Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...sserted' but rather to show why the witness is not trustworthy."). Therefore, the hearsay rule does not preclude admission of the statements under review. Further, the trial court properly admitted the statements for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...ailant, as excited utterances. Romines' statements made at the hospital, nodding that "Steve" was not her assailant, was "evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant ... inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement," which pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), "is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it." Therefore, it is irrelevant that Romines, the declarant, who was dead at the time of trial, was not afforded the opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistency....

...[3] Reaves presents sixteen issues, twelve in the guilt phase and four in the penalty phase. Reaves argues to this Court that several statements made by Hinton, under oath, prior to his 1987 trial testimony, [4] were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...§ 921.141(5)(b), (e), (h), Fla. Stat. (1985). [3] Reaves was honorably discharged from military service, had a good reputation in his community up to the age of sixteen, was a considerate son to his mother, and was good to his siblings. [4] See supra note 1. [5] Section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991), provides: (1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...ab lice. The defense objected, arguing that any statement was elicited on the State's cross-examination and that introduction of the convictions would be prejudicial. The court reviewed the trial transcript and found the convictions admissible under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (2002)....

...ment attributed to Huggins and that evidence of Huggins' nine felony convictions should have been excluded under the balancing test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2002). The trial court admitted the fact of Huggins' convictions on the basis of section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides in part that "[w]hen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." The trial court's ruling was made in accordance with First and Fourth District Court of Appeal holdings that section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant's felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another *756 witness at trial....

...hose statements impeached by felony convictions." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 806.04(2)(b) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.2002). We agree with the First and Fourth Districts on that point of law. Under section 90.806(1), a hearsay declarant is treated as a "witness" and his or her credibility may be attacked in the same manner as any other witness's credibility....

...Huggins ever shave his pubic region after complaining of lice?" The State's later question, "So your answer to counsel's question was based upon what Mr. Huggins told you?," was designed merely to reveal the implication that defense counsel had already succeeded in getting before the jury. Thus, pursuant to section 90.806, as properly construed in Llanos, Werley , and Kelly, Huggins opened the door to his own impeachment....

...ce. First, it is not even clear from the testimony that the correctional officer's knowledge of Huggins' explanation for shaving came solely from what Huggins told him, which would be necessary for impeachment of Huggins as a hearsay declarant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Even assuming that the testimony concerning Huggins' reason for shaving his pubic region opened the door for impeachment and that the prior record was not inadmissible under section 90.403, I nonetheless question whether the admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides that the credibility of a hearsay declarant "may be attacked ......

...This rationale does not apply when the "testimony" being impeached is a hearsay statement not made under oath. Section 90.610(1) further provides that a "party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused," with the witness's prior criminal record. (Emphasis supplied.) However, section 90.806(1), which governs impeachment of hearsay declarants rather than witnesses, authorizes admission of "[e]vidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement." A prior crimina...

...marijuana. [5] Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). [6] Spencer v. State, 615 So.2d 688 (Fla.1993). [7] In her dissent, Justice Pariente questions whether the admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806....

...July 1, 2004), Appellant contends that impeachment of the victim's statement by inconsistent statement is not possible because the necessary predicate of affording the witness an opportunity to review and explain the statement cannot be established. See § 90.614 Fla. Stat. (2003). Appellant's argument overlooks, however, section 90.806, Florida Statutes, which excepts the need for this predicate when a hearsay statement is attacked by an inconsistent statement of the hearsay declarant....

...And he said you will be all right. Don't breathe through your nose and it will clot up in a few minutes. In response to Mrs. Werley's testimony regarding Appellant's statements to her, the trial court allowed the admission of Appellant's six prior felony convictions, pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001)("When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.")....

...Werley told her he was sorry and not to swallow her blood. That testimony was later elicited by the defense during the trial. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted the prior convictions. See Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(ruling that, pursuant to § 90.806, trial court properly took judicial notice that defendant was on probation after defendant's hearsay statements, that he was sorry, were admitted into evidence upon defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim); 5 Jack B....

...terrogating officer and on cross-examination of the officer defendant elicited additional statements he made to the officer. As part of its case in chief, the state then offered evidence of prior convictions involving dishonesty. The state relied on section 90.806(1), saying that the convictions impeached defendant's credibility as a declarant and addressed the self-serving nature of part of his declarations. We agree with the state that it was proper to admit the convictions under section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). We previously confronted similar impeachment of a defendant's pretrial statements under section *950 90.806 in Llanos v....

...In this case during cross examination of the same witness, defendant also elicited the same statements, as well as other statements made during the same interrogation. His purpose was to show that in context the entire interrogation was exculpatory. Section 90.806 allows this specific use of such impeachment evidence....

...ng the penalty phase of the trial. In particular, Reaves asserted that several statements by witness Hinton, under oath, prior to Hinton's 1987 trial testimony were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...the fact that appellant was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses. Although this means of impeachment is not afforded by section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1999), [2] the declarant's credibility and possible bias may be impeached under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...An equally plausible reason that would cast doubt on appellant's motivation and credibility is that appellant wanted the victim to remain silent about the battery because he was on probation and his arrest could lead to the revocation of his probation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.... [3] 90.806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.— (1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. See also United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1130 (6th Cir.1979) (applying Fed. R.Evid. 806 which is almost identical to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999)).

...Q: Did you speak to Shavonne Chisholm? A: No. Q: That was the one name that he gave you though, true? A: Yes, sir. The State argued that this exchange introduced hearsay evidence of Fisher's alibi and opened the door to impeachment through his prior convictions under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...It is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence, and its ruling on admissibility will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., LaMarr v. Lang, 796 So.2d 1208, 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The court admitted evidence of Fisher's prior felony conviction under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which provided: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those pu...

...1st DCA 2011) (noting that a trial court’s decision concerning the questioning of a witness about prior convictions is reviewed for abuse of discretion). However, we agree with Mr. Mathis that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the certified copies of the prior convictions and sentences. Section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2011), provides that “[wjhen a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the de-clarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those...

...ited to *486 the existence and the number of prior convictions unless the witness answers untruthfully. Fotopoulos v. State, 608 So.2d 784, 791 (Fla.1992). In Huggins v. State, 889 So.2d 743, 755-56 (Fla.2004), the Florida Supreme Court held that “section 90.806 permits the introduction of a defendant’s felony convictions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness at trial.” However, unlike the present case, the certified copies of the convictions and sentences were not introduced into evidence in Huggins ....

...nder the rule of completeness. See § 90.108, Fla. Stat. (2005). When a defendant successfully introduces his hearsay statements into evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked just as if the declarant had testified as a witness. See § 90.806(1), Fla....

...(2016). Once such a statement is admitted into evidence, “credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.” § 90.806(1), Fla....

...Thompson's argument that he would have had an opportunity at trial to impeach the victim with evidence of prior felonies is unavailing. He had that chance. He raised this issue at trial, and the trial court ruled that such evidence would be admissible under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2006). [1] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior testimony. Affirmed. SILBERMAN and CANADY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] 90.806....

...The record shows that the State was in agreement that the rule of completeness allowed the defense to introduce exculpatory evidence; however, the State warned the defense that introducing the exculpatory statements would open the door to impeachment of those statements by introducing Kaczmar’s prior felonies pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...�s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. As the First District Court of Appeal found in Moore v. State, 943 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), pursuant to section 90.806(1), once a defendant introduces his or her hearsay statements into evidence by invoking the rule of completeness, “the credibility of the declarant may be attacked just as if the declarant had testified as a witness.” Here, in resp...

...The prosecutor objected, conceding that such exculpatory statements were admissible, but warning defense counsel that eliciting the exculpatory statements would lead to the State introducing Kaczmar’s prior felonies as impeachment. See Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949, 949-50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding that pursuant to section 90.806(1), such generally inadmissible evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions was admissible for impeachment purposes once the declarant introduced the exculpatory statements through cross-examination of the State’s witness); see generally Huggins v....

...779 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954, 83 S.Ct. 950, 9 L.Ed.2d 978 (1963). Attacking the credibility of prior testimony which is being introduced at a later hearing by evidence of subsequent contradictory statements seems to have been contemplated by section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides as follows: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for these purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...redibility resolution. This is not to say our holding renders irrelevant the testimony of Hill's investigator. The state concedes, upon the admission of Munson's former trial testimony, that Hill may introduce evidence of the post-trial recantation. § 90.806, Fla....

...he allegedly made that were related by a witness and are not to be considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense. Under the Evidence Code, one can impeach a hearsay statement with any evidence that could be used to impeach in-court testimony. § 90.806(1), Fla....

...Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and August A. Bonavita, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. TAYLOR, J. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant's prior convictions in his trial for felony battery. Under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes, the state was allowed to introduce *790 appellant's prior convictions to impeach his exculpatory out-of-court statements, which were elicited by defense counsel through another witness to suggest that appellant acted in self-defense....

...("A party may attack the credibility of any witness ... by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year ... or if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment....”); § 90.806(1), Fla.Stat....

...parties at trial and therefore was competent to proceed. The trial court determined that Gudmestad was competent to stand trial. The State moved in limine to introduce Gudmestad's prior convictions if the defense elicited any statements regarding aliens. Relying on section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2013), the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that because such statements tended to excuse Gudmestad from blame, they were subject to impeachment....

...A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its ruling "on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Mohler v. State, 165 So. 3d 773, 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting Masaka v. State, 4 So. 3d 1274, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)). Section 90.806(1) provides: "When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had t...

...Defense counsel clearly did not elicit Gudmestad's out-of-court statements in order to prove that the police were aliens. Because defense counsel elicited no hearsay statements, the trial court erred by allowing the State to attack Gudmestad's credibility under section 90.806(1). When a trial court erroneously admits evidence, we apply a harmless error test to determine whether the error necessitates reversal....

...Defense counsel had explained to the trial court that the defendant’s initial decision not to testify was based on his desire to prevent the jury from learning of his prior convictions, but after the trial court ruled that the defendant could be impeached with his prior felony convictions pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes, there was no longer a reason for not testifying....

...ther relevant statements made during the -2- conversation. The trial court agreed with the State and, over defense objection, admitted the certified copies of Foster's convictions into evidence under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2013), which allows for the introduction of a defendant's prior convictions when he elicits his own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another witness during trial. Generally, a defendant's out-of-court self-serving exculpatory statements are inadmissible hearsay....

...as questioned a detective on direct examination concerning inculpatory statements of the defendant without introducing any portion of the recording of the defendant’s statement and (2) whether the State is permitted to impeach a defendant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014)—which authorizes attacking the credibility of a hearsay declarant—when the defendant elicits from the detective on cross-examination exculpatory portions of the defendant’s statement to the police. We hold that section 90.108(1) does not apply unless a written or recorded statement is introduced into evidence. We also hold that a defendant is subject to impeachment under section 90.806(1) whenever the defendant introduces through cross-examination hearsay exculpatory statements of the defendant....

...e State did not offer the video into evidence. The [trial] court stated that if the desired portions of the statements were elicited when the defense -4-  cross-examined the detective, then section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014), allowed the State to use [Nock’s] prior convictions for impeachment. [Nock] later renewed his rule of completeness objection during the State’s direct examination of the detective; the court denied the motion....

...Specifically, Nock argued that: “(1) the rule of completeness applie[d]” under section 90.108(1) and “(2) the trial court erred in permitting the State to impeach [Nock’s] credibility with evidence of his prior felony convictions” under section 90.806(1)....

...“There, the Second District held [that once the State introduced a portion of the defendant’s statement into evidence,] the defendant was entitled to have the jury hear the remainder of his statement without placing his credibility in issue [under section 90.806(1)].” Id. However, the Fourth District concluded that Foster is contrary to section 90.806(1), precedent of the Fourth District, and this Court’s decisions in Kaczmar v....

...introduced by a party.” Accordingly, we expressly approve the Fourth District’s conclusion that section 90.108(1) “does not apply when the written or recorded statement is not introduced into evidence.” Id. II. Impeachment We now address whether section 90.806(1) permits the State to impeach a defendant1 when the defendant elicits on cross-examination of a State witness exculpatory portions of a statement made to the police by the defendant....

...e crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment . . . .” - 16 - jury hear the remainder of the defendant’s statement without placing his or her credibility in issue under section 90.806(1). The Fourth District’s decision in Nock primarily relied on this Court’s decisions in Kaczmar and Huggins, which addressed section 90.806(1); the Second District’s decision in Foster primarily relied on the concept of “opening the door.” To place the issue in proper context, we review the relationship between the rule of completeness and the principle of door-op...

...“[T]he State warned the defense that introducing the exculpatory statements [under section 90.108(1), Florida Statutes (2007)—the statutory rule of completeness—]would open the door to impeachment of those statements by introducing [the defendant’s] prior felonies pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2007) . . . .” Id. at 1001. Section 90.806(1) provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. § 90.806(1), Fla....

...3d at 1001. This Court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce the edited versions of the recordings.” Id. In support of its holding, this Court specifically acknowledged that “pursuant to section 90.806(1), 2. Section 90.806(1) has not been altered since this Court decided Kaczmar. - 19 - once a defendant introduces his or her hearsay statements into evidence by invoking the [statutory] rule of completeness, ‘t...

...1st DCA 2006)). This Court laid the foundation for Kaczmar in Huggins, in which we reasoned that a defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting exculpatory statements uttered by the defendant into evidence as hearsay is subject to having those statements impeached under section 90.806(1)....

...conclusion that once the State introduces a portion of the defendant’s statement into evidence, the defendant is entitled to have the jury hear the remainder of the - 20 - defendant’s statement without being subject to impeachment under section 90.806(1)....

...out-of-court statement into evidence would be subject to impeachment on the basis of those hearsay statements. Foster likewise did not address the reasoning of Huggins, which clearly laid a foundation for Kaczmar. There is no basis to permit a defendant to escape 90.806(1) impeachment under the concept of “opening the door” when similarly situated defendants would not escape 90.806(1) impeachment under Kaczmar’s application of the statutory rule of completeness and the reasoning of Huggins. Therefore, in light of Kaczmar and Huggins, we expressly approve the Fourth District’s conclusion that a defendant is subject to impeachment with the defendant’s prior convictions for felonies and crimes of dishonesty under section 90.806(1) whenever the defendant introduces portions of his or her out-of-court self-serving exculpatory statement into evidence. We thus reject Nock’s argument that had the “principles” of section 90.108(1) been applied to the detective’s testimony regarding Nock’s statement to the police, Nock would not have been “bound” or held responsible for eliciting the omitted portions of his statement and there would have been no section 90.806(1) - 21 - impeachment....

...Finally, Florida’s common law rule of completeness does not require a different result. The fact that the State has “opened the door” to the introduction of exculpatory hearsay statements of a defendant does not suspend the operation of the rule set forth in section 90.806(1) authorizing the impeachment of hearsay declarants....

...That hearsay testimony presented Bird Road Ranch’s version of the accident. 1 Bird Road Ranch contends that the testimony was admissible to impeach the owner’s prior admissions. See State v. Hill, 504 So.2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); A.T. v. State, 448 So.2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); § 90.806(1), Fla.Stat....

...a car for a friend, who happened to be deceased at the time of trial. This italicized self-serving hearsay statement, in which appellant was the declarant, opened the door to impeachment of the statement by appellant’s nine felony convictions. See § 90.806(1), Fla....

...The trial court agreed and because statements made by Ray had been admitted through the testimony of the state’s witnesses, the jury was told of these convictions without identifying the felonies for which he stood convicted. Such evidence is admissible under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and “should be considered only for the purpose of assessing the defendant’s credibility of statements he made that were related by witnesses, and are not to be considered as proof of guilt for the charged offense.” Werley v....

...by not allowing him to present the evidence, but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, Morris could offer evidence to dispute the truthfulness of his statement and impeach his admission. See § 90.806(1), Fla....

...a car for a friend, who happened to be deceased at the time of trial. This italicized self-serving hearsay statement, in which appellant was the declarant, opened the door to impeachment of the statement by appellant’s nine felony convictions. See § 90.806(1), Fla....

...o the hearsay statements of the passenger, who did not testify. The state responds that the testimony was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule in order to impeach appellant’s statement to the officer that he had not been drinking, citing section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999). We find nothing in section 90.806(1) which would authorize the officer to testify as to what the passenger told him. Section 90.806(1) provides that where a hearsay statement is admitted into evidence, the credibility of the non-testifying declarant can be impeached by the same methods as if the declarant had testified. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 90.806.1 (1999 Edition)....

...The trial court denied the request, specifically finding the rule of completeness inapplicable because the State did not offer the video into evidence. The court stated that if the desired portions of the statements were elicited when the defense cross-examined the detective, then section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014), allowed the State to use the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment....

...It merely questioned the detective on direct examination about his conversation with the defendant. The defendant was free to do the same and did so on cross-examination. But in doing so, the trial court properly ruled the rule of completeness inapplicable. Section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the de-clarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness....

...There, the Second District held the defendant was entitled to have the jury hear the remainder of his statement without placing his credibility in issue. We agree that the defendant’s position is supported by Foster . But, Foster runs contrary to section 90.806(1) and our prec *325 edent....

...within the province of the jury.”); Holmes v. Redland Constr. Co., 557 So. 2d 911, 912 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding evidence of a different personal injury claim was relevant because it tended to show that plaintiff’s presently claimed injuries resulted from another accident); § 90.806(1), Fla....

...Jackson, appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for burglary of an occupied dwelling. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. After the defense announced that it would not present a case, the trial court ruled that the defendant could be impeached with his prior felony convictions pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes....

...We're just going to get the girls. They're in the bathroom. Once they come out, we're going to leave.' " 2  Based on this testimony from the father-in-law, the court admitted Fernandez's prior record under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2021), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissibl...

...was Fernandez's father-in-law, that their wives were in the bathroom, and that they intended to leave. Rather, they were offered to prove that Fernandez was trying to diffuse the situation, and therefore they did not meet the threshold requirement under section 90.806(1) that a hearsay statement be admitted....

...y do not constitute hearsay. They were not offered for the truth of the matters 3 asserted, but rather to illustrate that Fernandez was attempting to diffuse the situation. As nonhearsay, they did not fall under section 90.806(1), and it was an abuse of discretion for the court to admit Fernandez's prior record on this basis. See Gudmestad v. State, 209 So. 3d 602, 605 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("Because defense counsel elicited no hearsay statements, the trial court erred by allowing the State to attack Gudmestad's credibility under section 90.806(1)."). "When a trial court erroneously admits evidence, we apply a harmless error test to determine whether the error necessitates reversal." Id....

...Additionally, Morris argues ■ that the trial court erred in preventing the defense from presenting evidence- regarding Morris’ mental state at the time he made the statement. Pursuant to the Florida Evidence Code, Morris could offer evidence, to dispute the truthfulness of his statement and impeach his admission. See § 90.806(1), Fla....