Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The trial court only counted the time Green actually spent in prison as time served. This denial of credit for gain-time already accrued was essentially a retroactive forfeiture of gain-time. Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1987), governs the forfeiture of gain-time....

...tion, see § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 96-106, § 5, Laws of Fla. In addition, it amended the gain time forfeiture statute to add that the filing of a pleading found frivolous by a court may also subject a prisoner to gain time forfeiture. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

include the forfeiture of gain time pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Trial Court Order

...ion pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1)-(6), of the Florida Constitution. We caution Rivera that further abuses of the judicial process could result in additional sanctions, including, but not limited to, sanctions under either section 944.279 or section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...He then attacked the above Rule in a Section 120.56, [2] Florida Statutes (Supp. 1976), proceeding. Rule 33-3.08 sets forth the procedure by which an inmate is subjected to disciplinary confinement and forfeiture of gain-time. Authority for the Rule is derived from Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1975), which allows forfeiture of all or part of gain-time earned by a prisoner should he be guilty of certain specified acts, including assault....

...NOTES [1] Rule 33-3.08 provides a supervising officer shall investigate any apparent violation and any reports of the incident, and shall file his own report with the disciplinary team. The team meets and reviews the two reports. If the team finds a chargeable offense under Section 944.28(2)(a), the Rule provides a copy of the charges will be delivered to the inmate at least 24 hours in advance of a hearing before the team....

...(2) The petition seeking an administrative determination under this section shall be in writing and shall state with particularity facts sufficient to show the person seeking relief is substantially affected by the rule and facts sufficient to show the invalidity of the rule." [3] Section 944.28(2)(b) provides the method of forfeiture: A written charge is delivered to the prisoner giving notice of a hearing before a disciplinary committee....

...To receive this basic gain-time award, the statute required only that the inmate perform "satisfactory and acceptable" work and be guilty of no infractions. [5] Even if these conditions were met, the basic gain-time award was subject to forfeiture for unacceptable conduct. Compare § 944.275(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1981) with § 944.28, Fla....

...However, other related statutory provisions state that DOC has discretion to summarily declare any gain-time award forfeited based on certain broadly defined acts or omissions, disciplinary infractions or unlawful conduct. [11] Compare § 944.275(5), Fla. Stat. (1987) with § 944.28, Fla....

...[11] For instance, any gain-time award is subject to summary forfeiture if inmates "refuse to carry out any instruction duly given ... [or] neglect to perform the work, duties, and tasks assigned to him in a faithful, diligent, industrious, orderly, and peaceful manner." § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...Singletary, 707 So.2d 326, 327 (Fla.1998)(describing program as "an additional post-prison supervision program for certain types of offenders that the legislature has determined to be in need of further supervision after release"); see also §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), 944.291(2), Fla....

...be forfeited. Therefore, while Duncan's gain time will not automatically be forfeited when he is released to *711 Conditional Release supervision, if Duncan fails to satisfactorily complete his supervision, then his gain time will be forfeited. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...See § 947.1405, Fla. Stat. (1999). Duncan's sentence does not expire when the incarcerative portion of his sentence ends; it only expires when the entire sentence, including the supervisory period, has been satisfactorily completed. See §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), 944.291(2), Fla....

...Since 1988, the gain time statutes have provided that when inmates subject to Conditional Release receive gain time, that gain time must be served as supervision upon release and is subject to forfeiture if the releasee violates the terms and conditions of his or her supervision. See §§ 947.1405, 944.28(1), Fla....

...NOTES [1] Of course, the releasee's underlying criminal offense must have been committed on or after the effective date of the statute providing for forfeiture of gain time upon Conditional Release revocation. See Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So.2d 1052, 1053 (Fla.1998); § 974.141; 944.28(1), Fla....

...Simmons makes no such claim. However, his motion for rehearing, which cites Netherly v. State, 508 So.2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), implies that this may not be necessary. Netherly involved an escapee whose conviction required the forfeiture of accrued gain time. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...also serves notice to the defendant contemplating a plea that the maximum possible penalty may be more than could otherwise be expected. [4] The court in Blackshear found no duty to warn about the discretionary forfeiture of gain time authorized by section 944.28....

...s to collateral review shall be strictly enforced. Further, a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited. Section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...Former Section 954.06, supra, to the extent applicable to county prisoners, has been revised and is now cited as Section 951.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The Florida Corrections Code of 1957 was adopted by Chapter 57-121, Laws of 1957, and now comprises Chapter 944, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Sections 944.27 and 944.28, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., now govern so-called good conduct gain time credits....

...The recommended gain time credits shall be allowed to the prisoner upon such certification "but not until, the adoption of such recommendations by the board, * * *." The net effect of this provision is that the Board allows the gain time on the recommendation of the warden or superintendent. Section 944.28, supra, authorizes the Board, upon the recommendation of the Director of the Division of Corrections, to declare a forfeiture of any or all gain time allowances previously earned....

...We here merely hold that under present legislative requirements the final responsibility for forfeiting gain time must be exercised by the Board itself. This may be done pursuant to the recommendations of the Director. The actual hearings required by Section 944.28, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., may be presided over by a hearing officer designated by the Board for the purpose....

...ing probation. Larimore v. State, 823 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Shortly thereafter, based on the revocation of probation, the Department of Corrections forfeited the gaintime (2,830 days) earned on Larimore's 15-year prison sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...nd involuntarily committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act. However, on December 10, 2004, [the First District] held that Larimore was entitled to immediate release from custody because forfeiture of Larimore's gaintime was not authorized pursuant to section 944.28(1) where Larimore's offense occurred before the effective date of the amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gaintime upon revocation of probation....

...Section 947.146(9) provided that if there were reasonable grounds to believe a releasee had violated the terms and conditions of release, the releasee would be subject to section 947.141; both section 947.146(9) and section 947.141 provided for gain time forfeiture where the release was revoked. Sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6) were also amended to provide for the forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of Control Release....

...(1989); see also Fla.Admin.Code R. 23-22.013. By the time inmates were offered this conditional benefit, the gain time statutes had been amended to make clear that a revocation of Control Release would result in a forfeiture of basic and incentive gain time. §§ 944.28(1), 948.06(6), 947.146(9), 947.141, Fla.Stat....

...NOTES [1] Although we find that Bowles waived his ex post facto argument, we note that at the time of Bowles' offenses in November 1989, all the post-prison supervision programs in effect provided for forfeiture of incentive and basic gain time upon revocation. See §§ 944.28(1), 948.06(6), 944.598(5), Fla....

...ally moot. However, mootness does not destroy a court's jurisdiction when, as here, the questions raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984). [4] As amended by chapter 89-526, section 6, section 944.28(1) provided in pertinent part: If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency, conditional release as described in chapter 947, probation or community control as described in chapter 948, provisional release as described in s....

...l gain-time earned according to the provisions of law by such prisoner prior to such escape or his release under such clemency, conditional release, probation, community control, provisional release, control release, or parole. (Emphasis added). See § 944.28(1)(note 1), Fla....

...Finally, we note that although the 1983 act does automatically give prisoners ten days of gain time, that gain time can be forfeited if, among other things, the prisoner “neglect[s] to perform the work duties, and tasks assigned to him in a faithful, diligent, industrious, orderly, and peaceful manner.” Fla.Stat. § 944.28(2)(a) (1987)....

...5th DCA 1997); O'Brien v. State, 689 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Further, a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...n revocation. That authority has been in effect since 1988, and it has provided for the forfeiture of "all gain time" upon conditional release supervision revocation. 731 So.2d at 1230-31; see also ch. 88-122, § 9, at 538, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1), Fla....

...Based upon careful review of defendant's filings in this court, we conclude defendant has reached that point. We also caution defendant that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court is subject to having his gain-time forfeited. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...e on probation. We construe this language to mean that for defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 1989, the sentencing judge is permitted, but not required, to forfeit the credit for gain time otherwise available under Green. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), also authorized DOC, on the revocation of probation and without notice or hearing, to declare a forfeiture of all gain time earned prior to the revocation....

...me previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited under section 948.06(6). ______ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1))....

...Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondents. PER CURIAM. We have for review Hall v. State, 698 So.2d 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), based on express and direct conflict with Mercade v. State, 698 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), concerning a court's proper role in the implementation of sections 944.28(2) and 944.279, Florida Statutes (1999), relating to the imposition of sanctions on prisoners who file frivolous pleadings. [1] We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In the Fifth District Court of Appeal's decision in Hall, the court utilized section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), to sanction Hall for filing a frivolous appeal of the denial of his postconviction motion. Section 944.28(2)(a) provides, in pertinent part: All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ... is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court.... § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996). After finding Hall's appeal to be frivolous, the Fifth District directed the Department of Corrections to forfeit Hall's gain time. See Hall, 698 So.2d at 577. The Second District Court of Appeal in Mercade also utilized section 944.28(2)(a) to sanction an inmate for filing a frivolous appeal of the denial of his postconviction motion. The court noted, however, that the Department of Corrections was vested with the sole discretion to declare a forfeiture under section 944.28(2)(a), and stated [W]e do not have the authority to simply direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit a prisoner's gain time after finding that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous....

...h has not been addressed by either court, but which we conclude controls the final decision in this case. [2] That question is whether an appeal of a postconviction motion is a "collateral criminal proceeding," and if so, whether a court may utilize section 944.28(2)(a), which contains no collateral criminal prohibition, independently of section 944.279, which contains *578 language prohibiting its application to collateral criminal proceedings. Both section 944.279 and the pertinent provisions of section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999), were enacted as part of an act that created or amended several statutory provisions for the purpose of reducing unnecessary or frivolous prisoner filings....

...§ 944.279, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 5, Laws of Fla., the act also amended the Department's gain time forfeiture statute to add that the filing of an action found frivolous by a court may also subject a prisoner to gain time forfeiture. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...indigents to exclude prisoners, and created a new indigency statute for prisoner filings. See §§ 57.081, 57.085, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 1, 2, at 93-95. Quite importantly, these amendments, except the disciplinary forfeiture provision of section 944.28(2)(a), provide that the restrictions do not apply to a "criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." See §§ 944.279(2), 57.085(10), Fla....

...ng. Therefore, having decided that both a postconviction motion and an appeal from the denial of that motion are collateral criminal proceedings, we now proceed to examine the second part of the question above: may gain time be forfeited pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), independently of section 944.279, for a frivolous appeal of a postconviction motion? For purposes of deciding that question, we have examined the 1997 amendment to section 944.279 which removed the specific reference to a gain time forfeiture for frivolous filings, as well as the reference to section 944.28(2)(a), and replaced it with a reference to "disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department." See § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 97-78, § 14, at 447-48, Laws of Fla. While section 944.28(2)(a) does not specifically prohibit its application to collateral criminal proceedings, that section is plainly tied to section 944.279 and, we conclude, cannot be utilized independently of that section....

...Of course that section clearly prohibits its application to such proceedings. Section 944.279 provides the courts with statutory authority to find that a frivolous filing warrants a referral to the Department of Corrections for discipline including possible gain time forfeiture under its administrative rules. Section 944.28(2)(a) is merely an ancillary statute which gives the Department of Corrections the statutory authority to forfeit gain time after a court has utilized 944.279 to find that the frivolous filing warrants a referral to the Department for discipline. In Saucer v. State, 736 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), the First District recently concluded that since the Legislature had "amended section 944.279 by deleting all reference to loss of gain-time and section 944.28(2) and added provisions for disciplinary procedures pursuant to rules of the department provided in section 944.09," the Legislature had sought to clarify that the two sections were separate and independent, as each provided altogether...

...[6] In reality, however, and as Judge Webster points out in his dissent in Saucer, the amendment made no change in the gain time sanction potential of either statute, and the actual effect of the amendment was to add additional sanctions, such as more restrictive confinement, for the filing of frivolous lawsuits, not to make section 944.28(2)(a) independent of section 944.279....

...944.09," that section does not set forth any rules. Section 944.09 is merely the general statutory authority for the Department to promulgate rules. The Department's rules have long provided for gain time forfeiture and the Department has long looked to section 944.28 for its gain time forfeiture authority....

...orrections to impose other disciplinary actions, in addition to gain time forfeiture, against prisoners who file lawsuits deemed by the court to be frivolous." [7] There is nothing in the analysis indicating that the Legislature intended to separate 944.28(2)(a) from 944.279 or in any way to allow 944.28(2)(a) to be used to sanction frivolous collateral criminal proceedings, such as postconviction proceedings, independently of 944.279, which has always provided, and still provides, that such sanctions may not be utilized in collateral criminal proceedings....

...If the original intent of the act was evidenced by the preamble which clearly refers only to civil actions, any "broader intent" to include criminal actions is simply not there. The State also asserts that if the Legislature had intended to exclude gain time forfeiture for criminal or collateral criminal proceedings under section 944.28(2)(a), it would have expressly done so, and in the absence of such a provision, under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we must conclude that the Legislature intended to allow for the sanctioning of frivolous criminal actions as well as frivolous civil actions....

...The only statutory mechanism for the courts to find a proceeding frivolous and refer the matter to the Department for possible gain time forfeiture or other discipline contains language prohibiting its application to collateral criminal proceedings. See § 944.279(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). Repeating that language again in section 944.28(2)(a) would have been redundant because it was assumed that the original frivolous finding by the court would be made under section 944.279. Therefore, since the Fifth District could not properly employ section 944.28(2)(a) to sanction Hall, resolution of the conflict question of whether the court should have recommended sanctioning *581 Hall instead of "directing" that the Department to do so is not necessary for the final disposition of this case....

...nder that section, we conclude that a court has no authority to "direct" the Department of Corrections to sanction a prisoner by gain time forfeiture or other discipline because only the Department has the authority to sanction an inmate pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a)....

...g another branch of the government what the required result of its administrative proceeding should be, as such language immediately conjures up questions of separation of powers. To the extent that a court has properly utilized sections 944.279 and 944.28(2)(a), to sanction a prisoner for filing an action which is sanctionable under those statutes, we find that a court may only "recommend" that the Department sanction an inmate. Therefore, while we conclude that Mercade improperly applied section 944.28(2)(a) to the appeal of the denial of a postconviction motion, we agree with that court's referring a disciplinary matter to the Department....

...[2] Once we have conflict jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction to decide all issues necessary to a full and final resolution. See Jacobson v. State, 476 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Fla.1985); Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla.1982). [3] Both sections 944.279 and 944.28(2)(a) provide for sanctions or discipline when a court makes any of a number of findings including (1) that the prisoner brought a frivolous or malicious action or appeal; (2) knowingly or recklessly brought false information or evidence before the court, or (3) violated a law or prison regulation....

...[4] We note, however, that while the Fifth District found in Ferenc that a postconviction motion was a "collateral criminal proceeding" for purposes of the prisoner indigency statute, it, nonetheless, threatened the petitioner there with possible gain time forfeiture under section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), for the filing of his frivolous appeal....

...e trial court, it becomes a collateral civil proceeding when it is appealed. Therefore, to the extent that Ferenc can be read to say that a postconviction proceeding does not retain its "collateral criminal" nature when on appeal, or that the use of 944.28(2) may be utilized independently of the "collateral criminal" prohibitions existent in section 944.279, we disapprove it....

...postconviction motions such a 3.800 or a 3.850 motion) would be "collateral" to his or her "main" criminal conviction, so such a proceeding would be a "collateral criminal proceeding." [6] The First District had previously concluded that the use of section 944.28(2)(a) was dependent upon a finding by the court under section 944.279....

...Weekly D1972 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug.17, 1998), withdrawn and superseded by Saucer v. State, 736 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). [7] See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Correct., HB 37 (1996) Staff Analysis, 1 (April 18, 1997)(on file with Comm.) [8] Having decided that section 944.28(2)(a) cannot be invoked independently of section 944.279, and having determined that section 944.279 cannot be utilized for sanctions in this case, we need not address whether either of those sections may be applied to petitioner retroactively....

...He contends this sentence was imposed pursuant to a negotiated plea and that the parties' intent called for a sentence of 63 months with credit for 793 days. Dellofano subsequently learned that the Department of Corrections ("DOC") forfeited 98 days of his previously earned credit under section 944.28, Florida Statutes....

...he known he must serve an additional 98 days, he would not have pled guilty to the violation. Dellofano's motion sought resentencing with 98 fewer days' incarceration to effectuate the plea agreement. The trial court denied his motion: [P]ursuant to Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, the [DOC] may, without notice or hearing, forfeit all gain-time earned by a prisoner upon his re-incarceration following a revocation of probation....

...was not entitled to credit for gain time. [2] *1098 Finally, we reject as without merit Bradley's argument that only the Department of Corrections had the authority to forfeit gain time. In another section of chapter 89-531 the legislature did amend section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1987), to authorize the department to declare a forfeiture of probation or community control upon probation revocation....

...5th DCA 1993), the court made similar statements by referring to chapter 89-526, but there, too, it made no difference because in each instance the original crimes occurred before October 1, 1989. Even this Court made the observation that as of September 1, 1990, the legislature had amended sections 944.28 and 948.06 to add revocation of probation to the list of circumstances suggesting forfeiture of gain time....

...iture of all gain-time earned according to the provisions of law by such prisoner prior to such escape or his or her release under such clemency, conditional release, probation, community control, provisional release, control release, or parole. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...at the trial court had in mind. Furthermore, it was the Legislature that provided for the award of gain time in the first place and it made the retention of that gain time conditional upon the satisfactory completion of the inmate's supervision. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...s part of the executive branch, merely executes or fulfills the legislative mandate that the previously awarded gain time be forfeited; thus the inmate must serve out his or her prior incarceration as a penalty for the revocation of supervision. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...Therefore, we conclude that upon resentencing in either a probationary split sentence or a true split sentence, regardless of whether the trial court resentenced the inmate to a lesser sentence, the Department's statutory authority to forfeit "all gain time" upon probation revocation should not be lessened. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...s to collateral review shall be strictly enforced. Further, a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited. Section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...rect an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(i). We affirm because the record conclusively refutes the appellant's claim for relief. In doing so, we in turn invoke the provisions of section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), find that the appellant has brought a frivolous appeal, and recommend that the Department of Corrections exercise its discretion and subject him to the forfeiture of gain time in accord with section 944.28(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...883 (1935) (providing a precise and comprehensive definition of what constitutes a frivolous appeal). We use this case, therefore, to send a message to prisoners collaterally attacking sentences imposed by the trial courts of this district that we fully intend to invoke the applicable provisions of section 944.28, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), governing the forfeiture of gain time and the right to earn gain time in the future, when we are confronted with a frivolous appeal, such as this one, from the denial of a motion for postconviction relief....

...Beasley, 580 So.2d 139, 142 (Fla.1991) ("As to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions."). Effective July 1, 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 944.28(2)(a) in part to provide that "[a]ll or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...r court decided it, i.e., against appellant or plaintiff in error. 121 Fla. at 510-511, 163 So. at 883-884 (footnote and citation omitted). [2] We adopt this definition for purposes of determining whether an appeal is frivolous within the meaning of section 944.28(2)(a)....

...frivolousness because, as noted, it was readily recognizable without argument or research as one which was completely devoid of merit on the face of the record and had no prospect whatsoever of success. We point out, however, that the legislature in section 944.28(2)(c) has vested sole discretion in the Department of Corrections to declare a forfeiture of a prisoner's gain time for any violation of section 944.28(2)(a), including the bringing of a frivolous appeal....

...re of the prisoner's gain time. Thereafter, in the words of the statute, "the department may, in its discretion, declare the forfeiture thus approved by the superintendent or any specified part thereof." It is manifestly clear to us that by amending section 944.28(2)(a), the Florida Legislature sent a definite message to prisoners such as the appellant that the initiation of frivolous legal proceedings before the courts of this state, including the bringing of frivolous appeals, will no longer b...

...We fully intend to implement this legislative policy expression. Accordingly, in view of our finding that the appellant has clearly brought a frivolous appeal in this court, we strongly recommend that the Department of Corrections invoke the provisions of section 944.28(2)(c) and thereafter, in its discretion, declare a forfeiture of the appellant's gain time for violating section 944.28(2)(a)....

...To *1316 that end, we direct the clerk of this court to furnish a certified copy of our opinion to the superintendent of the institution where the appellant is now confined. We note that we are not the first appellate court to rely on the provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) in an attempt to stem the flow of frivolous postconviction appeals. In Hall v. State, 690 So.2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ( Hall I ), the Fifth District advised Mr. Hall "that any further pursuit of frivolous appeals will subject him to sanctions as provided in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ef motions. After determining that the appeal was frivolous, the Fifth District in Hall v. State, 698 So.2d 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ( Hall II ), "direct[ed] the Department of Corrections to forfeit the applicable gain time earned by Hall pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)." (Emphasis added.) Although we share the same frustrations over frivolous postconviction appeals as do our colleagues on the Fifth District, we conclude that we do not have the authority to simply direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit a prisoner's gain time after finding that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous. In our view, to do so would be in direct conflict with the legislative scheme of section 944.28(2)(c) which, as previously analyzed, establishes a host of mandatory procedural requirements which must first be met before the Department of Corrections, "in its discretion," may declare a forfeiture of a prisoner's gain time. Accordingly, we decline to follow the "direct" approach of Hall II. We express our confidence, however, that if we consistently implement the legislative policy expressed in section 944.28(2)(a) in the manner we have done in this case, and if the Department of Corrections consistently invokes the procedures of section 944.28(2)(c) when notified that a particular prisoner has brought a frivolous appeal before us, then prisoners will be dissuaded from bringing frivolous postconviction appeals because of the looming specter of the loss of a prisoner's most precious commodity—gain time....

...93-216 and 93-297 against the overall seven-year sentence in Case No. 93-360. After Gibson began serving his sentences for violation of probation in Case No. 93-360, the DOC declared a forfeiture of the 1969 days of previously unforfeited gain time from the sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297 pursuant to section 944.28(1)....

...days). Because the gain-time forfeiture penalty of 5.4 years (1969 days) was greater than the revocation sentence of 2.4 years after deduction of Tripp credit, the DOC in effect required Gibson to serve the forfeiture penalty. Thus, the DOC applied section 944.28(1) in a manner that required Gibson to serve the forfeiture penalty as the punishment for violation of probation....

...We thus begin with the actual language of the statutes that the DOC relies upon for its assertion of authority to declare a forfeiture penalty of gain time from a sentence that was already fully served and apply it to another sentence imposed upon revocation of probation. A. Statutory Authority Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1993), provides: If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency, conditional release as described in chapter 947, probation or community control as described in chapter 948, provisional release as described in s....

...ned according to the provisions of law by such prisoner prior to such escape or his or her release under such clemency, conditional release, probation, community *380 control, provisional release, control release, or parole. (Emphasis supplied.) [5] Section 944.28(1) is one of two provisions that authorized forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of probation at the time of the offenses in this case....

...community control, or control release. (Emphasis supplied.) This subsection provides general authority to forfeit gain time and specifically refers to split sentences. [6] The issue in this case is whether the DOC may apply the forfeiture penalty of section 944.28(1) across offenses to the guidelines sentence imposed upon violation of probation for a crime that was originally included in the same guidelines scoresheet as the offense on which the gain time was accrued. Section 944.28(1) does not specify whether the forfeiture penalty applies to split sentences....

...tion 948.06(6) providing that upon revocation of the probationary or community control portion of a split sentence, the offender may be deemed to have forfeited all gain time earned up to the date of his release. We held in Eldridge that pursuant to section 944.28(1), the DOC may forfeit the gain time even if the trial court chooses to retain it....

...Thus, pursuant to Eldridge, the Department had the authority to forfeit any accrued gain time upon revocation of probation. Id. at 424-25 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). Judge Lewis's analysis correctly applies our precedent in this area. We conclude *384 that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to the single-unit sentence structure first addressed in Tripp is consistent with our prior case law in which we have recognized the continuing relationship among guidelines sentences that were originally imposed in relation to one another. Application of section 944.28(1) to single-unit sentences also serves the Legislature's purpose of penalizing offenders for violation of probation through the forfeiture of gain time....

...nauthorized general sentence. Viewed from the perspective of fairness and uniformity, an offender sentenced upon revocation of probation that was imposed as part of a single-unit sentence should not be exempt from the gain-time forfeiture penalty of section 944.28(1) while an offender sentenced upon revocation of probation imposed as part of a split sentence for a single offense is subject to the forfeiture penalty....

...Allowing the forfeiture penalty to be applied to single-offense split sentences while precluding application of the penalty to single-unit sentences on which the offender received Tripp credit would result in disparate treatment based solely on sentence structure rather than for any purpose served by either Tripp or section 944.28(1). We recognize that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to single-unit sentences will in some cases counteract much of the benefit of Tripp credit. However, if we were to hold that section 944.28(1) does not extend to single-unit sentences, the credit for unforfeited gain time applied to sentences imposed upon revocation of probation would give offenders such as Gibson a windfall in comparison to those sentenced to prison upon violating probation imposed as part of a single-offense split sentence....

...However, after the trial court granted Tripp credit, the DOC subtracted 1681 days of Tripp credit on the sentences in Case Nos. 93-216 and 93-297, yielding 874 days or 2.4 years to be served on the seven-year (2555-day) term. Then, in order to effectuate intent of section 944.28(1) that the prisoner be penalized for probation violation by loss of gain time previously accrued, the DOC applied section 944.28(1) in a manner that required Gibson to serve no less than the forfeiture penalty upon revocation of probation....

...penalty. With no net increase in the revocation sentence based on the expired sentence, there is no double jeopardy violation. IV. CONCLUSION The certified question in this case asks whether the forfeiture penalty authorized by our interpretation of section 944.28(1) in Eldridge also applies to the type of sentence imposed in Tripp — i.e., those in which offenses pending for sentencing are included in the same scoresheet and incarceration is imposed for one offense and probation or community control for another....

...cision. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We have chosen to retain jurisdiction although Gibson's sentence has expired so we may address the certified question and resolve uncertainty reflected in the district court opinion on the applicability of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1993), to sentences like those imposed here....

...In Gibson's case, treating the forfeiture penalty as consecutive to the new sentence would have resulted in his serving 288 days more than the seven-year sentence imposed. [5] In 1989, revocation of probation or community control was added to the circumstances contained in section 944.28(1) that authorize the DOC to forfeit an offender's gain time. See ch. 89-531, § 6, at 2717, Laws of Fla.; Dowdy v. Singletary, 704 So.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Fla.1998). The 1989 legislation superseded State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989), in which this Court held that under a previous version of section 944.28(1), credit both for time actually served and for gain time must be granted against a sentence imposed upon revocation of the probationary portion of a split sentence....

...In the complaint for mandamus filed in the Leon County Circuit Court, appellant challenged the revocation of his conditional release by the Florida Parole Commission ("the Commission") and the subsequent forfeiture of gain time by the Department of Corrections ("the Department") pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...gain time issue. While issues concerning jail time credit are logically brought to the attention of the sentencing court, [7] a proceeding which challenges the revocation of conditional release and the subsequent forfeiture of gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1), has to do with the inmate's behavior on release and the penalty imposed by forfeiture of gain time after the revocation....

...Hall, Jr., Palatka, pro se. No Appearance for Appellee. COBB, Judge. This court in Hall v. State, 690 So.2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) advised Clarence H. Hall, Jr. that any further frivolous pro se appeals would subject him to sanctions as provided in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...ef. The motions, directed *577 to a judgment and sentence in Case No. 81-1061 are untimely and without merit and clearly frivolous. [1] Therefore, we direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit the applicable gain time earned by Hall pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...5th DCA 1997); O'Brien v. State, 689 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Further, a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. GRIFFIN, C.J., concurs specially with opinion. GRIFFIN, Chief Judge, concurring specially. When the Florida legislature enacted chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida, which created section 944.279, Florida Statutes and amended section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, I understood that the reference to "a frivolous suit action, claim, proceeding or appeal" in section 944.28(2)(a) referred to the same kind of "frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal" that had previously been described in section 944.279....

...s state or in any federal court, which is filed after June 30, 1996, or who knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, brought false information or evidence before the court" does not include criminal or collateral criminal proceedings, but section 944.28(2)(a) applies to any type of proceeding and has no such procedural requirement. If the two statutes are independent, the first, section 944.279 would seem to be superfluous since both substantively and procedurally it is entirely subsumed in the broader statute, section 944.28(2)(a), (b). My understanding that 944.28(2)(a) refers to the cases described in 944.279 derives not only from the statutes themselves but from the preamble to chapter 96-106: WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court dockets and delay the administration of justice for al...

...ecision in this case based on our prior caselaw, but I do so not only with reservations concerning whether we are correct but exactly how this statute will work in the context of criminal appeals and collateral proceedings. I note, for example, that section 944.28(2)(a) is not expressly limited to unrepresented criminal defendants.

...He received fifteen days' disciplinary confinement, received ninety days' loss of earned gain-time, and was rendered ineligible to earn incentive gain-time for a period of six months after receiving the disciplinary report. The penalty assessed was based on section 944.281, Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that "[t]he department may declare that a prisoner" who violates a law or rule "shall not be eligible to earn incentive gain-time for up to 6 months," and rule 33-11.0065(5)(a)1.-5. of the Florida Administrative Code, which implements section 944.281. Britt has filed this petition for writ of mandamus seeking to prevent the governor and the department from applying section 944.281 and rule 33-11.0065 to him based on an asserted ex post facto violation because the statute and rule were not in effect at the time he committed his offense....

...We now address the petition as it pertains to the department. At the time Britt committed his offense, incentive gain time was governed by two statutes pertinent to this petition: (1) sections 944.275(4)(b) and (5), Florida Statutes (1991); and (2) section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ve gain time for good behavior. Additionally, subsection 944.275(5) provided: "When a prisoner is found guilty of an infraction of the laws of this state or the rules of the department, gain-time may be forfeited according to law." (Emphasis added.) Section 944.28(2)(b) likewise provided: A prisoner's right to earn gain-time during all or any part of the remainder of the sentence or sentences under which he is imprisoned may be declared forfeited because of the seriousness of a single instance of misconduct or because of the seriousness of an accumulation of instances of misconduct. (Emphasis added.) On October 1, 1995, section 944.281 was adopted, effective January 1,1996. That section provides: The department may declare that a prisoner who commits a violation of any law of the state or rule or regulation of the department or institution on or after January 1, 1996, and who is found guilty pursuant to section 944.28(2), shall not be eligible to earn incentive gain-time for up to 6 months following the month in which the violation occurred. The department shall adopt rules to administer the provisions of this section. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to the directive in section 944.281, the department adopted rule 33.110065(5)(a)1.-5....

...time of sentencing. Rather, the department argues that disciplinary confinement and forfeiture of gain-time or the right to earn gain-time are merely management tools used to control and modify improper behavior. Further, the department argues that section 944.281 is merely a further refinement of section 944.28....

...ng before its enactment'—and it `must disadvantage the offender affected by it' by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 896 (citations omitted). The statute at issue, section 944.281, changes the method of determining what punishment is to be imposed for a disciplinary infraction during an inmate's confinement by allowing the department to eliminate an inmate's opportunity *1048 to earn incentive gain-time for up to six months following the offense....

...ening the period that an inmate spends in prison in the face of a disciplinary action. The distinctions in the consequences of the two statutes become clear when the applicable administrative rules are examined. At the time of Britt's offense, under section 944.28, the department applied rule 33-22.008 to determine whether future eligibility to earn gain-time would be revoked....

...hieve the desired corrective results. (Emphasis added.) Because Britt's disciplinary infraction dealt with drug use, under the old rule, he would not have lost eligibility to earn gain-time. Under rule 33-11.0065(5)(a), which was enacted pursuant to section 944.281, he became ineligible to earn gaintime for six months for that same offense....

...gthen his sentence by increasing the punishment to be applied for disciplinary actions. Accordingly, for the reasons expressed, we grant Britt's petition, holding that, upon this opinion's becoming final, the department shall be barred from applying section 944.281 and its corresponding administrative rule to Britt and any other inmate convicted of an offense committed prior to October 1, 1995, the date the statute became law....

...ated the same as incentive gain time for purposes of ex post facto analysis. Thus, the United States Supreme Court held that its prior decision in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), applied to all types of gain time. Section 944.281, Florida Statutes (1995), and Department Rule 33.110055(5)(a)1.-5., under consideration in this case, are entirely different. They provide for the cancellation of gain time only if prisoners commit subsequent acts of misconduct. Unlike the circumstances in Lynce, section 944.281 and its corresponding rule do not take away anything to which the prisoner was entitled *1049 when his crime was committed or when he was sentenced to jail....

...ol release supervision. Dowdy violated the terms and conditions of his control release and it was revoked. Upon his return to prison in 1994, the Department of Corrections forfeited his previously awarded basic and incentive gain time under sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...o statutory authority for that forfeiture. Our decisions were based on interpretations of 1987 statutes which were subsequently amended, and the amendments were in effect when Dowdy committed his offenses. Our decision in Green was based on sections 944.28(1) and 944.291, Florida Statutes (1987). The 1987 version of section 944.28(1) provided for forfeiture of gain time after escape or upon revocation of parole or clemency....

...eiture upon the violation of several additional programs, including probation. Effective July 1, 1988, conditional release was added to the list of circumstances permitting gain-time forfeiture. See ch. 88-122, § 9 at 538, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988)); id. § 92 at 572 (providing for effective date). [3] Effective October *1054 1, 1989, probation, community control, and provisional release were added. See ch. 89-531, § 6, at 2717, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1989)); id. § 20 at 2721 (providing for effective date). Effective September 1, 1990, control release was added. See ch. 89-526, § 6 at 2663, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1) n....

...As we stated in another part of the decision in Green: Because of that accumulated gain-time, Green was released early, and the incarceration part of his split sentence was finished, although he was still required to serve the probation part of his split sentence. Green, 547 So.2d at 926 (emphasis added). [2] Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provided in pertinent part: If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency or parole granted to him is revoked, the department may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time...

...(emphasis added). [5] Our statements would, however, also apply to revocation of community control and provisional release since they were added along with probation effective October 1, 1989. See ch. 89-531, § 6 at 2717, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 944.28(1), Fla....

...m are "collateral criminal proceedings" for purposes of determining whether sanctions may be imposed under a different statutory *977 scheme, which provides for discipline when an inmate files a frivolous or other improper lawsuit. See §§ 944.279, 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...[4] Not only did the act provide statutory authority for the sanctioning of inmates who file frivolous, untruthful, or malicious lawsuits, see § 944.279, Fla. Stat. (1999); ch. 96-106, § 5, Laws of Fla. (statutory authority for court to find suit frivolous); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...See Poore, 531 So.2d at 163 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). At the time Poore was decided, however, a prisoner was permitted to accrue gain time which could be forfeited only for specific purposes and under specific procedures. See § 944.28, Fla....

...hout credit for time served, or (2) a sentence equal to the term of the initial sentence with credit for the full incarceration period previously imposed. [2] Since 1988, however, a prisoner's entitlement to gain time has been substantially limited. Section 944.28(1) was amended effective July 1, 1988, to allow the Department of Corrections to revoke gain time based upon the revocation of a conditional release....

...ecause his offense occurred before October 1, 1989, the effective date of the amendment to the gain time forfeiture statutes providing for forfeiture of all gain time upon the revocation of probation, community control or Provisional Release). See §§ 944.28(1), 948.06(6), Fla....

...Application of Lynce to Lancaster Three statutes were enacted after the commission of Lancaster's criminal offense which could be asserted as a legal basis to cancel Lancaster's overcrowding gain time. The first two were 1989 amendments to sections 948.06 and 944.28(1). See § 944.28(1); 948.06(6), Fla....

...y authority to forfeit overcrowding gain time upon supervision revocation. *1231 See generally State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989). We find, however, that in some cases, the State may claim statutory authority to forfeit overcrowding gain time. Section 944.28(1) states that "if the ......

...is revoked, the offender, by reason of his misconduct, may be deemed to have forfeited all gain-time." (Emphasis added.) [5] It appears that the State believes that neither of those sections includes Provisional Credits or Administrative Gain Time. We believe, however, that sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6) do provide the State with such authority but they can only be invoked for inmates whose underlying offenses were committed on or after October 1, 1989 (the effective date of the amendments providing for such forfeitures)....

...e to retroactively take away something to which Lancaster had an expectation at the time of his offense, actually received during his incarceration, and actually retained after revocation or must now be awarded because the 1989 forfeiture provision, section 944.28(1), may not be applied to him (as discussed above)....

...the effective date of the act." Tripp, 622 So.2d at 943 n. 2. Prior to that date, there was statutory authority for the forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of parole and clemency, but not probation, community control, or provisional release. See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1989); ch. 89-531, § 6, at 2717, § 20, at 2721, Laws of Fla.; § 948.06(6), Fla. Stat. (1989); ch. 89-531, § 13, at 2720; § 20, at 2721, Laws of Fla. [3] See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [4] Section 944.28(1), Fla....

...Accordingly, because Johnson has abused the post-conviction process and filed a frivolous and/or malicious appeal in this court, we direct the clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures which may include forfeiture of gain time. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...1989), which held that a prisoner who is released early because of gain-time has completed his or her sentence in full. Sub judice, Green applies because appellant committed the original offense before September 1, 1990, the effective date of section 948.06(6). Also, the state abandoned its argument that section 944.28(1)....

...Florida Statutes (1989), applied because it merely extended to the courts the existing authority of the Florida Department of Corrections to forfeit gain-time. Again, sub judice, Green applies because appellant committed the original offense before October 1, 1989, the effective date of section 944.28(1)....

...ump sum award of all basic gain time to which they may be entitled throughout the full term of their sentences upon entering the prison system. This gain time is earned when so credited, and is thereafter subject to earned gain time forfeiture under section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-11.011(1)....

...ime previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited under section 948.06(67). ____ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1))....

...credit for time previously served. The award of six years and six months, or 2,372.5 days, credit for time previously served included 1204 days of gain time previously earned. Upon Williams' return to the Department of Corrections [DOC], pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995), the DOC declared a forfeiture of the 1204 days of gain time he had previously earned....

...legally detained, and that had the gain time been properly credited, he should have been released in 1996. The trial court denied the writ of mandamus finding that the DOC had acted within its discretion in forfeiting Williams' gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1)....

...On June 17, 1992, he was returned to DOC's custody as a control release violator after having been sentenced in case no. CR91-12092 for a robbery which was committed on November 14, 1991. The Florida Parole Commission revoked appellee's control release supervision effective November 14, 1991. Pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1991), DOC forfeited 281 days basic gain-time and 42 days additional gain-time earned on appellee's previous four-year terms of imprisonment up to the date of his controlled release on November 5, 1991. Appellee thereafter filed an amended 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief on the ground that appellant's forfeiture of his gain-time through its retroactive application of section 944.28(1) was violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause because his offenses predated the effective date of section 944.28(1) of September 1, 1990. Construing appellee's motion for post-conviction relief as a 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence, the trial court granted the motion on the ground that his offenses were committed before the effective date of section 944.28(1)....

...The awarding of statutory gain time is solely a function of the DOC, and the trial court is without authority to prevent such award or order its waiver. See Curry v. Wainwright, 422 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Hall v. State, 493 So.2d 93 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The forfeiture of gain time is governed by § 944.28, Florida Statutes....

...Cassady is prohibited from filing any further pro se pleadings with this court concerning his 1991 conviction and sentence for four counts of attempted sexual battery. *1195 See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Additionally, we remind Mr. Cassady that section 944.28(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), provides that "[a]ll or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...State, 413 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The forfeiture of gain time following a plea of guilty is accomplished by a proceeding which is not an automatic or mandatory procedure, but "may" be done in the discretion of the Department of Corrections. Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1983). The proceeding is not instituted by either the state attorney or the trial judge. This discretionary forfeiture of accumulated gain time pursuant to Section 944.28 is a collateral consequence of Blackshear's guilty plea of which neither the trial court nor his counsel must advise him for the plea to be valid....

...Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his motion for post conviction relief. We caution defendant that "a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having his or her gain time forfeited." O'Brien, 689 So.2d at *1238 337 (citing section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) ("All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...We reverse. In the motion, Galindez alleges that his counsel failed to inform him that despite inclusion in the judgment of a provision concerning gain time, the Department of Corrections (DOC) could forfeit gain time based on his violation of probation. See § 944.28, Fla....

...Appellant pled guilty to the escape charge and received an 18-month sentence to run consecutively to the sentences that appellant was already serving. After his return to prison, appellant learned that the Department of Corrections revoked 2,011 days of his gain-time pursuant to Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...Pursuant to the court's order, the Department awarded Stephens credit for 530 days but did not award him the 498 days prison time he had previously served. The Department also forfeited the 165 days gain time awarded under the original incarceration pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...ons to compute and apply credit for all other time served previously on the prior sentence for the offense for which the offender is being recommitted. This section does not affect or limit the department's authority *578 to forfeit gain-time under ss. 944.28(1) and 948.06(7)....

...has now served all the time required by the resentencing on April 8, 2005. The DOC takes the position that none of the 1529 days served prior to his release in October 2004 applies to this net sentence of 5 years' imprisonment. Moreover, in light of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2000), it concludes that he has forfeited 253 days of gain time....

...r a period of 15 months, at the Florida State Prison, as punishment for his alleged escape. Because of this confinement, petitioner was not permitted "gain time" which would have amounted to 313 days. In addition, pursuant to provisions of Fla.Stat. § 944.28(1) (1971), respondent exercised his discretion to deprive petitioner of 686 days of accrued "gain time." Consequently, petitioner lost 999 days of "gain time." If this "gain time" had not been forfeited, petitioner would now be eligible for mandatory release. Fla.Stat. § 944.28(1), "[f]orfeiture of gain time and right to earn gain time in the future," provides in pertinent *1307 part, "[w]hen a prisoner escapes ....

...., the division shall, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain time earned and extra gain time allowed such prisoner, if any, prior to such escape . . . ." In view of the fact that when a prisoner is charged with unsuccessfully attempting to escape, Fla.Stat. § 944.28(2)(a), provides for (1) the charge of the offense to be delivered to the prisoner, (2) the prisoner to be notified of a hearing, and (3) the prisoner to be present at the hearing, it is crystal clear that Fla.Stat. § 944.28(1), applies only when the prisoner has been adjudicated guilty of the crime of escape....

...ee § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that when a court finds that an inmate files a "frivolous or malicious collateral criminal proceeding," the inmate is subject to "disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections"); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...The issue in this case is whether, following the revocation of a probationary portion of a split sentence, the sentencing court may properly delegate to the Department of Corrections the ministerial duty of calculating that portion of the previously awarded gain time forfeited pursuant to section 944.28(1) and 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...The court delegated to the Department the *831 duty of determining the credit given on the original sentence from its files. Further, the court determined that the defendant should be given credit for all unforfeited gain time previously earned during his original period of incarceration. The court recognized that under section 944.28(1), it is the Department that determines whether earned gain time is to be forfeited....

...The trial court committed no error in delegating to the Department the task of looking up the appropriate numbers to apply to the awarded jail credit. Nor did it commit error in directing the Department to credit against the new sentence any gain time that it found unforfeited. The judgment is consistent with section 944.28(1); it is consistent with section 948.06(6); it is consistent with the statewide sentencing form (Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.986); and it is consistent with section 921.0017 (although this section was not applicable at the time of the present sentence)....

...ee § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that when a court finds that an inmate files a "frivolous or malicious collateral criminal proceeding," the inmate is subject to "disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections"); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...of gain time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) (stating that when an inmate files a "frivolous or malicious collateral criminal proceeding," a court may recommend "disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections"); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...: Whittaker was originally sentenced for aggravated child abuse to a "true split sentence" of fifteen years—seven years incarceration to be followed by eight years probation. [1] His criminal act was committed in 1990, which means that, pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), any gain time earned by Whittaker during the serving of his sentence would be subject to forfeiture if, among other conditions, he later violated probation....

...Although Whittaker will have to spend additional time in prison to fulfill the sentence imposed by the first court before starting his "new" sentence, DOC's action does not affect the extended term of incarceration imposed because of the violation. And DOC's action is authorized by section 944.28(1)....

...Indeed, neither party to the appeal has even mentioned the sentencing guidelines. The sole issue concerns the authority of the Department, upon the defendant's return to prison, to forfeit the gain time previously awarded. The majority opinion correctly holds that the Department has the authority, pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes and Forbes v....

...entences in the form of gain-time in order to encourage satisfactory prisoner behavior," while several statutory sections provide for forfeiture *1186 of earned gain time upon an inmate's failure to satisfy conditions subsequent. See, e.g., Sections 944.28(1)(escape, or violation of clemency, conditional release, probation, community control, provisional release, parole, or control release allows the department "without notice or hearing, [to] declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned"), 944....

...ned while in prison. See s. 948.06(6), Fla. Stat. (1991); Forbes v. Singletary, 684 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1996). The DOC, like the trial court, also had the discretion to forfeit credit for prior gain time upon the revocation of probation. Forbes, supra ; § 944.28(1), Fla....

...hapter 96-248. Effective July 1, 1996, section 924.051(8) provides that it is the Legislature's intent that the terms and conditions of collateral review and procedural bars to collateral review shall be strictly enforced. Further, we point out that section 944.28(2)(a) provides a prisoner, who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court, is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited....

...Appellant contends that he had accumulated sufficient gain time prior to parole to terminate the first of the consecutive sentences and that therefore, he having served this sentence, the forfeiture of gain time was unlawful. As to forfeiture of gain time, § 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1975), provides as follows: "If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency or parole granted to him is revoked, the [Department of Offender Rehabilitation] may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeitur...

...ule 33-22.008(4)(a), which implements, refines, and places a definitive gloss on the Department's statutory authority to "declare forfeited" a "prisoner's right to earn gain-time during ... any part of the sentence ... under which he is imprisoned." § 944.28(2)(b), Fla....

...Appellee contends in response that the trial court's order reducing appellant's credit for time served should be affirmed because a defendant now forfeits any gain time previously earned following a revocation of probation or community control. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...On July r, 1981, Avera escaped from DOC custody and was recaptured the same day. That same year, Avera was convicted of escape and sentenced to an additional 15-year prison term. [1] In addition, DOC forfeited all gain time earned up to the date of the escape pursuant to section 944.28, Florida Statutes....

...ing probation. Larimore v. State, 823 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Shortly thereafter, based on the revocation of probation, the Department of Corrections forfeited the gaintime (2,830 days) earned on Larimore's 15-year prison sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...predator and involuntarily committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act. However, on December 10, 2004, this court held that Larimore was entitled to immediate release from custody because forfeiture of Larimore's gaintime was not authorized pursuant to section 944.28(1) where Larimore's offense occurred before the effective date of the amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gaintime upon revocation of probation....

...ith respect to the 1990 offense. See Larimore v. State, 823 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Once that credit was applied, however, DOC forfeited [1] all gain-time earned by Larimore during the incarcerative portion of his initial sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, and Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000). We conclude that since one of Larimore's crimes occurred prior to the effective date of the 1989 amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gain-time upon revocation of probation, our decision in Tranquille v....

...SERVING A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE AS DEFINED IN TRIPP, IS INCARCERATED FOR A CRIME COMMITTED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1989, AND PLACED ON PROBATION FOR A CRIME COMMITTED AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1989, IS THE DEFENDANT EXEMPT FROM THE FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 944.28(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IN CALCULATING THE TRIPP CREDIT UPON THE REVOCATION OF PROBATION? On the basis of the foregoing, we quash the circuit court's order and remand with directions to order Larimore's immediate release from custody....

...*849 ALLEN, PADOVANO, JJ., concur; HAWKES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion. HAWKES, J., concurring and dissenting. I concur with the majority's decision to certify the question of great public importance. However, my review of the plain language of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), in conjunction with the Florida Supreme Court decisions in Gibson v....

...See State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989). Gain-time earned during the incarcerative portion of a split sentence was credited against the sentence imposed upon revocation of probation. See id. However, effective October 1, 1989, the Legislature amended section 944.28, Florida Statutes, to permit forfeiture of gain-time earned on the incarcerative portion of a split sentence, when determining the amount of credit to apply to the new sentence imposed upon revocation of probation. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...ed. See Gibson, 885 So.2d at 384. Gain-time is no longer "time served" for all purposes. See Eldridge, 760 So.2d at 892. The question then becomes, in a probationary split sentence, where offenses occurred both before and after the effective date of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, when do the forfeiture provisions apply? I believe the statutory language is clear....

...offenses committed prior to 1989, upon revocation of probation, defendant entitled to credit for the gain-time accrued on the 1990 offenses, because the underlying offense for which he was placed on probation occurred prior to the effective date of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989))....

...Applicability of forfeiture provisions to Larimore Larimore takes the contrary position. Larimore argues that in his (and by extension, any) multi-case split sentence, if any of the offenses underlying either the incarcerative *850 or probationary portion of a sentence were committed prior to the effective date of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), the forfeiture provisions would never apply when calculating Tripp credit upon revocation of probation....

...Larimore committed the crime underlying his probation in 1990. Upon the violation of his probation, he is subject to the same statutory sanctions as any other offender who committed a crime in 1990. Those sanctions include the forfeiture provisions of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...sentence upon revocation of probation that, combined with the sentence originally received, exceeds the maximum guidelines sentence." Gibson, 885 So.2d at 382. Applying these goals, the Gibson court addressed how forfeiture of gain-time pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), works with the "credit for time served" requirement of Tripp....

...However, because the 7.75 year sentence is greater than the five-year sentence imposed by the trial court, Larimore's sentence can be no greater than five years. Conclusion Because the crime for which Larimore was placed on probation was committed after section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), became effective, I believe he is subject to the forfeiture provisions upon re-sentencing following revocation of his probation....

...The date of the offense is the "key date" for determining applicability of gain time forfeiture statutes. See State v. Lancaster, 731 So.2d 1227 (Fla.1998). Lawson's offense date in count II of the original information was April 4, 1993, subsequent to the enactment of gain time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28(1), Fla....

...redit. The trial court accepted the admission and sentenced Mr. Borders to 150.8 months in State prison, but failed to provide credit for any prior prison or jail time. Thereafter, the Department of Corrections forfeited Mr. Borders' gain time under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...We note that Grant also contends that the Department erred in forfeiting 1,475 days of his basic gain time upon his convictions for escape. It is clear, however, that the Department was entitled to forfeit Grant's gain time upon conviction for escape pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1983), and all subsequent versions of section 944.28(1)....

...e of process. Accordingly, we must limit the defendant's access to this court in order to conserve our limited resources. Furthermore, we advise the defendant that any further pursuit of frivolous appeals will subject him to sanctions as provided in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)....

...3d DCA 1996). We also advise the defendant that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to the forfeiture of all or any part of his or her accumulated gain time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...We further direct the Clerk of this Court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate correctional institution for consideration of disciplinary procedures pursuant to section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2008), including, but not limited to, the loss of gain time as provided in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...or previous prison time. Summers alleged that he would not have pleaded if he had known the sentence that he would receive. The trial court denied the postconviction motion because Summers has failed to show prejudice. We agree and therefore affirm. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, was amended in 1988 and 1989 to allow the Department of Corrections to forfeit all gain time upon the revocation of a conditional release, probation, or community control....

...Pursuant to statutory provisions calling for the loss of gain time upon the revocation of probation, the Department of Corrections apparently did not credit Martin's new sentence for the entire five year period of the original sentence, but rather for actual time served. See § 944.28, Flat....

...hs in prison, but that the forfeiture will lead to his serving 24 months, 181 days in prison. It is well-settled that the Department of Corrections has the authority to forfeit all of a defendant’s gain time following a violation of probation. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...ected that a certified copy of the order be provided to the superintendent of Union Correctional Institution "so that disciplinary action may be instituted against plaintiff, William Martin # 026396, in accordance with recently enacted amendments to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ply direct the Department of Corrections to forfeit a prisoner's gain time after finding that the prisoner's appeal is frivolous." Mercade v. State, 698 So.2d 1313, 1316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The circuit judge apparently recognized the requirements of section 944.28(2)(a), because he directed that his order be provided to the prison so that disciplinary action could be instituted against Mr....

...e. NOTES [1] We note that an abuse of the judicial process by filing successive pleadings raising sentencing claims that were previously rejected on the merits may be the basis for the imposition of sanctions such as the forfeiture of gain time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...ation of his gain time. ANALYSIS This Court held in Hall v. State, 752 So.2d 575 (Fla.2000), that if a state court recommends to the Department of Corrections (department) that it discipline an inmate for filing a frivolous action in accordance with section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), it is to do so in accord with section 944.279, Florida Statutes (2001)....

...The department's discretion was exercised in consideration of Spencer's substantial gain time (ten years) and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Thus, we conclude that the department complied with its disciplinary rules and with the prerequisites of the statutory scheme. Spencer also argues that sections 944.279 and 944.28(2)(a) are unconstitutional on their face and as applied because they do not meet the strict scrutiny test....

...nt from ever filing again. He also argues that since frivolous lawsuits are not really a problem anyway and there are now both state and federal statutes requiring that inmates pay for their lawsuits, there is really no need for sections 944.279 and 944.28(2)(a)....

...e it .... This Court will not tolerate incomplete responses .... If the Court cannot rely on the statements ... it threatens the quality of justice. Spencer v. Sullivan, No. 99-228-Civ-J-21A, order at 2 (M.D. Fla. order filed Mar. 19, 1999). [2] See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...legislature shares the trial court's view that frivolous appeals, even in collateral civil proceedings, should not be tolerated carte blanche. Appellant is herewith cautioned that frivolous appeals may subject a defendant to sanctions as provided in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), including a forfeiture of gain time....

...Plaintiff contends that his acceptance of his release was not voluntary, and that because his offenses were committed prior to the effective date of the Control Release Program the Department of Corrections' forfeiture of his gain-time pursuant to Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes was a violation of ex post facto....

...Florida Parole Comm., 799 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (Table) The instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on August 8, 2002. [10] Petitioner raises two claims for relief: 1. Petitioner's ex post facto rights were violated by Respondent's forfeiture of gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1), Fla....

...e that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." Harris 394 U.S. at 291. Ground One Petitioner's first claim is that because he offended prior to September 1, 1990, the effective date of the amendment to Florida Statutes, § 944.28(1), which authorizes the forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of control release, the FDOC violated the Ex Post Facto clause when it forfeited his gain time (Dkt. 13 at 7). See Fla. Stat. § 944.28(1)....

...lease revocation. In Lancaster, we held that the overcrowding credits known as administrative gain time and provisional credits were merely another type of gain time which could be forfeited upon violation of the conditions of release. We found that section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provided the requisite statutory authority for this forfeiture, but only if the releasee's underlying criminal offense was committed on or after October 1, 1989 (the effective date of the amendments to the...

...Const. Similarly, we now hold that control release credits are another type of overcrowding gain time which may be forfeited upon supervision revocation. The requisite statutory authority for this forfeiture is found both in section 947.141(6) and in section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...), by cross-referencing section 947.141(6), may be used to forfeit control release credits upon supervision revocation. In addition, we also find that because control release credits are a type of gain time, the regular gain time forfeiture statute (section 944.28(1)) may be used to forfeit control release credits. Finally, as to Lewis, who committed his crime in 1989, we have already held in Bowles v. Singletary, 698 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1997), that based on the principles of waiver, the State can use section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), to forfeit regular gain time upon control release revocation even if the releasee's underlying criminal offense was committed prior to the effective date of the control release program, if the releasee accepted placement on control release....

...eated control release program, the releasee waived any ex post facto claims. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1999) provides for the forfeiture of "all gain-time." Section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1999), provides similar forfeiture authority....

...d be no appellate review. Based upon these findings, the petition for belated appeal was denied without comment. Saucer v. State, 718 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). The state now asks this court to order a forfeiture of gain-time in accordance with section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...r the forfeiture of gain-time. Martin v. Singletary, 713 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(relying upon Mercade v. State, 698 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). More importantly to resolution of respondent's motion, we are persuaded that the provisions of section 944.28(2) are applicable to the instant proceeding....

...ce with rules adopted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 944.09 for frivolous or malicious actions in civil proceedings and provides that "[t]his section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." Section 944.28(2) authorizes a sanction of forfeiture of gain time if the prisoner "is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court; is found by a court to have knowingly or with reckless *12 di...

...ore the court." This sanction is without the limiting language of section 944.279 and appears to apply in both civil and criminal proceedings. Chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida, amended chapter 944, Florida Statutes, to add section 944.279 and amended section 944.28(2)(a) for the expressed purpose of reducing the onslaught of frivolous prisoner civil lawsuits. The amendments provided for loss of gain-time upon certain findings by the court. The new section 944.279 provided that court findings would be forwarded to the appropriate prison facility for disciplinary action provided in section 944.28(2). This section further provided that it would not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding. The gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28 did not contain a civil action limitation; however, there was no declared intent in chapter 96-106 to target frivolous or malicious proceedings in criminal matters. In chapter 97-78, Laws of Florida, the legislature amended section 944.279 by deleting all reference to loss of gain-time and section 944.28(2) and added provisions for disciplinary procedures pursuant to rules of the department provided in section 944.09. The gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28 were not changed. It appears the legislature has now authorized gain-time forfeiture and other disciplinary action in the case of frivolous civil litigation. In the absence of limiting language in section 944.28, there appears to be no reason why the gain-time forfeiture cannot apply to criminal proceedings....

...In view of the historical treatment of gain-time forfeiture and its statewide application in criminal proceedings, we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: May the gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) apply in criminal and collateral criminal proceedings? The motion to forfeit gain-time is granted, in part, and we find the petitioner either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information before the court....

...We are dealing here with statutory interpretation. In such a case, our task is to attempt to divine the legislature's intent, and then to apply the statute as we believe the legislature intended. Deason v. Department of Corrections, 705 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1998). The majority finds in section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), an intent that gain-time be subject to forfeiture if an inmate engages in frivolous or malicious criminal or collateral criminal litigation, or "knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth br[ings] false information or evidence before the court" in such litigation. I cannot agree with that conclusion. In my opinion, the legislature did not intend the language of section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies to apply to criminal or collateral criminal proceedings. At present, sections 944.279 and 944.28, Florida Statutes (1997), read: 944.279 Disciplinary procedures applicable to prisoner for filing frivolous or malicious actions or bringing false information before court.— (1) At any time, and upon its own motion or on motion of a party, a...

...(2) This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding. (3) For purposes of this section, "prisoner" means a person who is convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or who is being held in custody pending extradition or sentencing. 944.28 Forfeiture of gain-time and the right to earn gain-time in the future....

...specified part thereof. (3) Upon the recommendation of the superintendent, the department may, in its discretion, restore all or any part of the gain-time forfeited under this section. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion of subsection (2)(a) of section 944.28 is the language upon which the majority relies for its conclusion. Section 944.279 and the portion of section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies were both enacted as parts of chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida....

...Any remaining doubt regarding this proposition is removed by subsection (2) of section 944.279, as originally adopted—"This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding." Thus, section 944.279 and the language of section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies were initially intended to create a sanction that might be used only when an inmate engaged in frivolous or malicious civil litigation. It was necessary to add the language upon which the majority relies to section 944.28(2)(a) to make it clear that an inmate might be subject to forfeiture of gain-time for the reasons set out in section 944.279, as well as for the other reasons which were already enumerated in subsection (2)(a)....

...t to earn gain-time. The court shall issue a written finding and direct that a certified copy be forwarded to the appropriate institution or facility for disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the department action as provided in s. 944.09 944.28(2)....

...(2) This section does not apply to a criminal proceeding or a collateral criminal proceeding. (3) For purposes of this section, "prisoner" means a person who is convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or who is being held in custody pending extradition or sentencing. Ch. 97-78, § 14, at 447-48, Laws of Fla. Section 944.28(2)(a) was left unchanged....

...ble to earn gain-time might also be punished). Because forfeiture of gain-time was intended to continue as an available sanction after those amendments (but was no longer to be the only available sanction), it was necessary to retain the language in section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies....

...I am unable to glean from the 1997 amendments any intent to extend the sanction of forfeiture of gain-time to frivolous or malicious criminal or collateral criminal litigation. It seems to me that, because they were both adopted as parts of chapter 96-106, section 944.279 and the language of section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies must be read in pari materia, and as intended to remedy the problems identified in the preamble to that act....

...1 (Fla.1965) ("Statutes relating to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia, ... and this rule is applicable with special force where the statutes in question were enacted by the same legislature as part of a single act"). Thus read, it seems to me that the language of section 944.28(2)(a) upon which the majority relies—"All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner ......

...have knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information or evidence before the court"—was intended to authorize forfeiture of gain-time only for frivolous or malicious civil litigation. As Judge Griffin has noted, to read section 944.28(2)(a) as the majority does would appear inconsistent with many established principles of statutory construction, and would lead to many peculiar results, not the least of which is the possibility that a criminal defendant might be subj...

...State, 703 So.2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Griffin, C.J., specially concurring). I would deny the state's motion for sanctions in its entirety on the ground that this is a collateral criminal proceeding and that, therefore, the procedures outlined in sections 944.279 and 944.28 for forfeiture of gain-time when an inmate engages in frivolous or malicious litigation or "knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth br[ings] false information or evidence before the court" are inapplicable. Because the majority concludes that section 944.28(2)(a) authorizes the forfeiture of gain-time, respectfully, I dissent.

...ustice” exception in this case is entirely devoid of merit.”) (citing Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(h) and Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1241 (Fla.2004)). Meritless inmate filings like this can result in the litigant’s loss of gain-time. Pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, “[a]ll or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ... is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court....” This penalty is applicable to all of an inmate’s sentences. Section 944.28(2)(b) provides that “[a] prisoners right to earn gain-time during all or any part of the remainder of the sentence or sentences under which he or she is imprisoned may be declared forfeited because of the seriousness of a single inst...

...And because Appellant has abused the postcon-viction process and filed a frivolous appeal in this court, we direct the clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for *658 disciplinary procedures, which may include forfeiture of gain-time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...3rd DCA 2007) (prohibiting appellant from filing further pro se pleadings after appellant filed repetitive pleadings making the same argument, and sending a certified copy of the opinion to the Department of Corrections pursuant to section 944.279, Florida Statutes, for consideration of sanctions pursuant to section 944.28, Florida Statutes)....

...Appellant does not dispute that the DOC had the authority to declare his incentive gain-time forfeited. We find no merit in his distinction between basic gain-time and incentive gain-time, holding that both may be subject to forfeiture by the DOC pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Section 944.28(1) provides that when a control release violator is returned to jail, the DOC may revoke “all gain-time [previously] earned according to the provisions of law.” As both basic and incentive gain-time derive from legislative grant, b...

...visions of law.” See id. Further, the Legislature specifically refers to all earned gain-time, whether basic or incentive, as a right — one that is granted as a matter of grace and is not automatically retained, but is subject to forfeiture. See § 944.28(2)(b), (c); Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990); Rice v. State, 563 So.2d 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). As such, the DOC was within its authority and discretion to revoke Appellant’s basic gain-time as well as his incentive gain-time pursuant to section 944.28(1)....

...In 1988, he was re-sentenced to 30 years and the habitual offender designation was removed. In 1993, Knox was released early from prison to control release supervision. Knox violated the terms of supervision and supervision was revoked by the Florida Parole Commission. As a penalty for the violation, and based upon section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, DOC forfeited the gain time earned before release....

...The petition challenged the forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of control release supervision on the basis that the forfeiture constituted an ex post facto violation. The State's response to the petition noted that forfeiture authority is set out in sections 947.146 and 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...Also, if a prisoner violates the terms of his control release, the parole commission is authorized to revoke all gain- time earned by the prisoner prior to release – not just that picked up under the Control Release program but also all other gain-time he may have received under other statutes. See Fla. Stat. §§ 944.28(1), 947.141(6). As of June 23, 1992, Gaskins had earned 2953 control release credits under the new statute, and he was offered early release to control release supervision....

...of his control release. After numerous violations his release was revoked effective October 15, 1999, and he was returned to prison on November 22, 1999. After Gaskins returned to prison, all of his gain-time was forfeited pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 944.28(1), including those 270 days he had earned under the Provisional Credits statute. On January 4, 2000, Gaskins petitioned the Florida trial court for habeas Stat....

...Before FLETCHER and SHEPHERD, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM. Darryl Frederick, pro se, petitions this court for writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and deny the petition. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...umstances of this case violated Lee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. B. Lee's Gain-Time Rights 19 Florida law provides for granting and revoking gain-time according to specified standards and procedures. See Fla.Stat.Ann. Secs. 944.275 and 944.28 (West 1985 & Supp.1989)....

...arily abrogated"); see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 471-72 , 103 S.Ct. 864, 868, 871-72 , 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 , 100 S.Ct. 1254, 1261-62 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). Baranko's retroactive application of section 944.28's stringent procedural guarantees relating to gain-time establishes Lee's liberty interest beyond any doubt....

...24 Baranko was indisputably "clearly established law" for Anderson purposes. It established a highly specific rule of law on facts virtually identical to Lee's case: A Florida prisoner is entitled to gain-time, even for months spent in close confinement, unless that gain-time was denied by a section 944.28 forfeiture hearing....

...944.275(1) (West 1985) (pre-1983 version reprinted in historical note) 4 The new law applies "to all sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1978." Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 944.275(6)(a) (West 1985 & Supp.1989) 5 Both before and since the 1983 revision, section 944.28 has imposed a hearing requirement on all "forfeitures." 6 No subsequent case has overruled or modified Baranko, and it remains today the sole authoritative statement of Florida law on this point 7 See footnote 3 supra 8 Lee had origina...

...The attorney for DOC contended that the legislature had mandated upon sentencing for violation of probation, the cancellation of Galston's provisional credit by section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1995) and forfeiture of Galston's gain time by enactment of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...." See § 944.275(1), Fla. Stat. (1995); Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So.2d 2 (Fla.1991). However, a prisoner who is released on probation pursuant to Chapter 948, may have his gain time forfeited without notice or hearing if his probation is revoked. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...73-486 must be reviewed and signed by an attorney. We caution defendant that "a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having his or her gain time forfeited." O'Brien, 689 So.2d at 337 (citing section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) ("All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...We also caution defendant that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having his or her gain-time forfeited. See Gorge v. State, 712 So.2d 440, 440 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) ("All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...r belated appeal be denied. Consistent with the special master's findings and recommendation, we hereby deny the petition seeking belated appeal. In light of the special master's findings, the state has filed a motion regarding sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...However, given the fact that Allen personally swore that the information contained in his petition was true and correct, we reject his attempt to avoid responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, the state's motion regarding *1248 sanctions is granted, and in accordance with section 944.28(2)(a), we hereby certify that petitioner either knowingly or recklessly brought false information before the court in this proceeding....

...ns of collateral review and procedural bars to collateral review be strictly enforced. See O'Brien v. State, 689 So.2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Raley v. State, 675 So.2d 170, 173-74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Finally, we call to Adkins' attention, amended section 944.28(2)(a), effective July 1, 1996, which provides that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited....

...dges take earned gain-time into account when resentencing probation violators. Green II also precludes courts from usurping a function that has been delegated by statute to the Department of Corrections, namely, forfeiture of a prisoner's gain-time. § 944.28, Fla....

...hat any further attempts by him to relitigate this already over-litigated issue on appeal, may result in the forfeiture of any earned gain-time and preclusion by this Court of the filing of any further pro se appeals with this Court in the case. See § 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007) ("All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...In its consideration of the motion, the circuit court correctly determined that the appellant sought credit for his previously earned gain time pursuant to State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1989). The court found, however, that since the appellant was sentenced for a violation of his community control, section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1991), authorizes the Department of Corrections to declare a forfeiture of all earned gain time, and so denied the appellant's motion....

...First, there is no support in the record for the court's determination that the Department of Corrections had forfeited the appellant's gain time. In fact, an affidavit inappropriately filed in this court states that the gain time was not forfeited by the Department of Corrections. Second, the 1991 amendment to section 944.28 does not retroactively apply to the appellant as his offense occurred prior to its enactment....

...parture sentences that must be accompanied by written reasons). We also advise Appellant that additional, repetitive, non-meritorious post-conviction motions, writs, and appeals may lead to forfeiture of all or part of his accumulated gain time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...Bradley appeals the sentences imposed upon revocation of probation because he was given credit for only the actual time he served in custody. Bradley argues that his gain time should not be forfeited because his original offenses were committed before the effective date of the amendments to sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Bradley pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to seven years' incarceration to be followed by five years' probation on each charge, to run concurrently. In order to determine whether Bradley is entitled to accrued gain time, it is necessary to review sections 948.06(6) and 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989) and the amendments to these sections, as well as case law interpreting the effective dates of the amendments. Sections 948.06(6) and 944.28(1) both address forfeiture of gain time upon revocation of probation or community control. Originally, the Department of Corrections (DOC) was given the authority to forfeit gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1987), if the defendant was convicted of escape or if clemency or parole was revoked. In 1988, forfeiture of gain time for a violation of conditional release was added to that statute. Effective October 1, 1989, [1] section 944.28(1) was amended to permit DOC to forfeit gain time for violations of probation or community control....

...[4] Effective September 1, 1990, [5] forfeiture for a violation of control release was added. [6] Before section 948.06, Florida Statutes (1987) was amended to provide for forfeiture, the supreme court, in State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1989), noted that under section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1987), the trial court was without statutory authority to forfeit gain time upon a revocation of *1157 probation....

...2d DCA 1992), reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to correct sentence because the trial court failed to give the defendant credit for gain time after his community control was revoked. This court held that Green applied and that the 1991 amendment to section 944.28 did not control because the defendant's offense occurred before the enactment....

...Toschlog does not refer to the date of the defendant's offense, only the date of sentencing. Also, the Fourth District, in Thomas v. State, 605 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), addressed the effective dates of the amendments to sections 948.06(6) and 944.28(1). The court correctly stated, according to the Laws of Florida, that the effective date of the amendment to section 944.28(1) is October 1, 1989....

...State, 553 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1989), reversed the lower court's denial of gain time to a defendant upon revocation of probation on the authority of Green. The offenses in Carter occurred in 1985. The supreme court in dicta noted that the recent amendments to sections 944.28 and 948.06, Florida Statutes, to add revocation of probation to the list of circumstances justifying forfeiture of gain time did not apply because neither of the amendments were effective until September 1, 1990....

...Therefore, the trial court had the authority to forfeit Bradley's gain time. We conclude that this court is not bound by the dicta in Carter, and we certify conflict with Thomas. Toschlog is not in conflict with this opinion because this court did not state specifically the effective date of the amendment to section 944.28....

...The court shall issue a written finding and direct that a certified copy be forwarded to the appropriate institution or facility for disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the department as provided in s. 944.09. § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Possible sanctions include the forfeiture of gain-time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1999). Furthermore, we direct the clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for consideration of disciplinary procedures. § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...Moore, 760 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000), the Appellant was serving a probationary split sentence in part for crimes committed before October 1, 1989. Therefore, the Department of Corrections had no authority to add days to the sentence imposed by the trial court as a forfeiture penalty upon Appellant's revocation of probation. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...Any such motions or petitions filed by the Defendant will be rejected and not ruled upon. The Defendant is cautioned that further abuses of the judicial process could result in additional sanctions, including, but not limited to, sanctions under either Florida Statute § 944.279 or § 944.28(2)(a) (disciplinary action, loss of gain time)....

...In an order dated and entered March 23, 2010, the trial court dismissed the November 9, 2009 filings and the March 5, 2010 amended motion, ordered that a certified copy of the order be forwarded to O'Berry's institution for disciplinary procedures pursuant to sections 944.279(1) and 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, and also prohibited O'Berry "from filing any further pro se pleadings challenging his convictions and sentences." That order is the subject of the instant appeal....

...e case/count forfeited under section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes. The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.) It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing....

...time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited under section 948.06(6). ____ The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1))....

...Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Harry M. Hipler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees. BOYD, Justice. In February of 1973, while in state custody on a robbery conviction, William R. Morgan, Jr. escaped. Approximately ten months later he was arrested. Under the authority of Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1973), [1] the Department of Offender Rehabilitation declared all Morgan's earned gain time and any extra gain time allowed him to be forfeited. Morgan petitioned the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit for a writ of habeas corpus, attacking the constitutionality of Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1973)....

...1306 (M.D.Fla. 1972), the statute is constitutional. The Circuit *578 Court's denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and KARL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "944.28 Forfeiture of gain time and right to earn gain time in the future....

...Under the clear language of the statute a prisoner did not receive gain-time for any month in which he failed to comply with the statutory prerequisites. However, gain-time could not be "forfeited" unless the procedures for forfeiture of gain-time set forth in Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1979), were followed. Although the documents submitted by respondent support the forfeiture of 387 days of gain-time based on disciplinary reports, there is no documentary support indicating that the right to earn 310 days gain-time had been forfeited pursuant to Section 944.28....

...3d DCA 1996). We also advise the defendant that a prisoner who is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding or appeal in any court is subject to the forfeiture of all or any part of his or her accumulated gain time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...greement — that he serve a total of 366 days in state prison. We find the defendant’s argument to be meritorious. The Department of Corrections has the authority to forfeit all of a defendant’s gain time following a violation of probation. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...The appellant entered into a plea agreement to receive ten years credit for time served on a 17-year sentence following the revocation of probation and was sentenced in accordance with this agreement. The Department of Corrections ("DOC") revoked the gain time portion of the ten years in accordance with section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ned by the number of days of gain time awarded. § 944.291(2), Florida Statutes (1989, 1991); Duncan v. Moore, 754 So.2d 708 (Fla.2000). If the inmate is returned to prison as a conditional release violator, all gain time is subject to forfeiture. §§ 944.28(1), 947.141(4), Fla....

...Basic gain time under section 944.275(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1989, 1991) is applied in a lump sum when the Department first receives custody of the inmate and is subject to forfeiture thereafter depending on the inmate's conduct. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-603.402(3)(c); § 944.275(5), Fla. Stat. (1989, 1991); § 944.28(1), Fla....

...We have for review a decision on a question certified to be of great public importance, Saucer v. State, 736 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The district court certified the following question: May the gain-time forfeiture provisions of section 944.28(2)(a) apply in criminal and collateral criminal proceedings? Saucer v. State, 736 So.2d at 12 . We answer the question in the negative. Further, we hold that if a writ petition challenges the petitioner’s underlying criminal conviction or sentence, it is a collateral criminal proceeding and thus neither section 944.28(2)(a) nor section 944.279, Florida Statutes (1999), may be used to impose discipline or sanctions....

...He asserted that his trial counsel had agreed to appeal his case but failed to do so. The First District appointed a special hearing officer to conduct a hearing. After the hearing officer found Saucer’s allegations to be false, the State asked the First District to impose sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a)....

...Recently, this Court issued its opinion in Hall v. State, 752 So.2d 575 (Fla.2000), holding, in pertinent part, and consistent with Judge Webster’s dissent, that a post-conviction motion and its appeal are “collateral criminal proceedings” and sanctions cannot be invoked under section 944.28 because that statute must be construed together with section 944.279, which prohibits the invocation of these statutory sanctions in criminal or collateral criminal proceedings....

...Since Saucer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First District seeking a belated appeal of his criminal conviction, the subject matter of his petition should be characterized as collateral criminal and our decision in Hall controls. Hence, we reaffirm that sections 944.28(2) and 944.279 may not be utilized to invoke sanctions in these proceedings. Accordingly, although the district court found Saucer’s habeas petition to be untruthful, it could not invoke section 944.28(2)(a) or 944.279 to sanction Saucer....

...Section 944.279(1) provides for discipline when a court makes any of a number of findings including that the prisoner (1) brought a frivolous or malicious action or appeal; (2) knowingly or recklessly brought false information or evidence before the court, or (3) violated a law or prison regulation. Section 944.28(2)(a) provides the Department with the statutory authority to discipline inmates who have violated section 944.279(1) by forfeiting gain time....

...This Court also disapproved Saucer (in Hall) to the extent that the First District held that it could "direct” (as opposed to merely "recommend”) that the Department of Corrections sanction an inmate by gain time forfeiture. . As indicated above, while section 944.28(2)(a) does not contain an express collateral criminal prohibition, this Court held in Hall that it was tied to section 944.279, which does contain such a prohibition....

...to take land for a public purpose. In such cases, the “civil” nature of the action refers to the subject matter, not to the person or entity bringing the action. . We note that while the district court could not utilize either section 944.279 or 944.28(2)(a) to sanction Saucer, it has long been held that the courts have inherent power to impose sanctions upon finding a pleading frivolous or otherwise improper....

...jurisdiction to make a finding pursuant to section 944.279, Florida Statutes, that appellant, a prisoner, had brought a frivolous action when appellant had previously voluntarily dismissed that action. We find that the purpose of section 944.279 and section 944.28(2), Florida Statutes, is similar to that of section 57.105, Florida Statutes, which is to preclude the filing of frivolous litigation....

...Hook, 648 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We, therefore, hold that the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal by a prisoner does not divest a trial court of the requisite jurisdiction to enter an order authorizing sanctions in accordance with section 944.279 and section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Because Appellant has abused the postconviction process and filed a frivolous appeal in this court, we direct the clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures, which may include forfeiture of gain-time. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...1st DCA 2012) (prohibiting appellant from filing further pro se pleadings after appellant filed repetitive pleadings making the same argument, and sending a certified copy of the opinion to the Department of Corrections pursuant to § 944.279, Fla. Stat., for consideration of sanctions pursuant to § 944.28, Fla....

...ional Reform Act of 1983. In 1998, petitioner was released to parole supervision while serving the second of his consecutive sentences. After petitioner's parole was revoked, the Department declared a forfeiture of petitioner's gain-time pursuant to section 944.28, Florida Statutes....

...ed on the second sentence. As for petitioner's remaining consecutive sentences that have yet to be served, the Department is authorized to order the forfeiture of the right to earn gain-time in the future if it complies with the procedure set out in section 944.28(3), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See Williams v. Wasi, 681 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“We find no merit in his distinction between basic gain-time and incentive gain-time, holding that both may be subject to forfeiture by the DOC pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1995).”); Waldrup v....

...8136. Upon this stipulation, we now prohibit him from filing any additional pro se appeals, pleadings, motions, or petitions relating to this conviction and sentence. We also ordered defendant to show cause why we should not sanction him pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...We are constrained by the caselaw to reverse. On remand, the court may attach the records refuting the claim. The defendant is cautioned that sanctions may be imposed if he initiates a frivolous appeal. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999); § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla.1994); see also § 944.28(1), Fla....

...REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. HARRIS, CJ., and THOMPSON, J., concur. . Initially, the power to forfeit gain time upon revocation of probation was within the exclusive province of the Department of Corrections. Calhoun v. State, 522 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); § 944.28(1).

...probation, and unforfeited gain time. Upon his return to the custody of the DOC, the DOC forfeited the 220 days of basic gain time and 72 days of additional gain time granted when appellant served his 22-month sentence, as it was permitted to do by section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

disciplinary proceedings conducted pursuant to section 944.28(2), Florida Statutes (1995) be filed within

...o collateral review be strictly enforced). We forewarn appellant that a prisoner who is found to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court is subject to having all or any part of his or her gain time forfeited. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...filed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Clerk of this Court is therefore directed to forward a certified copy of this opinion to Plucinik and the appropriate institution for consideration of available disciplinary procedures. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...l the Department of Corrections to reinstate forfeited gain time. The petitioner alleges that the Department of Corrections has the discretion to declare only one forfeiture of gain time upon violation of supervision. There is nothing in case law or section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, that indicates that the Department of Corrections lacks the discretion to declare a second forfeiture of gain time that falls within the scope of the statute....

...Appellant has initiated numerous untimely and meritless postconviction challenges and appeals. He appears to have brought false information before the court. He is cautioned that abuse of postconviction relief procedures may result in sanctions. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999); § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

PER CURIAM. In this appeal from an order denying appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea after sentencing, appellant claims that the court erred in forfeiting his gain time, because the court had no authority under section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes, to enter an order of forfeiture....

...The sentencing court agreed and entered an order awarding credit for time served and unforfeited gain-time accrued on the initial prison sentences. Consistent with the sentencing court’s order, DOC applied the credit for time served and unforfeited gain-time, but relying on its independent authority under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, it then exacted a forfeiture of the accrued gain-time and restructured Gibson’s sentence accordingly....

...STATE, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla.1993), UPON VIOLATION OF PROBATION FOR THE SECOND OFFENSE? PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIO-RARI DENIED. LEWIS, J., concurs with opinion; BENTON, J., dissents with opinion. . All of Gibson's offenses occurred after October 1, 1989, and the applicability of section 944.28(1) is thus not in question....

forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)). _ It is further ordered that the defendant

...Henriquez argues that the trial court judge exceeded her authority in concluding: 11. The Defendant is hereby notified that this court may consider any other motions for reduction of sentence to be frivolous and will pursue the remedies set forth in Fla. Statutes § 944.28(2)(a)....

...us pleadings, thereby diminishing the ability of the courts to devote their finite resources to *36 the consideration of legitimate claims. See Rivera, 728 So.2d at 1166; Attwood, 661 So.2d at 1216-17; Martin, 627 So.2d at 1300. Id. at 48. Moreover, section 944.28(2)(a), specifically provides in part: All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner unsuccessfully ......

...Several months before the finding at issue, the trial court warned the defendant of the possible consequences of the continued filing of repetitive pleadings and gave him time to respond. Thus, we conclude that the above finding in the trial court’s order did no more than observe the court’s power under section 944.28(2)(a)....

...case/count forfeited under section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes. The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.) It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing....

...A court may “at any time” determine whether a collateral criminal proceeding is filed in good faith. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The statute equates a lack of “good faith” with a determination that the collateral action was “frivolous.” See id.; § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...The special master made findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluding petitioner was not entitled to a belated appeal. We accept the special master’s report and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

sentence could have been legally forfeited under section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1983). Because appellant

...d by an attorney. See Ali v. State, 729 So.2d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We caution defendant that disregard of this prohibition could further result in forfeiture of all or part of his gain time. See Duncan v. State, 728 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...itioner. Accordingly, the petition for belated appeal is denied. Further, we grant the State’s motion for sanctions and certify that petitioner either' knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information before this court. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...20 years in the DOC, with credit for 15 years and 260 days of credit for time served. Upon Petitioner's entry into DOC, he received credit, but had 2,900 days forfeited. DOC denied Petitioner's request for additional credit, noting that, pursuant to section 944.28(1), for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1989, DOC may forfeit gain-time earned prior to release, and DOC rules provide gain-time earned prior to release will be forfeited upon revocation of probation....

47 (Fla.1999); § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); § 944,28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Affirmed. POLEN, DAMOORGIAN

...Greene waived his right to have a hearing on the alleged violations, and in February 2010 the Commission revoked Mr. Greene’s conditional *47 release effective September 1, 2009. 2 When Mr. Greene returned to custody, the Department forfeited his gain time. See § 944.28, Fla....

...8 First, except in circumstances for which restoration of forfeited gain time is entirely prohibited, which is not the case here, the restoration of forfeited gain time in cases of conditional release revocation is a matter of discretion by the Department. See § 944.28(1), (3), Fla....

...frivolous actions or appeals may result in sanctions, State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999), and/or referral to prison officials for consideration of disciplinary procedures which may include loss of gain time. § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

SMITH, Judge. Elbert Smith’s gain-time earned on a pri- or sentence was revoked by the Department of Corrections upon his conviction for escape. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides: If a prisoner is convicted of escape, or if the clemency or parole granted to him is revoked, the Department of [Corrections] may, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain-time earned and extra gain-time allowed such prisoner, if any, prior to such escape ....

..., Section 1, Florida Constitution. The petition’s general and conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise the potentially significant questions that have been argued. Moreover, if the trial court necessarily passed on the constitutionality of Section 944.28(1), we have some doubt of this court’s jurisdiction of the appeal....

...ain time previously awarded on the above case/count forfeited under section 948.06(6). _The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1))....

...State, 559 So.2d 207 (Fla.1990), which, in effect, held that once a prisoner was released early because of gain-time credit, the remaining period of the sentence was extinguished. Widmer points out that although the legislature reacted to the situation involved in Green and Heuring by amending Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), effective as of October 1, 1989, the amendment cannot be applied retroactively to his situation without violating constitutional ex post fac-to principles, as well as Article X, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution....

...Application of the Department of Corrections policy to Widmer’s racketeering offenses means the commencement date for a determination of credit in regard to the racketeering charges is April 17, 1987, well before the effective date of the subsequently adopted forfeiture provisions set forth in sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6)....

...��s racketeering conviction would violate the ex post facto prohibitions of the federal and state constitutions. However, as to the sentence imposed upon the arson offense, we reach a different result. The arson was committed October 20 or 21, 1989. Section 944.28(1), permitting forfeiture upon revocation of probation, was effective October 1, 1989. Widmer has taken the position that the section 948.06(6) control release forfeiture provisions are applicable in the case, rather than section 944.28(1)....

...Since the effective date of the control release provision *411 was September 1, 1990, Widmer urges there can be no forfeiture with regard to the arson offense. However, in State v. Lancaster, our supreme court stated a belief that both provisions, i.e., sections 944.28(1) and 948.06(6), provide the state with authority to declare a forfeiture of all gain-time, including provisional credits, administrative, and incentive gain-time, but that authority can only be invoked for prisoners whose underlying offenses were committed on or after October 1, 1989....

in forfeiture of all or part of his gain time. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997); Duncan, 728 So.2d at

...��DOC”), where he is currently serving concurrent six-year sentences for the offenses he pled to in this case, improperly relied on a finding by the trial court that this action was frivolous to forfeit 214 days gain-time accrued by appellant. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...After exhausting the prison grievance process, Mack filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking restoration of this gain-time. The circuit court denied the petition finding that the Department of Corrections properly forfeited the gain-time under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...bstantive offenses. Bussey was sentenced to 99.15 months in prison with credit for 4 years and 199 days time served. Within his motion to enforce plea agreement Bussey alleged that the Department of Corrections declared a forfeiture of 191 days. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

being awarded gain time for good behavior [See Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1979)], or not prosecuted

amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that:

...For defendants who committed their offenses between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993, the Department of Corrections, like the sentencing judge, has the discretion to forfeit credit for prior gain time upon the revocation of probation pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...Upon arriving in the Department of Corrections, the Department revoked the gain time the defendant had received during his previous incarceration. Thus, in reality the defendant has received four years credit for time served, not twelve years. See § 944.28, Fla....

PER CURIAM. Stanley Williams appeals that portion of his judgment that stated: X The court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/ *1096 count (Gain time may be forfeited by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1)). Williams contends that another portion of the judgment properly awarded gain time to him and that the portion quoted above creates a conflict that should not have been included in his judgment. He argues that section 944.28(1) does not apply to his offenses because he committed them prior to October 1, 1989....

administrative review in the Department of Corrections. § 944.-28, Fla.Stat. (1981). We therefore dismiss the petition

...The Florida legislature has provided that “[a]ll or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ... is found by a court to have brought a frivolous suit, action, claim, proceeding, or appeal in any court.” § 944.28(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). The method of declaring a forfeiture is set forth in section 944.28, and requires that the prisoner be given notice by the Department of Corrections (DOC), and that a hearing be held by the DOC....

...In sum, we affirm the denial of post conviction relief but reverse that portion of the order declaring that fifty percent of the prisoner’s gain-time be forfeited. We remand this cause to the trial court with directions to determine, with specific findings, whether this post conviction proceeding falls within the ambit of section 944.28(2)(a), and if it does, to forward to the DOC a recommendation that some or all of the prisoner’s gain-time be forfeited in accordance with the procedural requirements of that statute....

...According to the Department of Corrections, Robinson received credit for time served in prison, and credit for unforfeited gain time. In his petition, Robinson argues the Department failed to credit him with his full 20-year sentence. In doing so, Robinson points out that the Department relied on the 1989 version of section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

petition for writ of certiorari is denied. See § 944.28(1), Fla. Stat. (1989); Forbes v. Singletary, 684

...Appellant is cautioned that the filing of repetitive or frivolous postconviction challenges and/or appeals may result in sanctions or referral to prison officials for disciplinary proceedings. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999); § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...Because the double jeopardy provisions of the Florida 2 and Federal 3 Constitutions do not apply to a judicial proceeding following an administrative proceeding, we affirm. See Sadler v. State, 333 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) and cases cited therein. AFFIRMED. DANIEL, C.J., and COWART, J., concur. . Section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987) provides in pertinent part: All or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law shall be subject to forfeiture if such prisoner shall unsuccessfully attempt to escape ......

...In 2006, the Department of Corrections audited the defendant’s sentences. The Department concluded that, as a result of the defendant’s escape conviction in the Palm Beach County case, he had forfeited the gain time which he had earned on his Duval County sentences. § 944.28(1), Fla....

...State, 982 So.2d 618, 625 (Fla.2008); Lonergan v. State, 13 So.3d 534, 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Gusow v. State, 6 So.3d 699, 704-05 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The defendant, with due diligence, could have discovered within *970 the two-year time limit that his gain time could be forfeited under section 944.28(1) as a result of his escape conviction....

...le for release from prison. Avera appears to have exhausted his administrative remedies because he attached to his petition an administrative appeal to — and response from — the Secretary of the DOC. The DOC’s response was that Florida Statute 944.28(1) states Tf a prisoner is convicted of escape ......

...The special master’s report found that petitioner did not instruct his attorney to file an appeal. Accordingly, we find that petitioner is not entitled to a belated appeal and therefore deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion regarding sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...State, 24 Florida Law Weekly D37, — So.2d -, 1998 WL 874774 (Fla. 1st DCA December 17, 1998), review pending, No. 95,031 (Fla. March 3, 1999), we certify the following question to the supreme court as one of great public importance: MAY THE GAIN-TIME FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 944.28(2)(A) APPLY IN CRIMINAL AND COLLATERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS? PETITION DENIED....

...; thus, the litigant is exempt from the filing fee requirement and lien provisions contained in section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2001). After Appellant violated his parole, the Department of Corrections forfeited Appellant’s gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which authorizes gain time forfeiture for parole revocation, without notice or hearing....

...Appellant requested additional credit for any unforfeited gain time which was denied by the trial court. The state concedes that appellant is entitled to any gain time not forfeited by the Department of Corrections since the offense occurred prior to the effective date of the 1991 amendment to section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...in *334 time. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2009) (stating that when an inmate files a "frivolous or malicious collateral criminal proceeding," a court may recommend "disciplinary procedures pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections"); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...The State charged him with escape but subsequently nolle prossed the charge. Without notice or hearing, the Division of Corrections forfeited Bretti’s gain time and extra gain time. He petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied. He appeals. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1971), provides that the Division shall, without notice or hearing, declare a forfeiture of all gain time and extra gain time allowed a prisoner when the prisoner escapes. Section 944.28(2)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes (1971), states that the gain time and extra gain time shall be subject to forfeiture if the prisoner unsuccessfully attempts to escape but he shall be entitled to notice and hearing. In view of this section, it is clear that Section 944.28(1) applies only when the prisoner is convicted of escape....

...Section 944.-28(1) and (2) affords a prisoner due process as to all other statutory and administrative charges. We reverse the order appealed and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to remand to the Division of Corrections for appropriate administrative proceedings following the guidelines set forth in Section 944.28(2)(b)....

...e case/count forfeited under section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes. The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.) It is further ordered that the defendant be allowed days time served between date of arrest as a violator following release from prison to the date of resentencing....

...Constitution because he is a “flesh-n-blood man.” The motion and this appeal are frivolous. The clerk of this court shall forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for consideration of disciplinary procedures. § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2011); § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...ast or in the future, is not affected by the later imposed habitual offender sentence. See § 944.275(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991). The plea and sentence in the Pinellas County case are not acts that should have resulted in a forfeiture of gain-time. See § 944.28, Fla....

...against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petition for belated appeal is denied. The State has moved for sanctions on the basis that petitioner either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth brought false information before this court. See § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

...At least three different cases were consolidated for purposes of a plea and sentence at that time. The transcript is confusing. Should the State wish to seek statutory sanctions in these cases in the future, it would be well advised to present evidence from which a special master could address the statutory factors of section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...case/count forfeited under section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes. . The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.) - 32 -  ....

...lowed a continuance to prepare for it. In its response, the state argued, inter alia, that Petitioner should be prohibited from filing any future pro se pleadings and warned that future pleadings could expose him to the loss of gain time pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a)....

...PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See Williams v. Wasi, 681 So. 2d 839, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“We find no merit in his distinction between basic gain-time and incentive gain-time, holding that both may be subject to forfeiture by the DOC pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes ....

section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1989) and section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989). Forbes. Thus,

...on the second ' offense.” However, as the state points out, Pankhurst is only entitled to credit for time actually served on counts I and II because, effective October 1, 1989, revocation of probation serves to forfeit gain time previously earned. Section 944.28(1), Fla.Stat....

forfeiture of gain time upon recommitment. See § 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1997); Dowdy v. Singletary

...case/count forfeited under section 948.06(7), Florida Statutes. . The Court allows unforfeited gain time previously awarded on the above case/count. (Gain time may be subject to forfeiture by the Department of Corrections under section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.) - 32 -  ....

...belated appeal. Consistent with this recommendation, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking belated appeal. Relying on the special master’s findings and recommendations, the state has filed a motion regarding sanctions pursuant to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...fender when sentencing him upon revocation of probation. See Branton v. State, 620 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Further, Mobley is correct that he is entitled to receive credit for the time he actually served in prison on the possession count. See § 944.28(1), Fla.Stat....

...Because Ponton has abused the post- conviction process and filed frivolous appeals and petitions in this court, we direct the clerk of this court to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for disciplinary procedures, which may include forfeiture of gain-time. § 944.28(2)(a), Fla....

However, we would direct appellant’s attention to section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). The filing

...itional release supervision revocation.” Id. Pointing out that his offenses were committed before 1988, Mr. Whisner argues that the present case is distinguishable from Mayes v. Moore, 827 So.2d 967 (Fla.2002), on this basis. While the language in section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, authorizing forfeiture of all gain-time upon the revocation of a prisoner’s conditional release did not take effect until 1988, the language in section 944.28(1) authorizing forfeiture of all gain-time upon a prisoner’s escape has been in effect since 1963....

...Appellant’s offenses occurred long after 1963, when DOC was originally authorized (and at that time required) to forfeit gain-time an escaping prisoner had accrued before the escape. DOC forfeited Mr. Whis-ner’s overcrowding credits because he was convicted of escape, not because his supervision was revoked. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

it from the 335 days of credit, pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1991). REMANDED to Correct

...We held that the Department’s application of the 10-day formula to the inmate in that case was an ex post facto violation because the inmate would have forfeited a lesser amount of BGT under the 3-6-9 formula in effect “at the time of his escape and escape conviction.” Id. at 169. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of gain-time if the prisoner escapes or his parole is revoked, allows the Department to forfeit all gain-time earned prior to the escape or release on parole....

...me served in the DOC from his sentence of 984 days, which would have resulted in a zero sentence to be served. However, the figure of 592 days for time served in the DOC included twenty-four days gain time, which the department forfeited pursuant to section 944.28(1)....

...State, 685 So.2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). As was the case in Harvey, 734 So.2d 1179, 1180 , we caution this defendant that future abuses of the judicial process could result in additional sanctions, including, but not limited to, sanctions under section 944.28(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)(pro-viding “all or any part of the gain-time earned by a prisoner according to the provisions of law is subject to forfeiture if such prisoner ......

...ings attacking his judgment and sentence. See State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47, 47 (Fla.1999); Huffman v. State, 693 So.2d 570, 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We must reverse as to that portion of the “Order Forfeiting Gain-Time Pursuant To Florida Statute § 944.28.” We note the trial court did not have the benefit of our supreme court’s decision in Hall v....

...cocaine. While incarcerated for his first offense, the appellant accrued an unspecified amount of gain time. Upon returning to prison after pleading guilty to the escape, the appellant learned that his gain time would be forfeited in accordance with section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes....

...seph Perkins, Judge. Edward Webb, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sheron Wells, Assistant Attorney General (Tallahassee), for appellee. Before LOGUE, LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.  Affirmed. See § 944.28(1), Fla....

...one already established. See State ex rel. Long v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515 , 164 So. 199, 205 (1935). Finally, we find no merit in Glenn’s claim that he should receive credit against his prison sentence for the time he spent out of custody on parole. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1981) allows the DOC to forfeit all gain time earned in the event that parole was granted and subsequently revoked as it twice was in Glenn’s case....

...to be seeking review of an order entered by the Department of Corrections. We dismiss the petition for the reasons stated below. In his petition, Clark asserts that upon revocation of his conditional release, his gain time was forfeited pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...See Sheley v. Florida Parole Commission, 720 So.2d 216 (Fla.1998). The issue before us is the propriety of the Department of Correction's election to impose a forfeiture penalty of 547 days in order to effect a complete forfeiture of gain time pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...rs probation. Since the ten and one-half year sentence imposed after revocation of probation was less than the original twelve-year incarcerative term, DOC added the forfeiture penalty of 547 days so that all gain time could be forfeited pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...credit. For the second time, we affirm the trial court’s denial of credit. We write only to advise Anderson that if he continues to file frivolous motions and appeals seeking the same relief, he will *1029 forfeit his earned gain time. Fla. Stat. § 944.28 (2)(a)(1997)....

...That is, control release credits are simply another type of overcrowding gain time which the Department may forfeit upon probation revocation if the releasee’s underlying criminal offense was committed on or after the effective date of the probation gain time forfeiture provisions. See § 944.28(1); 948.06(7), Fla.Stat....

...tencing as a probation violator may not be forfeited without offending the Ex Post Fac-to Clause, Article I, Sections 9 (cl. 3) and 10 (el. 1), U.S. Constitution, as Petitioner’s offense date predates the authority to forfeit gain time pursuant to Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Thus, Petitioner’s argument that his sentence is illegal because a modification from probation to community control amounts to a departure from the sentencing guidelines does not merit habeas relief because it raises no basis for federal review. Ex Post Facto Issue Petitioner argues that the application of Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1990) to his 1988 offense is an ex post facto application of the law violative of Article I, Sections 9 (cl. 3), and 10 (cl. 1), U.S. Constitution. Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1990), which became effective October 1, 1989, gives DOC the authority to forfeit gain time upon violation of probation or community control. See Bradley v. State, 616 So.2d 1156 (Fla.2d DCA 1993). Petitioner’s argument is without merit because the DOC did not cancel any gain time pursuant to Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1990)....

...3 Accordingly, the Court orders: That Petitioner’s petition for writ of habe-as corpus is denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk is directed to close this case. DONE AND ORDERED. . The state has not raised any exhaustion issues. . Petitioner’s Exhibit F does not establish that Section 944.28, Florida Statutes (1990), was applied in Petitioner's case....

(1974). The state merely responds by quoting Section 944.28(1) (1977), which permits the Division, without

the forfeiture of his gain-time pursuant to section 944.28(2), Florida Statutes (1997). Subsequent to

...ent with credit for time served. The written sentence gave Carter credit for only actual time served. Carter argues and the state agrees that he should be given credit for the entire four years served because the amendments to sections 948.06(6) and 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1987) were not effective at the time of his offense....

...In Green , the supreme court concluded that when the probationary part of a split sentence is revoked, a prisoner must be given credit for gain time earned during the incarcerative portion of his sentence. Because the effective dates of the amendments to sections 948.06(6) and 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1987) are after the date on which Carter committed his offense, Carter’s violation of probation sentence must be reversed and remanded with directions to credit Carter with four years for the state prison portion of his split sentence....

...FRANK, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., concur. . Section 948.06(6), Florida Statutes (1989) permits the trial court to forfeit gain time at sentencing when revoking a community control sentence when the offense occurred after October 1, 1989. See Ch. 89-531, §§ 13 and 20, Laws of Fla. Section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989) permits the Department of Correction to forfeit gain time for a revocation of community control when the offense occurred after October 1, 1989....