual context was obviously in the minds of legislators when the statutory language was adopted. The statute does not, however, clearly reflect whether the legislature also intended the duty to arise in the factual context of the present case, where the candidate has filed some papers described in section 99.061(7)(a) before the qualifying period but has made no effort to qualify during the qualifying period....

...etary of State, who is designated the chief election officer of the state by section 97.012, and the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections, both of whom have filed amicus curiae briefs in this case. The uncertain applicability of the section 99.061(7)(b) duty in the present case is made most apparent by the fact that these authoritative sources reach different conclusions as to whether the statutory duty might exist in the factual context of this case. In summary, even though the interpretation urged by Mr. Joanos might be a reasonable reading of the statute, we do not find the supervisor's view of this statute unreasonable. There being more than one reasonable reading of section 99.061(7)(b), the interpretation urged by Mr....

...ightly amiss because "shall" when used with the third person connotes compulsion or obligation. "Will" would be the proper choice of words to indicate simple future tense. See Webster's New World Dictionary, 1307 (2d ed. 1976). [4] It is argued that section 99.061(3) sheds light on the timing of declaration of nomination....

...[3] Section 100.061, Florida Statutes (1979), states that candidates who receive a majority of votes cast in the first primary election "shall be declared" nominated, and section 100.091(3) states that the candidate with the highest vote total in the second primary election "shall be declared" nominated. [4] § 99.061(3), Fla....

...The uncontradicted evidence also shows that Navarro was a Republican "candidate" within 97.021(18)(c), (d), or (e), after July 20, 1984. Appellees suggest, however, that section 99.021(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1983), means that a nominee need only state that he has not qualified pursuant to section 99.061 to run for nomination in a primary election....

...Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 28, 1994. PER CURIAM. Appellant Boudreau sought office in a Republican party primary election. He objected to paying the statutory qualifying fee, consisting of a filing fee and an election assessment, and the party assessment, which section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes (1993), requires candidates to pay to the state upon qualifying....

...sing in newspapers, magazines, or periodicals; "(c) Advertising on billboards, banners, or streamers; "(d) Advertising on campaign literature or any other printing; or "(e) [A rented] hall in which to address the public." * * * * * * [2] pursuant to § 99.061, Fla....

031(5)(a)1., there is more case law interpreting section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes, which applies broadly

GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Pursuant to section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), write-in candidates

...to do such — should be the body to handle such a matter. In footnote one, the majority states: "To remove any uncertainty, we exercise our authority to extend the qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to the dates specified in section 99.061(8), as set out above." Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are not the general supervisors of state legislatures....

...203), we recognized that there was some confusion and concern regarding the dates of the congressional qualifying period, and we exercised our authority to extend that qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to comport with the dates specified in Section 99.061(8), Florida Statutes....

...Plaintiffs' motion to reset the candidate qualifying dates for congressional elections to July 8 through July 12, 1996 (Doc. 209) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED. NOTES [1] The motion seems to assume that the candidates' qualifying period runs from May 6, 1996, to May 10, 1996. Although this is the period set out by Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes, the 1990 amendment adding Section 99.061(8) provides: (8) Notwithstanding the qualifying period prescribed by this section, in each year in which the Legislature apportions the state, the qualifying period for persons seeking to qualify for nomination or election to federal o...

...to 53 days prior to the first congressional primaries — or a deadline of noon on July 12, 1996. To remove any uncertainty, we exercise our authority to extend the qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to the dates specified in Section 99.061(8), as set out above....

Stat. (2018) ; § 99.096, Fla. Stat. (2018) ; § 99.061(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). Regarding qualifying

...have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. ... § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla....

...No dispute exists that Levey did so; she was thereby deemed “qualified” and the Division of Elections officially informed her so. Likewise, as to her opponent. What happened in the post-qualifying period, however, triggered the present controversy and spawned the statutory construction dispute at issue. Under section 99.061(7)(a)1, a candidate who is deemed otherwise “qualified” can be disqualified based on the last sentence in the subparagraph (italicized and bolded above), which provides that the “[f]ailure to pay the fee as provided in this s...

...The bank investigator’s stated reason for why the check drew scrutiny was that the “$2,000 deposit was a very large deposit into a brand new account” that had no “customer history.” 6 avail herself of the certified check cure in section 99.061(7)(a)1 (underlined in the statute above). The weekend having passed, the next business day, Monday, June 23rd, DFS prepared a debit memorandum notifying the Department that Levey’s check had been returned....

...the Division—apparently unaware of the looming kerfuffle over Levey’s qualifying check—certified her as qualified as a candidate for House District 113. Levey’s certification was on the last day of the statutory deadline for doing so. See § 99.061(6), Fla....

...but the Court is bound by precedent that says when the Legislature speaks clearly to a particular item, the Court is not to guess at what it means. Specifically, the Legislature in Section 14, Chapter 2011-40, Laws of Florida, amended Section 99.061 (7)(a)7 [sic], Florida Statutes, to eliminate or preclude the relief sought by [Levey] in this case. 8  4....

...10 period” including a “properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account payable to the person or entity as prescribed by the filing officer in an amount not less than the fee required by s. 99.092 . . . .” § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla. Stat....

...ven after qualifying is over, the Department has an affirmative duty to do so. Nothing in the statute (nor in any rule) prohibits the Department from exercising authority and discretion as to payment issues during the post-qualifying period. See § 99.061(10), Fla....

...Levey, as the trial court specifically held: “[t]here was nothing [she] could have 13 done differently that would have changed what happened during the week of qualifying.”4 A second and competing construction of section 99.061(7)(a)1, Florida Statues, relies heavily on a sentence (underlined in subparagraph above) that has no application in this case....

...conclude that candidates are disqualified if their timely-filed checks do not clear and provide payment until after the end of qualifying. 16  What’s more, the 2011 amendment to the cure sentence in section 99.061(7)(a)1 yields little support for the alternative reading of the statute. If a candidate’s check is returned by the bank for any reason, the filing officer shall immediately notify the candidate and the candidate shall...

...17 turn a blind eye and rotely disqualify candidates in these situations? Asking the question answers it: the Department should not. III. In conclusion, the natural and literal construction of section 99.061(7)(a)1, one that allows for the Department’s acceptance of payment on checks that are erroneously held by a bank, makes the most sense....

...She appeals an adverse final judgment rejecting her claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order directing that her name be placed on the ballot for the November 2014 general election. We affirm. Addressing the process of qualifying for election to federal, state, county, or district office, section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2014), sets forth the items that must be received by the appropriate filing officer by the end of the qualifying period in order for a candidate to be qualified....

...The existence of such a factual dispute would preclude summary judgment, but because the statute applies if a candidate’s qualifying check is “returned by the bank for any reason,” who was at fault is of no consequence to our disposition. 3 harshness of the result, section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...te. See Hill v. Davis, 4 70 So. 3d 572, 575 (Fla. 2011); see also State v. Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014). The result in this case is buttressed by the fact that under an earlier version of section 99.061, if a candidate’s qualifying check was returned, the candidate was allowed 48 hours after being notified of that fact by the filing officer to pay the fee by cashier’s check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding.” See § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...In conformity with the qualifying statute, Mrs. Levey timely filed everything the statute called for, including “a properly executed check drawn” on her campaign account for $1,781.82, the full amount of the filing fee. § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

created, the City Clerk referred Wright to section 99.061(7)(a)l. of the Florida Statutes which provides:

...office to all registered District 2 voters. At issue is whether a statute can impose a residency requirement for placement on the ballot that differs from the Florida Constitution’s residency requirement for the office of county commission. We agree with Francois that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is unconstitutional, and the circuit court improperly removed him from the ballot for the general election....

...4th DCA 2012). Appellee Brinkmann, a resident voter, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014). Brinkmann also sought an order forcing the primary election to be opened to all voters pursuant to the UPA. Francois conceded below, as he does on appeal, that he did not live in the district at the time he filed papers to qualify as a write-in candidate. However, he contends that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Florida Constitution and violates equal protection. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The circuit court also entered an injunction that opened the primary election to all registered voters.3 1 Pursuant to section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), write-in candidates are granted write-in access on the ballot for the general election, irrespective of party affiliation. § 99.061(4)(b), Fla....

...As it currently stands, the primary election for the Broward County Commissioner District 2 will be conducted concurrently with the general election on November 4, 2014, and will be open to all voters. 2  Legal Analysis Francois argues that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the language of the Florida Constitution, according to supreme court interpretation, and constitutes a denial of equal protection....

...1893)). The Florida Supreme Court has explained that in order to hold a legislative act unconstitutional, courts “must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1951). The crux of Francois’s argument is that section 99.0615 is unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write- in candidates at the time of qualifying conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates at the time of election as...

...res residency at the time of election.” (emphasis added). It then held unconstitutional a statute which required a candidate for county commissioner to live in the district in which he sought to run at the time of qualification for the office. Section 99.0615, a one-sentence statute applicable to only write-in candidates, states that: “At the time of qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by the office sought.” § 99.0615, Fla....

...ssion in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution”). In view of the supreme court’s decision in Grassi, we are “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs, 52 So. 2d at 795. We hold that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is facially unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by Article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution. Because we determine that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional, we do not address the equal protection argument raised....

CURIAM: The Florida Election Code, Florida Statutes § 99.061(1), F.S.A., requires candidates seeking election

...of party affiliation or whether the legislator appeared on the ballot as a write-in or not. In addition, “[a]t the time of qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by the office sought.” § 99.0615, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, by statute, write-in candidates must reside within the 2 district at an earlier point than other candidates—the time of qualification. § 99.0615, Fla....

...step. We do not agree. Qualification requirements, mandated by statute, include steps such as making “a full and public disclosure of financial interests,” taking an oath, and paying filing fees or gathering constituent signatures. See § 99.061(5), (7)(a)(1)- (2), Fla....

...The statutory requirement directly contravenes and adds to the constitutional fiat that legislators reside in the district at the time of election. See Francois v. Brinkmann, 29 Fla. L. Weekly 1923, 2014 WL 4426359, at *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 10, 2014) (finding section 99.0615 facially unconstitutional “because the timing of its residency requirement for write- in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by [the Constitution]”)....

...all candidates regardless of how they sought ballot access: payment of fees, write-in, collecting signatures, or otherwise). We find this to be a distinction without a difference. See also Francois, 2014 WL 4426359, at *2-3 (using Grassi to find section 99.0615 facially unconstitutional)....

...“must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Id. (quoting Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1951)). And as was the Fourth District, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *3. Accordingly, we find section 99.0615, Florida Statutes, facially unconstitutional.2 We REVERSE the circuit court’s order (i) finding Mr. Matthews is not a qualified candidate for office and (ii) “opening” the primary pursuant to Article VI, section 5(b), of the Florida Constitution....

failure to pay the qualifying fee as provided in section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2023) (“Failure

interests required by section 99.061(5). See 5 § 99.061(7)(a)1.–5., Fla

Ryan Torrens submitted the items listed in section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2017), and qualified

state.fl.us/ publications/index. shtml. . See § 99.061(2), Fla. Stat. (2005) (stating that candidates

parties for the office of Governor of the State (Section 99.061(2)); for holding of such primaries of such

receipt and filing fee.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 99.061(1) and (2) required candidates for state and

2012, and noon on April 20, 2012. See Fla. Stat. § 99.061 (listing requirements). Further, by Florida Statute

petition process pursuant to s. 99.095.” And section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), states that

payment of the qualifying fee is governed by section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2023). The

mandamus, see art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. 2. See § 99.061(7), Fla. Stat. (2024) (listing required items

candidates in municipal elections, citing Section 99.061, Florida Statutes (2024).

264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“We must enforce [section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2023)] as written.”)

of Representatives starts on April 8, 2024. See § 99.061(8), Fla. Stat. (2023). The parties were correct

office he assumed in 1968 and extends to 1974. Section, 99.061(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that

filing fees of candidates for state offices. Section 99.061(1) and (2), F.S. Within ten days after the

expedited review. II. Analysis 3 Section 99.061(7) of the Florida Statutes governs the process