Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...is contrary to law turns upon a construction of the following statutes: "F.S. Section 99.011, F.S.A., "`The word "candidate" shall mean any person who has announced to any person, or to the public, that he is a candidate for a certain office.' *468 "Section 99.061(2), as amended by Chapter 29936, Laws of Florida 1955, "`Candidates for nomination of any recognized political party for the office of governor and all other candidates for state offices are required to file their qualification papers...

...Clerk of the Criminal Court of Record of Orange County. The respondent *126 has declined to accept such qualifying statement and fee at this time on the ground that he is prohibited by the provisions of Chapter 29936, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1955, Section 99.061, Fla....

...ar as the qualifying date was concerned, as candidates for certain state-wide offices, named in the Act. Chapter 30233 was enacted into law on May 28, 1955. At that time, the general law relating to the qualifying dates for state and county offices, Section 99.061, Fla....

...uary 1 of the year in which any primary is held." Chapter 29936, supra, was introduced in the Senate on May 28, 1955, and became a law on June 20, 1955. This Act amended the general election law in various respects and, by Section 4 thereof, amended Section 99.061, Fla. Stat. 1953, to change the qualifying dates for candidates to state and county offices. As amended, Section 99.061 establishes a 14-day period within which candidates for nomination to such offices shall qualify: as to state offices, between the 77th and the 63rd days prior to the date of the first primary election, and as to county offices, between the 63rd and 49th days prior to such election....

...Indeed, Appellant does not allege that he wishes to vote for whomever the nominee of the Democratic Party may turn out to be. . Appellant responds that even write-in candidates and third-party candidates must qualify just like other major party candidates, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 99.061. Section 99.061 does not reveal a potential injury in fact, however, because nothing in that section requires a write-in or other candidate to sign or affirm a party loyalty oath like the Florida Democratic Party's oath. The single reference to a "loyalty oath” in § 99.061 (7)(a)(3) is to the completely different public employees oath mandated by Fla....

...Indeed, Appellant does not allege that he wishes to vote for whomever the nominee of the Democratic Party may turn out to be. 4 Appellant responds that even write-in candidates and third-party candidates must qualify just like other major party candidates, pursuant to FLA. STAT. ch. 99.061. Section 99.061 does not reveal a potential injury in fact, however, because nothing in that section requires a write-in or other candidate to sign or affirm a party loyalty oath like the Florida Democratic Party's oath. The single reference to a "loyalty oath" in § 99.061(7)(a)(3) is to the completely different public employees oath mandated by FLA....

...Therefore, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 106.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes. [2] Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes....

..., all qualified electors, regardless of party affiliation, may vote in the primary elections for that office." [29] See Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Elecs., Op. 00-06 (2000). Under Florida law, write-in candidates must qualify in advance. Fla. Stat. § 99.061(3) (2001). There is no fee for doing so. § 99.092(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). If no write-in candidate qualifies for an election, the ballot provides no block for writing in a candidate. See Fla. Stat. § 99.061(3) (2001)....

...Young's qualifying papers meet the requirements of election laws, despite the alleged deficiency identified by the Secretary. Because this is an issue of law, we review the trial court's decision by the de novo standard. We begin with the text of the statute. Section 99.061(5), Florida Statutes provides that "each candidate for a constitutional office shall file a full and public disclosure of financial interests," pursuant to Article II, section 8, of the Florida Constitution. This provision of the Constitution refers to a public disclosure of financial interests as a "sworn statement" but it does not specify a required method of attestation. No further direction is given on this point in the statute. Section 99.061(5) does not expressly require that a candidate's signature on the financial disclosure form must be notarized or that it must be verified in a particular way....

...This form includes the typical notary acknowledgment showing that it was signed and verified in Florida and it has a blank to write in the county in which it was signed. The Legislature could have incorporated a specific verification requirement such as this in section 99.061(5), for the execution of a financial disclosure form but did not. The Secretary argues that the notary requirement need not be set out in the statute because it is an essential part of a form created by the Commission on Ethics at the direction of the Legislature. This argument unfolds in a number of steps. Section 99.061(5) requires a candidate to submit a financial disclosure form in order to qualify for office....

...The final step is one not found in the statutes, but it is not in dispute. The form the Commission prepared at the direction of the Legislature does, in fact, require a notary public acknowledgment in the usual form with a space for the county. We could read this sequence of statutes to mean that section 99.061(5) requires a notary acknowledgment on a financial disclosure form....

...State, 332 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1976)). . According to the comment filed on behalf of the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Election, the qualifying date for all federal, state, county, and district candidates is between June 4 and June 8, 2012, pursuant to section 99.061, Florida Statutes....

...He further alleged that on Tuesday, July 23, 1974, he sent to Tallahassee his representative, the Honorable Robert W. Gordon, Municipal Judge of Neptune Beach, Florida, bearing Petitioner's qualification papers to be filed in accordance with Florida Statute 99.061(1); that the said Robert W....

...Therefore, there being no factual issue, we must resolve the question recited in the first paragraph of this opinion. The exact point before us does not appear to have been heretofore considered in Florida, nor are we aware of any case from any other jurisdiction exactly on point. Florida Statute 99.061(1) provides as follows: "Nomination of candidates for state, county and United States offices; sworn statement, receipt and filing fee....

...229, 25 So.2d 492; and State ex rel. Vining v. Gray, 1944, 154 Fla. 255, 17 So.2d 228. However, our examination of those cases reveal that they are not here controlling. As hereinabove recited the Respondent candidly concedes that she has not customarily construed Florida Statute 99.061 (1) to require the actual filing of candidates qualification papers and the payment of the qualification fees and party assessments prior to the noon deadline therein provided, it being her custom and practice to accept for filing such papers,...

...res with the county supervisors of elections. On or about July 9, 1992, the Party decided to run plaintiff Feather in the new seventh congressional district and began collecting petition signatures for him pursuant to Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 99.09651 and 99.061 which require a minor party candidate for congress, such as plaintiff Feather, to file 5,625 petition signatures by July 6....

...ed to September. Exhibit C to document 6; document 7 at 5. This request was similarly denied by letter dated July 14, 1992. On July 15, 1992, plaintiffs filed this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 103.021(3) and 99.061....

...The supervisor shall check the names and, on or before the date of the first primary, shall certify the number shown as registered electors of the county. [3] Plaintiffs state that the deadline is July 6, 1992, the 57th day before the first primary (document 2 at 8). Fla.Stat. § 99.061(8) provides that Notwithstanding the qualifying period prescribed by this section, in each year in which the legislature apportions the state, the qualifying period for persons seeking to qualify for nomination or election to federal office...

qualifying papers with the Department of State. § 99.061(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). Among the qualifying documents

...Ion Sancho, the Supervisor of Elections for Leon County ("the supervisor"), appeals an order of the circuit court granting mandamus relief to Manny Joanos, a candidate for re-election to the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County. In this order, the circuit court ruled that the supervisor was required by section 99.061(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), to notify Mr. Joanos that he had not timely filed all qualifying papers required by section 99.061(7)(a) within the qualifying period prescribed by section 99.061(2). The circuit court therefore ordered the supervisor to permit Mr. Joanos to file qualifying papers after the close of the statutory qualifying period. The parties' dispute centers on when the duty of notice arises under section 99.061(7)(b)....

...Because this statute does not impose a clear, indisputable legal duty on the supervisor to provide notice to Mr. Joanos under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that mandamus relief was not appropriate, and we reverse the order. Facts and Procedural History Under section 99.061(2), the qualifying period for prospective candidates for county offices in the 1998 elections ran from 12:00 noon on Monday, July 13 through 12:00 noon on Friday, July 17, 1998. Section 99.061(7)(a) states that in order for a candidate to be qualified, he or she must file six separately identified papers with the supervisor of elections "by the end of the qualifying period." Mr....

...but believing that he had satisfied all requirements for qualifying, put it aside. As *384 a consequence, he filed no qualifying papers with the supervisor during the qualifying period, and at the close of that period, four of the items required by section 99.061(7)(a) had not been filed....

...ments out of time, he filed his complaint for writ of mandamus in the circuit court. In his complaint below, Mr. Joanos predicated his claim for mandamus relief on the allegation that the supervisor had failed to perform the duty imposed upon him by section 99.061(7)(b), which provides in relevant part as follows: If the filing officer receives qualifying papers that do not include all items as required by paragraph (a) prior to the last day of qualifying, the filing officer shall make a reasona...

...Joanos within the time allotted by the order. The Parties' Arguments In their arguments to this court, the parties take markedly different positions on what constitutes a "qualifying paper" (a term not defined in the statute) and on the nature and scope of the duty imposed by section 99.061(7)(b). According to the supervisor, "qualifying papers" are only those documents listed in section 99.061(7)(a) and tendered for filing during the statutorily designated qualifying period. Thus, the supervisor argues, Mr. Joanos' reliance on section 99.061(7)(b) is misplaced since the act that triggers the notification requirement—the filing of incomplete papers during the qualifying period— did not occur in this case. In turn, Mr. Joanos argues that qualifying papers are those documents described in section 99.061(7)(a), without regard to whether they are filed during the qualifying period. Under this construction, because Mr. Joanos had filed some of the described documents, albeit not during the qualifying period, the supervisor was clearly obligated under section 99.061(7)(b) to inform him that all of the required items had not been filed....

...us relief in this case was not warranted unless the interpretation Mr. Joanos advocates is the only reasonable construction of the statute. Analysis Having carefully considered the statutory interpretations advocated by the parties, we conclude that section 99.061(7)(b) is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction....

...Further, we find that the interpretation placed on the statute by the supervisor is a reasonable one. Where a candidate presents himself before a filing officer for qualifying during the first four days of the qualifying period and submits incomplete qualifying documents, the filing officer clearly has a duty under section 99.061(7)(b) to make a reasonable effort to notify the candidate of any missing or incomplete documents and of the deadline for submission of those items....

...This factual context was obviously in the minds of legislators when the statutory language was adopted. The statute does not, however, clearly reflect whether the legislature also intended the duty to arise in the factual context of the present case, where the candidate has filed some papers described in section 99.061(7)(a) before the qualifying period but has made no effort to qualify during the qualifying period....

...etary of State, who is designated the chief election officer of the state by section 97.012, and the Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections, both of whom have filed amicus curiae briefs in this case. The uncertain applicability of the section 99.061(7)(b) duty in the present case is made most apparent by the fact that these authoritative sources reach different conclusions as to whether the statutory duty might exist in the factual context of this case. In summary, even though the interpretation urged by Mr. Joanos might be a reasonable reading of the statute, we do not find the supervisor's view of this statute unreasonable. There being more than one reasonable reading of section 99.061(7)(b), the interpretation urged by Mr....

...ightly amiss because "shall" when used with the third person connotes compulsion or obligation. "Will" would be the proper choice of words to indicate simple future tense. See Webster's New World Dictionary, 1307 (2d ed. 1976). [4] It is argued that section 99.061(3) sheds light on the timing of declaration of nomination....

...[3] Section 100.061, Florida Statutes (1979), states that candidates who receive a majority of votes cast in the first primary election "shall be declared" nominated, and section 100.091(3) states that the candidate with the highest vote total in the second primary election "shall be declared" nominated. [4] § 99.061(3), Fla....

...The uncontradicted evidence also shows that Navarro was a Republican "candidate" within 97.021(18)(c), (d), or (e), after July 20, 1984. Appellees suggest, however, that section 99.021(1)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1983), means that a nominee need only state that he has not qualified pursuant to section 99.061 to run for nomination in a primary election....

...Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 28, 1994. PER CURIAM. Appellant Boudreau sought office in a Republican party primary election. He objected to paying the statutory qualifying fee, consisting of a filing fee and an election assessment, and the party assessment, which section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes (1993), requires candidates to pay to the state upon qualifying....

...sing in newspapers, magazines, or periodicals; "(c) Advertising on billboards, banners, or streamers; "(d) Advertising on campaign literature or any other printing; or "(e) [A rented] hall in which to address the public." * * * * * * [2] pursuant to § 99.061, Fla....

...Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. § 105.031(5)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2017) (emphasis added). Appellant notes that while there is not an abundance of case law interpreting section 105.031(5)(a)1., there is more case law interpreting section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes, which applies broadly to filing fees for candidates for federal, state, district, or county offices other than judicial or school board member. § 99.061(1)-(3), Fla....

...received, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...Appellant also argues the trial court’s interpretation of the statute requiring hypersensitive compliance led to an absurd result. He relies on Wright, 200 So. 3d 765, in which the supreme court suggested that requiring strict compliance with the fee provision in section 99.061 led to an absurd result in that case, though the court declined to apply the absurd result doctrine because it found the statute was not ambiguous....

...compliance with a fee statute may create an absurd result. Wright timely paid his qualifying fee with a “starter check” from his newly opened campaign account, but it was returned by the bank due to a bank error after the qualifying period had ended. Wright, 200 So. 3d at 767. Section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...The version of the statute applicable in Wright stated that if the campaign check was “returned by the bank for any reason,” the candidate had only “until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check.” Id. at 772 (emphasis added) (citing § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...The statute expressly required him to provide a check drawn upon his campaign account, and he used a cashier’s check instead. His hesitancy to use a starter check is understandable 3 In his reply brief, appellant argues the Wright court’s determination that section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes, was not ambiguous is not binding on this court, even though section 105.031(5)(a)1., Florida Statutes, contains similar language, because Wright considered a different aspect of the statute. He is correct. Wright considered whether section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...Legislature had good reason for requiring candidates to use campaign checks whenever possible. Doing so provides a “paper trail” to ensure all expended funds came from the campaign account. Wright, 200 So. 3d at 782 (Polston, J., dissenting) (“Because section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...614 District 2 voters. At issue is whether a statute can impose a residency requirement for placement on the ballot that differs from the Florida Constitution’s residency requirement for the office of county commission. We agree with Francois that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is unconstitutional, and the circuit court improperly removed him from the ballot for the general election....

...4th DCA 2012). Appellee Brinkmann, a resident voter, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014)....

...Brink-mann also sought an order forcing the primary election to be opened to all voters pursuant to the UPA. Francois conceded below, as he does on appeal, that he did not live in the district at the time he filed papers to qualify as a write-in candidate. However, he contends that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Florida Constitution and violates equal protection. After an eviden-tiary hearing, the circuit court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The circuit court also entered an injunction that opened the primary election to all registered voters. 3 Legal Analysis Francois argues that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the language of the Florida Constitution, according to supreme court interpretation, and constitutes a denial of equal protection....

...The Florida Supreme Court has explained that in order to hold a legislative act unconstitutional, courts “must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs v. Peters, 52 So.2d 793, 795 (Fla.1951). The crux of Francois’s argument is that section 99.0615 is unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates at the time of qualifying conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates at the time of election as d...

...equires residency at the time of election.” (emphasis added). It then held unconstitutional a statute which required a candidate for county commissioner to live in the district in which he sought to run at the time of qualification for the office. Section 99.0615, a one-sentence statute applicable to only write-in candidates, states that: “At the time of qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by the office sought.” § 99.0615, Fla....

...ssion in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution”). *616 In view of the supreme court’s decision in Grassi we are “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs, 52 So.2d at 795 . We hold that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is facially unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by Article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution. Because we determine that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional, we do not address the equal protection argument raised....

...office. We also reverse the injunction entered by the trial court opening the primary election to all voters. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. WARNER, GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Pursuant to section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), write-in candidates are granted write-in access on the ballot for the general election, irrespective of party affiliation....

...to do such — should be the body to handle such a matter. In footnote one, the majority states: "To remove any uncertainty, we exercise our authority to extend the qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to the dates specified in section 99.061(8), as set out above." Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are not the general supervisors of state legislatures....

...203), we recognized that there was some confusion and concern regarding the dates of the congressional qualifying period, and we exercised our authority to extend that qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to comport with the dates specified in Section 99.061(8), Florida Statutes....

...Plaintiffs' motion to reset the candidate qualifying dates for congressional elections to July 8 through July 12, 1996 (Doc. 209) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED. NOTES [1] The motion seems to assume that the candidates' qualifying period runs from May 6, 1996, to May 10, 1996. Although this is the period set out by Section 99.061(1), Florida Statutes, the 1990 amendment adding Section 99.061(8) provides: (8) Notwithstanding the qualifying period prescribed by this section, in each year in which the Legislature apportions the state, the qualifying period for persons seeking to qualify for nomination or election to federal o...

...to 53 days prior to the first congressional primaries — or a deadline of noon on July 12, 1996. To remove any uncertainty, we exercise our authority to extend the qualifying period for all Florida congressional candidates to the dates specified in Section 99.061(8), as set out above....

...rite-in candidates may be listed on the general election ballot and may compete for the same offices as the major political party candidates in compliance with the Florida Election Code. § 99.0955, Fla. Stat. (2018) ; § 99.096, Fla. Stat. (2018) ; § 99.061(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). Regarding qualifying for nomination or election to county offices in particular, section 99.061(2) (emphasis added) provides that "each person seeking to qualify for nomination or election to a county office ......

...ballot by party or seeking nomination by a party during the primary election. However, the Florida Election Code expressly provides for nomination of candidates for county office by their respective political parties during the primary election. See § 99.061(2), Fla....

...have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. ... § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla....

...No dispute exists that Levey did so; she was thereby deemed “qualified” and the Division of Elections officially informed her so. Likewise, as to her opponent. What happened in the post-qualifying period, however, triggered the present controversy and spawned the statutory construction dispute at issue. Under section 99.061(7)(a)1, a candidate who is deemed otherwise “qualified” can be disqualified based on the last sentence in the subparagraph (italicized and bolded above), which provides that the “[f]ailure to pay the fee as provided in this s...

...The bank investigator’s stated reason for why the check drew scrutiny was that the “$2,000 deposit was a very large deposit into a brand new account” that had no “customer history.” 6 avail herself of the certified check cure in section 99.061(7)(a)1 (underlined in the statute above). The weekend having passed, the next business day, Monday, June 23rd, DFS prepared a debit memorandum notifying the Department that Levey’s check had been returned....

...the Division—apparently unaware of the looming kerfuffle over Levey’s qualifying check—certified her as qualified as a candidate for House District 113. Levey’s certification was on the last day of the statutory deadline for doing so. See § 99.061(6), Fla....

...but the Court is bound by precedent that says when the Legislature speaks clearly to a particular item, the Court is not to guess at what it means. Specifically, the Legislature in Section 14, Chapter 2011-40, Laws of Florida, amended Section 99.061 (7)(a)7 [sic], Florida Statutes, to eliminate or preclude the relief sought by [Levey] in this case. 8  4....

...10 period” including a “properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account payable to the person or entity as prescribed by the filing officer in an amount not less than the fee required by s. 99.092 . . . .” § 99.061(7)(a)1, Fla. Stat....

...ven after qualifying is over, the Department has an affirmative duty to do so. Nothing in the statute (nor in any rule) prohibits the Department from exercising authority and discretion as to payment issues during the post-qualifying period. See § 99.061(10), Fla....

...Levey, as the trial court specifically held: “[t]here was nothing [she] could have 13 done differently that would have changed what happened during the week of qualifying.”4 A second and competing construction of section 99.061(7)(a)1, Florida Statues, relies heavily on a sentence (underlined in subparagraph above) that has no application in this case....

...conclude that candidates are disqualified if their timely-filed checks do not clear and provide payment until after the end of qualifying. 16  What’s more, the 2011 amendment to the cure sentence in section 99.061(7)(a)1 yields little support for the alternative reading of the statute. If a candidate’s check is returned by the bank for any reason, the filing officer shall immediately notify the candidate and the candidate shall...

...17 turn a blind eye and rotely disqualify candidates in these situations? Asking the question answers it: the Department should not. III. In conclusion, the natural and literal construction of section 99.061(7)(a)1, one that allows for the Department’s acceptance of payment on checks that are erroneously held by a bank, makes the most sense....

...She appeals an adverse final judgment rejecting her claim for declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order directing that her name be placed on the ballot for the November 2014 general election. We affirm. Addressing the process of qualifying for election to federal, state, county, or district office, section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2014), sets forth the items that must be received by the appropriate filing officer by the end of the qualifying period in order for a candidate to be qualified....

...The existence of such a factual dispute would preclude summary judgment, but because the statute applies if a candidate’s qualifying check is “returned by the bank for any reason,” who was at fault is of no consequence to our disposition. 3 harshness of the result, section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...te. See Hill v. Davis, 4 70 So. 3d 572, 575 (Fla. 2011); see also State v. Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014). The result in this case is buttressed by the fact that under an earlier version of section 99.061, if a candidate’s qualifying check was returned, the candidate was allowed 48 hours after being notified of that fact by the filing officer to pay the fee by cashier’s check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding.” See § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...In conformity with the qualifying statute, Mrs. Levey timely filed everything the statute called for, including “a properly executed check drawn” on her campaign account for $1,781.82, the full amount of the filing fee. § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...endering a cashier’s check for the filing fee, as well as a separate check to pay the returned check fee. When Wright requested an explanation as to why he could not rectify the situation which he had not created, the City Clerk referred Wright to section 99.061(7)(a)l....

...reason, the filing officer shall immediately-notify the candidate and the candidate shall have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. § 99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla, Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). The City Clerk further referred Wright to the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Levey v. Detzner which had held that the clear and unambiguous language of section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...ify, or limit the express and unambiguous, terms of a statute. See Hill v. Davis, 70 So.3d 572, 575 (Fla.2011); see also State v. Chubbuck, 141 So.3d 1163 (Fla.2014). The result in this case is buttressed by the fact that under an earlier version of section 99.061, if a candidate’s qualifying check was returned, the candidate was allowed 48 hours after being notified of that fact by the filing officer to pay the fee by cashier’s check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding.” See § 99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla....

...Specifically, the City noted that Wright would be able to raise funds that other candidates would not be able to because he had not been a candidate. Ultimately, the trial court denied both of Wright’s motions on the merits. The trial court concluded that Wright was not entitled to any relief because section 99.061(7)(a) 1., Florida Statutes, explicitly required the City Clerk to disqualify Wright.' The trial court further explained that it was bound by the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Levey, 146 So.3d 1224 , which it conside...

...However, the Third District also noted that “this issue’s recurrence has moved the matter from the ‘mere anecdotal’ column to the ‘likely to recur’ column” and, therefore, certified the following question to be of great public importance: Does section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...s not required to fairly and substantially meet the statutory requirements to qualify as a candidate for public office. State ex rel. Siegendorf v. Stone, 266 So.2d 345, 346 (Fla.1972). Although we are primarily concerned with subparagraph (7)(a)l., section 99.061(7) provides in full: (7)(a) In order for a candidate to be qualified, the following items must be received by the filing officer by the end of the qualifying period: 1....

...ed and whether each item is complete on its face, including whether items that must be verified have been properly verified pursuant to s. 92.525(l)(a). The filing officer may not determine whether the contents of the qualifying papers are accurate. § 99.061(7), Fla....

...tify the candidate and the candidate shall have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided jn this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. § 99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla....

...Specifically, the Legislature removed language that would have allowed payment of the fee within 48 hours upon notice of a returned check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding,” and added that the candidate had “until” the end of qualifying: 99.061 Method of qualifying for nomination or election to federal, state, county, or district office.— [[Image here]] (7)(a) In order for a candidate to be qualified, the following items must be received by the filing officer by the end of the qualifying period: 1....

...f qualifying within the candidate’s control to be completed within the qualifying period. Furthering the cohesion of this bright line, in the very same Act, the Legislature removed all discretion from the filing officer by adding new sub-paragraph 99.061(7)(c): (c) The filing officer performs a ministerial function in reviewing qualifying papers....

...e the end of qualifying is essentially impossible if both the payor bank and collecting bank use all the time they are minimally entitled to under Florida law. The qualifying period for all elections by statute is only 96 hours or 4 days long. See §§ 99.061(1)-(3), Fla....

...Where offering a cure would not adversely impact an election or the election process, the arbitrary disqualification is the antithesis of our democracy and the election of its officers. In a similar manner, the bright-line rule imposed by the amendment to section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...d the statutory qualifying period to an earlier time, as it does in other elections, to assure orderly and effective elections. It is clear that none of the other interests previously considered' by this Court could possibly justify the amendment to section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...To take away this right is to reduce a man to slavery, for slavery consists in being subject to the will of another, and he that has not a vote in the election of representatives is in this case.”). We therefore sever the portion of section 14 of chapter 2011-40, Laws of Florida, that amends section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without, the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.”). Thus, the version of section 99.061(7)(a) 1....

...As the previous statute is now the law, Wright “shall, the end of qualifying notwithstanding, have-48 hours from the time such notification is received, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account.” § !99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla....

...office to all registered District 2 voters. At issue is whether a statute can impose a residency requirement for placement on the ballot that differs from the Florida Constitution’s residency requirement for the office of county commission. We agree with Francois that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is unconstitutional, and the circuit court improperly removed him from the ballot for the general election....

...4th DCA 2012). Appellee Brinkmann, a resident voter, filed a complaint in the circuit court, alleging that Francois was not properly qualified to be a write-in candidate because he did not physically live within the boundaries of the district as required by section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014). Brinkmann also sought an order forcing the primary election to be opened to all voters pursuant to the UPA. Francois conceded below, as he does on appeal, that he did not live in the district at the time he filed papers to qualify as a write-in candidate. However, he contends that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the Florida Constitution and violates equal protection. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that section 99.0615 is constitutional and disqualified Francois as a write-in candidate. The circuit court also entered an injunction that opened the primary election to all registered voters.3 1 Pursuant to section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), write-in candidates are granted write-in access on the ballot for the general election, irrespective of party affiliation. § 99.061(4)(b), Fla....

...As it currently stands, the primary election for the Broward County Commissioner District 2 will be conducted concurrently with the general election on November 4, 2014, and will be open to all voters. 2  Legal Analysis Francois argues that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional because it conflicts with the language of the Florida Constitution, according to supreme court interpretation, and constitutes a denial of equal protection....

...1893)). The Florida Supreme Court has explained that in order to hold a legislative act unconstitutional, courts “must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1951). The crux of Francois’s argument is that section 99.0615 is unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write- in candidates at the time of qualifying conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates at the time of election as...

...res residency at the time of election.” (emphasis added). It then held unconstitutional a statute which required a candidate for county commissioner to live in the district in which he sought to run at the time of qualification for the office. Section 99.0615, a one-sentence statute applicable to only write-in candidates, states that: “At the time of qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by the office sought.” § 99.0615, Fla....

...ssion in addition to those prescribed by the Constitution”). In view of the supreme court’s decision in Grassi, we are “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Mairs, 52 So. 2d at 795. We hold that section 99.0615, Florida Statutes (2014), is facially unconstitutional because the timing of its residency requirement for write-in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by Article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution. Because we determine that section 99.0615 is facially unconstitutional, we do not address the equal protection argument raised....

OPINION Before, RONEY, Circuit Judge, and TJOFLAT and HODGES, District Judges. PER CURIAM: The Florida Election Code, Florida Statutes § 99.061(1), F.S.A., requires candidates seeking election to the state *228 legislature as the nominee of a recognized political party to qualify for the election at least forty-nine days prior to the date of the first primary held to determine the party nominees....

...Those candidates are campaigning not for their party’s nomination, but for the general election, while the plaintiff is forced to wait until she attains the status of a “candidate.” 5 Plaintiff argues, then, that four sections of the Election Code are unconstitutional: Florida Statutes §§ 97.021(18), 99.061(1), 99.-161 (2) (e), and 99.153, F.S.A....

...tire regulatory scheme. The Florida courts, with their familiarity and expertise with the Code, are better suited to perform this task. It is for these reasons that we abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction and dismiss the case. . Florida Statute 99.061(1)....

...of party affiliation or whether the legislator appeared on the ballot as a write-in or not. In addition, “[a]t the time of qualification, all write-in candidates must reside within the district represented by the office sought.” § 99.0615, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, by statute, write-in candidates must reside within the 2 district at an earlier point than other candidates—the time of qualification. § 99.0615, Fla....

...step. We do not agree. Qualification requirements, mandated by statute, include steps such as making “a full and public disclosure of financial interests,” taking an oath, and paying filing fees or gathering constituent signatures. See § 99.061(5), (7)(a)(1)- (2), Fla....

...The statutory requirement directly contravenes and adds to the constitutional fiat that legislators reside in the district at the time of election. See Francois v. Brinkmann, 29 Fla. L. Weekly 1923, 2014 WL 4426359, at *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 10, 2014) (finding section 99.0615 facially unconstitutional “because the timing of its residency requirement for write- in candidates conflicts with the timing of the residency requirement for county commission candidates as established by [the Constitution]”)....

...all candidates regardless of how they sought ballot access: payment of fees, write-in, collecting signatures, or otherwise). We find this to be a distinction without a difference. See also Francois, 2014 WL 4426359, at *2-3 (using Grassi to find section 99.0615 facially unconstitutional)....

...“must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the act contravenes the superior law.” Id. (quoting Mairs v. Peters, 52 So. 2d 793, 795 (Fla. 1951)). And as was the Fourth District, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at *3. Accordingly, we find section 99.0615, Florida Statutes, facially unconstitutional.2 We REVERSE the circuit court’s order (i) finding Mr. Matthews is not a qualified candidate for office and (ii) “opening” the primary pursuant to Article VI, section 5(b), of the Florida Constitution....

failure to pay the qualifying fee as provided in section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2023) (“Failure

...nt of political party affiliation (or no party affiliation); (4) the completed DS-DE 9 form appointing a campaign treasurer and designating a campaign depository; and (5) the full and public disclosure or statement of financial interests required by section 99.061(5). See 5 § 99.061(7)(a)1.–5., Fla....

...and maintain uniformity in the interpretation[3] and implementation of the election laws.” See § 97.012(1), Fla. Stat. The Election Code further authorizes the Secretary to “prescribe by rule requirements for filing papers to qualify as a candidate.” See § 99.061(10), Fla....

...s the filing officer, performs a “ministerial function” in receiving and reviewing the required qualifying papers of a candidate, including determining whether the papers have been properly completed and, if required, appropriately verified. See § 99.061(7)(c), Fla....

...iser’s race. Here, too, Baker’s argument is not supported by Florida law. The Election Code requires a candidate to pay the applicable qualifying fee with “[a] properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account.” See § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

Ryan Torrens submitted the items listed in section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2017), and qualified

state.fl.us/ publications/index. shtml. . See § 99.061(2), Fla. Stat. (2005) (stating that candidates

...to a peremptory writ of mandamus. We recognize that statutory periods in the year 1970 for complying with such procedures as qualification of candidates for primary nomination of recognized political parties for the office of Governor of the State (Section 99.061(2)); for holding of such primaries of such parties therefor (F.S.Section 100.061, F.S.A.), and for printing the official ballot, including the names of such nominees thereon for the General Election of 1970 (F.S....

...Relator admits that he belongs to a party (The New Party of Florida) “which * * has fewer than 5% of the voters of the State registered as members.” Notwithstanding, he contends it is proper for his party through its executive committee to select him as its nominee for governor, which the committee has done, citing F.S. Section 99.061(2) F.S.A....

...He contends that in the absence of any author *506 ity for the primary election of its candidate for governor, his party’s Executive Committee is authorized to select such a candidate pursuant to the authority of the election laws, citing particularly the authority provided in Section 99.061(2) F.S., which refers to “all other candidates for state office” than those to be selected in primaries of “recognized” political parties....

...77-175 , Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 1978, the provisions of the Florida Election Code which set forth procedures for qualification of candidates for nomination or election to office applied only to candidates for national, state, or county office. See s. 99.061 , F. S. 1975, entitled `nomination of candidates for state, county and United States offices ; sworn statement, receipt and filing fee.' (Emphasis supplied.) Section 99.061 (1) and (2) required candidates for state and national office to file qualification papers and pay the qualification fee and party assessment, if any had been levied, to the Department of State during the qualifying period. Section 99.061 (3) imposed the same requirements on candidates for county office, except that the qualifying papers were to be filed with, and qualifying fees paid to, the clerk of the circuit court of the county....

...candidates for special district offices. The definitions of primary and general elections found at s. 97.021 (2) and (4), F. S. 1977, have been broadened to include district offices as well as national, state, and county offices. More specifically, s. 99.061 (2), F....

...g or qualifying time the amount of the filing fee, two-thirds of which shall be used to promote the candidacy of candidates for county offices and the candidacy of members of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied.) It is evident that the provisions of s. 99.061 (2), F....

...Thus, I am of the view that, insofar as s. 3(2) of Ch. 67-1630 , supra , provides that candidates for the board of commissioners of the district shall qualify before the clerk of the circuit court, it has been superseded and impliedly repealed or modified by s. 6 of Ch. 77-175 , amending s. 99.061 (2), F....

...77-175 , supra , as to the time and manner in which candidates for election to district office must qualify. The title to Ch. 77-175 evidence the legislative intent to prescribe `regulations for the qualification of candidates and the campaign and election of public officers . . . .' Under s. 99.061 (2), F....

...Thus, the qualifying dates established in s. 3(2) of Ch. 67-1630 should be deemed to be superseded and impliedly repealed or modified, and candidates for the office of commissioner of the district should now qualify during the qualification period set forth in s. 99.061 (2) (at any time after noon on the first day for qualifying which shall be the 63rd day prior to the first primary, but not later than noon the 49th day prior to the first primary)....

...In addition, under the principles of law enunciated above, I believe that s. 3(2) of Ch. 67-1630 , supra , has been impliedly repealed or modified insofar as it directly conflicts with procedures established by s. 6 of Ch. 77-175 , supra , as to the manner in which candidates for district office shall qualify. Section 99.061 (2), F....

...137 (Fla. 1936). Accordingly, in light of the language contained in s. 100.051 , F. S. 1977, quoted above, I am of the view that candidates for the office of Commissioner of the Lee County Mosquito Control District should qualify in the manner provided by s. 99.061 (2), F....

...Another issue relative to your request must also be considered. Section 3(2) of Ch. 67-1630 , Laws of Florida, states in part that `[n]o filing fees shall be required as a requisite for qualifying as a candidate for the office of commissioner of this district.' However, s. 99.061 , F....

...the alternative method, described in s. 99.095 (1), and has filed the oath provided therein. As noted in question 1, a candidate for the office of Commissioner of the Lee County Mosquito Control District must qualify either in the manner provided in s. 99.061 (2), F....

2012, and noon on April 20, 2012. See Fla. Stat. § 99.061 (listing requirements). Further, by Florida Statute

...minor political party shall file his or her qualifying papers with, and pay the qualifying fee and, if one has been levied, the party assessment, or qualify by the - 14 - petition process pursuant to s. 99.095.” And section 99.061(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), states that, after qualifying, “[a] write-in candidate is not entitled to have his or her name printed on any ballot; however, space for the write-in candidate’s name to be written in must be prov...

...lection ballot [but a] person may not qualify as a write-in candidate if the person has also otherwise qualified for nomination or election to such office.” Regarding qualifying for nomination or election to county offices in particular, section 99.061(2) (emphasis added) provides that “each person seeking to qualify for nomination or election to a county office ....

...during the primary election. However, the Florida Election Code expressly provides for nomination of candidates for county office by their respective political - 22 - parties during the primary election. See § 99.061(2), Fla....

...eived via email at 12:07 p.m. We first address the argument that Dr. Botel’s use of a cashier’s check precluded her from qualifying to appear on the ballot. We agree with Spiritis that the form of payment of the qualifying fee is governed by section 99.061(7)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2023). The form of payment of qualifying fees is governed by section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...of persons qualified to vote therein which are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter or of the City Charter . . . .” So the Riviera Beach Ordinances incorporate any election statute that does not conflict with the city ordinances. Section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...e candidate shall have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier’s check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate. § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2023) (emphasis added). Dr. Botel argues that section 99.061(7)(a)1. “is also inapplicable, because it does not apply to municipal races such as the one at issue.” It is true that the statute’s title is “Method of qualifying for nomination or election to federal, state, county, or district office.” § 99.061. The election at issue is municipal, not “federal, state, county, or district office.” But unlike each of the other provisions in section 99.061, section 99.061(7) is not limited to a specific category of elections. Additionally, the Riviera Beach Ordinances specifically incorporate all general laws of the state relating to elections, and section 99.061(7) is a general law of the state relating to elections. Finally, in Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765 (Fla. 2016), discussed below, the Florida Supreme Court explicitly applied the section to a municipal election. The court held that section 99.061(7) is clear and unambiguous and “because the fee was not paid before the end of qualifying, under the plain language of the statute[,] the filing officer had no choice but to disqualify Wright” as a candidate in the municipal election. Wright, 200 So. 3d at 772. 5 For these reasons, we reject Dr. Botel’s argument that section 99.061(7) does not apply. Section 99.061(7)’s history is convoluted. Until 2011, as it does now, section 99.061(7) required a candidate to provide a check drawn on the candidate’s campaign account in the amount of the fee. § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...Id. 5 The Florida Supreme Court noted that it was a non-partisan election but stated no party argued the election was governed by section 105.031, Florida Statutes (2016). Wright, 200 So. 3d at 773. Regardless, the requirement to pay by a check drawn on the campaign account exists in both sections 99.061 and 105.031....

...the candidate’s ability to cure the deficiency if the candidate’s check was returned after the qualifying period. Ch. 2011-40, Laws of Fla. But the Florida Supreme Court struck that portion of the 2011 amendments and held that “the version of section 99.061(7)(a)1. in existence prior to the 2011 amendments is revived by operation of law.” Wright, 200 So. 3d at 779. While we presume the Florida Legislature was aware of the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Wright, 6 it amended section 99.061(7) in 2021 and 2023, each time including the stricken language....

...unreasonable and unnecessary, as well as plainly irrational.” Id. at 776. Here, however, Dr. Botel did not do everything statutorily required for qualifying. So the constitutional infirmity the Florida Supreme Court relied on in Wright does not exist in this case. Instead, we focus on section 99.061(7)’s plain language. Section 99.061(7) requires candidates to pay the qualifying fee with a “properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account.” § 99.061(7)(a)1....

...required qualifying fee with campaign funds.” Id. at 782 (Polston, J., dissenting); see also Boatman v. Hardee, 254 So. 3d 604, 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citations omitted). The second sentence relaxes that rule for special district candidates. See § 99.061(7)(a)1....

...In Boatman, the candidate “paid his qualifying fee using a cashier’s check purchased with funds from his campaign account rather than a check drawn upon his campaign account.” Boatman, 254 So. 3d at 605. The First District concluded that “[section 99.061(7)] is unambiguous and” that “its plain language should be applied.” Id....

...7 As a result, the candidate who submitted the cashier’s check did not qualify to appear on the ballot. Id. at 605. Dr. Botel was required to pay the qualifying fee with a “properly executed check drawn upon the candidate’s campaign account.” § 99.061(7)(a)1.; see also Order Granting Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Kelson v. City of Riviera Beach, Case No. 50-2023-CA-016222 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2023) (concluding that, under section 99.061(7), it is not acceptable to pay the qualifying fee for the Riviera Beach City Council with a cashier’s check). Because Dr. Botel submitted her qualifying papers with a cashier’s check, she did not qualify to run for City Council. We recognize this result is harsh. But section 99.061(7) is clear, and it is not for us to rewrite a statute to save a party in such a situation....

...We must enforce the law as written. Because we agree with Spiritis that Dr. Botel’s failure to submit a properly executed check drawn on her campaign account precluded her from qualifying as a candidate, we need not address the second issue raised on appeal. Conclusion Section 99.061(7) unambiguously requires a candidate’s qualifying check to be drawn on the campaign account....

...day, Mayfield filed the petition at issue in this case. II Florida’s constitution gives this Court the authority to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus, see art. V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. 2. See § 99.061(7), Fla....

...establishes a comprehensive body of law on the topic of elections, including rules regulating candidate qualification. In the chapter governing candidates, the applicable language defines the term “qualify” as “to fulfill the requirements set forth in s. 99.061(7)(a).” § 99.012(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024). Section 99.061(7)(a), in turn, lists the specific items that must be submitted to a filing officer within the qualifying period “[i]n order for a candidate to be qualified.” 3 This list consists of proper payment of 3....

...See, e.g., § 106.07(2)(a)(1.), Fla. Stat. (2024); -5- the filing fee, the candidate’s oath, a written statement of party affiliation, a form specifying the campaign treasurer and campaign depository, and a statement of financial interest. § 99.061(7)(a). Once the paperwork has been submitted, the filing officer carries out a narrow review function. See § 99.061(7)(c)....

...are accurate. Id. If the papers are incomplete, it is the obligation of the filing officer to make a reasonable effort to apprise the candidate “of the missing or incomplete items” and also “inform” the candidate of the filing deadline. § 99.061(7)(b). No other requirements for § 106.0702(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2024); § 106.0703(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2024). -6- qualification are listed in section 99.061(7)(a), and no other tasks are assigned to the filing officer with respect to review of the qualifying papers....

...4 Notably, once the candidate qualifies under this statute, the Department of State “shall certify to the supervisor of elections, within 7 days after the closing date for qualifying, the names of all duly qualified candidates for nomination or election.” § 99.061(6). Finally, section 101.252(1) ties a candidate’s right to appear on the ballot with that candidate’s qualification....

...And the right to appear on the general ballot, in turn, depends on the result of the primary. § 101.2512. Considering these statutes collectively, we conclude that a candidate for elective state office who timely submits the paperwork required by section 99.061(7)(a) has met the statutory requirements 4....

...Thus, we must consider whether the Secretary has a ministerial obligation to place a candidate on the ballot who has met the qualifying standards required by statute. The answer is a straightforward yes. Pursuant to statute, the filing officer reviews the paperwork, and that review is a “ministerial function.” § 99.061(7)(c)....

...Indeed, “in determining whether a candidate is qualified,” the filing officer “may not determine whether the contents of the qualifying papers are accurate.” Id. Further, the Department is required to submit the names of those qualified— pursuant to section 99.061(7)(a)—to the supervisor of elections. § 99.061(6)....

...determine if the form of the candidate’s oath complies with statutory requirements. We know this because the statute characterizes review of the candidate’s oath as one for facial completeness and expressly forbids an assessment of whether the contents “are accurate.” See § 99.061(7)(c). Moreover, the filing officer’s responsibility for verification (referred to in section 99.061(7)(c)) specifically directs to a statute that governs only the manner of verification....

...plausible legal basis—taken action that threatens to disrupt the orderly and fair administration of the special election for Senate District 19. Second, time is of the essence. As the majority explains, in determining a candidate’s qualification under section 99.061(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2024), the Secretary “performs a ministerial function.” Majority op. at 6 (quoting § 99.061(7)(c), Fla....

...The statute makes clear beyond any doubt that the ministerial function involves determining only whether the items required to be filed in connection with qualifying—that is, the qualifying papers—have been “properly filed” and “whether each item is complete on its face.” § 99.061(7)(c), Fla. Stat....

...Determining the facial completeness and proper filing of those - 20 - items includes evaluating whether “items that must be verified have been properly verified” by the candidate under oath or affirmation as required by section 92.525(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2024). § 99.061(7)(c), Fla....

...The Secretary—purporting to quote the statute— says that he rejected Representative Mayfield’s candidacy because he “could not ‘properly verif[y]’ the material needed for qualification.” Resp. Br. at 3 (alteration in original) (quoting § 99.061(7)(c), Fla....

...argument that is directly contradicted by the statutory text. In doing so, the Secretary says not a word acknowledging that the statute expressly prohibits the Secretary from determining “whether the contents of the qualifying papers are accurate.” § 99.061(7)(c), Fla....

...nces section 8-1 provides: “All general laws of the state relating to elections are hereby adopted as parts of this chapter.” • Florida election laws fully recognize write-in candidates in municipal elections, citing Section 99.061, Florida Statutes (2024). 2  • The City Clerk’s office is required by law to use the state-approved election forms....

...re filed approximately thirty-three minutes prior to the noon deadline. Pedraza could have avoided this situation if he had filed his paperwork earlier. Pedraza caused the problem at issue. • The City Clerk complied with section 99.061(7)(c) which states the filing officer performs a ministerial function in processing qualifying papers and may not determine whether the contents of qualifying papers are accurate. • Pedraza’s qualifying papers showed an intent to qualify as a write- in candidate....

...He argues that the City Charter does not allow write-in candidates and expressly requires that his name be printed on the ballot because he gave written notice of his candidacy and paid the qualifying fee. Pedraza also argues that the City Charter does not specifically authorize write-in candidates and that section 99.061, Florida Statutes (2024), does not apply to the facts of his case. 2 2 Pedraza makes the one-sentence conclusory argument that section 99.061 does not apply to City of Miramar elections because the title of statutory section, 4  Pedraza’s reliance on City Charter section 5.02 ignores the application of City Charter section 5.01, w...

...Additionally, Pedraza’s briefs completely ignore the application of City of Miramar Code of Ordinances section 8-1 relied upon by the trial court. In our view, based on City Charter section 5.01 and Code of Ordinances section 8-1, we agree with the City Clerk that section 99.061 is applicable and controls this case. Section 99.061(4)(b) specifically states: “A write-in candidate is not entitled to have his or her name printed on any ballot; however, space for the write-in candidate’s name to be written in must be provided on the general election ballot.”...

..., or district office,” obviously does not include any reference to municipal elections. We reject that argument in this case as we did in Spiritis v. Botel, 384 So. 3d 260, 262063 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). As we said in Spiritis, certain subsections of section 99.061 are applicable to certain location-boundary elections, but other subsections are not so limited....

...As the trial court noted, the City Clerk was required to use state-approved forms, which allow the candidate to indicate he or she is running as a write-in candidate. We also determine the trial court properly applied the law and concluded that the City Clerk was to perform her function ministerially. Section 99.061(7)(c), Florida Statutes (2024), unambiguously states: The filing officer performs a ministerial function in reviewing qualifying papers....

...1st DCA 2022) (noting that “plaintiffs must have a legitimate or sufficient interest at stake in the controversy that will be affected by the outcome of the litigation.” (internal quotations omitted)); Spiritis v. Botel, 384 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (“We must enforce [section 99.061(7), Florida Statutes (2023)] as written.”). GROSS, LEVINE and KUNTZ, JJ., concur. * * * FINAL UPON RELEASE; NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ENTERTAINED; MANDATE ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH...

...compliance with Article III, Section 20 of the Florida Constitution.” The Florida Legislature is set to convene on January 9, 2024. See Art. III, § 3(b), Fla. Const. Qualifying in Florida for the United States House of Representatives starts on April 8, 2024. See § 99.061(8), Fla....

...It is further averred that the respondent Wright has filed as a candidate for the same office notwithstanding that he has not resigned his appointive position as chairman of the City of Miami Planning and Zoning Board, which term of office he assumed in 1968 and extends to 1974. Section, 99.061(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that respondent Stone’s department “shall certify to the board of county commissioners within ten days after closing date for qualifying the names of all duly qualified candidates for nomination who a...

...The duty sought to be coerced in this action is that the Secretary of State make a determination that Wright is the holder of an office from which he must resign in order to qualify as a candidate, that he has not resigned, and therefore he is not a “duly qualified” candidate subject to being certified under Section 99.061(4), Florida Statutes....

...on on Ethics in the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary. AS TO QUESTION 1: The secretary of state, as head of the Department of State, has the legal duty to receive the qualification papers and filing fees of candidates for state offices. Section 99.061 (1) and (2), F.S....

...Within ten days after the last day to qualify, the Department of State must certify to the boards of the various county commissions the names of all duly qualified candidates for nomination who are required by law to qualify with the Department of State. Section 99.061 (4), F.S....

...With respect to candidates required to file with the secretary of state, it is apparent that the legislature intended the secretary of state have general responsibility and authority to insure that only candidates complying with all statutory procedures have their names printed on the ballot. Section 99.061 (4), F.S....

...employment if a county or municipal office or an office of another political subdivision is sought. The procedures for filing the statement of disclosure thus closely follow the procedures for filing qualification papers and filing fees pursuant to s. 99.061 , F.S. In most, if not all, cases, candidates for state office will file both qualification papers and the disclosure statement with the secretary of state [see s. 99.061 (1) and (2)], and candidates for local office will file both sets of papers with the clerk of the local circuit court. [See s. 99.061 (3).] An intentional refusal to file a disclosure statement is a violation of Part III, Ch....

...The privilege of having one's name printed on the ballot at public expense may be controlled by legislative enactment. State ex rel. Harris v. Belote, 143 So. 881 (Fla. 1932); Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970). Strict compliance with the statutory procedure established by s. 99.061 , F.S., for qualifying as a candidate is a condition precedent to the exercise of the rights and privileges of candidacy....

...State ex rel. Taylor v. Gray, 25 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1946) citing State ex rel. Vining v. Gray, 17 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1941). The Secretary of State has the ministerial function of certifying only "duly qualified" candidates to the boards of county commissioners. Section 99.061 (4)....

...le a disclosure statement. The legislature must have intended that the secretary of state have responsibility to act upon such knowledge. The filing procedure is so similar to the procedures for the initial filing of qualification papers pursuant to s. 99.061 , F....

...2 The City also banked at Wells Fargo, albeit at a different branch than Wright’s. 3 entered the order on appeal denying Wright relief. We granted Wright’s motion seeking expedited review. II. Analysis3 Section 99.061(7) of the Florida Statutes governs the process of qualifying for election to office. Section 99.061(7)(a)1....

...Despite our tremendous distaste for the result, we are compelled 4Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985) (stating that in the absence of inter-district conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts). 5 As in Levey, we note that, prior to the Legislature amending section 99.061(7)(a) in 2011, candidates had 48 hours from notification of a returned check to pay the qualification fee with a cashier’s check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding.” § 99.061(7)(a)1., Fla....

...of a candidate and leaves a candidate with no remedy. We note this issue’s recurrence has moved the matter from the “mere anecdotal” column to the “likely to recur” column. We, therefore, certify the following question as one of great public importance: Does section 99.061(7)(a)1. require a candidate’s disqualification when the candidate’s qualifying fee check is returned by the bank 6 Judge Makar suggested that 99.061(7)(a)1....